

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

ACC

10000/104/258

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

00/109/258

NO. 1 SPECIAL FORCE RELATIONS
FEB. - SEPT. 1945

Previous

9

Please multi-intention reply to AFHQ in which please incorporate the last reply on folios 31 and 32 of the memo.

133.1000

E.C.

40

Ref. minutes 33, 34 and 35 please see intention reply to AFHQ. folios 36, 37 - 38 attached.

James V. Latham, Major
Local Govt. D.C.

17/10/45

41

Cso. Please see intention report to AFHQ, in volume of 5.0 M. to AFHQ. It is quite true that such promises were made to Position prior to our arrival. One prior regarding 5.0 M. struck me - as a C.A.D. - that the long reports the B.H.O.'s transmitted to their H.Q. about local conditions, personnel, communication etc. never reached the AFHQ, personnel working to find into a Province or Town. They would have helped us a great deal.

But X 151A

33 (42)

Ex. Sec. 1st Sec 38 and May Kemley's
41 above

(41)

C-80. Please see interim report 18 APR 68 in volume of S.O.M. to 2 APR 68. At this time their such pointers were made to positions prior to our arrival. One point regarding S.O.M. struck me - as a CAP - that the long reports to B.O. transmitted to their H.Q. about local conditions, personalities, communications etc. never reached the 2 APR 68 personnel working to find into a Service or Team; they would have been lost in a good deal.

20th 1969

33. (42)

Excerpt p1 Sec 38 and May Kennedy:
~~first known~~ ⁴¹ ~~the~~ where

19/1/73
 (43)

They were to my knowledge sent to Regent's

775/20/73

H

2383

Captain Amador

23

Reference for 22. Apart from the other sections mentioned

I think Economic Section could help - particularly Pub. Works and

Utilities S/C

Dec 20/8

(Some Action Taken At 24)

27

Notes

Economic Sec. has actually agreed with Capt. Amador to

consider this action with view of C.A. Sec.

Dec 25/8

23

602

Plan for 22 & my request to E.A. Sec. as per 22.

E.A. Sec. has written to Regan & sent an interim report, & says - Action taken by E.A. Sec. is at present 30 then 50. I would not be but has not yet received report on you will & need matter in urgency with E.A. Sec. as you will & write accordingly re info from E.A. Sec.?

Capt. 1/4/9

Capt. A.

34

4011 and ask Patriots Be to send recommendations

33

Plan for 2 & 3 my request to E. S. as per 24.
 C. S. has written to Rogers & want an interview re: 24, &
 25. - Action taken by E. S. but is at present to them 25.
 Summary as to 24 but has not yet received report the
 you will be sent matter in urgency with them as do
 you will be sent 25/10/53 as info from E. S. 24?

Letter
 25/10/53

Capt. A. Sgt.
 Hold and ask Patients Be
 to send reminder

25/12/53

Civil Affairs Section.
~~Public Affairs Section~~

Kindly inform (last 24/10/53)

As per our telephone conversation - E. S. 24's report
 are listed in plan table & plan 25/10/53. It was my understanding
 that ~~the~~ Civil Affairs Sect. is to coordinate there will report from
 the region.

Letter
 25/10/53

Ex 101

16

Ref para 12 of ^{EC. Duty 27 Apr} ~~12~~ Correspondence cannot be traced.
 VP C.A. Sec, I am informed, raised the point with SOM (Liaison) a short time ago. SOM's answer was that Blo's would be available for a period of about 14 days after liberation & would then be withdrawn. Thereafter they could become AMG officers if they wished but could not be seconded or attached.

Sh

1/5/45

1/5

W 2/5

17

VP E. Sec

Will Col Jones please contact SOM & find out

the position

1/5

W O (B):

To see 17, please

1/5/45

Sh

1/5

W/2/5

17

VP EST 800

Will Est Jones please contact 800 & find out

MS (24)

the position

18

NO (B)

To see 17, please keep

get 100
& keep

(19)

Ex Commission

All B.L.O.s, Approximately 10, B.L.O.s will be withdrawn by the end of May. They are all applying to join C.A. & as they submit their application forms, I am applying to G.S. for their temporary attachment to us. We may get them on this basis but A.F. 100, will not commit themselves.

