

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

ACC

10000/109/239
(VOL. IV)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

10000/109/239
(VOL. IV)

ISLD REPORTS
JULY, AUG. 1945

388.

Executive Commissioner.

Reports from IMLD are flagged at 368, 370, 375, 378 and 382 for your information. Copies have been sent to admission named.

26 July 45.

78/2617

SS
1680.

397

Executive Commissioner

Items 394 & 395 are for your information. Copies have been sent to State Highway Division.

27/7

for 395

398

See 105/2

Has action been taken on 395? 106/2087

399

From 398 + 399 are for your information
Copies have been sent to the Strategic Studies

27/2

for info

398

See HSC

Has action been taken on 398? HSC

399

Ex. Com.

Ref you made 398 above. Brig Danlop
report requested is as follows in file attached

(Ex 11/12 of 26 Jan 45)
(522 15 A)

30/2

(Action As At 400)

H.

Ch.

1482

Executive Commissioner.

Enclosed are some more interesting reports from ISLD.
Copies of reports at folios 14, 10 and 7 have been passed to
SCAO Venezia Giulia.

See Folio
347

12 July 45.

CSO.

Executive Commissioner:

Enclosed are some more reports from secret sources. Copies of
those at folios 13, 12 and 2 have been sent to SCAO Venezia Giulia
and of those at folios 10 and 2 to Venezia Region.

CC should, I suggest, see folio 10 in particular. We have asked
AMJ for their comments on the recommendations in the last paragraph of
this report.

See Folio 363-364

17 July 45.

EE 366

CSO.

Executive Commissioner:

Enclosed are some more reports from secret sources. Copies of those at folios 14, 15 and 16 have been sent to SCAD Venesia Giulia and of those at folios 10 and 2 to Venesie Region.

CC should, I suggest, see folio 10 in particular. We have asked AMG for their comments on the recommendations in the last paragraph of this report.

See. Folios 363-364

17 July 45.

366

See by Ex. Com.

✓ TWD
cc

287

367

380.

31
1481

1480

Summary

Files 326, 319, 316, 314, 310 and 1304
are all most interesting and
you and CC should read them.
I am sending a copy of 1304 to
S. A. Venzon's friend who
has had the previous reports
referred to in para 1.

1/1/7
330

✓ JWD

Seen by Ex. Com. 1/3/7

2/1/7

Sam Samling a copy 17304 to
S. K. Venugopal Smitia who
has had the previous reports
referred to in para 1.

21/7
330

✓ *[Signature]*

Seen by Ex. Com.

21/7

TOP SECRET
Confidential

RAEB
in turn pass to
LCR Talbot
Interacting back-stage
groups
3/10/45

Ref: 11/867

AUG-7 1945

To: Head of Chancery
British Embassy
ROME

Copy: A. Halford, Esq.,
Political Section
A.C., ROME

From: I.S.L.D.
Rome Area Allied Command

Date: 1st August, 1945

The attached report has been obtained from a reliable
source, dated 1st August, 1945.

[Signature]
Major
I.S.L.D.

1472
[Signature]
1/8

LIZARDI

POLITICAL

SOCIALIST PARTY LEADERS' OPINIONS ON THE PARTY CONGRESS

1. For some time past there have been rumours that the extremists of the Socialist Party were seeking a fusion with the Communists. This point was one of the major issues discussed at the Socialist Congress which was held between 29th and 31st July in Rome.
2. There was a heated discussion over this question which was proposed by NERMI and opposed by SARAGAT. The former, however, carried the day by 40 per cent. of the votes.
3. Commenting on this motion carried by NERMI, LIZARDI, who has always been a moderate, in conversation with a reliable source, said that he could not understand why this projected fusion has caused such a divergence of opinion in the Socialist Party and alarm amongst the right wing parties.
4. LIZARDI said that SARAGAT and the right wing fear that the Socialists have sold out to the Communists, whereas in actual fact, the Communists are now in the position where they may easily be absorbed in the popular party which it is the intention of the Socialist Party to create following the fusion.
5. This popular party according to LIZARDI is to appeal to all shades of democratic republican political opinion. He stated that the leaders of the Socialist Party realised that by open warfare with the Communists they risked

There was a heated discussion over this question which was proposed by MAMMI and opposed by SARAGAT. The former, however, carried the day by 40 per cent. of the votes.

3. Commenting on this motion carried by MAMMI, LIZZARDI, who has always been a moderate, in conversation with a reliable source, said that he could not understand why this projected fusion has caused such a divergence of opinion in the Socialist Party and alarm amongst the right wing parties.
4. LIZZARDI said that SARAGAT and the right wing fear that the Socialists have sold out to the Communists, whereas in actual fact, the Communists are now in the position where they may easily be absorbed in the popular party which it is the intention of the Socialist Party to create following the fusion.
5. This popular party according to LIZZARDI is to appeal to all shades of democratic republican political opinion. He stated that the leaders of the Socialist Party realized that by open warfare with the Communists they risked losing the support of the workers, but by this manoeuvre they will not only not lose the support of the workers, but will also attract members from the Communists, Christian Democrats and people at present belonging to no party at all. In any case, LIZZARDI continued, this new party would certainly weaken the Communist Party, a thing that it was impossible for them to explain at the Congress.
6. As a final word on this new party, LIZZARDI said that the Socialists hope to build a party which will more closely resemble the British Labour Party.

- 2 -

He felt that this was not as difficult as it would seem, and quoted the success of the Italian General Confederation of Labour, which is lead by a Socialist, a Christian Democrat and a Communist and is composed of members of all parties.

7. FOLLARTI's reactions are as yet unknown, but LIZZARDI said that if he raises any grave objection the workers will not follow him.

8. LIZZARDI concluded by saying that he thought SARAGAT's opposition to the motion was dictated more by personal ambition and a desire to supplant Nenni, than by any idealistic motive.

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Conclusion concluded by saying that he thought [redacted]'s opposition

to the motion was dictated more by personal ambition and a desire
to supplant [redacted], than by any idealistic motive.

To: Head of Chancery,
British Embassy,
Rome.

Copy: A. Holford Esq.,
Political Section,
A.C., ROME.

From: I.S.L.D.,
Rome Area Allied Command.

Date: 31st July, 1945

Ref: 11/860
Confidential
1945

has been right in
its attitude to me.

The following information has been received from our representative in TRIESTE. The sources of the information are believed to be reliable:-

1. FUND FOR THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

Early in July representatives of the Venetian Communist Party went to Istria in a small sailing vessel to hold a meeting with Yugoslav representatives. The day after the meeting a cheque for 300,000 Lire on the "Banca Commerciale Italiana" of Trieste was made out for the Communist Party of Venice in the name of SIGNORE FANTINI of Conseggio 2570.

2. TRIBUNALE DEL POPOLO

The Tribunale del Popolo is still active and is now divided into two sections:-

- (a) in the Palazzo dei Lavori Pubblici under Dr. HUNOCH.
- (b) in the Casa del Portuale, 4th floor, under Dr. SALICRUZZI.

3. MEETING OF THE ASSICURAZIONI GENERALI

A meeting took place on 15th July in the building of the ASSICURAZIONI GENERALI to discuss whether local firms and financial institutions should

be required to disclose whether local firms and financial institutions should

in TRIESTE. The sources of the information are believed to be reliable:-

1. FOCUS FOR THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

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2. TRIBUNALE DEL POPOLO

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sections:-

- (a) in the Palazzo dei Lavori Pubblici under Dr. MINOCHI.
- (b) in the Casa del Portuale, 4th floor, under Dr. SALSOVIZ.

3. MEETING OF THE ASSICURAZIONI GENERALI

A meeting took place on 15th July in the building of the ASSICURAZIONI GENERALI to discuss whether local firms and financial institutions should join the SINDACATI UNICI or the CAMERA DEL LAVORO of MILAN, which is affiliated to the CONFEDERAZIONE GENERALE ITALIANA DEL LAVORO, ROME. The following points were discussed:-

- (a) Whether firms in TRIESTE would join the SINDACATI UNICI if clause No. 5 were abolished. The following objection was raised - the removal of Clause 5 would not in effect settle anything, as the main direction of the SINDACATI would still remain Yugoslav.
- (b) The formation of another SINDACATI UNICI of an Italian character, to oppose the present SINDACATI UNICI. This new SINDACATI would when the time came, opt for a union with the CAMERA DEL LAVORO. Objection: It was too early to organize, as suggested in para (b) because no one yet knew whether TRIESTE was going to be Italian

or Yugoslav.

- (c) Join the CAMERA DEL LAVORO;
This last suggestion met with the approval of the following
financial institutions:

BANCA TRIESTINA
CREDITO ITALIANO
BANCA COMMERCIAL ITALIANA
BANCO DI ROMA.

[Signature]
Major.
I.S.L.D.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

1474

RL
Major,
I.S.L.D.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

542

Handwritten: RMC 102

Ref: 11/501

Handwritten: + to para 6
WCA Table

AUG 7 1945

Handwritten: Hu
3/12/45

To: Head of Chancery
British Embassy
ROME

Co to: A. Ralford, Esq.,
Political Section
A.C., ROME

From: I.S.L.D.
Rome Area Allied Command

Date: 31st July, 1945

Reference by 11/501 of 31st July, 1945, paragraph 4

Professor Fre is Managing Director of the Italian Association of Stock Companies and member of the Economic Committee of the Italian Liberal Party.

Handwritten signature
Major
I.S.L.D.

1479

To: Head of Chancery,
British Embassy,
Rome.

Copy: A. Halford Esq.,
Political Section,
A.C. Rome.

From: I.S.L.D.,
Rome Area Allied Command.

Date: 1st August, 1945.

The following report, from sources believed reliable, has been received from our representative in TRIESTE:-

1. A Signora ALOSI, wife of a Captain of the Reserve in the Italian Army, went on 24th July from TRIESTE to PIACENZA. On completion of her visit she applied to the Yugoslav police headquarters for a pass to return to TRIESTE. On handing over the pass the official remarked that passes would only be required for a few days more as within a week or so the Yugoslavs would be returning to TRIESTE.

2. This statement has been heard before and may be part of an inspired rumour campaign organised by the Yugoslav Propaganda Service. The latter organisation is working overtime at the present moment, and prophecies of the Yugoslavs returning to TRIESTE are being received from all areas from TREVISO to TRIESTE. Reports from the TREVISO, PIACENZA and TULINO areas mention the Yugoslav intention to make local moves westward in these areas also. The theme of much local propaganda is that now the Labour Government is in power in Great Britain, Yugoslav claims to TRIESTE and the northern part of VENETIA GIULIA will no longer

Ref: 11/866

CONFIDENTIAL
per to
LAC T.M.

Handwritten signature
4-1-45

received from our representative in TRIESTE:-

1. A Signora ALOSI, wife of a Captain of the Reserve in the Italian Army, went on 24th July from TRIESTE to PIRANE. On completion of her visit she applied to the Yugoslav police headquarters for a pass to return to TRIESTE. On handing over the pass the official remarked that passes would only be required for a few days more as within a week or so the Yugoslavs would be returning to TRIESTE.
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3. Large scale demonstrations and the attempted strike of the dock workers which met with poor response were organised in honour of the Labour Government on 27th July. Crowds demonstrated outside the prison demanding the release of Yugoslav prisoners and are suspected of having caused the large fire which broke out in an adjacent petrol dump. The latter, however, has not been proved.

Copy 1472
I.S.I.D.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

TOP SECRET.

400

Ref: 542/400/80.

~~Confidential~~ 45.

Subject: Political Reports.

To : Pol. Ad.A (Please pass on to Pol. Ad. (B) for retention)

Reference I.S.L.D. report 11/788 of 12 July 45. A copy of this report was passed to the Regional Commissioner, Venezia Region, and you may be interested to see his comments which are attached hereto.

(R.M./EC of 26 July)

/s/ E. TALBOT

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

Encl - 1.

Copy To : 522/EC.

[Handwritten signature]

(HOC) (S)
TOP SECRET

Ref: 542/80.

SUBJECT: Political Report.

TO : Regional Commissioner,
PUNJAB Region.

11 August 45.
Confidential

The enclosed report, received from a Secret source, is forwarded to you for information.

[Signature] Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

encl.

[Handwritten mark]

[Handwritten signature]
3/8

542
To: Head of Chancery,
British Embassy,
Rome.

Copy: A. Halford Esq.,
Political Section,
A.C., Rome.

From: I.S.L.D.,
Rome Area Allied Command.

Date: 25th July, 1945.

Ref 11/244 & 11/245
Confidential

JUL 30 1945

The following report has been received from a reliable source
in Trieste:-

FREE MASONS IN TRIESTE.

1. There are two groups of Free Masons in Trieste -
 - (a) Those practising to Scottish rite.
 - (b) Those attached to the Grand Orient of France.
2. The majority of Free Masons belong to the Scottish Lodge.
Before the war they numbered about 500, many of whom were Yugoslavs who had joined the Trieste Lodge because Free Masonry was forbidden in Yugoslavia.
3. The Scottish Lodge is at present reforming, and a representative of Paul Palermi is shortly expected from Rome. It is expected that a lawyer named ARA will be appointed as the new Master of the Lodge.

The following report has been received from a reliable source in Trieste:-

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(a) Those practising the Scottish rite.

(b) Those attached to the Grand Orient of France.

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3. The Scottish Lodge is at present reforming, and a representative of Paul Palermi is shortly expected from Rome. It is expected that a lawyer named ARA will be appointed as the new Master of the Lodge.

4. The Scottish Lodge has abandoned its anti-clerical policy, but intends to keep up its fight against Communism.

(Remarks:- Para 4 confirms a report we received about a year ago that there had been an agreement between the Vatican and the Scottish Rite of Freemasonry.)

1400-
Major,
I.S.L.D.

(c.s.)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

542
TOP SECRET
~~Confidential~~

Ref: 11/842

JUL 30 1945

To: Head of Chancery
British Embassy
ROME

Copy: A. Halford, Esq.
Political Section
A.C., ROME

From: I.S.L.D.
Rome Area Allied Command

Date: 25th July, 1945

We have received the attached information from reliable
sources in TRIESTE.

Major
I.S.L.D.

1468

(CSO)

used
(S)

ITALY
POLITICAL

1. Establishment of a University at MONTEFINO

- (i) A University has been founded by the Yugoslav authorities at Montefino.
- (ii) To date the total number of students enrolled is 140. The only subject on the curriculum so far is Communist propaganda.

2. Recruitment of Italian Workers for Split

The following terms are being offered to Italian workers in the Trieste area if they are willing to be employed in Split:-

Salary:	4000 lire per month
Allowance for wife:	1000 lire per month, plus allowance for each child.
Hours, daily:	8

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

542

Ref: 11/B40

CONFIDENTIAL

JUL 30 1945

To: Head of Chancery,
British Embassy,
Rome.

