

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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10000/109/260
(VOL. I)

ADMIN
JAN. -

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

0/109/260
DL. I)

ADMIN. ON GERMAN SURRENDER OR WITHDRAWAL
JAN. - MAR. 1945

203

203

1. Log File 177 in final form is at 20.

2. Points made by AG, WFO, BRG, SMC and I attended the Florence Meeting, which are not mentioned in the final Plan are as follows:

a. No requisitioning of troops for the accommodation of German (see Minutes of the Florence Meeting, para. 11(a) - page 72).

b. Allied Commander being brought into the picture on disarmament at an early date (para. 12(c) - page 72).

c. Trucks not being allowed to acquire captured transport in excess of their T-1's (para. 12(f) - page 71).

d. Not using road resources for the maintenance of the German army (para. 12(e) - page 71).

I bring the above additions to your attention for information only. I do not recommend the changes to the Plan, since the points were all covered in the Minutes of the Florence Meeting.

3. Reference is made in para. 12(a) of the Log File (page 20) to the fact that no prisoners may be put.

23 March 1945.

2484

Handwritten signature
L.S.

77

Ex Com.

Minister of the Florence working
at 76. Proper distribution
seven (1) Spain Open in
under

Ex Com (2)

(A Sec

Land Faces

W M D S/c

N. Holy Planners

Ex Com.

Si 12/3.

28

Pages

At some stage Emilia Region who

will be the unwilling host of the Kennedy should

Exec Sec (2)

CA Sec

Lead Rec

WM D S/c

N. Italy Planners

Ex Comm.

28

13/3

Pages

At some stage Emilia Region who

will be the unwilling host of the Keesdreas should
be brought I.P.

105/13/3

9 Kentchen copy 23 to Florence

2483

1230

79

So to cc

cc should see the minutes of the
meeting Ex Comm. I attend w/ Florence at
76. Re 20/11/77 in at 36.

Exec. Comm. 80

16/3

Noted

End cc

15/3

Ex Lane.

At 5:50 a.m. some letter in
the conference in Florence

11/13

Await the Minutes 11/13

60

Note

(51)

This map was shown to
V.P. CAS and Gen Sec Res
Mr. Rymis & Decato in
meeting today in Ex Lane's
Office.

11/13/12

11/13/13

64

60

51

Note

Pen map was shown to
V.P. CAS and Gen Sec Res
Mr. Rogers, DecAO and
meeting today in ExCom's

Office

9/23/72

MM 3/5

66.

ExCom

64 obs by information

67

9/13

The point is that whether it is legal or not
with Kesselring, that surrender and
we should have to administer his army
as P.O.W.

Mr 8/13

9/10/72

FEB 22 1950

CC 541

45.

Chief Commissioner:

Reference page 36, which is log Plan 177 dated 17 February. This plan is based on the assumption of increasing surrendering at or near his present line. The main points as affecting AC are:

1. Transport (pages 34, 35).

It is considered that 20 US Truck Companies and 5 British VC Companies might be available for the movement of civil supplies in R. Italy out of the total that might be available under surrender conditions to support formation.

2. Forces in the Army (page 36, para. 10b.).

It is proposed that the main concentration area would be the area between the 20 and Route 9.

3. Austria (page 27, para. 15).

The US intend to use WILSON and the British THOMAS for maintenance in Austria.

4. ALZ (page 25, para. 16).

ALZ of VALDIZIA will possibly be with the Russians on a tripartite basis.

5. Distribution of Civil Supplies (pages 26, 25 para. 17).

Estimated total of civil requirements 13,700 tons per day, of which 8,000 tons per day will be for the North West and 5,700 for the remainder of R. Italy.

6. Distribution to R. Italy (page 26, para. 18).

Military commitment - 600 tons per day (US) at PERONA
- 400 tons per day (UK) at UDINE

It is possible that AC might obtain about 3,000 German load-carrying vehicles (see page 24, para. 18a(iv)).

7. Ports (page 23, para. 22).

Maximum times required to open ports are:

- (a) TRIESTE - 12 weeks (might be 5 if unobscuring could be done via Italian Coast)
- (b) GENOA - 6 weeks
- (c) VICTORIA - 16 weeks (The opening of TRIESTE is, of course, an AC commitment and we are not likely to receive much help until TRIESTE and GENOA are open - see also top of page 31).

8. Roads (page 21, para. 23).

Priorities for repair. Top priorities R.A., Low 15th., lowest 5 of C Austria.

9. Inland Water Transport (page 19, para. 25).

Not considered safe to plan for movement of large tonnages, and anyhow it will be an AC responsibility to develop IT (last line on page 18).

10. P.O.L. (page 18, para. 26).

AC of VARIOUS COUNTRIES will possibly be with the Russians on a tripartite basis.
 5. Distribution of Civil Supplies (page 26, 25 para. 17).
 Estimated total of civil requirements 13,700 tons per day, of which 8,000 tons per day will be for the North West and 5,700 for the remainder of E. Italy.

6. Distribution to N.E. Italy (page 25, para. 13).
 Military commitment - 200 tons per day (13) at VAREZIA
 - 100 tons per day (3r) at GENE.
 It is possible that AC might obtain about 3,000 German load-carrying vehicles (see page 14, para. 18a(14)).

7. Ports (page 23, para. 22).
 Maximum times required to open ports are:
 (a) TRIESTE - 12 weeks (might be 8 if mine-sweeping could be done via Italian Docks)
 (b) GENOVA - 6 weeks
 (c) VAREZIA - 16 weeks
 (The opening of VAREZIA is, of course, an AC commitment and we are not likely to receive much help until TRIESTE and GENOVA are open - see also top of page 21).

8. Roads (page 21, para. 23).
 Priorities for repair. Top priorities L.S., Low M.S., lowest I of C Austria.
 9. Inland Water Transport (page 19, para. 25).
 Not considered safe to plan for movement of large tonnages, and anyhow it will be an AC responsibility to develop IWT (let him on page 18).

10. I.C.I. (page 18, para. 26).
 GENOVA and TRIESTE - military commitments.
 VAREZIA - rehabilitation of bulk installations which are the largest in the Northern Adriatic - AC commitment.
 11. Appendix A (page 10)

It is not intended to open FINE, and some civil supplies may be imported for Yugoslavia through TRIESTE.
 On page 19 is signal from ARHQ announcing a conference under the CAC on Monday (Transportation 2/2), Brig. JEMMETT, Col. MARSHALL (representing us and for Italy respectively), Maj. TILLY and myself. Col. MARSHALL will, of course, be there as Asst. Chief of Staff G-5.
 Please also see page 13 on which is 15 A.G. Operation Instruction after the capture of FLORENCE, which is entirely operational. Para. 10b. is important as it attaches IV Corps from Fifth Army and puts it under 15 A.G. at a certain stage.
 On page 12, G-2 Appreciation No. 39. The conclusions are to the effect that there is no firm evidence of any large-scale enemy withdrawal (see 18, 40).

22 February 45.
 M.S. Executive Commissioner.

Chief Clerk

Attached is submitted for your information/signature/approval.

We have no existing documents.

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Ms/24/148

1261, Noted — JWD

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HEADQUARTERS EMILIA REGION
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
APO 394

ACB/eah
28 March 1945

SUBJECT: AFHQ Log P.177

MAR 31 1945

TO : Acting Executive Commissioner.
(Attention: Major E. Talbot, Chief Staff Officer)

1. I return herewith receipt for copy number 33
Log P.177, dated 19 March 1945.

2. Even more than earlier material on the same
subject, this indicates to me the very high degree
in which this Region is involved in future plans, and
I wonder increasingly why the Regional Commissioner
is not invited to meetings and discussions which are
of such direct interest and importance to this Region.

Alfred P. ...

Colonel, JAGD
Regional Commissioner

FILE CLOSED

11/13/45
24/4

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Confident (102)

Ref: 56/102/10.

24 March 1945.

SUBJECT: German surrender or withdrawal in ITALY.

TO : Regional Commissioner, EMILIA Region. (Copy No. 13)
R. Italy Planning (Attn: Lieut. Wickelwright, (Copy No. 13)
PERSONE Rear HQ).

1. Herewith Copy No. of Log P.177 dated 19 March 1945, AMHQ appreciation on "Administrative requirements in ITALY in the event of a German surrender or withdrawal".

2. Please acknowledge receipt to this office immediately on the attached Receipt Form.

(Sgt) R. Talbot

Chief Staff Officer,
to the Executive Commissioner.

/m.

See (103)

2477

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ARMED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

LOG. PLANS SECTION

Confidential

MAR 22 1945

100

TOP SECRET
Auth: SAC
Initials: *[Signature]*
19 Mar 45
Copy No. 26

Log. E. 177

SUBJECT: Administrative requirements in REMEX in the event of a German surrender or withdrawal.

Reference draft Appreciation, subject as above, Log. E. 177 dated 17 Feb.

1. Appreciation has been prepared in final form and is attached for information.
2. Appendix "B", "Requirements and availability of load-carrying transport in terms of GP and Black Cows", is being issued separately on a restricted distribution.
3. The various points made on the draft Appreciation at the two meetings held at H. 15 ARMY HQ on Monday, 26 February 1945, have been included in the attached paper. Certain adjustments in the calculations, which have been suggested as a result of staff examination in the light of further information which has become available since the Appreciation was issued in draft, have also been included.

Log. E. 177-23 MAR 45

Copy 26
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Log. E. 177-23 MAR 45
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Log. E. 177-23 MAR 45
Log. E. 177-23 MAR 45
Log. E. 177-23 MAR 45
Log. E. 177-23 MAR 45

[Signature]
for B.H. ROBERTSON,
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Administrative Officer.

DISTRIBUTION

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ARMY FORCE HEADQUARTERS
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LOG. Plans Section

LOG. P. 177

19 Mar 45

SUBJECT: Administrative requirements in ITALY in the event
of a German surrender or withdrawal

1. Appreciation on "Administrative requirements in ITALY in the event
of a German surrender or withdrawal", prepared in final form, is
attached.

[Signature]
L. J. DONAHUE,
Colonel, GSO,
G-4 Plans.

[Signature]
A. M. MILLER,
Colonel,
LOG. Plans.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Appreciation on "Administrative requirements in ITALY in the event of a German surrender or withdrawal", prepared in final form, is attached.

A. J. Donahue
A. J. DONAHUE,
Colonel, GSC,
G-4 Plans.

A. M. Milne
A. M. MILNE,
Colonel,
Log. Plans.

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ALLIED ARMS HEADQUARTERS

Log. Plans Section

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FINAL

19 March, 1945

ANTICIPATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS
IN ITALY IN THE EVENT OF A GERMAN SURRENDER
OR WITHDRAWAL

OPERATIONAL BACKGROUND

a. Russian operations, possibly covering REISELING's maintenance communications, or a crumbling of German resistance on the Eastern and Western Fronts, may result in either of the following situations arising in this theatre in the near future:

i. REISELING may surrender on his present line or attempt to withdraw his forces into AUSTRIA before surrendering, or

ii. REISELING may attempt to keep his forces in the field on any one of a number of prepared positions SOUTH of the Austrian frontier.

The German Navy and Air Force may not surrender at the same time as the German Army.

b. The situation in the event of REISELING surrendering at or near his present line is, from the administrative standpoint, the most urgent problem which might arise, though in certain circumstances it may not be the worst case. In general terms, however, the broad administrative policy to meet the situation will cover the action required in other possible situations. This appreciation, therefore, only considers in detail the situation in the event of REISELING surrendering at or near his present line.

2. Briefly, the operational plan to meet the situation in para 1 b. above is likely to be:

a. To place Allied formations astride the German L of C between the German forces and the Austrian frontier so as to prevent any German withdrawal into AUSTRIA.

b. To secure the withdrawal of REISELING and clear these areas of enemy forces.

...operations, meeting serious resistance on the
communications, or a crumbling of German resistance on the
Eastern and Western Fronts, may result in either of the following
situations arising in this theatre in the near future:

1. KEMMERLING may surrender on his present line or attempt to
withdraw his forces into AUSTRIA before surrendering, or

2. KEMMERLING may attempt to keep his forces in the field on
an one of a number of prepared positions south of the
Austrian frontier.

The German Navy and Air Force may not surrender at the same time
as the German Army.

b. The situation in the event of KEMMERLING surrendering at or near
his present line is, from the administrative standpoint, the most
urgent problem which might arise, though in certain circumstances
it may not be the worst case. In general terms, however, the
broad administrative policy to meet the situation will cover the
action required in other possible situations. This appreciation,
therefore, only considers in detail the situation in the event of
KEMMERLING surrendering at or near his present line.

2. Briefly, the operational plan to meet the situation in para 1 b. above
is likely to be:

a. To place Allied formations astride the German L of C between the
German forces and the Austrian frontier so as to prevent any
German withdrawal into AUSTRIA.

b. To occupy SE and SW ITALY and clear those areas of enemy forces.

c. To move British and US occupational forces into AUSTRIA as soon
as administrative considerations allow.

For political and operational reasons it is essential that AUSTRIA be
occupied as early as possible, the operational requirement, which has been
accepted for planning purposes, being the establishment of a substantial
portion of the occupational forces in AUSTRIA not later than 4-6 weeks
after surrender by German forces in their theatre of war.

OBJECT OF APPRECIATION

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3. The object of this Appreciation is to consider the administrative
action required to meet the situation outlined in para 1 b. above insofar
as it affects present German Occupied Italy.

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MAIN ADMINISTRATIVE TASKS

4. The principal administrative tasks will be:
 - a. Maintenance of 15 Army Group and supporting Air Forces.
 - b. Disarmament and maintenance of surrendered German Navy, Army and Air Forces.
 - c. Satisfaction of a L of C or La of C for the maintenance of Force in AUSTRIA.
 - d. Integration of Allied Military Government in present German Occupied ITALY.
 - e. Provision and distribution of supplies for the civil population in German Occupied ITALY.

DEMOLITIONS, CAPTAINIES AND SEA MINES

5. The German L of C into AUSTRIA and communications within present German Occupied ITALY have already been extensively damaged as a result of Allied bombing. If the Germans have not withdrawn from ITALY before surrendering it is unlikely that a systematic program of demolitions will be carried out but instances of deliberate destruction by fanatics and disorders are to be expected. If the Germans withdraw before surrendering, demolitions in NORTH ITALY are likely to be considerable, especially if they are able to withdraw without close pursuit.

6. The Northern Adriatic Sea and the IONIAN Sea are heavily mined and clearance of sea routes will be a formidable naval commitment. In surrender conditions, provided the German Navy declares the location of minefields and the safe routes leading through them, the time required to open sea routes for shipping will be considerably shortened.

MAINTENANCE OF 15 ARMY GROUP

7. General

- a. Initially, the maintenance of Fifth and Eighth Armies and supporting Air Forces forward of railroads existing at the time of enemy surrender or withdrawal, will have to be by road.

- b. With the enemy withdrawal requirements of that section of a

2. Provision and distribution of supplies for the civil population in German Occupied Italy.

EVACUATIONS, CAPTIVES AND SEA MINING

The German L of U into ALGERIA and communications within present German Occupied Italy have already been extensively damaged as a result of Allied bombing. If the Germans have not withdrawn from ITALY before surrendering it is unlikely that a systematic programme of demolitions will be carried out but instances of deliberate destruction by fanaticism and disorders are to be expected. If the Germans withdraw before surrendering, demolitions in NORTH ITALY are likely to be considerable, especially if they are able to withdraw without close pursuit.

The Northern Adriatic Sea and the IONIAN Sea are heavily mined and clearance of sea routes will be a formidable naval commitment. In surrender conditions, provided the German Navy declares the location of minefields and the mine routes leading through them, the time required to open sea routes for shipping will be considerably shortened.

MAINTENANCE OF AIR PORTS

General

- a. Initially, the maintenance of Fifth and Eighth Armies and supporting Air Forces forward of railheads existing at the time of enemy surrender or withdrawal, will have to be by road.
- b. Fuel and daily maintenance requirements of that portion of a divisional group forward of railhead, in the event of an enemy surrender or withdrawal, are set out in Appendix 'A', para 1.
- c. The logistical plan for the occupation of NORTH ITALY, which has been assumed in this paper, is as follows:

Phase I

Three divisions moving to the VENETIA area and up to the Austrian frontier on the TRIESTE-BOLZANO axis.

Phase II

Disarmament of the surrendered German forces by US and British formations not required for the other phases of this plan.

Phase III

Four divisions moving to the ITALY.

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PHASE II

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Three divisions moving to NW ITALY.

The above plan is given in terms of equivalent divisions. Actual composition of forces, and nationality of divisions for each of the above Phases, will depend on the plan made by CG 15 Army Group.

- d. Phase I will be carried out before the other Phases. Phase II will take place some time to complete and will be continuing during Phases III and IV. It is probable that most of the occupational forces will be established in AUSTRIA before these Phases have been completed.

9. Administrative Factors

The time required to open ports and restore railway communications will result in a long lead L of C in the initial stages of this plan. While administrative requirements of service units generally will be strained to meet the above and other plan, the availability of load carrying transport is likely to be the principal administrative limitation.

9. Transport required by HQ 15 Army Group to meet commitments in ITALY.

- a. Transport requirements have been estimated on the following assumptions:

- i. US divisions are in the PRATO-FLORENCE area.
ii. US divisions are in the MEDAN area.
iii. Australian reinforcements and pipelinks are in the POHL - BOLOGNA area.
Detailed calculations of requirements and availability of transport units are shown in Appendix "B".

- c. Summary of position is as follows: (all figures in equivalent 25 ton Trunk Coys and 3 ton GT Coys).

US Trunk Coys Br GT Coys

- d. Requirement to meet Phase I
in IV simultaneously

69 37

- ii. Availability of Trunk Coys and GT Coys in surrender conditions to support formation engaged in Phase I to IV

79 10

iii. Balance of Trunk Coys and GT Coys 10 3

The time required to open ports and restore railway communications will result in a long road E of C in the initial stages of this plan. While administrative resources of services with generally will be obtained to meet the above operational plan, the availability of land carrying transport is likely to be the principal administrative limitation.

2.

Transport required by HQ 15 Army Group to meet commitments in HADY.

a. Transport requirements have been outlined in the following summary:-

- i. US railroads are in the RALTO-FLORISSA area.
- ii. US railroads are in the HADYSSA area.
- iii. British railroads and pipelines are in the FORLI - BOLONGA area.

b. Detailed calculations of commitments and availability of transport units are shown in Appendix 'A'.

c. Summary of position is as follows: (all figures in equivalent of ten Truck Coys and 5 ten GT Coys).

i. Requirement to meet Phases I to IV simultaneously	69	37
--	----	----

ii. Availability of Truck Coys and GT Coys in current conditions to support formation engaged in Phases I to IV

iii. Bal use of Truck Coys and GT Coys	10	3
--	----	---

d. The balance of 58 Truck Coys and GT Coys as shown in sub-para c.ii above might be employed initially to assist in the movement of civil populations and later to maintain the occupational forces in Austria.

e. The scenario from which the transport shown in sub-para c.ii above might arise should be considered in the light of the theoretical distribution of transport at the time, but, in the case of GT Coys the following would be the means of its provision:-

i. Re-allocation of GT Coys now with armies.

ii. Re-allocation of 2nd and 3rd line transport of formations, not engaged in Phases I to IV.

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iii. Allocation of Artillery Fls.

iv. Units in transport allocated in the 1 of 6 to docks, depots, etc, have maintenance and miscellaneous details.

5. In order that a plan may be prepared which could be put into operation without delay, a review of the sources from which the required US and British transport is to be drawn should be made.

6. Transport is likely to be available under withdrawal conditions to support formations following up an enemy withdrawal. On the other hand, the occupation of North Africa is likely to be slow and will require their under surrender conditions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary of estimated strength of KASSELING's forces and considerations affecting their transport and movement are given in Appendix "G".

ADMINISTRATIVE

1. It is the Allied intention that KASSELING's forces should be kept separate from themselves. The object of 15 Army Group should therefore be to:

i. prevent the disintegration of enemy units and formations.

ii. reform into or raised behind such units as have disintegrated in the course of surrender.

iii. prevent the enemy from destroying his materials and stores.

2. KASSELING's forces should be concentrated in areas which will give the best opportunity for escape to the NORTH, where they will have the best chance of cover, can be easily maintained, and where they can be put to useful work in favour of Allied administrative requirements. The area between the River PO and Highway 9 largely meets these requirements, and German divisions and ancillary troops concentrated in the general vicinity of the PO and NORTH of the river should be concentrated there. Divisions in the area should be concentrated in those parts, but the concentration should be to two main formations SOUTH of the PO and in circumstances above. The area between the PO and Highway 9 (exclusive of this route and major towns in the area) should therefore be the main concentration area for KASSELING's

10. Summary of calculated strength of KROSSBILDER's forces and considerations affecting their surrender and disarmament are given in Appendix "C".

11. Administrative Aspects of KROSSBILDER's Surrender

2. It is the intention that KROSSBILDER's forces should be taken care of by themselves. The object of 15 Army Group should be to prevent the disintegration of enemy units and formations.

3. To prevent the disintegration of enemy units and formations.

4. To prevent the disintegration of enemy units and formations.

5. To prevent the enemy from destroying his materiel and facilities.

6. The KROSSBILDER's forces should be concentrated in areas which will give them an opportunity for escape to the WEST, where they will have a high degree of cover, can be easily maintained, and where they can be put to useful work in relief of Allied administrative personnel. The area between the River PO and Highway 9 is ideally suited for this purpose. The German divisions and artillery troops concentrated in the general vicinity of the PO and SAAR are to be moved to this area. The area between the PO and SAAR is to be used as a concentration area for KROSSBILDER's forces. The area should be to a depth of 12 miles from the EAST coast. The area should not be used.

12. Administrative Aspects of Surrender

2. The KROSSBILDER's forces may be technically in their own hands, but they are not available for them to be held in the area. It is the policy to hold under observation the major part of KROSSBILDER's forces in the main concentration area, keeping the remainder in their unit and formation organizations under their own command.

3. Such areas as are required for the maintenance and administration of KROSSBILDER's forces, should, subject to sub-paragraph 2, be kept intact. The maintenance requirements of the German forces should be the responsibility of some of these units.

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2. Recaptured enemy personnel should be segregated from the remainder of the enemy forces and should be moved to PW cages south of the ARDENNES. For this purpose it may be necessary to establish enclosures in or near the main concentration area for the temporary holding of these personnel prior to their removal to cages south of the ARDENNES. The establishment of these transit PW enclosures within or near the main concentration area should be an Army responsibility, the maximum use being made of German labour and materials.

4. Summary of PW camp accommodation in Italy is given at Appendix "A".

5. PW may be employed on construction and repair subject to the following conditions:-

- i. That they work under supervision.
- ii. That they are not employed on any work prohibited by Articles 9, IV and 32 of the Geneva Convention.

Maintenance

a. Supplies

i. Until they are exhausted, existing enemy stocks of food, medical stores, clothing etc should be used.

ii. When supplies are no longer available from enemy sources, the provision of food, medical stores, clothing etc should be an Allied responsibility. This estimated commitment, which is given in detail at para 3 of Appendix "A" should be an equal British and US responsibility. The German Army should draw the necessary supplies from Allied depots using their own transport.

b. Tentative Accommodation Schemes

While the German Army has no appreciable quantity of tentage they are equipped with bivouacs/shelter halves and groundshelters. Materials necessary to establish their own ablation and sanitary facilities etc should be available in their own dumps. In respect of these materials it should be the policy to make ARDENNES's forces provide their own requirements from their own resources. Establishment of these facilities should be carried out under Allied supervision to ensure economical use of materials.

Dec 1948
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1. That they work under supervision.

11. That they are not employed on any work prohibited by Articles 9, 11 and 12 of the Geneva Convention.

Maintenance

A. Supplies

1. Until they are exhausted, existing enemy stocks of food, clothing stores, clothing etc should be used.

11. When supplies are no longer available from enemy sources, the provision of food, medical stores, clothing etc should be an Allied responsibility. This estimated commitment, which is given in detail at para 3 of Appendix "A" should be an equal British and US responsibility. The German Army should draw the necessary supplies from Allied depots using their own transport.

B. Tentage and Accommodation Stores

While the German Army has no appreciable quantity of tentage they are equipped with bivouacs/shelter halves and groundsheet. Materials necessary to establish their own ablation and sanitary facilities etc should be available in their own dumps. In respect of these materials it should be the policy to make Kesselring's forces provide their own requirements from their own resources. Establishment of these facilities should be carried out under Allied supervision to ensure economical use of materials.

C. Administrative units

German service units required for the maintenance of Kesselring's forces should continue to be employed for this purpose. As it is intended to replace Allied military transport employed on the movement of civil supplies by German motor transport, the maximum use should be made of animal transport for the maintenance of Kesselring's forces. Any animals not required for this purpose should be taken over and used to meet Allied military and civil requirements.

ESTABLISHMENT OF A CP C INFO AUSTRIA

General

From para 9 above it will be noted that sufficient transport is not likely to be available to maintain the full force in AUSTRIA until

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- a. Railroads and bulk petrol pipelines can be established considerably nearer to AUSTRIA than those set out at para 5 above.
 - b. A port has been opened considerably nearer to AUSTRIA than existing railheads through which maintenance requirements for forces in AUSTRIA can be imported.
15. Use of C for Forces in AUSTRIA
- a. Choice of L of C for the occupational forces in AUSTRIA will depend on the degree of damage to rail and road communications and also, in respect of the latter, on the political situation in Western Europe. It is essential, therefore, that planning of the maintenance requirements is done to support the occupational forces should be flexible. If these considerations allow it is intended to develop L of C as follows:
 - a. The US intend to use WILHELM as the port through which the maintenance requirements for their forces in AUSTRIA will be imported. They will be moved from that port by rail and road via BOLOGNA, and the BREMEN route. This is a convenient L of C but will involve a very expensive in transport until the BREMEN rail route has been opened. Later, US forces in AUSTRIA may be maintained from the L of C running through SOUTH GERMANY.
 - b. In view of the longer distances to the British zone by the BREMEN route, the British intend to use WILHELM as the main port for the import of maintenance supplies for the British occupational forces and to move supplies Northwards from this port into AUSTRIA by the coast through L of C. WILHELM will not be required for the import of military tonnage unless political considerations should preclude the use of WILHELM in which case it will be necessary to develop WILHELM as a military port.
 - c. WILHELM should be British controlled and operated in respect of all tonnage handled. As the Eighth Army will be responsible for the occupation of Western Europe, and, later, for the British zone in Germany, initially the port should be the responsibility of the Eighth Army, its opening and development being a first priority task. Its responsibility should be subject to the following restrictions:
 1. Allocation of tonnage imported through BREMEN as between the Eighth Army and other holders, whose maintenance was not the responsibility of the Eighth Army, should be made by AWHQ.
 2. The use of the port should be governed by AWHQ in

covered in order should be flexible. If these considerations allow it is intended to level 1a of C as follows:

The US intend to use 120000 as the part through which the United States requirements for their forces in ALGERIA will be met. They will be moved from that part by rail and road via BOLOGNE and the NORMAN route. This is a convenient L of C but will involve extensive in transport until the NORMAN rail route can be opened. In fact, US forces in ALGERIA may be maintained from the L of C running through SOUTH AFRICA.

In view of the longer distance to the British zone by the NORMAN route, the British intend to use TUNISIA as the main port for the L of C of maintenance supplies for the British occupational forces and to have supplies Northwards from this port into ALGERIA by the L of C designed L of C. VESICOR will not be required for the import of military tonnage unless political considerations should prohibit the use of TUNISIA in which case it will be necessary to develop TUNISIA as a military port.

TUNISIA should be British controlled and operated in respect of all tonnage handled. As the Eighth Army will be responsible for the occupation of VESICOR, and, later, for the British zone in ALGERIA, initially the port should be the responsibility of HQ Eighth Army, its expansion and development being a first priority task. Its responsibility should be subject to the following reservations:

i. Allocation of tonnage imported through TUNISIA as between HQ Eighth Army and other bidders, whose maintenance was not the responsibility of HQ Eighth Army, should be made by AFHQ.

ii. The plan for the port should be prepared by AFHQ in consultation with HQ Eighth Army, FMH and US Base Section (concerned). The Chairman of the Joint Board, in which these authorities could be represented, should be provided by AFHQ.

Should US tonnage require to be imported through TUNISIA, they will be handled by the British, the US giving countervailing assistance by following British resources, including transport, employed at a port elsewhere in ITALY.

At Appendix "A", para 5, it is estimated that 6,000 tons per day is likely to be the maximum tonnage required to be handled through TUNISIA at any one time.

TUNISIA should be developed more as a transit port than as advanced base, installations being kept to a minimum both as regards number and size. Such advanced base installations as may be required for the support of the British occupational zone and which may not be situated near the port, should be situated in ALGERIA.

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ARMED MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN ITALY

16.
 - a. AM Detachments with Fifth and Eighth Armies will advance with the armies at its current practices. The method by which military government will be imposed in VALENZA CIVIL is still under consideration.
 - b. Army rear boundaries are likely to be moved forward rapidly in the event of a German surrender or withdrawal. Regional HQs of the Allied Commission, should, therefore, plan with District HQs and PRS in respect of the areas of occupation behind Army boundaries.

PROVISION AND DISTRIBUTION OF CIVIL SUPPLIES IN NORTH ITALY

17.
 - a. Requirements
 - b. Civil requirements for NORTH ITALY are summarized at Appendix "A", part I.
 - c. Requisite rate by month will depend on the speed at which NORTH ITALY is occupied and the facilities available for distribution. The following is a survey, produced as a guide only, of the estimated civil supply tonnage requirements compiled on the following assumptions:

- i. The full occupation of NORTH ITALY takes place progressively over a period of two months.
- ii. Civil supply items are provided from imported sources to enable an import ratio of 100 tonnes to be supplied in the first month, rising to 200 tonnes in the second and 300 tonnes in the third month.

iii. Civil, IOL and reconstruction supplies are phased in, in accordance with the Distribution Facilities.

Serial	Item	First Month	Second Month	Third Month
1	Civil Supplies	1,600 tpd	3,400 tpd	5,650 tpd
2	Coal	-	1,000 tpd	4,100 tpd
3	Packed IOL	400 tpd	750 tpd	750 tpd
4	Reconstruction Supplies	-	-	250 tpd
5	TOTAL	2,000 tpd	5,150 tpd	10,750 tpd

iv. Tonnage between 1st and 3rd months and the remainder of NORTH ITALY is

1. Civil requirements for NORTH ITALY are summarized at Appendix "A", page 1.

2. Requirements by month will depend on the speed at which NORTH ITALY is occupied and the facilities available for distribution. This is based on a survey, produced as a guide only, of the estimated civil supply tonnage requirements compiled on the following assumptions:

- i. A full occupation of NORTH ITALY takes place progressively over a period of two months.
- ii. Civil supply items are provided from imported sources to enable an initial ration of 100 grams to be supplied in the first month, rising to 200 grams in the second and 300 grams in the third month.
- iii. Coal, fuel and reconstruction supplies are phased in, in accordance with the distribution facilities.