12.5.55. EX O(B) 20 J.E.V they have been assigned to Field 1
(Major Gibson: S.O.M.) Force Sub Com. who have left 8 to Disper. 14/5

7.

Lab
18 REC
11/13

Chief Commissioner.

Please see page 1 opposite. In the event that operation ORDERS
does not take place I think we should attach an addn to the KUMBI Party.
You will remember that this proposal was turned down before by the
Acting President, but I suggest you should take it up again with him.

785
Chief of Staff.

12 February 45.

R/Pres.
I still oppose This recommendation.
and for The heacons originally advanced
by you. *CL*

14
2
C.C.
MAR 21 1945
CC 757

I shall be glad if you can send
me also the:

17/2
10
It seems like C.C. be upon with
to accept recommendation
1/2 20/3

and for The Heavens originally advanced
by you.

14

2

C.C.

I shall be glad if you can send
me some about them.

from

17/2

(10)

It seems like C.C. has again
to accept recommendation

from 20/3

(11)

C.S.O. to C.C. - Can:

You will wish to call the attention of C.C. to above 2 minutes.

J. H. Alexander
20.3.43.

(12)

H. J. Evans

M. Soc. to write 7-11 above.

S. 18/3

29/3. Pls reply accordingly. I

23811

Establishment

2.

See folio 1, for appropriate recommendation.

[Signature]
7 Feb

3.

G-1 (B)

for comment, please.

Ad. Sec.
8 Feb

[Signature]
for Capt. Dec 8

4.

Adv. Sec.

It is difficult to express an opinion without knowing what has already been decided. It seems however that when the evening withdrawal from Berlin" an AMG Officer will be in position immediately & this detachment can report to him. We shall then have an officer in the intervening period.

[Signature]

G-2.48.

5.

Chief of Staff

10 see 4, please.

Ad. Sec.
9 Feb-48

[Signature]
for Capt. Dec 8

6

4.

Rev. S. Est. Sec.

It is difficult to express our opinion without knowing what has already been decided. It seems however that when the enemy withdraws from Tunis, an AFHQ officer will be in position immediately to this detachment can report to him. We shall then have an officer in the intervening period.

S. L. Jones

G. 2. 4. 4.

5.

Chief of Staff

To see 4, please.

Rev. Sec.

9 Feb 44

Without Capt. COS

6

COS

Re. Attachment of AC officer to #1 S.F. - please see folio 1 and min 4.

9 Feb

2379

562
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 384
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

94/7/PAT

17 Sep 45

SUBJECT: Assessment of value of Special Operations
Executive Action in WFO to Normal Military
Operations.

TO : A.F.H.Q. G-5 Section for Lt.Col. BARNETT.

Reference your G-5:350.05 of 20 Aug 45.

1. Investigations and inquiries have been made to Regions and Economic Section as to the value of Special Operation in preventing damage to installations etc. Replies have not been received from all sources asked but the following are forwarded to you in the meantime.

(a) PUBLIC WORKS AND UTILITIES

- (1) A detailed investigation of the partisan efforts to protect North Italy electric facilities has not been made. During the winter and spring of 1944-45, such information was furnished to Special Forces Quarters listing electric facilities which were considered to be the most important, and, which should be protected from enemy destruction.

(11) During the last few weeks of the war in North Italy, daily reports were received from Special Forces sources indicating that these, and other facilities were being protected by organizing partisan groups. It is known the electric facilities in North Italy were found by the Allies to be in good conditions generally, with approximately 8% of plants and 25% high tension transmission systems damaged. Most of

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(11) During the last few weeks of the war in North Italy, daily reports were received from Special Forces sources indicating that these, and other facilities were being protected by organizing partisan groups. As is known the electric facilities in North Italy were found by the Allies to be in good conditions generally, with approximately 8% of plants and 25% high tension transmission system damaged. Most of the destruction to high transmission systems was result of war damages.

(111) There is no known evidence of partisan activities in connection with electric facilities in Sicily, Sardinia, or Italy below the 1944-45 winter battle line.

