[redacted]

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

ACC

10000/109/316
(VOL. 4)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

10000/109/316
(VOL. 4)

FUTURE OF THE COMMISSION
JUNE - OCT. 1946

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

(360)

E.C.

A seems all right, except for para 13. Suggest "Cine Med" and "MAAC" be added to "G-3."

EWS
CC

29/VI

(361)

EC. ~~371 & 372~~ (Copy 32 of MJPS
P/328 removed by CC for his use & file.
Addtl copy to be provided by Busy Persons.

EWS
CC

29/VI

361.

369.

Executive Officer (B).

3685 -

Will you please, in conjunction with Ex O (A), prepare a reply to Folio 368. If necessary our reply to para 2 should show where the Establishment Division of LACAB may be involved with IMAS if the present living and office accommodation and other administrative arrangements remain.

M. Carr Biy
M. CARR,
Brigadier,
A/Executive Commissioner.

4 October 1946.

374.

OFFICE NOTE.

EC. ~~371 & 372~~ (Copy 32 of MJPS
P/328 removed by CC for his use & file.
Addtl copy to be provided by Brig
Parsons.

MS
CC

29/VI

Mr.

369.

Executive Officer (B). 3685 -

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M. Carr Brig

M. CARR,
Brigadier,
A/Executive Commissioner.

4 October 1946.

374.

OFFICE NOTE.

Pointed out to Ex.O (B) that letter at 373 should have ended " FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER".

As regards the figure 7 now bracketed in Column 1 of Folio 370 this was a breakdown figure and not for inclusion in the total.

M

M. CARR,
Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner

12 Oct 46

JPS. 12/10

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To AC

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Authority

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GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

GSA Form 7117 (12-71)

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GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

GSA FORM 7117 (1-72)

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

SECRET SECRET

My dear General, Rome, 29 June 1956.

I have had long and useful discussions here today with Admiral Stone, Brigadier Lush, and Charles Finlay (IG's).

I have sent you a signal on my discussions with Admiral Stone (JCS 5). Both he and Lush were at pains to impress upon me the desirability and practical necessity for a single organization, with the necessary subdivisions, but under one head, to conduct on behalf of SACEUR all contacts in Italy with the Italian Government. I confess I was shaken by their very arguments, but left Lush in no doubt that from what I knew of views expressed in Whitehall, I did not think that HMG would wear it for the reason (as stated in the minority report to the Ellis Report) that it would be tantamount to the retention of ALCOM under another name, and that much time would be wasted by putting forward such proposals. The issue will necessarily depend principally I think, on the instructions which Lord Charles receives.

IG's-IP's:

I find that officers here (in AFSE) just cannot believe that the Cabinet decision to withdraw support and hand them over to the Italians is the last word on the subject, or that the Cabinet could possibly be prepared to justify it in Parliament. They take the view that, although IG's are in British custody, the effect of their being handed over to the Italians would produce some unease and implications in the Cardinal field to which SACEUR, in his Cardinal hat, cannot turn the blind eye; and that any decision to hand them over must therefore come from CIS and not unilaterally from London. They point out that, apart from the Italian reluctance, or even refusal, to take them over (or to maintain them, on the withdrawal of British personnel and administrative support), their desire to get rid of them as quickly as possible would predispose them to comply with the inevitable Jugoslav and Russian pressure to hand over IG's and IP's under the "detriment to Allied Armament" clause of the Revised Armistice Terms, or, in the case of the Jugoslavs, to barter them for the return of Italians deported by the Jugoslavs from Zone A, (if any still survive, which over the American Political Adviser here seems to doubt).

Admiral Stone's news that the Italians will not sign the Revised Terms, if coupled with the Military Agreements in their present form, is interesting and important.

I enclose a Summary of my discussions here today, also copies of the Draft proposed by ALCOM for IMG, in the event of the proposals for the latter going through.

Yours

Maj-Gen. A.V. Anderson, C.B., M.B.E.
Directorate of Civil Affairs,
Hotel Victoria,
Northumberland Avenue,
LONDON, W.C.1

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379

SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS ON 18 JUNE AT H.Q., A. M. G. ROME
BETWEEN BRIGADIER MEW (DDA, MG), COLONEL PIES (MG of G-5, AFHQ)
AND BRIGADIER LEGH, (EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER.)

---

1. Functions requiring contact with the Italian Government in ROME, for the discharge of which an organization or organizations will be required on the abolition of ALCOM, when Revised Armistice Terms are signed, are regarded as being :-

   (a) AFHQ Staff Section dealing with Services Sub-Sections and Disarmament, as required by Article 3.
   (b) AMG.
      1. Control of AMG in UNRRA.
      2. Technical matters connected with AMG in VENEZIA GIULIA & UNRRA.
      3. Channel on all AMG matters between AMG UNRRA and 13 Corps in respect of AMG VENEZIA GIULIA, and ATT.
         N.B. : AMG in UNRRA is not under 13 Corps. It is understood that all AMG matters are dealt with at present by ALCOM and referred to AFHQ as necessary. PAN 650 is regarded as cancelled and non-operative by PAN 650.
   (c) Displaced Persons, to which it looks as if SHAEF may have to be added. Many thorny problems to be solved before this can be wound up.
   (d) Liaison Groups between Military and Local Authorities. Fifteen such groups retained for the elections. Pointed out that so long as SACMED is asked to supply such miscellaneous information about Italy which cannot be asked of Italian Govt., SACMED's only possible source of information is Liaison Groups sent out for the purpose. They help to solve many very vexed problems in regard to requisitioning, derequisitioning, & rerequisitioning of property by Services (recent glaring instance in MILAN.)
   (e) Medium for correspondence between Governments not in diplomatic relations with the Italian Govt. (e.g. Jugoslavia) - a considerable volume.
   (f) Custody and disposal of ALCOM records.
   (g) Implementation with the Italian Govt. of the U.K. & U.S./Italian Military and Civil Affairs Agreements.
   (h) Normal Liaison duties between SACMED and the Italian Govt.
   (j) Final review of all AMG Court cases.
   (k) Programming of supplies for VENEZIA GIULIA. Also a good deal of backlash which has not yet been handed over to Embassies. British Embassy have just got their staff : U.S. Embassy have just lost their staff (P.B.A. personnel.) Considerable disparity results.
      U.S. Ambassador (Kirke) very keen on a Tripartite Economic Council, and Noel Charles stated to be coming round to the inevitability of this. Some sort of Council with reps. from British and U.S. Embassies, UNRRA, ALCOM, and the Italian Govt., under Italian Chairmanship stated already to be in being.
   (l) Internal administration of 185 British Officers and American counterparts.

2. Stated categorically that it would make for efficiency and smooth working if there were only one channel of approach to Italian Govt., and that latter would prefer this, even if, in practice, it amounted to ALCOM under a

(a) AMG Staff Section dealing with Services Sub-Sections and Disarmament, as required by Article 5.

(b) AMG.

1. Control of AMG in UNRRA.
2. Technical matters connected with AMG in VENEZIA GIULIA & UNRRA.
3. Channel on all AMG matters between AMG UNRRA and 13 Corps in respect of AMG VENEZIA GIULIA, and APHQ.

N.B. : AMG in UNRRA is not under 13 Corps. It is understood that all AMG matters are dealt with at present by ALCOM and referred to APHQ as necessary. FAM 650 is regarded as cancelled and superseded by FAM 650.

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2. Stated categorically that it would make for efficiency and smooth working if there were only one channel of approach to Italian Govt., and that latter would prefer this, even if, in practice, it amounted to ALCOM under a new name.

MISCELLANEOUS PROBLEMS :

3. New Italian Government under formation : should SACMED, through ALCOM, recommend three separate Service Ministers or a single Minister of Defence.

4. Italian Amnesty Decree. Should this apply in UNRRA ? In VENEZIA GIULIA ? To persons sentenced by Italian Courts at the instigation of Military Authorities ? (N.B. : Problems such as these could not be settled by any organisation except ALCOM or its successor.)

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Revised Armistice Terms and connected agreements.

5. Great pressure is, likely to be brought to bear on the Italian Government under the Article requiring them to do nothing detrimental to the interests of the Allies.

(a) by France, for the raising of French ships in Italian harbours.
(b) by Yugoslavia,
1. for the repatriation of Chetniks and Dissident Jugoslavs. Italy will be under great pressure to trade these against return of Italians deported from Zone A (if still alive).
2. For handing over persons claimed as War Criminals, including General Berardi, Chief of Italian Army Staff.

6. The only possible coordinating machinery to prevent conflicting demands (vide Para 2 of Troopers 6027 of 15 June) is a Combined organisation in MMIE to handle with the Italian Government all questions relating to the implementation of the Agreements. Once you get out of the Combined channel, conflicting approaches are inevitable.

7. Italian Government would not object to the differences in the Financial Clauses of the Agreements. They recognise that the U.K. has not the same financial resources at the U.S. (and Admiral Stone emphasised that the American Financial Clauses are obscure and not as favourable as might appear at first sight.)

What the Italians do object to is the exclusive rights claimed by the British Agreement and particularly the Capitulary Rights claimed over British merchant seamen, the more so as there are no British agencies for the arrest of such men, and no British Courts in Italy in which such men could be tried. As we are still technically at war with Italy, British Consuls have no Exequitura and cannot try in Consular Courts.

8. Question of access by French and Soviet reps. to Special Staff Section set up by Article 3 of the Revised Terms :

French and Soviet reps., whilst having access to other papers at ALCOM, do not have access to papers of the Services Sub-Commissions. The French claim that in Paris they only dropped their claim to be included in the Special Staff Section on being given an assurance that their rights and privileges in this matter would be the subject of a separate agreement. Hence their insistence on this point in London and Rome.

Police Mission

9. Proposals for this were handled on an all-British Basis. This was always a wrong approach: even if personnel were all British, any such Mission in Italy must necessarily be an Allied Mission, the more so if it is intruded under the cloak of the Land Forces Sub-Commission (itself a Combined organisation under ALCOM). Present personnel will waste out shortly and should be allowed to do so. As, in any case the Mission could only cover the Carabinieri (who form part of the Army) and these form less than 50% of the total Civil Police Forces, this Mission cannot be justified.

of Italians deported from Zone A (if still alive).

2. For handing over persons claimed as War Criminals, including General Berardi, Chief of Italian Army Staff.

6. The only possible coordinating machinery to prevent conflicting demands (vide Para 2 of Troopers 60427 of 15 June) is a Combined organisation in ROME to handle with the Italian Government all questions relating to the implementation of the Agreements. Once you get out of the Combined channel, conflicting approaches are inevitable.

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What is required is a set-up to study the unification of all Police Forces in Italy and to make recommendations on the subject. During the recent institutional referendum there was a distinct danger that the Carabinieri would display monarchist sympathies and that the rest of the Civil Police would come out pro-Republic,

ROME 5074
29 June 1946

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ALLIED [redacted] COMMIS ION 377

INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Organisation and Strengths FILE No. XOB/III/84/0

TO : Executive Commissioner 17 Oct 1946

Herewith proposed strengths and organisation of IAMS and LACAB as requested.

K. WILKS-JONES
Lt-Col
Executive Officer (B)

d

Seen by EC. 17/10 KR.

PA 17/10 KR

Appendix A

	Proposed LACAB A : B		Officers available 15 Oct 46		Officers Available 15 Nov 46		Officers available 31 Dec 46		Officers avail. 31 Jan 47	
			A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B
Chief of Branch	1					1		1		1
Branch Staff	5				1	4	1	3	1	3
Displaced Persons	40				12	22	11	20	10	18
Legal	7				6	1	3		3	
Public Safety	3					3		3		2
Communications	1				1		1		1	
Establishment	13				7	6	4	5	4	4
P.R.O.	1				1		1		1	
Archives	6				3	3	2	3	2	2
Economic Division	11				6	5	4	5	4	5
TOTAL (excl Displaced Persons)	48		29	33	25	23	16	20	16	17
TOTAL (incl Displaced Persons)	88		38	57	37	45	27	40	26	35
			95		82		67		61	

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I. M. A. S.