Serial	Item	First Month	Second Month	Third Month
1	Civil Supplies	1,600 tpd	3,400 tpd	5,650 tpd
2	Coal	-	1,000 tpd	4,100 tpd
3	Packed fuel	400 tpd	750 tpd	750 tpd
4	Reconstruction Supplies	-	-	250 tpd
5	TOTAL	2,000 tpd	5,150 tpd	10,750 tpd

5. Spread between the first and the remainder of NORTH ITALY is defined as follows:

	First Month	Second Month	Third Month
NORTH ITALY	1,150 tpd	3,200 tpd	7,600 tpd
Remainder of NORTH ITALY	850 tpd	1,950 tpd	3,150 tpd
TOTAL	2,000 tpd	5,150 tpd	10,750 tpd

6. Requirements as shown above may be reduced if surrendered after July when the harvest will be available.

Distribution of Civil Supplies

7. General

The rate of acceptance of civil supplies will be governed by

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the possibility of distribution. The problem of internal distribution should be eased after July when the harvest will be available, and transport will not be required to the same extent on long hauls to main centers of distribution.

b. Military Assistance

It is considered that the following military assistance should be given to HQ Allied Commission for the distribution of civilian supplies :-

- | | | |
|------|--------------------|--|
| i. | 500 tons at BUKA | } This has already been accepted as a British military commitment. These should be 45 and British equivalents respectively and would require 10 US Truck days and 3 British OT days - shown to be available in para 2. |
| ii. | 400 tons at VERONA | |
| iii. | 350 tons at BUKA | |

Since tank transport and truck days would be required for the movement of military supplies when AUSTRALIA is occupied, this assistance should only be assumed to be available for a period not exceeding one month.

c. Other Transport

The following non-military transport might be available to assist in distribution :-

- i. Local indigenous vehicles which if it is estimated will be sufficient only to distribute imported supplies from provincial depots to outlying areas, and for the carriage of local produce.
- ii. Transport available at the time from HQ Allied Commission resources, (probably only a small amount).
- iii. 1,750 trucks on order from WASHINGTON estimated to be available here by mid-April and the remainder by late May.
- iv. 2,000 trucks on order from WASHINGTON due to arrive between May and late July.
- v. Central army transport. After allowing for the requirement for the maintenance of the surrendered army, some 5,000 vehicles might be available, of which about 2,000 operators may be turned into transport companies under Allied supervision.

0033

require 10 US Truck
Coy and 5 British Coy - shown to be
available in para 9.

Given these transport and truck coy would be required for the
movement of military supplies when AMBROS is occupied, this
assumption should only be assumed to be available for a period not
exceeding 48 hours.

c. Other Transport

The following non-military transport might be available to assist in
distribution:

- i. Local indigenous vehicles which it is estimated will be
sufficient only to distribute imported supplies from provincial
centres to outlying areas, and for the carriage of local pro-
duce.
- ii. Transport available at the time from HQ Allied Commission
resources, (probably only a small amount).
- iii. 1,000 trucks on order from WASHINGTON estimated to be available
late May by mid-June and the remainder by late May.
- iv. 2,000 trucks on order from WASHINGTON due to arrive between
May and late July.
- v. Captured enemy transport. After allowing for the requirement
for the maintenance of the surrendered enemy, some 5,000
vehicles might be available, of which about 2,000, operated
by 17 former Axis transport companies under Allied super-
vision, would be needed to replace the military vehicles
lost in para 3, above.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PARTICIPANTS IN HOSTILITIES/REPT. AND ACTIONS

Participating

There are estimated to be about 100,000 Indian participants who have been
operating in NORTH AFRICA in support of the allies. It is SOG's policy
to treat those persons who voluntarily when they are liberated. They will be
disarmament in specified areas where they will be armed, disarmed and
and employment. While they are in collecting centres, the participants will
be paid, clothed, fed and given medical treatment. 40s fifth and eighth
action in conjunction with their attached HQ, will be responsible for their
coefficient in support of participants located within the army areas. 18 Allied
Commission will be similarly responsible in respect of participants located
in the rear areas. Action and clothing needs and sources of
provision will be satisfied by HQ. It is anticipated that participants may

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be held in collecting centers for periods of up to three months, but it will be the responsibility of HQ Allied Commission to find them employment as soon as possible, either in the Italian Army or as labor to assist the military, or in Italian industry and agriculture. In dealing with patriot forces, the provisions in this HQ signal # 26948 dated 14.05.1945 will apply.

20.

Refugees and Displaced Persons

These persons, with the exception of Russians, are the responsibility of the Allied Commission for all purposes. Russians will be a military responsibility. Initially these persons should be subject to the "Stand Still" order, issued through military channels, for a minimum period of thirty days. In particular, responsibility for screening and registration should be that of HQ Allied Commission and HQ Staffs attached to HQ Fifth and Ninth Armies in accordance with G-2. The subsequent movement of refugees and displaced persons should be the responsibility of HQ Allied Commission as part of the overall plan in respect of these persons, movement requirements being co-ordinated with the military authorities concerned.

GUARANTEEING THE FUTURE OF ITALY (See Appendix "E")

21.

2. Instructions have already been issued regarding the area of responsibility of HQ 2 District in HQ Italy. It is considered that, at a later stage, on the assumption of responsibility by HQ 2 District, the boundary of HQ 2 District should be extended so that the whole of the Comptinent of Italy (except the Province of Fiume) is included in the territory of HQ 2 District, since such an arrangement would also the military and civil boundaries as nearly coincident as possible. In these circumstances the province of Fiume might be included in HQ 2 District's area.

3.

As it is intended that HQ 2 District in Italy will be maintained from 1 January by the Italian Army, the HQ will require a corridor from Bologna running north to the German. HQ should gradually assume responsibility for this corridor as the rear boundary of Fifth Army moves northwards.

4.

The present area of HQ 1 District's responsibility should be extended northwards to follow the rear boundary of Eighth Army. Eighth Army, with an area HQ under control, should, however, remain responsible initially for VENEZIA CIVILE.

5.

The present area of HQ 2 District's responsibility will be taken over by HQ 1 and 3 Districts as defined in para 15 of HQ letter LG 691.711/005 GTR-0 dated 3 Jan 45.

21.

STATISTICAL DATA SUMMARY (See Appendix "E")

1. Intra- as well as already been issued regarding the area of responsibility of HQ 2 District in Italy. It is considered that, at a later stage, on the assumption of responsibility by HQ 2 District, the responsibility of HQ 2 District should be extended so that the whole of the Comptech area of responsibility (except the Province of Mantova) is included in the territory of HQ 2 District, since such an arrangement would make the military and civil boundaries as nearly coincident as possible. In these circumstances the Province of Mantova might be included in HQ 2 District's area.

2.

As it is intended that US Forces in Austria will be maintained from 1950 onwards by the Austrian State, the US will require a corridor from BOISSE, running north to the RHEIN. This should gradually assume responsibility for this corridor as the rear boundary of Fifth Army moves backwards.

3.

The present area of HQ 1 District's responsibility should be extended northwards to follow the rear boundary of Fifth Army. Fifth Army, with an area HQ under command, should, however, remain responsible initially for VIENNA CIVIL.

4.

The present area of HQ 2 District's responsibility will be taken over by HQ 1 and 3 Districts as defined in para 15 of ARHQ letter 10 091.711/005 GTP-0 dated 3 Jan 45.

5.

The recommended layout to conform with the principles set out in the sub-areas 2 to 4 above is given in Appendix "F" attached.

DEVELOPMENT OF ROAD AND COMMUNICATIONS

22.

Parts

1.

Main parts in WESTERN ITALY are likely to be used for the following purposes. They should be developed as a military and civil responsibility as shown below.

Part

Traffic

2.

Responsibility for the transport of civil and military and of a small military force for the occupational troops in NW ITALY

Ordering, occupation and development

As defined in ARHQ letter 10 323/061 GTP-0 dated 25 Jan 45.

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<u>Item</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Origin, operation and development</u>
TRUCKS	Military part for the maintenance of forces in VIETNAM, CHINA, and elsewhere and for the transport of civil supplies for the army and others. They also required for the transport of civil supplies for the army.	Military responsibility (see para 15 d. above)
RAILS	Transport of civil supplies and possibly bulk petrol	Responsibility HQ Allied Commission
STUFFS	Not required for military purposes; when opened would be used for the transport of civil supplies.	Civil responsibility

2. Tonnage requirements

It is estimated that the following approximate tonnages will have to be transported through military controlled ports:

<u>Part</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civil</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
TRUCKS	3,000 tpd	3,000 tpd	6,000 tpd	Breakdown of tonnage is given in Appendix 1.
STUFFS	1,000 tpd	0	1,000 tpd	Only 2,000 tpd discharged and cleared as military responsibility.

3. Air transport requirements

The estimated tonnage of the time required to open the main ports in NORTH VIETNAM is as follows:

<u>Part</u>	<u>Time Required</u>	<u>Made up by</u>
TRUCKS	6 - 8 weeks	4 - 6 weeks air transport via Isthmian coast, 2 weeks salvaging work.
STUFFS	10 - 12 weeks	8 - 10 weeks air transport if early occupation of ISTHMIAN forces us to sweep the longer and more heavily mined route

needed for the import of
civil supplies.

2. Estimated requirements

It is suggested that the following approximate tonnages will have to be imported through military controlled ports:

Port	Military	Civil	Total	Remarks
TRINIDAD	3,000 tpd	3,000 tpd	6,000 tpd	breakdown of tonnage is given in Appendix "A".
GUAYAMA	1,000 " 3,000 to 7,000 "	4,000 "		Only 2,000 tpd discharged and cleared as a military responsibility.

3. Mineral, Civil and Naval Salvage

The following estimate of the time required to open the main ports in TRINIDAD is as follows:

Port	Time Required	Made up by
TRINIDAD	6 - 8 weeks	4 - 6 weeks minesweeping via Intruder boat, 2 weeks salvage work.
	10 - 12 weeks	8 - 10 weeks minesweeping, if enemy occupation of ISABELLA forces us to sweep the longer and more heavily mined route via VENEZUELA.
SAINT PIERRE	8 weeks	4 weeks minesweeping, 2 weeks salvage work to penetrate the block-ships.
VENEZUELA	10 - 15 weeks	6 - 8 weeks minesweeping, perhaps 4 - 6 weeks salvage work and dredging.

In the time required for minesweeping and civil salvage, units with capability for port clearance and repairs should have carried out initial works on the quays, except in the case of GUAYAMA where special conditions may necessitate bringing repair units and equipment in by sea. Naval minesweeping and salvage resources are available to enable the ports of TRINIDAD and GUAYAMA to be opened.

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simultaneously. The port of VIENTIANE cannot be opened at the same time without considerably reducing the above figures. Naval port parties are, however, available for THAKHEK, CHONG and VIENTIANE.

d. Port Repair

CHONG and CHONG. contain many deep-water berths and if systematic demolition of these parts has not been carried out, the port repair units available should be sufficient to repair the facilities required at these parts. There are not likely to be any other units available to repair VIENTIANE until such units can be obtained from THAKHEK or CHONG.

e. Transportation and Personnel

There should be sufficient British, Indian, Dutch, American, Chinese and US port facilities, allowing for civil stevedores, labour now employed and estimated to be available, to handle military commitments at CHONG. It is unlikely that any transportation units will be available which could be given to the Allied Commission to assist in the operation of CHONG. GI and Truck Coys for port clearance are allowed for in appendix "g".

f. Lighting

About 6,000 tons of lighting has been earmarked on the East coast for CHONG, CHONG parts. This will meet the requirements at THAKHEK (not likely to be more than 2,000 - 3,000 tons) and the balance will be available for VIENTIANE, where initially, ships for the port will be worked over. There is about 3,000 tons of lighting for CHONG available on the West coast. The IT Coys available in CHONG will be sufficiently sufficient to meet requirements and it will be necessary to train local civilians as quickly as possible at CHONG and VIENTIANE to handle harbour craft.

g. Military Assistance to the Allied Commission

The assistance to be given to the Allied Commission for the opening and operation of CHONG is defined in JAG letter J. 323/54 CHC-0 dated 23 Jan 1945. In respect to VIENTIANE and military units are likely to be available to assist in opening and operation of the port and the Allied Commission should, therefore, rely on civilian personnel. The only assistance which will be provided from military sources would be certain personnel and equipment in the form of Movement Control and

There should be sufficient British Dockyard Operating Coys and US Port & Harbours, allowing for civil stevedore labour now employed and not to be available, to handle military commitments at Italian ports. It is unlikely that any transportation units will be sent to which could be given to US Allied Commission to assist the operation of Italian ports. US and French Coys for port clearance are allowed for in Appendix 'A'.

Lighting

About 6,000 tons of lighting has been earmarked on the Italian coast for NORTH AFRICA ports. This will meet the requirements at TRIPOLI (not likely to be more than 2,000 - 3,000 tons) and the balance will be available for MED, where initially, ships for the port will be worked separately. There is about 3,000 tons of lighting for MED available in the WEST coast. The US Navy and USMC in MED will be severely sufficient to meet requirements and it will be necessary to train local civilians as quickly as possible at MED and MED to handle harbour craft.

Military Assistance to US Allied Commission

The assistance to be given to US Allied Commission for the opening and operation of MED is defined in JFM letter 532/04 dated 23 Jan 1945. In respect to MED no military units are likely to be available to assist the opening and operation of the port and US Allied Commission should, therefore, rely on civilian personnel. The only assistance which can be provided from military sources would be certain or civilian and assistance in the form of Movement Control and Engineer supervision.

Devotion of Resources

It is possible that in the event of German withdrawal or surrender, German resources will continue to hold out in one or more of these main Mediterranean ports. In such circumstances arrangements would have to be made to divert resources from one port to another.

Roads

a. The priority of repair of roads will depend on :-

- i. The operational plan, and
- ii. The nature of demolitions.

b. The previously planned plans for the occupation of NORTH ITALY are set out in para 7 c. above. In fact to demolitions which may enable an alternative route to be required in the event of suggested that roads should be developed and responsibility for their repair allotted as follows :-

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Priority 1 - Fifth Army Front to BOLOGNA - MODENA.

- VERONA.

Eighth Army Front to BOLOGNA - PAVIA -
- MILAN.

Priority 2 - VERONA - MANTOVA.

Priority 3 - Best route MILAN-OSTRE-TRENT.

MODENA - PAVIA.

Priority 4 - GERA - BERGAMO.

Priority 5 - PAVIA - ALESSANDRIA - TURIN.

Best route to MILAN.

Priority 6 - Best route 1 of 6 from TRENT
to MILAN.

There should be enough bridging material to carry out the reconstruction of the above roads provided that only about 50% mobilization is contemplated. The policy governing the use of PW on roads is given in para 12 e, above.

Until all routes are open to BOLOGNA to handle the transport of construction material, transport by road across the remaining gap to a backstop for Fifth Army and 2 District.

Railways

Many conditions and damage done by Allied bombing especially to BOLOGNA will make the repair of railways a long term project. Priorities for repair of railways should, therefore, be allotted with a view to:

1. Making long terminations, and

2. Releasing transport for other tasks as quickly as possible.

Priorities for repair of railways are at present allotted as follows:

Priority 1 - MANTOVA-BOLOGNA
- PAVIA - MILAN-PAVIA

Priority 2 - Best route to PAVIA.

Priority 6 - Is at disposal 1 of 3 from TRIESTE to ALGERIA.

2 District
: Eighth Army

- a. There should be enough bridging material to carry out the reconstruction of the above roads provided that only about 50% demolition is encountered. The policy governing the use of PW on this work is given in para 12.2. above.
- b. Until 11 routes are open to BOLOGNA to handle the transport of military stores material, transport by road across the ALPENNINES may be a possibility for Fifth Army and 2 District.

Buildup

- c. Many demolitions and damage done by Allied bombing especially to PW bridges will make the repair of railways a long term project. Priorities for repair of railways should, therefore, be allotted with a view to:

- i. Making long term commitments, and
 - ii. Making transport for other tasks as quickly as possible.
- Priority for repair of railways are at present allotted as follows:

Priority 1 - LERVEN-ERATO-BOLIGNA
Dormans line ANCOUL-PALENA

Priority 2 - Best route to FERRARA

Priority 3 - CANTON-ALCORA

- d. In the event of PW stock being uncovered before the remainder of PW, priority for the repair of railways in NW ITALY, certain at the extent of demolition, has been laid down as follows (22/3 letter 23 103/561 GNS-5 dated 25 Jan 1945):

i. VERONA-ALCORA-FERRA

ii. VERONA-FERRA-VERON

iii. W. coast route to MILAN

iv. CANTON-ALCORA

- e. In the event of a German surrender or withdrawal involving the

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uncovering of the state of NORTH VIETNAM priorities in sub-priorities and 1 above should be adjusted, contingent on the extent of conditions, to conform with the following order of priority :-

- Priority 1. Single line HANOI-HOANGMA
- Priority 2. Completion of line PHU THO-CHIAO-BOCHONG
- Priority 3. Single line BOCHONG-CHIAO
- Priority 4. Best route BOCHONG-HANOI

There are construction units available to work on both priorities 1 and 2 above. It should also be possible to start working on Priority 3 before those are completed. It is considered that as the building of a 10 bridge will be a long term job, construction units should be set to work on this task as early as possible.

If the development of the railway forward of TRIENH is required before the completion in sub-priorities 1, above are completed, such development would be a competing requirement for transportation units.

How to NORTH VIETNAM IWT System

The system has generally fallen into a state of disrepair since it is suited to the main flow of enemy supply from NORTH to SOUTH. The majority of serviceable craft have been withdrawn either for extensive repairs or for use as pontoon crossings of the PHU THO River or major bridges destroyed by allied air attack. Fallen bridges were block navigable channels at a number of points. Dredgers and tugs have been withdrawn to operational units. Further damage may occur as a result of enemy intentions to flood the PHU THO Valley and destroy locks and dams. Extensive mining may also be envisaged by the enemy if he has not already done so.

It is considered that sections of the IWT system might best be used for distribution of local produce where serviceable craft are found in short navigable stretches of waterway. Local wheat produce from the PHU THO area might be distributed to the HANOI-CHIAO area. Dairy produce from the CHIAO-BOCHONG area might be delivered to the HANOI-CHIAO area. It would not be safe to plan on the use of inland waterways for movement of large tonnages of civil supplies over long distances.

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Plan of Rail and TMT System

1. The development of the railway forward of THAMME is required before the priorities in sub-item 1, above are completed, such development would be a greatly requirement for transportation units.

2. The system has generally fallen into a state of disrepair since it is sited in the main flow of enemy supply from NORTH to SOUTH. The majority of serviceable craft have been withdrawn either to conserve traffic or for use as position coverings if the possibility of an air attack is destroyed by Allied air attack. Traction units are also available elsewhere at a number of points. Engines and tugs have been withdrawn to operational units. Further damage may occur as a result of enemy intentions to the PO Valley and destroy tracks and lines. Extensive mining is also being carried out by the enemy if he has not already done so.

3. It is considered that sections of the RMT system might best be used for distribution of local produce where serviceable craft are few. In short, reliable stretches of railway. Local short produce from the THAMME area might be distributed to the NORTH. Early evidence from the GUNDA-THAMME area might be collected in the early morning. It would not be safe to plan for the use of inland waterways for movement of large tonnages of goods supplies over long distances.

4. It is unlikely that military craft can be introduced into the PO and Traction system until after VERITY is opened, which may not be until 5-6 months after capture. For military craft are in any case subject to be requisitioned for interconnecting quays and locks. No military units will be available. As it is recognized under item 2, above that the RMT system should be used for air transport, its development should be the responsibility of HQ. The Contingent. Plans should be made to make the system one of this system of transportation.

26.

Plan ofPlan of Present Pipeline

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1. The enemy: The construction of the pipeline planned to follow the main artery to the THAMME Gap should be secured if circumstances occur on the present line. The other Highth deep pipeline should be extended to SOUTH.

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11. Fifth Army: One of the Fifth Army pipelines should terminate at BOLZONA, the other being extended as rapidly as possible to VERONA. The feasibility of the extension of the line beyond VERONA is still under examination. It might also be necessary to provide a third pipeline to BOLZONA.

B. GENOA

Plans have been made to provide bulk facilities at GENOA to meet military and civil requirements. One 4-inch pipeline will be provided from GENOA to ALESSANDRIA.

C. TRIESTE

Plans have been made to provide bulk facilities at TRIESTE on similar lines to those at GENOA to meet military and civil requirements except that construction work at TRIESTE will be undertaken by military personnel. This development can take place at alternately with the development of the pipeline FOGGIA-MI-BANJA and ALESSANDRIA-VERONA, and with the provision of bulk facilities at GENOA. No pipeline supplies, however, will be available to construct a pipeline NORTH into AUSTRIA from TRIESTE unless materials are recovered from the taking up of existing authorized constructions.

d. VERONA

VERONA is the largest bulk installations in the Northern ALPS. The installations will be rehabilitated to supply civil requirements but should be a lower priority to projects A, B, and C. Above in the use of military resources. HQ Allied Commission should be responsible for the rehabilitation of these installations making maximum use of civilian personnel and resources.

RE-ORGANIZATION OF ALLIED FORCES NECESSARY CONSEQUENT ON GENOA SURVEILLER

27. Allied administrative resources forward of railheads will be strained to their utmost for some time after a German surrender. From an administrative point of view it is, therefore, essential that all unnecessary formations and units which can readily be moved should be withdrawn as soon as possible to areas near developed ports and railheads from which they can be most economically maintained or be used for any tasks to which they

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Plans have been made to provide bulk facilities at TRINITE of similar kind to those at GERM. To meet military and civil requirements except that construction work at TRINITE will be undertaken by military personnel. This development can take place simultaneously with the development of the pipelines ROSSIA, GIL-WOLONG, and RUMCOSS-SPRONA, and with the provision of bulk facilities at GERM. No pipeline supplies, however, will be available to construct a pipeline WYNN into AUSTRAL from THIRUM unless materials are recovered from the taking up of existing authorized constructions.

3. WHITE

VISION is the largest bulk installations in the Northern HEMISPHERE. The installations will be rehabilitated to supply civil requirements but should be a lower priority to projects B, C, D, and E. Above in the use of military resources. HQ Allied Commission should be responsible for the rehabilitation of these installations making maximum use of civilian personnel and resources.

RE-ORGANIZATION OF ALLIED FORCES NECESSARY CONSEQUENT ON GERMAN SURRENDER

27. a. Allied administrative resources forward of railroads will be directed to their utmost for some time after a German surrender. From an administrative point of view it is, therefore, essential that all unnecessary formations and units which can readily be moved should be withdrawn as soon as possible to areas near developed ports and railroads from which they can be most economically maintained or be used for any tasks to which they can be conveniently converted.
- b. Administrative units of formations not required for operational or occupational tasks and withdrawn to base and I of C areas might be used to assist in base and I of C work relieving AHCQ services to one so that the latter may augment those working with AHCQ.
- c. The present organization of certain service units will be unsuitable for static tasks and consideration should be given to their re-organization to fit them for their new static functions.

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MAIN CONCLUSIONS

Maintenance of 15 Army Group (paras 7 - 9)

- a. Under surrender conditions it is considered that it will be possible to make available to Allies sufficient load-carrying transport to enable them to accept the surrender of KESSELING's Army and to undertake the occupation of NE and NW ITALY simultaneously.
- b. If occupational forces are moved into AUSTRIA before the port of TRIESTE is open, or the BRENNER rail route is partially restored, the increased transport commitment will limit the size of the forces which can be maintained in NE and NW ITALY until rail communications in NORTH ITALY have been developed.

Administration of KESSELING's forces (paras 10 - 13)

1. KESSELING's forces should be made to administer themselves.
2. They should be held under observation in the general area between the River Adige and Highway 9 (exclusive of this route and major towns in the area). They should retain their formation and unit organizations. Only reinforcements should be moved to NW areas SOUTH of the APENNINES.
3. The maximum use of German service units and administrative resources should be made.

Re-establishment of L of G into AUSTRIA (paras 14 - 15)

- a. Selection of L of G can only be provisional at this stage as planning must be flexible.
- b. Subject to c. above, the US Zone should be maintained by the BRENNER route, and the British Zone by the least damaged L of G running NORTH from the port of TRIESTE.
- c. TRIESTE should be British controlled and operated in respect of all tonnage handled, and initially make the responsibility of RAGTH Army. This responsibility should be subject to certain specific reservations as given in para 15 d.
- d. TRIESTE should be developed more as a transit port than as an advanced base, and should be capable of handling up to 6,000 tpd.

Provision and distribution of Civil Supplies in NORTH ITALY (paras 17 - 18)

30. Establishment of I of C into Austria (para 14 - 15)

- a. Establishment of I of C into Austria should be made to administer themselves.
- b. They should be held under observation in the general area between the 45th and 46th Highway 9 (exclusive of this route and major towns in the area). They should retain their formation and unit organization. Only reinforcements should be moved to by cargo SOUTH of the ARDENNES.
- c. The movement of German service units and administrative resources should be as follows:

31. Establishment of I of C into Austria (para 14 - 15)

- a. Solution of I of C can only be provisional at this stage as planning must be flexible.
- b. Subject to c. above, the US Zone should be maintained by the 8th Army, and the British Zone by the 1st Army (initially of 6 running NORTH from the port of FORT).
- c. The 8th Army should be British controlled and operated in respect of all transport, fuel, and initially under the responsibility of 8th Army. This responsibility should be subject to certain specific reservations as given in para 15 d.
- d. The 8th Army should be developed more as a transit port than as an advanced base, and should be capable of handling up to 6,000 tpd.

32. Evolution and Distribution of Civil Supplies in NORTH ZONE (para 17 - 18)

Military assistance in respect of the movement of civil supplies should be given to the Allied Commission as follows:-

- a. 500 tpd to USA (British military responsibility)
- b. 400 tpd to 7th Army (US military responsibility)
- c. 350 tpd to DIA (British military responsibility)

The Allied Commission should plan on this assistance being available for use month only.

33. Static War Reserve (para 21)

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- a. The present area of the No. 1 District's responsibility should be extended North-Eastwards, following the rear boundary of 8th Army, to the Northern boundary of 7th Army. Initially HQ 8th Army should remain responsible for VARELA GUERRE.

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b. The area of responsibility of HQ No. 2 District in NE ITALY as given in previous instructions should be later extended Eastwards to include all the provinces of the Comptennente of LOMBARDIA except that of MANTOVA. The province of PAVIA should also be included in the responsibility of HQ No. 2 District.

c. HQ should control the corridor on the axis of the BOLOGNA - BRESCIA route.

35. Development of Ports and Communications

a. Ports (para 22)

- i. The VB should be a military port. VENICE should be used for coastal supplies and should be operated by HQ Allied Commission.
- ii. There should be sufficient naval and military resources to open TRIESTE and TIENTSIN simultaneously. No military assistance, other than certain organizational assistance, supervisory in nature, can be given to HQ Allied Commission to assist in the opening and operation of VENICE.

b. Roads (para 23)

Main priorities for repair, subject to conditions at the time, should be as given below.

Priority 1. BOLOGNA to VERONA and to PAVIA

Priority 2. VERONA to the BRESCIA

Priority 3. PAVIA to TRIESTE and MODENA to PIACENZA

Priority 4. GENOVA to ALESSANDRIA

Priority 5. PIACENZA to TIENTSIN and the best route to MILAN

Priority 6. Least damaged route running NORTH from TRIESTE to AUSTRIA.

c. Railways (para 24)

In the event of surrender taking place in ITALY, present planned priorities for the repair of rail routes should be adjusted. Subject to conditions at the time, they should be as follows :-

...should be reported by the Allied Commission.

11. There should be sufficient naval and military resources to cover GENOVA and TRIESTE simultaneously. No military assistance, other than certain organizational assistance, supervisory in nature, can be given to the Allied Commission to assist in the handling and operation of GENOVA.

12. Roads (para 23)

Main priorities for roads, subject to conditions at the time, should be as given below.

- Priority 1. BOLOGNA to VERONA and to PAVIA
- Priority 2. VERONA to the ANICONS
- Priority 3. PAVIA to TRIESTE and MODENA to PIACENZA
- Priority 4. GENOVA to ALESSANDRIA
- Priority 5. PIAZZOLA to TURIN and the best route to MILAN
- Priority 6. Latest damaged route running NORTH from TRIESTE to GENOVA.

13. Railways (para 24)

In the event of surrender taking place in ITALY, present planned priorities for the repair of rail routes should be adjusted. Subject to conditions at the time, they should be as follows:-

- Priority 1. Single line PAVIA - BOLOGNA
- Priority 2. Completion of line PAVIA - BRILLANZA - BOLOGNA
- Priority 3. Single line BOLOGNA - PAVIA
- Priority 4. Best route BOLOGNA - VERONA

14. ICE (para 25)

Reports of the condition of the ICE system in NORTH ITALY make it unlikely that this method of transport will give any great assistance in the early stages to the movement of supplies in NORTH ITALY. It should, however, be used to the maximum extent possible for the movement of civil supplies, and its development should be the responsibility of the Allied Commission.

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5. Bulk POL (para 26)

Present oil and pipeline projects should be adjusted. One pipeline should be given priority to GERMANY as rapidly as possible, and one of the 21st Army pipelines should be extended to BELGIUM. Similarly, in these pipeline developments, it should be possible to provide bulk facilities at BRUSSELS and GERMANY. The allocation of military resources for the rehabilitation of POLAND should be a lower priority than the above requirements. Rehabilitation of POLAND should be the responsibility of the Allied Commission, making use of civil personnel and resources.

6. Re-organization of Allied Forces necessary consequent on German Surrender (para 27)

- a. Operation units not required in the forward areas should be withdrawn to base areas to facilitate their maintenance.
- b. To meet the regular requirements arising from surrender conditions, the organization of certain units may have to be revised to fit them for static tasks.

Operation - units not required in the forward areas should be withdrawn as soon as possible to facilitate their winter work.

To meet the peculiar requirements arising from superior conditions, the organization of certain units may have to be revised to fit them. Our staffs, please.

