

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

10000/109/312

ORGANIZATION, AMG, VENEZIE GIULIA
AUG. 1944 - SEPT. 1945

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

Chief Commissioner

28

AUG 16 1947
1127

You said you would express
opinion on this matter.

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52 7/8 10/8

My opinion is that as far
The Commission I see no need to
spend further time on a subject pretty
generally understood by all hands.

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Chief Commissioner.

1. The report on Pages 1 and 2 contains a reflection on the efficiency of SCAG, 3 Army AMB who was responsible for the planning in VERDELLA GUILIA and Regional Commander, VERDELLA Region who was responsible for the provision of personnel.

2. Knowing the background of the case I would have recommended to you that no further action should be taken, had it not been that a copy has been sent to Asst. Chief of Staff, 3-5, AMB. This being the case I must recommend to you that you should ask SCAG, 3 Army AMB, to whom a copy of the report has also been sent, for his comments.

29. June. 1962

7192

Chief Commissioner.

Brigadier Dunlop's letter dated 30 June, to which I referred yesterday, is at page 1.

2 July 45.

Ernest Miller
Chief Staff Officer,
To the Executive Commissioner.

9

EC. Request Brig. Dunlop to prepare the report suggested by him in enclosed 4, p. 6.

Yes

1-10-12

29 June 1945

3.

Chief Commissioner.

Brigadier Dunlop's letter dated 30 June, to which I referred yesterday, is at page 1.

2 July 45.

9

Erskine Blair
Chief Staff Officer,
to the Executive Commissioner.

EC. Request Brig. Dunlop to prepare the report suggested by him in his letter of 9 p. 6.

"

Done - 10.10.12
G. 127.

Chief Commissioner.

114-35

Attached is submitted for your signature/information/initial.

MS 1118

13/8

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PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

5992

JKD/say

(61)

HEADQUARTERS
VENEZIA REGION
Allied Military Government
APO 394

12 September 1945

SEP 15 1945

See 60

My dear Annie

Very many thanks for your letter of 5 September acknowledging the "Venezia-Italia Report".

I entirely agree with you that no further discussion on the subject is in the slightest degree necessary. I was pleased, and perhaps amused, to note that on the occasion of our last conference in Rome, Nelson Monfort quite obviously went out of his way to be friendly and courteous. At that time I mentally noted that the incident was clearly closed.

Many thanks for your help throughout. I think that all we need say is that should some busybody in the future dig up Nelson Monfort's original letter and start a witch hunt on alleged lack of preparation, there will be in existence a factual report.

*Yours ever
M.*

Brigadier Maurice Lash, CB, CBE, MC,
Executive Commissioner,
Headquarters Allied Commission.

PA

Please file this

HJ (1/2)

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CONFIDENTIAL

398

(57)

Ex. Comm.

HEADQUARTERS
VENEZIE REGION
Allied Military Government
APO 394

1 August, 1945

TO : Office of the Executive Commissioner

SUBJECT : Organisation A.M.G. XIII Corps.

FILE NO : RXII/850.74

Reference your 599/13/EC of 25 July.

The report on the preliminary moves in the organisation of A.M.G. XIII Corps is now completed and is being typed. I hope to be able to send it down by air on 3 August.

In view of the interest of the story it appears desirable to have the report fully documented.

3 AUG 1945

[Signature]
Regional Commissioner

JKD/lgc

[Signature]
(CSO)

[Signature]
(580245)
(Sum 60)

599

EXCOMMISSIONER

TOP SECRET 397

HEADQUARTERS
VENEZIA REGION
Allied Military Government
APO 394

AUG 3 1945

TO : H.Q. Allied Commission.

2 August 1945

1. Reference your 599/10/EC of 5 July.

2. I submit herewith in triplicate report on the events leading up to the establishment of A.M.G. in Venezia Giulia.


Regional Commissioner

Encl (3)

Copies of above mentioned report.

Non-Ex-Commissioner

SW

(2. Green Cover Paper)

(CSO)

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HEADQUARTERS
VENETIE REGION
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T O P S E C R E T

Allied Military Government - Venezia Giulia

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TOP SECRET

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HEADQUARTERS
VENEZIE REGION
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Allied Military Government - Venezia Giulia
Notes on Preliminary Planning.

1. Region "Z" was formed in Chienciano on August 6th. At that time it appeared likely that the Regional team would be required to operate in Region XII comprising the Tre Venezie (Venezia Tridentina, Venezia Propria and Venezia Giulia).

6 Aug.
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2. Therefore, on August 26, the first draft plan for the deployment of the Region was produced and sent as a Top Secret document to Headquarters Allied Commission (Appendix "A"). This plan provided for the nucleus of teams to Venezia Giulia; for Trieste, Lt. Col. Craig; for Fiume, Lt. Col. Armstrong; for Pola, Lt. Col. White. On 1st September the opportunity was taken of a visit of Col. Fiske to Chienciano to discuss this plan. In fact Lt. Col. White did not join the Region and planning for Venezia Giulia was carried on by Lt. Col. Craig and Lt. Col. Armstrong, both of whom joined the Region early in September. Visits were paid to authorities in Rome and such information as was available was gained from Patriot Officers and others.

26 Aug.

1 Sep.

3. As a result of these studies and on information received from Headquarters, Allied Commission, a Top Secret letter was written, on 18 September, by the Regional Commissioner to Headquarters, Allied Commission, setting out certain views on the probable problems to be encountered in the imposing of Allied Military Government in Venezia Giulia (Appendix "B").

18 Sep.

4. On the same day a second Top Secret letter suggested to Headquarters, Allied Commission, the necessity for a special Proclamation No. 1 for Venezia Giulia (Appendix "C").

19 Sep.

5. In the meantime the allied attack on the Gothic line was mounted, and as a result, on the 19th September

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6 Aug. 1. Region "2" was formed in Chienciano on August 6th. At that time it appeared likely that the Regional team would be required to operate in Region XII comprising the Tre Venezie (Venezia Tridentina, Venezia Propria and Venezia Giulia).

26 Aug. 2. Therefore, on August 26, the first draft plan for the deployment of the Region was produced and sent as a Top Secret document to Headquarters Allied Commission (Appendix "A"). This plan provided for the nucleus of teams to Venezia Giulia; for Trieste, Lt. Col. Craig; for Piume, Lt. Col. Armstrong; for Pola, Lt. Col. White. On 1st September the opportunity was taken of a visit of Col. Fiske to Chienciano to discuss this plan. In fact Lt. Col. White did not join the Region and planning for Venezia Giulia was carried on by Lt. Col. Craig and Lt. Col. Armstrong, both of whom joined the Region early in September. Visits were paid to authorities in Rome and such information as was available was gained from Patriot Officers and others.

1 Sep. 3. As a result of these studies and on information received from Headquarters, Allied Commission, a Top Secret letter was written, on 18 September, by the Regional Commissioner to Headquarters, Allied Commission, setting out certain views on the probable problems to be encountered in the imposing of Allied Military Government in Venezia Giulia (Appendix "B").

18 Sep. 4. On the same day a second Top Secret letter suggested to Headquarters, Allied Commission, the necessity for a special Proclamation No. 1 for Venezia Giulia (Appendix "C").

19 Sep. 5. In the meantime the allied attack on the Gothic line was being mounted, and as a result, on the 19th September the Advance Headquarters of Region XII, as it was now officially styled, moved from Chienciano to Senigallia, on the Adriatic coast, in order to be in close touch with Headquarters 8th Army and with Group Captain Benson, the S.C.A.O. On 23rd September a second move forward was made to Cattolica.

23 Sep. 6. On 28th September a copy was received at Regional Headquarters of the Chief Commissioner's Top Secret letter to A.P.H.Q. on the subject of Venezia Giulia.

28 Sep.

30 Sep. 7. As a result of this the Regional Commissioner held, on 30th September, a full conference with his Senior Staff Officers and a further letter was drafted for dispatch to Rome (Appendix "D"). However, before this letter was actually dispatched, Group Captain Benson, Col. Fiske and Mr. Harold Caccia arrived at Regional Headquarters to discuss the problems of Venezia Giulia. A further conference took place on the evening of October 1st, as a result of which a second and amplified letter was drafted and was sent forward to Rome the following day. This letter, among other things, pointed out the need for strong police units for Venezia Giulia (Appendix "E" & "F").

3 Oct. 8. As a further result of these discussions, between the 3rd and 7th October, Lt. Col. Craig and Lt. Col. Armstrong were sent down to Bari to contact Admiral Morgan and to get all possible naval information about Trieste and Fiume.

8 Oct. 9. On the 8th of October a letter was received at Regional Headquarters from the Executive Commissioner confirming all action taken by the Regional Commissioner to date.

10. By this time the weather had become very bad, the ground north of Rimini was water-logged and it became clear that a rapid advance across the Po was unlikely. 8th Army decided to put its troops into billets and there was an urgent demand for officers to assist civilian evacuation in Riccione, Cattolica and Chiesenattica. The only personnel available were the skeleton Venezia Giulia teams under Lt. Col. Craig and Lt. Col. Armstrong and these were put on to this work.

12 Oct. 11. On the 12th October, a general conference of Regional Commissioners was held at Siena in the course of which it was decided that the Regional Commissioner, Venezia, should go to Rome on 15th October for a full conference on Venezia Giulia plans. On 16 October at 1100 hours, therefore, a full scale conference took place in Rome with Brigadier Lush, Brigadier Upjohn, Col. Nelson Monfort, Mr. Harold Caccia, Col. Murray Mitchell, Sir Antony Rumbold, Lt. Col. Guy Shipp, Col. H. G. Willmer, Col. Carl M. Gevers and Brigadier Dunlop. It was decided that a further memorandum should be prepared. The Regional Commissioner, that evening, wrote a draft which was further discussed the following day by the same group of people, with the addition of Mr. Morris. This draft letter

16 Oct.

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- 18 Oct. 12. The following day the Regional Commissioner, Venezia, drove from Rome to Bari for a discussion with Brigadier Forestier-Walker of M.L. (Jugoslavia) and with Mr. Philip Broad. As it seemed likely that Lt. Col. Orpwood, then Zone Commissioner, Bari, would join the Venezia team, he was included in the discussions. The Regional Commissioner then returned to Cattolica whence a report was sent to Rome on the 21st (Appendix "B"). On the 22nd October the two teams for

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22 Oct. Trieste and Piume, at skeleton strength owing to shortage of personnel, were sent to Ascoli in order to be approximately halfway between Bari and Cattolica. Lt. Col. Craig and Lt. Col. Armstrong went on to Bari to carry out further discussions with Brigadier Forestier-Walker.

30 Oct. 13. On the 30th October, Regional Commissioner was informed by Brigadier Lush that, owing to the apparent stoppage of operations in the north, he should take over the post of Regional Commissioner, Southern Region.

31 Oct. 14. On the following day it was decided, in conference, that owing to the urgent need for officers to work in the devastated area of Region V, the officers of the Trieste and Piume teams, then at Ascoli, should be diverted to assist. In fact, Lt. Col. Craig with Junior Commander Proby later took over charge of the devastated area work at Headquarters, Allied Commission, and have never returned to Venezia Region.

4 Nov. 15. On the 4th November the Regional Commissioner left Region XII for Southern Region. With this departure most of the original group of officers who had studied, on a top secret level, the Venezia Giulia Allied Military Government was broken up. Col. Carl M. Gervers alone remained with Venezia Region.

9 Dec. 16. Even this solitary link did not last long for in mid December Col. Carl M. Gervers was called to go to plan for Austria. Nevertheless, within Southern Region, it was found possible to continue talks on the Venezia Giulia situation during the winter, and there were discussions with Brigadier Henn and Brigadier Lush at Caserta on Dec. 2th and with Col. Whitley of M.L. (Jugoslavia) at Bari on Jan. 30th.

30 Jan. '45

17. Early in January, the need for a strong campaign for olive oil collection was evident and all available Venezia Region officers, including those destined for Venezia Giulia, were sent to south Italy to help in olive oil collection. Steps were, however, taken wherever possible to keep teams together.

16 Feb. 18. On February 16th there was a discussion on the Venezia Giulia problems at Caserta with Brigadier Henn and Colonel Jacklin. The chief point in the discussion was the possibility of a solution to the Venezia Giulia problem on the basis of an "Army boundary" between Jugoslav and 8 Army troops. A further conference on Feb. 18th was followed by an aide

18 Feb.

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18 Feb.

26 Feb. 19. On February 26 Regional Commissioner went north to Florence to attend Lt. Gen. Sir Bryan Robertson's conference on Log Plan 177.

8 Mar. 20. On 8th March at a conference held by the President of the Allied Commission a plan was announced for the closing down of Southern Region. The majority of the officers then

set free would be available to build up the Venezia and Venezia Giulia. It was, however, also announced that olive oil collection would have to be carried on. Most of the officers destined for the Venezia Giulia were in fact engaged on this work. An opportunity had, however, been taken at the end of February to concentrate the Venezia Giulia officers at Lucera and Bari although they were still heavily engaged on olive oil collection. While there, Lt. Col. Orpwood and Lt. Col. Armstrong had many opportunities of discussion with R.N. landing units at Manfredonia. The party, however, at its strongest had never more than eleven officers and unfortunately some of these were later posted away and never reached Venezia Giulia.

22 Mar.

21. On March 22nd a further discussion took place at Caserta - Brigadier Henn, Col. Fiske, Brigadier Dunlop - wherein the problem of a form of independent Region for Venezia Giulia was discussed. As a result the following day a letter was forwarded by Brigadier Dunlop showing an estimated strength, supposing the whole of Venezia Giulia was occupied, of 115 officers, compared with the then existing establishment for Venezia Giulia of 60 and an actual effective strength of only 11 officers.

1 Apr.

22. On April 1st Southern Region came to an end and Brigadier Dunlop left Naples on the way north to rejoin Region XII, now called Venezia Region. Three days were spent in conferences in Rome, including, on April 3rd, a meeting with Lt. Col. Scholtz, suggested by A.C. as Deputy Regional Commissioner for Venezia Giulia.