Copy: A. Holford Esq.,
Political Section,
A.C., ROME.

From: I.S.L.D.,
Rome Area Allied Command.

Date: 25th July, 1945

(3)

Attached is a report from a source
believed to be reliable. The report is dated
early July, 1945.

Major,
I.S.L.D.

(eso)

1466

400F

2

ITALY
POLITICAL
PARTISAN BAND H.Q.

1. The HQ of the MATTEOTTI Partisan formation, commanded by PIERO PIERO, is located in a farm known as LA PIANURA, between LUSIGLIE (J.1255) and CORTEREGGIO (J.1353).

Source believes that arms are concealed in the farm.

2. The farm used to be the secret HQ of PIERO PIERO during the German occupation. The bodies of a number of victims of the partisans' summary justice are buried in a field adjoining the farm.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

542)

Confidential

Ref: 11/835

To: Head of Chancery
British Embassy
ROME

Cop: A. Halford, Esq.,
Political Section
A.C., ROME

From: I.S.L.D.
Rome Area Allied Command

Date: 22nd July, 1945

Attached is a further report on the general strike in
Trieste of July 19th.

Major
I.S.L.D.

1464

(cso)

ITALY

POLITICAL

TRIESTE GENERAL STRIKE

1. We have received the following information on the general strike from

Trieste:-

2. The general strike in Trieste started on July 19th. Directions to workers were issued by the SINDACATI UNICI, and propaganda was issued by the COMITATO DI AZIENDAZIONE DELLA UNIONE ANTI FASCISTA ITALIANA SLOVENA.

The following individuals have been identified as taking an active part in preparations:

SACCIOLOVIZ, President of the People's Court

NEBOCH, Public Prosecutor

URSIC, Vice President of the Council of Liberation

SRONA, Secretary of the Council of Liberation

GUSTINCICH, Official of UNITA OPERAIA.

3. The only absentees were the banks, school teachers, chemists and insurance companies, who are not affiliated to the SINDACATI UNICI. Intimidation of shop keepers who hesitated to comply with strike orders and threats to news vendors selling P.B.B papers were in evidence.

4. The strike fell flat as little enthusiasm was shown except by organisers.

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SACCOLLOVIZ, President of the People's Court

NEBOCH, Public Prosecutor

URSIC, Vice President of the Council of Liberation

STOKA, Secretary of the Council of Liberation

GUSTINCICH, Official of UNITA OPERALA.

3. The only absentees were the banks, school teachers, chemists and insurance companies, who are not affiliated to the SINDICATI UNICI. Intimidation of shop keepers who hesitated to comply with strike orders and threats to news vendors selling P.M.B papers were in evidence.

4. The strike fell flat as little enthusiasm was shown except by organisers.

5. Reasons given for the strike were the suspension by A.D. of Democratic Organ and inadequate wages paid to workers.

1467

REMARKS: Note that the official reasons for the strike as reported in the newspapers were a protest against arrest of anti-fascists as well as suspension by A.D. of Democratic Organ.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

TOP SECRET

396

Confidential

Ref: 542/596/80.

27 July 1945.

SUBJECT: Political Reports.

TO : S.C.A.G.,
Venezia Giulia.

391 and 394

The enclosed two reports have been received from a Secret source, and are forwarded to you for information.

MISS REFOR

✓ Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

1462

TOP SECRET

542 Ex Commissioner

Confidential 9792 (397)

HEADQUARTERS
VENEZIE REGION
Allied Military Government
APO 394

25 July, 1945

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission


JUL 27 1945

SUBJECT : Political Reports.

Reference your 542/18/EC would you please note that this letter, although dated 17th July, in fact only reached this Headquarters this morning when it was immediately brought before me. I hope to let you have my comments tomorrow. In the meantime the reply will be, in part, covered by the report which I am submitting to you today in response to your cipher telegram 2244 of the 20th.

236 file 522/EC

236


Regional Commissioner

JKD/lgc

See M. 397 398

1461

(CSO)

(1 ENCLAVE COPY)

To: Head of Chancery,
British Embassy,
Rome.

Copy: A. Halford Esq.,
Political Section,
A.C., Rome.

From: I.S.L.D.,
Rome Area Allied Command.

Date: 20th July, 1945

The following information on Political Parties in Trieste is dated 11th July, and has been collected from reliable sources:-

1. Following is the present composition of the CLN:-

- | | |
|--------------------------|---|
| (a) Action Party - | Represented by Prof. PALADIN, who is professor of philosophy at the University. |
| (b) Christian Democrat - | Represented by Ing. MARITOLI, one of the directors of the S(?).Z.I.V.R.G. |
| (c) Liberal Party - | Represented by Sig. MARZGA, a business man. |
| (d) Socialist Party - | Represented by the son of avv. PUECHER. |

2. ACTIVITIES OF THE VARIOUS PARTIES.

At the present moment, the parties are represented by individuals who were mainly self-elected during the period of the German occupation, and are continuing to operate in a conspiratorial manner, living in mortal terror of compromising themselves.

Each party, in addition to having a President, a secretary and two representatives with the CLN, has an executive of from 8 to 10 members chosen by the leaders, whereas normally they would be elected by the members of the

dated 11th July, and has been collected from reliable sources:-

1. Following is the present composition of the CIN:-

- (a) Action Party - Represented by Prof. PALADIN, who is professor of philosophy at the University.
- (b) Christian Democrat - Represented by Ing. MARTOLI, one of the directors of the S(7).L.V.L.G.
- (c) Liberal Party - Represented by Sig. MARZOLA, a business man.
- (d) Socialist Party - Represented by the son of Adv. MENCHER.

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At the present moment, the parties are represented by individuals who were mainly self-elected during the period of the German occupation, and are continuing to operate in a conspiratorial manner, living in mortal terror of compromising themselves.

Each party, in addition to having a President, a secretary and two representatives with the CIN, has an executive of from 8 to 10 members chosen by the leaders, whereas normally they would be elected by the members of the Party.

1460

The activity carried out at the moment by the various parties in TRIESTE amounts to little more than "conspiring". There are very few individuals and parties who are carrying out work which could be considered adequate preparation for their political and economic responsibilities.

3. (a) Action Party

Has between 4 and 5 thousand possible supporters, a small number of these being drawn from the working classes, a fair number from the artisan class and the preponderant number from the bourgeois.

VGA

-2-

The driving force of the Party is Ercole Miani. Due to his past activities as an anti-Fascist, as a fighter and as a decent living citizen, he is considered as the champion of the Italians of TRIESTE.

The president of this party is at the moment AVV. MICHELLE MIANI, the brother of Ercole MIANI.

The Action Party enjoys the greatest respect of all the political parties in that it has a broader basis than the others. During the war it played an important part in the struggle for liberation.

(b) Christian Democratic Party

This Party, after the Communist Party, has the largest organized following, numbering some 10,000. It includes a large variety of secondary organizations, such as the Catholic Youth Movement, Catholic Action Party, Catholic Mens League, Catholic Women's League, Opere di San Francesco di Paolo etc. Persons of all classes are members of this party. All the members are essentially pro-Italian in sentiment and anti-Communist, and naturally Catholics.

The leader of the Party, Don MAZZARI, was recently advised by the Bishop to give up the leadership of the Party on account of his cloth. Don MAZZARI refused to do this and was supported in this by other leading members of the Party.

(c) The Liberal Party

Has less than 1,000 members, the majority of them drawn from the professional classes, and intellectuals. It is monarchical in sentiment. The main group of the members belonged in the past to the old Liberal Italian School. Their leader, Ing. (name illegible) has recently returned from DACIAU.

(d) The Socialist Party

Has 2,000 to 3,000 inscribed members. The greater part of these are blackcoated workers; there are few members of the working classes.

The leader of the Party is Prof. Schiffler, who is at the moment in Milano on Party business. SIG. PUCHER is deputising for him in his absence.

The real head of the Party is, however, SIG. PUCHER's father, AVV. PUCHER, who has just returned from DACIAU. He has belonged to the Italian Socialist Party for 50 years and is a very well-known figure in TRIESTE. He was Italian deputy to the Austrian Government and was imprisoned by the Austrians, then by the Fascists and

Catholic Action Party, Catholic Mens League, Catholic Women's League, Opere di San Francesco di Paolo etc. Persons of all classes are members of this party. All the members are essentially pro-Italian in sentiment and anti-Communist, and naturally Catholic.

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The real Head of the Party is, however, Sig. PUCHER's father, Avv. PUCHER, who has just returned from DACHAU. He has belonged to the Italian Socialist Party for 30 years and is a very well-known figure in TRIESTE. He was Italian deputy to the Austrian Government and was imprisoned by the Austrians, then by the Fascists and recently by the Nazis.

(e) Democratic Party of Labour (P.D.L.)

1433

A branch of this Party, which is one of the six component parts of the CLN Central Italy is about to be started in TRIESTE. The most prominent persons connected with this Party at the moment are:-

Ing. FRANCESCHINA and Ing. AUDOLI.

This party is counting on deriving support from its Central position which is intended to bridge the gap between the Right and the Moderate Left.

It should be noted that the PDL is composed of the following three parties:-

(i) Italian Democratic Party, which is monarchist. One of its most prominent members is GENE LOTTO.

(ii) The Democratic Social Party.

-3-

392

(iii) The Socialist Reform Party which until recently was headed by
BCHOND.

The persons who are at present working for the institution of this party
are shortly sending their representatives to Rome in order to gain official
recognition for their work.


Major,
I. S. L. D.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

1458

Mo Jan,
L. S. L. D.

To: Head of Chancery,
British Embassy,
Rome.

Copy: A. Halford Esq.,
Political Section,
A.C., Rome.

From: I.S.L.D.,
Rome Area Allied Command.

Date: 19th July, 1945

COMMUNIST MEETINGS IN TRIESTE

1. On 6th July a meeting, attended by the chiefs of the Trieste Communist cells, was held in the Casa del Lavoratore Portuale. At this meeting it was decided to form three new organisations:-

(a) The CEAIS (Italo-Slovene Executive Anti-Fascist Committee) - to take the place of the suspended People's Tribunal.

(b) The CAIS (Italo-Slovene Anti-Fascist Committee) - a non-executive body to operate in every district of the town. Suitable members of CAIS could be recruited for the CEAIS. Both the CAIS and the CEAIS are to receive their orders through the local Communist Party which, in its turn, will have received them from the Slovene Communist Party.

(c) The UAIS (The Anti-Fascist Italo-Slovene Union) - also a non-executive body.

2. It is anticipated that the above three organisations will be formed by the end of July.

3. Early in July the Slovene Communist Party held a meeting in the Casa del Lavoratore Portuale, at which nearly 2,000 persons attended. The President stated that in spite of opposition the general strike had been a success. He then discussed the Communist Party. He considered that 4,000 members represented a very small proportion of the town's population. He gave instructions for the enrolling of more sympathisers and ordered the secretaries of the various groups to have their lists made out. He announced that all the syndicates of the various categories should be united into one body. This, he said, would make control much easier.

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Major,
I.S.L.D.

1457

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

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The

RICK

390

L. H. Jones

Confidential
Ref: 11/325

JUL 27 1945

Aug
21-75To: Head of Chancery
British Embassy
ROMECopy: A. Balford, Esq.,
Political Section
A.C., ROMEFrom: I.S.L.D.
Home Area Allied Command

Date: 19th July, 1945

Attached is a political report on Yugoslavia
dated 12th July, 1945.Major
I.S.L.D.

1456

389

A. Political trends in Udolin, Delvic and Karlovac areas:

In the above three areas Ustashe opposition to the Tito regime is reported to be still strong.

B. Yugoslav Activity in Gorizia:

1. The Italian Communists in the JUDRIO and ISONZO areas are tending to detach themselves from TITO's Communists. They are however recruiting in the villages by means of substantial gifts of money.
2. There are still 3,000 persons missing from GORIZIA from the time it was occupied by the Yugoslavs.
3. The Yugoslavs took away from the municipal offices in Gorizia a number of black identity cards and ration books. The official records office at GORIZIA was brought completely under their control.
4. About 50 adolescents of both sexes between the ages of 15 and 18 from the GORIZIA area have been sent to Russia to undergo a course of political training.

REMARKS

Paragraph A is from an untried source. The information, however, sounds probable as these three towns were always Ustashe strongholds.

Paragraph B is from a fairly reliable source.

Lu 390
1455

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

TOP SECRET

Confidential

Ref: 542/387/20.

26 July 1945.

SUBJECT: Political Report.

TO : Regional Commissioner,
VASSALA Region.

The attached report, received from a Secret source, is passed
to you for information.

✓
Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

1454

To:- Head of Chancery,
British Embassy,
Rome.

Copy: A. Holford Esq.,
Political Section,
A.C., Rome.

From: I.S.L.D.,
Rome Area Allied Command.

Date: 19th July, 1945.

The following report is based on information obtained from

one of the leaders of the OSORPO:-

1. The Corpo Patrioti dell'Ordine, according to the instructions given by AMG, should have been made up of 150 men from the OSORPO and 150 from the GARIBALDINI. The officers, ten in number, should also have been chosen in equal proportion. Instead of this, only 104 men are from the OSORPO, as the other 46 men were told that there were no vacancies available and that they would have to wait.

2. On 27th May the OSORPO HQ was informed that the battalion of PATRIOTI DELL'ORDINE would come under the UDINE "QUESTURA". The patriot CADELO was also told by the chief of the QUESTURA that GUIDO, a Garibaldino, had been put in command of the battalion, that the OSORPO contingent of the CONGO DELL'ORDINE would be brought up to strength, and that their officers would be employed wherever they were needed. The question of rank was also raised and CADELO was told that, even if in the OSORPO group there were officers senior to GUIDO, the latter would still keep his appointment.

3. CADELO also spoke with GUIDO and was given very vague answers,

Ref: v832

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3. CADELO also spoke with GUIDO and was given very vague answers, mostly on the theme of the uncertainty of the future employment of the battalion.

4. When, on 1st June, the 46 OSOPPOs, who were due to join the battalion, appeared once again before the CORPO DELL'ORDINE, they were informed by the ZIC, PERUGLIO (Garibaldino) that the recruiting was finished, and were sent back to their units. When CADELO complained to GUIDO about it, the latter excused himself by saying that as, by the 25th May, only about 100 OSOPPO had reported, he had felt justified in filling up the vacancies with

Garibaldini, as AMG was pressing him to hand in the list of names, so as to issue identity cards.

Copy sent: RC VENEZIA Regia

-2-

5. The higher posts in the OSHTO are held as follows:-

CHIDO - CO of the CORPO DELL'ORDINE

STANUS - CO of the battalion.