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MINIMUM DATA

APPENDIX "A"
to LOS. P. 177
Control 19 Mar 45

1. NOTE

During the phase of operations involving the occupation of NORTH ITALY, the maintenance requirements of that portion of a div also forward of RH are included in the following data :-

2. British

1. Strength :-

Personnel	25,000
Vehicles (incl W/cycles)	6,000
11. <u>Maintenance :-</u>	<u>tpd.</u>
Supp, incl III and Postal	70
at special rates	20
ROL at 6 galls per vehicle	160
Army Stores	70
Ord Stores	17
Also incl Medical	3
<u>Total</u>	<u>340</u>

2. US

1. Strength :-

Personnel	25,000
Vehicles (incl W/cycles)	5,000
11. <u>Maintenance :-</u>	<u>tpd.</u>
Class I rations at 5 lbs per man	70
Class II Ord and Miscellaneous	40
Class III ROL at 8 galls per veh	160
Class IV Army Stores	90
Class V Ammunition	20
<u>Total</u>	<u>400</u>

NOTE :

In the event of a German withdrawal in lieu of surrender, an increase in ammunition requirements would be offset to some extent by a decrease in ROL requirements. There would, however, probably be an increase of 50 tpd in the total div requirements under such conditions.

sum of special rates	70
POL at 6 balls per vehicle	20
ingr stores	150
Grd Stores	70
also incl Method	17
	5
Total	340

1. Strength :-

ammunition	25,000
vehicles (incl W/cycles)	5,000
	total
Less 1 ration at 6 lbs per man	70
Class II Grd and Miscellaneous	40
Class III POL at 8 balls per veh	180
Class IV Eng Stores	90
Class V Ammunition	20
Total	450

NOTE : In the event of a Cuban withdrawal in lieu of surrender, an increase in ammunition requirements would be effect to some extent by a decrease in POL requirements. There would, however, probably be an increase of 50 tpd in the total HV requirements under such conditions.

2. CIVIL

Civil supplies (excluding POL and coal) required to be imported for present Cuban occupied EMAs are estimated as shown below :

Serial	Compartimento	Total on 100 grams ration + tpd	Total on 200 grams ration ++ tpd	Total on 300 grams ration tpd
1.	PIEDRAHITA	625	810	1,090
2.	LICURIA	275	355	470
3.	LA GUAYAMA	1,070	1,380	1,850
4.	EMILIA (coal provisions or FOOD and SALVEMIA)	250	315	420
5.	Provincia de ARICA and LIMA in YOSANA	80	105	140

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APPENDIX 'A' (Cont'd)

Serial	Compartimento	Total on		Total on	
		100 gramo ration + tpd	200 gramo ration + tpd	300 gramo ration tpd	
6.	VENEZUELA ORIENTAL	115	145	200	
7.	VENEZUELA GUAYANA	165	215	290	
8.	VENEZUELA PARAGUAY	570	875	1,180	
9.	TOTAL	850	1,235	1,670	

- NOTES: + broad requirement, including supplemental feeding, equals 50% of requirement at 300 gramo basic ration.
- ** broad requirement is 70% of requirement on 300 gramo basic ration.

3. GERMAN ARMY

Assuming that the surrendered German Army are out of their source of supply, the Allied maintenance responsibility in respect of this force is based on the following data :-

A. Strength:-

Personnel
Vehicles

1,000,000
16,000

(of which 5,000 may be used to maintain German Army)

Horses and Mules

100,000

(of which the Italians may seize 30%)

B. Maintenance:-

Food 3 1/2 lbs per man

FCU for 5,000 vehicles @ 6 galls per vehicle

Medical

For 500 6 lbs per animal

tpd.

1,560

140

15

270

Total 1,985

4. LEADERS THROUGH THE LINE

The requirement for the maintenance of the occupational force is about half the total requirement when allowance is made for civilian supplies and extraordinary items peculiar to surrender conditions. The various requirements to be handled through the post war period are simultaneously, and as

++ Broad requirement is 70% of requirement on 300 grante basic ration.

3. GERMAN ARMY

Assuming that the surrendered German Army are cut off from their source of supply, the Allied maintenance responsibility in respect of this force is based on the following data :-

a. Strength:-	
Personnel	1,000,000
Vehicles	15,000
(of which 5,000 may be used to maintain German Army)	
Horsem and Mules	100,000
(of which the Italians may seize 30%)	
b. Maintenance:-	
	tpd.
Food 3 1/2 lbs per man	1,560
For 5,000 vehicles @ 6 galls per vehicle	140
Medical	15
For 6 @ 6 lbs per animal	270
Total	1,985

4. THROUGH TRIESTE

The requirement for the maintenance of the occupational forces is about half the total requirement when allowance is made for civilian supplies and extraordinary items peculiar to surrender conditions. The various requirements to be handled through the port may not occur simultaneously, and as far as the full requirements for AUSTRIA are concerned, they cannot be imported until rail communication between TRIESTE and the principal centres in AUSTRIA has been established. A possible breakdown of tonnage required to support British and US commitments in AUSTRIA and British commitments in that part of NE ITALY best served from TRIESTE is given below :-

a. British (excl Balk ROL).

Serial	Use	Temporary Requirement tpd	Eventual Requirement tpd	Remarks
1.	Ground Forces in AUSTRIA	1,000	Three div and etc	tpd including AC (AUSTRIA)
2.	Ground Forces in VENETIA			Three arms
3.	RAF in AUSTRIA			

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Serial	Item	Temporary Requirement Type	Eventual Requirement Type	Remarks
4.	RAF in VERZEL, GIBRA.		30	Two aqms
5.	Coal for NA, ITALY		800	
6.	Allied AF and Russian civilians in Br zone	260		until evacuation completed
7.	Civil requirements in ALGERIA		1,000	500 grams ration
8.	Civil requirements in VERZEL, GIBRA and ALGERIA		850	500 grams ration
9.	Engineer stores	300		for 30 days only
10.	Reserves and contingency allowance for unforeseen items such as port maintenance of the GIBRA and VERZEL forces		350	
Total			4,420	
b. US (excluding bulk fuel) - see sub-item c. below.				
1.	Ground forces in ALGERIA		1,200	Three aqms and etc type including USACV
2.	RAF in ALGERIA		400	
3.	Civil supplies for US zone in AF		1,000	500 grams ration
4.	Allied AF and Russian civilians	260		
5.	Reserves and contingency allowance for unforeseen items such as port maintenance of the GIBRA and VERZEL forces		400	
Total			3,000	

2. The import of US tonnage through TRIPOLI is only a possible condition depending on the condition of the BRANZER route. In any event it is unlikely that the whole of the US requirements will be moved through TRIPOLI as a permanent commitment and a

Total		4,420
b. US (excluding bulk 102.) - see subpara 9. below.		
1. Ground forces in JABUTIA.	1,200	Three diva and att tps. including USGGS
2. USMC 1st MASHUTIA.	400	
3. Civil 1st MASHUTIA for US zone in JABUTIA.	1,000	500 ground motion
4. 1st and Russian civilians 260		
5. Reserve and contingency allowance for the Russian items such as part maintenance of the 12th MASHUTIA forces	400	
Total		3,000

2. The report of US transport through TRIESTE is only a possible
preliminary depending on the condition of the YUGOSLAV route.
In any event it is unlikely that the whole of the US requirements
will be moved through TRIESTE as a permanent commitment and a
figure of half the requirements should be assumed, in addition to
the total British requirements, as a basis for planning the extent
to which the port should be developed.

3. There may also be an eventual commitment of up to 1,000 tpd for
civil supplies for YUGOSLAVIA to be handled through the port.

4. Allowance for the factors outlined above it is considered that
plans for the development of TRIESTE should be made to enable
6,000 tpd to be handled through the port.

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ATTACHED TO

Form P. 117

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INFORMATION REGARDING FRENCH FORCES

6-2 INFORMATION

1. Strength

a. German

1. Total German Strength 600,000 of which combat forces are estimated at 250,000 to 300,000.

Strength of Italian and other forces maintained by SECURITY

500,000
1,300,000

of the Italians it is considered some 300,000 may return to their homes leaving a total commitment to PW of 1,000,000

b. Total III

10,000

of whom 5,000 may be required to maintain the German Army.

c. PW

100,000

of whom the Italians may release some 30%

2. Summary

a. It is estimated that with formations and in depots the enemy has some 20 days rations.

b. A large but incalculable portion of the rations is thought to be obtained locally in Italy.

c. A principal supply base is thought to be in the MIZIO area, with several other depots scattered across NORMAN and SOUTH of the PO.

3. Summary

This is taken from the form :-

either

a. The PW may surrender as an organized body with no breakdown in command or administration

or

Of the Italians it is considered some 500,000 may return to their homes leaving a total commitment of Rs of 1,000,000

b. Expenditure 10,000

It is estimated that 5,000 may be required to maintain the German Army.

c. Costs 100,000

Of which the Italians may share some 300

Supplies

a. It is estimated that with formations and in depots the enemy may have 30 days supplies.

b. A large but unreliable portion of the supplies is thought to be obtained locally in India.

c. A critical supply issue is thought to be in the Madras area, with scattered other depots in scattered areas within and south of the PO.

Surrender

This is taken up of two forms :-

a. The only way surrender as an organized body with no breakdown in command or administration

b. The only way disintegrate and surrender piecemeal by units and individuals, in many cases throwing away their arms and equipment.

DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION

a. Dissemination of Allied Formations

Particular Fifth and Sixth Armies, in their advance, should be responsible for keeping the surrender of enemy formations, effecting their disarmament, preparing the necessary documentation and supervising their administration.

Linkage

Linkage should be responsible for the provision of Liaison Staffs from within their own resources to be attached as necessary to German Corps, Divisional and other administrative HQs. Staff liaisons to the German Army Group HQ and Army HQ should also be provided on a scale to be notified by HQ. Suitable officers for these increments should be nominated by the Liaison Staffs from present employment, should be nominated by the Liaison Staffs from within their own resources to be attached as necessary to German Corps, Divisional and other administrative HQs. Staff liaisons to the German Army Group HQ and Army HQ should also be provided on a scale to be notified by HQ. Suitable officers for these increments should be nominated by the Liaison Staffs from present employment, should be nominated by the Liaison Staffs from within their own resources to be attached as necessary to German Corps, Divisional and other administrative HQs.

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APPENDIX "C" (Contd)

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For ease of control enemy formations should be concentrated in groups of four or five divisions. In regard to the main concentration area it is considered that the Corps, each of two or three divisions will be necessary to perform the task detailed in para 2 a. above. It will be desirable that these Corps should be, from right to left, one British and one US, the inter-Corps boundary being the railway between PMS and HQ No. 1 District (see Appendix "B" para 1). With the advance of Fifth Army the US Corps should pass to under command of AFHQ/AFMORC, supply responsibility being that of PMS. In respect of the advance of Eighth Army, the British Corps should pass to under command of AFHQ except for local administration which should be the responsibility of HQ No. 1 District.

7.

Disarmament

a. Primary disarmament should be carried out immediately in accordance with the orders under Fifth and Eighth Armies wherever the enemy may be found. Allied guards should be placed over dumps of enemy material and the enemy should be searched to the concentration area. German formations should be permitted to retain sufficient transport for their own maintenance and such housekeeping and medical equipment as they may require to establish their own camps. Scales of equipment which should be retained by enemy formations is being prepared and will be issued in an AFHQ Memorandum. The Staff of the Land Forces Division (AFHQ) and the Group Control Council will be available to advise on disarmament matters.

b. The existing enemy dumps and depots should also be taken over by the Allies as soon as possible. Formations should carry out this task in respect of the areas for which they are made responsible. A proportion of German Service Troops should be left at the dumps and depots to assist formations in this task.

c. Enemy materials from dumps created in the course of primary disarmament and from existing dumps and depots should be disposed of in the following manner:-

i. Stocks of food, clothing, domestic equipment, engineer stores, etc. required for the maintenance of the German Army should be left in situ, to be used for that purpose subject to Allied supervision.

ii. Material and vehicles required by the Allies (for re-issue to Allied units to assist in civil relief and rehabilitation, for G-2 purposes or for shipment out of the theatre) should be moved into Allied or enemy dumps or depots.

iii. Enemy material which is not required for the maintenance of the German Army or for Allied war purposes should be left under Allied guard. This material will be destroyed or

any other way. Allied guards should be placed over dumps of enemy materiel and the enemy should be warned to the concentration area. German formations should be permitted to retain sufficient transport for their own maintenance and such housekeeping and medical equipment as they may require to establish their own corps. Scale of equipment which should be retained by enemy formations is being prepared and will be issued in an AFM. Memorandum. The Staff of the Land Forces Division (AUSTRIA) and US Group Central Command will be available to advise on disarmament matters.

b. The existing enemy dumps and depots should also be taken over by the Allies as soon as possible. Formations should carry out this task in respect of the areas for which they are made responsible. A proportion of German Service Groups should be left at the dumps and depots to assist formations in this task.

c. Enemy materiel from dumps created in the course of primary disarmament and from existing dumps and depots should be disposed of in the following manner :-

i. Stocks of food, clothing, domestic equipment, engineer stores, etc, required for the maintenance of the German Army should be left in situ, to be used for that purpose subject to Allied supervision.

ii. Materiel and vehicles required by the Allies (for re-issue to Allied units to assist in civil relief and rehabilitation, for G-2 purposes or for shipment out of the theatre) should be moved into Allied or enemy dumps or depots.

iii. Enemy materiel which is not required for the maintenance of the German Army or for Allied war purposes should be left under Allied guard. This materiel will be destroyed or disposed of in accordance with instructions to be issued later.

d. Enemy vehicles and vehicles under G. ii. above which are dumped in course of primary disarmament, or taken over in existing dumps in the main concentration area, should be moved to parks preferably SOUTH of Route 3.

e. Enemy materials and vehicles under G. i. and ii. above dumped or found in existing dumps NORTH of the PO, should be concentrated in German depots existing SOUTH of the PO.

f. The guarding, sorting and moving of enemy materiel in respect of dumps in the main concentration area, (para d. above) and in the area NORTH of the PO (para e. above) should be initially a Fifth and Eighth Army responsibility under the direction of US 15 Army Group.

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The receiving and sorting of enemy material in parks SOUTH of Bonn should be an ARMY/AFROSA responsibility exercised in accordance with normal administrative procedure through District/Zone Section HQs, but certain units will have to be withdrawn from armies for this purpose.

There will be assistance in the sorting and classifying of enemy material should be given by the German service organizations under Allied supervision and instructions.

The German use of German labour and vehicles should be made in the dumping and moving of enemy material.

The main task of sorting and classifying enemy material is likely to be in respect of dumps NORTH of the PO, ARMS should provide certain additional services personnel who will be placed at the disposal of the armies to assist in inspecting enemy dumps and reports.

Naval disarmament at CEM, STUBB, THURSTON and other ports will be conducted by a small Naval Staff sent there for the purpose. This staff will probably be British. Details for enemy naval barracks, dumps and storeshouses will, however, require to be provided by the military authorities as these cannot be provided by the Army. This commitment will be small.

The Air Forces Commander will be responsible for determining the action to be taken to dispose of enemy air force equipment and materials, other than explosives. Bombs and other explosives, except for any that may be required by the Air Forces for intelligence purposes, will be a military responsibility. For personnel, the Air Force, providing technical advice and assistance as necessary. It will be a military responsibility to provide enemy air material, and to coordinate inter-service activities where necessary. Army assistance will be required for the eventual disposal of such material as is not required by the Air Forces.

Captured Material

When sufficient material has been allotted to the German Army for their maintenance, there should be a considerable surplus which can be taken over by the Allies for civil and military purposes. Personnel from existing Allied V & R Units, not required under current conditions should be used to form cadres for Allied collecting centres.

be taken of sorting and classifying enemy material is likely to be in respect of dumps NORTH of the PO. AFHQ should provide certain military and service personnel who will be placed at the disposal of the Armed Forces to assist in inspecting enemy dumps and depots.

2. Naval disarmament at ZEMER, ARSHEL, THIRY and other ports will be conducted by a small Naval Staff sent there for the purpose. This staff will probably be British. Guards for enemy Naval barracks, dumps and storehouses will, however, require to be provided by the Military authorities as these cannot be provided by the Navy. This commitment will be small.

3. The Air Force Commander will be responsible for determining the action to be taken to dispose of enemy air force equipment and materials, other than explosives. Bombs and other explosives, except for any that may be required by the Air Force for intelligence purposes, will be a military responsibility for disposal, the Air Force providing technical advice and assistance as necessary. It will be a military responsibility to dispose of enemy air material, and to coordinate inter-service activities where necessary. Army assistance will be required for essential disposal of such material as is not required by the Air Force.

Unstarred

When sufficient animals have been allotted to the German Army for their maintenance, it should be a considerable surplus which can be taken over by the Allies for civil and military purposes. Personnel from existing Allied V & S Units, not required under current conditions should be used to form cadres for animal collecting units.

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APPENDIX "D"
to LOR. P. 177
Entel

IV ACCOMMODATION AT PRESENT AVAILABLE

1. British

<u>Location</u>	<u>Capacity</u>
ITALY (Forward Areas with Artillery)	3,000
L of C	14,000
TUNISIA	20,000
NORTH AFRICA	10,000
MIDDLE EAST	35,000

2. US

AFRICA	22,000
INDONESIA (transit only)	10,000
FIJIS	5,000 (with authorized expansion to 13,000)

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2. US

BARBANTO	20,000
NORTH AFRICA	10,000
MIDDLE EAST	35,000

AFRICA	22,000
INDONESIA (transit only)	10,000
FLORIDA	6,000 (with authorized expansion to 13,000)

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ATTACHED COPY
to LOG.P.177
dated 19 March 45

STATUS HQ LAYOUT

LAYOUT OF STATUS HQs

1. The following layout has formed the basis of forward planning:
 - a. US to control a corridor on the axis of the Fifth Army advance on the BRESCIA route.
 - b. Eighth Army to control Compartments of VENEZIA GIULIA, HQ 55 Area being allotted to Eighth Army for this purpose.
 - c. HQ I District to control NE ITALY up to boundary of VENEZIA GIULIA with two additional Sub-Area HQs under command.
 - d. HQ II District to control NW ITALY with HQ 57 Area, HQ 59 Area and N 151 Sub-Area under command.
 - e. BRESCIA to be administered by a US HQ responsible to CG FRS with a British element attached.
 - f. HQ VENEZIA Command, as at present constituted, to pass under command CG FRS when the Army boundary is moved NORTH of PLORENCE, with the proviso that the present allocation of rest and leave facilities should not be disturbed without reference to AFHQ.

BOUNDARIES

2. a. General
It is considered that boundaries should follow as closely as possible the existing provincial boundaries.
- b. Boundaries of No. 1 District
It is considered that No. 1 District should be bounded as follows:
NORTH - The NORTH boundary of the Province of ESSENIO and UDINE.
EAST - The EAST boundary of the Province of UDINE.
SOUTH - The SOUTH boundary of the Provinces of ALESSANDRIA and VERCELLI.
WEST - The WEST boundary of the Provinces of:-

BIELLA
VIGEVANO
VERCELLI

1. BORDERS to be administered by a US HQ responsible to CG IES with a ritual increment attached.
2. HQ COMBAT Command, as at present constituted, to pass under command CG IES when the army boundary is moved NORTH of PIERRE, with the proviso that the present allocation of rent and leave facilities should not be disturbed without reference to AFHQ.

BORDERS

1. a. Borders

It is considered that borders should follow as closely as possible the existing provincial boundaries.

- b. Borders of No. 1 District

It is considered that No. 1 District should be bounded as follows:-

NORTH - The NORTH boundary of the Province of BELLINO and UDINE.

EAST - The EAST boundary of the Province of UDINE.

SOUTH - The SOUTH boundary of the Provinces of ASCOLI and PESERA.

WEST - The WEST boundary of the Provinces of:-

BELLINO
VERONA
PADOVA
ROVERETO

2460

The WEST boundary of the Province of VERONA from its northernmost limit to the railway Riva-Bologna.

The railway Riva-Bologna from where it crosses the WEST boundary of VERONA Province to BOLOGNA inclusive.

Route 9 from BOLOGNA to the present inter-army boundary. The present inter-army boundary to its junction with the present 55 Area boundary.

TOP SECRET

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-5-

The present 55 km. East boundary from the junction with the Army boundary to the junction with the West boundary.

The present West boundary of 50 km. to the junction with 201 Sub-Group boundary.

This re-organization would give to HQ 2 D District the whole of the Comandancia of VERACRUZ, including the Province of VERACRUZ.

The precise boundaries through the Province of VERACRUZ and PUEBLA must be decided in accordance with administrative requirements and locations of military posts.

ORGANIZATION OF HQ 1 DISTRICT

1. District HQ

VERACRUZ is considered to be the best location for HQ 1 District since it is centrally situated and has good road and rail communications NORTH and SOUTH.

2. Subordinate HQs

1. The following subordinate HQs should be allotted to HQ 1 District :-

- | | |
|--------------|---|
| 61 Area | |
| 71 Sub-Group | |
| 201 " " | (From HQ 2 District) |
| 207 " " | (or a Sub-Group to be formed from a Beach Group (Group HQ)) |
| 210 " " | (From HQ 3 District) |

2. The responsibilities of the subordinate HQs and the location of their respective territories should be decided by Commander District.

3. POW and PLANNING

It is considered that the British Government at ELM/VERACRUZ and PLANNING should be under control HQ 1 District, and should be co-ordinating allied units (in accordance with the definitions contained in JSP Administrative Instructions No. 14 dated 23 Jan 43).

4. British Troops in the Territory

HQ 1 District would be responsible for the administration of the British troops in the PRC area (C3) of the



Amesbury, Mass. (cont'd)

Hardin, J. *Evolution of present concepts* 1964

Territory at present controlled by No. 2 District should be handed over to Nos. 1 and 3 Districts as follows :-

[illegible]

14. Responsibilities in regard to NRM should be handed over to the District.

vid. to (A) Salween would give into 1970 reform.

6. Subordinate to the main

to which the following subordinate static eqs would be added:

57. Area
59. Area
151. Sub-area

4. **Remove the outside trim**

the 2 District would retain its responsibilities in regard to

203 Sub-iron,
SULFONIL +
NOSOL

ed Ball Court in AMO. Letter JC 323/035 GPO dated 24 Jan 45.

* Reason: Depending upon the administrative situation responsibility in regard to SANDHU may at a later date be transferred to 593 District.

DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS

Q.	<u>Topic: Scope of Sustainability</u>
Q.1	Q.1

Part: (b) adjustments would have to be made in the responsibilities of HQ 3 District consequent upon the charges in respect of HQs 1 and 2 Districts. The responsibilities of subordinate HQs and the boundaries of their respective territories would be decided by HQ 3 and HQ 3 District.

• Median (middle value)

The *new* subcategory **Fig** would be defined by

57 Area
58 Area
59 Sub-area

5. Responsibilities outside ITALY

HQ 2 District would retain its responsibilities in regard to

203 Sub-area
SABINIA
CERESIO

as laid down in AFHQ letter AG 523/535 GCE-2 dated 24 Jan 45.

- NOTE: Depending upon the administrative situation responsibility in regard to SABBINIA may at a later date be transferred to HQ 3 District.

ORGANIZATION OF THE 3 DISTRICT

1. Tasks and Responsibilities

Certain adjustments would have to be made in the responsibilities of HQ 2 District consequent upon the changes in respect of HQs 1 and 2 Districts. The responsibilities of subordinate HQs and the boundaries of their respective territories would be decided by Command HQ 3 District.

2. Subordinate HQs

The following subordinate HQs would be under command HQ 3 District :-

52 Area
54 Area
56 Area
94 Sub-area
204 Sub-area
208 Sub-area
209 Sub-area

ETNA. (For certain purposes only)

3. Territory at present controlled by HQ 204 Sub-area

2459

The responsibilities in respect of the territory at present controlled by HQ 204 Sub-area would be taken over by the British increased 204th Area.

4.

6. The should ultimately be responsible for the following provinces in addition to its present territory and responsibilities :

ROMA } At the Command of
TIBURTO } VERONA
VENETIA TAURINUM }

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OF VENETIA PROVINCE

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APPENDIX "2" (Contd.)

EMILIA In the Compartimento of LOREARELLA

ROMEO EMILIA } " " " " EMILIA

EMILIA (MESA) } " " " " TOSSARELLA

WEST part of BOLOGNA *

WEST part of FIRENZE *

* For boundaries see para 2

7. A sketch map showing the proposed boundaries of Nos 1, 2 and 3 Districts and PPS is attached at Annexure I.

0072

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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Tel: 678730

Ref: 564/61/30.

17 March 1945.

Subject: Minutes of Meeting held by Chief Administrative Officer.

To : Regional Commissioner,
MILIA Region.

1. Enclosed herewith is Copy No. 23 of Minutes of CAO's
Conference for your information and retention.

2. Please acknowledge receipt.

68-76
Major E. Talbot

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

Incl: As stated in
Para 1.

2458
PA
12/3

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017**TOP SECRET**Copy No. 16**CONFIDENTIAL**

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Log. P. 177

10 Mar 45

MAR 12 1945

To:	Copy Nos
HQ 15 Army Group	1 - 8
HQ Fifth Army	9 - 12
HQ Eighth Army	13 - 15
HQ Allied Commission	16 - 23
HQ 1 District	24
HQ 2 District	25
CO PSS	26

Minutes of meeting held by Chief Administrative Officer at HQ 15 Army Group at 1030 hrs, Monday, 26 Feb 1945 to consider AFHQ Planning Paper Log. P. 177 dated 17 Feb 1945 are attached.

A. M. White
A.M. WHITE, Colonel,
Log. Plans,
Secretary.

DISTRIBUTION:

External
C-in-C Med

Copy Nos
27 - 30

Internal

GAO
A/GAO
G-1(A)
G-1(B)
G-3
G-4(A)

31
32
33
34
35 - 36
37 - 38

Internal

G-4(B)
G-4(Mov & Tr)
G-5
Q(Maint)
Q(AE)
Engrs
Sigs
Pet Sec
Log. Plans (Spares)

Copy Nos

39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

Log. Plans (Spares) 47 - 60 **2457**

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MINUTES OF GAO'S CONFERENCE HELD AT HQ 15 ARMY GROUP

AT 1030 HOURS 26 FEB 45

TO CONSIDER AFHQ PLANNING PAPER LOG. P. 17 DATED 17 FEB 45

PRESENT:-

GAO, Lt-Jen Sir B.H. ROBERTSON, Rt, KCVO, CB, CBE, DSO, MC, Presiding

AFHQ

Maj-Gen A.C. DUFF, CBE, MC.
Brig-Gen A.L. HARMLEN
Brig S.D. A. ANDERSON, DSO.
Brig-Gen C.D. WACHOLDER
Brig A.M. FILLARDON, DSO, CBE.
Brig A.T. du RUI PHILIP, CB, CBE.
Brig-Gen C.M. PROFFORD
Colonel A.M. VINE, CBE.
Colonel G.H. WELLS

G-4(B)
A/GAO
HQS G-3 Org (B)
G-4(A)
ADG(G)
DAG (Mov & Tr)
G-5
G-4(Log Plans)
Pvt Sec

HQ 15 ARMY GROUP

Maj-Gen H.L. CONNELL-ROGERS, CBE, DSO.
Brig C.D. FROGDO, DSO, CBE.
Brig-Gen D.L. BRUM
Brig-Gen R. TATE
Colonel P.D. MILLER, CBE.
Colonel J.M. RING
Colonel A.M. LALAN
Colonel T. TELCH, CBE.
Colonel W.D. MCMAHON
Colonel T.R. HOW
Colonel N. MONTFORT
Capt H.C. REILLY, RN.
Lt-Col H.T. PRIEST, MBE.
Lt-Col P.A. HERMANO
Lt-Col C.C. HILCOMB
Lt-Col T.J. HERBERT
Lt-Col G.J.F. MURPHY

CE.
D/CS (Br)
G-3
G-4
G-5
G-3(sp Ops)
G-3(Plans)
Col "A"
G-1
DOSO
G-5
HLO
G-3(Plans)
G-4(Plans)
G-4
LAG
AGM

Maj Gen A.C. HUFF, CDR, MC.
 Brig Gen L.D. HAMILTON
 Brig J.E.A. ANDERSON, LSC.
 Brig Gen C.A. MAGRUDER
 Brig A.M. FULTON, DNO, CDR
 Brig A.T. de Rive PHILIP, CDR, CDR
 Brig Gen C.M. BRIDGEMAN
 Colonel A.M. MILNE, CDR
 Colonel C.H. WHEEL

HQ 15 ARMY GROUP

Maj Gen H.A. FOXHILL-ROBERTS, CDR, LSC.
 Brig C.D. FARGAR, LSC, CDR.
 Brig Gen D. J. BRANN
 Brig Gen H. TATE
 Colonel P.D. MILLER, CDR.
 Colonel J.H. RIVER
 Colonel A.M. LOGAN
 Colonel T. WILKIN, CDR.
 Colonel H.C. HENDERSON
 Colonel T.R. HON
 Colonel N. MONTFORT
 Capt H.C. HENRY, IN.
 Lt Col R.T. PHILIP, MBE.
 Lt Col P.A. HENDERSON
 Lt Col C.C. HENDERSON
 Lt Col T.R. HENDERSON
 Lt Col G.E.E. HENDERSON

FLAG OFFICER NORTHWEST ARCA, MC.

Capt D. HARRISLEY JOHNSTON, R.

HR FIFTH ARMY

Brig Gen R. ANDERSON-IRVING
 Colonel C.A. RICH, CDR.
 Colonel E.J. O'NEILL
 Lt Col E.A. HILL
 Lt Col E.R. WILKIN
 Lt Col D.M. ANDERSON
 Lt Col A.S. SUTHERLAND, JR.

G-4(B)
 A/CAG
 Hqs G-3 Org (B)
 G-4(A)
 ADAG(C)
 DQAG (Mov & Tr)
 G-5
 G-4(Log Plans)
 Pet Sec

CE
 D/CS (Ref)
 G-3
 G-4
 G-5
 G-3(3p Ops)
 G-3(Plans)
 Col "A"
 G-1
 DCSO
 G-5
 HCO
 G-3(Plans)
 G-4(Plans)
 G-4
 HAG
 AQMG

Chief of Staff

G-5
 DA & QMG
 G-4
 G-3
 G-4
 AQMG
 G-5(Exec & J)

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- 2 -

HQ EIGHTH ARMY

Brig G.S.M. STANTON, CBE.
Colonel J.C. FREEMAN, DSO.
Group Capt C. HENSON
Lt-Col A.C. SCORER, CBE.
Lt-Col W.S. HARRIS

HQ ALLIED COMMISSION

Brig M.S. LAMB, CB, CBE, MC.
Brig J.A. DUNLOP, DRE, MC, TD.
Colonel H.J. LEGG
Major S.M.S. TILLOT

FILE

Brig-Gen P.H. OCK
Lt-Col S.M. FORBES

HQ 1 DISTRICT

Major-Gen G.A. HETTERMAN, CB, MC.

HQ 2 DISTRICT

Major-Gen H.P. NARIS, CBE, MC.
Colonel D. LYNN GRAY, CBE, MC.
Lt-Col Sir M.I. MENDHAM BT.

ARMY

Colonel R.P. MAXWELL

HQ IV CORPS US

Colonel A.F. LAUREY
Colonel G.L. MOWAT
Colonel G.B. CHURCH

SIGNALS HQ I OF C ITALY

Brig W.C. BOWMAN, CBE, MC.
Lt-Col P.S. RHINE

GENERAL

~~Confidential~~

DA & QMS
Col QS
QMS
AQM
AQM(M)

HQ AC
HQ VANCE/IE
HQ AS (Food Sub-Comm)
HQ AC

OG
G-4

QAC

QOS
DA & QMS
G-1

RG PERMANENT Region

G-4
AC

QSO

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Definite conclusions

Brigadier F.H. OAK
Lt-Col S.A. FOWLES

Hq 1 DISTRICT

Major Gen D.A. HENNING, CB, MC.