Present Officer Strengths - as at 17 Oct 46

	U.S.	Br	Total
Navy Sub-Commission	4	5	9
Land Forces Sub-Commission	5	35	40
Air Forces Sub-Commission	7	19	26
Combined totals	16	59	75

BAVI 6 of 6 Approved 36
5 of 3 " total 15
Cdn-Dutch 14
Total 65

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LACAB

Proposed Organization



NOTE 1. - Figures in brackets give the appropriate number of Officers. The total

NOTE 2. - Where a Division is broken down, eg. Displaced Persons, the greater num of the lesser numbers (8) and (32).

NOTE 3. - This chart should be read in conjunction with availability state as set

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8 B

LACAB

Proposed Organisation



NOTE 1. - Figures in brackets give the appropriate number of officers. The total number is 88.

NOTE 2. - Where a Division is broken down, eg. Displaced Persons, the greater number (40) is the total of the lesser numbers (8) and (32).

NOTE 3. - This chart should be read in conjunction with availability state as set out at attached Appendix.

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File

373

Tel No: ROME 489081, Ext 510

Headquarters
Allied Commission (ITALY)
CMP

Subject: Organisation of LACAB

Ref No: 600/RC

11 Oct 46

G-5 Section
AFHQ CMP

368

1. Reference is made to your letter 900.28 dated 30 Sep 46.

372 371

2. The information required by your para 2 is given at Appendix A (American) and Appendix B (British).

370

3. The answer to your para 3 is given at Appendix C, which provides a forecast of available personnel as at 15 Nov next. Certain minor changes will no doubt take place, but it is considered that the position will be fairly stable until the end of December. At that time U.S. War Department Circular 272 will take effect, which will affect some 10 American Officers. It may also be expected that some 8 British Officers will proceed on Release or Python during the months of Dec 46 and Jan 47.

K. WILME-JONES
Lt-Col
for Brigadier
Executive Commissioner

KWJ/d

see M 374

5669

(CSO)

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appendix A

372

T/O for Establishment Sections (American)

3668

1. Director .... (Exec.O.(A) and C.O. 2675th Regt.)

2. Executive ..... Boards, Courts, funds, supervisedadministration and inspections, security, fire marshal

3. S-1 ..... G-1(A), G-1 Civilian, Adjutant Allied Commission Awards and Decorations, Message Center

4. Asst.S-1 ..... Regt. Personnel Officer, Orders and Daily Bulletin, Alcom Orders, cables & publications

5. S-4 ..... G-4(A) Alcom Office Supply & Office Space, Civilian Motor Transport Records, Rations & Supply.

6. M.T.O. ..... handles all Motor Transport (American) for Allied Commission, 85 Vehicles at present. Repair, Maintenance, Dispatching and Records.

7. C.O. Hq Company ..... Commands Hq Company of Allied Commission as well as 85 to 110 attached EM's (AFA, AMAA, Microfilm, Navy etc.)

appendix B.

371

ESTABLISHMENTS SECTION - BRITISH ELEMENT

1. The British element of the establishments section comprises:

a) G-1(Br) - One officer responsible for all A and MS work, including personal services.

b) G-4(Br) - One officer responsible for all Q work.

c) Camp Commt - One officer responsible for maintenance of buildings, security of Rj building, billeting, supervision of civilian personnel, including payment and mid-shift meal. Responsible also for collection of hotel and ration charges.

d) Despatch Office - One officer responsible for all MT - Garage - repairs, and despatch of personnel and goods by road, rail or air.

e) Purchasing, Contracts and Claims Officer - One officer, responsible for physical payment of all civilian employees, local purchase, and investigation of claims against AMG/AC.

f) British Detachment - Two officers, OC and 2 i/c and Quartermaster.

g) The work of these officers is supervised and co-ordinated by one officer, who is also the Executive Officer (B) of the Commission.

2. This number will be required in the early stages to complete the essential clearing up of AMGOT, but then can be reduced to six by combining (b) and (d) under one officer and (c) (e) and (f) under ~~two~~ three officers instead of ~~three~~ four.

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b) Q(MT) - One officer responsible for all Q work.

c) Camp Commdt - One officer responsible for maintenance of buildings, security of HQ building, billeting, supervision of civilian personnel, including payment and mid-shift meal. Responsible also for collection of hotel and ration charges.

d) Despatch Office - One officer responsible for all MT - Garage - repairs, and despatch of personnel and goods by road, rail or air.

e) Purchasing, Contracts and Claims Officer - One officer, responsible for physical payment of all civilian employees, local purchase, and investigation of claims against AMG/AC.

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Appendix C

	Proposed LACAB A & B	Officers available 15 Oct 46 A	Officers available 15 Oct 46 B	Officers available 15 Nov 46 A	Officers available 15 Nov 46 B	Officers available 31 Dec 46 A	Officers available 31 Dec 46 B	Offrs available 31 Jan 47 A	Offrs available 31 Jan 47 B
Chief of Branch	1				1		1		1
Branch Staff	5			1	4	1	3	1	3
Displaced Persons	40			12	22	11	20	10	18
	7			6	1	3		3	
Public Safety	3				3		3		2
Communications	1			1		1		1	
Establishment	13			7	6	4	5	4	4
P.R.O.	1			1		1		1	
Archives	6			3	3	2	3	2	2
Economic Division	11			6	5	4	5	4	5
Division Staff	(7)			3	1				
Food and Supply				2	-				
Industry & Commerce				1	-				
Transportation				-	1				
C.E.M.				-	3				
TOTAL (excl Displaced Persons)	48		29	33	25	23	16	20	16	17
TOTAL (incl Displaced Persons)	88		38	57	37	45	27	40	26	35

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

9112

E. Banie

368.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

OCT 3 1946

G-5: 900.28

30 September 46

SUBJECT: Organization of LACAB.

TO : Chief Commissioner,
Allied Commission,
APO 794.

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1. There was handed Col. Hamblen by Brig. Carr on 27 September 1946, a first draft of the "family tree" of the proposed LACAB, together with notes as to the duties envisaged for each division.

2. No information was given concerning the duties of the Establishment Division. May details please be furnished as to each appointment in this division.

3. It is requested further that a possible break-down as between British and U.S. personnel be shown for each division taking into consideration personalities who are likely to remain on duty for an appreciable time and the policy of parity of strengths.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN:

A. L. HAMBLEN
Colonel, G.S.C.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

See 373

366.

DRAFT

367

Received from Col Hamilton 95 26/9 MC

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

G-5: 900.42

September 1945

SUBJECT: Organization and Functions Civil Affairs/Military Government.

I. Organization of Liaison and Civil Affairs Branch, G-5, AFHQ.

1. In conformity with instructions contained in _____ dated _____ from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the Allied Commission is abolished.

2. In addition to the functions set forth in Staff Memorandum 48, AFHQ, 14 May 1944, G-5, AFHQ, is hereby designated as Chief Civil Affairs Officer and made responsible for:

(a) Technical control of and advice to all Allied Military Government Agencies, except the Italian Military Affairs Section, AFHQ. He will exercise operational command over such agencies outside of Zone A, Venezia Giulia. Operational command over AMG agencies in Venezia Giulia is vested in Headquarters, XIII Corps.

(b) The final review over all Military Government Court cases which in conformity with existing instructions are referred to the Chief Civil Affairs Officer.

(c) The administration of Allied Military Government Agencies and camps for displaced persons, and for repatriation.

(d) The programming of all AMG imports.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

AFHQ.

1. In conformity with instructions contained in _____ dated _____ from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the Allied Commission is abolished.

2. In addition to the functions set forth in Staff Memorandum 48, AFHQ, 14 May 1944, G-5, AFHQ, is hereby designated as Chief Civil Affairs Officer and made responsible for:

(a) Technical control of and advice to all Allied Military Agencies, except the Italian Military Affairs Section, AFHQ. He will exercise operational command over such agencies outside of Zone A, Venezia Giulia. Operational command over AMG agencies in Venezia Giulia is vested in Headquarters, XIII Corps.

(b) The final review over Military Government Court cases which in conformity with existing instructions are referred to the Chief Civil Affairs Officer.

(c) The administration of Allied Military Government Agencies and camps for displaced persons, and for repatriation.

(d) The programming of all AMG imports.

(e) The maintenance and disposition of files and records of the Allied Commission except those pertaining directly to the Armed Forces Sub-Commissions of the Allied Commission. These latter records will be maintained and disposed of by the Chief of the Italian Military Affairs Section, AFHQ (IMAS)

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

(f) Liaison with the Italian Government in connection with the functions herein set forth or as directed by the SAC.

(g) Acting as the representative of the Commanding General, MTOUSA, and G.O.C.inC., CMF, when so desired by either, in contacts with the Italian Government and in day to day negotiations arising out of the U.S. and British Civil and Military Affairs Agreements with the Italian Government.

(h) Such other matters pertaining to Civil Affairs and Military Government as may be directed by the SAC from time to time.

5. For the purposes set forth herein, and for such others as may be authorized, G-5, AFHQ, will set up and operate a Branch in Rome to be known as the Liaison and Civil Affairs Branch, G-5, AFHQ (short title LACAB, Rome), and will so adjust the duties and personnel of his Section as a whole, as to effect the maximum efficiency and saving of manpower.

4. As Chief Civil Affairs Officer, G-5, AFHQ, is vested with the authority now pertaining to that office, except that he shall not be responsible for:

(a) Supervision and direction of the Italian Armed Forces.

(b) Control of the size and character of the Italian Armed Forces.

(c) Control of the production of armaments by

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Italian Government and in day to day negotiations arising out of the U.S. and British Civil and Military Affairs Agreements with the Italian Government.

(h) Such other matters pertaining to Civil Affairs and Military Government as may be directed by the SAC from time to time.

3. For the purposes set forth herein, and for such others as may be authorized, G-5, AFHQ, will set up and operate a Branch in Rome to be known as the Liaison and Civil Affairs Branch, G-5, AFHQ (short title LACAB, Rome), and will so adjust the duties and personnel of his Section as a whole, as to effect the maximum efficiency and saving of manpower.

4. As Chief Civil Affairs Officer, G-5, AFHQ, is vested with the authority now pertaining to that office, except that he shall not be responsible for:

(a) Supervision and direction of the Italian Armed Forces.

(b) Control of the size and character of the Italian Armed Forces.

(c) Control of the production of armaments by the Italians.

II. Organization of Italian Military Affairs Section, AFHQ.

1. In conformity with instructions contained in_____ from the Combined Chiefs of

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Staff, dated_____, there is hereby established in Rome under the Chairmanship of the Supreme Allied Commander a special Section of APBQ, to be known as the Italian Military Affairs Section, APBQ (short title IMAS).

2. IMAS will:

(a) Assume control of the functions of the supervision and direction of the Italian Armed Forces heretofore exercised by the Land, Navy and Air Force Sub-Commissions in the Allied Commission.

(b) Control the size and character of all the Italian Armed Forces.

(c) Control the production of armaments by the Italians.

(d) Maintain liaison with the Italian Government in connection with matters pertaining to the responsibilities of the Section.

(e) Maintain and dispose of records and archives pertaining directly to the Section.

3. A Deputy Chairman, IMAS, is hereby authorized as the Chief, IMAS, who shall function as executive head of the Section. The relationship between the Chief, IMAS and Chiefs, Sub-Sections, IMAS, will be similar to that heretofore existing between the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, and the Heads of the Land, Naval and Air Forces Sub-Commissions, Allied Commission.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

(a) Assume control of the functions of the supervision and direction of the Italian Armed Forces heretofore exercised by the Land, Navy and Air Force Sub-Commissions in the Allied Commission.

(b) Control the size and character of all the Italian Armed Forces.

(c) Control the production of armaments by the Italians.

(d) Maintain liaison with the Italian Government in connection with matters pertaining to the responsibilities of the Section.

(e) Maintain and dispose of records and archives pertaining directly to the Section.

5. A Deputy Chairman, IMAS, is hereby authorized as the Chief, IMAS, who shall function as executive head of the Section. The relationship between the Chief, IMAS and Chiefs, Sub-Sections, IMAS, will be similar to that heretofore existing between the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, and the Heads of the Land, Naval and Air Forces Sub-Commissions, Allied Commission.