PERUGLIO - ZIC of the battalion.

Two OSHTOs have been given family responsible positions:-

SIRIO - CO of the patriots in charge of the railway.

MAIRE - will command the TARCONVO region.



Major,
L. S. L. D.

1452

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

1452


Major,
I. S. L. D.

To: Head of Chancery,
British Embassy,
Rome.

Copy: A. Halford Esq.,
Political Section,
A.C., ROME.

From: I.S.L.D.,
Rome Area Allied Command.

Date: 19th July, 1945.

Translation of a draft of an agreement for signature
circulated by the SINDACATI UNICI to the ASSOCIATION

GENERALI

1. Agreement has been reached on the following points by Messrs.....
representatives of the United Syndicates, and Messrs.....
representatives of the Internal Industrial Commissions.

That both parties concerned hold the same views as regards the Sindacati Unici, insofar as the workers unity is the workers best defence.

That the reason why the workers represented by the above Commissions have not adhered to the Syndacal organisation is that they were under the influence of political prejudices caused by:-

1. Article No. 5 of the Sindacati Unici Statutes, which refers to the amalgamation of the Syndicates to Jugoslavia, and which does not meet with the approval of the majority of the population.
2. The exiguous support given to the Communists by the other anti-Fascist parties.
3. The fact that in the confused period that followed the 1st of May, 1945, many of the elections of the Commissions and of the workers' committees were not carried out in a strictly democratic way.

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2. The exiguous support given to the Communists by the other anti-Fascist parties.
3. The fact that in the confused period that followed the 1st of May 1945, many of the elections of the Commissions and of the workers' committees were not carried out in a strictly democratic way.

It is, therefore, agreed that the above Internal Commissions will join the Syndacal organisations provided that the following conditions are fulfilled:-

- A. Article No. 5 is cancelled, together with all other parts of the Statute referring to the linking up of the Syndicates to the Jugoslav Federation.
- B. The non-political nature of the Syndicates is confirmed so that every member will feel quite free to belong to any anti-Fascist party and to express his unrestricted political views in public or through the Press, but not within the Syndicates, owing to the strict non-political character of this organisation. The Syndicates will in some cases be allowed to take part in political demonstrations, but only if requested to do so by the majority of the Trieste anti-fascist parties.

-2-

C. The Commissions and the Factory Committees, representing all the industries of the town will elect their representatives, who will in their turn appoint the Directive Committee, which will be the central body of the organization. The Directive Committee will be charged with the revising and modifying of the existing Statute, and with the organizing of the yearly elections of the Industrial Commissions and Factory Committees to be held in December. The voting will be secret and two-thirds of the members at least must cast their vote. The Directive Committee and the Syndicate representatives will also have the same yearly election arrangements.

[Signature]
Major,
I. S. L. D.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

h
Major,
U.S.L.D.

1450

To: Head of Charcoory,
British Embassy,
Rome.

Copy: A. Halford Esq.,
Political Section,
A.C., Rome.

From: L.S.L.D.,
Rome Area Allied Command.

Date: 19th July, 1945

COPY SENT:- SCAC
VENEZIA GUERRA.

JUL 25 1945

The following report comes from a source who is well placed to report on this subject, and appears to be reliable:-

1. The administrative boundary between Croatian ISTRIA and the SLOVENE LITORAL is a line which, starting at the mouth of the DRAGOGNA river (East of PIRANO), follows the course of this river till it joins the TRIESTE-POLA railway line, which it follows as far as ESPERANZA-COSINA, from where it goes through CATTOLICU NUOVO D'Istria to FUMES.
2. The SLOVENE Litoral is divided thus:-
 - a) The autonomous City of TRIESTE.
 - b) The district of TRIESTE.
 - c) The district of GORIZIA.
3. The autonomous city of TRIESTE includes all the territory of the Comune, and all districts and suburbs, together with the villages of SANTA CROCE, PROSECCO, CATTOLICU, OFFICINA BANCHE, TERBICANO, PIERICIANO, GORIZIADA, BANOVIZZA and LIPIZIA.
4. The district of TRIESTE includes the whole remaining part of the provinces of Trieste with DUTTO-AURISINA, S. DOMINGO della VALLA, MUGLIA, ESPERANZA-COSINA, VILLA DEL NEVOLO, CAPO D'ISTRIA, PIRANO, POSTUMIA,

CONFIDENTIAL
MUL TANT.

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Mr. R. H. B.
11/13

SLOVENE LITORAL is a line which, starting at the mouth of the DRAGONIA river (East of PIRANO), follows the course of this river till it joins the TRIESTE-POLA railway line, which it follows as far as PORTOFINO-COGLIO, from where it goes through CASTEL NUOVO D'ISTRIA to FIUME.

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- a) The autonomous City of TRIESTE.
- b) The district of TRIESTE.
- c) The district of GORIZIA.

3. The autonomous city of TRIESTE includes all the territory of the Cosune, and all districts and suburbs, together with the villages of SANTA CRUCE, PROSECCO, CANTOVILLO, OFFICINA BIANCA, TRISICANO, PATRICIANO, CROSTADA, BAKOVITZA and LIPITZA.

4. The district of TRIESTE includes the whole remaining part of the province of Trieste with DAIRO-AURISINA, S. DOMINGO della VALLA, MUGLIA, ESPERLUG-COSTUA, VILLA DEL NUOVO, GARGO D'ISTRIA, PIRANO, POSTALIA, VERONA and MESTALCONE.

5. The district of GORIZIA includes all the provincial territory of GORIZIA and the SLOVENE territory of the province of UDINE, that is including CIVIDALE, TREVISO and TREVISO.

6. The administrative system both in Istria and in the Slovene coastal area is based on the Committee of liberation, which are nominated by the Yugoslav National Committee of liberation and, in the case of the Slovene Litoral, by the C.F. (Liberation Front).

7. The formation of these committees both in Istria and in the Slovene Litoral cost the Yugoslav organizers a great deal of trouble. Before 8 Sept they found supporters only among political outcasts and among crooked professional elements. The remainder of the Slav population was busy

of communist ideology. From a document which fell into source's hands in November 1943, but which had been compiled before 8 September of that year, it was discovered that the AVROJ (Anti-Fascist Yugoslav Council of liberation) had told its emissaries in Istria to drop the Communist theory from their propaganda, as the population was too attached to its private property, to its family and to the Church. They were instructed to wave the flag of Nationalism and of Slav Irredentism. This method gained a hearing only among the youth of the area, a large number of whom joined the Partisan ranks.

8. On 8 September 1943, with the collapse of Italy the situation was materially unchanged. The population now had to put up with the new regime which was imposed on them by the partisans. From that moment began the painful tragedy of the Italians who were thrown by the hundreds into death pits. Other documents which source found later throw light on these facts. The slaughter of the Italians was part and parcel of a plan drawn up by higher powers, according to which Italians were to be eliminated from Istria in order to be able to present to the Allies a wholly Slav Istria.

9. With the arrival of the Germans, the Partisan movement was disrupted in a few days, but a short time afterwards the slow and patient work of reorganisation and penetration in depth began again and was enforced with terrorism and violence.

10. In every village, no matter how small, a Committee of liberation was set up which, among other duties, had that of spreading the Communist Gospel and of eliminating those who showed themselves reactive under the

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oriented in a few days, but a short time afterwards the slow and patient
work of reorganisation and penetration in depth began again and was
enforced with terrorism and violence.

10. In every village, no matter how small, a Committee of liberation was set up which, among other duties, had that of spreading the Communist Gospel and of eliminating those who shored themselves restive under the penetration of the new ideas. There were those who resisted, and in particular the clergy and salaried employees, but new "death pits" soon welcomed the bodies of many who did not intend to assimilate these new currents of thought. (There is a pit at S. CATERINA called "Gerovize" to the south of PIEDRA where the bodies of at least 350 persons are buried, and another in VAL DE PIEDRA where there are 250 bodies; ^{these} are both famous.)

11. The Committees of Liberation, having exhausted their political duties, extended their activities into the administrative field and took on the following pyramidal composition.

At the apex is (in Croatia) ZAVNOH (Anti-Fascist Territorial Council for the Liberation of Croatia) which has jurisdiction over the whole of Istria, which territory is divided into three parts or zones, each of

-3-

which is assigned to an Okruuni N.O.O. (Area Circle National Committee of Liberation). Each one of these Okruuni N.O.O. in its turn includes a certain number of Kotarski NOO (District National Committees of Liberation) which in its turn is divided into a series of Opoinski NOO (Municipal National Committees of Liberation). Each one of these Committees is

divided into a certain number of Soski NOO (Village National Committee of Liberation) which are set up even in the smallest villages and hamlets.

12. Later on the various NOO's assumed economic and military functions, whether it consisted of impounding the products of the earth in order to give them to those who did not wish to work or to replenish the needs of the armed bands who infested the area. Later the NOO took on the duties of espionage, with the introduction of elements of OZNA.

13. In this way the system permitted of a complete personal control. No one could evade the forced requisitioning of goods, no one could leave the village without an authority and no one could escape being called up in the partisan army.

14. To-day the system and the situation remains the same, and they have spread to the areas where there used to be German garrisons.

[Signature]
Major,
K.S.L.D.

give them to those who did not wish to work or to replenish the needs of the armed bands who infested the area. Later the MDO took on the duties of espionage, with the introduction of elements of OZNA.

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14. To-day the system and the situation remains the same, and they have spread to the areas where there used to be German garrisons.


Major,
I. S. I. D.

Ref: 321

To: Head of Chancery,
British Embassy,
Rome.

Copy: A. Halford Esq.,
Political Section,
A.C., ROME.

From: I.S.L.D.,
Rome Area Allied Command.

Date: 13th July, 1945.

A. GENERAL CONDITIONS IN LJUBLJANA

1. Sources who are of neutral nationality and established residents in LJUBLJANA report that complete administrative chaos reigns in the city. Foodstuffs are scarce and there is a considerable Black Market.
2. During the last two months only two distributions of meat have been made, each of a couple of hundred grammes of preserved meat.
3. The prisons are full of prisoners held without any specific charge being preferred against them.
4. The city is disfigured by slogans in favour of Tito and Stalin scrawled on the walls, mingled with others which insult the Allies. There are, however, numerous Allied flags still displayed in the shops.
5. Among persons arrested are many Catholic priests. Every day, particularly in the evening, persons are taken from the prisons in LJUBLJANA to the woods in the COCEVJE area, whence firing can be heard.
6. It is impossible to help the prisoners in any way - to take them food or contact them.

... of the Yugoslav police.

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6. It is impossible to help the prisoners in any way - to take them food or contact them.
7. The city lives in mortal terror of the Yugoslav police.
8. Persons of Venezia Giulia origin, but who have taken Yugoslav nationality, are being recruited as propagandists and sent back to Venezia Giulia - particularly to Trieste and Gorizia.
9. There is general dissatisfaction throughout Slovenia with the manner in which the new Government is behaving.

over/

Copies sent: SCSO Venezia Giulia
144!
Finance etc

B. RATE OF EXCHANGE OF THE DINAR

A neutral source from LJUBLJANA reports:-

1. In the near future it is proposed by the Yugoslav authorities to modify the rate of exchange of the Dinar.
2. According to this modification the Dinar will be worth three Italian lire or three German marks. It is rumoured that exchange payments will be made in cash up to the value of 5,000 lire. Sums over this amount will be paid in bonds cashable in three months' time.
2. For sums over 5,000 brought into the country, taxation, which may amount to as much as 70% in the case of private individuals and 40% in the case of public funds, according to the magnitude of the sum, will be levied by the Government.

Major,
I. S. L. D.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

40% in the case of public funds, according to the magnitude of the sum, will be levied by the Government.

Major,
I. S. L. D.

1445

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

542
CONFIDENTIAL
To: Head of Chancery
British Embassy
ROME

Copy: A. Halford, Esq.,
Political Section
A.C., RME

From: I.S.L.D.
Home Area Allied Command

Date: 18th July, 1945

The attached report on the present situation of
the Action Party is dated early July, 1945.

Ref: 11/318

+ Home Area
Lodged Tablet
JUL 25 1945

Major
I.S.L.D.

1444

ITALY

POLITICAL

THE PRESENT SITUATION OF THE ACTION PARTY

1. A usually reliable source reports that a sub-source, who he judges to be well-informed, states the Action Party to be at present undergoing pressure from both Right and Left.

2. It is said:-

- (a) That the Communist and Socialist leaders have proposed to PARRI the formation of a "workers' front", comprising Action Party, Communists, Socialists and possibly some sections of the Christian Democrats.
- (b) That the Banca Commerciale Italiana, whose financial assistance to the Action Party will be a vital factor in the latter's electoral campaign, is endeavoring, through CUSNU and LA MALPA, to influence the Party towards the Right.

3. An independent source reports the Action Party in FIRMONT to be in financial difficulties.

4. Ing. COMIG, a member of the Party Executive in TURIN, recently stated:-

- (a) That if the Party did not receive increased financial support it would not be able to sustain the expense of the coming elections.

(b) That the TURIN section recently sold one of its cars in order to raise ready money.

(c) That unless the financial situation improved it would become necessary to transform the Party's local newspaper, "Giustizia e Libertà" from a daily to a weekly publication.

Christian Democrats.

- (b) That the Banca Commerciale Italiana, whose financial assistance to the Action Party will be a vital factor in the latter's electoral campaign, is endeavouring, through CUSU and LA MIPA, to influence the Party towards the Right.

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- (c) That unless the financial situation improved it would become necessary to transform the Party's local newspaper, "Giustizia e Libertà" from a daily to a weekly publication.

5. Another informant states that a belief is current among the former Directors of PIAT that FUCCHI, nominated as Director General of that concern by the C.L.H., was manoeuvred into that position by his party, in the hope that it would enable him at the opportune time, to assist the latter financially.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

To: Head of Chancery
British Embassy
ROME

Copy: A. Halford, Esq.,
Political Section
A.C., ROME

From: I.S.L.D.
Home Army Allied Command

Date: 16th July, 1945

Reference our No. 11/897 of 16th July, 1945, paragraph 4 (iii).

This paragraph should read as follows:

"He personally considered that in view of the present political trend and Allied occupation the Yugoslavs would NOT try to regain TRIESTE."

Error regretted.

Major t43
I.S.L.D.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Confidential

JUL 25 1945

in the past &
Tulh
for such action
as you see fit.

To: Staff of Embassy
British Embassy
RMS
From: A. Gellard, Esq.,
Political Section
S.I., RMS
Pres: I.S.I.C.
S.I. as an Allied Counsel
Date: 10th July, 1945

(309)

Am
21/7/45

Attest: A. Gellard, Esq., Political Section, S.I., RMS

Major
I.S.I.C.