Hq 2 DISTRICT

Major Gen D.P. HARRIS, CBE, MC.
Colonel B. LACAN HARRIS, CBE, MC.
Lt-Col Sir H.J. MURRAY BT.

AMC

Colonel R.H. MAXWELL

Hq IV CORPS US

Colonel A.T. INCEY
Colonel C.H. MCKINLEY
Colonel G.G. GIBBS

SIGNAL HQ I OF C ITALY

Brig W.Z. RICHMOND, CBE, MC.
Lt-Col F.S. HINE

GENERAL

1. HQ stated that it was not possible to reach such definite conclusions regarding the occupation of NORTHEAST ITALY as had been reached in respect of NORTHWEST ITALY. The movement into NORTHEAST ITALY was to occupy a specific area from which there was no intention to advance; moreover, the occupation would not involve large scale offensive operations in the area. In contrast the movement into NORTHEAST ITALY

a. would be only one stage in the advance into AUSTRIA.

b. might well be a fighting advance.

c. might be complicated by the surrender of KUSSCHNER'S ARMY.

d. would give rise to political problems in relation to VENETIA GIULIA, the solution of which lay outside the scope of military decision.

Problems involved in the occupation of NORTHEAST ITALY were not, therefore, capable of immediate solution.

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CO
S-4

COG

COO
DA & QMG
G-1

NO PIEMONTE Region

G-4
AC

CSO

TOP SECRET

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- 3 -

2. CMO emphasized that Log. P. 177 was a planning paper prepared for his consideration and was not an official instruction laying down approved administrative policy.
3. CMO then examined Log. P. 177 in detail. The following minutes should be read in conjunction with the appropriate paragraphs of the paper as indicated below.
4. DEFERRED L. 2, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000
C/MO stated that it seemed unlikely that AUSTRIA would surrender before German resistance on the WEST and WEST fronts had crumbled. When surrender did occur, however, it might be necessary to occupy AUSTRIA and NORTHWEST ITALY simultaneously. There would also be operational and political pressure to occupy AUSTRIA, under the NEWBORN plan, as early as possible and this was not sufficiently emphasized in the paper. For planning purposes it must be assumed that there will be a requirement for Allied forces to enter AUSTRIA some four to six weeks after AUSTRIA's surrender.

MAIN ADMINISTRATIVE TASKS (para 4)

5. In considering the difficult question of priorities, emphasis was laid on the importance of the distribution of civil supplies which, if neglected might result in a heavy military commitment to ensure the maintenance of law and order.
6. MAINTENANCE OF 15 ARMY GROUP (para 5)
 - a. CMO stated, and G-5 15 Army Group, agreed, that surrender by AUSTRIA was unlikely to occur before the end of March.
 - b. With regard to the development of rail communications for the maintenance of 15 Army Group, it was expected that the railway from AUSTRIA would be through to FLORENCE by early April and through the AUSTRIAN tunnel by early May, though at this stage any forecast of completion of work on the AUSTRIAN tunnel must be very provisional.
 - c. With reference to para 6 c. of the paper the allocation of British and US divisions to the various tasks should not be laid down in the paper as this was the responsibility of G-5 15 Army Group.
 - d. G-5, 15 Army Group, pointed out that NORTHWEST ITALY would probably be occupied by a composite force which would be US and British maintained.

4. CMO stated that the administration of forces entering AUSTRIA would be an AUSTRIAN responsibility. AUSTRIAN, acting through static HQs in accordance with normal administrative procedure.

be assumed that there will be a requirement for Allied forces to enter AUSTRIA some four to six weeks after KENNEDY's surrender.

MAIN ADMINISTRATIVE PAPER (para 4)

In considering the difficult question of priorities, emphasis was laid on the importance of the distribution of civil supplies which, if neglected might result in a heavy military commitment to ensure the maintenance of law and order.

MAINTENANCE OF 15 ARMY GROUP (para 6)

1. CAG stated, and G-3 15 Army Group, agreed, that surrender by KENNEDY was unlikely to occur before the end of March.
2. With regard to the development of rail communications for the maintenance of 15 Army Group, it was expected that the railway from LEXINGTON would be through to FLORENCE by early April and through the APENNINE tunnel by early May, though at this stage any forecast of completion of work on the APENNINE tunnel must be very provisional.
3. With reference to para 6 c. of the paper the allocation of British and US divisions to the various tasks should not be laid down in the paper as this was the responsibility of G-3 15 Army Group. G-3, 15 Army Group, pointed out that NORTHWEST ITALY would probably be occupied by a composite force which would be US and British maintained.
4. CAG stated that the administration of forces entering AUSTRIA would be an ARMY responsibility. AFHQ/ARMA, acting through static HQs in accordance with normal administrative procedure, would be responsible for administering formations remaining in ITALY.

TRANSPORT (para 8)

7. G-4, 15 Army Group, questioned whether rail capacity NORTH of ANCONA would be sufficient in the circumstances to meet all commitments. CAG stated that this would be further examined.
8. Calculations in load carrying transport made by HQ 15 Army Group differed slightly from the ARHQ figures in respect of the availability of British transport units but showed a considerably greater requirement for US truck units than those given in the ARHQ paper. CAG stated that the transport availabilities and requirements would be made the subject of further examination.

/ADMINISTRATION...

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ADMINISTRATION OF KESSELING'S ABCI (paras 9 and 10)

9. a. GAO emphasized that the Germans must be made to administer themselves. It was therefore particularly important that units and formations of KESSELING's Army should be kept intact. If they had disintegrated they would be re-organized as soon as possible.
- b. It was agreed that the area between the River PO and Route 9 (excluding this route and the major towns in the area) should be the main concentration area for KESSELING's Army. As the coastal belt to a depth of 12 miles from the EAST coast was highly malarial, this part of the area would not be used.
- c. Surrendered Forces would have to live in whatever tents they possessed. They might be made of big warehouses etc if these were not wanted for Allied military or Allied Commission purposes. There would be no requisitioning of houses for the accommodation of Germans.
- d. It was agreed that the responsibility for action under paras 10 c., d. and e. of the paper would be that of HQ 15 Army Group.
- e. It would not be the policy to evacuate civilians from the concentration area.

TRAINING AND DISARMING (para 11)

10. It would not be possible to hold KESSELING's Army in PW cages. Only recalcitrant personnel would be removed to PW cages. These personnel would be initially held in 2/3 cages in or near the concentration area, but such anomalies would be for transit purposes only. The policy would be to move recalcitrant personnel to cages SOUTH of the concentration area as early as possible. It might however, be advantageous to move additional PW gradually to cages SOUTH of the concentration area.

DISARMING OF KESSELING'S ABCI (para 12)

11. a. The division of responsibility between AFHQ, HQ 15 Army Group, Fifth and Eighth Armies would be as given in para 12 c. of the paper. AFHQ will issue the initial instructions in broad lines to HQ 15 Army Group who would issue the necessary instructions to the two Armies. HQ 15 Army Group would then supervise the execution of these instructions.
- b. Reports from the disarmament staff which is being formed as part

not wanted for Allied military or Allied Commission purposes. There would be no requisitioning of houses for the accommodation of Germans.

1. It was agreed that the responsibility for action under items 10 a, b, and c, of the paper would be that of HQ 15 Army Group.
2. It would not be the policy to evacuate civilians from the concentration area.

HOLDING AND QUARTERING (para. 11)

10. It would not be possible to hold Kesselring's Army in PW cages. Only recalcitrant personnel would be moved to PW cages. These personnel would be initially held in PW enclosures in or near the concentration area, but such enclosures would be for transit purposes only. The policy would be to move recalcitrant personnel to cages south of the ARVNTHAL as early as possible. It might, however, be advantageous to move additional PW gradually to cages south of the ARVNTHAL.

DISARMAMENT OF GERMAN ARMY (para. 12)

11.
 1. The division of responsibility between AFM, HQ 15 Army Group, Fifth and Eighth Armies would be as given in para. 12 f. of the paper. AFM will issue the initial instructions on broad lines to HQ 15 Army Group who would issue the necessary instructions to the two Armies. HQ 15 Army Group would then supervise the execution of these instructions.
 2. Experts from the disarmament staff which is being formed as part of Allied Commission, AFMTHAL, would be made available to give assistance on disarmament matters.
 3. Chief of Staff, Allied Commission requested that the War Material Sub-Committee of the Allied Commission should be brought in on disarmament matters at an early date.
 4. In view of the large number of personnel which would be required for guarding dumps, it was agreed that consideration should be given to the use of the Italian Army for this purpose.
 5. It was agreed that German administrative units required to handle heavy supplies and material should not be deprived of vehicles and equipment necessary for carrying out their service functions.

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- c. No unit would be allowed to acquire captured transport except where operationally necessary. In this event transport might be held by units to the extent necessary in bringing vehicle strength up to TO/AFS but not in excess thereof. Such transport would in any case be surrendered as soon as possible since all available heavy transport would be required to meet civil commitments.

MAINTENANCE OF THE ITALIAN ARMY (para 13)

12. a. GAO stated that the word "maintained" in the 6th line of para 13 a.i. was confusing and should be deleted.
- b. GAO stated that in principle local resources would not be used for the maintenance of ~~the Italian Army~~. In the case of fresh vegetables only those surplus to Allied and civil requirements would be available for this purpose.
- c. Chief of Staff, Allied Commission stated that the PW ration, on which the Germans would be fed, gave a higher feeding scale than that which was applicable to Italian civilians. This would doubtless cause discontent. GAO took note of this statement.
- d. It was agreed that as much use as possible should be made of animal transport for the maintenance of ~~the Italian Army~~. This would require further examination by AFHQ in respect of the provision of fodder.

ESTABLISHMENT OF ONE AND A HALF OF C INTO AUSTRIA (para 14 and 15)

13. GAO stated that, taking into account the assistance to be given for the movement of civil supplies, para 14 of the paper was correct.
14. Reverting to the uncertainty of the political position in Austria, GAO emphasized the need for flexibility in the planning of administrative requirements in ~~the Austrian Army~~. Because of this uncertainty the use of the term "advanced base" in reference to Trieste should be used with caution. While certain advanced base units would be required to support the occupational forces in Austria, these might better be located in ~~the Italian Army~~ rather than in Trieste. If political reasons precluded the use of Trieste it would be necessary to develop Venice as a military port.
15. GAO stated that if Trieste was used it would be British controlled and operated in respect of all tonnage handled. Should US tonnage require to be handled counterbalancing assistance would be given by the US at another Italian port. AFHQ would be responsible for producing the key plan for Trieste in conjunction with the Eighth Army, G-3 and AFHQ. For the allocation of tonnage between the Eighth Army and other bidders whose maintenance was not the responsibility of the Eighth Army, AFHQ would also

is available for this purpose.

c. Chief of Staff, Allied Commission stated that the PW nation, on which the Germans would be fed, gave a higher feeding scale than that which was applicable to Italian civilians. This would doubtless cause discontent. CAO took note of this statement.

d. It was noted that as much use as possible should be made of animal transport for the disembarking of VERMILION'S ARMY. This would require further examination by AFHQ in respect of the provision of fodder.

ESTABLISHMENT OF BASE AND I OF C INTO AUSTRIA (para 14 and 15)

13. CAO stated that, taking into account the assistance to be given for the movement of civil supplies, para 14 of the paper was correct.

14. Referring to the complexity of the political position in VERMILION GIBBIA, CAO emphasized the need for flexibility in the planning of administrative requirements in VERMILION GIBBIA. Because of this uncertainty the use of the term "advance base" in reference to VERMILION should be used with caution. While certain advanced base units would be required to support the occupational forces in AUSTRIA, these might better be located in AUSTRIA rather than in VERMILION GIBBIA. If political reasons precluded the use of VERMILION it would be necessary to develop VERMILION as a military port.

15. CAO stated that if VERMILION was used it would be British controlled and operated in respect of all tonnage handled. Should US tonnage require to be handled counterbalancing assistance would be given by the US at another Italian port. AFHQ would be responsible for producing the key plan for VERMILION in conjunction with HQ Eighth Army, G3 PMS and DONALI and for the allocation of tonnage between HQ Eighth Army and other theaters whose maintenance was not the responsibility of HQ Eighth Army. AFHQ would also provide the Chairman of the Siting Board. As US tonnage may be handled through the port, G3 AFHQ will be consulted in the preparation of the key plan and a representative of AFHQ will be a member of the Siting Board.

ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN ITALY (para 16)

16. CAO stated that a Military Government plan for VERMILION GIBBIA required further examination. Reference to the possibility that the government might be undertaken on a tripartite basis with Russian participation should be deleted from the paper. 245

17. CAO drew attention to the fact that the provinces of BOLOGNA, TREVISO and VERONA were largely German in population and administration.

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18.

Civil administration in the compartments of VERONA would be an Eighth Army responsibility through AMB, Eighth Army.

19.

PROVISION AND DISTRIBUTION OF CIVIL SUPPLIES IN NORTH ITALY (paras 17, 18 and Appendix "A")
CAO stated that the figures given at para 2 of Appendix "A" were too high and would be revised.

20.

Chief of Staff, HQ Allied Commission stated that it was intended to provide from imported sources the following civil ration :-

- | | |
|-----------------|-------------------------------|
| a. First month | Impact ration of 100 grammes. |
| b. Second month | 200 grammes ration. |

The balance of the civil ration during these two months would be made up from indigenous resources. CAO stated that on this basis the transport required for civil supplies as estimated in the paper was excessive.

21.

CAO summarized as follows, the assistance which might be given by the military for the movement of civil supplies in NORTH ITALY, emphasizing that this offer, in the uncertainty of the operational situation, should not be regarded as absolutely firm.

a. NORTHWEST ITALY

Delivery of 500 tons per day of civil supplies to PAVIA. This had already been accepted as a military commitment and would be a British responsibility.

b. NORTH ITALY

Delivery of 400 tons per day to VERONA. This would be a US responsibility.

c. NORTHEAST ITALY

Delivery of 350 tons per day to PAVIA. This would be a British responsibility.

Chief of Staff, HQ Allied Commission confirmed that this would be sufficient to provide a 100 gramme impact ration.

22.

The CAO emphasized that the movement of civil supplies to PAVIA, VERONA and SALDA would be undertaken by military transport. This assistance must, however, be subject to a time limit as the transport employed would be later needed for the maintenance of Fifth and Eighth Armies in their advance into AUSTRIA. While this assistance would be given for as long as possible, HQ Allied Commission emphasized its availability for a period of longer

21. GAO summarized as follows, the assistance which might be given by the military for the movement of civil supplies in NORTH ITALY, emphasizing that this offer, in the uncertainty of the operational situation, should not be regarded as absolutely firm.

1. NORTHWEST ITALY

Delivery of 500 tons per day of civil supplies to TRIESTE. This had already been accepted as a military commitment and would be a British responsibility.

2. NORTH ITALY

Delivery of 400 tons per day to VERONA. This would be a US responsibility.

3. NORTHEAST ITALY

Delivery of 350 tons per day to PADOVA. This would be a British responsibility.

Chief of Staff, HQ Allied Commission confirmed that this would be sufficient to provide a 100 grams impact ration.

22. The CAC emphasized that the movement of civil supplies to TRIESTE, VERONA and PADOVA would be undertaken by military transport. This assistance must, however, be subject to a time limit as the transport employed would be later needed for the maintenance of Fifth and Eighth Armies in their advances into AUSTRIA. While this assistance would be given for as long as possible, HQ Allied Commission should not plan on its availability for a period of longer than one month.

PARTISANS (para 13)

23. 1. An instruction has already been issued on this subject by AFHQ (AFHQ Operation Instruction "Occupation of NW ITALY" dated 24 Dec 44 supplemented by Cable P 26518 of 14 Feb 45).
2. It was agreed that the estimate of 100,000 partisans was acceptable as a basis for planning.
3. It was agreed that transport and maintenance of partisans should be a military commitment within the Army areas and an Allied Commission consultant behind Army rear boundaries.

/REMARKS.....

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REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS (para 23)

24. b. It was agreed that HQ Allied Commission/MSs attached to Army HQs would be responsible for Refugee Camps in Army areas but that Artillery would assist in far as they were able.
- c. CAO stated that it was now firm that Russian civilians would be a military responsibility.

STATION LAYOUT (para 23)

25. a. The map attached as Appendix 1 to L.S. P. 177 required slight modification in respect of HQ3 boundary south of RAME. Also BICHA, SARDINIA and BORN AFANTA should be shown as under HQ 3 District.
- b. CAO pointed out that the proposed boundary of HQ 2 District differed from that given in the instruction on NORTHWEST ITALY (JFH letter AG 323/661 (28-0) dated 25 Jan 45 as amended by letter with reference of 30 Jan 45). The boundary given in this instruction was based on the assumption that active operations would be taking place to the east of Lake COMO in which circumstance part of the Province of LOMBARDIA would be required as an Army rear area. In the circumstances envisaged in L.S. P. 177 it was desirable to make the boundaries of HQ 2 District coincide as far as possible with those of the Camp commands of LOMBARDIA.

PORTS (para 22)

26. a. CAO drew attention to the length of time which the Naval staff estimates would be required to clear the sea routes to GENOA and TRIESTE of mines. In similar conditions, and provided the Germans were prepared to disclose the location of their minefields, it was possible that these times might be improved.
- b. Italian VESUVIO was required for military purposes (see para 14 above) the port would be owned and operated by HQ Allied Commission. The daily maintenance which could be provided from military sources would be certain organizational assistance in the form of movement control and RA supervision. Priority for mine-sweeping would come after the requirements for the opening of TRIESTE and GENOA.
- c. With reference to the opening of the smaller ports in the LIGURIAN coast, CAO stated that this was a matter for negotiation and settlement between HQ4 and HQ 2 District.

2. CAG pointed out that the proposed boundary of HQ 2 District differed from that given in the instruction on NORTHWEST ITALY (JFH) letter IS 323/361 GDS-0 dated 25 Jan 45 as amended by letter HQ 2 District (JFH 361 Jan 45). The boundary given in this instruction was based on the assumption that action operations would be taking place to the east of Lake Garda in which circumstances part of the Province of LOMBARDIA would be required as an army zone. In the circumstances envisaged in L.O.S. P. 177 it was desirable to have the boundaries of HQ 2 District coincide as far as possible with those of the Compartimento of LOMBARDIA.

REPORT (para 22)

26. a. CAG drew attention to the length of time which the Naval staff estimates would be required to clear the sea routes to GENOA and TRIESTE of mines. In surmounter conditions, and provided the Germans were prepared to disclose the location of their minefields, it was possible that these times might be improved.

b. Unless VOSTOK was required for military purposes (see para 14 above) the port would be opened and operated by HQ Allied Administration. The only assistance which could be provided from military sources would be certain organizational assistance in the form of movement control and all supervision. Priority for mine-sweeping would come after the requirements for the opening of TRIESTE and GENOA.

2. c. With reference to the opening of the smaller ports on the LIGURIAN coast, CAG stated that this was a matter for negotiation and settlement between British and HQ 2 District.

3. d. It was agreed that the opening of a port to serve NORTHWEST ITALY would be a matter. In the event of GENOA being held as a fortress by the enemy, the Navy may be asked to open SAVONA. HQ 2 District confirmed that they had planned to cover such an eventuality.

USE OF NORTH ITALY IRT SYSTEM (para 23)

27. e. Examinations of the assistance to be obtained from the IRT network in NORTHWEST ITALY was very discouraging. HQ Allied Commission, however, should make plans to make the maximum use possible of this method of transportation. Chief of Staff, Allied Commission confirmed that this was being done. 2451

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ITALY POL (para 26)

25.

Other than the proposed pipeline from GENOA to ALESSANDRIA, no further assistance could be offered to the Allied Commission as pipeline capacity in NORTH ITALY would probably be required to meet military and normal civil requirements now being handled. The CAC said that petroleum section would examine the possibility of the provision of a pipeline from PORTOFINO to BOLZANO. No pipeline supplies would be available to construct a pipeline NORTH from TRIESTE into AUSTRIA unless materials were recovered from the taking up of existing or authorized construction.

FURTHER ACTION

26.

100. P. 177 would be revised incorporating the points made at the meeting and issued in due course to all concerned.

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and issued in the course of all concerned.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

CONFIDENTIAL (64)

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 301
LEGAL SUB-COMMISSION

AG/4076/1.

/rlp.
1 March 1945.

SUBJECT : Prisoners of War.

-2 MAR 1945

TO : VP, CA Sec.

MAR 7 1945

You have requested the opinion of this sub-commission as to the circumstances in which an organized body of troops surrendering in the field is entitled to be treated as prisoners of war. The opinion of this sub-commission is submitted.

1. The Geneva Prisoners of War Convention, 1929 applies to "all persons (of a certain category) who are captured by the enemy." All persons of that category can therefore claim to have been made prisoners of war and to be entitled to the benefits of the convention provided only that they have been captured by the enemy.

2. No definition is contained either in this Convention or in The Hague Convention 1907 of the acts, circumstances or conditions required to constitute such capture. Whether or not a state of capture exists is a question of fact in each case. The underlying consideration is whether the person captured is in the power and control of the capturing force. This is implicit in the statement in the Geneva Convention that prisoners of war are in the power of the hostile government but not of the individuals or formations which captured them.

3. Clearly, if a body of troops surrenders, and this surrender is accepted and thereafter the troops are physically confined in a camp of whatever size, in which they are entirely dependent on the control and supervision of the opposing belligerent, a state of capture exists and the troops must be treated as prisoners of war.

4. It is not necessary that the area of confinement should be enclosed by any fence or other detaining obstacle.

5. On the other hand if there is a temporary armistice between opposing forces during which the troops of an army agree to remain under their own commander in a particular area during the armistice, but with the intention that at the conclusion of the armistice hostilities will be resumed,

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they obviously do not come under the control of the opposing army and do not require a status of prisoners of war.

6. If, however, the armistice is likely to be indefinitely prolonged, and the surrendering troops, although remaining under their own commander, are in fact under the control of the opposing army and depend for their normal maintenance upon arrangements made or permitted by the opposing army, then it is the opinion of this sub-commission that these surrendering troops are under the control of the opposing army and acquire prisoner of war status.

W. E. Stephens

W. E. STEPHENS,
Colonel,
Deputy Chief Legal Advisor.

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APD 394

CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

Confidential

Tel. Ext. 608

Ref: TS/18/11/CA.

23 Feb 15.

(36)

SUBJECT: Mine Clearance.

TO: Executive Commissioner.

Reference your 564/EC of 23 Feb 15, giving the points that are to be raised at the meeting in Florence on the 26 Feb 15, on Log Plan 177.

- 1 With regard to the first item - "Clearance of land mines. How far is this a military responsibility?" - it is considered that it may be useful for you to have notes made with regard to the position as seen by this Section at the present time.
- 2 Under the Directives so far issued by AFHQ, 15 Army Group Military Authorities are responsible for the opening of various ports, e.g. TRIESTE, GENOA, and certain main trunk highways and railways. It is therefore to be presumed that any mine clearance which will be required to carry out these responsibilities will also be the responsibility of the Armies.
- 3 This contention is borne out by the Minutes of the North West Italy Planning Committee, dated 14 Feb 15, para 10 (a) which states:

"Land Mine Clearance - Port of Genoa.
"Accepted by 17 Area as an Army responsibility in conjunction with U.K. No call would be made on AC."
- 4 Resources - AC have at their disposal at the present moment, two mine clearance companies, one of which is functioning well and has heavy responsibilities. The other requires overhauling and re-vitalising. There can also be made available a small nucleus of instructors with a view to training Italian civilians. These can be allotted to northern Regions.
- 5 No. 1 District, however, have contacted this Section and enquired what assistance can be given in the question of land mine clearance in the port of GENOA. It is, therefore, proposed to attach the 561 Mine Clearing Company to No. 1 District immediately, move it to LIVORNO, where the 35th U.R.E. is prepared to take it in hand and assist in its equipment and give it practical work to do in clearing the large number of mines there situated. It is then proposed to transfer it to the port of GENOA for a limited period to assist in the work of clearing mines and booby traps which it is anticipated will be found there (under command of U.S. for a period not exceeding 2 weeks).

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6 There is still the remaining Company (562) which can be transferred to the north and it is anticipated to use it when further information as to the location of mine fields has been obtained. But to let it continue the valuable work it is now carrying out pending this information.

7 It can therefore be seen that the resources of AC for large scale mine clearance work are limited and in the early stages, for the opening of the trunk roads and ports, military assistance is essential.

P. A. Gripps E.
/C.S. UNJOINT, BRIG..
VP CA Section.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Log. P. 177

21 Feb 45.

SUBJECT: Administrative requirements in ITALY in the event of
a German surrender or withdrawal

Reference Log. P. 177 dated 17 Feb 45.

Attached is copy No. 29-40 of Annexure 1 to Log. P. 177
Appendix "C" dated 17 Feb 45.

For MASH May

for A.M. MELER,
Colonel,
Log. Plans.

Distribution:

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G-2	7	G-3(Plans)	27
G-3	8 - 9	C/S MTCUSA	29
G-4(A)	10	CSO	30
G-4(B)	11	CG 15 Army Group	31 - 34
G-4(C)	12	CG Fifth Army	35 - 36
G-4(D)	13 & 26	COC Eighth Army	37 - 38
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Q(AS)	15	Q4	41
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G-5	18	G-3(Org)	43
Engrs	19 - 20	G-4(Plans)	44 - 47

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16
1 March 1945.
Notes on the Meeting in Florence on 26 February
on Log Plan 177

1. Austria.

General ROBERTSON said that the entry into Austria would be made 4 - 6 weeks after HITSCHLER's surrender.

2. Billeting in the Concentration Area.

It was ruled that the Army would avoid billeting German troops in buildings occupied by Italians, and would only use big empty buildings which would not interfere with the economy of the country.

3. War Material Disposal.

General ROBERTSON said that there would be a team of expert officers to advise on this problem (Lt. Col. CURRIE should contact). The principle was established that when the Armies had taken the war material they required for operational purposes the War Materials Disposal Sub Commission would take over. General ROBERTSON also gave as the point that German transport will only be taken over by Allied Army units on a temporary basis and taken on charge by them to make up any deficiencies in their TC/W. It is necessary now to tie this up with ARMO.

4. Local Resources.

These are not to be regarded as available for feeding the German Army in the early stages. Later on, in the back areas, they will become available at the discretion of the Local Resources Board.

5. L of C into Austria.

General ROBERTSON ruled that the movement of civil supplies in Italy would have higher priority than the movement of supplies to maintain forces in Austria (see paras. 14 (a) and (b) of Log Plan).

6. Venezia Giulia.

3. War Material Disposal.

General ROBERTSON said that there would be a team of expert officers to advise on this problem (Lt. Col. SALLIS should contact). The principle was established that when the Allies had taken the war material they required for operational purposes the War Materials Disposal Sub-Commission would take over. General ROBERTSON also gave AC the point that German transport will only be taken over by Allied Army units on a temporary basis and taken on charge by them to make up any deficiencies in their TC/Ms. It is necessary now to tie this up with AFHQ.

4. Local Resources.

These are not to be regarded as available for feeding the German Army in the early stages. Later on, in the back areas, they will become available at the discretion of the Local Resources Board.

5. L of C into Austria.

General ROBERTSON ruled that the movement of civil supplies in E. Italy would have higher priority than the movement of supplies to maintain forces in Austria (see paras. 14 (a) and (b) of Log Plan).

6. Venezia Giulia.

Venezia Giulia will be an eighth Army responsibility, and General ROBERTSON suggested that AC should have a specially selected and rather more than the usual ~~inexperienced~~ regional personnel in this area.

7. Monaseros.

General ROBERTSON said that, in addition to the military commitment of 500 tpd at PAVIA for N. Italy, there will be another 500 tpd at an unrefined railroad, making a total of 1000 tpd. He altered the figures for N. Italy to read 1000 tpd at VERONA and 500 tpd at PAVIA.

It was stated that the convoys are an overall civil supply lift excluding POL and coal. AC will be responsible for the breakdown as between food, clothing, medical supplies, etc.

General ROBERTSON said that the time limit for the military commitment was about one month, that is to say that AC should plan to take over after this period, since the Army might start to take away some of their transport. The problem, however, would be dealt with elastically.

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8. Partisans.

It was agreed to take the figure of 100,000 as the proper commitment. It was confirmed that the movement of rations and supplies for partisans was a military commitment within the Army area, behind the Army boundary it was an AG commitment with the assistance of the Army.

9. Ports.

The opening of small Liqueur ports was not a military commitment, and the matter lies between AG and Admiral HODGES (FONAL).

10. I. F. T.

General HODGES was disappointed in the reports about this and directed AG to study the matter.

8.

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General BARNETT was disappointed in the reports about this and directed AC to study the matter.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

Ref: 564/SC.

23 February 1945.

Points to raise at Meeting in Florence on 26 February on Log Plan 177.

1. Clearance of land mines. How far is this a military responsibility?
2. Disarmament of German POW held by patriots. Whose responsibility?
3. Figure in Plan of 300,000 Italian Fascist soldiers returning to their homes and not being captured. Query the number, and obtain instructions as to whether RGs are to round them up and make them POW. If so, are they to send them to the concentration area between the Po and Route 9?
4. Local Resources. To what extent will the Army use local resources for the feeding of Kesselring's Army, in particular in the concentration area? Are they going to move Italian civilians out of the concentration area? If not, query the relationship between civilians and POW.
5. Malaria. Anti-malarial measures in the concentration area must be army commitment.
6. Truck Companies. Are the 20 US and 5 British Truck Companies, which may be available for the movement of civil supplies, going to be used only for the commitments of 800 t.p.d. at VERONA and 400 t.p.d. at UDINE, or will they be available for N.W. Italy as well?
7. Patriots. Query the figure of 100,000. DOCAO suggests it might be 250,000.
8. The transport of rations and clothing for patriots to the collecting centres is a G-4 responsibility in Phase 1. In Phase 2, 1 and 2 District must take on this commitment.
9. Displaced Persons and Refugees. At a later stage, after the numbers of troops are reduced, military transport will have to be made available for the movement of refugees South. In the early stages refugees will move on the returning L of C vehicles, as in previous operations.
10. Civil Supply Tonnes. Coal and POL are excluded, but do they include medical supplies, clothing, etc.?

How will arms and war material be collected and disposed of? Field Kitchens, Butcher etc.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
WAR MATERIALS DISPOSAL AND
ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR SUB COMMISSION

WMD/59/73

24 February 1946

MEMORANDUM ON DISPOSAL OF WAR MATERIAL.

Reference Log Plan 177.

1. The original Directive for the War Materials Disposal Sub-Commission within this Theatre of Operations was to require and initiate action of one central Allied Agency in the field for the procurement, recovery, storage, and distribution of war materials; this Agency to supersede all existing Agencies of Allied Military Forces in areas designated by higher authorities. The War Materials Disposal Sub-Commission of Allied Commission to be the Agency of control. Italian Government Agencies formed or to be formed will eventually act as components of the Sub-Commission.