4. The structure of the Land, Navy and Air Forces Sub-Commissions will not be substantially changed without the approval of the Supreme Allied Commander. These organizations will function as Sub-Sections of IMAS and will continue to operate under existing directives of the respective Sub-Commissions.

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5. The employment and disposition of the Italian Navy remains as at present under the command and control of the Supreme Allied Commander, separate and apart from his capacity of Chairman of IMAS.

6. The Deputy Chairman, IMAS, is authorized to deal directly with the Chairman, IMAS (SAC). However, normally all communications will be addressed to AFHQ and the usual staff procedures between Major Commands and AFHQ will be followed.

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directly with the Chairman, IRAS (SAC). However, normally all communications will be addressed to AFHQ and the usual staff procedures between Major Commands and AFHQ will be followed.

1991

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Copy handed to Col H Ellen, G-5, AFHQ - 26/4/46.

366

LIAISON AND CIVIL AFFAIRS BRANCH

DETAIL OF DUTIES AND OF RESIDUAL FUNCTIONS OF

ALLIED COMMISSION

1. DISPLACED PERSONS DIVISION:

Maintenance with a view to subsequent resettlement or repatriation of approximately 200,000 persons.

2. ECONOMIC DIVISION:

(a) Head of Division.

(i) Direct, supervise and coordinate the work of the Division.

(ii) Advise on economic conditions in Italy.

(iii) Attend to residual correspondence such as matters pertaining to finance, claims, requests for information, various sources, and liaison between AMG, AFHQ and the Italian Government.

(iv) Liaise and channel correspondence between Italian agencies and Allied Forces on all questions of de-requisitioning.

(b) Food, Agriculture and AMG Supply Sub-Division.

(i) Advise on the food and agriculture situation.

(ii) The programming and supervision and allocation of supplies for Venezia Giulia/Udine.

(iii) Liaise with the Italian Government with regard to supplies for Venezia Giulia/Udine. Supply question as regards to Italian Armed Forces and Displaced Persons.

(iv) Effect a settlement of accounts with the Italian Government for foodstuffs advanced by the Allied Forces for midshift meals and displaced persons.

(c) Industry and Utilities and Commerce Sub-Division.

(i) Attend to residual correspondence of Divisions which have been closed out, such as the Coal Division.

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(ii) Liaise with the Italian Government in the matter of Public Works

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

projects for Venezia Giulia/Udine.

(iii) Liaise with AFHQ and the Italian Government on various Public works projects, such as snow removal, road repairs and maintenance.

(iv) Insuring that the supply of electric power is made available to XIII Corps from sources in Italian Government territory.

(v) Screen R.C.L. items for import and export.

(vi) Liaison between Italian Government and Venezia Giulia/Udine and former Italian colonies now under military control, in the matter of export, import problems and requests.

(c) Transportation Sub-Division.

(i) Advise on transportation situation in Italy.

(ii) Attend to residual problems for transportation, assistance in recovering looted vehicles, claims for requisitioned vehicles and liaison with State Railways and military authorities extraneous to the Military Railway Service.

(d) C.E.M. Sub-Division.

(i) Disposal of CEM held by Allied military units and in dumps not yet handed over to ARAR.

(The above activities entail a mass of detailed work so long as the Allied authorities maintain a system of quantative receipts. If the Allied authorities should decide to give to the Italian Government all CEM not in possession of military units without reporting transfer, the work would be very considerably reduced).

3. LEGAL DIVISION.

Continuance of review of all AMG court cases. Advise on Courtant matters. Review of AMG court cases in Udine and Venezia Giulia of a definite category and special supervision of AMG courts in existing AMG territory.

4. PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION.

Liaison between the Allied authorities and the Italian Government on police matters. Compilation of a report on Italian Police Forces with a view to bringing to the Italian Government's attention the need for an Allied Police Mission. Security matters. Liaison with the Italian Government on warcriminals and alleged traitors.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

5. ARCHIVES DIVISION.

Preparation and micro-filming of all Allied Commission archives.

6. COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION.

Liaison between the Allied authorities and the Italian Government on all matters of communications.

7. PUBLIC RELATIONS DIVISION.

8. ESTABLISHMENT DIVISION.

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LIAISON AND CIVIL AFFAIRS BRANCH

DETAIL OF DUTIES AND OF RESIDUAL FUNCTIONS OF

ALLIED COMMISSION

1. DISPLACED PERSONS DIVISION:

Maintenance with a view to subsequent resettlement or repatriation of approximately 200,000 persons.

2. ECONOMIC DIVISION:

(a) Head of Division.

(i) Direct, supervise and coordinate the work of the Division.

(ii) Advise on economic conditions in Italy.

(iii) Attend to residual correspondence such as matters pertaining to finance, claims, requests for information, various sources, and liaison between AMG, AFHQ and the Italian Government.

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(i) Advise on the food and agriculture situation.

(ii) The programming and supervision and allocation of supplies for Venezia Giulia/Udine.

(iii) Liaise with the Italian Government with regard to supplies for Venezia Giulia/Udine. Supply question as regards to Italian Armed Forces and Displaced Persons.

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(i) Attend to residual correspondence of Divisions which have been closed out, such as the Coal Division.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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(iv) Insuring that the supply of electric power is made available to XIII Corps from sources in Italian Government territory.

(v) Screen R.O.L. items for import and export.

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(ii) Attend to residual problems for transportation, assistance in recovering looted vehicles, claims for requisitioned vehicles and liaison with State Railways and military authorities extraneous to the Military Railway Service.

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(The above activities entail a mass of detailed work so long as the Allied authorities maintain a system of quantative receipts. If the Allied authorities should decide to give to the Italian Government all CEM not in possession of military units without reporting transfer, the work would be very considerably reduced).

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4. PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION.

Liaison between the Allied authorities and the Italian Government on police matters. Compilation of a report on Italian Police Forces with a view to bringing to the Italian Government's attention the need for an Allied Police Mission. Security matters. Liaison with the Italian Government on war criminals and alleged traitors.

5055

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5. ARCHIVES DIVISION.

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Liaison between the Allied authorities and the Italian Government on all matters of communications.

7. PUBLIC RELATIONS DIVISION.

8. ESTABLISHMENT DIVISION.

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[redacted]



Figures in brackets give the appropriate number of officers.

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LABOUR AND LEGAL AFFAIRS BRANCH (LANAB)

DRAFT PROPOSALS FOR ORGANIZATION



Figures in brackets give the approximate number of officers. TOTAL 60 OFFICERS.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017



Figures in brackets give the approximate number of officers.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017



Figures in brackets give the appropriate number of officers.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

801 RP.

INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Ex Comm 364

Originator's Reference: C GA300
Date/Time of Origin: SEPT 231015 B

Message Centre No: N/6764
Date Time Rec'd: SEPT 231500 B
Precedence: ROUTINE

FROM: AFHQ FROM G 5
TO : ALCOM ROME AMG XIII CORPS , INFO: RAAC

SEP 23 1946

UNCLASSIFIED.

1. COL HAMBLEN G-E AFHQ will arrive ROME 1200 hours Thursday 26 September to discuss physical set up and terms reference LACCAB.

2. Desire conference 270930 B on AMG loans VENEZIA GIULIA with REPS AFA, ALCOM, and AMG VENEZIA GIULIA. At your ~~discretion~~ discretion invite financial advisors British and US Embassies if embassies agree.

3. MTD for CASERTA 280830 B.

4. For AMG VENEZIA GIULIA. Desirable COL BEARD attend Friday conference with full particulars present situation. Other reps as you think desirable. Confirm.

AC DIST

ACTION EX COMMR 2
INFO CHIEF COMMISSIONER
FILE
FLOAT 2

ACTION

HEADQUARTERS 23 SEP 1946

AFA to forward
G-9 (AMG) [illegible]

5652 -

Ex Commissioning.

RG 331
ACC - Italy
Box 209
Folder 10000/109/316
"5651-5644"
1 doc. / ~ 4 pages

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 10000/109/316

Date 5/2/46

From AFHQ

To AGWAR

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

- [x] Security-Classified Information
- [ ] Otherwise Restricted Information

JCS POST 46
Authority

10/9/44
Date

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

ACC - Italy
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"5651-5644"
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ACCESS RESTRICTED

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File Designation 10000/109/316

Date 5/7/46

From AFHQ

To AGWAR

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- [x] Security-Classified Information
- [ ] Otherwise Restricted Information

JCS Post 46
Authority

10/4/74
Date

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

GSA FORM 7117 (6-72)

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

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File Designation _____

_____

Date _____

From _____

To _____

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- [ ] Otherwise Restricted Information

_____ Authority

_____ Date

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

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ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation _____

_____

Date _____

From _____

To _____

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☐ Security-Classified Information

☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

_____ Authority

_____ Date

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

GSA FORM 7117 (12-73)

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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ACC - Italy
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"5651-5644"
1 doc. / ~4 pages

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File Designation 10000/109/316

Date 6/20/46

From LUSH

To ETHG

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- [x] Security-Classified Information
- [ ] Otherwise Restricted Information

JCS 095-46 — Authority

10/6/94 — Date

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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ACCESS RESTRICTED

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

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File Designation 10000/109/316

Date 6/25/46

From LOSH

To ATHQ

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

- [x] Security-Classified Information
- [ ] Otherwise Restricted Information

JCS post-46
Authority

10/9/74
Date

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

GSA FORM 7117 (3-72)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file

File Designation

Date

From

To

In the review of this file, this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restriction records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

- [ ] Security-Classified Information
- [ ] Otherwise Restricted Information

Authority

Date

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation _____

_____

Date _____

From _____

To _____

In the review of this file, this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restriction records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☐ Security-Classified Information

☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

_____ Authority _____ Date

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION GSA FORM 7117

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

650

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 794
ECONOMIC SECTION

Ref: Eo/1 38

21 June 1946

JUN 21 1946

SUBJECT: Economic/Supply Functions - I.M.A.S.

TO : Executive Commissioner
Allied Commission

1. It is visualized that economic and supply functions will exist in the Italian Military Affairs Section (I.M.A.S.). The functions may be summarized as follows:

(a) Supply to AMG territory of food, agricultural, industrial, utilities, transportation, fuel and power.

(b) Supply to the Italian Army, Navy, and Air Force of non-military items.

(c) Supply for displaced persons.

(d) Channel for finance questions for above agencies.

(e) Channel for claims and negotiations between Italian Government and the Allied Military Authorities.

(f) Industrial rehabilitation in AMG territory.

(g) Commerce between AMG territory, Italy, and other nations.

(h) Commerce with British Military authorities and Italy (former Italian Colonies).

(i) Derequisitioning of Allied-held premises.

(j) Disposal of captured enemy material.

(k) AFHQ may require reports on economic conditions in Italy where military interests are affected.

2. The following diagram represents the organizational set-up:

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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Chief — 1 Officer

Coordinating Officers

Requisitions — 1 Officer

Food & Agriculture	Industry Public Utilities Fuel	Finance Derequisitioning Commerce	Captured Enemy Material
2 Officers	3 Officers	4 Officers	5 Officers

~~TOTAL 10 Officers~~

*For the total it is planned to have American and British Officers.

3. (a) Supply for AMG. Requests for civil supplies are prepared by the AMGs of Venezia Giulia and Udine. These requests are channeled through Allied Commission for the purposes of:

(i) Consolidation.
(ii) Screening items which are available in the Italian economy. (Contacts with Italian Government and other agencies to get commitments on willingness to supply.)
(iii) Screening items as to justifications.
(iv) Making allocations and issuing instructions on the division of supplies as they arrive.
(v) Borrowing and repayment from other programs of essential supplies to cover non-arrivals.
(vi) Insuring that the supply of electric power is made available to XIII Corps from sources in Italian Government territory.

In the operations above outlined there are many signals and other communications to establish understandings on items not originally clear, or on which changes are proposed.

(b) Advice to AMG on Economic Activities. This function includes responding to AMG inquiries and requests for information and instructions. It consists largely of dealing with isolated cases as they arise and covers widely divergent matters. A few typical recent examples are:

(i) Interpretation of Italian Government decrees, the application of which may be desirable for VG.
(ii) Advising Udine on appropriateness of the use of AMG funds for certain purposes.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

(iii) The adoption of arrangements for trade between Italy/Venezia Giulia and Zone B Venezia Giulia.