1441

269

ITALY
POLITICAL / MILITARY
ATTACHMENT

MEMORANDUM

Reference is made to the memorandum dated 12/1/50, captioned as above, and to the memorandum dated 12/1/50, captioned as above, and to the memorandum dated 12/1/50, captioned as above.

ITALY

A certain CASATI (alias BASTARDI or BASTARDI), former member of the Italian Fascist Party, is reported to have been active in the Italian Fascist Party, and to have been active in the Italian Fascist Party.

1440

Copy sent: Ambassador

To: Head of Chancery,
British Embassy,
Rome.

Copy: A. Melford Esq.,
Political Section,
A.C., ROME.

From: I.S.L.D.,
Rome Area Allied Command.

Date: 13th July, 1945.

SECRET INFORMATION SERVICES

1. Further to our report 11/757 of 7th July, para 6; we have now received additional information concerning the expansion of intelligence cells in certain organisations in North West Italy. In particular, the report that FRACASSI was in possession of one million lire as a preliminary fund for this work is now confirmed by an independent source who adds that when FRACASSI returned ten million lire to Ing. VALLETTA, former Director General of the FIAT Company (the money having been lent by VALLETTA in support of the Partisan movement during the German occupation), VALLETTA asked FRACASSI to retain one million lire as a subscription towards his "Servizio Informazioni." He indicated that the remaining nine million could be considered by FRACASSI as being available to meet any future contingency.

2. Reliable sources indicate that both Right and Left Wing organisations in N.W. Italy are intensifying their efforts to be well informed on the activities of those whom they consider to be actual or potential enemies.

JUL 25 1945

~~Confidential~~
+ 1/2 page
2/10/45

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2. Reliable sources indicate that both Right and Left Wing organizations in N.W. Italy are intensifying their efforts to be well informed on the activities of those whom they consider to be actual or potential enemies.

(1) Right Wing

- (a) Shortly after the liberation of TURIN, Marchese Maurizio FRACASSI, leader of a Monferrato Brigade, established a Servizio Informazioni to watch the activities of the Communists in N.W. Italy. The specific purpose of his "Servizio Informazioni" is to collect as much evidence as possible against Communist personalities with a view to bringing them to trial for violations of the common law.
- (b) FRACASSI recently admitted that contributions from industrialists for this purpose have raised his funds to 6,000,000 lire. His financial transaction with VALLETTA is reported in para 2. above.

Copies sent:

*Lignani -
Lignani -
Pierini -*

14311

-2-

(11) Left Wing

- (a) An untried source, who, however, co-operated closely with the Allies during the last year of the war in ITALY, and who was considered trustworthy by British Liaison officers in FLEISSET prior to the German collapse, reports that a secret service composed entirely of women has been organized in TURIN by the Communists for the purpose of obtaining military information from the Allied troops in the area.
- (b) The head of the organization is said to be Signora SIVITO, whose husband, a Communist, was appointed Deputy to the Vice-Questore in TURIN by BARBATO, now Under Secretary of State for War.
- (c) It is alleged by source that BARBATO is aware of the existence of this, and a similar organization composed of men, and that information from these sources is sent to him direct.
- (d) An independent and usually well-informed source who, however, is liable to exaggerate or accept without confirmation reports on Communist activities, states that BARBATO, before leaving TURIN for MOBI, discussed with a certain Marchese ORSICO the desirability of organizing a Communist information service to check on Allied troop movements and intentions in North West ITALY.

REMARKS

The allegations regarding the interest of BARBATO in the activities described in para 2(11) are reported with reserve. This office has no confirmation that these statements (sub-para 2(11)(c) and (d)) are not deduction and surmise rather than fact.

existence of this, and a similar organization composed of men, and that information from these sources is sent to him direct.

- (d) An independent and usually well-informed source who, however, is liable to exaggerate or accept without confirmation reports on Communist activities, states that BARKANO, before leaving TULSA for RENO, discussed with a certain Marchese ORRICO the desirability of organizing a Communist information service to check on Allied troop movements and intentions in North West ITALY.

REMARKS.

The allegations regarding the interest of BARKANO in the activities described in para 2(11) are reported with reserve. This office has no confirmation that these statements (sub-para 2(11)(c) and (d) are not deduction and rumour rather than fact.


Major,
I. S. L. D.

143v

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

TOP SECRET

Ref: 542/18/RC.

17 JUL 45

Subject: Political Reports.

To: Regional Commissioner.
VERMONT REGION.

367 349

Attached are copies of two reports received from secret sources.

Will you please let us have your comments on the recommendations made in the report at "A".

You will note that the report at "A" does not tally with that at "B".

E. Talbot
Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

Encl - 1.

(COPY ON 522/ER)

BU
25/7

SEE 7/26/45

1437

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

TOP SECRET.

Ref: 542/17/20.

17 July 45.

Subject: Political Reports.

To: SCAD,
VERONICA GIULIA.

CONFIDENTIAL
257,360 1241

Attached are copies of three reports received from secret sources.

Will you please let us have your comments on the recommendations made in the report at "B".

You will note that the report at "C" does not tally with that at "B".

E. Talbot
Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

ENCL - 3.

BU
25/7.

SEE 7366-240

1436

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

542

Intersec

Handwritten: RAB
 + 1/5/45
 Ref: 41/802
 L. L. Talm
 JUL 18 1945
 Perhaps for Boring
 st. in the

To: Head of Chancery
 British Embassy
 HOME

Copy: A. Halford, Esq.,
 Political Section
 A.C., ROME

From: I.S.L.D.
 Rome Area Allied Command

Date: 12th July, 1945

Handwritten: Alre
 12/7/45

Attached is a report on the FRONTA DEI
 VOLONTARI DELLA LIBERTA, dated 5th July, 1945.

Handwritten signature
 Major
 I.S.L.D.

1435

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

ITALY

POLITICAL

FRONTE DEI VOLONTARI DELLA LIBERTA

1 This Partisan movement which was formed early in June in opposition to the National Association of Partisans is making steady progress.

2 According to a source in close touch with General Bancivenga, the founder of the movement, General CADORNA, who was leader of all resistance groups in the North, has expressed his sympathy with the F.V.L., and has gone as far as entrusting to Colonel ARGENTON of the LOMBARDY REGIONAL COMMAND, the task of contacting partisan leaders in the North with the object of recruiting them for the movement.

U R R

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

522
TOP SECRET
Ref: 12/796
Auth R H 6
4 to 1000
hired 1/4/45

To: Head of Chancery
British Embassy
ROME

JUL 16 1945

Copy: A. Halford, Esq.,
Political Section
A.C., ROME

From: I.S.L.D.
Home Area Allied Command

Date: 18th July, 1945

The attached two items of information from TRIESTE
are dated June 30th. They may be of interest to you.

C
MAJOR
I.S.L.D.

16-11-45
16-11-45

ITALY
POLITICAL

1. After the suspension of the People's Court of TRIESTE, Dr. SAGOVITZ, President of the Court, reported to LJUBLJANA for orders.
2. The 120 million lire taken by the Yugoslavs from the Banca d'Italia during the period of Yugoslav occupation of TRIESTE are being held by the local Communist Party and used to pay elements of the UNIONE OPERAIA for the purpose of organizing strikes etc.. They have enough money left to last another fortnight.

They are going to try and obtain funds from the AMG through the COMITATO di LIBERAZIONE TRIESTINO which has already opened negotiations with AMG regarding the handling of local financial resources.

To: Head of Chancery,
British Embassy,
Rome.

Copy: A. Halford Esq.,
Political Section,
A.C., ROME.

From: I.S.L.D.,
Rome Area Allied Command.

Date: 11th July, 1945.

Confidential

The following information on Yugoslav Political tactics in Gorizia is based on information contained in a document which was seen by an informant in a prefecture in that area:-

1. In the town of GORIZIA the Communists have been instructed to collaborate with the Yugoslavs and to withdraw their representative in the CLN.
2. (a) A group of clerical Slovenes in the Gorizia area are trying, by small-scale propaganda methods, to recruit adherents for a non-communist-autonomous-Slovenia movement.
(b) It would appear that this propaganda is tolerated by the Communist party.

Note: It will be remembered that similar political aspirations were held by clerical circles in Slovenia proper, and that the Yugoslav Partisans ruthlessly opposed it.

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(b) It would appear that this propaganda is tolerated by the Communist party.

Note: It will be remembered that similar political aspirations were held by clerical circles in Slovenia proper, and that the Yugoslav Partisans ruthlessly opposed it.

Handwritten signature
Major,
F.S.L.D.

1432

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

5242 A

~~TOP SECRET~~
Confidential

Ref: 11/768 *W.C. Tabb.*

To: Head of Chancery
British Embassy
ROME

Copy: A. Halford, Esq.,
Political Section
A.C. ROME

From: I.S.L.D.
Rome Area Allied Command

Date: 12th July, 1945

Reference by report 0351 of July 2nd and 11/701 of June 1944

The attached report gives some additional information
on Yugoslav preparations for subversive activities.

[Signature]
Major

I.S.L.D.

363 364
see F 1647
1 1647

ITALY

POLITICAL

YUGOSLAV PREPARATIONS FOR SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

It is learned that Yugoslav preparations for subversive activities are not confined to TRIESTE but extend over the entire FRIULI province.

This information comes from a number of sources believed to be reliable.

1. AREA OF OPERATION

Groups of Communist agents have been established under Yugoslav direction in all towns and most villages within the area of FRIULI under Allied Military Government bounded on the east by the ISONZO and on the North by the CARSIIC ALPS; the western boundary of their sphere of operations, as at present established, appears to be the rough line AMPEZZO - MANIAGO - PORCENONE, but may very possibly be further to the west. Yugoslav agents are reported in VERONA and along the line MANTOVA - PREVISO - BELLUNO, but their presence is not established as directly connected with the general Yugoslav programs in FRIULI.

2. PERSONNEL

The members of these groups are chiefly Italian Communists and Italian-speaking Slovanes. Some non-Italian-speaking Yugoslavs have been identified. A few Russians and ex-trainees of the LENIN School of Sabotage are reported among them. In areas near the Austrian frontier,

Groups of Communist agents have been established under Yugoslav direction in all towns and most villages within the area of TRIESTE under Allied Military Government bounded on the east by the ISONZO and on the North by the GORISC ALPS; the western boundary of their sphere of operations, as at present established, appears to be the rough line AMERZO - MARILLO - PORDENONE, but may very possibly be further to the west. Yugoslav agents are reported in VERONA and along the line MESTRE - TREVISO - BELLUNO, but their presence is not established as directly connected with the general Yugoslav programme in TRIESTE.

2. PERSONNEL

The members of these groups are chiefly Italian Communists and Italian-speaking Slovenes. Some non-Italian-speaking Yugoslavs have been identified. A few Russians and ex-trainees of the LHM School of Sabotage are reported among them. In areas near the Austrian frontier, attempts are being made to recruit Austrian sympathizers. There is a large proportion of women in all groups; the women in several areas being controlled by Communist priests. It is reported that funds are distributed to the groups by Yugoslav couriers.

3. PROGRAMME

The programme is reported to be the same as that given in my No. 0351 of July 2nd. The following points, however are new:-

1...X430

- 2 -

- (i) To organize espionage against the allies;
- (ii) To promote discontent and stimulate friction between the Allies and Italians, and between different groups of Italians, e.g. between native Italians and former officials from Southern Italy, and between the adherents of different political parties.
- (iii) To prepare the ground for a series of coups d'etat whereby Communist committees seize control of all towns and elect for autonomy. In the first phase it is intended to elect for an autonomous unit of Uffine and area, an autonomous unit of Portogruaro and area, etc.. The second phase would see all the autonomous units combined in a single autonomous State of Friuli which will declare itself free of Italy and sign a treaty of friendship with Yugoslavia.

4. ROLE OF GARIBOLDINI

The role of the GARIBOLDINI in the execution of this programme is still not clear. Although the rank and file as a whole are obviously disillusioned by the treatment lately accorded them by the Yugoslavs, there is little evidence that their Communist sympathies have declined, and it is considered, for the following reasons, that their official overtures to the OSOPO may be intended as deception.

- 1) Numerous GARIBOLDINI and former GARIBOLDINI are members of these

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- 1) Numerous GARIBOLDINI and former GARIBOLDINI are members of these groups and are actively engaged in the execution of the programme given in paragraph 3 above.
- 2) TOCCCHI, alias TROCHI, Supreme Commander of the GARIBOLDINI, and MARIO LIGUERO, alias AMERGA, Chief Commander of GARIBOLDINI, are reported to be the leading propagandists and Communist agents in Friuli. They are credited in Garibaldi circles with being in W/T contact with Russian intelligence services.

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- 3 -

- 3) The GARIBOLDINI have established numerous arms dumps throughout PRULI, and in areas where they have been officially disbanded are known to have surrendered only a small proportion of their weapons. Unit commanders, on several occasions, are reliably reported to have instructed men attending demobilisation parades to keep themselves in readiness for re-arming, and to have said that in a short time, with Russian support, they would take up arms against the English and Americans.
- 4) There are numerous evidences that collaboration between Yugoslavs and GARIBOLDINI staffs are still intimate - e.g., an OSNA Intelligence bulletin has been seen in a GARIBOLDI HQ, and the wording of an intercepted pass from GARIBOLDI DIV HQ PRULI to Police HQ SUSAN showed that on June 22nd the relation between Intelligence staffs was still that of close collaboration.
- 5) An individual living near PALMAROVA who was under suspicion of being a Russian agent and survived an inept and unauthorized attempt at arrest on June 12th, is now reported living in the same area under GARIBOLDINI protection.
- 6) GARIBOLDINI are still pursuing their programme of attempting to penetrate the OSOFRO, and on several recent occasions GARIBOLDINI have attacked OSOFRO patrols. In the SAVONA

- 4) There are numerous evidences that collaboration between Yagodolova and GARIBALDIINI staffs are still intimate - e.g., an OSNA Intelligence Bulletin has been seen in a GARIBALDI Bde Hq. and the marking of an interrupted pass from GARIBALDI DIV Hq. VERULI to Police Bq. SUSAL showed that on June 22nd the relation between Intelligence staffs was still that of close collaboration.
- 5) An individual living near PALMAKOVYA who was under suspicion of being a Russian agent and survived an inept and unauthorized attempt at arrest on June 12th, is now reported living in the same area under GARIBALDIINI protection.
- 6) GARIBALDIINI are still pursuing their programme of attempting to penetrate the OSOPPO, and on several recent occasions GARIBALDIINI have attacked OSOPPO patrols. In the SATOGRA and IMANCHIA areas they are reported to be preparing to attack villages which have been contributing to the support of the OSOPPO as soon as the OSOPPO units, which are garrisoning the area, are withdrawn. It was reported earlier in the month that GARIBALDIINI Hq had instructed subordinate units to attempt to eliminate all OSOPPO leaders whose activities endangered the success of the Communist programme.