23. On April 5th Advance Headquarters was established in Camp near Forlì along side 6th Army Headquarters.

9 Apr.

24. There was a second visit to Rome on April 9th and a further conference with Lt. Col. Scholtz with whom the Regional Commissioner discussed the Venezia Giulia situation. The same day the Allied offensive started. Owing to general shortage of officers in the Commission there was considerable difficulty in getting the leading Provincial teams into the field sufficiently strong to carry out the work. It was, therefore, quite impossible to reinforce Lt. Col. Orpwood's Venezia Giulia party, now concentrated at Lucera, near Foggia, with a strength of only 8 officers and 16 men. They had, however, been relieved from olive oil control work as of 1 April in order to devote some time to the study of the Trieste

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22 Mar. 21. On March 22nd a further discussion took place at Caserta - Brigadier Henn, Col. Fiske, Brigadier Dunlop - wherein the problem of a form of independent Region for Venezia Giulia was discussed. As a result the following day a letter was forwarded by Brigadier Dunlop showing an estimated strength, supposing the whole of Venezia Giulia was occupied, of 115 officers, compared with the then existing establishment for Venezia Giulia of 50 and an actual effective strength of only 11 officers.

1 Apr. 22. On April 1st Southern Region came to an end and Brigadier Dunlop left Naples on the way north to rejoin Region XII, now called Venezia Region. Three days were spent in conferences in Rome, including, on April 3rd, a meeting with Lt. Col. Scholtz, suggested by A.C. as Deputy Regional Commissioner for Venezia Giulia.

23. On April 5th Advance Headquarters was established in Camp near Forlì along side 8th Army Headquarters.

9 Apr. 24. There was a second visit to Rome on April 9th and a further conference with Lt. Col. Scholtz with whom the Regional Commissioner discussed the Venezia Giulia situation. The same day the Allied offensive started. Owing to general shortage of officers in the Commission there was considerable difficulty in getting the leading Provincial teams into the field sufficiently strong to carry out the work. It was, therefore, quite impossible to reinforce Lt. Col. Orwood's Venezia Giulia party, now concentrated at Lucera, near Foggia, with a strength of only 8 officers and 16 men. They had, however, been relieved from olive oil control work as of 1 April in order to devote some time to the study of the Trieste problem.

17 Apr. 25. While Regional H.Q. was at Forlì daily touch was maintained with AMG 8th Army. On April 17th the Regional Commissioner was informed by Air Commodore Benson that there was a strong possibility that the Allied entry into Trieste would be made by sea, and the Regional Commissioner was to produce a plan. A bid for 35 officers, 25 men and 9 vehicles was therefore submitted and reported to HQ. A.C. (Appendix "I").

20 Apr. 26. In view of this development, Lt. Col. Orwood was called up from Lucera to discuss the plan and to work out the details

of officers, men and stores for the landing. It was, however, decided, in conjunction with 8th Army, to keep his party at Lucera in order to be as near as possible to the likely port of embarkation, Bari, or the air field at Foggia. Plans had however soon to be rethought, for Air Commodore Benson informed the Regional Commissioner that the bids for craft space for the Trieste party had been turned down by 8th Army. He was resubmitting a bid for 14 officers and men to enter on D + 1. The next day Advance Headquarters moved to near Imola in order to conform to the move of Headquarters 8th Army.

22 Apr.

23 Apr.

26 Apr.

27. A conference was held at Headquarters 8th Army on April 26th between Air Commodore Benson, Colonel Fiske and Brigadier Dunlop. At this conference 8th Army asked that Lt. Col. Orpwood's party should remain at Lucera in view of the likelihood of an amphibious operation. At this time, however, the best allotment of craft space that could be obtained from 8th Army was two officers with one jeep on D + 1, and 8 officers, 6 men and 2 vehicles sometime between D + 2 and D + 5. The Regional Commissioner on this day sent a telegram to Rome pointing out the shortage of officers for his Region and for Venezia Giulia in especial (Appendix "J").

28 Apr.

28. Lt. Col. Scholtz, who had been detained in Rome by duties, arrived at Advance Headquarters on April 28 and went into conference at once with Lt. Col. Armstrong, detailed as his senior staff officer. Together they went through all files and checked all available information. The same night, in view of the general development, Regional Commissioner proposed to 8th Army that a telegram be sent to the Lucera party calling them forward to Cesena. 8th Army agreed and the telegram was sent off that night. The next day an even more important development occurred. Air Commodore Benson reported that the 2nd New Zealand Division was hurrying fast on the road to Trieste and that an A.M.C. party should be immediately organized to go with them. As the Lucera party was still on the way north an extemporized team of Lt. Col. Scholtz, Lt. Col. Armstrong, and six other officers was sent out to catch up the New Zealand Div. leaving Imola 0700 hours on the 30th April (Appendix "K").

1 May.

29. On 1st May Advance Headquarters again moved forward to Geibano some three miles from Headquarters 8th Army. Lt. Col. Orpwood and his party of eleven officers arrived from Lucera at Main Regional Headquarters at Cesena. There was a further conference between the Regional Commissioner and S.C.A.O. 8th Army to review the Venezia Giulia position.

between Air Commodore Benson, Colonel Fieke and Brigadier Dunlop. At this conference 8th Army asked that Lt. Col. Orpwood's party should remain at Lucera in view of the likelihood of an amphibious operation. At this time, however, the best allotment of craft space that could be obtained from 8th Army was two officers with one jeep on D + 1, and 2 officers, 6 men and 2 vehicles sometime between D + 2 and D + 3. The regional Commissioner on this day sent a telegram to Rome pointing out the shortage of officers for his Region and for Venezia Giulia in especial (Appendix "J").

28 Apr. 28. Lt. Col. Scholtz, who had been detained in Rome by duties, arrived at Advance Headquarters on April 28 and went into conference at once with Lt. Col. Armstrong, detailed as his senior staff officer. Together they went through all files and checked all available information. The same night, in view of the general development, Regional Commissioner proposed to 8th Army that a telegram be sent to the Lucera party calling them forward to Cesena. 8th Army agreed and the telegram was sent off that night. The next day an even more important development occurred. Air Commodore Benson reported that the 2nd New Zealand Division was hurrying fast on the road to Trieste and that an A.M.G. party should be immediately organized to go with them. As the Lucera party was still on the way north an extemporized team of Lt. Col. Scholtz, Lt. Col. Armstrong, and six other officers was sent out to catch up the New Zealand Div. leaving Imola 0700 hours on the 30th April (Appendix "K").

1 May. 29. On 1st May Advance Headquarters again moved forward to Gaibano some three miles from Headquarters 8th Army. Lt. Col. Orpwood and his party of eleven officers arrived from Lucera at Main Regional Headquarters at Cesena. There was a further conference between the Regional Commissioner and S.C.A.C. 8th Army to review the Venezia Giulia position.

3 May 30. By May 3rd it was clear that the situation at Trieste was going to be difficult. Nevertheless it was also clear that Udine Province would require a number of officers. Therefore, on the evening of that day, Air Commodore Benson asked for the remainder of the Venezia Giulia party to move forward and come under command 8th Army. Lt. Col. Orpwood and party therefore moved forward from Cesena on 4th May (Appendix "L"). With the issue of the Regional Order of 4th May placing Lt. Col.

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Orpwood's party under command 8 Army. Region had sent forward every available officer and man. The numbers were, obviously, far below what was required to do the work but they were all that could be scraped together at a time when the whole of North East Italy was falling into Allied hands, and when teams were moving forward - themselves much under strength - into all the ten provinces of Venezia Propria and Venezia Tridentina. Though, from this date the operational deployment of the Venezia Giulia teams became entirely the responsibility of A.M.C. 8 Army, there remained, ever present, the possibility that H.Q. Region might, at short notice, have to take over from Army. The Regional Commissioner, therefore, was in constant touch with S.C.A.C. 8 Army and received from him full information as to Army proposals and plans.

31. The following period was marked by constantly varying military and political situations, due to the fact that the 8th Army was in contact with Yugoslav aspirations on both its flanks. On the right 13th Corps was face to face with Yugoslav troops in the areas Monfalcone, Gradisca and Germans. On the left 5th Corps was in contact with other Yugoslav troops in Austria and around Fervasio. Clearly it was going to be difficult for Air Commodore Benson, S.C.A.C. 8th Army, and already commanding A.M.C. Austria, to watch effectively both Venezia Giulia and Austria. As a temporary solution, Lt. Col. Giffin was acting as his staff officer for Venezia Giulia and Grp. Capt. Beer as staff officer for Austria. On Saturday 5th May Headquarters Venezia Region reached Padova and the Regional Commissioner was able to report to AMC 8th Army that Region would be able to take over the administration of such provinces as was required. Most conferences with Army at this time were fairly late at night. At an important discussion at Mestre on the 7th May it was decided that Region could take over administration of the Provinces of Rovigo, Padova, Venezia and Treviso the following day. Udine remained under Army. Air Commodore Benson reported that Lt. Col. Scholtz, Lt. Col. Armstrong and four other officers were living just outside Trieste and were engaged in giving help to 25 Area HQ in Trieste. All other officers of the Scholtz party were being held back in Udine. 8th Army also decided to call forward the Orpwood party to help Lt. Col. Bright in that Province.

5 May

10 May 32. At another late night conference on 10 May held at Mestre Air Commodore Benson told the Regional Commissioner that as Col. Douglas Smith was leaving AMC 13th Corps and, as it was becoming increasingly difficult for Army to supervise Venezia Giulia and Austria, it was quite possible that Region would be required to take direct control over Venezia Giulia at short notice. In any

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with S.C.A.O. 8 Army and received from him full information as to Army proposals and plans.

31. The following period was marked by constantly varying military and political situations, due to the fact that the 8th Army was in contact with Yugoslav aspirations on both its flanks. On the right 13th Corps was face to face with Yugoslav troops in the area Monfalcone, Gradisce and Gorizia. On the left 5th Corps was in contact with other Yugoslav troops in Austria and around Trieste. Clearly it was going to be difficult for Air Commodore Benson, S.C.A.O. 8th Army, and already commanding A.M.G. Austria, to watch effectively both Venezia Giulia and Austria. As a temporary solution, Lt. Col. Giffin was acting as his staff officer for Venezia Giulia and Gp. Capt. Beer as staff officer for Austria. On Saturday 5th May Headquarters Venezia Region reached Padova and the Regional Commissioner was able to report to AMG 8th Army that Region would be able to take over the administration of such provinces as was required. Most conferences with Army at this time were fairly late at night. At an important discussion at Mestre on the 7th May it was decided that Region could take over administration of the Provinces of Rovigo, Padova, Venezia and Treviso the following day. Udine remained under Army. Air Commodore Benson reported that Lt. Col. Scholtz, Lt. Col. Armstrong and four other officers were living just outside Trieste and were engaged in giving help to 55 Area HQ in Trieste. All other officers of the Scholtz party were being held back in Udine. 8th Army also decided to call forward the Crpwood party to help Lt. Col. Bright in that Province.

5 May

10 May

32. At another late night conference on 10 May held at Mestre Air Commodore Benson told the Regional Commissioner that as Col. Douglas Smith was leaving AMG 13th Corps and, as it was becoming increasingly difficult for Army to supervise Venezia Giulia and Austria, it was quite possible that Region would be required to take direct control over Venezia Giulia at short notice. In any event 13th Corps was asking the Regional Commissioner to go forward for a conference. The Air Commodore also reported that he had distributed Lt. Col. Crpwood's team in Udine Province in order to release 8th Army "Spearhead" officers for Austria. Even so the total number of officers was quite inadequate even for Udine and the frontier. A further twelve C.A.Cs would be wanted at once.

11 May

33. Accordingly on the following day, 11th May, Brigadier Dunlop went forward to HQ. 13th Corps at Duino where he had a

12 May

conference with Lt. Gen. Sir John Harty. The following day he visited Trieste where he met Lt. Col. Armstrong at the HQ. 55 Area, and other officers. The situation in Trieste was fully reported in a letter to Brigadier Lush written the following day - Sunday - and sent down to Rome by Spitfire (Appendix "M").

13 May

In fact, however, on the return journey from this trip the Regional Commissioner called at AMG 8th Army where he was greeted by Lt. Col. Griffin with the news that plans had been changed. The Commander, 8th Army, had decided that he could not, in fact, divest himself of responsibility for Venezia Giulia and therefore Air Commodore Benson would have to remain, in his capacity as S.C.A.C. 8th Army, responsible for both Venezia Giulia and Austria. The system of two staff officers therefore continued, Lt. Col. Griffin shortly thereafter went back to England and was replaced by Major David Mynors from AMG 5 Army. There were further developments on 16th May.

16 May

Air Commodore Benson had decided at this time that he could put the officers of his Austria team into Udine and that part of Gorizia-Trieste west of the Isonzo line. That meant an immediate reinforcement of fourteen officers. Such a number eased the immediate problem of Udine and the frontier but did not provide any spare for a possible entry further into Venezia Giulia. Moreover as these officers were borrowed from AMG Austria they were liable to recall at short notice. It was further reported by Air Commodore Benson that he had decided that Lt. Col. Orwood was to go that day to Cervignano to set up headquarters of the "Frontier Zone" in a strip of country along the marches of Udine and Venezia Giulia. Administratively, however, these communes would remain under the Provincial Commissioner, Udine, Lt. Col. Bright.

17 May

On the 17th Brigadier Henn arrived in Padova from A.P.H.Q. and the following day was taken by the Regional Commissioner to Headquarters 8th Army now just north of Udine, where there was a most important conference with Air Commodore Benson on the whole position of Venezia Giulia. The situation in Austria was improving and it again looked probable that AMG Austria might have to go on forward in strength. As, at that time, there were fourteen C.A.Cs and fourteen police officers borrowed from Austria, serving in Udine and the frontier, it was clear that the situation would be serious if the Austrian party was withdrawn. At the same time, though approximate deadlock continued on the Isonzo, it was always possible that sudden developments might take place. The plan for an independent Regional organization for Venezia Giulia was further discussed and as a first move it was decided that Lt. Col.

16 May

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15 May

35. Throughout this period the Regional Commissioner had been pressing Headquarters continuously for additional officers though fully appreciating the difficulties experienced by A.C. itself due to serious lack of personnel. On 15 May a telegram had been sent to Headquarters pointing out the position (Appendix "N"). By 15 May the effective strength of

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the Venezia Giulia teams was only 31 officers, some of these were 8th Army spearhead officers of experience who were now being transferred to the Sub-Region. A reply telegram from Headquarters, Allied Commission, dated 19th May and received on the 21st pointed out the difficulties clearly enough. (Appendix "O")

22 May

36. On 22 May there was a further discussion with Air Commodore Benson and others at Sub-Region H.Q. Udine. It will be remembered that as early as Sept. 18, 1944, the Regional Commissioner had raised the question of a special proclamation No. 1 for Venezia Giulia. No reply had ever been received from A.F.H.Q. on this point. Now, indeed, was this surprising because the factors affecting the issue of the proclamation were not firm. However, as the situation became clear it appeared necessary to get the proclamation ready. Region, while realizing that the responsibility for policy was that of Army and through them to A.F.H.Q., offered to help, and Major Gates was sent to Rome with a draft. A letter written the following day to 8 Army gives the story (Appendix "P"). An 8th Army order of the following day gives a clear picture of the situation as it then existed in Trieste (Appendix "Q"), and shows in para 3 the method envisaged by 8 Army of securing immediate setting in operation of A.F.H.Q.