(iv) Assisting AMG in conforming to provisions of Italian trade agreements.

(v) Acting as channel for certain public works proposals of the Italian Government.

(vi) Aiding in the consummation of contracts for AMG factories and other agencies.

The functions of Allied Commission with respect to AMG territory are comparable to the normal functions of an intermediate headquarters in a chain of command.

4. The non-military supply of the Italian Armed Forces, principally food, requires contacts with Ministries and agencies of the Italian Government other than the military Ministries. The personnel who are specializing in supply for AMG already have useful contacts and are able effectively to perform such functions.

5. The supply for displaced persons, while treated as a responsibility of the Italian Government, entails a considerable amount of contact with that Government in order to insure suitable arrangements. The same specialists who are required for supply to AMG have effective liaison with the appropriate agencies.

6. Financial Questions. There is a wide variety of financial problems which pertain to the Allied Forces, and for which provision should be made in the economic portion of I.M.A.S. Most prominent among the questions will be matters of claims, rights and remunerations.

7. AMG Industry. As a part of the program to avoid disease and unrest in AMG territory, industrial development and employment are important. Matters constantly arise regarding the use of AMG plants, regarding the acquisition of materials and equipment for the plants, which includes allocations from Italian Government agencies and also includes contracts to furnish supplies to Italian as well as to other countries.

8. AMG International Commerce. Arrangements are under way to conduct and control the international commerce of AMG territory. The arrangements also include Italian international trade which may pass through AMG areas. Effort is consistently made to treat the disputed area as a part of economic Italy. However, it is not practical to make blanket application of all Italian regulations because of conditions peculiar to Zone A.

9. The British military authorities in the Italian Colonies have relied upon AFHQ and its agencies to deal with the Italian Government in their procurements of Italian products or in their supply of goods to Italy. It appears likely that this activity will continue and personnel of I.M.A.S., because of contacts with the Italian Government, is best qualified to carry it on.

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10. Dereguisitioning. The requests for dereguisitioning are constantly increasing. With the revision of the Armistice and with the new civil affairs arrangements it may be expected that there will be an up-surge in the already considerable number of such requests. It is believed that AFHQ will be well served by establishing a central activity in I.M.A.S. to treat with the Italians and the Italian Government.

11. Captured Enemy Material.

(a) After the needs of the Allied Military have been met, captured enemy material, with the exception of a few special items, is turned over to the Italian Government on quantitative receipts. CMI Branch attends to the actual turnover to the Italian agency A.N.A.R. Officers of that Branch accompany the A.N.A.R. officials and agree on the quantities. Hand receipts are taken which are followed by more formal receipts from the Government. Since the dumps of material are very diversified as to types of material, quantities and locations and the A.N.A.R. organization is not well adapted to rapid receipt and disposal, the job is difficult and the completion necessarily slow. This function will continue so long as military units are closing out and giving up previously undisclosed CMI material.

(b) There are under the control of C.M.M. Branch certain files which pertain to the supply operation in Italy of the German NUK organization. These files are undergoing constant study and classification for the purpose of making their contents more useful to the Allied and Italian Governments. It is likely that these files may eventually go to some agency not I.M.A.S.

12. Economic Conditions in Italy. It is believed that AFHQ may call upon I.M.A.S. for reports on economic conditions in Italy insofar as the conditions may affect military interests. The personnel required to carry on the functions listed above will have suitable contacts and will be well qualified to prepare such reports. They will rely upon information from the Embassies, the Italian Government, and UNRRA. Such items as ration scales, food stocks, local production, fuel supplies, labor and unrest, and transportation availabilities may become the basis of such reports.

13. Residual Work. There is inevitably residual correspondence and work left over from Allied Commission, as the result of its almost three years of activity in the Theater, which demands some attention. It is visualized that the staff provided for the Economic Branch of I.M.A.S. will have to carry on this type of work as an added responsibility.

Charles W. Walton

CHARLES W. WALTON
Colonel, A.C.
Acting Vice President

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349.

Col. F. G. A. PARSONS,
G-5, AFHQ, CMF

20 June 1946

Dear Nash.

Reference our conversation yesterday. Assuming that Drew arrives on Friday, I would like to bring him up to Rome on Monday, 24th, and return here that night, so as to be here for the C.I.G.S.'s visit. Provided the road is dry, we should be at Rome about 1100 hrs.

I should like Drew to get a picture of the problems involved in the abolition of ALCOM and its replacement by the body on which the MJPS agreed at Tuesday's Meeting. It would be most helpful if you could produce a rough outline of the organization which you think will be required for the new body, showing how the personnel now with ALCOM, and who will remain available, can be fitted in. Of course, it will be no good going above the ceiling laid down in General Hamblen's letter of 7 June to R.A.A.C. (plus the 30 additional bodies who have now been approved) and I hope it will be possible to do with less on the British side.

I should also like Drew to have a talk with Findlay or Fothergill, as he is particularly interested in the problem of getting rid of our DP commitments.

Yours, Alex Parsons

Brig. N. S. Lush, CB, CBE MC,
Executive Commissioner,
HQ, Allied Commission.

CSO

Arranged thus by telephone

Please arrange for DP to be present 1100 hrs onwards.

NS 21/6

NS. 22/6.

25/6

Subject : Lecture on June 20th at CAIRETTA. 801

34

Major General L. Browning, CB, CBE, MC.
Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C.
(M.M.I.A.) R C M S .

DO/2 11 June 46.

JUN 11 1946

To : H.Q. A.C. (For Executive Commissioner)

Ref your 801/CCA/EC dated 11 June :-

1.(a) When this Mission was originally formed in the spring of 1944 there were nearly as many American as British officers.

(b) The decision to form "Combat Groups" provided with British Equipment and trained on British lines necessitated an increase in British personnel.

(c) For standardisation and uniformity, (based on the "hard core" of the 5 Inf. Divs., ex - "Combat Groups"), the Italian Army Training Establishments have been issued with British weapons on loan, pending approval by C.C.S. British weapons are now being issued, (also on loan, pending C.C.S. approval), to the 10 Independent Regts, (1 per Terr. Region) and the 3 I.S. Divisions. This accentuates the disparity between the number of British and American personnel.

(d) The "CC.RR. Section" is composed of British Police officers as it was decided that reorganisation of the CC.RR. should be on British Police lines.

(e) The Italian P.W. Section, (for the repatriation of P.W.s) is headed by an American officer with a combined American and British staff.

(f) The U.S.A. element in Land Forces Sub-Commission consists of a second-in-command to the British G.O.C. and 7 other officers mainly concerned with Italian P.W.s, Supply and Intelligence, and watching U.S. interests.

2. Herewith a draft copy of my exposition on the Italian Army. I have today, at his request, sent a copy direct to General MACLEAN,

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To : H.Q. A.C. (For Executive Commissioner)

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A. Browning

Major General.
Land Forces Sub-Commission, AC. M. M. I. A.

(sc)

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Talk on June 20th 1944

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THE ITALIAN ARMY

1. [illegible]

Gentlemen,

To give you a proper idea of the new ITALIAN Army of today, I must say a few words about its evolution from the chaotic days of 1943.

An account of the activities of the ITALIAN Army since 8 Sep 43 can be divided into two parts:-

(a) The co-belligerent Army - Sep 43 to VE Day;

(b) The Liberation Army - VE Day to date, and until the final peace settlement.

2. THE CO-BELLIGERENT ARMY

(a) Under the terms of the Armistice the ITALIAN Gov't undertook to make available to the ALLIES such ITALIAN troops as they required. By the time of the GERMAN surrender in ITALY the ITALIAN Army serving the ALLIES had reached a total of 350,000. This growth was achieved by stages, part passu with the development of Allied operations on the ITALIAN mainland, and dependent largely on the amount of food, clothing, boots and equipment that the ALLIES were able to provide.

A start was made with the co-operation of the ITALIAN XXXI Corps with the FRENCH Army in CALABRIA. This consisted of assistance in the maintenance of the L. of C., in the reconstruction of bridges, organisation of transit camps etc. At the same time an Allied Mission was making the first contacts with the ITALIAN 7 Army in APULIA.

(b) Soon came the question then sketch of an ITALIAN War Ministry and General Staff to supervise and LEAD for which purpose Commanis

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A start was made with the co-operation of the ITALIAN XXXI Corps with the FIFTH Army in CALABRIA. This consisted of assistance in the maintenance of the L of C, in the reconstruction of bridges, organisation of transit camps etc. At the same time an Allied Mission was making the first contacts with the ITALIAN 7 Army in APULIA.

(b) Post came the creation from scratch of an ITALIAN War Ministry and General Staff at BRINDISI and LECCE for which purpose Generals CRAGNO and DERANDI were repatriated from DC and appointed respectively as War Minister and Chief of the Army Staff.

(c) Thereafter began the build-up of a first instalment of [illegible] 5637 Service tps for the EIGHTH and FIFTH Armies and L of C, and the organisation of an ad hoc combat formation of 20,000 men, entirely equipped from ITALIAN sources.

The Service tps were employed mostly as labour but at the ports

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2.(c) (Cont'd)

and in Allied installations, although many other types of units were formed - notably pack tpt and OT ocgs, line and signal ocgs, engineer ocgs, traffic control units and so forth.

The ITALIAN Army has always been notoriously deficient in technical and mechanical personnel, and it was quite a business getting together suitable men for some of the more specialized units.

The combat tps were in the line first with FIFTH Army, and subsequently, with the new new "CIL" (Corpo Italiano Liberazione) under command of the British 8th Army.

(d) In the spring of '44, the shortage of Allied man-power in this theatre led to the decision to increase the number of ITALIAN Service tps and at the same time to organize the ITALIAN combat force, to fit them out entirely with British arms and equipment and to train them on British lines.

The first infantry division (called "Combat Group" and about half the size of a British Division) was created within 6 months and the remainder successively at about monthly intervals. Four of them took part, with credit, in actual battle on the GOTHIC line and in the final northward drive. The fifth was ready in reserve but did not actually enter battle. The Sixth provided reinforcements.

The service tps were formed into pack tpt ocgs and various other administrative units, which were urgently needed for both BRITISH and FIFTH Armies in the GOTHIC line.

(e) By VE Day the ITALIAN Army had some 50,000 combat tps and 300,000 service tps and participated with the Allied armies and in rear areas. They had suffered 11,000 casualties:

Killed - 1,000

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(e) By VE Day the ITALIAN Army had some 50,000 combat tps and 300,000 service tps and cooperated with the Allied Armies and in rear areas. They had suffered 12,000 casualties:

Killed	-	3,000
Wounded	-	7,000
Missing	-	2,000

Throughout these bloody months the ITALIAN Army had cooperated well with the ALLIES, and although they were much more interested to "earn their passage" by shedding blood in the actual fighting against the GERMANS (for which they had zeal but no equipment), they did their best to supply all the ALLIES needed in the way of auxiliary tps for service duties.

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2.(e) (Cont'd)

Great credit is due to the officers who were put in charge of the new ITALIAN War Ministry (and in fact of the formations and units) at that time for what was achieved. The ITALIAN Army had more or less disintegrated, and it was no easy matter in the circumstances in which the ITALIANS then found themselves to maintain the discipline and morale of the men and to run and administer this [redacted] of the army. The ITALIAN Army had done much for the ALLIES, and for ITALY to "earn her passage".

3. INTERIM ARMY

(a) After VE Day a new policy was elaborated by the ALLIES, and approved by CCS, for an Interim ITALIAN Army pending final settlement by peace treaty. This policy came into force on 15 Nov 45, concurrently with the handing over of the ITALIAN Army to the control of the ITALIAN Gov't (subject to the overriding control of SAC), and is the policy on which we are working today.

(b) From that date the ITALIAN Govt became responsible for the organization, administration and training of their own Army, subject to certain reservations and excluding Service units still under Allied command. Within a very few weeks from now the last of these Service units will be disbanded, and all ITALIAN tps will then be under direct ITALIAN control.