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1428

- 4 -

- 7) A number of GAMBALDINI in the Province of UDINE are in possession of a special membership card, endorsed with the emblem of the hammer and sickle and overprinted with the words AMICI DELL'UNIONE SOVIETICA.
- 8) Full time GAMBALDINI are still paid a salary of 200 lire per day, which they are told is supplied by the Yugoslav Communist Party. They are enjoined, under threat of severe punishment, not to divulge the source or amount of the financial aid received.

5. PROPAGANDA

The Keynotes of the propaganda disseminated are the following points:-

- a) ITALY is still Fascist
- b) ITALY has always neglected, and is now prepared to abandon, FRIULI
- c) ENGLAND and AMERICA are reactionary and are trying to revive Fascism.
- d) ENGLAND and AMERICA are unable to solve the economic problems of the area.
- e) FRIULI is naturally a Yugoslav sphere of influence, and it is only by collaboration with YUGOSLAVIA that the area can achieve economic prosperity.
- f) Yugoslav interests in FRIULI are fully backed by RUSSIA, and Russian troops will join in the fight against ENGLAND and AMERICA when the moment comes.

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- d) ENGLAND and AMERICA are unable to solve the economic problems of the area.
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- f) Yugoslav interests in FASCHISM are fully backed by RUSSIA, and Russian troops will join in the fight against ENGLAND and AMERICA when the moment comes.

NOTE:

The solitary exception to the current propaganda trend alleging imminent Russian aid was the following statement made by the Commander of the PARTISAN DIVISIONS in BIRME on 21st June at a private meeting attended by a source:

we are, as yet, not fully prepared for a revolution and Russian representatives have informed us that RUSSIA is at present unable to help us because at the moment she has to attend to the solution of other important questions.

It is considered unlikely that such a statement, completely reversing the previous propaganda trend, would have been made

without direction from superior authorities or, since co-ordination of propaganda is generally good, that the statement will have been isolated. The disclaimer has, however, not as yet been reported as reflected in propaganda publicly disseminated.

6. EFFECT OF PROPAGANDA

Reactions to the programme vary considerably in different districts. The following are the principal factors affecting its success or failure.

a) LOCAL PHASE

This is primarily an agricultural area of conservative tendencies. In the country areas there is no serious food shortage and though there is some unemployment it has not reached unmanageable proportions.

Militant communism is chiefly confined to towns, such as PORTOBUENO, SAN GIORGIO DI MUGARO and LATISANA. Such success as the Communist programme achieves is ascribable to the following circumstances:-

- 1) There is considerable bewilderment on the general issue of allied political intentions. The failure of AMG to establish an effective police force and their apparent toleration of Yugoslav and Communist pretensions inclines the population to suspect that Yugoslav propaganda may be true and to believe that the allies will in fact, at some suitable

Figure.

a) LOUIS FRUHLI

This is primarily an agricultural area of conservative tendencies. In the country areas there is no serious food shortage and though there is some unemployment it has not reached unmanageable proportions. Militant communism is chiefly confined to towns, such as PORTOFRANCO, SAN GIORGIO DI NOGARO and LATISANA. Such success as the Communist programme achieves is ascribable to the following circumstances:-

- i) There is considerable bewilderment on the general issue of Allied political intentions. The failure of AMG to establish an effective police force and their apparent toleration of Yugoslav and Communist pretensions incites the population to suspect that Yugoslav propaganda may be true and to believe that the Allies will in fact, at some suitable moment, admit Yugoslav claims to the area. Non-communist Italians are consequently afraid to embark on overt political action for fear of subsequent victimization.
- ii) There is widespread discontent at the failure of AMG to facilitate acquisition of the few commodities of which the area is short - e.g. timber for reconstruction purposes and fuel, which could be obtained at once from UPPER FRUHLI and CARNIA in exchange for food if transport were provided.
- iii) Resentment is felt at the closing down by AMG of the NUOVE PIZZINARI in the towns, coupled with the failure to enforce an

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- 5 -

effective price and rationing system; these combine to produce black market activities and food smuggling.

- 17) A large number of young men have recently been demobilised from the OSOPPO and GARIBOLDI and now find themselves with nothing to do. They form a fertile field for all types of propaganda. It is understood that attempts are to be made to absorb some of them in the Italian Regular Army, but many have already earned with the forces and have a mistrust of the restrictions of army life.

6) UPPER PIUOLI and GARDA

These areas are considerably more receptive to propaganda, for the following reasons:-

- 1) The majority of the factories are inactive, chiefly through lack of coal, and unemployment figures are on the increase. Seasonal emigration is prohibited by government control and the absence of transport, and the ranks of the unemployed are continually being swollen by ex-prisoners of war and forced labourers returning from AUSTRIA and GERMANY. To these must now be added men thrown on the labour market by the disbanding of GARIBOLDI and OSOPPO formations.
- 2) There is a serious shortage of food, chiefly owing to the lack of transport from LOWER PIUOLI which normally supplies the area.

restrictions of army life.

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- 2) There is a serious shortage of food, chiefly owing to the lack of transport from LOWER PSIHLI which normally supplies the area.
- 3) Bewilderment on the score of allied political intentions, and the ultimate fate of the area, is more acute than in LOWER PSIHLI, because of the more critical economic position.
- 4) For the same reason there is greater resentment at what is considered to be the mismanagement of AMO, and the most trifling cause of complaint is sometimes enlarged by rumour into a scandal.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

All sources agree that the following measures would do much to restore confidence and to make the area less vulnerable to propaganda.

142

- 7 -

- 1) More specific statements of policy by AMG
- 2) The establishment by AMG of an effective police force throughout TRIULI.
- 3) Impartial control by AMG of press and radio.
- 4) Revival of MOVIMENTO POPOLARE and institution of an effective price and rationing system.
- 5) Granting of facilities for the reactivation of industries and initiation of reconstruction - e.g. timber industry and silver mines in CARALA and UPPER TRIULI, silk and sunflower oil industries in LOWER and CENTRAL TRIULI, the salt-pans at GRASSO, which (together with those at MUGLIA) have acquired new importance now that the sources of supply in ISCHIA are in Yugoslav hands. A considerable amount of labour could also be absorbed in reconstruction.
- 6) Provision of transport for the interchange of goods between UPPER and LOWER TRIULI.
- 7) Organisation of youth centres and camps to absorb those for whom employment is not available.

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CENTRAL ETHIOPIA, the salt-pans at GADDA, which (together with
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labour could also be absorbed in reconstruction.

6) Provision of transport for the interchange of goods between GADDA
and LOWE ETHIOPIA.

7) Organisation of youth centres and camps to absorb those for whom
employment is not available.

To:

Head of Chancery,
British Embassy,
Rome.

Copy: A. Halford Esq.,
Political Section,
A.C., ROME.

From:

I.S.L.D.,
Rome Area Allied Command.

Date: 11th July, 1943.

Further to our report No. 11/776 of 10th July, we have just received the following information from TRIESTE confirming that there is a split between the Yugoslav and Italian Communists:-

1. Disagreement between GARIBOLDINI and Yugoslav Partisans is becoming more acute, and the GARIBOLDINI are renewing the efforts to break away from Yugoslavs and establish union with OSOPPO.
2. The cause of these overtures is the growing alarm among the GARIBOLDINI at the possible consequence of the policy of armed action in FRIULI against the Allies and non-Communist Italians, as demanded by Yugoslav propaganda.
3. The overture on behalf of the GARIBOLDINI has not been made by AMERIA or NINCHI, but by their own subordinates.
4. The OSOPPO view is that if a genuine union of patriot forces in FRIULI can be arranged, they are prepared to

there is a split between the Yugoslav and Italian Communists--

1. Disagreement between GARIBOLDINI and Yugoslav Partisans is becoming more acute, and the GARIBOLDINI are renewing efforts to break away from ^{the} Yugoslavs and establish union with OSOFTO.
2. The cause of these overtures is the growing alarm among the GARIBOLDINI at the possible consequence of the policy of armed action in FRIULI against the Allies and non-Communist Italians, as demanded by Yugoslav propaganda.
3. The overture on behalf of the GARIBOLDINI has not been made by AMERIA or NINCHI, but by their own subordinates.
4. The OSOFTO view is that if a genuine union of patriot forces in FRIULI can be arranged, they are prepared to participate, even if combined organization is politically further to the left than they would like themselves.
5. They are on their guard against any overtures inspired by Yugoslavs or Russians.

[Signature]
Major,
I.S.L.D.

To: Head of Chancery,
British Embassy,
Rome.

Copy: A. Halford Esq.,
Political Section,
A.C., ROME.

From: L.S.L.D.,
Rome Area Allied Command.

Date: 10th July, 1945.

Further to our unnumbered report of 9th July, para B

(viz that three Yugoslavs had come to Rome to discuss the

TRIESTE question with the Communists), we have now received the following

details of ~~the~~ meeting between TOGLIATTI and ~~the Yugoslav~~ ^{a Trieste CLN} delegates:-

1. During the private meeting in ROME between PALADIN, a member of the Trieste CLN, and TOGLIATTI the question of TRIESTE and of VENEZIA GIULIA was discussed. PALADIN was disappointed at the lack of interest evinced on this subject.
2. TOGLIATTI's main comment was that he was concerned that it should not raise a squabble of a national character.
3. PALADIN then asked TOGLIATTI what interpretation he put on the present Slav-Communist activities in Trieste and TITO's address to the DAIS in which he deplored the lack of national character in the present religious doctrinal instruction in Yugoslavia. TOGLIATTI refused to commit himself to a criticism of present Yugoslav policy in that area.

The source of the above report is a prominent member of the CLN in TRIESTE.

Confidential
11/785

JUL 16 1945

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The source of the above report is a prominent member of the CLN in TRIESTE.


Major,
I. S. L. D.

1422

0903

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

~~TOP SECRET~~

(347)

Ref: 542/17/NO.

12 July 45.

Confidential

Subject: Political Reports.

To: SCAO, VERDELLA GIULIA.

Enclosed please find copies of two reports from a secret source, forwarded for your information.

The two principal sources of the report at "B" are important persons in the Trieste CIM and each item of information in this report has been given by at least six sub-sources, refugees from the area.

✓ E. Talbot

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

Encl - 1.

1421

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

542

TOP SECRET

R 1450

Ref: 11/779

1420

JUL 12 1945

To: Head of Chancery
British Embassy
ROME

Copy: A. Halford, Esq.,
Political Section
A.C., ROME

From: I.S.L.D.
Rome Area Allied Command

Date: 10th July, 1945

The attached report on the Comitato Giuliano Alta Italia
has been received from SARD, dated end of June, 1945.

Major
I.S.L.D.

1420

ITALY

POLITICAL

COMITATO GIULIANO ALTA ITALIA

1. On 14th June, 1945 a meeting was held by the COMITATO GIULIANO ALTA ITALIA at MILAN. The committee was announced as follows:-

Dr. ARA Fabio

Avv. SENIGALLIA

Prof. GASTA

Dr. DRABENZI

ARA and SENIGALLIA are both refugees from TRIESTE. DRABENZI is a Dalmatian, who was engaged in clandestine activities during the German occupation and is now believed to be supplying information on the VENETIA GIULIA situation to the Italian STATO MAGGIORE.

2. About 150 persons attended the meeting. ARA announced that the committee had been recognised by the C.I.L.R. GIULIANO in ROM and stated its aims to be as follows:

(i) To keep alive the people of VENETIA GIULIA to their

Italian nationality

(ii) To keep constantly before the eyes of all other Italians the urgency and importance of the problems of that Province.

3. The future organisation of the Committee, as announced by ARA, would be a directing body and the four following sections:-

(i) Political: To gain the interest and support of the various

ARA and SENGALLIA are both refugees from TRIESTE. DRABHERI is a
Talmatian, who was engaged in clandestine activities during the German
occupation and is now believed to be supplying information on the VENEZIA
GIULIA situation to the Italian SP-TO ADDIORE.

2. About 150 persons attended the meeting. ARA announced that the
committee had been recognised by the C.L.M. GIULIANO in ROMA and stated its
aims to be as follows:
 - (i) To keep alive the people of VENEZIA GIULIA to their
Italian nationality
 - (ii) To keep constantly before the eyes of all other Italians the urgency
and importance of the problems of that Province.
3. The future organization of the Committee, as announced by ARA, would be a
directing body and the four following sections:-
 - (i) Political: To gain the interest and support of the various
Parties in the Committee's aims.
 - (ii) Cultural: To spread propaganda in ITALY and abroad,
especially in AMERICA
 - (iii) Assistance: To provide material as well as moral support to
Italians in VENEZIA GIULIA
 - (iv) Financial: To collect funds for the carrying out of the
Committee's aims.
4. It was proposed to publish a weekly paper and a bi-monthly magazine.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

542
TOPSEC
Ref: 11/782
Phy RAC 59
34
the power
Confidential
ALL TALK
JUL 12 1945
hm

To: Head of Chancery
British Embassy
ROME

Copy: A. Ralford, Reg.,
Political Section
A.C., RME

From: I.S.L.B.
Rome Area Allied Command

Date: 10th July, 1945
34

The attached report on MOSCATELLI has been received from
MAST, SAND and RIVER, dated end of June.

1945
Major

I.S.L.B.

ITALY

POLITICAL

THE ACTIVITIES OF NICOLO MOSCATELLI, MAYOR OF NOVARA

1. An informant whose past justifies his being considered objective and who knew MOSCATELLI well during the German occupation of North Italy, describes him as an inspiring demagogue but extremely conceited and of only average intelligence. MOSCATELLI is said to be still completely under the influence of his mistress, MARIA, who was seen by source in GMO in early June. According to source MARIA is definitely Italian, with a knowledge of Tuscan acquired through having lived the early years of her life in either VERZILIA GIULIA or ISTRIA.

2. Source and other informants, while quoting greatly differing numbers of men and arms, agree:-

(1) That at the direct orders of MOSCATELLI elements of his former partisan formations have returned to the mountains, and particularly to the GSSOLA valley (numbers given vary from two or three hundred to four thousand).

(ii) That arms, properly pressed and packed have been systematically hidden by these individuals.

3. A source closely in contact with all branches of clandestine activity prior to the German collapse states that acting on orders from the Communist Party in MILAN MOSCATELLI began to hide authentic weapons in April, 1944. Source alleges in particular that seventeen "drops" of arms, received by the MOSCATELLI Partisans shortly before the Partisan insurrection, were hidden

2. Source and other informants, while quoting greatly differing numbers of men and arms, agree:-

(1) That at the direct orders of MOSCATELLI elements of his former Partisan formations have returned to the mountains, and particularly to the OSSOLA valley (numbers given vary from two or three hundred to four thousand).