25 May

37. Events were however leading quickly to the final development. On the evening of May 25 there was a further meeting at A.F.H.Q. 8 Army, north of Udine, between Air Commodore Benson, Brigadier Dunlop, Col. Nelson Monfort and Col. Jackson from G-5 A.F.H.Q. Colonel Monfort was present as Regional Commissioner elect for Venezia Giulia. The next morning a further full conference took place at the H.Q. of A.F.H.Q. Austria, then in Udine, at which the above four officers were joined by others. The general situation was reviewed. Air Commodore Benson estimated that the immediate requirements for C.A.Gs for Udine and Venezia Giulia combined were 35. As 16 Austrian officers could be left on loan for a further two weeks and as six south African officers were expected to arrive, the immediate situation was in hand. He was also able to lend Venezia Giulia twenty vehicles, pending receipt from A.C. It was further agreed that Lt. Col. Dawson should immediately go to Padova to link up the work done by H.Q. Venezia on Proclamations 2 & 3, and the later paragraphs of Proclamation 1.

Lt. Col. Orwood had by this time been smuggled forward by 8 Army into Trieste where he joined Lt. Col. Armstrong who had been continuously in Trieste since 3 May. They were both visited in Trieste on the afternoon of 26 May by the Regional

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30 May

38. On 30 May, Brigadier Lush, Brigadier Giffey-Smith and Brigadier Dunlop drove from Padova to Udine to have what was, in fact, the final conference with Air Commodore Benson on the setting up of a separate Regional H.Q. for Venezia Giulia. A letter written from Regional H.Q. to A.M.G. 8 Army that evening gave the final picture (Appendix "R").

Appendix "A"

TOP SECRET

COPY

25 August 1944

To Executive Commissioner:

1. The following is the first key plan for the deployment of Region XII.

It has NOT yet been discussed with Group Captain Benson: if you concur in its general principles, I propose to discuss it with Gp. Capt. Benson on Wednesday next, 30th August.

2. MOBILE ADV. H.Q.

3. EASTERN GROUP:

- a) Teams for POLA -- Lt. Col. White (B)
PIUME -- Lt. Col. Armstrongs (A)
TRIESTE -- Lt. Col. Craig (B)

will form at CHIACIANO on Sept. 4.

- b) These teams will either:

- i) Proceed to their destination by sea or air, in which case their move may be sudden; OR

- ii) Proceed overland, in which case they will move behind southern group of provinces:

- c) The possibility of a sudden move by sea will always remain, and this group should NOT be used to reinforce the southern group of provinces.

- d) In the event of a sea move, transport (except perhaps motor cycles) will not be taken. Reliance must be placed on the local requisitioning of vehicles.

- e) Provision must be made for the carriage of officers, men, carabinieri and baggage, from CHIACIANO to port or airfield of departure.

Two sections (10 trucks) in all, from Tn. Sub-Commission should be earmarked for this move of three provincial teams.

- f) If a full Colonel or a senior Lt. Col. be made available, he should be posted as Provincial

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- e) Provision must be made for the carriage of officers, men, carabinieri and baggage, from CHIACIANO to port or airfield of departure.
- Two sections (10 trucks) in all, from Tn. Sub-Commission should be earmarked for this move of three provincial teams.
- 2) If a full Colonel or a senior Lt. Col. be made available, he should be posted as Provincial Commissioner, GORIZIA, and put in charge of the sub-region VENEZIA GIULIA.
- If no such officer be available, Lt. Col. Craig will act as sub-region commander.
- 3) Provision will be made for eventual establishment of Adv. Regional H.Q. in VENEZIA GIULIA.
4. PROVINCE OF VENEZIA (Lt. Col. McCleery (B))
- a) Will form at CHIACIANO Sept. 4.
 - b) It is possible that allied troops will enter VENEZIA by sea.

In this case the provincial teams should be prepared to move by sea.

Limited transportation only will be provided.

- c) The move of provincial team to port of embarkation will be made in transport provided by Tn. Sub-Commission.

5. SOUTHERN PROVINCES.

- a) ROVIGO - Major Graham (B)
PADOVA - Capt. Hoelscher (A)
VERONA - Major Blackwell (A)
VICENZA - Major Haessler (A)

form at CHIANGIANG Sept. 4.

- b) So far as is possible each of these provincial teams will be provided with enough regional transport to render the team self-mobile.

- c) The policy of moving forward complete teams under orders AMG 5th Army will be carried out in the case of these provinces.

- d) The use of members of these teams as temporary reinforcements for each other or for the easterly provinces of Region IX will be within the discretion of SCAC AMG 5th Army.

6. NORTHERN PROVINCES.

- a) GORIZIA BELLUNO
UDINE BOLZANO
TREVISO TRENTO

It is not proposed to provide as at Sept. 4 officers, men and vehicles for these provinces.

It is hoped that when the need arises some at least of the necessary staff will be found from AMG 8 Army.

- b) In the special case of GORIZIA see Para 3 (f)

7. No provision is made in this scheme for Zera. Your special instructions in this matter are awaited.

8.

9.

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- Capt. Hoelscher (A)
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9.

- 10. It is not proposed at present to estimate the number of officers and men required to carry out the above programme. It is rather proposed to make the deployment programme fit the number of officers and men available. In this connection it is to be borne in mind as a general principle that any officers or men arriving as windfalls from sources outside the present strength of A.C.C. should be directed in the first place to ISTRIA where a considerable degree of direct rule may be necessary.

Copy No. 1) Brig. Insh

" " 2) (Exec. Comm.)

" " 3) Brig. J.K. Dunlop

" " 4) Col. C.M. Geyer

JOHN K. DUNLOP

Regional Commissioner

HEADQUARTERS REGION XII
Allied Control Commission
APO 394

TO : HQ ACC (R.O. & M.G. Section) 18 Sept. 45

SUBJECT: Administration of Frontier Provinces

1. I have to acknowledge receipt of your Top Secret Memorandum 808/15/CA of 14 September.

2. The contents of this letter have been disclosed to the following officers only: Col. Gevers (Executive Officer), Col. Willmer (Regional Legal Officer), Col. Howell (Regional Finance Officer), Lt. Col. Millhouse (Regional Public Safety Officer), Lt. Col. Craig (Prov. Comm., Trieste).

3. Some of these officers have asked whether they are permitted to discuss certain implications of the problems with their respective Sub-Commissions. I have replied that such discussion should NOT take place until your authority has been obtained.

4. It is not clear whether you have also communicated with SCAC's 5th and 8th Armies. They may of course be intimately concerned with the problems in the six provinces named in the letter from the Chief of Staff. I propose not to discuss matters with them till so authorized by you.

5. Full note is taken of the important points raised by you in your letter of 11 September. On the reply received to this letter the whole of our future policy must depend.

6. You have clearly pointed out that the automatic suspension of Italian sovereignty mentioned in paragraph 1 of the annexure, may or may not carry with it many implications affecting the every day life of the people.

7. In previous administration of other regions the policy has been adopted of the earliest possible return to normalcy. This involved inter alia: the reopening of Italian Courts, (Civil as well as Criminal); the reopening of Italian Banks and Post Offices; the reinstallation and organization of Italian Carabinieri, the reopening of hospitals and the re-establishment of the service of Medico Provinciale; the re-establishment of SEPRAI and Consorzio Agrario; the organization of Genio Civile; the reopening of schools; the distribution of CIP products. Each of the quoted cases raises its own particular problem in the case of Border States administered by direct Military Government.

8. There is no intention to exaggerate the difficulties of

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8. There is no intention to exaggerate the difficulties of the problem; such difficulties will, in any event, be reduced by adequate fore-knowledge.

9. It is noted that your reply dealt only with the problems of Venezia Giulia. An equivalent, or even more delicate problem will exist in Venezia Tridentina.

43

10. According to information available here, information which no doubt will be before you, the provinces of Bolzano, Trento and Belluno have been amalgamated by the German authorities and given the name "Pre-Alpine Operational Area". The political, administrative and military authorities are all German. German ration cards have been issued and the quantity of rationed goods are the same as in Germany. German law is used and enforced.

The Provinces of Udine, Trieste, Gorizia, Pola and Piuma have been organized as the "Litorale Adriatico" group under German command. It appears probable that the assimilation to the German system is not so complete as in the case of the "Pre-Alpine Operational Area".

11. In this connection it is to be remembered that the provinces of Belluno and Udine, included by the Germans in their above quoted administrative zones, have been Italian since 1866, and are not included in the six provinces mentioned in the Chief of Staff's letter. It is therefore assumed that in the case of these two provinces the normal AMG/ACC practice will be followed of restoring as quickly as possible normal Italian Administration.

12. In the case of the other six provinces it will be a question for a major decision whether such existing German (or indeed Yugoslav) administration as may be found on our arrival be continued under AMG control or replaced by the administrative system of metropolitan Italy. From the point of view of the easy passage of troops there may be arguments in favour of the use of de facto organisations.

13. It is submitted that immediately on entry a regulation be posted forbidding the flying of contestant flags or the public use of contestant emblems.

14. It is clear that:-

(a) A considerable additional staff will be required for the six provinces.

(b) That at the earliest possible moment a considerable amount of preliminary detailed work must be put in hand.

15. If you so direct, I am prepared, with my staff, to study and report at an early date on both these problems.

/s/ JOHN K. DUNLOP

Regional Commissioner

Distribution:

HO ACC (RC & MG Sec) Copies 1, 2 & 3.

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Col. C.M. Gevers	" 5
Lt. Col. Craig	" 6

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TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "C"

42

HEADQUARTERS REGION XII
Allied Control Commission
APO 394

TO : HQ. A.C.C. (R.C. & M.G. Section)
SUBJECT: Administration of Frontier Provinces.
DATE : 18 September 1944

With further reference to our communication on the above subject of to-day's date, it is submitted for your consideration that the wording in the Preamble to Proclamation No. 1 (Revised) "all territory freed from German domination" may be taken to imply a promise to the Italian People inconsistent with the Chief of Staff's statement regarding the six frontier Provinces.

/s/ John K. Dunlop
Regional Commissioner

Distribution:-

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Regional Commissioner - Copy No. 4
Colonel Willmer - Copy No. 5

COPY

APPENDIX "D"

TOP SECRET

ADVANCED
HEADQUARTERS REGION XII
Allied Control Commission
APO 394

TO : HQ. Allied Commission
Attn: Chief of Staff
30 September 1944

SUBJECT: Administration of Frontier Provinces.

FILE No: ARXII/4

1. Receipt is acknowledged of a copy of your letter on the above subject No. 808/20/CA - A/CC 321 dated 25th September 1944.
2. I await with great interest your further information based on the replies which you still await to your letters of the 11th and 26th September.

3. In the meantime further study has been given to certain aspects of the problem, seen from the point of view of the officers who might have to undertake the responsibility of the Military Government of the area involved. The following considerations are submitted to you in this sense. Please appreciate that in making these suggestions we are not attempting to interfere in matters of high policy. It is evident that the supreme decisions must be taken on the highest level. It may however be of some assistance to you in your own discussions with the Advisory Council and other such authorities, if we put forward certain technical considerations.

4. Any consideration of the problem must start from the Annexure to SAC (44) Special (5) Memorandum of the 13th of August. Inasmuch as it is the declared policy of the Allied Governments to impose an Allied Military Government over the Italian frontier provinces, it is obvious that any acquiescence in a de facto Yugoslav suzerainty will automatically involve a retrogression from a position deliberately taken up by the Allies and will to that extent weaken Allied authority in general.

5. Subject to the above general consideration, it is clearly a matter of great importance to the Allied Government if the conditions of local Military Government can approximate, so far as possible, to the wishes of the majority of the local inhabitants.

6. If it is conceded in principle that some change in the prewar boundary is in contemplation, there need be no insuperable practical difficulty in giving effect to local sentiment, so long

1. Receipt is acknowledged of a copy of your letter on the above subject No. 808/20/CA - A/CC 321 dated 26th September 1944.
2. I await with great interest your further information based on the replies which you still await to your letters of the 11th and 26th September.
3. In the meantime further study has been given to certain aspects of the problem, seen from the point of view of the officers who might have to undertake the responsibility of the Military Government of the area involved. The following considerations are submitted to you in this sense. Please appreciate that in making these suggestions we are not attempting to interfere in matters of high policy. It is evident that the supreme decisions must be taken on the highest level. It may however be of some assistance to you in your own discussions with the Advisory Council and other such authorities, if we put forward certain technical considerations.
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5. Subject to the above general consideration, it is clearly a matter of great importance to the Allied Government if the conditions of local Military Government can approximate, so far as possible, to the wishes of the majority of the local inhabitants.
6. If it is conceded in principle that some change in the prewar boundary is in contemplation, there need be no insuperable practical difficulty in giving effect to local sentiment, so long as it is clearly understood, throughout the community, that the executive power is held in the hands of the Allied Government and that such local changes as are made, are subject to later alteration in the light of the general settlement.
7. Indeed, unless the Allied Governments are prepared to make some long local concessions they will be forced to maintain large local forces to maintain order, or to allow movement of Italian troops into the area with the inevitable counter move of Yugoslav troops or partisan formations.
8. The comparatively sharp division along the ethnic line and the absence of large minority communities among the majority populations render more easy such local concessions.

9. There are three main problems that have to be faced in the general consideration of the immediate future of Veneto Giulia. They are :-

The problem of Trieste

The problem of Fiume and the Fiume-Ljubljana railway

The problem of the Istrian coal mines.

There is a senior problem in connection with the port of Pola.

10. In the case of Trieste it appears exceedingly important to prevent any approach to a coup de main by Yugoslav elements. It is supposed that whatever may be the future status of Trieste its out and out possession by Yugoslavia is not the most likely. Forcible seizure of Trieste by Yugoslavia and Allied acquiescence therein, would be the one thing which would cause serious repercussions in Italy. Therefore, from the military point everything possible should be done to make the initial Allied occupation really strong - even for a brief period. Everything possible should be done to make the maximum showing of the Allied use of the port as a supply base. From the point of view of Allied Military Government the entry into the city of a strong team at the first juncture will be planned. Local administration will be maintained on an entirely Italian basis, but the introduction of new Italian Officials must be most carefully controlled. It is suggested that the Italian Government might be warned at an early date of the intention of the Allied Military Government to maintain Italian administration but to employ, to the maximum extent, in that administration, persons of local extraction. In this connection it is observed that the Italian Government have already nominated a chief of the Carabinieri for the Province of Trieste. It appears desirable to issue a caveat against giving the Italian Government any overt promise as to the future of Trieste which might arise from applications from various Sub-Commisss ons direct to the Italian Government, for the appointment, in advance, of Italian Officials, for various administrative posts in the Province. The above considerations only apply to the commune of Trieste and the communes of the province which lie generally west thereof. The communes east of the ethnic line - poor and sparsely inhabited - will demand different treatment.