(iv) In North Italy there is considerable evidence of the effectiveness of partisan activities in either protecting electric facilities against enemy destruction or destroying them to deny their use to the enemy.

(v) The following specific instance concerning partisan activities in North Italy are cited:

(a) When the Allies entered TORINO and MILAN

P. J. W. 20/1/45

-2-

partisans were found to be holding the electric and gas facilities there.

(b) Any enemy destruction in the PIZMONTE Area was made difficult as the result of partisan discovery and destruction of a large scale explosive cache.

(c) According to electric Company officials in VENEZIA, an Allied Officer arrived there while it was still in enemy hands. They sheltered him, and he subsequently organized partisan bands to protect electric facilities in the area. Plants on the PI VE River, which form one source of supply to VENEZIA were the scenes of skirmishes between partisans and the enemy, according to electric company personnel. These plants were found to be undamaged.

(d) In PARMA an official of the local electric company coordinated each of the activities of the partisans and a Special Operations Officer in Emilia Region. In this case, as with the electric companies in general, the company's private telephone system were used to transmit instructions to the partisans.

(b) INDUSTRY

(i) In Northern Italy it was agreeable surprise to find so many of the industrial facilities very little damaged, undoubtedly due in number of cases to partisan activities.

(ii) Whilst there are no specific instances which can be quoted, it appears reasonable to assume that partisans were aided and encouraged to protect industry by the Special Operations Officers.

(c) PIZMONTE REGION

(i) It was difficult for AVG to identify particular damage or plant as a result of actions of BLOCs

the enemy, according to electric company personnel. These plants were found to be undamaged.

- (d) In PARMA an official of the local electric company coordinated much of the activities of the partisans and a Special Operations Officer in Emilia Region. In this case, as with the electric companies in general, the company's private telephone system were used to transmit instructions to the partisans.

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- (i) In Northern Italy it was agreeable surprise to find so many of the industrial facilities very little damaged, undoubtedly due in a number of cases to partisan activities.
- (ii) Whilst there are no specific instances which can be quoted, it appears reasonable to assume that partisans were aided and encouraged to protect industry by the Special Operations Officers.

(c) PIEMONTE REGION

- (i) It was difficult for AMG to identify particular damage or plant saved as a result of actions of BLOCs although undoubtedly these officers along with the Partisans did excellent work in this respect. It is understood that reports have been rendered to military sources by senior BLOCs.
- (ii) The following is furnished on reports supplied to HQ Piemonte Region
 - (a) ASTI Province. Major ISA and Captain POWELL carried out valuable work with the Partisans in the prevention of damage to industries and communications.
 - (b) CUNEO Province. SLO performed excellent work with Partisans in saving industries and removal of machinery.

-3-

- (c) ROVANA Province. Valuable work carried out with Partisans by Major REDHEAD and Major LE EMOCQ.
- (d) TURIN Province. No information available except it is believed Partisans' action prevented the destruction of TURIN telephone exchange.
- (e) VERCELLI Province. Opinions vary as to Partisans' work but the work of the BLOs was universally regarded as excellent.
- (114) With regard to the manner and extent to which special Operation Officers including British Liaison Officers proved of value to civil affairs work both before AMG was set up and immediately thereafter, the following summary is furnished.
- (a) Work of Value.
1. Provided valuable information as to local personalities and conditions and paved the way for AMG prior to AMG arrival.
 2. Assisted in control and disarmament of Partisans.
 3. Calmed the population and controlled unruly elements pending arrival of AMG.
- (b) Work to Detriment of AMG.
1. Attempted to set up Civil Affairs Administration centred around Partisan formations and not Italian Civilian Administration.
 2. Issued car permits to Partisans which hindered the recovery of the vehicles.
 3. Furnished promises and consents which could not be honoured by AMG.
 4. Opened Post Offices and Banks prior to arrival of AMG.
- (17) The foregoing is quoted only to expatiate the desirability of AMG training being given to BLOs should necessity arise in future for similar operations, and

AMG was set up and immediately thereafter, the following summary is furnished.

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1. Attempted to set up Civil Affairs Administration centered around Partisan formations and not Italian Civilian Administration.
2. Issued car permits to Partisans which hindered the recovery of the vehicles.
3. Furnished promises and consents which could not be honored by AMG.
4. Opened Post Offices and Banks prior to arrival of AMG.