2. To carry out these functions a draft TO/WI was submitted to Allied Force Headquarters. The proposals were to split the Sub-Commission into 3 Sections:

- (a) Administration and control.
- (b) Intelligence, inspection and liaison.
- (c) Statistics and reports.

The total number of personnel to be

Officers - 12 (to include Chief and Deputy
Chief)
EM or ORs - 9

Approval was given by Allied Force Headquarters early in December 1943 for

Officers - 12) Allied Commission letter No.
EM or ORs - 9) 322 dated 5 December 1943.

It was decided after numerous meetings that 8 officers would

Commission within this Theatre of Operations was to require and initiate action of one central Allied Agency in the field for the procurement, recovery, storage, and distribution of war materials; this Agency to supersede all existing Agencies of Allied Military Forces in areas designated by higher authorities. The War Materials Disposal Sub-Commission of Allied Commission to be the Agency of control. Italian Government Agencies formed or to be formed will eventually act as components of the Sub-Commission.

2. To carry out these functions a draft TC/WE was submitted to Allied Force Headquarters. The proposals were to split the Sub-Commission into 3 Sections:

- (a) Administration and control.
- (b) Intelligence, inspection and liaison.
- (c) Statistics and reports.

The total number of personnel to be

Officers - 18 (to include Chief and Deputy Chief)
EM or ORs - 9

Approval was given by Allied Force Headquarters early in December 1943 for

Officers - 18) Allied Commission letter No.
EM or ORs - 6) 322 dated 5 December 1943.

It was decided after numerous meetings that 8 officers would be sufficient to carry out the work of the Sub-Commission as of that date, because at that time there was little or no material to be disposed of; it was decided that the balance of personnel should be available for posting as and when the question of disposal of war material became a bigger problem.

3. After inspections of all depots in Southern Italy were carried out, it was agreed that 5 officers were sufficient as a nucleus to carry out the duties of the Sub-Commission.

4. In the event of Log Plan 177 becoming effective it is suggested that:

- (a) All captured material not essential for operational purposes be handed over to Allied Commission at the earliest possible moment for use in connection with the Commission's operations in the rehabilitation of Italy, and to help in the supplies and transportation problem of the North. If captured MT in excess of

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Figure 1 consists of two line graphs, (a) and (b), plotting the rate of reaction against temperature. Graph (a) shows a linear increase in the rate of reaction as temperature increases from 0°C to 40°C. Graph (b) shows a sharp increase in the rate of reaction as temperature increases from 0°C to 40°C, characteristic of an enzyme-catalyzed reaction.

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TOP SECRET

AGREEMENT NO. 1 TO LOS. P. 177 DATED 17 FEB 45.

Reference Appendix "A", para 2 - delete the existing para and substitute the following :-

CIVIL

2. Civil Supplies (excluding POL and Coal) required to be imported for present German occupied ITALY are estimated as shown below :

Serial	Compartimento	Total when ration is 100 grams + tpd	Total when ration is 200 grams + tpd	Total when ration is 300 grams tpd
1	PIEMONTE	625	810	1,090
2	LIGURIA	275	355	470
3	LOMBARDIA	1,070	1,380	1,850
4	EMILIA (excl. provincia of FORLI and RAVENNA)	250	315	420
5	provincia of APUANIA and LUCCA in TOSCANA	80	105	140
6	VALLE D'AOSTA	115	145	200
7	VALLE D'AOSTA	165	215	290
8	VALLE D'AOSTA	670	875	1,180
9	TOTAL	3,250	4,200	5,640

Notes:

Bread requirement, including supplemental feeding, equals 50% of

			tpd	tpd
1	PIEMONTE	625	810	1,090
2	LIGURIA	275	355	470
3	LANGRANZIA	1,070	1,380	1,850
4	EMILIA (excl provincia of FORLI and RAVENNA)	250	315	420
5	provincia of ABRUZZIA and L'AQUILA in ROSARIO	60	105	140
6	VENEZIA TRIESTINA	115	145	200
7	VENEZIA GIULIA	165	215	290
8	VENEZIA TROFRIA	670	875	1,190
9	TOTAL	3,250	4,200	5,640

Notes:

* Bread requirement, including supplemental feeding, equals 50% of requirement on 300 grams basic ration.

** Bread requirement is 70% of requirement on 300 grams ration.

2438

TOP SECRET

Executive Commissioner:

Attached is a list of points to be raised at the meeting on Monday 26 February.

Arising out of this morning's meeting the following things were agreed to be done at AG:

1. Economic Section. To check the civil requirement tonnage set out in Log Plan 177.
2. Brigadier DUNLOP to be reminded that he must plan with FDS as well as with No.1 District.
3. Ask Naval S/C whether there is a possibility of utilising Italian Naval facilities for opening VENICE.

25 February 1945.

C.E.O.

23 February 1945.

Ref: 564/20.

Points to raise at Meeting in Florence on 26 February on ICG Plan 177.

1. Clearance of land mines. How far is this a military responsibility?
2. Disarmament of German POW held by patriots. Whose responsibility?
3. Figure in Plan of 300,000 Italian Fascist soldiers returning to their homes and not being captured. Query the number, and obtain instructions as to whether IGs are to round them up and make them POW. If so, are they to send them to the concentration area between the Po and Route 9?
4. Local Resources. To what extent will the Army use local resources for the feeding of Kesselring's Army, in particular in the concentration area? Are they going to move Italian civilians out of the concentration area? If not, query the relationship between civilians and POW.
5. Malaria. Anti-malarial measures in the concentration area must be army commitment.
6. Truck Companies. Are the 20 US and 5 British Truck Companies, which may be available for the movement of civil supplies, going to be used only for the commitments of 300 t.p.d. at VASOMA and 400 t.p.d. at IMBIA, or will they be available for N.W. Italy as well?
7. Patriots. Query the figure of 100,000. DCCAD suggests it might be 250,000.
8. The transport of rations and clothing for patriots to the collecting centres is a G-4 responsibility in Phase 1. In Phase 2, 1 and 2 Districts must take on this commitment.
9. Displaced Persons and Refugees. At a later stage, after the numbers of troops are reduced, military transport will have to be made available for the movement of refugees South. In the early stages refugees will move on the returning L of G vehicles, as in previous operations.
10. Civil Supply Tonnages. Coal and POW are excluded, but do they include medical supplies, clothing, etc?

564

(48)

15 ARMY GROUP CIVIL AFFAIRS

2064

21 February 45

ROUTINE

RECEIVED PD

URGENT IS CONSIDERED TWENTY SIX FEBRUARY PD

FROM TO FIFTEEN ARMY GROUP FROM PD ALONG WITH AGENT PAPER

YOUR ATTENTION IS DRAWN TO THE FACT THAT PD NUMBER OF ALONG

REPRESENTATIVES ATTENDING CONFERENCE WILL BE FIVE INCLUDING DOG DOG

CHIEF OF ARMY GROUP PD ACCORDANCE AIRWAY FIELD

Office of Mr. Coordinator

300

Mjr

2435

564

File

(4)

Extract of Minutes of Executive Committee's Meeting held on 20 February 1945.

8. Italy Planning Meeting. Ex C reported that the GAC had called a meeting of 15th Army Group on 26 February. Four representatives from HQ AG were to attend. Ex C was DGAC were going and two others not yet chosen, as it had not been decided whether RIA or CA and Economic experts should go. Ex C undertook to let Sections concerned know of the decision as soon as possible.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

N. Italy Planning Meeting. Ex G reported that the OAO had called a meeting of the 19th Army Group on 26 February. Four representatives from HQ AG were to attend. Ex G and DDCAG were going and two others not yet chosen, as it had not been decided whether RGs or CA and Economic experts should go. Ex G undertook to let Section concerned know of the decision as soon as possible.

2431

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

5614
INCOMING MESSAGE
 HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Originator's Reference: **FX 29724**
 Date/Time of Origin: **FEB 19/1612**

Message Centre No: **D/2542**
 Date/Time Recd: **FEB 20/0830**
 Precedence: **PRIORITY**
FEB 20 1945

FROM: **APHQ SIGNED SIGNED SITE: PHCAO**
 TO: **15 ARMY GROUP, 5TH ARMY, MAIN 5TH ARMY, ALCOM, PES, DISTONE,**
DISTWO.

SECRET Confidential

SECRET.

Further to FX 29401 dated 18 February. Time of meeting will
 be 1030 hours.

AC DIST

Action: **Executive Commissioner (2)**
 Info: **A/President**
Chief Commissioner
S.O. to Chief Commissioner
C.A.Sec
Econ Sec
N.W.I. Planning
File

ACTION

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

⁵⁶⁴ ¹⁴
INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Originator's Reference

Date/Time of Origin

FEB 191630

Message Centre No.

D/2531

Date/Time Rec'd

FEB 191130

Precedence

ROUTINE

FROM

15 ARMY GROUP

TO

MAIN 8th ARMY, DISTONE, DISTWO, AIGOM

FEB 20 1945

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED.

Ref FREEDOM PX 29401 cite FMCAO dated 18.

Request you advise number of Reps attending conference and if accommodation required stating dates. Understand conference will be at 1030 hrs

ACTION

DIST

ACTION EA COMMISSIONER (2)
INFO A/PRESIDENT
CHIEF COMMISSIONER
S.O. to CHIEF COMMISSIONER
ECON SEC
C A SEC
MVI PLANS
FILE

HEADQUARTERS

2132

A.

RESTRICTED

TOP SECRET

FEB 19 1945

HEADQUARTERS,
FIFTH ARMY GROUP

Cas. No. 37.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Confidential

Date: 12/24/45

OPERATIONS INFORMATION

1

12 Feb 1945

OPERATIONS IN N. ITALY AFTER CAPTURE OF MONTEBELLUNA

1. It is estimated that the German preparations for a withdrawal to the line of the ADIGE are now complete, and that the plan can be put into operation at short notice, if not already started. There are, however, no factual indications that the plan will be put into effect at any stated time. The enemy would prefer, other things being equal, to remain on his present line and retain control of the whole area of Northern ITALY at present in his hands for various reasons. He will withdraw, therefore, only because of other and more important considerations and in particular because of the need of detaching troops for other theatres. If and when the enemy decides to withdraw, he will execute the withdrawal from his present front only under pressure. The extent of resistance which he will offer will vary according to the extent to which he has already incurred his front.

2. The enemy can shorten his present line by withdrawing his left to the line VALLE DI ORSAGNOL - MEDICINA - MT. GRADIS, allowing him to release up to three to four divisions. If the enemy releases more than this number it will probably involve a withdrawal to the line of the TIGRINO and PO and subsequently to his strongest prepared positions - the ADIGE or the ALPS lines.

3. The enemy can be credited with three capabilities:

- a. To resume the offensive.
- b. To remain on present positions, and when forced, to withdraw to successive positions.
- c. To withdraw voluntarily to a position behind the PO to enable him to release divisions for other theatres.

4. There is no firm evidence of any large-scale withdrawal although preparations to withdraw from Northern ITALY still continue. Based on past performance it can be assumed the enemy will adopt the second of his capabilities, making up fight for any ground he desires. See also the German communication No. 19 dated 5 Feb, attached.

of the ARMY are now complete, and that the plan can be put into operation at short notice. If not already started. There are, however, no factual indications that the plan will be put into effect at any stated time. The enemy would prefer, other things being equal, to remain on his present line and retain control of the whole area of Northern ITALY at present in his hands for various reasons. He will withdraw, therefore, only because of other and more important considerations and in particular because of the need of detaching troops for other theatres. If and when the enemy decides to withdraw, he will execute the withdrawal from his present front only under restraint. The amount of resistance which he will offer will vary according to the extent to which he has already thinned his front.

2. The enemy can shorten his present line by withdrawing his left to the line GALLI DI CORMACCHIO - MEDICINA - MT. CARNESE, allowing him to release up to three to four divisions. If the enemy releases more than this number it will probably involve a withdrawal to the line of the TIGRINO and PO and subsequently to his strongest prepared positions - the ALPINE or the ALPS lines.

3. The enemy can be credited with three capabilities:

- a. To sustain the offensive.
- b. To remain in present positions, and when forced, to withdraw to successive positions.
- c. To withdraw voluntarily to a position behind the PO to enable him to release divisions for other theatres.

4. There is no firm evidence of any large-scale withdrawal although preparations to withdraw from Northern ITALY still continue. Based on past performance it can be assumed the enemy will adopt the pattern of his expedition, seeking a fight for any ground he desires. ESO 8-2 15 Army Group Appreciation No. 59, dated 5 Feb, attached at appx 'A' for detailed analysis.

5. 15th Army Group is charged with the mission of:

- a. Holding present positions in event of an enemy offensive.
- b. Containing the maximum number of enemy divisions in ITALY.
- c. Bringing the enemy to battle to destroy German forces in ITALY.
- d. Finally clearing ITALY of the enemy.

6. In line with the assigned mission, 15th Army Group plan of operations will be staged in three phases:

- Phase I - Capture and establishment of a bridgehead around BOLZANO.
- Phase II - Developing the PO river position.

(.....Phase III.....)

T O P S E C R E T

42

this Headquarters. Plans will provide for early training of personnel in river crossings, utilizing all expedients at our command. Details of the River PO and ABISE crossing sites and terrain studies are being currently issued and will continue to be issued by this Headquarters.

b. ~~IV Corps Headquarters will prepare plans to occupy the area liberated April 1945. For purposes of this planning, IV Corps Headquarters is authorized to contact directly No. 2 District, 12th Army Group, and other necessary Headquarters.~~ (100-100)

By command of Lieutenant General CHASE :

A.M. GROSSER,
Major-General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIALS:

DONALD W. BLANK,
Brig. Gen., G.S.C.,
A.C. of S., G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

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100 Fifth Army	3 - 4	G-1	13
100 IV Corps	5	G-2	14
100 G-3	6	G-3 Plans	15
G-4	7	G-4	16 & 35
100 G-5	8	G-5	17
100 2 District	9	Sign	18
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		Artillery	20
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		Hist Sec., (Italy) Br.	22 - 27
		Historian HQ	28
		War Diary	29 - 32
		AG File	33
		File	34 & 30
		Spares	35 - 40

TOP SECRET - CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix 'A'
to HQ 15 Army Group
Operation Instruction
No. 3 dated 12 Feb 45.

G-2 APPRECIATION NO. 49

1. OBJECT

To establish the manner of an enemy withdrawal from his present positions to positions in Northern Italy.

2. ENEMY POLICY

We believe that:-

- (a) The enemy would prefer, other things being equal, to remain on his present line and retain control of the whole area of Northern Italy as present in his hands for various reasons, political and economic, which need not be specified. He will consent to a withdrawal, therefore, only because of other and more important reasons and in particular the need of detaching troops for other theatres.
- (b) If and when the enemy has decided to withdraw he will only finally vacate his present front under pressure from the Allies. The amount of resistance which he will oppose to this pressure will vary according to the extent to which he has already thinned out.
- (c) The main prepared defensive positions North of the present line are the TICINO - PO, ADIGE and PIAVE lines.

3. ENEMY STRENGTH AND DISPOSITIONS

The enemy has at the moment twenty-six divisions in Italy, one Infantry Division having just left. Three of these, however, viz 155 Trg Div, 152 Troopman Div and 188 Res Mtn Div, can scarcely be considered at present either as a useful contribution to the Eastern Front or as suitable to life in any but a quiet sector of the front line in Italy. They may, however, improve in quality in time. There are in addition four or five Italian Republican Divisions which are only suitable for security duties and the defence of quiet sectors when supported by German troops. At the present moment there are sixteen plus divisions in line with three divisions in reserve South of the PO, three in NW Italy and four minus in NE Italy.

The enemy will only withdraw his line when his forces become too weak to hold their present positions. There is at

He will consent to a withdrawal, therefore, only because of other and more important reasons and in particular the need of detaching troops for other theatres.

(b) If and when the enemy has decided to withdraw he will only finally vacate his present front under pressure from the Allies. The amount of resistance which he will oppose to this pressure will vary according to the extent to which he has already thinned out.

(c) The main prepared defensive positions North of the present line are the TICINO - PO, ADIGE and PIAVE lines.

3. ENEMY CURRENT AND DISPOSITIONS

The enemy has at the moment twenty-six divisions in ITALY, one Infantry Division having just left. Three of these, however, viz 155 Trg Div, 162 Turcoman Div and 125 Res Mtn Div, can scarcely be considered at present either as a useful contribution to the Eastern front or as suitable to life in any but a quiet sector of the front line in ITALY. They may, however, improve in quality in time. There are in addition four or five Italian Republican Divisions which are only suitable for security duties and the defence of quiet sectors when supported by German troops. At the present moment there are sixteen plus divisions in line with three divisions in reserve South of the PO, three in NW ITALY and four minus in NE ITALY.

The enemy will only withdraw his line when his forces become too weak to hold his present positions. There is at present no firm evidence that he has been called on to provide more than the one division which has already left, though another division is possibly now on the way, but there are reports of an intended evacuation of Northern ITALY which imply that RESSORING has in fact been ordered to detach considerable forces for other theatres. The reliability of these reports is open to doubt.

The enemy can adjust his present line to effect an economy in force by pulling back his left or Eastern flank to a shorter line between M. GRANDE and Lake COM. COLO. By doing this he could despatch, it is calculated, a further four divisions to another theatre and still continue to hold South of the river PO. If our beliefs in para 2 are correct, it follows that if the enemy shows signs of withdrawing further back than this, we can deduce that he has been obliged to release at least five and probably more divisions. In the latter case it is clear that the release of divisions and the withdrawal to a shorter line would proceed concurrently in order to avoid leaving weak spots in an over-extended line.

4. THE PO POSITION

The line of the PO and the TIGLIO measures about 225 miles. At the moment the enemy's Southern front from east to west measures about 100 miles and the Alpine front 120 miles. It is estimated that the line of the TIGLIO (100 miles) could be held by 76 German Divisions, which is the present defending the Alpine front, with two German Divisions and one Italian, since this front is less likely to be attacked. The remainder of the front, along the PO valley, measures 175 miles from the mouth of the TIGLIO to the mouth of the PO, but the last 25 miles, down stream from COMBOLA, is marshy and susceptible to flooding and can be subordinated from the total. It is calculated that this could be held against all but a barefacedly staged, concentrated, surprise attack by twelve German and three Italian Divisions. One Italian and one low category German Division would be employed on security duties in NE Italy, plus various foreign formations such as Czecho, Czechs and Slovaks, and the 5.5 Karol Brigade. In this case 11 additional German Divisions could be released to another theatre and the river line could be held for a period.

Such a disposition would only be safe provided the enemy could make certain of a defeating the Schwerpunkt of our attack. It must be certain of being strong in the sector BORGOFORTE - COMBOLA, as this covers the approaches to the next line, the ADIGE. No can, however, take a calculated risk on the Western end of his line. It is likely that he would not attempt, with the forces suggested above, to hold the PO line indefinitely against a strong allied attack for fear of the (certain) event of some of his forces due to a penetration East or West of the approaches to the frontier.

5. THE ADIGE LINE

The line of the river ADIGE, on which the enemy has been working now for many months, measures 100 miles from the sea to Lake Garda and its continuation from the lake to the Swiss frontier is about 50 miles. The latter sector, however, presents few avenues of attack. Defence works on the ADIGE are numerous (for considerations of flooding and new Engineer appreciation). In that we have to deal with German formations only as the Italian Divisions will have been seriously reduced by desertion and will probably be found unreliable. One division (10 FLOMAS) may be reliable enough to undertake security duties in the rear, together with 162 Tirolesian Division which would still not be put in the line. This would leave 12 German Divisions for the main line, and, if a determined stand is to be made on the ADIGE, this number cannot be considered at all excessive. Any reduction below this figure which

Such a penetration would only be safe provided the enemy could make certain of recognizing the Schwerpunkt of our attack. It must be certain of being struck in the sector BOROVITZ - CORBOLA, as this covers the approach to the next line, the ADIG. He can, however, take a calculated risk on the Western end of his line. It is likely that he would not retreat, with the future suggested above, as hold the FO line indefinitely against a strong Allied attack for fear of the withdrawal of some of his forces due to a penetration at or west of the approaches to the ARUNDA.

5. THE ADIG LINE

The line of the river ADIG, on which the enemy has been working now for many months, measures 100 miles from the sea to Lake Garda and is a continuation from the Lake to the Swiss frontier to about 50 miles. The latter sector, however, presents few advantages of attack. Defences work on the ADIG are numerous (for considerations of flooding and New Engineer Appreciation). In considering these dispositions for this line we can probably assume that we have to deal with German formations only as the Italian Divisions will have been seriously reduced by desertion and will probably be found unreliable. One division (10 PICTAS) may be reliable enough to undertake security duties in the rear, together with 100 Turcoman Division which would still not be put in the line. This would leave 12 German Divisions for the main line, and, if a determined stand is to be made on the ADIG, this number cannot be considered at all expensive. Any reduction below this figure which might be ordered would risk the necessity of a withdrawal still further.

In any case however, there is little advantage to be gained by holding a line on the ADIG or PLAVE in preference to a line following the Alps throughout. The Germans seem to think, or to have thought, that there was some advantage or they would not have wasted time and labour on defences there. However, if the need for men elsewhere was really overpowering they could feel fairly confident of preventing the Allies from entering Austria from the South with the expenditure of only about seven divisions and detachments the other eight from the ADIG line to the area where they were most needed.

6. MATTER OF ENEMY WITHDRAWAL

When the order for a withdrawal to the FO was given the enemy would probably start in the West by beginning to thin out in the French Alps. At the same time he could pull back the Western

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flank of his present main front. (He may walk back to the present position of one German Brigade in order to deny up the port). This movement would be complicated by the presence of the Italian Division; they are probably intended to act as rearwards and will be found very unreliable in the role. However the enemy probably expects that we will not be very active in pressing the pursuit either across the Alps or up routes 62 and 63. On the Eastern flank of the main front there is an abundance of water lines on which a rearguard can impose delay. The enemy will not give up BOLOGNA until the last minute. On giving it up his first delaying position will be on the RENO.

A withdrawal from the PO - TICINO line to the ADIGE is a straightforward operation provided the cohesion of the front can be maintained.

7. CONCLUSIONS

- (a) There is no firm evidence yet of any large scale enemy withdrawal although preparations to withdraw from Western Italy still continue.
- (b) The enemy will hold BOLOGNA as long as he can, but, if and when he releases more than four further divisions from the main battle front, he must withdraw to successive defence lines which have been prepared. He may be expected to delay temporarily on the RENO, to hold for a rather longer time the line TICINO - PO, and to make a firm stand on the ADIGE.
- (c) The enemy might hold the TICINO - PO line with fourteen German or three Italian divisions, and the ADIGE line with fourteen German divisions only.
- (d) A reduction in the number of German divisions in Italy below fifteen may lead to a continuance of the withdrawal to the Alps.

C-2 Section,
5 Feb 45.

SIGNED - C. R. R. HIRSCH,
Brigadier, G.S.
A.C. of S., G-2.

- (a) There is no firm evidence yet of any large scale enemy withdrawal although preparations to withdraw from Western Italy still continue.
- (b) The enemy will hold BOLOGNA as long as he can, but, if and when he releases more than four further divisions from the main battle front, he must withdraw to successive defence lines which have been prepared. He may be expected to delay temporarily on the RENO, to hold for a rather longer time the line TICINO - PO, and to make a firm stand on the ADIGE.
- (c) The enemy might hold the TICINO - PO line with fourteen German and three Italian divisions, and the ADIGE line with fourteen German divisions only.
- (d) A reduction in the number of German divisions in ITALY below fifteen may lead to a continuance of the withdrawal to the ALPS.

G-2 Section,
5 Feb 45.

SIGNED - G.W.R. HIRSCH,
Brigadier, O.S.
A.C. of S., G-2.

2428

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Originator's Reference: **EX 29401**
Date/Time of Origin: **FEB 18**

Message Centre No: **D 2406**
Date/Time Rec'd: **FEB 19 0950A**
Priority: **PRIORITY**
FEB 19 1945

FROM: **AFHQ SIGNED SACMED CITE PHCAO**
TO: **15 ARMY GROUP, 5 ARMY MAIN, 8 ARMY ALCOM PBS DISTONE, DISTWO**

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
CAC will hold conference one COY HQ 15 ARMY GP on Monday 26 February. Time will be notified later. Subject administration plans for occupation north ITALY. This Hq planning paper log P.177 of 17 February 1945 to first four addressees refers. Addressees are requested to send representatives. To keep number down it is suggested armies and Alcom should limit representatives to maximum 4 each. Districts and PBS 2 each.

Dist

Action - Executive Commissioner
Info - ☒ President
Chief Commissioner
S.O. to Chief Commissioner
N.W.I. Plans
Econ
CA Sec
File

ACTION

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

C.A.C.'s Office

FEB 19 1945

CAO/751

18 Feb 45.

SUBJECT: Administrative requirements in ITALY

To: Commanding General 15 Army Group
Commanding General Fifth Army
General Officer Commanding Eighth Army
Chief Commissioner Allied Commission

Copies 31 - 34
" 35 - 36
" 37 - 38
" 39 - 40

1. Copies, numbered as above, are enclosed of AFHQ planning paper, Log. P. 177 dated 17 Feb 45, Subject: "Appreciation of Administrative Requirements in ITALY in the event of a German surrender or withdrawal."
2. A meeting will be held by the CAO at HQ 15 Army Group on Monday, 26 February 1945, at a time to be notified later, at which this subject will be discussed.

B.E. Robertson
B.E. ROBERTSON,
Lieut-General,
Chief Administrative Officer.

2426

Copy No. 39 passed to Chief Clerk
1100 hrs 19 FEB 45

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

LOG. P. 177

17 Feb 46 **Confidential** FEB 19 1945

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SUBJECT:- Administrative requirements in ITALY in the event of
a German surrender or withdrawal.

1. The attached planning paper, "Appreciation of administrative requirements in ITALY in the event of a German surrender or withdrawal", has been prepared by Administrative Planning Staff for submission to the GAO. The appreciation will form the basis for a conference to be held by the GAO in the near future at HQ 15 Army Group.

2. The Appreciation is divided into the following main headings :-

Subject matter

Operational Background
Object of Appreciation
Main Administrative tasks
Demolitions and Obstacles
Maintenance of 15 Army Group
Re-establishing a Army
Establishment of a Base and L of C into AUSTRIA
Military Government and Civil Supplies
Responsibility for Partisans and Refugees/Displaced Persons
Static HQ Layout
Development of Ports and Communications
Re-organisation of Allied Forces consequent on German surrender
Main Conclusions
Maintenance Data
Transport
Static HQ Layout

Para. Nos.

1 - 2
3 - 4
4 - 5
5 - 6
6 - 8
8 - 13
13 - 15
15 - 18
18 - 20
20 - 21
21 - 26
26 - 27
27 - 28
28 - 30
Appx 'A'
Appx 'B'
Appx 'C' &
Annexure 1

3. Annexure 1 will be forwarded separately.

A. J. DONAHUE,
Colonel, GSC.

A. M. MILNE,
Colonel, Plans

Subject Matter

Operational Background
Object of Appropriation
Main Administrative Tasks
Demolitions and Obstacles
Maintenance of 15 Army Group
Reconnaissance Army
Establishment of Base and L of C into AUSTRIA
Military Government and Civil Supplies
Responsibility for Partisans and Refugees/Displaced Persons
Station HQ Layout
Development of Parts and Communications
Re-organization of Allied Forces consequent on German surrender
Main Conclusions
Maintenance Data
Transport
Station HQ Layout

3. Annexure 1 will be forwarded separately.

A. J. Donahoe
A. J. DONAHOE,
Colonel, AGC.
G-4 Plans.

Distribution :-

G-4-in-C Mod
Air G-4-in-C Major
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26 - 50

A. M. Miller
A. M. MILLER,
Colonel,
Log. Plans.

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Copy No.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Log. F. Confidential

17 Feb 45

SUBJECT:-- APPRECIATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS IN ITALY
IN THE EVENT OF A GERMAN SURRENDER OR WITHERAWAL

OPERATIONAL BACKGROUND

1. a. Russian operations, possibly causing KESSELRING'S maintenance communications to be covered, may result in any of the following situations arising in this theatre in the near future :-
 - i. KESSELRING may surrender on his present line or attempt to withdraw his forces into AUSTRIA before surrendering.
 - ii. KESSELRING may attempt to keep his forces in the field on any one of a number of prepared positions South of the AUSTRIAN Frontier.
 - b. The situation in the event of KESSELRING surrendering at or near his present line is, from the administrative standpoint, the most urgent problem which might arise, though in certain circumstances it may not be the worst case. In general terms, however, the broad administrative policy to meet the situation will cover the action required in other possible situations. This appreciation, therefore, only considers in detail the situation in the event of KESSELRING surrendering at or near his present line.
2. Briefly the operational plan to meet the situation in para 1 b. above might be :-
 - a. To place Allied formations astride the German L of C between the

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785017

1. Kesselring may surrender on his present line or attempt to withdraw his forces into AUSTRIA before surrendering.

or 4. Kesselring may attempt to keep his forces in the field on any one of a number of prepared positions south of the AUSTRIAN frontier.

b. The situation in the event of KESSELRING's surrendering at or near his present line is, from the administrative standpoint, the most urgent problem which might arise, though in certain circumstances it may not be the worst case. In general terms, however, the broad administrative policy to meet the situation will cover the action required in other possible situations. This appreciation, therefore, only considers in detail the situation in the event of KESSELRING's surrendering at or near his present line.

2. Briefly the operational plan to meet the situation in para 1 b. above might be :-

- a. To place Allied formations astride the German L of C between the German forces and the Austrian frontier so as to prevent any German withdrawal into AUSTRIA.
- b. To occupy NZ and NE ITALY and clear these areas of enemy forces.
- c. When the tasks at para 2 b. above have been initiated and, as soon as the administrative situation will permit, to move Allied forces into

AUSTRIA. 4 weeks

OBJECT OF APPRECIATION

3. The object of this Appreciation is to consider the administrative action required to meet the situation outlined in para 1 b. above in so far as it affects present German occupied ITALY.

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MAIN ADMINISTRATIVE TASKS

- 2 -

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4. The principal administrative tasks will be :-

- a. Maintenance of 15 Army Group and supporting Air Forces.
- b. Disarmament and maintenance of surrendered German Navy, Army and Air Forces.
- c. Establishment of an advanced base and L of C into AUSTRIA.
- d. Imposition of Allied Military Government on present German occupied ITALY.
- e. Provision and distribution of supplies for the civil population in present German occupied ITALY.

DEMOLITIONS AND OBSTACLES

5. The German L of C into AUSTRIA and communications within present German occupied ITALY have already been extensively damaged as a result of Allied bombing. If the Germans have not withdrawn from ITALY before surrendering it is unlikely that a systematic programme of demolitions will be carried out but instances of deliberate destruction by fanatics and die-hards are to be expected. If the Germans withdraw before surrendering, demolitions in N. ITALY are likely to be considerable, especially if they are able to withdraw without close pursuit. The commitment of clearing sea minefields will be equally heavy in the case of either surrender or withdrawal.