(ii) That arms, properly pressed and packed have been systematically hidden by these individuals.

3. A source closely in contact with all branches of clandestine activity prior to the German collapse states that acting on orders from the Communist Party in MILAN MOSCATELLI began to hide automatic weapons in April, 1944. Source alleges in particular that seventeen "drope" of arms, received by the MOSCATELLI Partisans shortly before the Partisan insurrection, were hidden en bloc in the mountains North of BONGIARNO.

4. This same informant describes MOSCATELLI as now being a popular "cock of the walk" in NOVARA, where his conduct as Mayor has been satisfactory and as a politician very moderate. He has been absent from the town for some weeks and is assumed locally to be still in ROMA, where he was recently nominated Colonel.

/

1417

5. This source gives the following description of the situation in NOVAYA: the former H.Q.s in the town of the MOSKAFELLI formations, have been disbanded, and although many Partisans walk about in uniform their conduct is orderly. Summary execution, particularly heavy here in the early days, has now almost ceased, but the rising cost of living and the deteriorated food situation are causing an increase in popular demonstrations. In the rural districts, and particularly among the small farmers who are tired of feeding former Partisans for no payment, the Christian Democrats, are gaining an increasing number of supporters.

among the small farmers who are tired of feeding former Partisans for no payment, the Christian Democrats, are gaining an increasing number of supporters.

To: Head of Chancery,
British Embassy,
Rome.

Copy: A. Walford Esq.,
Petition Section,
A.C., ROME.

From: I.S.L.D.,
Rome Area Allied Command.

Date: 10th July, 1945.

1. We have now received from TRIESTE an answer to our query whether the information contained in para 3(a) and (b) of our report No. 0351 of 2nd July can be confirmed by investigation. TRIESTE replies that it is abundantly evident from I.S.L.D., A.M.G. and British Army sources that a considerable number of the Guardo Del Popolo, as well as other Yugoslav and Communist propagandists, are carrying on energetic clandestine activities in TRIESTE. As A.M.G. have not imposed any system of movement control or identity check, accurate verification of numbers is still impossible.

2. The following is further information on the next items on the Yugoslav and Communist programmes:-

(a) An informant - who is a member of the factory committee in Ilva Steel Works - reports that his committee has been warned of the imminence of an armed strike in TRIESTE; July 10th was suggested as a probable date. It is planned to seize the food stores from the port area with the aid of arms already stored on the premises. The suspension of the Tribunale del Popolo will be given as a pretext for the disturbance.

(b) Another informant - who claims to be in contact with a Yugoslav official engaged in planning the strike - confirms the imminence of the strike, but reports that disagreement has arisen between the Yugoslav and Italian Communists over the expedience of using arms. The Italians are alarmed at the possibility that such an armed disturbance.

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- (b) Another informant - who claims to be in contact with a Yugoslav official engaged in planning the strike - confirms the imminence of the strike, but reports that disagreement has arisen between the Yugoslav and Italian Communists over the expedience of using arms. The Italians are alarmed at the consequences that might ensue from an armed disturbance. This informant states that the strike is being organised in LUBLANA and it is planned to last three days. The Yugoslavs claim that Russian consent for the strike has been obtained and that local agitators will be reinforced by armed Partisans from ISTRIA.
- (c) Another informant - a former Gestapo informer now acting in the same capacity for the Yugoslavs - confirms the disagreement between the Italian and Yugoslav Communists, and states that for this reason the strike has been delayed.

-2-

(a) An unconscious informant in contact with members of the Committee of the union of tram works reports that the Committee has also been warned of the strike.

(e) All informants report that different groups of workers give different reasons for the strike. Among the reasons so far reported are:-

- (i) the suspension of the Tribunale del Popolo.
- (ii) inadequate arrangement of food distribution by A.M.C.
- (iii) the system of communal messes.
- (iv) the shortage of public transport.


Major,
I.S.L.D.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

1414


Major
I. B. L. D.

To: Head of Chancery,
British Embassy,
Rome.

Copy: A. Helford Esq.,
Political Section,
A.C., ROMEX.

From: I.S.L.D.,
Rome Area Allied Command.

Date: 10th July, 1945.

The attached report on Yugoslav activities and aspirations in Istria has just been received from TRIESTE. The two principal sources are important persons in the TRIESTE CLN; each item of information has been reported by at least six sub-sources - refugees from the area.

Major,
I.S.L.D.

1413

ITALY

POLITICAL

YUGOSLAV ACTIVITIES AND ASPIRATIONS IN ISTRIA

1. According to the territorial allocation made by the Yugoslav Sponsored Committee for Istria all territory North of the river RACONA and a line East from the source of the river is to be included in Slovenia, and all territory south of that demarcation is to be included in Croatia.
2. The Communist Party is preponderant over all other Parties in Istria. The Christian Democrats, though strong numerically, are continually attacked and the leaders denounced as Fascists.
3. The programme of de-Italianisation is in evidence, especially in South Istria, where street names have been changed into Slav, and where Serbo-Croat has been made the official language in schools. Many official documents are issued in Serbo-Croat only.
4. Looting of Italian-owned shops, conscription into the Yugoslav army, executions, arrests, and deportation to Croatia of Italians continue.
5. Catholic priests are compelled to make eulogistic references to the Tito regime in their sermons.
6. In the mountains there are considerable forces both of regular troops and armed but non-uniformed Partisans.
7. This programme is popular only among a small proportion of the population either Slav or Italian, but since it is imposed by force

2. The Communist Party is preponderant over all other Parties in Istria. The Christian Democrats, though strong numerically, are continually attacked and the leaders denounced as Fascists.
3. The programme of de-Italianisation is in evidence, especially in South Istria, where street names have been changed into Slav, and where Serbo-Croat has been made the official language in schools. Many official documents are issued in Serbo-Croat only.
4. Looting of Italian-owned shops, conscription into the Yugoslav army, executions, arrests, and deportation to Croatia of Italians continue.
5. Catholic priests are compelled to make eulogistic references to the Tito regime in their sermons.
6. In the mountains there are considerable forces both of regular troops and armed but non-uniformed Partisans.
7. This programme is popular only among a small proportion of the population either Slav or Italian, but since it is imposed by force no group is in a position to resist. A fair indication of popular sentiment is that even for ostensibly spontaneous Communist demonstrations few recruits are voluntarily available, and press-gang methods are employed to secure reasonable attendance.

1412

542
100
FOR SEC
330
HB
Ref: 601/2
CONFIDENTIAL
para 6
HR Table

To: Head of Chancery
British Embassy,
Rome.

Copy: A. Halford Esq.,
Political Section,
A.C., ROME.

JUL 12 1945

Lt-Col. Cameron Curry.

From: I.S.L.D.,
Rome Area Allied Command.

Date: 9th July, 1945

Attached is a report on economic conditions
in the north of Italy, dated beginning of July.

[Signature]
Major,
I.S.L.D.

1411

ITALY
ECONOMIC
CONDITIONS IN THE NORTH

1. In Northern Italy the dearth of raw materials, and especially of coal, has paralysed industry. It is forbidden to dismiss workers, and factories are compelled to take on all partisans who have obtained release.
2. The high expenditure on wages and the cessation of production have created insoluble problems.
3. At BENTO S. GIOVANNI a glass-blowing works refused to grant the recent increase in pay, stating to the Labour Office that the directors preferred to hand over administration to a commissioner to be nominated by the latter, as they saw no prospects of successfully confronting the added burden.
4. There is great anxiety among the working classes because of the growing increase in the cost of living - especially of staples. A cost-of-living bonus of Lit. 85 per diem has been granted to operatives and black-coated workers until the 30th July. This emergency increase has already been rendered ineffectual by the Black Marketeers, so that no benefit will accrue to the workers, while industry will be forced to bear an added burden from such payments.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

TOPSEC

Ref: 11/771

To: Head of Chancery,
British Embassy,
ROME.

Copy: A. Halford Esq.,
Political Section,
A.C., ROME.

From: I.S.L.D.,
Rome Area Allied Command.

Date 9th July, 1945

Attached is a report on the Soviet Socialist
Republic of Northern Italy and Cisalpine Federal
Movement, written by a British officer.

Major,
I.S.L.D.

1403

ITALY

POLITICAL

SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF NORTHERN ITALY AND CLAMPING

GENERAL MOVEMENT

1. On 20 June subsource attended a private meeting in UDINE, called by local Action Party, Christian Democrat and Socialist representatives, to discuss measures to be taken to counteract Communist influence in TRIESTE and VENEZIA GIULIA. In the course of discussion reference was made to two movements, originating outside the area, in whose programmes plans for the future of VENEZIA GIULIA are included.

SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF NORTHERN ITALY

2. The long term objective of at least a faction of the S.O.I. was said to be to create a Soviet Socialist Republic of Northern Italy, the territorial limits of which are shown at Appendix A.
3. This Republic would not oppose Yugoslav claims to VENEZIA GIULIA as far as the TRIESTE area.
4. Organization of the movement working for this solution had reached an advanced stage of development before the Allied occupation of Northern Italy. It was said that the accelerated tempo of partisan activities in the last weeks before the German collapse was designed to reduce as far as possible the amount of military action required to be undertaken by the Allies in ALTA ITALIA, in the hope that, as a reward for the partisan contribution to the fight against the Wehrmacht, the

outside the area, in whose programs plans for the future of VENEZIA GIULIA are included.

SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF NORTHERN ITALY

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4. Organization of the movement working for this solution had reached an advanced stage of development before the Allied occupation of Northern Italy. It was said that the accelerated tempo of partisan activities in the last years before the German collapse was designed to reduce as far as possible the amount of military action required to be undertaken by the Allies in ALTA ITALIA, in the hope that, as a reward for this partisan contribution to the fight against the Wehrmacht, the Allies would concede a considerable measure of authority and freedom to the C.I.R.I. The C.I.R.I. could then become a covering organization for large scale Communist activities.

ALPINE FEDERAL MOVEMENT

5. This was said to be a non-Communist movement working for a Federation of two North Italian Republics, one Republic consisting of VENEZIA GIULIA, VENEZIA TRIDENTINA and VENEZIA ADIGE, the other of FRIULI, LOMBARDIA, VENETIA and LIGURIA.

6. The territorial limits of the Federation are shown at Appendix B.

It will be noted that TRIESTE is included.


7. The proposed capital of the Federation is MILAN.
8. The movement publishes a newspaper called IL CISPALPINO, printed in MILAN.
9. No indication was given of the backing enjoyed by this movement.
10. Before the arrival of the Allies, members of the movement captured DOMODOSSOLA and occupied it for three days.
11. They are said to be strongly nationalist and resentful of any Allied interference in Italian politics.
12. They were associated with another movement called I BIANCHI.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

1407

APPENDIX 'A'

SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF NORTHERN ITALY



APPENDIX 'B'


CISALPINE FEDERATION



ER of SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

APPENDIX B

CISALPINE FEDERATION



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Confidential
Secret

Ref: 542/50.

11 July 45.

Subject: Political Reports.

To: SMO, VENEZUELA GIBLIA.

Attached please find copy of report from a
secret source, forwarded for your information.

E. Talbot

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

Encl - 1.

see M.329

To: Head of Chancery,
British Embassy,
Rome.

Copy: A. Hallford, Esq.,
Political Section,
A. G. ROME.

From: I.S.L.D.,
Rome Area Allied Command.

Date: 7th July, 1945

Attached is a report on the Partisan Groups
in Northern and Southern Italy, dated beginning
of July.

Major,
I.S.L.D.

1401

043

ITALY

PARTISAN GROUPS IN NORTHERN AND CENTRAL ITALY

1. A source, himself a partisan leader, was present at a recent meeting of leaders of the partisan groups of non-ideological tendencies. Among those who attended the meeting were:-

- Pietro Alfano (Mussolinist - ex-President of the Unione Nazionale Italiana).
- Commander Agnelli (Assistant to Alfano).
- Commander Agnelli (Leader of Valli di Susa Group).
- Commander La Pradelle (Leader of Piedmont Group).
- Commander Gabrielli (Leader of Montebello Group).

2. They had once to have in discussion with Patti the position of the partisans belonging to the autonomous groups who, in fulfillment of their duty and in accordance with the orders issued by the Allies, were now handing over their arms.

3. At the meeting it was stated that Patti had been informed that the Communist Partisans of the North and South have not the slightest intention of deserting. In fact, groups of ex-fascists now with Communist Partisans are preparing acts of revenge against the Partisans, and especially the autonomous groups. The representatives told Patti that unless he takes energetic steps to suppress this movement, they would be forced to re-organise their groups for their own safety.

4. Patti and Agnelli gave assurance that adequate action would be taken and that Gabrielli and Agnelli in particular would be told of the present dangerous situation as indicated by the partisan leaders.

... (leader of ... group).
... (leader of ... group).
... (leader of ... group).

2. They had come to know to ... with ... the position of the ...
partisans belonging to the ... groups who, in fulfillment of their
duty and in accordance with the orders issued by the ... are now leading
over their area.
3. At the meeting it was stated that ... had been informed that the
Communist Partisans of the North and South have not the slightest intention
of disarming. In fact, groups of ... now with Communist Partisans
are preparing acts of revenge against the Partisans, and especially the
... group. The representatives told ... that unless he takes
energetic steps to suppress this movement, they would be forced to re-organize
their groups for their own safety.
4. ... and ... gave assurance that adequate action would be taken
and that ... and ... in particular would be told of the present
dangerous situation as depicted by the partisan leaders.
5. Source states that the delegates are not, however, fully convinced of
this intervention, and indicated that upon their return to their own districts
they will promptly maintain their organizations in a clandestine manner.
6. ... announced at the meeting that he was expanding the intelligence
cells within his own group, with the object of following closely the pro-
paganda of the Communists, and discovering their sources of arms. He told
Source privately that he had received from ... of ...
preliminary fund of one million lire for this purpose.