(iv) The foregoing is quoted only to emphasize the desirability of AMG training being given to ELOs should necessity arise in future for similar operations, and in no way should be construed as detracting from the excellent work which these officers performed.

2. Further information will be forwarded to you as and when it comes in.

3. In a general manner the formation of the Special Operations Branch and its activities have proved to be of considerable help in preventing wholesale destruction by the enemy of power light and fuel plants.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

Copy to file 562/20

[Signature]
M. OAKS, Brig
V2 CA Section 7 (i)

785017

562

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSIC
APO BOX
ECONOMIC SECTION

32

ROUTING AND WORK SHEET

Each note must be numbered and each space completely filled in. THIS WORK SHEET MUST NOT BE REMOVED FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE TO WHICH ATTACHED UNTIL ACTION IS COMPLETED AND THEN FILED WITH FILE COPIES OF COMMUNICATION TO WHICH IT PERTAINS. A line will be drawn the full width of the page under each note.

SUBJECT: Attached correspondence

SEP 11 1945

No	Date	To	REMARKS	From
1	3/9/45	PUB. WKS.	The attached correspondence was routed to you on 25/8/45 requesting you to set forth your comments and to pass the correspondence to Industry S/C. There is no indication of your ever having received the correspondence. Will you please comply with the original request now.	<i>D.A. Clark</i> Major Clark S/S Production
2	8/9/45	Boon. Sec.	See attached detailed report dated 8 Sept. '45 - file 197/PWU	<i>George M. ...</i> I. J. Ristad Colonel, C. E. Director I. J. Ristad, S/C
3	10/9/45	C.E.O. to Executive Commissioner	Ref. your 562/24/45 dated 23/8/45 herewith please find enclosed the information you requested and which has been furnished by Industry and P.M. & U. S/C's.	<i>D.A. Clark</i> Major, RE Prod. Div. Boon. Sec. <i>D.A. Clark</i> 2335

HEADQ "RTERS ALLIED COMMISS" NT
APO 804
ECONOMIC SECTION

ROUTING AND WORK SHEET

Each note must be numbered and each space completely filled in. THIS WORK SHEET MUST NOT BE REMOVED FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE TO WHICH ATTACHED UNTIL ACTION IS COMPLETED AND THEN FILED WITH FILE COPIES OF COMMUNICATION TO WHICH IT PERTAINS. A line will be drawn the full width of the page under each note.

SUBJECT: Assessment of Value of Special Operations Executive Action in ETO to Normal Military Operations.

No	Date	To	REMARKS	From
1	25/8 45	P.W. & U. S/C	1. Reference attached G-5:350.05 dated 20/3/45 and 562/24/EC dated 23/8/45: 2. Would you please submit an informal memo to this Division setting forth your comments as requested in G-5 letter. 3. Please pass on to Industry S/C.	Production Division
2		Industry S/C	1. Transmitted for action same as above and return to this Division. <i>D.A. Clark</i> D.A. CLARK Major	
3	31-8-45	Econ.Sect.	1. In Northern Italy it was an agreeable surprise to find so many of the industrial facilities very little damaged, undoubtedly due in a number of cases to partisan activities. 2. Whilst there are no specific instances which can be quoted, it appears reasonable to assume that partisans were aided and encouraged to protect industry by the Special Operations Officers. <i>Charles Feringo</i> CHARLES FERINGO Major, RASC for A.H. GLENDINING, Colonel, Acting Director, Industry Sub-Commission.	Industry S/C.

785017

Page

No	Date	To	REMARKS	From

DO NOT WRITE BELOW THIS LINE

Eq. 317

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

GPP/nc

Inter Office Memo

197/PWU

8 September 1945

Subject : Activities of Partisans in Protecting
North Italy Electrical Facilities

To : ECONOMIC SECTION

From : Public Works and Utilities Sub-Commission

1. A detailed investigation of the partisan efforts to protect North Italy electric facilities has not been made. During the winter and spring of 1944-45, much information was furnished Special Forces Quarters listing electric facilities which were considered to be the most important, and hence, which should be protected from enemy destruction.