MAINTENANCE OF 15 ARMY GROUP

6. General

- a. Initially the maintenance of 15 Army Group and supporting Air Forces forward of railheads existing at the time of enemy surrender or withdrawal will have to be by road. (para 5 above).
- b. Estimated daily maintenance requirements of that portion of a Div

5. The German 2 of C into AUSTRIA and communications within present German occupied ITALY have already been extensively damaged as a result of Allied bombing. If the Germans have not withdrawn from ITALY before surrendering it is unlikely that a systematic programme of demolitions will be carried out but instances of deliberate destruction by fanatics and die-hards are to be expected. If the Germans withdraw before surrendering, demolitions in N. ITALY are likely to be considerable, especially if they are able to withdraw without close pursuit. The commitment of clearing sea minefields will be equally heavy in the case of either surrender or withdrawal.

MAINTENANCE OF 15 ARMY GROUP

6. General

- a. Initially the maintenance of 15 Army Group and supporting Air Forces forward of railheads existing at the time of enemy surrender or withdrawal will have to be by road. (para 5 above).
- b. Estimated daily maintenance requirements of that portion of a Div which forward of RH in the event of an enemy surrender or withdrawal are set out at Appendix 'A', para 1.

c. The operational plan for the occupation of N. ITALY which has been assumed in this paper as follows :-

Phase I Three US Divs moving to the VERONA area and up to the

Austrian frontier via the BRESCIA route.

Phase II Disarmament of surrendered German Army by US and British

Formations.

Phase III Four British Divs moving to NE ITALY.

Phase IV Three British Divs moving to NE ITALY.

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Phase I will be carried out first. Phase II will take some time to complete and will be continuing during Phases III and IV. Depending on operational requirements in ITALY it is operationally desirable that forces be moved into AUSTRIA as early as possible, which may be before Phases III and IV have been completed. The extent to which this will be possible will depend on the administrative situation.

7. Administrative Factors.

The time required to open ports and restore railway communications will result in a long road L of C in the initial stages of this plan. While administrative resources of service units generally will be strained to meet the above operational plan the availability of load carrying transport is likely to be the principal administrative limitation.

8. Transport required by 15 Army Group to meet commitments

a. Assuming that :-

- i. US railheads are in the PRATO - FLORENCE area.
 - ii. US pipeheads are in the RADICOSA area.
 - iii. British railheads and pipeheads are in the FORLI - BOLOGNA area
- It is estimated that the transport set out below will be required by 15 Army Group to meet their various commitments.

b. Transport requirements to meet commitments under Phases I to IV above simultaneously are estimated to be :-

- i. The equivalent of 44 x 2½ ton (augmented) Trunk Coys.
- ii. The equivalent of 45 British G.T. Coys.

(For details see Appendix 'B').

c. From Appendix 'B' para 2 it will be noted that it is estimated

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Administrative resources of service units generally will be strained to meet the above operational plan the availability of load carrying transport is likely to be the principal administrative limitation.

3. Transport required by 15 Army Group to meet commitments

a. Assuming that :-

- i. US railheads are in the PRATO - FLORENCE area.
 - ii. US pipelineheads are in the RADIOSSA area.
 - iii. British railheads and pipelineheads are in the FORLI - BOLOGNA area
- it is estimated that the transport set out below will be required by 15 Army Group to meet their various commitments.

Transport requirements to meet commitments under Phases I to IV above simultaneously are estimated to be :-

- i. The equivalent of 41 x 2½ ton (augmented) Truck Coys.
- ii. The equivalent of 45 British G.T. Coys.

(For details see Appendix 'B').

- c. From Appendix 'B' para 2 it will be noted that it is estimated that the equivalent of 84 x 2½ ton Truck Coys might be made available/under surrender conditions to support formations engaged in Phases I to IV. This is 43 x 2½ ton Truck Coys in excess of anticipated commitments under Phases I to IV. These Coys, if not required for other commitments due to a modification of the plan, might be used for movement of civil supplies in N. ITALY and for the movement of troops to, and their subsequent maintenance in, AUSTRIA.

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- d. A detailed examination of Appendix 'B' of the possibility of providing the British transport requirements as at sub-para 2. ii. above has shown that the equivalent of some 50 x 3 ton G.T. Coys might be made available under surrender conditions to the forces engaged in Phases I to IV. The sources from which the transport is to be found must be considered in the light of the theatre distribution of transport at the time, but the following would be the means of its provision:-
- i. Re-allocation of G.T. Coys now with Armies.
 - ii. Re-allocation of 2nd and 3rd line transport of Formations, not engaged in Phases I to IV.
 - iii. Re-allocation of Army Pls.
 - iv. Cuts in transport allocated in the L of C to Depots, B2,

Base Maintenance and miscellaneous details.

- e. In order that a plan may be prepared which can be put into operation without delay a review of the sources from which the required US and British transport is to be drawn should be made periodically.

- f. Less transport is likely to be available under withdrawal conditions to support Formations following up an enemy withdrawal. On the other hand the occupation of N. ITALY is likely to be slower under withdrawal conditions than under surrender conditions.

- g. From the sub-para above and Appendix 'B' it will be noted that the equivalent of 43 x 2½ ton US Truck Coys and 6 British G.T. Coys might be found which are in excess of Armies' immediate requirements. Of these it is considered that planning might be based on 20 US Truck Coys and 5 British G.T. Coys being available initially for the

initial supplies to N. ITALY (see para 18 below) and later

iii. Re-allocation of Army Pls.

iv. Cuts in transport allocated in the L of C to Decin, Depots, HQ, Base Maintenance and miscellaneous details.

2. In order that a plan may be prepared which can be put into operation without delay a review of the resources from which the required US and British transport is to be drawn should be made periodically.

3. Less transport is likely to be available under withdrawal conditions to support formations following up on enemy withdrawal. On the other hand the occupation of N. ITALY is likely to be slower under withdrawal conditions than under surrender conditions.

4. From the sub-para above and Appendix 'B' it will be noted that the equivalent of 43 x 2½ ton US Truck Coys and 5 British G.F. Coys might be found which are in excess of known immediate requirements. As these it is considered that planning might be based on 20 US Truck Coys and 5 British G.F. Coys being available initially for the movement of civil supplies to N. ITALY (see para 18 below) and later for the movement of troops and maintenance requirements into AUSTRIA.

REQUIREMENTS OF THE ARMY

9. G-2 Information

5. The total strength of Germans in ITALY is estimated to be 300,000 of which 250,000 - 300,000 are combat troops. In addition there are about 500,000 Italian troops and para-military formations who are maintained by REINFORCING. Up to 1,000,000 Italians may be expected to return to their homes before surrender to or capture by 2,2 million a total commitment of about 1,000,000 personnel.

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The enemy is estimated to hold normally about 20 days rations with formations and in army depots. A large, but inexactable proportion of the enemy's rations are thought to be obtained locally in Italy. Their principal supply base appears to be in the VERONA area, although there are several depots in scattered areas North and South of the

River EC.

The enemy is believed to have little or no sabotage but most enemy troops should be equipped with a type of groundnut suitable for making a bivouac.

a. Surrender may take one of two forms :-

i. The enemy may surrender as an organised body with no breakdown in command or administration

or ii. The enemy may disintegrate and surrender piecemeal by sub-units and individuals in many cases throwing away and destroying their arms and equipment.

10. Administration

a. It is the Allied intention that KES KLING'S Army should administer itself. The object of 15 Army Group should therefore be :-

i. To prevent disintegration of enemy units and formations.

ii. To re-form into organised bodies such units which have disintegrated in the course of surrender.

iii. To prevent enemy destruction of his own material.

b. The German Army should be concentrated in areas which will give least opportunity for escape to the North, where they will have some degree of cover and can be easily maintained, and where they can be put to

- i. The enemy may surrender as an organized body with no breakdown in command or administration.
- or ii. The enemy may disintegrate and surrender piecemeal by sub-units and individuals in any cases throwing away and destroying their arms and equipment.

10. Administration

- a. It is the Allied intention that KESSELER'S Army should administer itself. The object of 15 Army Group should therefore be :--
 - i. To prevent disintegration of enemy units and formations.
 - ii. To re-form into organized bodies such units which have disintegrated in the course of surrender.
 - iii. To prevent enemy destruction of his own material.

- b. The German Army should be concentrated in areas which will give least opportunity for escape to the North, where they will have some degree of cover and can be easily maintained, and where they can be put to useful work in matter of Allied administrative resources. The most suitable area is that between the River PO and Route 9, and German divisions and auxiliary troops surrendering in the general vicinity of the PO and South of the River should be initially concentrated in this area. Divisions in NE and NW Italy should be concentrated initially in NE and NW Italy but the intention should be to move these formations South of the PO as soon as circumstances allow. The area between the PO and Route 9 (exclusive of this route and major towns in the area) will therefore be the main concentration area for KESSELER'S Army. This area is not desirable from a medical

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point of view as it is highly malariou. It is considered, however, that other considerations outweigh these objections and special material control measures will have to be taken.

2. It will be the responsibility of formations and Fifth and Eighth Armies, in their advance, to accept the surrender of enemy formations, to effect their disarmament, prepare the necessary documentation and to supervise their administration.

3. For ease of control, enemy formations should be concentrated in groups of four to five divisions. In the case of the main concentration area it is estimated that two corps, each of two or three divisions, will be necessary to perform the tasks in 2. above. It will be desirable that these corps should be, from right to left, one British and one US, the boundary being the FRIEDRICH/SOLOMUN railway line which is the proposed boundary at a later stage between PIS and 1 District (see Appendix 'C' para 2). With the advance of Fifth and Eighth Armies the US and the British corps will pass under command of AFHQ except for local administration which will be under PIS and 1 District respectively.

4. It will be an Army responsibility to provide liaison staffs from within their own resources to be attached as considered necessary to German Corps, Divisional or other administrative HQs. Staff increments to the two German Army HQs and the Army Group HQs will also be provided on a pool to be notified by AFHQ. Suitable officers for these increments, who will be found by detachment from present employment, will be nominated by AFHQ.

necessary to perform the tasks in c, above. It will be desirable that these corps should be, from right to left, one British and one US, the boundary being the HERNERA/BOLOGNA railway line which is the proposed boundary at a later stage between PWS and 1 District (see Appendix 'B' para 2). With the advance of Fifth and Eighth Armies the US and the British corps will pass under command of AFHQ except for local administration which will be under PWS and 1 District respectively.

e. It will be an Army responsibility to provide liaison staffs from within their own resources to be attached as considered necessary to German Corps, Divisional or other administrative HQs. Staff increments to the two German Army HQs and the Army Group HQs will also be provided on a scale to be notified by AFHQ. Suitable officers for these increments, who will be freed by detachment from present employment, will be nominated by AFHQ.

11. Holdings and Guarding

a. While the German Army will be technically PW after surrender, it is not possible for the Army to be held in PW cages. Allied formations should be responsible for guarding enemy formations and only recalcitrant enemy personnel should be removed to PW enclosures. The following camp accommodation is available :-

1. British - ITALY (Forward areas with Armies)	3,000
2. of C	14,000
3. GERMANY	20,000
4. NORTH AFRICA	10,000
5. MEDITERRANEAN	35,000
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14. US - ~~SECRET~~
15. ~~SECRET~~
16. ~~SECRET~~

15,000
10,000

5,000 (capable of
expansion to 20,000)

- * This camp should only be regarded as of transit status.

It is proposed to establish a number of PW camps in the EC valley, sufficient to hold the US share of PW who need to be confined.

The number and size of camps is still in the planning stages.

b. It will probably be necessary to establish barbed wire enclosures in the main concentration area to confine a total of say, 50,000 German personnel in which recalcitrant enemy personnel can be kept. These enclosures should be erected by German labour.

c. The policy regarding the ultimate disposal of enemy personnel has not yet been decided. Until a decision is made it should be the policy to keep KIM IL-SUNG's army concentrated in the area between the EC and Route 9.

d. PW may be employed on construction and repair work subject to the following conditions :-

1. That they work under proper guards.

11. That they are not employed on any work prohibited by Articles

9, 31, and 32 of the Geneva Convention.

12. Disarmament

a. Primary disarmament should be carried out immediately on surrender by combat forces under Fifth and Eighth Armies wherever the enemy may be found. Allied guards should be placed over dumps of enemy material and the enemy should be marched to the concentration area. German formations should be permitted to retain sufficient transport for

their equipment as

concentration should be erected by German labour.

c. The policy regarding the ultimate disposal of enemy personnel has not yet been decided. Until a decision is made it should be the policy to keep Kesselring's Army concentrated in the area between the PO and Route 2.

d. PW may be employed on construction and repair work subject to the following conditions :-

- i. That they work under proper guards.
- ii. That they are not employed on any work prohibited by Articles 9, 11, and 12 of the Geneva Convention.

12. Disarmament

a. Primary disarmament should be carried out immediately on surrender by combat formations under Fifth and Eighth Armies wherever the enemy may be found. Allied guards should be placed over dumps of enemy material and the enemy should be moved to the concentration area. German formations should be permitted to retain sufficient transport for their own maintenance and such housekeeping and medical equipment as they may require to establish their own camps. Scale of equipment which should be retained by enemy formations is being prepared and will be issued in an Allied Memorandum.

b. The existing enemy dumps and depots should also be taken over by the Allies as soon as possible. Formations should carry out this task in respect of the areas for which they are made responsible.

c. Enemy materials from dumps created in the course of primary disarmament and from existing dumps and depots should be disposed of in

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the following manner :-

- i. Stores of food, clothing, domestic equipment, engineer stores, etc, required for the maintenance of the German Army should be left in situ, to be used for that purpose subject to Allied supervision.
- ii. Material and vehicles required by the Allies (for re-issues to Allied units to assist in civil relief and rehabilitation, for G-2 purposes or for shipment out of the theatre) should be moved into Allied or enemy dumps or depots.
- iii. Enemy material which is not required for the maintenance of the German Army or for Allied war purposes should be left under Allied guard. This material will be destroyed or disposed of in accordance with instructions to be issued later.
- iv. Enemy materials and vehicles under c. ii. above which are dumped in course of primary disarmament, or taken over in existing dumps in the main concentration area, should be moved to service dumps in South of Route 9.
- v. Enemy materials and vehicles under c. i. and ii. above dumped or found in existing dumps North of the PO, should be concentrated in German depots existing North of the PO.
- vi. The guarding, sorting and moving of enemy material in respect of dumps in the main concentration area (para i. above) and in the area initially a Fifth and Eighth North of the PO (para v. above) should be / Army responsibility. The receiving and sorting of enemy material in parks South of Route 9 should be an Army responsibility.

Allied guards. This material will be destroyed or disposed of in accordance with instructions to be issued later.

Enemy materials and vehicles under c. 11. above which are dumped in course of primary dismantling, or taken over in existing dumps in the main concentration area, should be moved to service dumps South of Route 9.

Enemy materials and vehicles under c. 1. and 11. above dumped or found in existing dumps North of the PO, should be concentrated in German dumps existing North of the PO.

The guarding, sorting and moving of enemy material in respect of dumps in the main concentration area (para d. above) and in the area initially a fifth and eighth North of the PO (para g. above) should be / Army responsibility. The

receiving and sorting of enemy material in parks South of Route 9 should be an AFHQ responsibility.

Technical assistance in the sorting and classifying of enemy material should be given by the German service organizations under Allied supervision and instructions.

The maximum use of German labour and vehicles should be made in the dumping and moving of enemy material.

As the main task of sorting and classifying enemy material is likely to be in respect of dumps North of the PO, AFHQ should provide certain additional service personnel which will be placed at the disposal of the Allies to assist in transporting enemy dumps.

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2. Naval disarmament at CEMSA, SHELVA, TRUSSE, and other locations will be conducted by a small Naval Staff sent there for the purpose. Guards for enemy Naval barracks, dumps and storehouses will, however, require to be provided by the Military Authorities as these cannot be provided by the Navy.

3. The Air Forces Commander will be responsible for determining the action to be taken to dispose of enemy air force equipment and materials, other than explosives. Bombs and other explosives, except for any that may be required by the Air Forces for intelligence purposes, will be a military responsibility for disposal, the Air Force providing technical advice and assistance as necessary. It will be a military responsibility to guard enemy air material, and to co-ordinate inter-service activities where necessary.

13. Maintenance

a. Supplies

- i. Until they are exhausted, existing enemy stocks of food, medical stores and clothing should be used.
- ii. When stores are no longer available from enemy sources, the provision of food, medical stores and clothing should be an Allied responsibility. The commitment, which should be an equal responsibility between British and US, is estimated to amount to 2,000 tons (See Appendix 'A'). The German Army should draw the necessary supplies from Allied railheads or depots using their own transport.

b. Tentage and Accommodation Stores

to a military responsibility for disposal, the Air Force providing technical advice and assistance as necessary. It will be a military responsibility to guard enemy air material, and to coordinate inter-service activities when necessary.

13. Maintenance

a.

Supplies

- i. Until they are exhausted, existing enemy stocks of food, medical stores and clothing should be used.
- ii. When stores are no longer available from enemy sources, the provision of food, medical stores and clothing should be an Allied responsibility. The commitment, which should be an equal responsibility between British and US, is estimated to amount to 2,300 tons (See Appendix 'A'). The German Army should draw the necessary supplies from Allied railheads or depots using their own transport.

b.

Sanitary and Accommodation Stores

While the German Army has no appreciable quantity of tents, they have bivouacs and groundhuts. Materials necessary to establish their own camps (washhouses, latrines etc) should be provided from their own dumps, as far as enemy stocks allow. Only the balance of materials, to the minimum scale necessary, should be provided from Allied stocks. Establishment of camps must be carried out under Allied supervision to ensure economical use of materials.

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2. Animal Transport

The German Army is estimated to have between 100,000 - 150,000 mules and horses. On surrender a considerable proportion of these will be recovered by Italian civilians. The German Army will require to sustain some animal transport for their own maintenance. There should, however, be a large number of animals surplus which can be taken over by the Allies for military or civil purposes. Personnel from existing Allied V & K units, not required under surrender conditions, should be used to form cadres for animal collecting centres.

ESTABLISHMENT OF A RAIL AND L OF C INTO AUSTRIA

14. General

From para 8 above it will be noted that sufficient transport is not likely to be available to maintain forces in AUSTRIA until:

- a. railroads and bulk petrol pipelines can be established considerably nearer to AUSTRIA than those set out at 8 a. above, or
- b. a port has been opened considerably nearer to AUSTRIA than existing railroads through which maintenance requirements for forces in AUSTRIA can be imported.

15. Background of C for forces in AUSTRIA

- a. The US intend to use LIECHTEN as the port through which maintenance requirements for their forces in AUSTRIA will be imported. They will be moved from that port by rail and road via BOLOGNA and the BRESCIA route. This is a convenient L of C but very expensive in transport until the BRESCIA rail route has been restored. Later, US forces in AUSTRIA may be maintained from the US L of C into South GERMANY. The BRESCIA route is, however, considerably further to the British

From para 8 above it will be noted that sufficient transport is not likely to be available to maintain forces in AUSTRIA until:

- a. railheads and bulk petrol pipelines can be established considerably nearer to AUSTRIA than those set out at 8 a. above, or
- b. a port has been opened considerably nearer to AUSTRIA than existing railheads through which maintenance requirements for forces in AUSTRIA can be imported.

15. Base and L of C for Forces in AUSTRIA

- a. The US intend to use ISGHOF as the port through which maintenance requirements for their forces in AUSTRIA will be imported. They will be moved from that port by rail and road via BOLOGNA and the BRESCIA route. This is a convenient L of C but very expensive in transport until the BRESCIA rail route has been restored. Later, US forces in AUSTRIA may be maintained from the US L of C into South Germany.
- b. The BRESCIA route is, however, considerably further to the British zone than to the US zone. The British, therefore, intend to establish their base for forces in AUSTRIA at TRIESTE. It is intended to use the least damaged L of C into AUSTRIA from this port. In the event of a German withdrawal the BRESCIA route or the L of C from TRIESTE may be found so damaged that the US forces in AUSTRIA will need to import their military or civil requirements through TRIESTE for a short time or similarly that the British forces in AUSTRIA will need to import their initial requirements via the BRESCIA.

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g. As the port of TRIPOLI will ultimately be a British base and as Eighth Army will be responsible for British forces occupying VERRAIA GULF and later SUKRA, it should be the responsibility of Eighth Army to open this port as a first priority task. This port should be British controlled and operated in respect of all tonnages handled. Any US assistance required should take the form of replacement of British resources including transport employed at other Italian ports. AFHQ and Eighth Army in conjunction with FOTALLI should prepare the key plan for TRIPOLI. The Chairman of the sitting board should be furnished by AFHQ. The allocation of tonnages through TRIPOLI as between Eighth Army and other theaters should be made by AFHQ.

h. At Appendix 'A' para 5, it is estimated that 6,000 tons is likely to be the maximum tonnage required to be handled through TRIPOLI at any one time.

ALLIED MILITARY COOPERATION IN ITALY

16. a. All Detachments with Fifth and Eighth Armies will advance with the Armies as in normal practices. The province of VERRAIA GULF will probably be subjected to military government for a considerable period (with the possibility that this government will be later undertaken in conjunction with the Russians on a tripartite basis.) *delete 1-2*
b. Army rear boundaries are likely to be moved forward very rapidly in the event of a German surrender or withdrawal. Regional HQs of HQ Allied Division should, therefore, plan with District HQs and PEG in respect of the areas of occupation behind Army boundaries.

by AFHQ. The allocation of tonnage through TRINITY as between Eighth Army and other bidders should be made by AFHQ.

1. At Appendix 'A' para 5, it is estimated that 6,000 tpd is likely to be the maximum tonnage required to be handled through TRINITY at any one time.

ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN 1945

15. a. All Detachments with Fifth and Eighth Armies will advance with the armies as in normal practice. The provision of VINCENNA GUILLA will probably be subjected to military government for a considerable period (with the possibility that this government will be later undertaken in conjunction with the Russians on a tripartite basis.) *File 77*
- b. Army rear boundaries are likely to be moved forward very rapidly in the event of a German surrender or withdrawal. Regional HQs of HQ Allied Command should, therefore, plan with District HQs and PWS in respect of the areas of occupation behind Army boundaries.

PROVISION AND DISTRIBUTION OF CIVIL SUPPLIES IN 1945

17. Civil Requirements

- a. Civil requirements for H. 1945 are estimated as follows :-

i. Civil supplies	4,800	5,600 tpd (based on 500 grams bread ration. See Appendix 'A' para 2 for details).
ii. Coal	4,100 tpd	(when rail transport is available).
iii. POL	3,000 tpd	(of which about 1,000 tpd will be petrol).
iv. Reconstruction supplies	1,000 tpd	
Total	13,700 tpd	

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of this savings, it has been estimated that about 8,000 tpd will be required for NW ITALY (area defined in AFHQ letter AG 323/061 SIC-0 dated 25 Jan 45), leaving a balance of about 5,700 tpd for the remainder of NW ITALY.

It should also be noted that civil supplies for British and US zones in AUSTRIA, estimated to amount to about 2,000 tpd (exclusive of coal and FCE), will have to be imported into AUSTRIA through Italian ports.

10. Distribution

Distribution facilities will be the main bottleneck /, the rate at which will govern which civil supplies can be absorbed at N. Italian ports.

the delivery of 500 tons of civil supplies at PIRMA for NW ITALY has already been accepted as a military commitment. It is considered that as much assistance as possible should be given by the military to AG in respect of NW ITALY. From para 8 above it would appear

likely that 20 US Truck Coys and 5 British C.T. Coys might be made available for the distribution of civil supplies. This would enable about ~~600~~ ⁴⁰⁰ ~~900~~ to be delivered by US military at VARENN and 400 to be delivered by British military at ENTRE or proportionately greater or less amounts at towns nearer to or further from BOLOGNA.

The following transport might also be available for the distribution of civil supplies in addition to transport which the military might make available (see sub-part b, above) :-

1. Local indigenous transport which is estimated to be sufficient only for the distribution of local produce and of imported supplies from provincial capitals to outlying areas.

the time available from AC resources.

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which civil supplies can be transported at N. Italian ports.

2. The delivery of 500 tpa of civil supplies at PUKIA FOR THE ITALY has already been accepted as a military commitment. It is considered that as much assistance as possible should be given by the military to AC in respect of AC ITALY. From para 8 above it would appear likely that 20 US truck Coys and 5 British C.T. Coys might be made available for the distribution of civil supplies. This would enable about ⁴⁰⁰⁰ 600 tpa to be delivered by US military at VERONA and 400 tpa to be delivered by British military at WIDNES or proportions only greater or less arranged at their discretion to or further from VERONA.

3. The following transport might also be available for the distribution of civil supplies in addition to transport which the military might make available (see sub-para 2. above) :-

1. Local indigenous transport which is estimated to be sufficient only for the distribution of local produce and of imported supplies from provincial capitals to outlying areas.

14. Such transport as is at the time available from AC resources. This is not likely to be a large amount.

144. The 1700 x 1 1/2 ton trucks and 2,000 x 3 ton trucks which are on order from WASHINGTON. Of the 1,700 trucks, 72 have so far arrived and only 12 have been assembled. It is not anticipated, based on present planned rates of arrival and assembly, that the full 1,700 trucks will be available for use before the end of May. From May onwards the 2,000 x 3 ton trucks are expected to arrive in the theatre. The completion of their arrival and assembly is not expected before mid-August.

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iv. It is possible that up to 5,000 load carrying vehicles might be

obtained from the surrendered German forces after allowing for

German maintenance requirements. These should be used to

distribute civil supplies. Surrendered German and Italian Army

personnel should be formed into transport companies/units filled

superior to release military transport assisting AC under para

b. above. This might absorb about 2,000 vehicles. Any balance

should be made available to AC who are likely to be very short

of load carrying transport.

4. It should be noted that the civil supply problem should be considerably

eased after July which is the first month the steam-transport is likely

to be available. There will be a saving in transport, both military

and AC, engaged on long hauls of civil supplies to main centres of

distribution on and after this month.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR PARTISANS AND REFUGEES/DISLOCHED PERSONS

19. Partisans

There are estimated to be about 100,000 Italian partisans who have been operating in Italy in support of the Allies. It is the JSSG policy to treat these partisans generously when they are disbanded. They will be concentrated in specified areas where they will be sorrounded, disarmed and found employment. While they are in collecting centres, partisans will be paid, clothed, fed and given medical treatment. There will be the responsibility of Allies in conjunction with

AMV. Action and clothing centres will be notified later by AMV. It is

anticipated that partisans may be held in collecting centres for periods of up to

three months but it will be an AC responsibility to find them employment as soon

as possible, either in the Italian Army or as labour to assist the military or in

used after July when in the first month the summer harvest is likely to be available. There will be a saving in transport, both military and AC, especially on long hauls of civil supplies to main centers of distribution on and after this month.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR PARTIAL AC AND HUMANITARIAN/RELIEF OPERATIONS

Partisan

There are estimates to be about 100,000 Italian partisans who have been operating in R. Italy in support of the Allies. It is the AFHQ policy to treat these partisans generously when they are disabled. They will be concentrated in specified areas where they will be screened, disarmed and dual employment. While they are in collecting centers, partisans will be paid, clothed, fed and given medical treatment. This will be the responsibility of AFHQ in conjunction with the AFHQ. AFHQ and clothing supplies will be notified later by AFHQ. It is anticipated that partisans may be held in collecting centers for periods of up to three months but it will be an AC responsibility to find them employment as soon as possible, either in the Italian Army or as labor to assist the military or in Italian industry and agriculture.

20. Refugees and Displaced Persons

These persons, with the exception of Russians, are the responsibility of the Allied Commanders for all purposes. Russians may be a military responsibility. Initially these persons should be subject to a standard order, issued through military channels, for a minimum period of 30 days. Responsibility for registration and registration should be that of HQ AC and AFHQ attached to HQ Fifth and Eighth Armies, in conjunction with S-2. The subsequent movement of refugees and displaced persons should be the responsibility of HQ AC as part of the overall plans in respect to the

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of 6000 persons, movement requirements being coordinated with the Ministry of Defense.

STATUS OF LAYOUT (CONFIDENTIAL 'U')

- a. Instructions have already been issued regarding the area and responsibility of Hq. 2 District in the U.S.S.R. It is probable that at a later stage, on the assumption of responsibility by PWS from the area, the Eastern boundary of Hq. 2 District may be extended so that the whole of the Camp Volants of LOMAXIA (except the province of KAZANOV.) is included in the territory of Hq. 2 District, since such an arrangement would make the military and civil boundaries as nearly coincident as possible. In these circumstances the province of KAZANOV might be included in Hq. 2 District/area.
- b. As it is intended that 150000 persons in LOMAXIA will be maintained from the area by the PWS, the U.S. will require a corridor from BELARUS running north to the PWS. PWS will gradually assume responsibility for this corridor as the rear boundary of PWS Army moves northwards.
- c. The present area of Hq. 1 District's responsibility will gradually be extended northwards to follow the rear boundary of Hq. 2 Army. Hq. 2 Army, with an area in the rear command will, however, remain responsible initially for KAZANOV-CELESTIA.
- d. The present area of Hq. 3 District's responsibility will be taken over by Hq. 1 and 3 District.
- e. The recommended layout to conform with the principles set out in sub-paragraphs 2. to 5. above is set out in Appendix 'U' attached.

2. nearly coincident/ In those circumstances the provisions of PIRRA might be included in H. 1. 2 District/area.
3. as it is intended that the forces in SIBIRIA will be maintained from supplies by the BUREAU route, the III will require a corridor from BUREAU, running North to the BUREAU. PIRRA will gradually assume responsibility for this corridor in the rear boundary of Fifth Army area Headquarters.
4. The present area of H. 1 District's responsibility will gradually be extended Northwards to follow the rear boundary of Eighth Army. Eighth Army, with an Area Headquarters nominal will, however, remain responsible initially for THERMIDOR-GHILL.
5. the present area of H. 2 District's responsibility will be taken over by H. 1 and 3 District.
6. The recommended layout is set out with the principles set out in sub-section 2. above is set out in Appendix 'B' attached.

REQUIREMENT OF BUREAU AND COMMUNICATIONS

2.1. BUREAU

1. The least estimate of the time required by the Navy to open the main ports in U. TRAIL is as follows:-

Port	Time Required
TRAIL	6 - 8 weeks
or	
	10 - 12 weeks

Made up by:

4 - 6 weeks minimum required via
ISIRIA coast, 2 weeks minimum
work.

5 - 10 weeks minimum required if
early occupation of ISIRIA forces
us to group the longer and more
heavily armed units via VIETNAM.

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6 weeks

VEHICLE

10, 16 weeks

4 weeks maintenance, 2 weeks salvage work to provide the blockading.