11. In the case of Fiume and the Fiume-Ljubljana railway it appears, in the contrary sense, that its cut and out possession by Italy is the least likely postwar contingency. Hence Allied interests would appear to lie in the direction of scrupulous avoidance of any act which might give the Italian Government any opening for interference in Fiume. Subject to the clear recognition of Allied Military Government as the supreme master, considerable concession might be made to local Yugoslav feeling. It is suggested that, if on investigation it be found that courts are in existence administering Yugoslav civil law, that these should be retained. The police system

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would be the one thing which would cause serious repercussions in Italy. Therefore, from the military point everything possible should be done to make the initial Allied occupation really strong - even for a brief period. Everything possible should be done to make the maximum showing of the Allied use of the port as a supply base. From the point of view of Allied Military Government the entry into the city of a strong team at the first juncture will be planned. Local administration will be maintained on an entirely Italian basis, but the introduction of new Italian Officials must be most carefully controlled. It is suggested that the Italian Government might be warned at an early date of the intention of the Allied Military Government to maintain Italian administration but to employ, to the maximum extent, in that administration, persons of local extraction. In this connection it is observed that the Italian Government have already nominated a chief of the Carabinieri for the Province of Trieste. It appears desirable to issue a caveat against giving the Italian Government any overt promise as to the future of Trieste which might arise from applications from various Sub-Communities direct to the Italian Government, for the appointment, in advance, of Italian Officials, for various administrative posts in the Province. The above considerations only apply to the commune of Trieste and the communes of the province which lie generally west thereof. The communes east of the ethnic line - poor and sparsely inhabited - will demand different treatment.

11. In the case of Trieste and the Trieste-Ljubljana railway it appears, in the contrary sense, that its cut and out possession by Italy is the least likely postwar contingency. Hence Allied interests would appear to lie in the direction of scrupulous avoidance of any act which might give the Italian Government any opening for interference in Trieste. Subject to the clear recognition of Allied Military Government as the supreme master, considerable concession might be made to local Yugoslav feeling. It is suggested that, if on investigation it be found that courts are in existence administering Yugoslav civil law, that these should be retained. The police system must be retained rigidly in Allied control and the cost of its administration should be regarded, at least temporarily, as an Allied liability. The civil administration must similarly be financed through Allied Military Government and be regarded as autonomous under Allied control. So far as is found necessary a General approximation to Yugoslav form may be made.

As in the case of Trieste, the maximum outward display should be made of any Allied use of the port.

The whole of the province of Trieste lies to the east of the ethnic boundary and can therefore be treated as a whole in the application of the above suggested plan.

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12. A special problem is presented by the coal mines at Area near Albena in the south of the Istrian Peninsula. These mines have been considerably developed as part of the programme of Italian "autonomia" and are economically closely linked with the industrial developments at Trieste and Mestre. Your Economic Section will be able to give you more expert advice on these matters, but it appears on first consideration that these coal mines would have little value to Yugoslavian industry since the coal would have to be hauled up the long and costly Fiume and Ljubljana railway. In other words, the only justification for the working of the mines lies in their close incorporation with the Italian economic system. This will be a matter of especial importance in the postwar period when lack of value, shortage of shipping tonnage, and high freights, will reduce ability of Italy to import coal.

Therefore it appears to the Allied interest to retain the coal fields, - the port of Pola, and the Pola-Trieste railway, within the area in which the Italian administrative system is followed. This will have the disadvantage of placing the administrative frontier east of the ethnic line. What adjustments may be needed will be determined by experience.

13. The Province of Gorizia has a fairly clearly defined distinction between the town of Gorizia and the communes immediately west thereof, which are Italian, and the sparsely inhabited remainder of the province which is Yugoslav. In this case it appears possible to make concession to Yugoslav sentiment on the mountain plateaux where administration will be, at best, a matter of local affairs.

14. In general it is felt that a realist, firm and consistent policy, in respect of the three main problems of Trieste, Fiume and the coal fields, will have a steady effect on the remainder of the region. It will then be possible to concentrate these Military Government officers, who are available after the needs of the cities are met, on:-

(a) the communes adjacent to the main railway lines and main roads.

(b) the communes on the ethnic line.

Regional Commissioner

Copy No. 1 Mr. Harold Cascoe
Copy No. 2 Colonel Willmer

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14. In general it is felt that a realist, firm and consistent policy, in respect of the three main problems of Trieste, Fiume and the coal fields, will have a steadying effect on the remainder of the region. It will then be possible to concentrate those Military Government officers, who are available after the needs of the cities are met, on:-

(a) the communes adjacent to the main railway lines and main roads.

(b) the communes on the ethnic line.

Regional Commissioners

Copy No. 1	Mr. Harold Caccia
Copy No. 2	Colonel Willmer
Copy No. 3	Colonel Howell
Copy No. 4	Colonel Gevers
Copy No. 5 & 6	File

3277

TOP SECRET

ADVANCED
HEADQUARTERS REGION XII
Allied Control Commission
APO 394

TO : H.Q. Allied Commission
Attn: Chief of Staff
1 Oct 44

SUBJECT: Administration of Frontier Provinces

FILE No: ARXII/4

1. A letter on the above subject dated this H.Q. 30 Sept. has been sent to you by the hand of Mr. Harold Caccia.

2. That letter was written before there was an opportunity of a discussion with Mr. Caccia, Colonel Piske and Group Captain Benson. A conference with these officers was held last night, at which it was decided:

(a) That the letter of 30 September should go forward as it stood, in order that you might be aware, at the earliest opportunity, of certain points upon which we sought guidance.

(b) That we should prepare a revised letter dealing with and elaborating the main points raised in our letter of 30 Sept.

(c) That we should prepare a first estimate of the additional officers and men required.

(d) That we should confine our first comments to the problems of Veneto Giulia, but that this should be followed by a similar letter dealing with the situation in Veneto Tridentina.

3. I hold myself in readiness to proceed to Rome at any time on your instructions in order to attend a conference on these important matters.

In order to facilitate communication, I have arranged with the agreement of Group Captain Benson, to form a small mobile Tactical Regional Headquarters which will always be situated within a few miles of Main H.Q. 8th Army, wherever the latter may move.

In all matters the closest liaison will be maintained with Group Captain Benson, with whom this letter has been discussed.

4. Any consideration of the problem must start from the Annexure to SAC (44) Special (5) Memorandum of the 13 August. Therein is laid down the declared policy of the Allied Governments to impose an Allied Military Government on, inter alia, the frontier areas of Coriaria, Trieste, Piuma and Pola. This decision has been

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In all matters the closest liaison will be maintained with Group Captain Benson, with whom this letter has been discussed.
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5. It is therefore clearly the duty of the Allied Commission to prepare to carry out, literally, the instructions issued by the Supreme Allied Command. Any retrogression from a position so deliberately taken up by the Allied Governments must inevitably weaken Allied authority in general.

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6. There is the obvious danger that both the Italian and Yugoslav Governments might attempt to produce a condition whereby Allied Military Government on entering upon the territory - possibly after a period of vacuum - will be confronted with a series of faits accomplis the reversal which might lead to local disorder tending to disperse Allied control.

7. It appears desirable to take preliminary measures now, in order to render more easy the delicate task that lies ahead. It is submitted for your consideration that the following are matters wherein the support of AFHQ might be sought, or action taken by H.Q. Allied Commission.

(a) The maintenance of a firm attitude vis a vis the Yugoslav Government coupled, as may be necessary, be friendly warnings as to the serious effects of any attempted coup de main.

(b) The avoidance of any action or language on the part of the Allied Governments which would give to the Italian Government any pretext for believing that it would have a part in the administration, under Allied Military Government, of the four provinces concerned. In this connection policy must be coordinated with all Sub-Commissions of the Allied Commission, with P.M.H., and with M.M.I.A., and the Naval and Air Commissions.

(c) The securing through A.P.H.Q. and otherwise, of a regular and up to date series of reports of the existing political and administrative position in the provinces of Venezia Giulia.

(d) The planning, with A.P.H.Q., of a rapid and adequate Allied occupation of the Ports of Pola, Trieste and Fiume. Such occupying forces might, in the first instance and for a limited period, exceed those required on a purely military basis.

8. While it is clear that the action to be taken by Allied Military Government will have to depend, to some extent, on the situation as it is found to exist at the moment of entry, there are certain considerations which appear to be fundamental, and upon which your approval is sought.

(a) There appear to be three main centres of importance within the general area.

- (i) The Port of Trieste
- (ii) The Port of Pola and the coal and bauxite mines of Southern Istria.
- (iii) The Port of Fiume.

It is felt that a firm, fair, and consistent Allied Administration in these three important centres will have a steady effect on the remainder of the area. Much of the remainder is sparsely populated and in any event, under winter conditions,

government coupled, as may be necessary, be friendly warnings as to the serious effects of any attempted coup de main.

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- (i) The Port of Trieste
- (ii) The Port of Pola and the coal and bauxite mines of Southern Istria.
- (iii) The Port of Piume.

It is felt that a firm, fair, and consistent Allied Administration in these three important centres will have a steady effect on the remainder of the area. Much of the remainder is sparsely populated and in any event, under winter conditions, will be difficult of approach.

It is therefore proposed to allot a large share of our limited resources to these three main centres - if necessary Allied Control over the remainder of the territory will have to be limited in communes adjacent to main roads and main railways.

(b) It is felt that the introduction to the area, under the shield of Allied Military Government, of Italian Officials and Carabinieri, is likely to be a fruitful source of local dissension. It is therefore proposed that the government shall be by direct control by A.M.G., using as subordinates, officials of local extraction of both Italian and Yugoslav races.

(c) This will involve a departure from the general policy, adopted since the Cassino offensive, of the most rapid possible return to normal Italian administration.

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(d) In the special case of the police it is felt that the return to the territory of Carabinieri from Metropolitan Italy would be undesirable. It will therefore be necessary to raise a local police force from the best local elements, to be paid and controlled by A.M.G. Such a force will need backing of Allied Military Police and our estimate of such requirements is set out in Paragraph 10.

(e) It is proposed that all criminal cases, including cases between local nationals be tried before Allied Military Courts, and the local courts both civil and criminal be closed till the local situation be further considered.

(f) It is submitted that any required legislation be by direct promulgation by A.M.G., and that the method recently adopted of A.M.G. endorsement of Italian legislation, be NCT found.

(g) It is submitted that the Regional Commissioner should be given a reasonably free hand to continue in being or dissolve, administrative agencies of an autonomous character, which may be found to be in existence upon the arrival of Allied Military Government.

9. Your approval is requested for the prohibition of the flying of either Italian or Yugoslav flags in the territory involved.

10. It is considered that, to carry out the above policy, the following additions to normal ACC strength would be required:-

- | | | |
|--|---|---|
| (a) Military Police: | For Trieste - four Provost Coys | |
| | For Gorizia, Pola and Trieste - one Coy each. | |
| (b) Additional A.M.G. Legal Officers - | For Trieste - 6 | |
| | For Gorizia, Pola and Trieste - 2 each. | |
| (c) CAC's to be on the basis of: | | |
| Trieste Province | (30 Communes) | 4 |
| City of Trieste | | 5 |
| Remainder | | 7 |
| Gorizia Province | (42 Communes) | 2 |
| Pola Province | | 7 |
| City of Pola | | |
| Remainder | | |
| Trieste Province | | |
| City of Trieste | | |
| Remainder | | |
| Trieste Province | | |
| City of Trieste | | |
| Remainder | | |

(d) Special requirements in the direction of additional officers for Public Safety, Public Health, Finance and other

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of A.M.G. endorsement of Italian legislation, be NOT found.

(5) It is submitted that the Regional Commissioner should be given a reasonably free hand to continue in being or dissolve, administrative agencies of an autonomous character, which may be found to be in existence upon the arrival of Allied Military Government.

9. Your approval is requested for the prohibition of the flying of either Italian or Yugoslav flags in the territory involved.

10. It is considered that, to carry out the above policy, the following additions to normal ACC strength would be required:-

- (a) Military Police: For Trieste - four Provost Coys
For Gorizia, Pola and Piume - one Coy each.
- (b) Additional A.M.G. Legal Officers - For Trieste - 6
For Gorizia, Pola and Piume - 2 each.

(c) CAC's to be on the basis of:

Trieste Province	(30 Communes)	
City of Trieste		4
Remainder		5
Gorizia Province	(42 Communes)	7
Pola Province		
City of Pola		2
Remainder		7
Piume Province		
City of Piume		2
Remainder		3
		<u>30</u>

(d) Special requirements in the direction of additional officers for Public Safety, Public Health, Finance and other Commissions will be submitted at an early date.

/s/ JOHN K. DUNLOP

Regional Commissioner

Copies No. 1 & 2 - Chief of Staff, HQ., A.C.

Copy No. 3 - Colonel Willmer

" " 4 - Colonel Howell

" " 5 & 6 - File

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APPENDIX "F" 35

COPY

Brig. Dunlop

My understanding of our conversation last night was that you would redraft pages two and three of your memorandum to make the following points:-

- 1) that your three areas were Trieste, Piume and Pola plus coal and bauxite areas
- 2) that your scheme of administration for all would be the same i.e. Allied Military Government, Allied Military Courts (no civilian courts to begin with) and Allied Military police companies to form backbone.
- 3) in each area there would be local recruitment for local administrative posts as well as for local district police guards to supplement allied M.P. companies.
- 4) in no area would Italian Government officials or Carabinieri be introduced and in reply to any inquiries from the Italian Government we would restrict ourselves to saying that we intended to apply strict military government -- see our letter of September. In no circumstances would any statement of our intentions be volunteered to the Italian Government.
- 5) by above plan S.A.C. Made instructions to Commission could be carried out, but his support would be essential in two ways:-

- a) Tito would have to be made to understand that we meant business (M.P. this should be easier for him to accept if we explain how we intended to operate without bringing in Italian authorities from Italy proper).
- b) M.P. companies, extra Legal Officers, and A.M.G. officers would have to be provided. An estimate of numbers will be submitted by you at the earliest date - your curbstone guess was 4 M.P. companies for Trieste plus 1 company each for Piume, Pola and Gorizia: 6 Legal Officers for Trieste plus two for each of the other places above: C.A.Cs on original scale of A.M.G. reckoning i.e. one per every six communes. This, on the presumption that the Army will look after the protection of its own railway and roads and L of C.