2. During the last few weeks of the war in North Italy, daily reports were received from Special Forces sources indicating that these, and other facilities were being protected by organized partisan groups. As is known, the electric facilities in North Italy were found by the Allies to be in good condition generally with approximately 8% of plants and 25% high tension transmission system damaged. Most of the destruction to high transmission systems was result of war damaged.

3. There is no known evidence of partisan activities in connection with electric facilities in Sicily, Sardinia, or Italy below the 1944-45 winter battle line.

4. In north Italy there is considerable evidence of the effectiveness of partisan activities in either protecting electric facilities against enemy destruction or destroying them to deny their use to the enemy.

5. The following specific instances concerning partisan activities in North Italy are cited :

- (a) When the Allied entered Torino and Milan partisans were found to be holding the electric and gas facilities there.

(29)

- (b) Any enemy destruction in the Piemonte area was reportedly made difficult as the result of partisan discovery and destruction of a large explosive cache.
- (c) According to electric company officials in Venice, an Allied Officer arrived there while it was still in enemy hands. They sheltered him, and he subsequently organized partisan bands to protect electric facilities in the area. Plants on the Piave River, which form one source of supply to Venice, were the scenes of skirmishes between partisans and the enemy, according to electric company personnel. These plants were found to be undamaged.
- (d) In Parma an official of the local electric company coordinated much of the activities of the partisans and a Special Operations Officer in Emilia Region. In this case, as with the electric companies in general, the company's private telephone systems were used to transmit instructions to the partisans.

13
for *George Parker Heal. Inf.*
E.J. RISTEDT
Colonel, C.E.
A/Director

Enclosures
Routing and work Sheets

Ext 451

ABA/el 28

Ref: 562/28/EO

10 September 1945

MEMORANDUM:

TO : Economic Section

1. Reference is made to our memorandum 562/24/EO, 23 August, enclosing a copy of AFHQ, G-5 Section's letter ref. G-5: 350.05 of 20 August, subject "Assessment of Value of Special Operations Executive Action in MTO to Normal Military Operations."

2. It would be appreciated if this office were informed if your section has made any comments in accordance with AFHQ's letter.

A. B. KINOLDY,

Chief Staff Officer
To Executive Commissioner

See FOUR 29 to 32
PA 10/9

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

Tel No 489081
Ext 469

25 Aug 45

Ref : 947/TAT

Subject : Assessment of Value of Special Operations
Executive Action in HTO to Normal Military
Operations

AUG 27 1945

To : AFHQ - G-5 Section

Reference your G-5: J50.05 of 20 Aug 45.

1. Full information on the manner in which Special Operation Officers were of assistance to the Allied Commission is not available in this HQ and inquiries have been sent to Regions to enable a more comprehensive report to be made.

2. A reply will be sent to your letter when this further information has been received.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER

H. GARR
Brigadier,
VP, CA Section

Copy to : Exec. Com.

(Not Kept)

2370

47

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

(25)

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
LOCAL GOVERNMENT SUB COMMISSION
PATRIOTS BRANCH

Tel No 489004
Ext 469

Ref : 9/7/42

25 AUG 45

Subject : Assessment of Value of Special Operations
Executive Action in MSP to Naval Military
Operations

To : MR LAMARCA, LIGONIA, VERMONT, VERMONT, VERMONT CITULIA

For 23 Lines

1. In order to assess the value of the Special Operations conducted behind the German lines and of determining how far it may be desirable in future to copy them or how they should be improved MSP is desirous of receiving a report on
 - a) The result of MSP measures to prevent damage to port installations communications and industrial targets and in particular the port installations in Genoa and Venice and industrial installations in Milan and Turin.
 - b) The manner and extent to which Special Operation Officers including British Liaison Officers proved of value to civil affairs work both before MSP was set up and immediately thereafter.
2. Your industry and transportation divisions will no doubt be able to give you an over-all picture of the success of these measures but it would be appreciated if you could add from Patriot sources instances of particularly good or valuable work which resulted in the saving of installations or communications mentioning the names of the SPOs concerned and a summary of how these officers were of assistance in setting up MSP.