6 - 8 weeks maintenance, 2 weeks salvage work to provide the blockading.

In the time required for maintenance and repair salvage work units with equipment for port clearance and repairs should have carried out related work on the ground, except in the case of GEMSA where road conditions are unsuitable bringing repair units and equipment in by sea. Salvage maintenance and repairs resources are available to enable the port of ULLAH and GEMSA to be opened simultaneously.

The port of ULLAH must be opened at the same time without considerably increasing the above things. Salvage port parties are, however, available for ULLAH, GEMSA and VEHICLE.

THREE and GEMSA contain only equipment for the port and if systematic maintenance of these ports has not been carried out, the port repair units available should be sufficient to repair the facilities required at these ports. There are not likely to be any engineering units available to undertake in repairing ULLAH and GEMSA units can be released from ULLAH and GEMSA.

It is estimated that the following numbers will have to be reported :-

	Military	Civil	Total	Remarks
VEHICLE	4,000 tpd	1,300 tpd	5,000 tpd	Includes 2,200 tpd on military account which may have to be handled through the port.
GEMSA	1,000 + up to 7,000 tpd		8,000 tpd	Only 2,000 tpd discharged as military responsibility.
THREE		5,000 tpd	5,000 tpd	to operate.

the port of GENOA cannot be opened at the same time without simultaneously relieving the other things. Several port berths are, however, available for TIRRENIAN, ADRIATIC and IONIAN.

3. TIRRENIAN and ADRIATIC contain many deep-water berths and if systematic maintenance of these ports has not been carried out, the port repair units available should be sufficient to repair the facilities required at these ports. These are not likely to be any dangerous units available to maintain as in any other TIRRENIAN and ADRIATIC units can be released from GENOA or NAPLES.

4. It is estimated that the following numbers will have to be imported:-

	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civil</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
CRUISE	4,700 tpd	1,300 tpd	6,000 tpd	Including 2,000 tpd on US military account which may have to be handled through the port.
CRUISE	1,000 " up to 7,000 tpd		8,000 tpd	Only 2,000 tpd discharged as military responsibility.
CRUISE	-	5,000 tpd	5,000 tpd	As expected.

5. Including now the two British Docks at GENOA and CRUISE to GENOA and now ready to return to NAPLES, it is estimated that there will be sufficient British port facilities units to handle military contingents to the East coast of Italy and at GENOA. There will be no British tonnage to be imported through NAPLES, but it is probable that the US would have to be responsible for discharging and clearing up to 2,000 tpd of British tonnage at one of the 4. TIRRENIAN ports. There are sufficient US transportation personnel to handle this to be done and eight to three days can be made available to handle the

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closure of the corridor. It is

that this is the case.

available to assist in the work, unless the work is

at ~~TRINITY~~ is not required or reduced in the future.

2.

About 6,000 yds of it storage has been earmarked in the past month for N. HORTON's work. This will meet the requirements at present (not likely to be more than 2,000 - 3,000 yds) and the balance will be available for HORTON, where initially, ships for the next year will be working on site. There is about 5,000 yds of lightages

available for HORTON in the past month. The 1000 yds available in 1962 will be certainly sufficient to meet requirements and it will be necessary to train 1-2 civilians as quickly as possible in 1963 and 1964 to handle the work.

It is possible that in the event of a major withdrawal of equipment, German tanks will continue to hold out some of them of ships in HORTON's work. In such circumstances it would have to be made to divert resources from the port to shipping.

23. Notes

1. The priority of repair of roads must depend on :-

a. The operational plan, and

b. The extent of conditions.

The presently planned plans for the occupation of N. HORTON are not out in part 2. above. Subject to limitations which may operate on alternative routes to be repaired more quickly, it is suggested that priorities for repair of roads and allocation of responsibility might

be planned as follows :-

necessary to train 1st divisions up quickly in possible air attack, and
to be in the line of attack.

It is possible that in the event of German withdrawal or surrender,
German garrisons will continue to hold out in one or more of these
main German ports. In such circumstances
would have to be made to divert resources from one port to another.

23. Results

1. The priority of repairs of roads must depend on:
 - i. The operational plan, and
 - ii. The extent of operations.
2. The previously planned program for the completion of the roads is not
out in part (e.g. above). Subject to facilities which may enable an
alternative route to be repaired more quickly, it is suggested that
priority for repair of roads and allocation of resources by weight
be obtained as follows:-

Priority 1 - First Army front to POLAND - main
- main

Second Army front to main - main
- main

Priority 2 - main - main - main

Priority 3 - main - main - main

Priority 4 - main - main - main

Priority 5 - main - main - main

Priority 6 - main - main - main

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Priority 1 - Post route to Jammu : Fifth Army/2 District

Priority 2 - Post route to Jammu : Eighth Army

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- d. There should be enough bridging material to carry out the reconstruction of the above routes provided that only about 50% materials are encountered. The policy governing the use of PM in road work is given in para 11 d. above.
- e. With rail routes are now in progress to handle the transport of construction material, transport by road across the Himalayas may be a bottleneck for Fifth Army and 2 District.

24. Railways

- f. Every fortification and bridge done by Allied bombing especially to the PM bridges will make the repair of railways a long term project. Priorities for repair of railways should, therefore, be allotted with a view to:
1. meeting long term necessities, and
2. release of transport for other tasks as quickly as possible.
3. Priorities for repair of railways are at present allotted as follows :-

Priority 1 - Kashmir - Poonch - Jammu

Dubbing line Jammu - Poonch

Priority 2 - Post route to Jammu

Priority 3 - Poonch - Jammu

- g. In the event of any railway being uncovered before the remainder of

to be telechecked for Fifth Army and 2 District.
2. Army demolitions and bridge work by Allied bombing especially to the IV bridge will make the repair of railways a long term project. Priorities for repair of railways should, therefore, be allotted with a view to:

- 1. Section I and two dead ends, and
- 2. restoring transport for other tasks as quickly as possible.

3. Priorities for repair of railways are at present allotted as follows:-

- Priority 1 - LAMAR - PACO - GAGO A
DURING THE SECOND - THIRD
- Priority 2 - Post route to HEMMA
- Priority 3 - GAGO B - LAMAR

4. In the event of an early being completed before the remainder of work, priority for the repair of railways in IV TRAIL, contingent on the extent of demolitions has been laid down as follows:-

- 1. GAGO - LAMAR GHI
- 2. LAMAR GHI - HEMMA
- 3. The unit route to HEMMA
- 4. GAGO - LAMAR GHI

5. In the event of a German surrender - demolitions involving the unit route - the order of 1. first priorities in sub-paragraph 1. and 2. above shall be maintained, contingent on the extent of demolitions, in conformity with the following:-

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English - French - Russian

ii. Completion of line RATO - BRITAIN -

iii. Completion line SYLOMA - RATO

iv. Best route SYLOMA - BRITAIN

2. There are construction units available to work on both priorities i. and ii. iv. It would be possible to start working on priority iii. before these are completed. It is considered that as the building of a 200-mile line will be a long time ~~3-4~~, construction units should be sent to work on this task as early as possible.
3. If the development of the railway forward at BRITAIN is required before the priorities ii, iii, and iv, above are completed, such development would be a competing requirement for transportation units.

25. How of ITALY I.R.F. 14/12/50

1. The system has generally fallen into a state of disrepair since it is not suited to the main flow of enemy supply from North to South. The ability of a visible craft has been withdrawn either for construction or for use as a position covering of the 20 in line of major bridges controlled by Allied air attack. Italian bridges across block navigable air routes are under attack. Bridges and tugs have been withdrawn to port-timed ports. Further damage may occur as the result of a new intention to attack the Po valley and destroy locks and dams.

2. It is considered that sections of the I.R.F. system might be used for distribution of local produce where serviceable craft are found in short supply in navigation of waterway. Local wheat produce from the Po valley area might be distributed to the BRITAIN - RATO area. Daily

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could be a competing requirement for transportation units.

25. Use of IRAF I.R.I. 3.3.3

2. The system is a smaller caliber (50) 100mm of diameter since it is not subject to the same flow of energy supply from north to south. The system of hydraulic craft has been withdrawn either for construction or for use as a platform for the 100 in line of major bridges destroyed by Allied air attack. Pollen bridge spans block navigable canals to a number of points. Producers and tugs have been withdrawn to operational parts. Further damage may occur as the result of energy fluctuations to flood the PO valley and destroy locks and dams.

3. It is assumed that sections of the IFF systems might best be used for distribution of fuel and power where serviceable crafts are found in short navigable stretches of waterway. Local craft produce from the main 4. are subject to distribution to the 100th - 100th area. Daily production from the 100th - 100th area might be believed in the 100th - 100th area. It would not be safe to plan on the use of inland waterways for movement of large quantities of goods supplies over long distances.

4. It is unlikely that military craft can be introduced into the PO and Venetian systems until after the 100th is opened when they may not be until 3 - 4 months later. The military craft are in any case 2407 available to 100th for interconnecting vessels and locks. No military units will be available. As it is recommended under para 3. above that the IFF system should be used for civil purposes, it is

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Development should be an AD responsibility.

26. BULK POL

a. Extension of present pipelines

1. Eighth Army: The construction of the pipeline planned to follow Eighth Army to RAVENNA and the ARGENTA GAP should cease if surrender occurs on the present line. The other Eighth Army pipeline should be extended to BOLZANO.

2. Fifth Army: One of the Fifth Army pipelines should terminate at BOLZANO, the other being extended as rapidly as possible to VERONA. The feasibility of the extension of the line beyond VERONA is still under examination.

b.

GENOVA

Plans have been made to provide bulk facilities at GENOVA to meet military and civil requirements. One 4" pipeline will be provided from GENOVA to ALESSANDRIA.

c.

TRIESTE

In the event of existing storage facilities being partially destroyed, arrangements have been made for the supply of bolted tankage which should be sufficient to provide facilities for bulk POL at TRIESTE. Assuming the rehabilitation programs contemplated can be accomplished. This tankage may be erected simultaneously with the development of the pipeline FONDRECCOLI - BOLZANO and RADICOSA - VERONA, and with the provision of bulk facilities at GENOVA.

b.

GENOA

Plans have been made to provide bulk facilities at GENOA to meet military and civil requirements. One 4" pipeline will be provided from GENOA to ALESSANDRIA.

c.

TRIESTE

In the event of existing storage facilities being partially destroyed, arrangements have been made for the supply of bolted tankage which should be sufficient to provide facilities for bulk POL at TRIESTE, assuming the rehabilitation programme contemplated can be accomplished. This tankage can be erected simultaneously with the development of the pipelines FORLIDROPOLI - BOLOGNA and RAVENNA - VERONA, and with the provision of bulk facilities at GENOA.

d.

VENICE

VENICE had the largest bulk installations in the Northern ADRIATIC. The installations will be rehabilitated to supply civil requirements but should be a lower priority to projects in a, b, and c, above in the use of military resources. HQ Allied Commission should be responsible for the rehabilitation of these installations making maximum use of civilian personnel and resources.

REORGANISATION OF ALLIED FORCES ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON GERMAN SURRENDER

27.

d. Allied administrative resources forward of railheads will be strained to their utmost for some time after a German surrender. From an 2400 administrative point of view it is, therefore, essential that all unnecessary formations and units which can readily be moved

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withdrawn as soon as possible to areas near developed ports and railheads from which they can be most economically maintained or be used for any tasks to which they can be conveniently converted.

- b. Administrative units of formations not required for operational or occupational tasks and withdrawn to bases and L of C areas might be used to assist in base and L of C work relieving AMHQ service troops so that the latter may augment those working with Armies.
5. The present organization of certain Service units will be unsuitable for static tasks and consideration should be given to their re-organization to fit them for their new static functions.

MAIN CONCLUSIONS

26. Maintenance of 14 Army Group

- b. Extent to which Army maintenance requirements can be met (paras 6-8)
- i. Under surrender conditions it is considered that it will be possible to make available to Armies sufficient load-carrying transport to enable them to accept the surrender of KESSERING's Army and undertake the occupation of NE and NW ITALY simultaneously.
- ii. If it is required to move forces into AUSTRIA before the port of TRIESTE is opened or the BRIGNONE rail route is partially restored the increased transport commitment will limit the size of the force which can be maintained in NE and NW ITALY.

b. Bases and L of C for AUSTRIA (paras 14, 15, and 22)

- i. As a first priority, TRIESTE should be developed as the advanced Base for British forces in AUSTRIA to handle up to 6,000 tpd. Eighth Army should

to fit them for their new static functions.

MAIN CONCLUSIONS

25.

Maintenance of 15 Army Group

- a. Extent to which Army maintenance requirements can be met (para 6 - 8)
 - i. Under surrender conditions it is considered that it will be possible to make available to armies sufficient load-carrying transport to enable them to accept the surrender of KESSLERING's Army and undertake the occupation of NE and NW ITALY simultaneously.
 - ii. If it is required to move forces into AUSTRIA before the port of TRIESTE is opened or the BRENNER rail route is partially restored the increased transport commitment will limit the size of the force which can be maintained in NE and NW ITALY.
- b. Base and L of C for AUSTRIA (para 14, 15, and 22)
 - i. As a first priority, TRIESTE should be developed as the Advanced Base for British forces in AUSTRIA to handle up to 6,000 tpd. Eighth Army should be responsible for opening TRIESTE subject to AFHQ responsibilities noted in para 15 g. above. It should be British controlled and operated. The British L of C should be the latest damaged route from TRIESTE to AUSTRIA.
 - ii. US forces should be based on LIECHTEN and use the BRENNER route as their L of C into AUSTRIA.
- c. Other Points (para 22)
 - i. Plans for the opening of GENOA should not be altered. Resources are ^{240.} sufficient to open this port at the same time as TRIESTE.

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11. VENTRE should be controlled and operated by AG. It should, however, be given as soon as it can be released from TRIESTE.

d. Roads and Railways (para 23 and 24)

Suggested priorities for repair are given in para 23 and 24.

e. Inf System (para 25)

The NORTH ITALY Inf system may be of some assistance to AG in the distribution of civil supplies. Its development should be an AG responsibility. Military assistance is unlikely to be available.

f. Bulk PCL (para 26)

Future development is summarised in para 26.

g. Static HQ layout (para 27 and Annex "C")

The boundaries of No. 1 District and FBS should be extended northwards to follow the rear boundaries of Ninth and Fifth Armies respectively. Eighth Army should be responsible for VIETNAM GIULIA. See Annexure I to Appx. "C" for details of proposed ultimate static HQ boundaries.

29. Kesselring's Army (para 9 - 13)

1. So far as possible KESSELRING's army should be made to administer and maintain itself with the minimum of allied supervision.

2. It should be concentrated in groups of four to five divisions in the general area between the PO and Route 9, exclusive of this route and major towns in the area.

3. Guarding, disarmament and supervision of maintenance and administration should be the responsibility of formations detailed for the task by HQ 15 Army Group. No special organisation should be established. Technical supervision should mainly come from present army resources.

29. Static HQ layout (para 21 and appx "C")
The boundaries of No. 1 District and PHS should be extended northwards to follow the rear boundaries of Eighth and Fifth Armies respectively. Eighth Army should be responsible for VARELA GULLA. See Annexure I to appx. "C" for details of proposed ultimate static HQ boundaries.

- a. Kusselring's Army (para 9 - 13)
 1. So far as possible KUSSELING's Army should be made to administer and maintain itself with the aid of allied supervision.
 2. It should be concentrated in groups of four to five divisions in the general area between the DQ and Route 9, exclusive of this route and major towns in the area.
 3. Guarding, disarmament and supervision of maintenance and administration should be the responsibility of formations detailed for the task by HQ 15 Army Group. No special organization should be established. Technical supervision should mainly come from present Army resources.
 4. AFHQ should provide Service personnel to assist in inspecting enemy depots and dumps.

30. Civil

- a. Allied Military Government (para 16)

Regional HQs of AG should plan with District HQs and PHS in respect of the areas of occupation behind Army rear boundaries.
- b. Civil supplies (para 17 and 18)

In the event of an enemy surrender it is considered that the following daily tonnage of civil supplies in respect of NE ITALY should be delivered to AG

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as a military commitment at the places stated until ports can be opened :-

VIRATA - 500 tpd

UPHE - 400 tpd

or proportionately greater or smaller tonnages at towns nearer to or further from Allied railheads. German transport should be organized to relieve military transport of this commitment as soon as possible.

c. Other military assistance to AC (paras 23 and 24)

Military assistance to AC in respect of NW ITALY should remain unchanged subject to adjustment in priorities of road and rail development under surrender conditions.

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at priorities of road and rail development under
surrounding conditions.

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MAINTENANCE DATA

i. ARMY

During the phase of operations involving the occupation of N. ITALY, the maintenance requirements of that portion of a div alicie forward of RH are based on the following data:-

A. British

i. Strength:-

Personnel

25,000

Vehicles (incl M/Cycles)

6,000

ii. Maintenance:-

Supp, incl RPI and Postal

tid

Ann @ special rates

70

POL @ 6 galls per vehicle

20

Engr Stores

160

Ord stores

70

Misc incl Medical

17

Total

3

340

B. US

i. Strength:-

Personnel

25,000

Vehicles (incl M/Cycles)

5,000

ii. Maintenance:-

tid

70

Class I Rations @ 6 lbs per man

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Vehicles (incl W/Cycles)	6,000
ii. Maintenance:-	<u>tyd</u>
Supp, incl 331 and Postal	70
San @ special rates	20
POL @ 6 galls per vehicle	160
Engr Stores	70
Ord stores	17
Misc incl Medical	<u>3</u>
Total	340

E. US

i. Strength:-

Personnel	25,000
-----------	--------

Vehicles (incl W/Cycles)

	5,000
--	-------

ii. Maintenance:-

Class I Rations @ 6 lbs per man	<u>tyd</u>
Class II Ord and Miscellaneous	70
Class III POL @ 8 galls per vehicle	40
Class IV Engr Stores	180
Class V Ammunition	90
	<u>20</u>
Total	400

Note: In the event of a German withdrawal in lieu of surrender, an increase of 240% in ammunition requirements would be offset to some extent by a decrease in POL requirements. There would, however, probably be an increase of 50 tyd in the total div requirements under such conditions.

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CIVIL

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2. Based on a 300 grams bread ration, civil supplies (excluding coal and POL) required to be imported for present German occupied ITALY are estimated to be as follows:-

	Estimated Tonnage per day
PIEMONTE	1,090
LIGURIA	470
LOMBARDIA	1,850
EMILIA (incl the Provincia of FORLI and RAVENNA)	420
PROVINCIA of APERUNIA and LACIA (in TOSCANA)	1140
VENEZIA TREVENTINA	200
VENEZIA GIULIA and ZARA	230
VENEZIA PROPRIA	1,180
Total	5,640 tons

GERMAN ARMY

3. Assuming that the surrendered German Army are cut off from their source of supply, the Allied maintenance responsibility in respect of this force is based on the following data:-

a. Strength:-

Personnel

Vehicles

Horses and mules

(assuming Italians seize 50% of animals)

b. Maintenance:-

tons

PROVINCE OF AREZZO and LUCCA (in TOSCANA)

140

VENETIA TRIDENTINA

200

VENETIA GORIZIA and ZARA

290

VENETIA PADOVA

1,180

Total 5,640 tpd

GERMAN ARMY

3. Assuming that the surrendered German Army are cut off from their source of supply, the Allied maintenance responsibility in respect of this force is based on the following data:-

a. Strength:-

Personnel 1,030,000

Vehicles 15,000
(of which 5,000 may be used to maintain German Army)

Horses and Mules 100,000
(assuming Italians seize 30% of animals)

b. Maintenance:-

Supplies 3 1/2 lbs per man tpd 1,560

FOI for 5,000 vehicles @ 6 galls per vehicle 140

Medicinal 50

Forage @ 6 lbs per animal 270

Total 2,020 tpd

IMPORTS THROUGH TRIESTE

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4. It is estimated that the following are likely to be the maximum tonnages to be handled through the port of TRIESTE:-

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a. British

Ground Forces in AUSTRIA

Ground Forces in VENETIA GIBLIA

RAF in AUSTRIA

RAF in VENETIA GIBLIA

Allied PW in British Zone in AUSTRIA

Russians in British Zone in AUSTRIA, say

Civil requirements (excl coal and POL) for
British Zone in AUSTRIA

Civil supplies (excl coal and POL) for
VENETIA GIBLIA

Build up of reserves at 10%

	<u>Tpd</u>
	960
	400
	50
	30
	150 (temporary requirement)
	600 (temporary requirement)
	1,000
	300
	350
<u>Total</u>	<u>3,840 tpd</u>

b. US (possible commitment)

Ground Forces in AUSTRIA

USAF in AUSTRIA

Allied PW in US Zone in AUSTRIA

Russians in US Zone in AUSTRIA, say

Build up of reserves at 10%

	<u>Tpd</u>
	1,240
	50
	170
	600
	200
<u>Total</u>	<u>2,260 tpd</u>

Notes:

- The full tonnages above will not be imported until rail communications North of TRIESTE have been established.

Civil requirements (excl coal and POL) for
British Zone in AUSTRIA

1,000

Civil supplies (excl coal and POL) for
YUGOSLAVIA

300

Build up of reserves at 10%

350

Total 2,650 tpd

b. US (possible commitment)

tpd

Ground forces in AUSTRIA

1,210

USAF in AUSTRIA

50

Allied PW in US Zone in AUSTRIA

170

Russians in US Zone in AUSTRIA, say

600

Build up of reserves at 10%

200

Total 2,230 tpd

Notes:

- i. The full tonnages above will not be imported until rail communications North of TRIESTE have been established.
- ii. Initially considerable tonnages of transportation stores and construction materials will be required but the demand for these should fall off by the time the full civil requirement can be accepted at the port. Certain tonnages of civil supplies may be imported through TRIESTE for YUGOSLAVIA as it is not the intention to open FUMZ.
- iii. The US may prefer to import civil supplies for their zone in AUSTRIA through TRIESTE in lieu of their ground and air force requirements. This will not, however, increase their tonnage requirements.

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COMMISSIONS

5. Plans should be made to develop TRISTE to handle:-

3,000 typ British maintenance tomorrow

2,200 typ US

"

Total 6,000 typ

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APPENDIX "B"
to Ltr. P. 177
dated 17 Feb 45. (10)

REQUIREMENTS AND AVAILABILITY OF ROAD CAPABILITY TRANSPORT IN

THEATRE OF OR AND THUDX. COMB.

1. REQUIREMENTS

British and US transport requirements to meet commitments under Phase I to IV in para 6 of the main paper simultaneously are estimated as follows:-

a. US	Formations	Area	Distance from PISTOLA	Daily Maintenance Requirements	No. of Truck Boys
Two US Divs	VIRANIA		150	800	17 (Augmented)
			250	400	13 (Augmented)
One US Div	MOLZANO		300	800	11 (Augmented)
Two US Divs	BOLLOMA - PERAZALA - MIRINA				41 (Augmented)

Note: Augmented implies that each Coy has 24 drivers in excess of the normal allotment of 4 driver per truck.

b. British	Formation	Area	Distance from PISTOLA (less 50 miles for 1st and 2nd line transport)	Daily Maintenance Requirements	No. of Coy Drivers (excl 2nd Line)
Two equivalent British Divs	TIDMORE		175	600	10
			155	630	3
Two equivalent British Divs	UDING				2
Two equivalent British Divs	PERAZALA				11

One of Div 20289 250 400 13 (Augmented)
 Two US Divs BOLIVIA - 100 600 11 (Augmented)
 PERU - 41 (Augmented)
 MEXICO

Note: Augmented implies that each Coy has 24 drivers in excess of the normal allotment of 1 driver per truck.

British	Formation	Area	Distance from PUEBLO (less 50 miles for 1st and 2nd line transport)	Daily Maintenance	No. of Coy's (incl 2nd line)
Two equivalent British Divs	GRANDE		175	600	10
Two equivalent British Divs	USINE		155	600	9
Rehabilitation part of 1st line and local details			-	-	2
Two equivalent British Divs - PERU - BOLIVIA AREA			-	600 +	NIL
One equivalent British Div	MELAN		125	340	3 1/2
One equivalent British Div	CEGOA		160	340	4 1/2
One equivalent British Div	TURIN		210	340	2 3/4
Rehabilitation part of CEGOA and local details			-	-	2
Delivery of Civil Sup. lines	PERU - PANAMA		95	500	4
10% Reserve					1 1/5

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- Maintenance by unit and proportion of formation and line transport.

Notes:

In the above calculations it is assumed that all US and British formations not included above will be located near ports and this from where they can maintain themselves with unit transport.

2. APPROXIMATION OF IN SHORTAGE VEHICLES

- a. In making the estimate of transport available for operational and administrative requirements in North ITALY allowances have been made for the following truck requirements in the L of C (Zone of

Communication):-

- i. Clearance of ports.
- ii. Depot and railhead operations.
- iii. Other rear area requirements
- iv. A possible requirement for eight truck convoys to haul British cargo from docks to depots at a South ITALY port.

- b. After making estimated allowances for the transport needed to meet the requirements in para 2 a. above, the following equivalent of ton truck convoys might be made available to lift supplies from existing railheads and POC depots and for other administrative and operational uses.

	Augmented	Standard	Total
FIFTH ARMY	30	4	34 (a)
USG	40	10 (c)	50 (b)
Total	70	14	84

Notes:

...to be the equivalent

12. Depot and railhead operations.
 13. Other rear area requirements
 14. Portable requirement for eight truck coys to haul British cargo from docks to depots at a South ITALY port.
 b. After making estimated allowances for the transport needed to meet the requirements in para 2 a. above, the following equivalent 2 1/2 ton truck coys might be made available to lift supplies from existing magazines and BSC depots and for other administrative and operational uses.

	Allocated	Standard	Total
5th Army	30	4	34 (a)
PMR	40	10 (c)	50 (c)
Total	70	14	84

Notes:

- (a) This assumes 5 x 5 ton tractor trailer coys to be the equivalent of 10 x 2 1/2 ton truck coys.
 (b) This assumes 12 x 10 ton tractor trailer coys to be the equivalent of 36 x 2 1/2 ton truck coys.
 (c) Includes 4 x 2 1/2 ton truck coys due into ITALY ex NORTH AFRICA by 1 March.

3. BALANCE OF US TRANSPORT AVAILABLE FOR OTHER COMMITMENTS UNDER SUPPLEMENTAL CONDITIONS

Deducting the above estimated requirements from the estimated truck coys available, the following US truck coys might be made available for other US commitments including civil supplies:-

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Source

British Army

YHS

Number and Type

4 equivalent of 10 standard truck cargo

29 equivalent of 10 standard truck cargo

10 standard of 10 truck cargo

43 truck cargo

Total

4. PRESENT DISTRIBUTION OF PRESENT STOCKS

Load carrying transport (exclusive of formation and line transport) in at

present distributed as follows :-

Serial No. of Unit	Formation	Trucks	Light	Medium	Heavy	Total
1	Army Troop	2	-	-	-	2
2	Corps Troop	9	-	-	-	9
3	Corps Troop	5	-	-	-	5
4	Army Troop	15	3	-	-	18
5	Corps Troop	5	46 (a)	3	2 (a)	56
6	Army Troop (a)	14	1	-	-	15
7	Station Corps	-	6 (b)	-	-	6
8	Infantry Civil File	-	1	-	-	1
9	TOTAL	57	57	3	2	119

Notes:

(a) incl. in the unit used for 100. Tpt purposes.

(b) Have 1 additional file, i.e. 14 files.

1 file included in 2nd line Tpt duties.

Serial	Qty of	Current	Initial	APPROX	Current	Plus	Total
	tpt						
1	Army Tpt Coy.	2	-	-	-	-	2
2	Coys Tpt Coy.	9	-	-	-	-	9
3	Coys Tpt	5	-	-	-	-	5
4	Army Tpt	18	3	-	-	-	18
5	Gen. Tpt	5	45 (d)	3	2 (a)	-	56
6	Army Pls (a)	12	12	-	-	4 Reserve	32
7	Station Coys	-	5 (b)	-	-	12 Station	74
8	Indep Civil Pls	-	1	-	-	-	1
9	TOTAL	57	57	3	2	14	101

Notes:

- Each of 34 units used for tpt. Tpt purposes.
- Devs 7 additional Pls, i.e. 14 Coys.
- Each of 12 with 31 and 33 Pls assigned on 2nd line tpt duties.
- Inclusion of 2 Coys which are allowed for service outside India.