(c) Under the terms of this policy the ITALIAN Gov't is permitted to maintain an Army of 110,000 men organized on the following lines:-

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3. ITALIAN ARMY

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(c) Under the terms of this policy the ITALIAN Gov't is permitted to maintain an Army of 140,000 men organized on the following lines:-

(POINT OUT ON ITALIAN ARMY 1/ SQUARE)

(i)	Local and mob reserves (combat troops)	
	Five Inf Divs Seven Inf and Three Alpine Regts (one for each Terr Region on the mainland) Three Internal Security Divs (Two in SICILY, one in SARDINIA)	90,500
(ii)	Command	5632
	Ministry of War & Territorial Regional Hqs	9,000
(iii)	Air	20,000
(iv)	Non A. Effs	12,500
		140,000

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3. (Cont'd)

(d) The main reservations which I referred to are:-

(i) The Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, has the right to assume command at any time of the whole or any part of the ITALIAN Army located in the theatre and to vote any project not acceptable to the ALLIES.

(ii) The ITALIAN Gov't has to continue to supply to the ALLIES all the information about the ITALIAN Army that may be required.

4. AUTHORITY ASPECT OF THE ALLIED PLAN

About the same time as the new policy for the Italian Army was approved the ITALIAN War Ministry was informed of certain important conditions relating thereto:

(a) that it was the wish of the US and British Gov'ts that an ITALIAN Army of such a size as could reasonably be maintained by the ITALIAN Gov't should be brought to a high state of efficiency in the shortest possible time.

(b) that as far as possible the ITALIAN Army was to be organized and commanded on lines generally similar to those employed in the British Army.

(c) that with this end in view, the Allied Military Mission which had been the liaison link between Allied Hqs and the ITALIAN Army since the early days of the Armistice, would now advise and assist (instead of controlling) the ITALIAN Ministry of War in this new task of reorganizing, training and administering the ITALIAN Army and C.M.M. (in addition to carrying out its previous functions of obtaining and transmitting to superior Allied

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all the information about the ITALIAN Army that may be required.

4. ADMINISTRATIVE ASPECTS OF THE ITALIAN ARMY

About the same time as the new policy for the Interim Army was announced the ITALIAN War Ministry was informed of certain important conditions relating thereto:

(a) that it was the wish of the US and British Gov'ts that an ITALIAN Army of such a size as could reasonably be maintained by the ITALIAN Gov't should be brought to a high state of efficiency in the shortest possible time.

(b) that as far as possible the ITALIAN Army was to be organised and commanded on lines generally similar to those employed in the British Army.

(c) that with this end in view, the Allied Military Mission which had been the liaison link between Allied HQs and the ITALIAN Army since the early days of the Armistice, would now advise and assist (instead of controlling) the ITALIAN Ministry of War in this new task of reorganising, training and administering the ITALIAN Army and C.M.M. (in addition to carrying out the previous functions of obtaining and transmitting to superior Allied authorities such information about the ITALIAN Army as was required).

(d) that the ITALIAN Ministry of War would normally accept the advice of the Mission.

5. RELATIONS BETWEEN MMA AND THE ITALIAN ARMY

Before proceeding on a detailed study of the Interim Army, I ought here to make the premise that in all our dealings with the ITALIAN War Ministry we have always endeavoured to take into account the temperament and tradition of the ITALIANS and the national characteristics of the ITALIAN Army, on the principle that:

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5. (cont'd) (i)

(i) anything that the ITALIANS imposed that the ITALIANS did NOT like would be discovered as soon as our backs were turned, whereas what they willingly accept on its merits would remain.

(ii) results would be more efficient, "you can lead a horse to the water but you can't make him drink" - unless he wants to.

I am glad to say that this policy has paid us well, even though the patience of my Mission has been sorely tried at times. It has of course always been our care to give the most sound and objective advice, to eschew politics and NOT to meddle in purely ITALIAN affairs. This has earned for the Mission the trust and respect of the ITALIANS and thus we have got things done. Not once has it been necessary for me to appeal to the SAC (as I am entitled to to) because of the unwillingness of the War Ministry to follow our advice. Another factor I must mention here as being the light motif in our dealings with the ITALIANS, is the mutual recognition that British and ITALIAN interests run parallel. I have often said, and four successive ITALIAN War Ministers have agreed with me, that the British and ITALIAN streams in the general European and international picture flow along the same course. There has been this tacit understanding all along and it has got us over some difficult hurdles.

6. [illegible]

Having given this brief account of recent ITALIAN Army history and explained the Allied policy for the Italian Army and breakdown in

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horse to the water but you can't make him drink" - unless he wants to.

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6. <u>DETAILS OF THE ITALIAN ARMY</u>

Having given this brief account of recent ITALIAN Army history and explained the Allied policy for the Italian Army and Revolution in general terms of the 140,000 man permitted, I next propose to say a few words about the organisation and composition of this new ITALIAN Army, its present duties, its personnel, equipment, morale etc.

(a) <u>Organisation</u>

(1) The ITALIANS are very poor organisers and their Army is no exception to the national trait. The "set-up" at the War Ministry (including the General Staff) is an extraordinary mix-up, being a legacy of the Fascist period and a product

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6. (a)(i) (Cont'd)

of the distrust of the Gov't for the Army Staff. To tackle the matter during the war or the reorganization on to a peace basis was impossible. One cannot have one foot firm when climbing up or down a tree. The time has now arrived however when we can tackle the problem and a proposal for reorganization of the War Ministry based on a simplified version of the British War Office organization has been submitted by the Minister to the War Ministry and accepted in principle. The ITALIAN elections have rather held this up, but once the basic idea has been approved, sub committees will get to work on elaborate a detailed plan, which will incorporate the three main staff branches (G, A and Q) and an Army Council and Executive Committee. The senior people at the War Ministry are enthusiastic about these proposals.

(ii) Apart from the War Ministry itself, however, which has been left until last for the reason I have stated, the ITALIAN Army has already been drastically reorganized and the process is continuing.

The country is divided into eleven Army Regions, (PRINT OUT ON WALL MAP A' by 5' 6') like our Home Commands, each commanded by a Lieut General or senior Major General. In each Region there are military districts, engineering depots and the usual administrative services. There are small military staffs at these installations, but much of the work is done by civilians. The Army Commanders are in complete control of their own

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(ii) Apart from the War Ministry itself, however, which has been left until last for the reason I have stated, the ITALIAN Army has already been drastically reorganized and the process is continuing.

The country is divided into eleven Army Regions (PLEASE CUT OUT WALL MAP 4' by 5' @F) like our Home Commands, each commanded by a Lieut General or senior Major General. In each Region there are military districts, regimental depots and the usual administrative services. There are small military staffs at these installations, but much of the work is done by civilians. The Army Commanders are in complete control of their own Regions, thus achieving decentralization. The perhaps greatest fault of the past was over-centralization.

(iii) We have insisted on the greatest economy of manpower in these territorial cuts, since the ITALIAN have been accustomed in the past to a lavish provision of batmen and general servants for the convenience of their officers and staff generally.

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6.(a)(iii) (Cont'd)

In this connection we were able to persuade the General Staff some months ago to try out the British system of British HQ Committees. The ITALIAN immediately found this most valuable and I am sure the system has come to stay. It is resulting in big economies of manpower and the new ITALIAN data respond very closely to British ideas on the subject. A staff offr of the Mission sits in as observer at all meetings of the ITALIAN HQ Committee.

(iv) Administrative Services

The figure of 28,000 (23% of the whole) for Administrative Services may seem low. But the peace time administration of the ITALIAN army is carried out as regards supply largely by the use of civilian contractors and is augmented by the employment on permanent installations of civilian personnel. Moreover, this Interim Army is not envisaged for battle fighting on a great scale, but only locally on the frontiers. The administrative Services could of course be expanded if the Peace Treaty allows ITALY an Army larger than 440,000. In any event, even with only 28,000, the administration is working well.

(v) The gendarmerie or police has number 90,000 (which the ITALIANS consider the minimum necessary) and are organised as shown on the chart. Their task is to uphold the authority of the ITALIAN Gov't and to assist the civil authorities as a last

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big commander of manpower and the new ITALIAN code respond very closely to British ideas on the subject. A staff offr of the Mission also is an observer at all meetings of the ITALIAN GS Committee.

(iv) Administrative Services.

The figure of 28,000 (20% of the whole) for Administrative Services may seem low. But the peace time administration of the ITALIAN army is carried out as regards supply largely by the use of civilian contractors and is augmented by the employment on permanent installations of civilian personnel. Moreover, this Interim Army is not envisaged for battle fighting on a great scale, but only locally on the frontiers. The administrative services could of course be expanded if the Peace Treaty allows ITALY an army larger than 440,000. In any event, even with only 28,000, the administration is working well.

(v) The Carabinieri or Police Bde number 30,000 (which the ITALIANS consider the minimum necessary) and are organised as shown on the chart. Their task is to uphold the authority of the ITALIAN Gov't and to assist the civil authorities as a last resort for the maintenance of law and order in support of the civil police and Carabinieri. The five Inf Divs, which are stationed in the NORTH of ITALY in addition to the above role are also intended to serve as a deterrent to foreign aggression across the frontiers of ITALY.

These five Inf Divs are the same ones organised, trained and equipped by the British during the war.

Their cadrs are at this moment being reviewed and revised in the

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C.(e)(v) (Cont'd)

light of combat experience, so as to economize in manpower and bring them also more into line with current British practice. They are small two bde divs, and the ITALIANS, (who are still operating under the memory of MUSSOLINI's bright ideas on the subject), will undoubtedly want to convert them into the traditional "Savoyr" or three bde divs as soon as they are permitted to do so. This is being taken into account in reorganizing the cdns so that each div and its services can be expanded proportionately to provide a balanced three bde div.

These five divs form the backbone of the Interim Army and have the best officer and NCO cadres available.

The ten Territorial regts (seven inf and three alpine) are allotted one to each of the Terr regions on the ITALIAN mainland.

The three Internal Security Divs, each 5,000 strong, are a relic of the Allied occupation, as their description implies. They serve as Terr Bde for the islands, two divs in SICILY and one in SARDINIA.

It is intended shortly to convert Terr Bde to the same cdns as the regts of the inf divs, so as to make them interchangeable, with the regts of the inf divs and achieve a measure of flexibility, uniformity and standardization.

(vi) It is not out of place to mention here that one of the hindrances we have had to contend in the ITALIAN Army, is the

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convert them into the traditional "tommy" or three bde div as soon as they are permitted to do so. This is being taken into account in re-arming the cadre so that each Div and its services can be expanded proportionately to provide a balanced three bde div.

These five divs form the backbone of the Interim Army and have the best officer and NCO cadres available.

The two Territorial regts (seven inf and three sig/fwd) are allotted one to each of the Terr regions on the [illegible] mainland.

The three Internal Security Divs, each 5,000 strong, are a relic of the Allied occupation, as their description implies. They serve as Terr Inf for the islands, two divs in [illegible] and one in [illegible].

It is intended shortly to convert two divs from the same cadre as the regts of the Inf divs, so as to make them interchangeable, with the regts of the Inf divs and achieve a measure of flexibility, uniformity and standardization.

(vi) It is not out of place to mention here that one of the bottlenecks we have had to contend in the [illegible] Army, is the needs for special cadre for certain types of tps such as [illegible], [illegible], [illegible] etc, which in the British and American Armies would be considered to have the normal role of Inf of the line. ~~[illegible]~~

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6.(a)(vi) (Cont'd)

By dint of persuasion the ITALIAN General Staff is now beginning to see the light, both as regards uniformity of ends and the need to raise the quality of the inf in general. I think they have a good case for special selection of the Alpine regts and Grenadiers, but the other "specialities" will remain a name only.

~~The ultimate objective so far as general level of the Italian Army was concerned is to have transport inf regts all on the same lines, but at the five inf divs and infantry in the Alpine regiments - all of equal value and skilled, [illegible].~~

(vii) ~~Training~~ Liaison Units (B.L.O's)

As a result of the success of the British ~~[illegible]~~ in trg the five ITALIAN divs during the war, the ITALIAN War Ministry has adopted British trg methods throughout the ITALIAN Army.

The training org of the Interim Army is in two parts:

- Territorial Training Centres for basic inf trg of recruits and conscripts (one per Territorial Region).
- Central Army Schools (concentrated in the vicinity of ROME) for the specialised arms of the service and for specialised inf weapons and other subjects.