R.R. CRISTO Colonel,
Director,
Local Govt. Sub Com.

Copy to : Home, Com.

2369

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Ext 451

ABV/el 24

Ref: 562/24/23

23 August 45

MEMORANDUM:

TO : Economic Section

1. Enclosed is a copy of AFHQ, G-5 Section's letter G-5: 350.05 of 20 August 45, subject "Assessment of Value of Special Operations Executive Action in MPO to Normal Military Operations." Also enclosed is a copy of comments received by AFHQ from 15th Army Group and Fifth Army.

2. It would be appreciated if your section would inform this office of any comments along the lines requested in AFHQ's letter, which we could transmit to them.

A. B. ARNOLOV.

Chief Staff Officer
To Executive Commissioner

2 Incls:
as above

See File 25-26

29-32

24
236/8

2330

785017

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

gone 22

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

RB/TBJ/waw

G-5: 350.05

20 August 1945

AUG 21 1945

SUBJECT: Assessment of Value of Special Operations Executive
Action in MTO to Normal Military Operations.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission, APO 394.

1. This HQ is preparing for the British Chiefs of Staff an estimate of the value of Special Operations Executive in this theater as a whole and in particular as regards:

a. The effect of resistance activities controlled by SOE on landing operations in Sicily, Corsica, Sardinia and Italy.

b. The effect of the Resistance Movement on the campaign in Italy, especially during the Summer of 1944 and the Spring of 1945.

c. The result of SOE measures to prevent damage to port installations, communications and industrial targets with special reference to airfields and dock installations in Greece, port installations in Genoa and Venice, and industrial installations in Turin and Milan.

2. As one of the appendices to the appreciation it is desired to state in what manner and to what extent Special Operations Officers proved of value to Civil Affairs work both before it was possible to set up AMG and at and immediately after the time AMG was established.

3. Attached for your information are copies of comments received at this HQ from 15 Army Group and 5 Army. It is understood 8 Army had no comments from the AMG angle.

4. It is requested that you submit your comments on the points raised in 2 above, instancing specific examples where possible. It is particularly requested that you will also comment on the success from a Civil Affairs angle of the anti-scorch policy adopted by the Partisans in Northern Italy under guidance from the Special Operations Officers.

For Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5:

RB
R. BARLATT,
Lt. Colonel.

Incl:
as above

(Original passed to CAS for ACTION)

PA 218

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

21

COMMENTS ON VALUE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE by

a. HQ 15 ARMY GROUP

"In the field of Public Relations, special operations through partisan contacts assisted to an unknown degree in the attempt to create a civilian viewpoint sympathetic to Allied war aims. After the cessation of hostilities special operations personnel in the field were of direct help to AMG officers in the collection of arms from partisan bands and in certain relationships with local personalities."

b. 5 ARMY

"The direct effect of special operations on military government was not very great. Occasionally, as the armies advanced northward in Italy, military government officers were aided in bringing under control the troublesome personnel of the partisan ranks by Allied liaison officers who had been parachuted behind the enemy lines. These officers remained with the partisans when they were first overrun by the Allies and aided and prevented many acts of violence on the part of the partisans."

15

EXTRACT FROM MINUTES OF EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER'S MEETING
27 Apr 45.

- "12. Use of FLOs after Liberation. CA Sec stated it had been agreed to lend FLOs to AEG for a limited period after liberation of an area. CSO to Ex C to look up this instruction, and Est Sec to follow up on the matter."

H. 16-20
seen by Matt
H. 16-20
15/4

see M 16, 17
18. 19. 20.
2360

~~SECRET~~

Ref: 562/14/80

Tel: 478730

30 March 1945.

SUBJECT: Attachment of an A.C. Officer to No.1
Special Force Detachments in FRANCE.

TO : S.O.(M) Liaison Staff (Rome),
C/o R.A.A.C., CMF.

With reference to your letter LS/14/312 dated 7 February 1945, it has now been decided by the A.C. not to attach an AMQ/AC officer to the party that your HQ proposes to move into TURIN.

Major E. Talbot

Chief Staff Officer,
To Executive Commissioner.

2 3 3 6