5. SOURCE FROM WHICH CURRENT INFORMATION IS BEING OBTAINED

- Initial tpt requirements under surrender conditions as set out in para 1 b. Above might be met from the following sources:- **2396**
 - Re-allocation of 2nd and 3rd line tpt.
 - Re-allocation of Artillery Pls.
 - Each of 12 tpt allocated in the 7 of 8 to 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22nd, 23rd, 24th, 25th, 26th, 27th, 28th, 29th, 30th, 31st, 32nd, 33rd, 34th, 35th, 36th, 37th, 38th, 39th, 40th, 41st, 42nd, 43rd, 44th, 45th, 46th, 47th, 48th, 49th, 50th, 51st, 52nd, 53rd, 54th, 55th, 56th, 57th, 58th, 59th, 60th, 61st, 62nd, 63rd, 64th, 65th, 66th, 67th, 68th, 69th, 70th, 71st, 72nd, 73rd, 74th, 75th, 76th, 77th, 78th, 79th, 80th, 81st, 82nd, 83rd, 84th, 85th, 86th, 87th, 88th, 89th, 90th, 91st, 92nd, 93rd, 94th, 95th, 96th, 97th, 98th, 99th, 100th, 101st, 102nd, 103rd, 104th, 105th, 106th, 107th, 108th, 109th, 110th, 111th, 112th, 113th, 114th, 115th, 116th, 117th, 118th, 119th, 120th, 121st, 122nd, 123rd, 124th, 125th, 126th, 127th, 128th, 129th, 130th, 131st, 132nd, 133rd, 134th, 135th, 136th, 137th, 138th, 139th, 140th, 141st, 142nd, 143rd, 144th, 145th, 146th, 147th, 148th, 149th, 150th, 151st, 152nd, 153rd, 154th, 155th, 156th, 157th, 158th, 159th, 160th, 161st, 162nd, 163rd, 164th, 165th, 166th, 167th, 168th, 169th, 170th, 171st, 172nd, 173rd, 174th, 175th, 176th, 177th, 178th, 179th, 180th, 181st, 182nd, 183rd, 184th, 185th, 186th, 187th, 188th, 189th, 190th, 191st, 192nd, 193rd, 194th, 195th, 196th, 197th, 198th, 199th, 200th, 201st, 202nd, 203rd, 204th, 205th, 206th, 207th, 208th, 209th, 210th, 211st, 212nd, 213th, 214th, 215th, 216th, 217th, 218th, 219th, 220th, 221st, 222nd, 223rd, 224th, 225th, 226th, 227th, 228th, 229th, 230th, 231st, 232nd, 233rd, 234th, 235th, 236th, 237th, 238th, 239th, 240th, 241st, 242nd, 243rd, 244th, 245th, 246th, 247th, 248th, 249th, 250th, 251st, 252nd, 253rd, 254th, 255th, 256th, 257th, 258th, 259th, 260th, 261st, 262nd, 263rd, 264th, 265th, 266th, 267th, 268th, 269th, 270th, 271st, 272nd, 273rd, 274th, 275th, 276th, 277th, 278th, 279th, 280th, 281st, 282nd, 283rd, 284th, 285th, 286th, 287th, 288th, 289th, 290th, 291st, 292nd, 293rd, 294th, 295th, 296th, 297th, 298th, 299th, 300th, 301st, 302nd, 303rd, 304th, 305th, 306th, 307th, 308th, 309th, 310th, 311st, 312nd, 313th, 314th, 315th, 316th, 317th, 318th, 319th, 320th, 321st, 322nd, 323rd, 324th, 325th, 326th, 327th, 328th, 329th, 330th, 331st, 332nd, 333rd, 334th, 335th, 336th, 337th, 338th, 339th, 340th, 341st, 342nd, 343rd, 344th, 345th, 346th, 347th, 348th, 349th, 350th, 351st, 352nd, 353rd, 354th, 355th, 356th, 357th, 358th, 359th, 360th, 361st, 362nd, 363rd, 364th, 365th, 366th, 367th, 368th, 369th, 370th, 371st, 372nd, 373rd, 374th, 375th, 376th, 377th, 378th, 379th, 380th, 381st, 382nd, 383rd, 384th, 385th, 386th, 387th, 388th, 389th, 390th, 391st, 392nd, 393rd, 394th, 395th, 396th, 397th, 398th, 399th, 400th, 401st, 402nd, 403rd, 404th, 405th, 406th, 407th, 408th, 409th, 410th, 411st, 412nd, 413th, 414th, 415th, 416th, 417th, 418th, 419th, 420th, 421st, 422nd, 423rd, 424th, 425th, 426th, 427th, 428th, 429th, 430th, 431st, 432nd, 433rd, 434th, 435th, 436th, 437th, 438th, 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582nd, 583rd, 584th, 585th, 586th, 587th, 588th, 589th, 590th, 591st, 592nd, 593rd, 594th, 595th, 596th, 597th, 598th, 599th, 600th, 601st, 602nd, 603rd, 604th, 605th, 606th, 607th, 608th, 609th, 610th, 611st, 612nd, 613th, 614th, 615th, 616th, 617th, 618th, 619th, 620th, 621st, 622nd, 623rd, 624th, 625th, 626th, 627th, 628th, 629th, 630th, 631st, 632nd, 633rd, 634th, 635th, 636th, 637th, 638th, 639th, 640th, 641st, 642nd, 643rd, 644th, 645th, 646th, 647th, 648th, 649th, 650th, 651st, 652nd, 653rd, 654th, 655th, 656th, 657th, 658th, 659th, 660th, 661st, 662nd, 663rd, 664th, 665th, 666th, 667th, 668th, 669th, 670th, 671st, 672nd, 673rd, 674th, 675th, 676th, 677th, 678th, 679th, 680th, 681st, 682nd, 683rd, 684th, 685th, 686th, 687th, 688th, 689th, 690th, 691st, 692nd, 693rd, 694th, 695th, 696th, 697th, 698th, 699th, 700th, 701st, 702nd, 703rd, 704th, 705th, 706th, 707th, 708th, 709th, 710th, 711st, 712nd, 713th, 714th, 715th, 716th, 717th, 718th, 719th, 720th, 721st, 722nd, 723rd, 724th, 725th, 726th, 727th, 728th, 729th, 730th, 731st, 732nd, 733rd, 734th, 735th, 736th, 737th, 738th, 739th, 740th, 741st, 742nd, 743rd, 744th, 745th, 746th, 747th, 748th, 749th, 750th, 751st, 752nd, 753rd, 754th, 755th, 756th, 757th, 758th, 759th, 760th, 761st, 762nd, 763rd, 764th, 765th, 766th, 767th, 768th, 769th, 770th, 771st, 772nd, 773rd, 774th, 775th, 776th, 777th, 778th, 779th, 780th, 781st, 782nd, 783rd, 784th, 785th, 786th, 787th, 788th, 789th, 790th, 791st, 792nd, 793rd, 794th, 795th, 796th, 797th, 798th, 799th, 800th, 801st, 802nd, 803rd, 804th, 805th, 806th, 807th, 808th, 809th, 810th, 811st, 812nd, 813th, 814th, 815th, 816th, 817th, 818th, 819th, 820th, 821st, 822nd, 823rd, 824th, 825th, 826th, 827th, 828th, 829th, 830th, 831st, 832nd, 833rd, 834th, 835th, 836th, 837th, 838th, 839th, 840th, 841st, 842nd, 843rd, 844th, 845th, 846th, 847th, 848th, 849th, 850th, 851st, 852nd, 853rd, 854th, 855th, 856th, 857th, 858th, 859th, 860th, 861st, 862nd, 863rd, 864th, 865th, 866th, 867th, 868th, 869th, 870th, 871st, 872nd, 873rd, 874th, 875th, 876th, 877th, 878th, 879th, 880th, 881st, 882nd, 883rd, 884th, 885th, 886th, 887th, 888th, 889th, 890th, 891st, 892nd, 893rd, 894th, 895th, 896th, 897th, 898th, 899th, 900th, 901st, 902nd, 903rd, 904th, 905th, 906th, 907th, 908th, 909th, 910th, 911st, 912nd, 913th, 914th, 915th, 916th, 917th, 918th, 919th, 920th, 921st, 922nd, 923rd, 924th, 925th, 926th, 927th, 928th, 929th, 930th, 931st, 932nd, 933rd, 934th, 935th, 936th, 937th, 938th, 939th, 940th, 941st, 942nd, 943rd, 944th, 945th, 946th, 947th, 948th, 949th, 950th, 951st, 952nd, 953rd, 954th, 955th, 956th, 957th, 958th, 959th, 960th, 961st, 962nd, 963rd, 964th, 965th, 966th, 967th, 968th, 969th, 970th, 971st, 972nd, 973rd, 974th, 975th, 976th, 977th, 978th, 979th, 980th, 981st, 982nd, 983rd, 984th, 985th, 986th, 987th, 988th, 989th, 990th, 991st, 992nd, 993rd, 994th, 995th, 996th, 997th, 998th, 999th, 1000th, 1001st, 1002nd, 1003rd, 1004th, 1005th, 1006th, 1007th, 1008th, 1009th, 1010th, 1011st, 1012nd, 1013th, 1014th, 1015th, 1016th, 1017th, 1018th, 1019th, 1020th, 1021st, 1022nd, 1023rd, 1024th, 1025th, 1026th, 1027th, 1028th, 1029th, 1030th, 1031st, 1032nd, 1033rd, 1034th, 1035th, 1036th, 1037th, 1038th, 1039th, 1040th, 1041st, 1042nd, 1043rd, 1044th, 1045th, 1046th, 1047th, 1048th, 1049th, 1050th, 1051st, 1052nd, 1053rd, 1054th, 1055th, 1056th, 1057th, 1058th, 1059th, 1060th, 1061st, 1062nd, 1063rd, 1064th, 1065th, 1066th, 1067th, 1068th, 1069th, 1070th, 1071st, 1072nd, 1073rd, 1074th, 1075th, 1076th, 1077th, 1078th, 1079th, 1080th, 1081st, 1082nd, 1083rd, 1084th, 1085th, 1086th, 1087th, 1088th, 1089th, 1090th, 1091st, 1092nd, 1093rd, 1094th, 1095th, 1096th, 1097th, 1098th, 1099th, 1100th, 1101st, 1102nd, 1103rd, 1104th, 1105th, 1106th, 1107th, 1108th, 1109th, 1110th, 1111st, 1112nd, 1113th, 1114th, 1115th, 1116th, 1117th, 1118th, 1119th, 1120th, 1121st, 1122nd, 1123rd, 1124th, 1125th, 1126th, 1127th, 1128th, 1129th, 1130th, 1131st, 1132nd, 1133rd, 1134th, 1135th, 1136th, 1137th, 1138th, 1139th, 1140th, 1141st, 1142nd, 1143rd, 1144th, 1145th, 1146th, 1147th, 1148th, 1149th, 1150th, 1151st, 1152nd, 1153rd, 1154th, 1155th, 1156th, 1157th, 1158th, 1159th, 1160th, 1161st, 1162nd, 1163rd, 1164th, 1165th, 1166th, 1167th, 1168th, 1169th, 1170th, 1171st, 1172nd, 1173rd, 1174th, 1175th, 1176th, 1177th, 1178th, 1179th, 1180th, 1181st, 1182nd, 1183rd, 1184th, 1185th, 1186th, 1187th, 1188th, 1189th, 1190th, 1191st, 1192nd, 1193rd, 1194th, 1195th, 1196th, 1197th, 1198th, 1199th, 1200th, 1201st, 1202nd, 1203rd, 1204th, 1205th, 1206th, 1207th, 1208th, 1209th, 1210th, 1211st, 1212nd, 1213th, 1214th, 1215th, 1216th, 1217th, 1218th, 1219th, 1220th, 1221st, 1222nd, 1223rd, 1224th, 1225th, 1226th, 1227th, 1228th, 1229th, 1230th, 1231st, 1232nd, 1233rd, 1234th, 1235th, 1236th, 1237th, 1238th, 1239th, 1240th, 1241st, 1242nd, 1243rd, 1244th, 1245th, 1246th, 1247th, 1248th, 1249th, 1250th, 1251st, 1252nd, 1253rd, 1254th, 1255th, 1256th, 1257th, 1258th, 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1384th, 1385th, 1386th, 1387th, 1388th, 1389th, 1390th, 1391st, 1392nd, 1393rd, 1394th, 1395th, 1396th, 1397th, 1398th, 1399th, 1400th, 1401st, 1402nd, 1403rd, 1404th, 1405th, 1406th, 1407th, 1408th, 1409th, 1410th, 1411st, 1412nd, 1413th, 1414th, 1415th, 1416th, 1417th, 1418th, 1419th, 1420th, 1421st, 1422nd, 1423rd, 1424th, 1425th, 1426th, 1427th, 1428th, 1429th, 1430th, 1431st, 1432nd, 1433rd, 1434th, 1435th, 1436th, 1437th, 1438th, 1439th, 1440th, 1441st, 1442nd, 1443rd, 1444th, 1445th, 1446th, 1447th, 1448th, 1449th, 1450th, 1451st, 1452nd, 1453rd, 1454th, 1455th, 1456th, 1457th, 1458th, 1459th, 1460th, 1461st, 1462nd, 1463rd, 1464th, 1465th, 1466th, 1467th, 1468th, 1469th, 1470th, 1471st, 1472nd, 1473rd, 1474th, 1475th, 1476th, 1477th, 1478th, 1479th, 1480th, 1481st, 1482nd, 1483rd, 1484th, 1485th, 1486th, 1487th, 1488th, 1489th, 1490th, 1491st, 1492nd, 1493rd, 1494th, 1495th, 1496th, 1497th, 1498th, 1499th, 1500th, 1501st, 1502nd, 1503rd, 1504th, 1505th, 1506th, 1507th, 1508th, 1509th, 1510th, 1511st, 1512nd, 1513th, 1514th, 1515th, 1516th, 1517th, 1518th, 1519th, 1520th, 1521st, 1522nd, 1523rd, 1524th, 1525th, 1526th, 1527th, 1528th, 1529th, 1530th, 1531st, 1532nd, 1533rd, 1534th, 1535th, 1536th, 1537th, 1538th, 1539th, 1540th, 1541st, 1542nd, 1543rd, 1544th, 1545th, 1546th, 1547th, 1548th, 1549th, 1550th, 1551st, 1552nd, 1553rd, 1554th, 1555th, 1556th, 1557th, 1558th, 1559th, 1560th, 1561st, 1562nd, 1563rd, 1564th, 1565th, 1566th, 1567th, 1568th, 1569th, 1570th, 1571st, 1572nd, 1573rd, 1574th, 1575th, 1576th, 1577th, 1578th, 1579th, 1580th, 1581st, 1582nd, 1583rd, 1584th, 1585th, 1586th, 1587th, 1588th, 1589th, 1590th, 1591st, 1592nd, 1593rd, 1594th, 1595th, 1596th, 1597th, 1598th, 1599th, 1600th, 1601st, 1602nd, 1603rd, 1604th, 1605th, 1606th, 1607th, 1608th, 1609th, 1610th, 1611st, 1612nd, 1613th, 1614th, 1615th, 1616th, 1617th, 1618th, 1619th, 1620th, 1621st, 1622nd, 1623rd, 1624th, 1625th, 1626th, 1627th, 1628th, 1629th, 1630th, 1631st, 1632nd, 1633rd, 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1759th, 1760th, 1761st, 1762nd, 1763rd, 1764th, 1765th, 1766th, 1767th, 1768th, 1769th, 1770th, 1771st, 1772nd, 1773rd, 177

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-4-

	No. of equivalent Goya
50% of 2nd line tpt of two Goya not engaged operationally	2
50% of 2nd line tpt of five Indop. also not engaged operationally	3
50% of say seven Corps tpt Camp Goya	3½
50% of say five Corps tpt Goya	2
50% of say 30 Army Pls employed on 2nd line	4
Equivalent of 24% of Goya now with cadres as Army tpt, of Goya and Army Pls - say	18
Total	32½

g. 1. From para 4, above it will be noted that about 38 of Goya are at present engaged on L of C duties. A recent analysis of the complement of transport in the L of C given the following results:-

	No. of Goya employed
Clearance of Documents and Messages	13.7
Report work	15.5
Int work	9
Base maintenance	10
Base details	5
Total	53.2

ii. The difference between tpt allocated to the L of C and that actually employed is accounted for partially by deficiencies in unit holdings of vehicles and VCR. By making good the

Total 364

2. 1. From para 4 above it will be noted that about 50 of Coys are at present engaged on L of C duties. A recent analysis of the employment of transport in this L of C gives the following results:-

	No. of Coys employed
Choreuses of Trucks and MULES	13.7
Depot work	15.5
222 work	9
Base maintenance	10
Line details	5
Total	53.2

- ii. The difference between the total allocated to the L of C and that actually employed is accounted for partially by deficiencies in unit holdings of vehicles and VCR. By making good the deficiencies and VCR, it should be possible to make 5 Coys available from the L of C at any time.

- iii. In addition to the total available in g. ii above, it is considered that the following arbitrary cuts can be made without seriously interfering with work in the L of C:-

Trucks	2 (on US taking over commitment)
Depots	3
222	3
Base maintenance	3
Line details	2
Total	13

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4. Under emergency b. and c. above a total of 51 MT Coys have been found. This will provide a small margin of 6 MT Coys over estimated requirements which might be used to assist in the distribution of civil supplies.
5. For the purpose of this appreciation no account has been taken of 62 Coys which may be transferred to ITALY from NORTH AFRICA and GREECE and allow-
ance has been made for an anticipated reduction in Ind line, 3rd line and
UT Coys in the theater.

6. CONCLUSION

- a. Assume that Grades I to IV of the operation are carried out as set out in para 6 of the main paper. It should be possible to carry out these simultaneously and provide the following further to to prevent in the movement of civil supplies to Northern ITALY and the movement of forces into AUSTRIA :-

US - equivalent of 45 x 24 ton Dues Coys

British - equivalent of 6 x 3 ton W Coys

- b. Subject to unobscured operational capabilities it is considered that plans should be made on 20 US truck Coys and 5 British 62 Coys being made available for the movement of civil supplies to North ITALY.

According to the Reports I to IV of the operation are carried out as set out in part 6 of the main report, it should be possible to carry out these simultaneously and provide the following further up to assist in the movement of civil supplies to Northern Ireland and the movement of forces into IRELAND:-

US - equivalent of 43 x 2 1/2 ton trucks

British - equivalent of 6 x 3 ton trucks

2. Subject to unforeseen operational difficulties it is considered that plans should be made on 20 US Trucks, 10,000 and 3 British 37 Trucks being made available for the movement of civil supplies to North Africa.

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SINCE HQ CANON

LETTER OF INTENT HQ

1.

The following layout has formed the basis of current planning :-

- a. HQ to control a corridor on the side of the 7th Army advance and the BREWER route.
- b. British Army to control Commandos of FIVEIRA GILLES, HQ 30 area being allotted to British Army for this purpose.
- c. HQ No. 1 District to control the main g to boundary of VANDER GILLES with two additional sub-areas to control same.
- d. HQ No. 2 District to control the main with HQ 27 Area, HQ 25 Area and HQ 151 Sub-area under control.
- e. FIVEIRA to be administered by HQ 151 responsible to HQ, FIVEIRA with British troops and attached.
- f. HQ FIVEIRA Command, as at present constituted, to pass under command HQ, also when the Army boundary is moved north of FIVEIRA, with the proviso that the present allocation of post and leave facilities should not be disturbed without reference to HQ.

BOUNDARIES

2.

a. General

It is considered that boundaries should follow as closely as possible the existing practical boundaries.

b.

Boundaries of HQ, 1 District

It is considered that HQ, 1 District should be treated as follows :-

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with two additional subsections to be added as follows.

- a. HQ No. 2 District to contain 14 Sub-Districts by 37 Areas, 34 by Area and 10 151 Sub-Districts under command.
- b. SOLOMONS to be redefined by a NSM recommended to O's, PSC with a British firm contract attached.
- c. HQ LANCE to remain, as at present constituted, so long as under command of, and when the Army boundary is moved North of MONROVIA, with the proviso that the present allocation of staff and leave facilities should not be disturbed without reference to A.S.M.

BOUNDARIES

a. General

It is considered that boundaries should follow as closely as possible the existing provincial boundaries.

b. Constitution of No. 1 District

It is considered that No. 1 District should be divided as follows :-

- NORTH - The North boundary of the Province of ATLANTIC and UTAH
- EAST - The East boundary of the Province of UTAH
- SOUTH - The South boundary of the Province of ATLANTIC and UTAH
- WEST - The West boundary of the Province of :-

ATLANTIC
VICTORIA
SALOMON
PROVINCE

2394

The West boundary of the Province of ATLANTIC from its northernmost limit to the railway SALAMON-PROVINCE.

The railway SALAMON-PROVINCE from where it crosses the West boundary of ATLANTIC Province to SALAMON inclusive.

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Route 2 from HOLA to the present inter-army boundary. The present inter-army boundary is its junction with the present ~~inter-army~~ boundary.

The present 55 area West boundary from its junction with the army boundary to its junction with 59 area West boundary.

The present West boundary of 59 area to its junction with 207 Sub-Area West boundary.

This arrangement will give to HQ 2 District the whole of the

Departamento of VIOLETA PROPIA except the Province of VIOLETA.

2. The precise boundaries through the Province of BOLSONA and FINEZUELA must be decided in accordance with administrative requirements and locations of national rest areas.

ORGANIZATION OF HQ 1 DISTRICT

3. 1. General

The following are the most important ports, towns and centres of command (town) in the area to be allocated to HQ 1 District :-

Ports

VALENCIA
LA OLA

Towns and centres of communication

LA OLA
LA OLA
LA OLA

b. District HQ

Location is considered to be the best location for HQ 1 District since

it is centrally situated and has good road and rail communications

LA OLA and LA OLA.

c. Subordinate HQ

ORGANIZATION OF HQ 1 DISTRICT

5. General

The following are the most important parts, towns and centers of communication in the area to be allotted to HQ 1 District :-

Towns

MAHE
MADGAO

Towns and centers of communication

MAHE
MADGAO
MADGAO

b. District HQ

MAHE is considered to be the best location for HQ 1 District since it is centrally situated and has good road and rail communications NORTH and SOUTH.

c. Subordinate HQ

1. The following subordinate HQs may be allotted to HQ 1 District :-

- 61 area
- 71 Sub-area
- 231 " " (from HQ 2 District)
- 207 " " "
- 210 " " (from HQ 5 District)

ii. The responsibilities of the subordinate HQs and the boundaries of their respective territories must be decided by HQ 1 District **3899** the following dispositions have been worked out, on a planning basis, as a possible solution, to ensure the resources given to HQ 1 District are adequate for their task.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Territory responsibility unchanged.

Factory to compete

Summary: An original and

Supporting 45 companies

Territory to compare

- Condutivitas saat ini 2.000.

It is considered that the British Instruments of Surrender and Exchange should be under command HQ No. 1 District, and should be co-ordinating allied units (in accordance with the definitions contained in APMR para 1000 No. 11 dated 25 Jan 45).

0474719, CYCLOP NU-2 TEST RITE

Effect of the type of treatment on

1. In the initial design territory, the responsibility is still on

1-18 Nov in 4910 letters 65 123/051 CRG-V dated 20 Jan 45 (4.dmin-)

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Floor 10

estimation of the

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1500

proportion of (1995) to (2000) is

Boundaries are off. 2 novo.

4. It is considered that the British inventors of ROCKET and MANAGER should be under control of U2 No. 1 District, and should be co-operating with U2 No. 1 District with the definitions contained in U2 No. 1 District No. 19 dated 23 Jan 63.

0-234-413-414-1 or No. 2. 1958.

4. Conditionality in the context

1. In the initial 90-day temporary and responsibility period, the individual from among letters LC 323/051 and LC 20 Jan 45 (under-
retroactive instructions on NY IT-227).

ii. It is better able to do the supervision of municipalities from Fifth
 army to 20th the territory may be extended to include the
 whole of the Department of LORCA. Also, except the province of
 Madrid, in order to make administrative and civil boundaries as
 far coincident as possible. Also, in these circumstances *22392*
 province of FALSA might be transferred to 22 District.

is I evictant is possible. Also, in these circumstances, 2392

corollary of Table 4 might be transformed to $\mathcal{R} \cup \mathcal{E}$ instead.

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b. funding over 30 percent to municipalities

Territory at present controlled by HQ No. 2 District will be handed over to Nos. 1 and 3 Districts as follows :-

Territory is present	controlled by HQ 59 Area	- 1 District
"	"	- 3 District
"	"	- 3 District
"	"	- 3 District

5. In and through the following subordinate units HQ will be under control HQ No. 2 District :

57 a.m.
59 a.m.
60 Sub-urge
101 Sub-urge

Q. A. EQ No. 2 District will retain its responsibilities in regard to

203 Suburban
Surrey
Station
Surrey

1112 days 11.45 Lutlog LG 325/055 00000 dated 21 Jan 45.

COMPLETION OF NO.3 DISTRICT

5. Certain adjustments will have to be made in respect of the responsibilities of HQ 3 District consequent upon the movements of HQs 1 and 2 Districts. In particular it will be necessary for HQ 3 District to take over the responsibilities and territory at present given to HQs Nos 201 and 210 Sub-areas. The arrangements in respect of these must be made by HQ No. 3 District but the following is a tentative solution :-

Fig. 209. Sub-ventrals should be over-

t. The territory and responsibility of HQ 240 Sub-area.

...of HQ 2nd Sub-...

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2. HQ No. 2 District will retain its responsibilities in regard to

203 Sub-area
SARINIA
OCHIKI
HKS.

as laid down in HQ letter no 203/035 QAF-0 dated 20 Jan 42.

ORGANISATION OF HQ 3 DISTRICT

5. Certain adjustments will have to be made in respect of the responsibilities of HQ 3 District consequent upon the movements of HQs 1 and 2 Districts. In particular it will be necessary for HQ 3 District to take over the responsibilities and territory at present given to HQs Nos 201 and 210 Sub-areas. The changes in respect of these must be made by HQ No. 3 District but the following is a possible solution:-

1. HQ 209 Sub-area should be over-

1. The territory and responsibilities of HQ 210 Sub-area.
11. The territory and responsibilities of HQ 201 Sub-area. (The administrative content in these territories is likely to be very small).
2. The remainder of the status HQs under command of 3 District and their several territories to remain unchanged.

FM

6. FMS should ultimately be responsible for the following provisions in addition to its present territory and responsibilities:-

BUZANO / In the Department of
PHILIP / MARINE, MALAYA

VIKING / In the Department of VIETNAM, PHILIP

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in the Department of Labor.

AGOSTO 1971

111

1. *Chlorophyll a* (Chl *a*)
 2. *Chlorophyll b* (Chl *b*)
 3. *Chlorophyll c* (Chl *c*)
 4. *Chlorophyll d* (Chl *d*)
 5. *Chlorophyll e* (Chl *e*)
 6. *Chlorophyll f* (Chl *f*)
 7. *Chlorophyll g* (Chl *g*)
 8. *Chlorophyll h* (Chl *h*)
 9. *Chlorophyll i* (Chl *i*)
 10. *Chlorophyll j* (Chl *j*)
 11. *Chlorophyll k* (Chl *k*)
 12. *Chlorophyll l* (Chl *l*)
 13. *Chlorophyll m* (Chl *m*)
 14. *Chlorophyll n* (Chl *n*)
 15. *Chlorophyll o* (Chl *o*)
 16. *Chlorophyll p* (Chl *p*)
 17. *Chlorophyll q* (Chl *q*)
 18. *Chlorophyll r* (Chl *r*)
 19. *Chlorophyll s* (Chl *s*)
 20. *Chlorophyll t* (Chl *t*)
 21. *Chlorophyll u* (Chl *u*)
 22. *Chlorophyll v* (Chl *v*)
 23. *Chlorophyll w* (Chl *w*)
 24. *Chlorophyll x* (Chl *x*)
 25. *Chlorophyll y* (Chl *y*)
 26. *Chlorophyll z* (Chl *z*)
 27. *Chlorophyll aa* (Chl *aa*)
 28. *Chlorophyll ab* (Chl *ab*)
 29. *Chlorophyll ac* (Chl *ac*)
 30. *Chlorophyll ad* (Chl *ad*)
 31. *Chlorophyll ae* (Chl *ae*)
 32. *Chlorophyll af* (Chl *af*)
 33. *Chlorophyll ag* (Chl *ag*)
 34. *Chlorophyll ah* (Chl *ah*)
 35. *Chlorophyll ai* (Chl *ai*)
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 40. *Chlorophyll an* (Chl *an*)
 41. *Chlorophyll ao* (Chl *ao*)
 42. *Chlorophyll ap* (Chl *ap*)
 43. *Chlorophyll aq* (Chl *aq*)
 44. *Chlorophyll ar* (Chl *ar*)
 45. *Chlorophyll as* (Chl *as*)
 46. *Chlorophyll at* (Chl *at*)
 47. *Chlorophyll au* (Chl *au*)
 48. *Chlorophyll av* (Chl *av*)
 49. *Chlorophyll aw* (Chl *aw*)
 50. *Chlorophyll ax* (Chl *ax*)
 51. *Chlorophyll ay* (Chl *ay*)
 52. *Chlorophyll az* (Chl *az*)
 53. *Chlorophyll aa'* (Chl *aa'*)
 54. *Chlorophyll ab'* (Chl *ab'*)
 55. *Chlorophyll ac'* (Chl *ac'*)
 56. *Chlorophyll ad'* (Chl *ad'*)
 57. *Chlorophyll ae'* (Chl *ae'*)
 58. *Chlorophyll af'* (Chl *af'*)
 59. *Chlorophyll ag'* (Chl *ag'*)
 60. *Chlorophyll ah'* (Chl *ah'*)
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 62. *Chlorophyll aj'* (Chl *aj'*)
 63. *Chlorophyll ak'* (Chl *ak'*)
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 67. *Chlorophyll ao'* (Chl *ao'*)
 68. *Chlorophyll ap'* (Chl *ap'*)
 69. *Chlorophyll aq'* (Chl *aq'*)
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 72. *Chlorophyll at'* (Chl *at'*)
 73. *Chlorophyll au'* (Chl *au'*)
 74. *Chlorophyll av'* (Chl *av'*)
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 76. *Chlorophyll ax'* (Chl *ax'*)
 77. *Chlorophyll ay'* (Chl *ay'*)
 78. *Chlorophyll az'* (Chl *az'*)
 79. *Chlorophyll aa''* (Chl *aa''*)
 80. *Chlorophyll ab''* (Chl *ab''*)
 81. *Chlorophyll ac''* (Chl *ac''*)
 82. *Chlorophyll ad''* (Chl *ad''*)
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 103. *Chlorophyll ay''* (Chl *ay''*)
 104. *Chlorophyll az''* (Chl *az''*)
 105. *Chlorophyll aa'''* (Chl *aa'''*)
 106. *Chlorophyll ab'''* (Chl *ab'''*)
 107. *Chlorophyll ac'''* (Chl *ac'''*)
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 129. *Chlorophyll ay'''* (Chl *ay'''*)
 130. *Chlorophyll az'''* (Chl *az'''*)
 131. *Chlorophyll aa''''* (Chl *aa''''*)
 132. *Chlorophyll ab''''* (Chl *ab''''*)
 133. *Chloroph*

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for bounded as in part 2.

4. Sketch map showing the proposed boundaries of Nos. 1, 2 and 3 Districts and Fig is attached to MEMORANDUM I. (See Appendix)

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TOP SECRET

FIG. 23 is attached to Appendix 1.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Subject: - Operation "POTENTIAL"

TO: - Office of Chief of Staff
US Armed Operations

This action is planned to attach copy of letter request from G-1(S) at time of (1/27/55/G-1(S) at 12 Jan 55).

Thurmond Jones

Lt. Colonel,
Chief Staff Officer

PA 1/27/55

LC 1C

528

ly

SECRET

Headquarters

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Confidential

SECRET: Operation "FRANKLIN"

SECRET

NO 15th ADD GROUP, CAP.

1403/5/001(H)

19 Jan. 45

OC, Fifth Army
Sixth Army
List 'B'

1. The codeword "FRANKLIN" has been allotted to denote "Operations to occupy territory in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations and when every operation occurs".

2. The following guide is issued regarding the security classification to be given to documents and messages relating to Operation "FRANKLIN"

a. Mention of the codeword "FRANKLIN" requires classification not lower than SECRET.

b. Documents and messages which include the codeword "FRANKLIN" will be classified SECRET or TOP SECRET according to their contents.

c. Documents and messages which do not include the codeword "FRANKLIN" but which deal with the Operation will be classified according to their contents.

3. It will be the responsibility of all originators of existing documents relating to Operation "FRANKLIN" to review their documents in accordance with the above guide and notify all concerned.

(Signature)

For Major-General, *(Signature)*
Chief of Staff

Operations to occupy territories in the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations and then enemy occupation areas".

2. The following guide is issued regarding the security classification to be given to documents and messages relating to Operation "FLAMINGO".

a. Mention of the code word "FLAMINGO" requires classification not lower than SECRET.

b. Documents and messages which include the code word "FLAMINGO" will be classified SECRET or TOP SECRET according to their contents.

c. Documents and messages which do not include the code word "FLAMINGO" but which deal with the Operation will be classified according to their contents.

3. It will be the responsibility of all originators of existing documents relating to Operation "FLAMINGO" to regrade their documents in accordance with the above guide and notify all concerned.

(Signature)

For Major-General,
Chief of Staff.

2380

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