- 6) Although the essence of the scheme is that each Provincial Commissioner would be at liberty

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b) M.P. companies, extra Legal Officers, and A.M.G. officers would have to be provided. An estimate of numbers will be submitted by you at the earliest date - your curbstone guess was 4 M.P. companies for Trieste plus 1 company each for Udine, Pola and Gorizia: 6 Legal Officers for Trieste plus two for each of the other places above: C.A.Gs on original scale of A.M.G. reckoning i.e. one per every six communes. This, on the presumption that the Army will look after the protection of its own railway and roads and L of C.

6) Although the essence of the scheme is that each Provincial Commissioner would be at liberty to obtain assistance from local population in the light of the circumstances that he found in Trieste, Pola or Fiume, it would be helpful to have as much advanced information as you can get on what those circumstances are likely to be. In particular you should know the system of local administration being applied now; are the Italian courts administering Italian law in Fiume now, etc., also what personnel are being used as police.

7) Unless you are otherwise instructed the above is the scheme for which you will plan and which later you intend to carry out. Is this right?

/s/ H.A. Caccia

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TOP SECRET PERSONAL

APPENDIX "G"

ADVANCED
HEADQUARTERS VENEZIA REGION
Allied Commission
APO 394

D/C ARXII/13

21 October 1944

Dear

1. I returned to Cattolica late last night, and am sending this letter down to you by Harold Cockson, who will leave with it on Sunday morning.
2. In the meantime, I sent you a telegram from Bari, copy whereof I attach to this letter, giving you my outline plans.
3. It struck me very forcibly, as a result of my visit to Forestier-Walker that we should not leave out of account the possibility of Allied amphibious operations in the northern Adriatic.
4. I have therefore instructed Lt. Col. Craig, Provincial Commissioner for Trieste and Lt. Col. Armstrong, Provincial Commissioner for Fiume, that they should proceed tomorrow (Sunday 22 October) to Bari to get in touch with Forestier-Walker and with his officers. The two teams - not yet at full strength - have already moved to Ascoli, where they will be within a day's run of Bari.

5. By making certain adjustments within our present strength we can find most of the people required for the two Provincial teams for Trieste and Fiume - that is to say for the initial entry into the two towns. Of course we should require many more officers for the whole job.

6. I am not at present forming up any teams for Pola or Gorizia. We have not enough officers to allow for that.

7. I am sending down one copy of this letter to Colonel Gavers and am telling him to discuss with Norman Viske the filling of the one or two positions still vacant.

8. To revert to the general problem ahead, Brigadier Forestier-Walker was of the opinion that we should find a good deal of cooperation from the Yugoslav authorities. He felt that they would definitely wish to avoid any sort of conflict with the western Allied. He also thought that the influence of the Russians would be wholly helpful. He had evidence that the Russians were adopting a very cooperative attitude in warning Tito against being antagonistic about UNRAA.

Philip Broad was not quite so optimistic. He seemed to

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Philip Broad was not quite so optimistic. He seemed to think that Tito might be rushed by people on his staff. His view was that condition 'A' in our draft letter was very unlikely.

9. Both Forestier-Walker and Broad were in complete agreement with our proposed handling of the position. Forestier-Walker, from the Yugoslav angle, was inclined to like the idea of a separate Region, but agreed that the very fact that the Yugoslavs would like it, would be an argument against it.

10. Prestier-Walker would like a further talk with you fairly soon, say about 29-30 October, probably at Caserta - myself present if you agreed.

11. It looks as if any decision in your letter to AFHQ will have to be taken fairly quickly. In the meantime, I am carrying on with all plans on the basis that Trieste and Piave parties might go in under the aegis of Region XII.

Yours,

/s/ JK

Incl. (1) Telegram

Brigadier Maurice Lash, C.B.E., M.C.

Copy to: Colonel C.M. Geyers
File Copy

Copy No. 1

Copy No. 2

Copy No. 3

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

/s/ JK

Incl. (1) Telegram

Brigadier Maurice Lash, C.B.E., M.C.

Copy to: Colonel C.M. Geyers

File Copy

Copy No. 1

Copy No. 2

Copy No. 3

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COPY OF TELEGRAM SENT FROM BARI 19 OCTOBER.

TOP SECRET PERSONAL DUNLOP TO LUSH HAVE BEEN FORESTIER-WALKER
AND BROAD THIS THURSDAY MORNING NOW RETURNING TO CATTOLICA PD
PROPOSE SENDING PROVINCIAL COMMISSIONERS TRIESTE AND FIUME TO
BARI TO LIAISE WITH FORESTIER-WALKER PD HE SUGGESTS FURTHER
CONFERENCE WITH YOU ALSO IF YOU AGREE MYSELF PROBABLY AT
CASERTA IN ABOUT TEN DAYS TIME.

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APPENDIX "H"

SOUTHERN REGION
ALLIED COMMISSION

Office of the
Regional Commissioner

19 February 1945

Dear

I have been rereading some of the notes which I have made in times past on the subject of the frontier provinces. You have probably made your own notes on our previous conversations. However, I am attaching hereto, an aide memoire on some of the matters which appear to be most worthy of consideration when we are making our future plans. I have fuller notes available should you require them.

Yours,

/s/ J.K.

Colonel T. Henn,
G-5, A.F.H.Q.,
C.M.F.

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TOP SECRET

FRONTIER PROVINCES

AID MEMOIRE

19 February 1945

Certain notes on the possible administration of the provinces of Venezia Giulia.

1. The general practice of the Allied Commission up to date, has been to set in motion from the first date of occupation of a province, a policy of gradual return to normal conditions. Indeed, since the time of the May offensive, there has been an increasing tendency in our administration to take the first steps towards this return to normal conditions at an ever earlier period in the timetable of occupation.

Typical steps in this development are: the reopening of Law Courts, civil as well as criminal; the reopening of Post Offices both for savings bank business and for postal services; the reopening of banks; the reinstitution of tax gathering machinery and the service of state pensions; the reopening of hospitals and the reestablishment of the Medico Provinciale; the re-establishment of SEPRAI and the Consorzio Agrario; the organization of the Genio Civile; the reopening of schools; the distribution of petroleum products through CIP.

2. The above list is by no means exhaustive, but it does show the type of administration effecting the everyday life of the people, that must be taken into consideration by Provincial Commissioners and others concerned with AMU/ACC.

3. You will note that practically every function mentioned has its eventual relationship with the Italian Government in Rome. It would be possible to carry out a number of these functions on a basis of local autonomy. Something of this sort was done when the Allied Armies first landed in Sicily. It must, however, be remembered that in those days AMGOT was able to dispose of a large number of officers in Sicily and also that a great deal of the regulation then produced were of an empirical and frequently short-lived nature. It might be possible to find in Venezia Giulia, sufficient men of intelligence and integrity to form a local regional council, but in the first instance the Allies would have to provide a great many of officers themselves.

4. My personal feeling is that any form of autonomy for Venezia Giulia, would prove embarrassing and difficult to work after the first two or three months. It would be better to try and reach some

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increasing tendency in our administration to take the first steps towards this return to normal conditions at an ever earlier period in the timetable of occupation.

Typical steps in this development are: the reopening of Law Courts, civil as well as criminal; the reopening of Post Offices both for savings bank business and for postal services; the reopening of banks; the reinstitution of tax gathering machinery and the service of state pensions; the reopening of hospitals and the reestablishment of the Medico Provinciale; the re-establishment of SEPRAI and the Consorzio Agrario; the organization of the Genio Civile; the reopening of schools; the distribution of petroleum products through CIP.

2. The above list is by no means exhaustive, but it does show the type of administration affecting the everyday life of the people, that must be taken into consideration by Provincial Commissioners and others concerned with AMS/ACC.

3. You will note that practically every function mentioned has its eventual relationship with the Italian Government in Rome. It would be possible to carry out a number of these functions on a basis of local autonomy. Something of this sort was done when the Allied Armies first landed in Sicily. It must, however, be remembered that in those days AMGOT was able to dispose of a large number of officers in Sicily and also that a great deal of the regulation then produced were of an empirical and frequently short-lived nature. It might be possible to find in Venezia Giulia, sufficient men of intelligence and integrity to form a local regional council, but in the first instance the Allies would have to provide a great many of officers themselves.

4. My personal feeling is that any form of autonomy for Venezia Giulia, would prove embarrassing and difficult to work after the first two or three months. It would be better to try and reach some sort of empirical solution by allowing Trieste and the communes of the interior to go their own way in practice, preserving the semblance of juridical Italian sovereignty.

5. I have reminded you of the position of the coal mines at Arsa. These coal mines were considerably developed as part of the Fascist economic policy for Italy. Their main outlets are the gas works at Trieste and Venice and to the various industries at Mestre and Porto Marghera. They have little value to Yugoslavia for the only practical outlet is by water.

29

6. I also mention to you the fact that the Italian Carabinieri would not be welcomed in the mountain districts because of their association in the minds of the people with the compulsory recruitment in 1940 of many young Italian subjects of Yugoslav descent. These young Yugoslavs were sent to Sardinia where they were formed into unarmed labour Companies. Many of them have since joined Marshal Tito's forces.

/s/ JOHN K. DUNLOP,
Regional Commissioner
Southern Region, A.C.

Copies 1 & 2 - Colonel T. Mann
" 3 - files.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Regional Commissioner
Southern Region, A.C.

Copies 1 & 2 - Colonel T. Mann
" 3 - Files.

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "I"

ADVANCED HEADQUARTERS

REGION VENEZIA

Allied Military Government

17 April 1945

I have the honour to report for your private information that I was today asked by 8 Army to submit my proposals for an AMG party to accompany a possible expedition by water to Trieste.

I was informed, on a top-secret level, that the proposal contemplated the securing of the city and a limited surrounding area only. It was also emphasized that the matter was only at the exploratory stage and it was by no means likely that such an operation would take place. As landing craft would be used, numbers would be cut to a minimum and limited to essentials.

I have therefore submitted a bid for a party of thirty-five officers, twenty-five men and nine vehicles. This will constitute a reinforced Trieste Provincial Team.

Subject to your concurrence I propose that both Lt. Col. Scholtz and I go in with the initial party.

The officers and men whom I propose to include in the party are either now with the Region, or could be assembled without undue stir.

I shall not fail to keep you informed of any developments.

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The officers and men whom I propose to include in the party are either now with the Region, or could be assembled without undue stir.

I shall not fail to keep you informed of any developments.

I am, yours very sincerely,

/s/ J.K.D.

J.K. Dunlop, Brigadier
Regional Commissioner.

Rear Admiral Ellery M. Stone
Chief Commissioner,
Allied Commission.

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APPENDIX "J"

27

C O P Y

C-25 TO ALCOM G-1 RPTD 5 ARMY AMG 8 ARMY AMG VENEZIE MAIN
BY HAND 261900 RESTRICTED (26 APRIL 1945)

This is urgent. Both Armies are asking for forward provincial teams and situation is developing rapidly. Following officers required to report Cesena forthwith. From Toscana, Lt. Col. William E. McBrackney, Captain G.U. Brown, Captain P.M. Jackson, Lt. F.O. Willmore, Major William D. Stump. From Emilia, Major V.C.I. Bradshaw. From HQ ACC, A.L. Dorf, Labour. Also ten clerks, British or American, urgently required. We are experiencing great delay in officers reporting, therefore commencing tomorrow will send you telegram giving surnames only of officers who have not, repeat not reported, 72 hours after despatch our telegram calling them forward. (Sent "Immediate")

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Copy

MAIN HEADQUARTERS
VENEZIE REGION
Allied Military Government
APO 394

/sb 26
APPENDIX "K"

VENEZIE REGION ORDER NO. 352

By Brigadier J.K. Dunlop, OBE, MC, TD

29 Apr 45

1. The following Officers and EM/ORs are assigned to Venezia Giulia Team and are placed under command HQ AMG Eighth Army wef date of this order:

Dep. Reg. Commissioner	Lt Col J.D. Scholtz	(A)
Provincial Commissioner	Lt Col P.J. Armstrong	(B)
Public Safety	Maj J.R.K. Cowan	(A)
Public Health	Maj J.L.C. Ruisi	(A)
Legal	Capt R.A. Gaziano	(A)
Finance	Maj W.J.E. Ringquist	(B)
Public Works	Maj J.E. Poden	(B)
Clerks	Cpl Alley P.H.	(A)
	T/5 Nudi A.O.	(A)
	Pvt McCarter W.P.	(A)
General Duty	Pfc Poli D	(A)
	Pte Fawbert J	(B)
Drivers	Dvr Davies S	(B)
	Dvr Butler E	(B)
	Gdem Richards M	(B)
	Cpl Bonicalzi L.L.	(A)

2. The following transport will be made available for the team:

1	C & R
1	Jeep
2	3-tonners
1	Other vehicle

3. The team will move off from Main HQ under command Lt Col Scholtz at 0700 hrs Monday 30 Apr 45.

4. Rations will be provided by HQ AMG Eighth Army for all personnel for fifteen (15) days.

Required will be taken.