The Territorial Training Centres are an entirely new departure for the ITALIAN Army. There is one TTC in each Terr Region with a capacity per region of 3,600 recruits at a time - total [illegible]. [illegible] recruits were trained by

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will remain a mere only.

[redacted]

(vii) Training

As a result of the success of the British [redacted] Liaison Units (BLU's) in training the five KENYAN divs during the war, the KENYAN War Ministry has adopted British trg methods throughout the KENYAN Army.

The Training org of the Interim Army is in two parts:

- Territorial Training Centres for basic inf trg of recruits and conscripts (one per Territorial Region).
- Central Army Schools (concentrated in the vicinity of NAIR) for the specialised arms of the service and for specialised inf weapons and other subjects.

The Territorial Training Centres are an entirely new departure for the KENYAN Army. There is one TTC in each Terr Region with a capacity per region of 3,600 recruits at a time - total 4,000 for the country. Formerly recruits were trained by units, and since there was no uniformity of instructors it followed that there was no uniformity in the training of recruits. Now all instructors are trained at the Central Schools and there is a common programme for all Trg Centres. The first three months basic recruits course is drawing to a close, and although results are not perfect the KENYAN authorities are satisfied that the new system has thoroughly justified itself and the current course for the KENYAN Army of the future.

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6.(a)(viii) (cont'd)

The Central Army Schools receive recruits for arms other than inf after they have had one month's basic inf trg(inf recruits do their whole three months trg at the YOI's). In between the trg of recruits there are refresher courses for the offr and NCO cadres of the Army, courses for instructors and so on. A team of British officers is att to the Central Army Schools to give advice and assistance in the application of British trg methods.

(b) Personnel and Manpower

There is no Adj Gen in the ITALIAN Army and no senior military member at the War Ministry responsible for co-ordinating personnel and manpower problems. This is one of the things we aim to put right in the reorganisation of the War Ministry.

Consequently personnel and manpower have always been the most neglected aspects of the ITALIAN Army and are particularly so at the moment.

(i) The ITALIAN Army is a conscript army and the Italian Force of 440,000 is composed at present roughly of 20,000 regular offrs and NCOs and 420,000 conscripts serving for twelve months. With 40,000 men being called-up every four months and a similar number being discharged simultaneously it follows that at any given time:-

$\frac{1}{3}$ of the other ranks are at the trg centres doing basic trg

$\frac{1}{3}$ have been with their unit under four months;

$\frac{1}{3}$ have been with their unit four to eight months, and will

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(i) The ITALIAN Army is a conscript army and the Interim Force of 140,000 is composed at present roughly of 20,000 regular officers and NCOs and 120,000 conscripts serving for twelve months. With 40,000 men being called-up every four months and a similar number being discharged simultaneously it follows that at any given time,-

½ of the other ranks are at the Trg Centres doing basic trng

½ have been with their unit under four months;

½ have been with their unit four to eight months, and will shortly be discharged.

Thus, at present, the strength of units of the Army is below actual WE. This will be rectified if and when the ITALIANS are permitted an Army larger than 140,000. In the opinion of the ITALIAN General Staff at least 50% of their Army will have to be regulars if their new small Army is to be an efficient one. Conditions of Finance rule this out for the moment, but this is what long term plan.

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6.(-)(i) (Cont'd)

In the meantime proposals have again been put fwd to the ITALIANS to alter their present call-up system, so as to mitigate the effects of the present arrangement, but the change cannot be made until the end of the year. The proposals (our original ones) envisage a monthly call-up so that the graph of intake and outflow shall not be so violent as under the 4 monthly call-up. The ITALIANS are not more than half convinced that this is the right answer.

(ii) ITALIAN OTHER RANKS. Apart from a generally low standard of education and peculiar ideas about hygiene, there is plenty of good material among ITALIAN other ranks. They are hardy, simple and keen. Given good leadership and try and proper supplies and equipment they would make a really good showing - as they proved in the Desert Groups in the war.

(iii) Specialist Employment. Compared with some other countries ITALY is a nation in backward mechanically, and this, coupled with the low standard of education, produces from the call-ups a very small proportion of mechanical or electrical tradesmen or recruits who can be brought up to the necessary standard in short courses. It is quite impracticable to produce a specialist in certain trades and also employ him in that role for a reasonable period when the term of service is only twelve months.

The ITALIAN General Staff plans to recruit volunteers for 3 - 5 years with the colours at rates of pay that bear some comparison with civilian tradesmen rates; but has been unable to date

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and outlook shall not be so violent as under the 4 monthly call-up. The ITALIANS are now more than half convinced that this is the right answer.

(ii) ITALIAN Other Ranks. Apart from a generally low standard of education and peculiar ideas about hygiene, there is plenty of good material among ITALIAN other ranks. They are hardy, simple and brave. Given good leadership and trg and proper supplies and equipment they would make a really good showing - as they proved in the Combat Groups in the war.

(iii) Specialist Tradesmen. Compared with some other countries ITALY has a ratio in backward proportion, and this, coupled with the low standard of education, produces from the call-up a very small proportion of mechanical or electrical tradesmen or recruits who can be brought up to the necessary standard on short courses. It is quite impracticable to produce a specialist in certain trades and also employ him in that role for a reasonable period when the term of service is only twelve months.

The ITALIAN General Staff plans to recruit volunteers for 3 - 5 years with the colours at rates of pay that bear some comparison with civilian tradesmen rates; but has been unable to date to obtain Treasury approval for the scheme. And on 1 July when the last of the wartime classes will be released the ITALIAN Army will face a crisis over the signals, MT and wings. The great bugbear in the whole business is, as always, Finance.

(iv) Regs. NCOs are regulars, and quite and below conscripts. The present regular cadres contain a big proportion of elderly NCOs who are inefficient and poorly trained, and who will have to be retired in the near future, to make way for younger and more active NCOs who have been taught British methods of trg at

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6.(b)(iv) (Cont'd)

the Central Military Schools.

A new plan will also have to be drawn up for cdts and cpls, who were formerly promoted to these ranks on completion then the term of service used to be eighteen months.

(v) Morale. There are some good officers, but the majority are bad. Among the reasons, I would mention:-

- poor system of trg, with too much emphasis on culture and insufficient attention to leadership and command during the trg period. ITALIAN officers have been spending far too long on theory at the Military Academy and Schools of Application (four to five years) before going near the tps;
- no idea of man management or looking after the welfare of the tps. With the majority of ITALIAN offrs it is a question of their own comfort first and the men a very poor second.
- unwillingness to take responsibility and the habit (officially encouraged) of leaving decisions to the men above.

I have found even in the highest places in the ITALIAN General Staff quite a complex over this culture business. They attach definitely more importance to their offrs being able to "keep their end up" in society than to the standard of their professional ability. Some ITALIAN offrs have learned their lesson during the war from the example of British and American offrs. I have also told the War Minister, and he has accepted my view, that I cannot agree to longer than two years at the Mil Academy, and that this must be followed by a posting to a unit for six months or more before the young offr is sent on

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Another big question the ENGLISH still have to settle is the disposal of the 4 - 5,000 regular senior offrs who are now surplus, following the drastic reduction in the size of the ENGLISH Army to the present level. There again my Minister has made strong representations that compulsory retirement should be based on comparative ability, and not simply by reducing age limits all round.

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(b) (v) (Cont'd)

It has taken over twelve months to get the necessary legislation approved fixing the terms of retirement, and of course this has had a most unsettling effect on all the offr cadres. The ministerial decree has just been published in the Official Gazette and I hope for action now that the elections are over. Yet a further matter which has stirred passions in this already tormented land is the question of personnel who co-operated with the Republican Gov't after the Armistice.

It sounds an easy matter to settle, but there are so many degrees and shades of co-operation, (from the man who actively assisted the enemy, to the man who "signed on" for the republic to get his pay and at the same time did what he could to obstruct the republican effort), that the issue is often confused. Many of these "doubtful cases" are still in the Army, and the Chief of the Army Staff has been pressing for their immediate retirement.

The solution of most of these personnel and manpower questions depends on political and financial decisions and progress is thus slow. Nevertheless, some progress has been made, and with a new and more authoritative Gov't after the elections we can expect better results.

(vi) Time prevents me from going into details as regards other "A" matters, but I might mention that we have instituted a new Welfare Branch & Public Relations Office at the War Ministry, and introduced Personnel Selection procedure for

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[illegible] and that. [illegible] passions in this already tormented land is the question of personnel who co-operated with the Republican Gov't after the Armistice.

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The solution of most of these personnel and man-power questions depends on political and financial decisions and progress in time also. Nevertheless, some progress has been made, and with a new and more authoritative Gov't after the elections we can expect better results.

(vi) Time prevents me from going into details as regards other "R" matters, but I might mention that we have instituted a new Welfare Branch & Public Relations Office at the War Ministry, and introduced Personnel Selection procedure for recruits at the C.A.R.'s. The introduction of Court Martials, in addition to the existing procedure of Military Tribunals & Judges, will I hope also soon be a fact. All these are new departures.

(c) Legislation of the Italian Army

(i) The Italian Government is now responsible for the Executive Maintenance of the Interim Army. It can provide [illegible] 5625, rations, accommodation stores, P.O.L. - and some transport,

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ANNEX "A"
to
APPENDIX "A"

FOOD PURCHASED BY 5 ROMAN FAMILIES - APRIL 1946 -

Family No.	Type of Family	Daily Calories per capita				Daily cost in Lire per capita of foodstuffs purchased:			
	No. of pers.	Purchased on Ration Cards:	Purch. Free Market	Total	% from ration items:	on Ration Cards:	Free Market	TOTAL:	% for ration items:
I	4 adult women	719	1414	2133	34	7.80	121.20	129.--	6.00
II	7 (1 man (2 women (4 children	759	1456	2215	34	10.--	126.--	136.--	7.35
III	5 (1 man (1 woman (3 children	764	1194	1958	39	10.25	113.75	124.50	8.20
IV	2 adult women	678	1458	2136	32	5.95	145.05	151.--	3.95
V	3(1 man (2 women	775	1295	2070	37	10.75	138.25	149.--	7.20
AVERAGE 4.2		732	1363	2102	35	8.25 (Lire)	128.85 (Lire)	137.90 (Lire)	6.40

a. Generating Facilities (KW name Plate rating)

UTILITIES	Prewar Capacity	Capacity available on liberation Percent	Capacity available 31 Dec. 1945 Percent	Unrepaired capacity Percent
Sardinia	88,000	72%	72%	21%
Sicily	86,900	44%	64%	36%
Southern Italy	409,500	42%	63%	37%
Central Italy	935,850	11%	41%	59%
Northern Italy	4,228,550	88%	95%	5%
SUB. TOTAL UTILITIES	5,749,600	72%	83%	17%
I State RR	242,500	57%	58%	42%
TOTAL ITALY	5,992,100	71%	82%	18%

b. Transmission Lines

The following data pertains to transmission lines of 30,000 volts and above and stated in KM.

UTILITIES	Prewar length KM	Available on liberation Percent	Available 31 Dec. 1945 Percent	Unrepaired Percent
Sardinia	757	100%	100%	none
Sicily	700	62%	100%	none
Southern Italy	3,446	63%	82%	18%
Central Italy	6,686	11%	84%	16%
Northern Italy	23,041	65%	95%	5%
SUB. TOTAL UTILITIES	34,630	55%	91%	9%
I State RR (Est)	11,312 (Est)	41% (Est)	86% (Est)	14% (Est)
TOTAL ITALY	45,942	52%	90%	10%

Note: Above data on I. State Railways transmission lines is estimated due to accurate information not yet being available. Can be considered reasonably accurate.

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c. Substations

The following data pertains to substations of 30,000 volts primary voltage and higher. Ratings are in thousands of KVA.