1407

7. It was unanimously agreed by the leaders to organize intelligence centres in their respective areas and to maintain close contacts with each other. They also agreed to deliver up the smallest possible quantity of arms. The reasons for this policy are:-

- a) Italy has no efficient army or police force. In the event of communist intervention they could call up all their organized members of the autonomous groups and form a force to combat the uprising.
 - b) In case of emergency, they would support the action of the Allies should they be called to intervene.
 - c) In the event of elections, they would safeguard the polls from local communist violence.
 - d) They would safeguard persons carrying on legitimate propaganda in favour of a return to normalcy in the life of the country.
 - e) To maintain and strengthen contacts between groups of North and South.
8. Stomil (who in 1919 was leader of the Nationalists and opposed the advent of Mussolini in 1921, for which he was imprisoned) stated that he was at his disposal in Sicily 30,000 organized men ready for action, and that similar groups are being organized at the present moment in Calabria, Apulia and other zones. His statement is given verbatim hereunder:-

"We have had enough of this body of Communism. Italy is not Communist and has no intention of adopting Communism. If there are remnants in the Government, we ourselves will rectify the situation before it is too late. My chief anxiety is that the Allies do not appear to understand that our one desire is to facilitate their policy of law and order in Italy. We shall not hesitate to admit to our towns even organized Fascists, provided they are honest and responsible individuals. It is preferable to admit one who has the good of his country at heart, even though he hold a Fascist 'license', than a person who is furthering the cause of Communism and Anarchy."

to the event of elections. They would safeguard the polls from local communist violence.

c) They would safeguard persons carrying on legitimate propaganda in favor of a return to normalcy in the life of the country.

d) To maintain and strengthen contacts between groups of North and South.

e. Alquist (who in 1949 was leader of the Nationalists and opposed the advent of socialism in 1928, for which he was imprisoned) stated that he was at the diagonal to Sicily 50,000 organized men ready for action, and that similar groups are being organized at the present moment in Calabria, Apulia and other zones. His statement is given verbatim hereunder:-

"We have had enough of this boggy of Communism. Italy is not Communist and has no intention of adopting Communism. If there are weapons in the Government, we ourselves will rectify the situation before it is too late. My chief anxiety is that the Allies do not appear to understand that our one desire is to facilitate their policy of law and order in Italy. We shall not hesitate to assist to our forces even organized Fascists, provided they are honest and responsible individuals. It is preferable to enlist one who has the good of his country at heart, even though he holds a Fascist license, than a person who is furthering the cause of Communism and anarchy."

f. In private conversation with sources Alquist said that the partisans who belong to the Communist and Socialist groups are placed in factories and works, and, should the circumstances require, they (the directors) are dismissed from their positions. Any attempt on the part of the autonomous leaders to circumvent this measure is met by threats of vengeance from the Communists. Perils are becoming more serious and widespread, and the various strikes which are taking place ostensibly for economic reasons are nothing less than trials at mobilization by communist agitators.

1902

10. HALLID also told source that the arms in possession of the communists are not deposited in storehouses, but are concealed in scattered districts. Each member entrusted with this work - i.e., the cell leaders - are obliged to make a cache of a certain number of heavy guns and ammunition, which are stored underground. As wages are low the communists must subsidize ranging from 3-4,000 lire per month to their members. They are carrying on active propaganda in the medical profession so as to attract members to their various organizations.

11. HALLID recommended by saying that whereas the leaders of the leftist groups are provided with considerable permits, those of the autonomous groups are prevented from obtaining them even by the local C.L.I. In short, he said the situation in the North is deteriorating.

12. Source is maintaining contact with these partisan leaders which as partisan leader he can well do without compromising himself.

Notes: Commander HALLID (major of the HALLID Corps of Allied Partisans) is one of the highest organizers of autonomous groups of Partisans who fought in the Po Valley against the Germans, with about 10,000 effectives in his ranks. His activities were closely followed by British officers, including Col. Stavros.

groups are provided with automobile permits, those of the autonomous groups are provided from obtaining them even by the local U.I. U.I. In short, he said the situation in the North is deteriorating.

12. Source is maintaining contact with those partisan leaders which as partisan leader he can well do without compromising himself.

23. Commander MALINI (Major of the KARPIV Group of Armed Partisans) is one of the highest organizers of autonomous groups of Partisans who fought in the Po Valley against the Germans, with about 10,000 activities in his name. His activities were slowly followed by British officers, including Col. Stevens.

1401

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

54297
TOP SECRET
Confidential
To: Head of Chancery
British Embassy
ROME

Copy: A. Halford, Esq.,
Political Section
A.C., ROME

From: I.S.L.D.
Rome Area Allied Command

Date: 7th July, 1945

Ref: 11/770
JUL 11 1945
H. C. T. 11/770

Attached is a further report on the Associazione

Per Il Controllo Democratico (see our 11/486 of 17th April, 1945).

Major
I.S.L.D.

1400

ITALY

POLITICAL

ASSOCIAZIONE PER IL CONTROLLO DEMOCRATICO

1. Since the first meeting on April 12th, this Association has held several meetings at one of which Count Sforza was elected President.
2. General Bencivenna, a member of this Association, told a source, a close personal friend of his, that at the last meeting held at the end of June it was decided that the necessary preliminaries connected with its formation having been completed, the Association should now enter the political arena.
3. General Bencivenna mentioned to source that he is not very happy about Sforza's intrigues in the Association. He fears his connection with the Action Party and said that although Sforza avoids any open contact with the Party, he, Bencivenna, is convinced that Sforza remains the spiritual head of it, whose directives have always been accepted and followed.
4. As an example of Sforza's intrigues Bencivenna stated that pressure is being brought to bear on himself and others, who up to now have never publicly stated their feelings on the institutional question, to decide once and for all which camp they are going to join.
5. According to source Bencivenna considers this pressure comes from Sforza, who thinks that the decision taken by Bencivenna and other important members of the Association will determine its final character, and Sforza is

3. General Bencivenna mentioned to source that he is not very happy about Sforza's intrigues in the Association. He fears his connection with the Action Party and said that although Sforza avoids any open contact with the Party, he, Bencivenna, is convinced that Sforza remains the spiritual head of it, whose directives have always been accepted and followed.
4. As an example of Sforza's intrigue Bencivenna stated that pressure is being brought to bear on himself and others, who up to now have never publicly stated their feelings on the institutional question, to decide once and for all which camp they are going to join.
5. According to source Bencivenna considers this pressure comes from Sforza, who thinks that the decision taken by Bencivenna and other important members of the Association will determine its final character, and Sforza is very anxious to know which way the wind is blowing before advancing any further.
6. Under the Presidency and guidance of Sforza the Association is now organizing cells in all important towns in Italy. The Secretary of the Association, Eusebio MONTICELLI, is already in MILAN where he will

/

1399

- 2 -

form the first group.

7. The cells are to be formed of well known personalities, whose initial charter will be to study the particular problems in these areas and report to the Central Committee in Rome.
8. The central Committee has in addition been given the task of watching the Government and reporting when it considers it necessary for the Association to intervene.
9. According to Bencivenna, Sforza hopes in this way to create a form of central on the Government, in which all the most prominent people in the country will participate in the defence of democratic principles.

429
TO PRECISELY
Confidential
from [unclear] (38)

Ref: 11/764 *USA Tel.*

To: Head of Chancery
British Embassy
ROME

Copy: A. Halford, Esq.,
Political Section
A.C., ROME

From: I.S.L.D.
Rome Area Allied Command

Date: 6th July, 1945
11/764

*This confirms [unclear]
that the Vatican is
trying to undermine the
Allied Govt.*
[Signature]

JUL 11 1945

Attached is a report on Catholic reaction to the New
Government, from several independent sources, dated beginning of July.

[Signature]
Major
I.S.L.D.

1397

ITALY
POLITICAL

CATHOLIC REACTION TO THE NEW GOVERNMENT

1. Monsignor DADAGLIO of the Vatican Secretariat, in conversation with a reliable source stated that Vatican circles are not satisfied with the new PARI Government, which they consider too far to the left.
2. These sentiments appear to have given added impetus to the Vatican's struggle against Left Wing Parties in general and the Communists in particular.
3. Evidence of this appears in the special instructions which have been issued, following the formation of the PARI Government, to all Diocesan Bishops in Italy to oppose to the utmost the spread of Communism.
4. Monsignor PERRONE, an official in the Vatican, told another source, a close friend of his, that the Vatican has reiterated its behest that no Catholic become a member of the Communist Party. It has also defined its attitude to the Socialist Party, and has similarly decided that, at the present juncture, Catholics should remain outside this Party, which, the Vatican claims, is based on agnostic theories. Monsignor PERRONE concluded by saying that only at such time as the policy of the Italian Socialist Party approaches the principles of the British Labour Party will membership in the Party be compatible with the Catholic faith.
5. According to Monsignor DADAGLIO the Directorate of the Christian Democrat

struggle against Left Wing Parties in general and the Communists in particular.

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5. According to Monsignor DADAGLIO the Directorate of the Christian Democrat Party is endeavouring to modify the policy of the Left Wing elements in the Party.

6. A further indication is that, in the North, Padre Aurelio GIUSSANI, a Professor at San Carlo College, who was formerly Chaplain to the Partisan Forces at Parma and a friend of an independent source, states that the Christian Democrat Party is arming in order effectively to meet the menace of the Communists.

- 2 -

7. According to the Padre the Party has formed "Blue Groups of Freedom" (SCHIERE AZZURRE DELLA LIBERTA), which, though ostensibly concerned with study and sport, will actually become clandestine armed forces. They will be used to defend public order and will go into action with the Carabinieri should the Socialists and the Communists eventually abandon themselves to acts of violence. Padre Giussani told source that he will be Chaplain to the Blue Groups, which initially are intended to counteract the FRONTE DELLA GIOVENTU - the Socialist - Communist counterpart.
8. For the first time since the liberation of any part of Italy, the Christian Democrats have been able to hold a series of successful public meetings in Rome - comparable to those of the Socialists and Communists. A source who attended these meetings said that on one occasion a crowded theatre applauded wildly the speaker (LOMBARDI, a Jesuit) when he condemned "all dictators and those who wish to impose their will by employing the same methods as the Fascists".
9. This stiffening of the attitude of the Vatican and the Christian Democrat Party has had its reaction in the Communist and Socialist Parties.
10. According to Professor CANTIMORI, a prominent member of the Communist Party, the leaders of his party are concerned, as they realise they are losing members to this new drive.

11. LEONARDO SIRONI, prominent member of the Socialist Party, told a

the Socialist - Communist counterpart.

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10. According to Professor CANTIMORI, a prominent member of the Communist Party, the leaders of his party are concerned, as they realize they are losing members to this new drive.
11. Ignazio SILONE, prominent member of the Socialist Party, told a source that the relations between the Socialists and the Christian Democrats are very strained. He added that NANNI is in fact preparing an attack against the Christian Democrat Party.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

5423
TOP SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
Ref: 11/766
JUL 11 1945
NOT TALK
316
1394

To: Head of Chancery
British Embassy
ROME

Copy: A. Halford, Esq.,
Political Section
A.C., ROME

From: I.S.I.D.
Rome Area Allied Command

Date: 6th July, 1945

Attached is a report on the alleged visit of
a Mission from TITO to ROME.

[Signature]
MAJOR
I.S.I.D.

ITALY / YUGOSLAVIA

POLITICAL

VISIT OF A DELEGATION FROM TITO TO ROME

1. The following information has been given to one of our sources in MILAN. The information was supplied by an unconscious sub-source ADOLFO GUARISO - who is said to be the brother of a well-known Communist leader in Venezia Giulia.
2. A delegation from TITO which reached MILAN clandestinely during the last week in June, has left MILAN and is now in Rome.
3. The object of the mission is to induce the Italian Communists to press the Italian Government to negotiate direct with TITO on the basis of TRIESTE remaining Italian, but that the port should be under joint Italo-Yugoslav and not international control. The object of this is to exclude Anglo-American influence.
4. Through this mission or other Yugoslav sources the Italian Communists have received the following directive from the Russians:
 - i) To ensure fusion with Socialists
 - ii) To purge Communist Partisan formations of Partisans of doubtful loyalty to party
 - iii) To retain all possible modern weapons
 - iv) To advise workers that Russian alliance with Anglo-Americans

2. A delegation from TITO which reached MILAN coincidentally during the last week in June, has left MILAN and is now in ROME.
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 - i) To ensure fusion with Socialists
 - ii) To purge Communist Partisan formations of Partisans of doubtful loyalty to party
 - iii) To retain all possible modern weapons
 - iv) To advise workers that Russian alliance with Anglo-Americans only a necessary expedient and one that cannot last.
5. There is confirmation of many Yugoslavs arriving in MILAN but not of specific mission.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

To: Head of Chancery
British Embassy
ROME

Copy: A. Halford, Esq.,
Political Section
A.C. ROME

From: I.S.L.D.
Rome Area Allied Command

Date: 6th July, 1945

Attached is a report on Italo/French relations, dated
4th July, 1945.

Major
I.S.L.D.

1392

ITALY

POLITICAL

ITALIAN/FRENCH RELATIONS

1. A source who is a close friend of GOMELLA was told by the latter that the French Ambassador, M. Couve de Murville, who recently returned to Rome from Paris has had several conversations with DE GASPERI on the subject of Italo-French relations.
2. According to GOMELLA, who is a close friend of DE GASPERI, these conversations are following the lines of a directive given to M. Couve de Murville in Paris, according to which he is to try to form an entente between the two Governments without the intervention of the Allies, especially the British. This last condition was particularly emphasized by the French.
3. According to GOMELLA, Couve de Murville will shortly have conversations with RANDI to discuss this entente. The proposal is that the French will assist Italy in her efforts to change her international status, and support her claims for the retention of her principal colonies. In return for this Italy will renounce for ever any rights in Tunis, and will consent to certain small adjustments on her north western frontier.
4. DE GASPERI told GOMELLA that he feels this approach is more

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3. According to GOMELLA, Couve de Murville will shortly have conversations with FALLOI to discuss this entente. The proposal is that the French will assist Italy in her efforts to change her international status, and support her claims for the retention of her principal colonies. In return for this Italy will renounce for ever any rights in Tunis, and will consent to certain small adjustments on her north western frontier.
4. DE GASPERI told GOMELLA that he feels this approach is more a personal approach by DE GAULLE than by the French nation. DE GASPERI thinks that DE GAULLE feels his position very insecure vis-a-vis the old French statesmen, who, he considers, might be able to bring about his overthrow with the help of the Allies, and he is therefore anxious to produce an international success. DE GASPERI concluded by saying he felt that Italy should profit by this state of affairs to obtain the maximum from France.

5429
TOP SECRET
Ref: 11/759

To: Head of Chancery
British Embassy
ROME

Copy: A. Halford, Esq.,
Political Section
A.C., ROME

JUL 11 1945

From: I.S.L.D.
Rome Area Allied Command

Date: 6th July, 1945.

The attached report on Partisan's contacts with members of the House of Savoy during the German occupation of Northern Italy may be of interest.

The information was supplied to our source by Colonel Curreno Delle Maddalena (nom de guerre Colonel Delle TORRI) who commanded the Partisan Groups in Valdossola.

Major
I.S.L.D.