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Dep. Reg. Commissioner	Lt Col J.D. Scholtz	(A)
Provincial Commissioner	Lt Col F.J. Armstrong	(B)
Public Safety	Maj J.R.K. Cowan	(A)
Public Health	Maj J.L.C. Ruissi	(A)
Legal	Capt R.A. Gaziano	(A)
Finance	Maj W.J.E. Ringquist	(B)
Public Works	Maj J.E. Poden	(B)
Clerks	Cpl Alley P.H.	(A)
	T/5 Hudl A.O.	(A)
	Pvt McCarter W.F.	(A)
General Duty	Pfc Poli D	(A)
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1 Jeep
2 3-tonners
1 Other vehicle

3. The team will move off from Main HQ under command Lt Col Scholtz at 0700 hrs Monday 30 Apr 45.

4. Rations will be provided by HQ AMG Eighth Army for all personnel for fifteen (15) days.

5. All personal kit and stores as required will be taken.

6. Mess Officer, CO Co. 'M' and HQ Commandant will arrange breakfasts for party at 0630 hrs.

/s/ E.W.J. Horrell

Maj, R.A.

for Regional Commissioner

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DISTRIBUTION

- 1 - each Officer & EM/OR named
- 1 - Lists 'A' & 'B'
- 1 - Advance HQ Venezie Region
- 1 - C.O. Co. 'M'
- 1 - Mess Officer
- 2 - HQ AMG Eighth Army
- 1 - HQ A.C. G-1 (A)
- 1 - HQ A.C. G-1 (B)
- 5 - Spares

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MAIN HEADQUARTERS
 VENEZIE REGION
 Allied Military Government
 APO 394

/ab APPENDIX "L"

EWJH/rb

S E C R E T

VENEZIE REGION ORDER NO. 375By Brigadier J.K. Dunlop, OBE, MC, TD

4 May 45

1. The following Officers and ORs assigned to the VENEZIA GIULIA Team will move out from Regional Headquarters for their Provinces via Rovigo and come under command AMG Eighth Army on Friday 4 May 45:

Lt Col F.S. Orpwood	(B)	1st Lt L.C. Becker	(A)
Lt Col G.G.T. Ainslie	(B)	1st Lt J. Milich	(A)
Lt Col G. Marshall	(B)	Mr. C. Hurd	(A)
Maj C.J. Carrillo	(A)	SQMS Downs S	(B)
Maj A.E. Gold	(A)	Sgt Ferrari B	(B)
Maj C.W. Lockwood-Tatham	(B)	Pte Bath H	(B)
Maj G.M. Reveley	(B)	Rfn Brandon W	(B)
Maj M.F. Sheehan	(A)	Rfn Jennings F	(B)
Capt H.R. Hanbury	(B)	Gdm Priestley D	(B)
Capt E.A. Valentine	(A)	Dvr Sackett E	(B)
Capt L.P. Whatley	(B)	Pte Whitehead R	(B)

2. All available transport and stores will be taken.

3. Rations for three (3) days will be provided for all personnel moving out with the team.

/s/ E.W.J. Horrell

Maj. R.A.
 for Regional Commissioner

DISTRIBUTION

- 1 - each Officer & OR named
- 1 - Lt Col F.S. Orpwood
- 1 - Lists 'A' & 'B'
- 1 - Advance HQ, Venezia Region
- 2 - HQ AMG Eighth Army
- 1 - HQ A.C. G-1 (A)
- 1 - HQ A.C. G-1 (B)
- Spares

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TOP SECRET

13 May 45

Brigadier Maurice Lash, CB, CBE,
Executive Commissioner
HQ Allied Commission.

1. I am writing the letter early on Sunday morning and I shall try to get it down to you by the air courier today because I think that it might be of some help to you to know a bit about the position on the frontier. I want you to realize that it is the story of a very hurried trip and, for the most part, of a series of somewhat fleeting impressions. The journey of the last day and a half covered a good deal of territory and I did not have time for a very detailed exploration anywhere.

2. When I last wrote you, I explained that it seemed likely that Gen Benson would find it difficult to look after both Austria and the southern part of the Venezia Giulia problem and that I might be asked to take a fairly close and detailed responsibility for the frontier as well as for Udine.

3. On the late evening of Thursday last I went across to Mein HQ Eighth Army, which was still at Mestre, and met Gen who had just returned from Klagenfurt. At that discussion he said that 13 Corps had very especially asked that I should go forward for a conference on the Trieste position and that it seemed very likely that I should have to take over the administration, on behalf of Army, of the AMG work on the border provinces.

4. I shall say at once that late last night I heard that the plan had been somewhat changed. However the result of the Thursday evening discussion was that I had a very interesting journey which I am about to report to you. I had already three meetings booked for Friday morning, one of them with the Prefects of four provinces to tackle the very important refugee problem and therefore I told Gen that I should not be able to leave on Friday till about 1400 hrs. He warned 13 Corps to this effect.

5. You may find it useful to follow the rest of this letter on a map, if you have one handy. In fact I did get away at 1400 hrs and had a very good run along the coast road through Mestre - Route No. 14. There is nothing to report on the earlier part. The road has been a good one but is getting pretty badly knocked about and there are dangerous potholes. There were not many

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5. You may find it useful to follow the rest of this letter on a map, if you have one handy. In fact I did get away at 1400 hrs and had a very good run along the coast road through Mestre - Route No. 14. There is nothing to report on the earlier part. The road has been a good one but is getting pretty badly knocked about and there are dangerous potholes. There was not very much military traffic. There were not many refugees coming west and there were a few going eastwards.

6. It was about Cervignana that I saw the first car with the Jugo Slav red star on it. It is, however, not easy in this part of the world to be sure whether the individuals are part of the regular Jugo Slav army or are partisans of the Garibaldi brigade who have been working with the Jugo Slavs. There were a certain number of partisans about this part of the country but not to an unusual extent. It is worth remembering

that Cervignone, the Austrian frontier village before 1914. The present last war frontier down her lay in her west then the present frontier between Udine and Trieste provinces.

7. Between Cervignone and the Isonzo I saw one or two people who might have been regular Jugo Slav soldiers. The Isonzo bridge was guarded by the Germans who appeared to be still moving in. (I did not check this latter point).

8. Shortly after crossing the Isonzo one commenced to meet many Jugo Slav troops and the town of Monfalcone was full of them. At the same time there were, superimposed upon the Jugo Slav occupation many Allied troops, and there was a constant stream of Allied military traffic up and down the road.

9. I found Headquarters of the 13 Corps situated in a most picturesque castle at Duino. The B.A. and A.M.C. was "Bill" Roe who I had known at Southern Command. I was most hospitably lodged.

10. There was a very full discussion of the situation which I can give in brief as follows. The number of Jugo Slav troops was difficult to estimate but they appeared to have three divisions at least, one in Trieste, one round Gorizia, and one moved down to Monfalcone. We had the New Zealand Division along the road Monfalcone-Trieste, the 56 Division on its left and the 91st Division on the road Cormons-Gorizia. I should add that there is one battalion of the 91st Division in Trieste and that I found that American and British troops were closely associated all through the area.

11. The Corps Commander - Lt. Gen. Sir John Harding - was trying to get the Jugo Slavs to withdraw all their troops to the eastern side of the Isonzo. The Corps Commander explained that the Isonzo was more or less an explicit boundary. (You will note that it does not agree either with the Provincial boundary or with the Ethnic Line in these parts). It does, however, give a boundary which is easy to identify on the ground. It was also the approximate line on which the two forces met.

12. His instructions to me were that I should try and form a strong AMB team west of the Isonzo and introduce effective Military Government there. East of the Isonzo I was not to introduce Military Government nor put up proclamations. I should have men available to move forward into the country east of the Isonzo should a decision be reached which would enable us to do this. He specifically mentioned the communes of Grado and Cormons as places which needed special attention. He promised to give his full

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13. On the subject of the supply of food to Trieste and Monfalcone his view was that the proper channel for Jugo Slav approach was through Belgrade to Caserta. He did not wish any local agreements to be made for the supply of food to the population east of the Isonzo. He expected L.C.F.s to arrive in Trieste the following day; i.e. the 12th May.

14. The following morning, yesterday, 5 May 12th May, I had a further talk. We discussed the plan of Lt. Col. Scholtz coming to Corps HQ. to be their AG officer, in view of the fact that Lt. Col. Donald Smith had gone forward to Austria. I then went forward into Trieste. The road is, except for one or two places where road blocks are being cleared away, in excellent condition.
15. The picture presented is certainly a queer one. Of all the possibilities for which we planned I think we did not contemplate that two armies with, at any rate different immediate aims, should be completely superimposed one on the other. Jugo Slav and Allied troops are completely intermingled. As far as traffic is concerned, I suppose that Allied vehicles outnumber the Jugo Slavs by about a hundred to one. Many of the Jugo Slav soldiers are in British battle dress with their own cap. They all go about fully armed, many with British weapons. They look tough and fit, many of them are very young. There are a number of girls and women with their forces, mostly in trousers and with long hair.
16. In Trieste I called on Brigadier Eve commanding 35 Area. Our Trieste party had not, of course, established any separate office and Lt. Col. Armstrong with Major Cowan (A) a P.S. officer, Capt. Garieno (A) Legal and Major Foden (B) P.W.U. had been assisting the Brigade staff on the Civil Affairs side. Brigadier Eve spoke in the highest terms of the assistance that had been given him by our officers.
17. I had a long talk with Brigadier Eve, who I had known on many previous occasions. The following is a short digest. We have got in the town one New Zealand battalion, one battalion from the 91st Division and one battalion of the Scots Guards. We had, incidentally, two bands which were very valuable. It was exceedingly difficult to get any idea of the numbers of J/S troops. They were in complete control of the administration of the city.
18. The command of the city was in the hands of Major General Kvedir, (I had another spelling of the name given to me) Lt. Col. Clark and Major Harrison of the 37 Military Mission were on the staff of the J/S Commander.
19. Co-operation from the J/S authorities varied in a very remarkable way and it was Brigadier Eve's opinion that this was in a great measure due to their fear to take any action without consulting their own higher command. Hence a tendency to stall. Letally, so noticeably as to indicate the receipt of instructions, they had been much more helpful. Major General Buff had first come to secure an agreement as to the conditions under which we would use the port. These local negotiations had broken down and matters were proceeding on a day to day basis.

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20. Lt. Gen Sir Brian Robertson had been in Trieste the previous day, 17th May, and the plan was to go ahead with the development of the port but on a scale much reduced from the first ideas. The present discussions with the J/S were for the entry of 900 tons per day. This was far below the present capacity of the port which might handle ten times that amount. The port installations were not badly damaged and the electric cranes were working.

21. On the previous day a young American prisoner had been in the city as an observer from G-5 A.P.H.Q. (I subsequently heard from Lt. Col. Scholtz that Major Klein of the Transportation Sub-Commission has also visited the port).

22. H.M.S. Orion and three destroyers had arrived. (Orion was lying off; the destroyers had entered the harbour and were lying alongside the berths). L.C.F.s were, on the latest information, due in on the 13th.

23. Brigadier Eve thought that the J/S had done well in getting the city going. The city services were all working and the tramways were running.

24. When the J/S first came in they locked up nearly all the influential Italians. They did not take many of them - if any - out of the city and many of them were now being released. There had been very little shooting. There had been a considerable amount of requisitioning and a good deal of looting. The J/S were very anxious to get into their hands the very large amount of German equipment that was lying about in the port.

25. In respect of food supply, Brigadier Eve reported that when the J/S first came in they reported that all was well. Later they raised the question of civil supply and said that a good deal of food had already been contracted forward in Udine and the Po valley.

26. Brigadier Eve thought the J/S army was running short of petrol. This seems to be an important point in connection with any possible import of petrol for civil needs.

27. Nearly all the flour consumed in Trieste used to be milled at Carvignab. The J/S were now rather alarmed about the food situation. A notice had appeared in the local paper 'Il nostro Avvenire' of the 9 May calling for lorry drivers and craft owners who are prepared to fetch food from the port of Susak. They would be paid.

28. After this talk I drove around Trieste with Armstrong. The port is in fair shape. The warehouses have been knocked about but the quay side is all right and there seem to be rail facilities available and working. In the city area round the port Allied and J/S officers and Headquarters are completely intermingled. Heavily armed J/S patrols of from eight to ten stolid and tough looking soldiers move slowly about. There are - so far as I could see - no Allied patrols, but the Allied armed sentries outside our H.Q. are very smartly turned out. A strong company of J/S troops were drilling inside the dock area with Allied barriers coming and going around them.

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29. It must be said that the streets of Trieste give an impression very different from that of any other "liberated" city which I have seen lately. The banks are closed and very nearly all the shops. The people are going about quietly and there is no manifestation of enthusiasm of any sort. There are many proclamations up, and wall slogans in Slovene everywhere. There are many J/S national flags. I also saw flags in the Italian colours with a star in the place of the shield of Savoy. I had also noticed these in Monfalcone. There were also public manifestoes in the same colouring. I asked Armstrong about these. His report was that these were issued by the Italian Communist party of Trieste. This party was now **323** every

disillusioned state. They had been prime cooperators with the J/S in securing control of the city from the Germans and they now found themselves completely left out in the cold. They had been described as the "Trojan horse" of Trieste. I read one of these manifestoes. It laid great stress on the fraternity between the Italian and J/S peoples and proclaimed an autonomous Trieste within the framework of a federated Jugo Slavia.

30. Eve had told me that the Italian community were very anxious to get out of the town but that the J/S authorities had imposed very severe restrictions. Armstrong however thought that they restrictions were lessened and the J/S were now granting passes. We discussed the question of letting through into Veneto such Italians.

31. I am making plans for a reception point at Cervignano, in the event of a wholesale Italian exodus from Trieste.

32. I then went with Armstrong to the billet occupied by the AMG team. It is on the Monfalcone-Trieste road just at the boundary of Trieste commune (Villa Isabella).

33. I discussed with Scholtz his work with the 13 Corps. He thought it a very good plan but asked that he be given a Junior British officer used to staff work. I can arrange that.

34. From Trieste I proceeded via Monfalcone to Grado. This small seaside resort is being developed by us into a troops rest area. It seems to me to be important because, as you will see from the map, it forms part of the Province of Trieste. Its traditional connection with Trieste no doubt derives from the fact that its batteries command the entrance to the port.

35. I saw the acting Town Major and Acting Sindaco. The 8 Army AMG officer was taken away four days ago. I shall put an AMG officer into the town as soon as possible. Moreover, as I shall explain later I shall propose to make Grado the centre of the assembly of the Trieste team.

36. From Grado I returned via Monfalcone to the junction of route 14 and route 55. From there to Gorizia. Troops of 56th Div, 91st Div and Jugo Slav troops were along the road. Gorizia similarly had a mixed garrison- 8 Bn. of 91st Div., a Coldstream Bn. of the 56th Div. and Jugo Slav regular troops. The town looked less tense than Trieste but most of the shops were closed. I was struck by a poster in Slovene and Italian entitled "3 Puntis la guerra". The purport of this announcement was that the Italian army was not to be

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were lessened and the J/S were now granting passes. We discussed the question of letting through into Veneto such Italians.

31. I am making plans for a reception point at Cervignano, in the event of a wholesale Italian exodus from Trieste.

32. I then went with Armstrong to the billet occupied by the AMG team. It is on the Monfalcone-Trieste road just at the boundary of Trieste commune (Villa Isabella).

33. I discussed with Scholtz his work with the 13 Corps. He thought it a very good plan but asked that he be given a Junior British officer used to staff work. I can arrange that.

34. From Trieste I proceeded via Monfalcone to Grado. This small seaside resort is being developed by us into a troops rest area. It seems to me to be important because, as you will see from the map, it forms part of the Province of Trieste. Its traditional connection with Trieste no doubt derives from the fact that its batteries command the entrance to the port.