UTILITIES	Prewar capacity 1000 of KVA	Available on liberation Percent	Available 31 Dec. 1945 Percent	Unrepaired Percent
Sardinia	87	76%	86%	14%
Sicily	113	84%	91%	9%
Southern Italy	1,304	53%	65%	35%
Central Italy	2,753	20%	45%	55%
Northern Italy	11,897	88%	94%	6%
	16,154	73%	84%	16%
I State RR	1,057	33%	36%	64%
TOTAL ITALY	17,211	71%	81%	19%

d. Completion of Rehabilitation

Based on the present plans of the utility companies, and barring delays, the rehabilitation of generating plants, which are to be restored, will be accomplished in the various areas about as follows:

Sardinia	By the end of 1946
Sicily	" " " " 1947
Southern Italy	" " " " 1947
Central Italy	" " " " 1947
Northern Italy	" " " " 1946
I. State R.R.	" " " " 1948

The rehabilitation of substations and transmission lines will keep pace with and will be completed in about the same order as above.

ANNEX "A"
to
ANNEX "A"

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IV	2 adult women	678	1458	2136	32	5.95	145.05	151.--	3.95
V	3(1 man (2 women	775	1295	2070	37	10.75	138.25	149.--	7.20
AVERAGE 4.2		739	1363	2102	35	8.95	128.85	137.80	6.40
						(Lire)	(Lire)	(Lire)	

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6.(c) (i) (Cont'd)

to a gradually increasing extent. They are prohibited at present from manufacturing arms and in any event their weapons are largely antiquated.

(ii) The present arms, eqpt and MT of the Italian Army

- The five Inf Divs have their British arms, eqpt and MT.
- The Territorial Bns have ITALIAN weapons, eqpt and MT but are changing to British weapons.
- The Territorial Trg Centres have British weapons on loan and ITALIAN MT.
- The Central Military Schools have British weapons and almost British and ITALIAN MT.

(iii) Proposed policy on arms, eqpt and MT of the Italian Army

In consideration of the fact that

- the ITALIAN Gov't is NOT at present permitted to manufacture arms, arm and AFVs;
- that there are no modern types of ITALIAN weapons and AFV;
- that the five inf divs, (the hard core of the Army) are already

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6.(c)(iii) (Cont'd)

equipped with British weapons and MT, and bearing in mind the need for standardization throughout all the combat tps and tng organization.

It has been recommended to the CCS by AFHQ that British armament ~~[illegible]~~ be made available to the ITALIAN Gov't for the whole of the Italian Army.

Pro tem, SAC has authorized issue on loan of sufficient weapons to permit of a standard armament throughout, pending CCS decision. (By AFW's in mount Arm'd Cars - the ITALIANS are NOT allowed tanks in the Italian Army).

(iv) ~~(v)~~ Maintenance of British equipment already supplied to the ITALIAN ARMY

The British weapons and MT supplied to the five inf divs last year are in very poor shape through lack of spares. It is estimated that nearly 30% of these British vehs are off the road and cannot be put back again until the spares are made available. The ITALIANS are beginning to be apprehensive about this situation, and in conjunction with other factors affecting Allied equipment mentioned above, it may well be that they will decide to make do with MT of ITALIAN production, except Arm'd Cars, which they cannot make, and possibly other special types. Whatever plan is ultimately decided on for the supply of Allied weapons and tpt, it is essential that adequate provision be made for the supply of spares.

(5) ~~(vi)~~ Barracks and accommodation

Many of the ITALIAN Army barracks are antiquated or badly located

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[illegible].

Pro ten, SHC has authorized issue on loan of sufficient weapons to permit of a standard armament throughout, pending GOC decision. (By AFV's in usual Arm'd Cars - the [illegible] are not allowed units in the Interim Army).

(iv) ~~(v)~~ Maintenance of British equipment already supplied to the [illegible] Army.

The British weapons and kit supplied to the five [illegible] Corps last year are in very poor shape through lack of spares. It is estimated that nearly 50% of these British vehicles are off the road and cannot be put back again until the spares are made available. The [illegible] are beginning to be apprehensive about this situation, and in conjunction with other factors affecting Allied equipment mentioned above, it may well be that they will decide to make do with 100% of [illegible] production, except Arm'd Cars, which they cannot make, and possibly other special types. Whatever plan is ultimately decided on for the supply of Allied weapons and kit, it is essential that adequate provision be made for the supply of spares.

(5) ~~(vi)~~ Barracks and accommodation

Many of the [illegible] Army barracks are antiquated or badly located in the centre of large towns; others were extensively damaged during the fighting. Apart from these however there are sufficient suitable barracks for the needs of the reduced Interim Army. Great difficulty and much delay has been experienced in getting the units into suitable accommodation quarters, as many barracks were occupied until quite recently by Allied [illegible] being used as emergency centres for housing refugees.

Some of the better barracks are being used as hospitals for

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6.(c)(vi) (cont'd)

Defense.

Suitable dry areas on the [illegible] seaboard present a problem; the country is either intensely cultivated or very mountainous. Therefore good barracks with suitable dry facilities are the exception rather than the rule.

The Central Schools have been located round [illegible] where there is excellent dry country, with the added advantage of a large number of tps centrally located near the capital.

7. [illegible]

This is outside the terms of reference of the Military Mission, but it is known that the [illegible] have prepared for the [illegible] conference, proposals for a future Army of about 300,000. We have been assured by the [illegible] General Staff that it is their intention to use the solid foundations on which the Imperial Army is being built as a basis for the new Army, and simply to expand the various categories to meet what they consider to be essential [illegible] requirements. Such are, for instance, converting the 1st Div to three-bde div, and providing a new category of covering tps for their land and sea frontiers. Whatever these forces are to be, they obviously serve only as a slight deterrent to aggression across [illegible]'s frontiers, and something to "hold the fort" until assistance can arrive from outside. [illegible] will have to look pretty heavily on the United Nations security organisation, or on other friendly nations around her. As regards equipment, we have already seen that the [illegible] will be entirely dependent on outside help for their armament (if this is to be effective) and relatively arm and AFVs. They

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One finds to see also how the [illegible] can contemplate the future with equanimity without some technical assistance from the [illegible]. The past [illegible] years has shown up all too clearly the organisational and tactical deficiencies of the [illegible] Army. Under Allied supervision the [illegible] have learned some useful lessons, particularly in the field of [illegible] organisation, but they have a very long way to go yet. Tactically too, many senior officers have been out of touch with reality for too long.

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7.(Cont'd)

but the ITALIANS are a proud nation (even if they have just had a soft beating, and know it,) and as like as not would probably prefer to muddle along on their own devices, rather than that they should feel that the "sovereignty" of their Army is being touched.

8. CONCLUSIONS

In 1943 - 44 the ITALIAN Army touched the bottom of the downward curve, but since then it has definitely started on the long and arduous climb back to morality and greater efficiency despite major crises over manpower, finance, etc. There are keen and good offers on the ITALIAN General Staff, and given a chance they will rebuild something good and worth while.

I consider, however, the fulfillment of the following conditions a sine qua non for a reliable and efficient ITALIAN Army:

(i) Reorganization of the ITALIAN War Ministry including the elimination of undue political interference in Army matters, and the use of proper staff procedure similar to those of the British and American armies;

(ii) The recognition and acceptance by the ITALIAN Gov't that the ITALIAN Army, however small, needs to be encouraged and brought to a high state of efficiency, and that the Army must have whatever funds the country can afford for this purpose; and the corollary,

(iii) that the size of the Army be related to the amount of funds available, i.e. cutting their suit according to their cloth, and (iv) first fixing the size of the Army and then [illegible] with whatever funds the Gov't

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In 1943 - As the ITALIAN Army reached the bottom of the downward curve, but since then it has definitely started on the long and arduous climb back to normality and greater efficiency despite major crises over manpower, finance, etc. There are here and good offs on the ITALIAN General Staff, and given a chance they will rebuild something good and worth while.

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(ii) The recognition and acceptance by the ITALIAN Gov't that the ITALIAN Army, however small, needs to be encouraged and brought to a high state of efficiency, and that the Army must have whatever funds the country can afford for this purpose; and the corollary,

(iii) that the size of the Army be related to the amount of funds available, i.e. cutting their suit according to their cloth, and NOT first fixing the size of the Army and then trying to run it on proper lines with whatever funds the Gov't chooses to allow;

(iv) the elimination at an early date of surplus and inefficient officers and NCOs, and the creation of a proper cadet college or sabre lines;

(v) the introduction of better terms of service, pay 5622 promotion for all ranks, with a view to:

- eliminating some of the graft and dishonesty (the result of poor terms of service) which has always been the rule, and

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6.(v) (cont'd)

- attracting good types and providing an incentive to do well in an Army career - i.e. accelerated promotion for those who deserve it;

(vi) The introduction of a 3 - 5 year term of service for a proportion of the trainees and CMT.

(vii) An early decision by the ALLIES on the question of the supply of Allied arms, and not ARMS for the future.

(viii) The continuance, if possible, in some form of Allied technical assistance and supervision, possibly bound up with and conditional on the provision of Allied weapons of war.

In this talk I have only been able to touch on certain major aspects of this vast and fascinating problem of the evolution of a new ITALIAN Army practically from scratch. I hope I have not given too gloomy a picture. The ITALIAN Army and always will be below Allied standards. But I have great hope for the future. The new Army is staying well and shows a good chance of being better than ever before. Working and fighting alongside the ALLIES the ITALIANS have learned some valuable lessons. I feel the way to judge them is NOT as much by their past showing, as by what they are capable of if properly trained, equipped and led. They have achieved much out of chaos in the short space of two years, and will achieve much more providing they continue to receive help and guidance and understanding from the ALLIES - both British and American.

Think things on to my last point. ITALY has a population of 45 millions, a great reserve of manpower, occupying a vital strategic

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supply of Allied arms, and and AFWA for the future.

(viii) The continuance, if possible, in some form of Allied technical assistance and supervision, possibly bound up with and conditional on the provision of Allied weapons of war.

In this talk I have only been able to touch on certain major aspects of this vast and fascinating problem of the evolution of a new INDIAN Army periodically from scratch. I hope I have not given too gloomy a picture. The Army as it always will be below Allied standards. But I have great hope for the future. The new Army is showing well and stands a good chance of being better than ever before. Working and fighting alongside the ALLIES the INDIANS have learned some valuable lessons. I feel the way to judge them is not so much by their past shortcomings, as by what they are capable of if properly trained, equipped and led. They have achieved much out of chaos in the short space of two years, and will achieve much more providing they continue to receive help and guidance and understanding from the ALLIES - both British and American.

Which brings me to my last point. INDIA has a population of 45 millions, a great reserve of manpower, occupying a vital strategic point on our Mediterranean communications, and a bastion this side of the iron curtain. As we stand at the crossroads, the majority of INDIANS are looking towards the west. They have been encouraged in this by our tolerant attitude since the revolution, by our trying to forget the past and looking to the future. So I say it is most key to continue this policy. It must pay us to market the new INDIAN Army in whatever way we can. By supplying her with our surplus weapons of war, for instance, even though we should receive little or nothing in exchange, we should secure continuity of Allied

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C. (cont'd)

friendship and influence with the ITALIAN Army and indirectly with the ITALIAN nation. This would also enable the ITALIAN Gov't to devote to reconstruction of the country those resources which would otherwise have to go to the manufacture of armaments. I am sure the ITALIANS would approve of this. They are unlikely to forget that GARIBALDI's corps came here in this last war.

British and American sympathy just now - practical sympathy - is all important. He dat git dat get - he gives twice who gives quickly. ITALY is on the boundary between WAR and PEACE, and I am very certain that as an Allied Government, ITALY and the ITALIAN ARMY are capable of yielding a valuable dividend.

L. Browning

Major General
General Officer Commanding
Land Forces Sub Commission A.C.
(Military Mission ITALIAN Army)

SECRET

20 June 1946

LG/abc

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[illegible]

20 June 1946

LB/bbc

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION.
APO 394.
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION.

801 AB

Ref: A/322/OK.

14th June, 1946

JUN 17 1946

TO: Executive Commissioner.

SUBJECT: Problems and Tasks of Allied Commission and those of its Successor.

With reference to 801/224/30 of 11th June 1946, attached is a copy of a note on the present and future problems confronting the Allied Commission.

It is impossible to consider the responsibilities which will confront the successors of the Commission without any indication as to what organization will replace the Commission and what will be the scope of its activities. It has, therefore, been necessary to make certain assumptions.