1890

ITALY

POLITICAL

CONTACTS WITH PERSONNEL OF THE HOUSE OF SAVOY

1. Colonel DELLA TORRE stated that during the German occupation he sent envoys to confer with the COUNT DI TORINO, in Switzerland, requesting him to participate in the Partisan movement. The Count replied that he had to undergo an operation for cancer, but that after this had been performed he would accept the invitation. The movement was already in operation upon his recovery.
2. A similar request was made to the Duke of SARDINIA, but he declined.
3. Both the Princess of PIEMONTE and Countess of CALVI DI BERGOLO (Princess Yolande) were invited to join the movement as Red Cross nurses, under the protection of Colonel DELLA TORRE and other leaders of the district. It was proposed that, on the liberation of Italy, it would have been announced that members of the Royal Family had lent their assistance in the struggle for liberty, and this fact would have been indubitably advantageous for the Monarchy. Not one of these individuals accepted the proposition.

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2. A similar request was made to the Duke of BRIGANO, but he declined.

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1389

542 91
TOP SECRET
Ref: 11/730
URGENT
311
11/730
URGENT
JUL 11 1945
367-20

To: Head of Chancery
British Embassy
ROME

Copy: A. Halford, Esq.,
Political Section
A.C., ROME

From: I.S.L.D.
Rome Area Allied Command

Date: 5th July, 1945

The attached report is self explanatory. The identity of SAND is known to you.

The ZANARDI case referred to in paragraph 3(b) of the comments is the first occasion on which the Italian Naval Authorities were caught putting agents behind the German lines without Allied knowledge; Commander CALOSI was heavily involved in this case.

X
Major
I.S.L.D.
1388

ITALY

POLITICAL

ACTIVITIES OF SAND, ITALIAN NAVAL OFFICER AND CHIEF OF MILAN
DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO ROME

1. SAND left MILAN for ROME on 14th June, 1945. The declared purpose of this journey was:-

- (a) For SAND to report to the Italian Naval Authorities, with whom he had had no official contact since entering German occupied ITALY on an Allied sponsored mission early in 1944.
- (b) To enable SAND to discuss matters of Police interest with the Questura in ROME.

2. The return journey was completed by 15th June, 1945. During his three days in ROME SAND had conversations with the following Allied and Italian personages:

- (i) Major DOTTI of S.I.M.
- (ii) Admiral del COUTURE
- (iii) Signor BONOMI
- (iv) Signor SILVAGGI (director of Italia Nuova, organ of Monarchist Partito Democratico Italiano)
- (v) The Lieutenant General
- (vi) The High Commissioner, Allied Commission
- (vii) Sir Noel Charles

ITALY on an Allied sponsored mission early in 1944.

- (b) To enable SAND to discuss matters of Police interest with the Questura in ROME.

2. The return journey was completed by 18th June, 1945. During his three days in ROME SAND had conversations with the following Allied and Italian personages:

- (i) Major DOTTI of S.I.M.
- (ii) Admiral del COURTAIN
- (iii) Signor BONCHI
- (iv) Signor SALVAGGI. (director of ITALIA NUOVA, organ of Monarchist Partito Democratico Italiano)
- (v) The Lieutenant General
- (vi) The High Commissioner, Allied Commission
- (vii) Sir Noel Charles
- (viii) A senior official of the American Embassy.

The order of these interviews may not be exactly as given but it is certain that the visit to DEL COURTAIN was among the first.

3. In his conversations with the Lieutenant General, SAND, after referring to the then apparent inability of the C.I.M. to agree on the formation of a new government, urged the Lieutenant General to take a decisive step by publicly proclaiming that the country could not continue without a government and inviting BONCHI or ORLANDO to form a new ministry comprised of able men willing to serve, irrespective of their political party. The Lieutenant General, after considerable

- 2 -

hesitation, agreed to take this action, subject to the approval of the Allied Authorities.

4. SAND, through the intermediary of ROMMI, subsequently obtained interviews with the important American and British representatives mentioned in paragraph 2, whose reactions to the proposal in paragraph 3 he states were not unsympathetic. At this stage the formation of the PARI Government cut short SAND's activities, which, he declares, had been directed with a three-fold purpose:-

- (a) to ensure that, in fact, Italy did not continue longer without a government,
- (b) to weaken, it was hoped irreparably, the political prestige of the C.L.S. by focusing public attention on the complete inability of its members to agree among themselves,
- (c) to enhance, by contrast, the prestige and authority of the Lieutenant General.

5. On his return to MILAN, SAND, while expressing his admiration for the personal qualities of the new Prime Minister, vouched his conviction that the new government could not last and that the opportunity of carrying out the manoeuvre described in paragraph 3, with the subsequent establishment of a non-C.I.N. Government, might well occur at a not too far distant date.

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.....

The following comments on the above have been made by a British officer who describes himself as source.

1. As SAND himself is without political position the activities described in the above mentioned report might well be supposed to be those of an ardent Monarchist, seizing an opportunity to press his personal views in circles which normally would not be accessible to him.

1...1384

- 3 -

2. It is suggested that there are some grounds for believing that this may not be the case and for supposing:-

- (a) That SAND acted at the instigation of certain extreme Right-wing elements in RCM and notably at that of DEL COURTEN.
- (b) That these elements, believing - if not hoping - that the PAPRI Government is unlikely to prove a success, are ready with a plan of action should that government fall.

3. The following facts provide some basis for this supposition:-

- (a) SAND, although a declared monarchist, had always expressed moderate views in frequent conversations with source. He was in no hurry to make the trip to RCM and his arrival there was a time psychologically favourable for his actions was solely a matter of chance.

- (b) On his return he approached source on behalf of the Italian D.M.I., Commander CALOSI, expressing the latter's regret that nasty behaviour on his Commander CALOSI's part, in the past, had caused the unsatisfactory relations existing between source and himself. Commander CALOSI hoped that a better understanding might now be established. There appears no explanation for such a n. approach at this juncture unless it may be construed as a policy of DEL COURTEN that all the latter's officers should be on good terms with their Allied opposite numbers who might be supposed to have potential value for propaganda purposes. In the opinion

- (a) SAND, although a declared monarchist, had always expressed moderate views in frequent conversations with source. He was in no hurry to make the trip to Rome and his arrival there was a time psychologically favourable for his actions was solely a matter of chance.
- (b) On his return he approached source on behalf of the Italian D.M.I., Commander CALOSI, expressing the latter's regret that nasty behaviour on his Commander CALOSI's part, in the past, had caused the unsatisfactory relations existing between source and himself. Commander CALOSI hoped that a better understanding might now be established. There appears no explanation for such a n approach at this juncture unless it may be construed as a policy of DEL CORRAL that all the latter's officers should be on good terms with their Allied opposite numbers who might be supposed to have potential value for propaganda purposes. In the opinion of source, Commander CALOSI is a schemer who should have been dismissed at the time of the ZAMANDI case. Source does not, however, consider him particularly intelligent and believes that in his duties as D.M.I. he has acted on orders from above and never on his own initiative. SAND had previously expressed to source his own poor opinion of Commander CALOSI.

4. SAND's qualifications to carry out the negotiations described are evident. He is persona grata with the Allied authorities and his work against the Germans and Fascists has been acknowledged by the C.I.B., which renders it difficult for him to be attacked openly by the latter. As an officer arriving in Rome from North Italy after eighteen months of prominent

- 4 -

activity on the clandestine front. His influence with the hesitant Lieutenant General could be expected to be considerable.

5. It is easy to understand how SAUD, arriving in HME under these circumstances and finding himself once more in Naval circles with their attendant Monarchist tradition, might have been swept into assuming a role which, while in the North, it would never have occurred to him to attempt to play.
6. It is appreciated that the report under reference and these comments prove nothing, but the supposition in paragraph 2 above, if accepted, would indicate that the PAHAL Government may expect considerably more kicks than halfpence from some quarters of the Extreme Right.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

54291
TOP SECRET
Confide. *Aug 1 1945* *306*

To: Head of Chancery
British Embassy
ROME

Ref: 11/753

JUL 11 1945

Copy: A. Halford, Esq.,
Political Section
A.C., ROME

Date: 5th July, 1945

From: I.S.L.D.
Rome Area Allied Command

Attached is a report on negotiations in progress between
MIANI and REGENT*, dated 4th July, 1945.

AC
Major
I.S.L.D.

* Note: Further enquiries are
being made concerning
REGENT.

1383

ITALY

POLITICAL

Source, who was formerly employed in Trieste, and is now in close touch with the clandestine C.L.N., reports that negotiations are in progress between MIANI, one of the leaders of the C.L.N., and Regent, a member of the Yugoslav sponsored Council of Liberation and head of the Yugoslav sponsored Social Assistance Office.

2. Regent is said by source to be the leader of a section of Communists formerly collaborating with the Yugoslavs in Trieste but now wishing to renounce the alliance and make an agreement with the clandestine C.L.N.

3. Reasons for the change of policy are said to be decreasing belief in Russian support for the Yugoslav campaign to secure Trieste and apathy among the majority of workers for demonstrations and strikes approved by the Yugoslavs.

4. Source maintains that negotiations proceeding well and says large numbers of Communist workers will support Regent if an agreement is made with C.L.N.

5. On the other hand, Moraga who is the liberal leader in clandestine C.L.N., says that Regent is a dangerous agitator who was one of the leading organizers of the recent strike and probably playing a double

game.

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4. Source maintains that negotiations proceeding well and says large numbers of Communist workers will support Regent if an agreement is made with C.L.N.

5. On the other hand, Maraga who is the Liberal leader in clandestine C.L.N. says that Regent is a dangerous agitator who was one of the leading organizers of the recent strike and probably playing a double game.

6. Regent is known to have been formerly with the Yugoslav army and believed to have spent many years in Russia.

To: Head of Chancery
British Embassy
ROME

Copy: A. Halford, Sec.
Political Section
A.C., ROME

From: I.S.L.D.
Rome Area Allied Command

Date: 5th July, 1945

JUL 11 1945

1. The source referred to in paragraph 2 of my letter

No. 0351 of 2nd July, 1945, has given the following additional information on paragraph 8 of enclosure to my letter reference 11/744 of 29th June, 1945:

"It is confirmed by source that the GUARDIA DEL POPOLO were informed by the Yugoslavs that armed rising would be staged in Trieste in July".

2. Commenting on this, our representative in Trieste says:

1) This has been the consistent theme of Yugoslav sponsored propaganda both in Trieste and Friuli for the last month.

2) It is quite possibly merely part of the rumour campaign, but it has been reported too frequently to be ignored, and large

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1. The source referred to in paragraph 2 of my letter No. 0351 of 2nd July, 1945, has given the following additional information on paragraph 8 of enclosure to my letter reference 11/744 of 29th June, 1945:

"It is confirmed by source that the CHIARDA DEL POPOLO were informed by the Yugoslavs that armed rising would be staged in Trieste in July".

2. Commenting on this, our representative in Trieste says:

i) This has been the consistent theme of Yugoslav sponsored propaganda both in Trieste and Friuli for the last month.

ii) It is quite possibly merely part of the rumour campaign, but it has been reported too frequently to be ignored, and large numbers of weapon dumps in the area do not indicate pacific intentions on the part of Yugoslavs and communists.

iii) I consider it quite possible that the original Yugoslav intention was in fact to stage an up rising, but that the plan was abandoned in favour of sabotage on account of the sympathy of the majority of the workers towards Yugoslav propaganda, and failure to gain support among workers for communist rank and file demonstrations and strikes which were to be preliminary to up rising.

1 318
See p. 318

- 2 -

- (iv) Further indirect evidence of change of plan is less frequent references to Russian support in propaganda issued during the last few days.


Major
I.S.L.S.

1380

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

5420
TOP SECRET
To: Head of Chancery
British Embassy
ROME

P 17/68
Ref: 0358
RHB

Copy: A. Halford Esq.,
Political Section
A.C. ROME

Confidential JUL 11 1945
MCH Talbot

From: I.S.L.D.
Rome Area Allied Command

Date: 4.7.45.
301

Attached is a report on The Monarchy in North West Italy prepared
by a British officer from his own contacts.

Major
I.S.L.D.
1379

THE MONARCHY IN NORTH WEST ITALY

1. A reliable assessment of the Monarchist position in North West Italy is considered impossible. Judged by the complete absence of demonstrations, posters and chalked slogans on walls, and other visible forms of propaganda so extensively used by the Communists, its strength appears negligible. Conversations with Italians in every walk of life tend to confirm this impression. There does exist a very considerable anti-Communist mass, which, however, is by no means Royalist.
2. The steady progress in this area of the Christian Democrats (figures are not available to this office at present but there is no doubt that there has been progress), coupled with the desire of many Right Wing elements to establish a common rallying ground more positive than anti-Communism, may indicate, however, that the Monarchy in these provinces is not yet a hopelessly lost cause.
3. Whatever the latent strength of the Monarchy may be, many of its most ardent supporters independently affirm that it would be greatly increased by the adoption of the formerly much discussed plan of a regency involving the Prince of HESSES and his mother but excluding completely the present Lieutenant General.
4. The following are remarks made to source during the past three weeks by strong Monarchists who have known the Prince of PLAMONT personally for many years:-
 - (a) Marquis MEDICI DEL VASCHELLO: "I saw the Prince when I was in Rome. It's hopeless- he isn't the man. We can only hope that he may serve us as a symbol. I tried to tell him the truth about his position in the North but he appeared to be interested only in hearing news of his old friends of both sexes."
 - (b) Marquis MAURICE FRACASSA: "I recently saw the Prince. He has all his old charm but it isn't enough. You know he is a pederast - I'm told the Communists know it too and that they have some compromising proof - produced at the right time it would be the coup de grace. However, we must go on working."
5. In conversation many have expressed their dilemma if faced with the choice of voting for a Republic for which they feel the country is not yet ready, or a Monarchy represented by a man for whom they have little respect and who will remain always controversial and vulnerable to Left Wing attack.

3. Whatever the latent strength of the Monarchy may be, many of its most ardent supporters independently affirm that it would be greatly increased by the adoption of the formerly much discussed plan of a regency involving the Prince of REMES and his mother but excluding completely the present Lieutenant General.

4. The following are remarks made to source during the past three weeks by strong Monarchists who have known the Prince of PIMMONT personally for many years:-

(a) Marquis MEDICI DEL VASCHELLO: "I saw the Prince when I was in ROME. It's hopeless- he isn't the man. We can only hope that he may serve us as a symbol. I tried to tell him the truth about his position in the North but he appeared to be interested only in hearing news of his old friends of both sexes."

(b) Marquis MAURICE FRACASSE: "I recently saw the Prince. He has all his old charm but it isn't enough. You know he is a pederast - I'm told the Communists know it too and that they have some compromising proof - produced at the right time it would be the coup de grace. However, we must go on working."

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