35. I saw the acting Town Major and Acting Sindaco. The 8 Army AMG officer was taken away four days ago. I shall put an AMG officer into the town as soon as possible. Moreover, as I shall explain later I shall propose to make Grado the centre of the assembly of the Trieste team.

36. From Grado I returned via Monfalcone to the junction of route 14 and route 55. From there to Gorizia. Troops of 56th Div, 91st Div and Jugo Slav troops were along the road. Gorizia similarly had a mixed garrison - a Bn. of 91st Div., a Coldstream Bn. of the 56th Div. and Jugo Slav regular troops. The town looked less tense than Trieste but most of the shops were closed. I was struck by a poster in Slovene and Italian entitled "3 Pivita la guerra". The purport of this appeared to be to emphasise the solidarity of democratic ideals and the necessity for friendship between Jugo Slav and Italian peoples.

37. A Brigade Major who I met at the H.Q. of the Coldstream Guards promised to try to secure a copy for me.

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38. A high level "Bailey" is being constructed across the Isonzo S.W. of Gorizia and I was allowed to cross it before it was quite finished. Between the bridge and Cormons there were few J/S troops. The situation at Cormons was calmer than had been reported. The AMG office was functioning and proclamations had been posted. Lt. Milich was the C.A.C. He was out but Major Cariccio was there on a visit from Gradisca where he was C.A.C.

39. There were a few J/S soldiers or Partisans about but Italian flags were flying and there were Italian Partisans wearing Alpine hats.

40. I went on to Udine where I found Bright and Orpwood. The situation here was rapidly approaching normal. Many shops were open and plenty of lively bustle. There were many partisans of the Caspo and Geribaldi brigades, mostly unarmed. There were one or two people dressed in J/S uniforms but they were probably partisans.

41. H.Q. 3 Corps had moved forward out of this town. H.Q. AMG, Austria, had been set up and the Austria party was assembling.

42. I shall report later on the news that Bright and Orpwood gave me about Tarvisio.

43. I called late at night at H.Q. 8 Army to find that Commodore Benson was with the Army Commander and Mr. Harold Macmillan. I was told by Lt. Col. Gifford it was likely that the Army Commander would feel that the Venetia Giulia situation was so important that he had to keep in direct personal touch and that Gen would remain as his personal advisor. I should carry out the detailed work. That seems to me a very wise and possible plan.

44. I am going to H.Q. 8 Army at 1230 today for a further talk.

45. The outline plan which I had in mind following on the instructions of Corps Commander, 13 Corps, was:-

1. - To reform the Trieste and Gorizia teams with HQ. at Grado and Cormons respectively.
2. - To make these two teams responsible for all the frontier work.

This would leave Bright free to develop the normal administration of the Province of Udine.

3. - To establish a forward Regional report centre probably Cervignano with telephone connection with Padova.

46. To do all this we need more officers. The 20 U.S. combat officers have not yet arrived and I rather think there may be delay

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41. H.Q. 5 Corps had moved forward out of this town. H.Q. AMG, Austria, had been set up and the Austria party was assembling.

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This would leave Bright free to develop the normal administration of the Province of Udine.

3. - To establish a forward Regional report centre probably Cervignano with telephone connection with Padova.

46. To do all this we need more officers. The 20 U.S. combat officers have not yet arrived and I gather that there may be delay in their arrival.

47. Will you please do all you can to help. I feel that adequate AMG strength along this disputed land may be a real contribution to a peaceful settlement.

/s/ John K. Dunlop

Regional Commissioner

C O P Y

FROM : HEADQUARTERS VENEZUE REGION

15 MAY 1945

TO : ALCOM

RXII/ADM/106.04. At end of first week in new Headquarters have reviewed officer position. It is extremely serious. Following are in Hospital: Major R.W. Russell, Captain G.W. West. Following have not yet reported: Captain J.R. Arno, Major H.E. Bell, Captain S.A. Matthucci, Captain J. Giammarco, Captain A.G.A. Seul, Warrant Officer M.D. Weaver, Captain G.S. Billinghamurst, Captain F.R. Price, Captain H.G. Best, Major J.B. Wilson, Captain A. Riley, Major H.M. Renwick, Captain H.P. Strand, Major C.L. Hasie, Captain H.H. Dowdy, Captain E.R. Fairweather, Captain L.S. Monson, Lieutenant A. Macnab, Captain M. Short, First Lieutenant G.M. Clegg, Major K.C. Shepherd. Following are posted to Austria: Major A.G. Perley, Captain F.M.H. Stephens, Captain W.C. Cubberley, Major C.E.P. Hanbury-Tracy, Lieutenant R.A.M. Hastings, Lieutenant W.A. Roberts, Major A. McGahan, Major W.D.R. Thompson. No sign of promised twenty American combat officers. Problems of the frontiers are far more serious than originally estimated and demand considerable numbers of sound experienced Civil Affairs Officers. Present effective number of Provincial Commissioners is 13 and of Civil Affairs Officers 42. Establishment was 14 Provincial Commissioners plus 65 Civil Affairs Officers plus 20 semi-trained reinforcements. Please give this matter your urgent and immediate attention.

Signed Dunlop.

IMMEDIATE

Signed

Following have not yet reported: Captain J.R. Arno, Major H.E. Bell, Captain S.A. Mattucci, Captain J. Giammarco, Captain A.G.A. Saul, Warrant Officer M.D. Weaver, Captain G.S. Billinghamurst, Captain F.R. Price, Captain H.G. Best, Major J.E. Wilson, Captain A. Riley, Major H.M. Renwick, Captain H.P. Strand, Major C.L. Hasie, Captain E.H. Dowdy, Captain E.R. Fairweather, Captain L.S. Monson, Lieutenant A. Macnab, Captain M. Short, First Lieutenant G.M. Clegg, Major K.C. Shepherd. Following are posted to Austria: Major A.G. Ferley, Captain P.M.H. Stephens, Captain W.C. Cudberley, Major C.E.P. Hanbury-Tracy, Lieutenant R.A.M. Hastings, Lieutenant W.A. Roberts, Major A. McGahan, Major W.D.R. Thompson. No sign of promised twenty American combat officers. Problems of the frontiers are far more serious than originally estimated and demand considerable numbers of sound experienced Civil Affairs Officers. Present effective number of Provincial Commissioners is 13 and of Civil Affairs Officers 42. Establishment was 14 Provincial Commissioners plus 65 Civil Affairs Officers plus 20 semi-trained reinforcements. Please give this matter your urgent and immediate attention. Signed Dunlop.

IMMEDIATE

Signed

John K. Dunlop

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RESTRICTED

C O P Y

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APPENDIX "O"

TO : FOR ACTION EIGHTH ARMY FOR AMG VENEZIE REGION FOR DUNLOP
FROM ALCOM FROM LUSH CITE AOGIB PAREN

1. The shortage of officers in your Region is having my personal attention and I hope will soon be resolved.
2. At same time you will realise that Emilia Region with prospective commitments in connection German disbanded Army must be kept at full strength.
3. You have the use of Giulia team and when Toscana is turned back to Italian Government early June I will send you specialists.
4. Can you extract combat officers from Eighth Army as temporary assistance.

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TOP SECRET

COPI

APPENDIX "P"

HEADQUARTERS
VENEZIA REGION
Allied Military Government
APO 394

23 May 1945

TO : AMG 8th Army.

SUBJECT: Posting of Proclamations in Venezia Giulia.

FILE No: RXII/C32.12(G)

1. This letter is in confirmation of a conversation yesterday afternoon (Air Commodore Henson - Brigadier Dunlop) on the subject of the posting of Proclamations in Venezia Giulia. I submitted to you the proposal that the proclamations in their present form and wording would not be suitable for Venezia Giulia. Moreover, it would appear desirable to have the proclamations posted in three languages, English, Italian and Slovene and to have the main proclamation extremely clearly printed so that it would be understood at once even by a country population.

2. It was decided that you would consult the Army Commander on the preparation of a special proclamation No. 1, Part 1, to contain only the three main paragraphs of Part 1 of the present proclamation No. 1. That is to say the three paragraphs announcing the establishment of Allied Military Government. There would be no preamble.

3. The posters would carry side by side versions in all three languages.

4. In order to provide security and to save time, it might be desirable to produce these versions in mimeograph form. These mimeograph copies could be then distributed to CACs with instructions to them to secure local printing as rapidly as possible.

5. In the meantime I should arrange at this Headquarters for the overhaul of all other proclamations and particularly for the provision of the revised text in English, Italian and Slovene of Parts 2 & 3 of Proclamation No. 1.

6. I am sending this forward to you by hand and should be glad to have any further comment from you on this important matter.

7. Since our meeting it has been suggested to me that you

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6. I am sending this forward to you by hand and should be glad to have any further comment from you on this important matter.

7. Since our meeting it has been suggested to me that you might consider the advantage of a preamble to the Main Proclamation No. 1, Part 1, such preamble being to the effect that no decision on the status of Venezia Giulia would be taken until the peace treaty and that the establishment of Allied Military Government was an interim measure intended to provide tranquility and administration of Venezia Giulia in the meantime.

Copies to:-

Legal Division Regional HQ.
Sub-Headquarters Venezia Giulia
Civil Affairs Section, HQ. A.C.

/s/ John K. Dunlop

Regional Commissioner

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COPY

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HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
EIGHTH ARMY

APPENDIX "Q"

CA/23

24 May 45

Subject: Supplement to Operational
Order - Establishment of M.G.
in Venezia Giulia.

TO: P.C. TRIESTE

1. With reference to the Operational Order for the establishment of Military Government in VENETIA GIULIA. I wish to make it quite clear that the Military Government envisaged in the Operational Order, only comes into force when orders are issued from this H.Q. or from VENETIA Sub-Region H.Q. Such orders are not likely to be issued from this H.Q. until negotiations now being carried on on governmental levels with the Yugoslav Government, have achieved finality, and agreement been arrived at as to the zone in which Allied Military Government will be imposed. You should, therefore, draw the attention of all officers to para 8 of the Operational Order. This paragraph particularly concerns those officers of the TRIESTE Provincial H.Q. who are ordered to proceed to TRIESTE City.

2. The greatest care is to be taken so as to ensure that during the period that they are there, and until the setting up of Allied Military Government, no disclosure is to be made as regards the fact that they are Military Government officers.

3. The object of the Provincial H.Q. in TRIESTE during the period that they are waiting there, will be to coordinate a plan with 55 Area in order that when the time comes to exercise Military Government, there will be no delay in taking over the functions allotted to each officer in the appropriate buildings in TRIESTE.

4. The opportunity should also be taken of obtaining through 55 Area all information possible as regards the present administration in the City of TRIESTE.

5. It will not be advisable to put the Provincial H.Q. for GORIZIA into that city, until such time as Military Government can be definitely imposed, as there is not in GORIZIA an administrative unit such as there is in TRIESTE, in the form of an Area H.Q.

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2. The greatest care is to be taken so as to ensure that during the period that they are there, and until the setting up of Allied Military Government, no disclosure is to be made as regards the fact that they are Military Government officers.
3. The object of the Provincial H.Q. in TRIESTE during the period that they are waiting there, will be to co-ordinate a plan with 55 Area in order that when the time comes to exercise Military Government, there will be no delay in taking over the functions allotted to each officer in the appropriate buildings in TRIESTE.
4. The opportunity should also be taken of obtaining through 55 Area all information possible as regards the present administration in the City of TRIESTE.
5. It will not be advisable to put the Provincial H.Q. for GORIZIA into that city, until such time as Military Government can be definitely imposed, as there is not in GORIZIA an administrative unit such as there is in TRIESTE, in the form of an Area H.Q.
6. Contents of this letter are to be made clear to all officers concerned, and a copy given to each of the officers going into the City of TRIESTE.

/s/ C. Benson
Air Commodore,
Officer Commanding,
H.Q., AMG EIGHTH ARMY.

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TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "R"

ADVANCED HEADQUARTERS
REGION VENEZIA
Allied Military Government
APO 394

30 May 1945

SUBJECT : Venezia Giulia.

TO : A.M.G. 8 Army.

1. Reference today's conference, Lush-Benson-Dunlop; it was understood that HQ. A.C. would issue at an early date orders separating the AMG team for Venezia Giulia from the remainder of Venezia Region.
2. It was agreed that, for the time being, Venezia Region would be responsible for the A/Q administration of British Venezia Giulia personnel. Further, as far as was at present known, U.S. officers, men and stores would continue to be carried on the strength of Company "M".
3. A British Staff officer for Colonel Nelson Monfort and other agreed reinforcements would be sent forward by Venezia Region as soon as possible.
4. It would be convenient if, shortly after the arrival of Colonel Nelson Monfort, Venezia Giulia could assume the responsibility for the complete administration of all occupied communes in Gorizia and Trieste Provinces; thus freeing Lt. Col. Bright of all Administrative responsibilities outside the Province of Udine.
5. Certain changes in the organization of Venezia Giulia Regional and Provincial staffs were discussed. I propose to take no action in this respect but to leave the necessary changes to be made by you in conjunction with Colonel Nelson Monfort.
6. Please let me know if and when you would desire a handing over conference.

Rptd. HQ. A.C. (1 & 2)

Sub-Region Venezia Giulia (3)

Provincial Commissioner - Udine (4)

Files No. 5 & 6

/s/ John K. Dunlop

J. K. DUNLOP, Brigadier

Regional Commissioner

785017

CONFIDENTIAL

Ref: 399/11/ED.

23 July 45.

Subject: Organisation AMB XIII Corps.

To: Regional Commissioner,
Venezia Region.

Reference our 399/10/20 of 5 July. We would be
grateful if you could let us have the report on the preliminary
stages in the organisation of AMB XIII Corps as soon as possible.

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

see 57

Notar

520/1

785017

File

CONFIDENTIAL

(12)

Ref: 559/12/EC.

12 July, 45.

Subject: Organisation AM2 XIII Corps.

To: G-5, AMHQ.

Reference Col. Monfort's letter of 18 June 45, addressed to the Chief Commissioner, HQ Allied Commission, copy to you. Enclosed is a copy of a letter from Brigadier DUNLOP, commenting on Col. Monfort's letter. A report on the preliminary stages in the Venezia Giulia set-up has been asked for and a copy of this will be sent you when we get it.

For Chief Commissioner:

E. Talbot

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

Encl - 1.

(BU at 10 min)

PA
5250 14/9

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CONFIDENTIAL

Ref: 559/10/80.

5 July 45.

Subject: Organisation AMS XIII Corps.

To: Regional Commissioner,
Venezia Region.

The Chief Commissioner has seen your letter to the Executive Commissioner of 30 June and instructs me to ask you to submit the report on the various preliminary stages in the Venezia Giulia set up, in accordance with your suggestion, in your third form last para.

E. Toller
Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

see 12

see 13

BU
Hated 27

16
7 Hated 11

see 9 & 11

RA

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CONFIDENTIAL

JKD/dsf

HEADQUARTERS
VENEZIE REGION
Allied Military Government
APO 394

Dear Brigadier Scholtz.
30 June 1945
Recd 2/7/45

I have been considering the letter which you showed me yesterday and the more I consider it the more difficult appears the next move.

You will observe that the letter has been repeated to G-5 A.F.H.Q. and to A.M.G. 8th Army and, therefore, can no longer be regarded as a private letter to the Chief Commissioner. Moreover, quite a number of people are involved.

I am certainly arraigned in respect of an alleged failure to make the necessary plans and to obtain the necessary information in the preliminary period up to May 4th, and there can be no doubt that if there were such a failure the fault would be mine.

It was on May 4th that Lt. Col. Orpwood's main party of officers and men for Venezia Giulia passed under command A.M.G. 8 Army. Lt. Col. Scholtz's advance party had already passed under command on April 29th.

Thereafter the entire responsibility for the deployment and employment of these officers rested with A.M.G. 8th Army. We remained responsible only for the provision of their mail, official letters and for their personal well-being. All their orders and all their plans were issued from the officer S.C.A.O. 8th Army as was entirely proper having in view the fact that the occupation of Trieste was an 8th Army operation. This was all in continuance of a method of cooperation between Region and A.M.G. Army which had been carried out by us all through the advance from Cassino in 1944 and in the advance in 1945. I cannot believe that Col. Nelson Monfort was ignorant of this fundamental arrangement. In fact during the entire period in question I was in constant consultation with S.C.A.O. 8th Army and he kept me fully aware of his plans. You will remember that, in order to set 8th Army free to deal with Austria and Venezia Giulia, Venezia Region took over the Provinces of Rovigo, Padova, Venezia and Treviso on May 8th, and took over the administration of Udine on May 11th. I may perhaps be permitted to say that throughout all our conferences it appeared to me that Air Commodore Benson made prudent and capable use of all the means made available to him by Allied Commission or by 8th Army.

You will observe that the letter has been repeated to G-5 A.P.H.Q. and to A.M.G. 8th Army and, therefore, can no longer be regarded as a private letter to the Chief Commissioner. Moreover, quite a number of people are involved.

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In respect of the "handful of officers" charge, the answer must, I feel, lie with Etablissement Branch, A.C., in conjunction with A.M.G. 8 Army and myself.

In respect of the preparation of proclamations, G-5 A.P.H.Q., Civil Affairs Section, A.C. are also involved.

In respect of the issuance of directives on policy, responsibility lies with G-5 A.P.H.Q. and with H.Q. A.C.

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You will see, therefore, that the situation is a complicated one. One's inclination is to suggest an immediate inquiry to determine (a) if the facts alleged in Col. Nelson Monfort's letter are true and (b) if they are true, where responsibility lies.

There are, however, obvious disadvantages in such an inquiry. In the first place 8th Army are clearly involved and the inquiry would have to be with their consent. In the second place such an inquiry takes up a lot of time of busy officers. In the third place, and this I hold strongly, I have always maintained that one of the most important functions of Allied Commission was to show the possibility of complete U.S. - U.K. collaboration. I should, therefore, be exceedingly reluctant to have any sort of court of inquiry which might have the danger of developing into inter-national dispute.

There is, however, the danger that the charges contained in the letter may be repeated later on in America and it might be desirable to have rebutting evidence collected at this time before any of the participants disappear from this theatre.

The whole question of preliminary preparations is capable of proof in a very simple way, for I have complete copies of all letters and notes of all conferences. It might be desirable to have testimony from Col. Gervers, Col. Willmer, Lt. Col. Scholtz, Lt. Col. Orpwood, and Lt. Col. Armstrong. You, yourself, Brigadier Upjohn and Brigadier Henn are also aware of the preliminary discussions and of the drafts prepared by me.

It has seemed to me that it might be valuable if I prepared a short and purely factual account of the various preliminary stages in the story of the Venezia Giulia deployment from the A.M.C. point of view, giving the dates of various conferences, the decisions, etc. If you will let me have your instructions to this effect, I could produce the report in a few days.

For the rest I am entirely content to leave it to the judgment of the Chief Commissioner. It seems to me that an unfounded and unjust attack has been made on a number of officers of the Allied Commission. To decide the next step is, I admit, not so easy.

I am sending you four copies of this letter. As Colonel Nelson Monfort's original letter was also sent to A.M.C. 8 Army and to G-5 A.F.H.Q., I should be glad if, with the Chief Commissioner's approval, you would send copies of this letter to the same addressees.

I have shown this letter to Colonel T.H. Page who has been my invaluable Deputy and Senior U.S. officer since my return

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I have shown this letter to Colonel E.M. Page who has been my invaluable Deputy and Senior U.S. officer since my return to Venezia Region on April 1st.

Brigadier Maurice Lush, CB, CBE, MC,
Executive Commissioner,
Headquarters Allied Commission.

Yours sincerely
W. H. Lush

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WHS/ejj

CC 1008

27 June 1945

JUN 28 1945

Dear Nelson:

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Thank you for your letter of 18 June in which you enclosed a report on your organization of AMB XIII Corps. I am looking into the situation that existed prior to your taking over.

I have followed very closely AMB activities of Venezia Giulia, and am aware of and entirely sympathetic with the difficult task which confronted you during this initial phase.

In accordance with our understanding, I am planning to send Colonel Bowman as your relief and will do so as soon as I hear from Eighth Army which I assume will be within the next few days.

Sincerely,

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLEWY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Colonel Nelson W. Monfort,
Senior Civil Affairs Officer,
AMB XIII Corps.

cc: Ex. Commr. ✓
ESTAB. SECTION

M.S.

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(CSO)

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HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
13 CORPS

18 June 1945

Dear Eliery:

I have discussed the situation in THOMASIA BUCHIA in full with "Chuck", Brigadier Upjohn, and "Con" Hanson, and as a result I am submitting the enclosed report.

I certainly found a mess on my arrival here and as both the Corps Commander and "Con" realized only at the last minute how things really were, it is quite clear now why I am here.

The situation is not rosy. I was able to accomplish something in the way of organization in the nick of time. In my opinion, we are over the highest hurdle and I have every confidence that from now on things will improve daily. Within a week I hope to present you with a going concern.

I feel that I have not fulfilled my part of our agreement and I am hopeful that you will find it possible to relieve me before the end of June. As you know, I want to get out of military service just as quickly as possible and "Chuck" has agreed to support my application to go home as soon as I am relieved of this job.

With kindest regards, I am,

Sincerely yours,

/s/ NELSON W. MONROE

Rear Admiral Eliery E. Stone,
Chief Commissioner,
Headquarters, Allied Commission.

cc: Ex. Commr.

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HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
13 CORPS

JUN 27 1945
CC 0842

27/6

Ref:

Date 18 June 1945

SUBJECT Organization Allied Military Government 13 Corps.

JUN 27 1945

TO: Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner,
Headquarters, Allied Commission.

1. As a result of an agreement reached between Lt Gen MCCREERY, Commanding Eighth Army, Lt Gen HARDING, Commanding 13 Corps, Maj Gen GRUENTHER, Chief of Staff, 15th Army Group, and yourself, I was ordered to proceed to Headquarters, 13 Corps where I arrived and assumed Command of Allied Military Government with the title of Senior Civil Affairs Officer, 13 Corps, on 31 May 1945.
2. Within 48 hours after my arrival, having personally investigated conditions on the spot, and having spoken with practically all personnel concerned, it was quite apparent that there was no organization ready to assume the functions of Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA.
3. The situation I found was nothing short of scandalous. There was a mere handful of officers available -- it was impossible to determine the numbers because none had orders -- there was no operational or administrative plan and I could not find a single officer who had even been briefed as to what he was going to do. Whether this was due to inefficiency or negligence I can not say, but certainly the organization was completely chaotic and had it been necessary to enter the area concerned Military Government could not have functioned even to a minimum degree.
4. I am told that a group had been planning for several months for the occupation of VENEZIA GIULIA. If this is true, I feel you should institute an official inquiry to fix the responsibility for the complete ignorance of the problem and lack of preparation which I found.
5. I immediately set to work and wrote an Administrative Plan which fortunately I had completed on 11 June, 24 hours before I was ordered to start functioning. With a skeleton Headquarters Staff and with skeleton Provincial teams for TRIESTE and GORIZIA, many of whom were British officers borrowed from Military Government Austria, AMG in VENEZIA GIULIA was born at 1000 hours, 12 June 1945.
6. Proclamation No. 1, which with great difficulty was translated and printed in English and Italian, was posted the same day. It has since been translated, printed and posted in Slovene as well. Proclamations No. 2, 3,

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Ltr, Subj: "Org AMG 1 Corps", dtd 18 Jun 45.

and 4 are now being printed and they will be posted as soon as they are ready, I hope within the next 24 hours.

7. Today, again with a skeleton force, AMG started to function at POLA.

8. Taking advantage of the presence of Brig Gen SPOFFORD, Brig UNGER, and Air Commodore BENSON, the personnel problem has been fully discussed. As a result some officers have already arrived, others have been promised, and I am hopeful that within the next week or ten days the personnel problem will have been solved.

9. Pending the result of our negotiations with the Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav Army, the situation in VENEZIA GIULIA is extremely difficult. Our efforts to administer the area in normal AMG fashion are being obstructed on every hand. It is expected that negotiations will be resumed tomorrow and if an agreement is reached I propose, in full agreement with the Corps Commander, to "turn on the heat".

10. A full report covering the political, economic and administrative fields is being prepared and will be forwarded as soon as completed.

Nelson W. Monfort
NELSON W. MONFORT
Colonel, GSC
SCAO

Copy to:

A. C. of S., G-5, AFHQ
SCAO, AMG Eighth Army

CONFIDENTIAL

JKD/day

HEADQUARTERS
VENETIAN REGION
Allied Military Government
APO 354

30 June 1945

Allen Bergeson

I have been considering the letter which you showed me yesterday and the more I consider it the more difficult appears the next move.

You will observe that the letter has been repeated to G-5 A.V.H.Q. and to A.M.G. 8th Army and, therefore, can no longer be regarded as a private letter to the Chief Commissioner. Moreover, quite a number of people are involved.

I am certainly erring in respect of an alleged failure to make the necessary plans and to obtain the necessary information in the preliminary period up to May 4th, and there can be no doubt that if there were such a failure the fault would be mine.

It was on May 4th that Lt. Col. Orwood's main party of officers and men for Venezia Giulia passed under command A.M.G. 8 Army. Lt. Col. Scholtz's advance party had already passed under command on April 29th.

Thereafter the entire responsibility for the deployment and employment of these officers rested with A.M.G. 8th Army. We remained responsible only for the provision of their mail, official letters and for their personnel well-being. All their orders and all their plans were issued from the officer, S.C.A.O. 8th Army and was entirely proper having in view the fact that the occupation of Trieste was an 8th Army operation. This was all in continuance of a method of cooperation between Region and A.M.G. 8th Army which had been carried out by us all through the advance from Cassino in 1944 and in the advance in 1945. I cannot believe that Col. Nelson Monfort was ignorant of this fundamental arrangement. In fact during the entire period in question I was in constant consultation with S.C.A.O. 8th Army and he kept me fully aware of his plans. You will remember that, in order to set 8th Army free to deal with Austria and Venezia Giulia, Venezia Region took over the Provinces of Novigo, Padova, Venezia and Treviso on May 8th, and took over the administration of Udine on May 11th. I may perhaps be permitted to say that throughout all our conferences it appeared to me that Air Commodore Benson made prudent and capable use of all the means made available to him by Allied Commission or by 8th Army. I am sure that the situation concerning Venezia Giulia after May 4th it is, how-

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In respect of the "handful of officers" charge, the answer must, I feel, lie with Establishments Branch, A.C., in conjunction with A.M.G. 8 Army and myself.

In respect of the preparation of proclamations, G-5 A.P.H.Q., Civil Affairs Section, A.C. are also involved.

In respect of the issuance of directives *Br. Affairs*, responsibility lies with G-5 A.P.H.Q. and with A.C.

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You will see, therefore, that the situation is a complicated one. One inclination is to suggest an immediate inquiry to determine (a) if the facts alleged in Col. Nelson Monfort's letter are true and (b) if they are true, where responsibility lies.

There are, however, obvious disadvantages in such an inquiry. In the first place 8th Army are clearly involved and the inquiry would have to be with their consent. In the second place such an inquiry takes up a lot of time of busy officers. In the third place, and this I hold strongly, I have always maintained that one of the most important functions of Allied Commission was to show the possibility of complete U.S. - U.K. collaboration. I should, therefore, be exceedingly reluctant to have any sort of court of inquiry which might have the danger of developing into inter-national dispute.

There is, however, the danger that the charges contained in the letter may be repeated later on in America and it might be desirable to have rebutting evidence collected at this time before any of the participants disappear from this theatre.

The whole question of preliminary preparations is capable of proof in a very simple way, for I have complete copies of all letters and notes of all conferences. It might be desirable to have testimony from Col. Gevers, Col. Willmer, Lt. Col. Scholtz, Lt. Col. Orpwood, and Lt. Col. Armstrong. You, yourself, Brigadier Upjohn and Brigadier Henn are also aware of the preliminary discussions and of the drafts prepared by me.

It has seemed to me that it might be valuable if I prepared a short and purely factual account of the various preliminary stages in the story of the Venezia Giulia deployment from the A.M.C. point of view, giving the dates of various conferences, the decisions, etc. If you will let me have your instructions to this effect, I could produce the report in a few days.

For the rest I am entirely content to leave it to the judgment of the Chief Commissioner. It seems to me that an unfounded and unjust attack has been made on a number of officers of the Allied Commission. To decide the next step is, I admit, not so easy.

I am sending you four copies of this letter. As Colonel Nelson Monfort's original letter was also sent to A.M.C. 8 Army and to G-5 J.F.H.4., I should be glad if, with the Chief Commissioner's approval, you would send copies of this letter to the same addressees.

I have shown this letter to Colonel T.M. Page who has been my invaluable Deputy and Senior U.S. officer since my return to Venezia Region on April 1st.

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Brigadier Maurice Lash, CB, CBE, MC,
Executive Commissioner,
Headquarters Allied Commission.

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