I presume there is no intention of maintaining the present organization and merely changing its title. If so there would be no object in differentiating between present and future responsibilities which would change more in theory than in practice though they would decrease in course of time. Moreover, such a plan, although it might be administratively convenient would in my opinion, not be in keeping with the spirit of the terms of the revised Armistice and would, after the power which has been wielded by the Commission, be quite contrary to well-established practice in such matters.

The attached note does not cover the Service Sub-Commissions. It is based mainly on activities with which the Civil Affairs Section has been concerned, but it is presumed that unless there remain responsibilities in connection with civil supplies for VENEZIA GIULIA, Economic responsibilities have already, in general, passed to other agencies.

M Carr Brigadier

M. CARR, Brigadier.
VP. CA. Section.

Forwarded that I understand C.A.G.S. Vol XIII has been cancelled
16/6

MC

(CSO)

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NOTE ON PROBLEMS AND TASKS OF THE ALLIED COMMISSION AND THOSE OF ITS SUCCESSOR.

1. PRESENT PROBLEMS AND TASKS

These tasks fall under four main headings:-

(A) Technical matters connected with A.M.G. in UDINE and VENEZIA GIULIA.

(B) Acting as a medium for correspondence and representations between the Italian Government and representatives of Governments not in diplomatic relationship with the Italian Government.

(C) Outstanding functions and residual matters (other than A.M.G.)

(D) Information.

(E) Personnel.

(A) A.M.G.

As regards A.M.G. in both UDINE AND VENEZIA GIULIA, the Commission reviews A.M.G. Court cases of a defined category and is responsible for general supervision of A.M.G. Courts.

In view of the fact that UDINE is under A.M.G. solely for military purposes, administration in this territory is left, as far as possible to the Italian authorities. Italian law has full effect and any new decrees passed automatically have effect in the Province. In many matters such as Education, Public Health, appointment of subordinate officials etc., local Italian authorities deal direct with the Italian Government in Rome. The Commission's responsibilities as regards UDINE are, therefore, less those which might normally apply.

As regards VENEZIA GIULIA, Italian law does not have effect in the territory and direct correspondence between local Italian officials and the Italian Government is prohibited.

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The Commission, therefore, advises on drafting of A.M.G. Orders and especially on those which keep A.M.G. legislation in line with that enacted in the remainder of Italy and acts as a medium for correspondence with the Italian Government on such matters as Education, promotion and pay of officials etc., It also advises on War booty problems.

Other matters such as Public Health, Public Safety, Local Government are dealt with almost exclusively by XIII Corps., A.M.G.

There may also be certain economic matters connected with civil supply for and industrial rehabilitation in VENEZIA GIULIA.

(B) DIPLOMATIC MATTERS

The principal function of the Commission is to act as medium between the representative of the Yugoslav Government on the Advisory Council and the Italian Government in matters outside the province of the Advisory Council. These include such matters as alleged seizure of Italian fishing vessels by the Yugoslavs, arrest of Yugoslavs by the Italian authorities, and claims made by the Yugoslavs in respect of property and war booty.

(C) OUTSTANDING ACTIVITIES AND RESIDUAL MATTERS (OTHER THAN AMG)

(a) Directions etc., from higher authority.

The Commission conveys to the Italian Government the directions, views or requests of the Supreme Allied Commander.

(b) Displaced Persons.

One of the main outstanding functions is that of Displaced Persons. Certain camps have recently been taken back from UNRRA bringing the total number of Camps under the Commission to 15.

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Unless there should be a rush of illegal Jewish entrants into Italy in connection with immigration into Palestine and except for a certain incidence of routine illegal entrants, the number of Displaced Persons and Refugees can be considered as static.

(c) Legal.

The Legal Sub-Commission are completing a review of all Court cases with a view to adjustment of all deterrent sentences. A careful check is also being made of all prisoners held under Allied authority in Italian prisons. The work should be completed by August 31st 1946. The Legal Sub-Commission also advises and expresses opinion on current matters and deals with such questions as trial of merchant seamen.

(d) Local Government.

Now that the main Italian elections are over, the closing work on Local Government is mainly historical.

(e) Control of Munitions Production.

The control of production of arms and munitions is a function which, the Commission, though charged with it, has never been able to perform mainly through lack of personnel.

(f) Minor Matters.

Minor residual matters comprise certain current matters, some few matters pertaining to Sub-Commissions or Branches which have ceased to exist such as Education, Monuments and Fine Arts, Patriots etc., and enquiries from outside sources regarding individuals and property.

(h) INFORMATION.

By reason of the fact that the Commission has Liaison Groups or Officers in many areas in Italy, a large amount of information is obtained by means of D/O letters, telegrams, 'phone messages and monthly reports on matters which have long since been the responsibility of the Italian Government.

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Such information which duplicates the above is also obtained from Italian Government sources all of which has to be translated. All appropriate information is disseminated and further is collated into a monthly report normally about two months in arrears. It is not known of what interest such a report is to Washington and London.

Items of interest are transmitted to AFHQ and to the U.K. and U.S.Embassies, this supplementing information obtained through Military and Consular channels respectively. This information service occupies much of the working time of many officers and a considerable number of civilian employees.

(b) PERSONNEL.

This Commission has already dropped functions solely by reason of lack of personnel caused by redeployment and release. Such process will continue. As regards the future, for instance, it could not be possible to continue the present activities of the Local Government Sub-Commission which will have lost all its key personnel by early July 1946.

The number of Legal officers available is insufficient to meet present requirements and the situation may continue to deteriorate. The provision of Public Safety Officers also presents a problem.

2. PROBLEMS WHICH WILL CONFRONT THE SUCCESSORS OF THE COMMISSION.

(a) It is difficult to make an appreciation of these problems in the absence of any precise information as to what organization will replace the Allied Commission.

It is, therefore, necessary to make certain assumptions.

It is assumed that when the Allied Commission is abolished it will cease to exist in its present form.

It is further assumed that Allied Commission Liaison Groups and officers will be withdrawn and that collection of information on matters which are solely the responsibility of the Italian Government will cease and that AFHQ will rely on such military facilities as remain and the U.K. and U.S.Embassies on the peace-time source of Consular offices. The press and radio will also be available.

On the above assumption it is presumed that in accordance with the revised Armistice the successors of the Allied Commission will be:-

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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(323)

(i) A Service Mission responsible for the Italian Land, Sea and Air Forces and the Control of Production of Warlike Stores.

(2) A Liaison Group responsible for technical advice on AMG matters in UDINE and VENEZIA GIULIA, residual Allied Commission matters, and winding up as quickly as possible the affairs of the Allied Commission.

These two organizations would be independent and each come directly under AFHQ.

(b) The functions which would remain for the Liaison Group in broad outline would be as follows:-

(i) A.M.G

Review of Court cases, co-ordination with Italian Government, supervision of A.M.G. legislation, advice on sundry civil affairs matters, medium for correspondence between Italian Government and Italian officials in AMG territory. (Note: There may be some economic functions to be included.)

(ii) DISCARDED

To continue to act as medium between the Italian Government and the Yugoslav representative in Italy.

(iii) DISPLACED PERSONS.

To continue to administer Displaced Persons not acceptable to UNRRA until some other organisation accepts responsibility or until agreement is reached with the Italian Government that they will accept responsibility on the withdrawal of Allied Military support.

(iv) GENERAL.

To act in a Liaison capacity between AFHQ and the Italian Government.

To deal with residual matters, to transfer matters to other agencies in accordance with policy and generally to wind up the affairs of the Allied Commission.

M. CAMP, Brigadier.
VP. CA. Section.

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 794
ECONOMIC SECTION

Ref: 33/1.38 13 June 1946

SUBJECT: Economic Section - Functions.

TO : The Chief Commissioner

1. With the cessation of the ALCOM supply line, and the successive transfers of control in various areas to the Italian Government, the Economic Section has been drastically reduced. The volume of work in connection with the remaining functions is scaled down. However, the diversity and scope of business tends to cover the whole field formerly comprised in the activities of the Section when it had 7 Sub-Commissions and 2 Branches. Matters arising are of such varied nature and the number of occasions on which a type of problem arises per month is uncertain. Hence the following statement of functions should be interpreted as listing only the more important activities.

2. The remaining functions of the Economic Section fall generally under one of the following headings:

a. Clearing, consolidating and allocating the Venezia Giulia/Udine Supply Program.

b. Advice on VG/Ud economic activities.

c. Disposal of Captured Enemy Material to Italian Government.

d. Collecting evaluating information and reporting upon economic conditions in Italy.

e. Furnishing advice and assistance to the Italian Government, when requested.

f. Liaison for Allied Military formations with Italian Government --

Derequisitioning
Supply of timber
Utilities
Power
Highways
Transportation and shipping.

g. Attending to residual correspondence.

3. <u>Venezia Giulia Supply</u>

Requests for civil supplies are prepared by the AMGs of Venezia Giulia and Udine. These requests are channeled through Allied Commission for purposes of:

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a. Consolidation.

b. Screening items which are available in the Italian economy. (Contacts with Italian Government and other agencies to get commitments on willingness to supply.)

c. Screening items as to justifications.

d. Making allocations and issuing instructions on the division of supplies as they arrive.

e. Borrowing and repayment from other programs of essential supplies to cover non-arrivals.

f. Insuring that the supply of electric power is made available to XIII Corps from sources in Italian Government territory.

In the operations above outlined there are many signals and other communications to establish understandings on items not originally clear, or on which changes are proposed.

4. Advice on VG/Gd Economic Activities

This function includes responding to AMG inquiries and requests for information and instructions. It consists largely of dealing with isolated cases as they arise and covers widely divergent matters. A few typical recent examples are:

a. Aiding toward the consummation of a contract for textile manufacture between VG mills and the Commodity Credit Corporation (US).

b. Arranging contacts with the appropriate Italian Ministries on an extensive road construction project which extends beyond VG proper.

c. Acting as channel for certain public works proposals of the Italian Government.

d. Advising Udine on appropriateness of the use of AMG funds for certain purposes.

e. Interpretation of Italian Government decrees, the application of which may be desirable for VG.

f. Intercession with Italian Government for loan of 50,000,000 lire to reconstruct a cotton factory - Udine.

g. The adoption of arrangements for trade between Italy/Venezia Giulia and Zone B Venezia Giulia.

h. Assisting AMG in conforming to provisions of Italian trade agreements.

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The functions of Allied Commission with respect to AMG territory are somewhat comparable to those of an intermediate headquarters in a chain of command.

5. Disposal of Captured Enemy Material

a. After the needs of the Allied Military have been met, captured enemy material, with the exception of a few special items, is turned over to the Italian Government on quantitative receipts. CEM Branch attends to the actual turnover to the Italian agency A.R.A.R. Officers of that Branch accompany the A.R.A.R. officials and agree on the quantities. Hand receipts are taken which are followed by more formal receipts from the Government. Since the dumps of material are very diversified as to types of material, quantities and locations and the A.R.A.R. organization is not well adapted to ready receipt and disposal, the job is difficult and the completion necessarily slow. This function will continue as long as military units are closing out and giving up previously undisclosed C.E.M. material.

b. There are under the control of C.E.M. Branch certain files which pertain to the supply operation in Italy of the German RUK organization. These files are undergoing constant study and classification for the purpose of making their contents more useful to the Allied and Italian Governments. C. It appears that some organization must continue to handle C.E.M. until both American and British units are redeployed. The present volume of business is higher than usual, about 890 vehicles having been handed over this month by the Allies.

6. Economic Conditions in Italy

The personnel remaining in the Economic Section undertake to follow the basic economic conditions in Italy. The principal sources of information are AC Liaison Officers, the Italian Government, and UNRRA. Items which are observed include food stocks, rationing, agricultural production and supply, fuel and raw materials, supplies, electric power, labor and unrest, and transportation. (See Appendix A). Reports are made to SACMED when it is deemed that the information merits his attention.

7. Advice to the Italian Government

When requested, effort is made to advise and assist the Italian Government on economic problems. Here again the matters are of diverse nature. A few examples are:

a. Furthering of international trade.

b. Trading with British military administrations of occupied countries (ex-Italian colonies).

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c. Assisting in obtaining additional guards for property acquired from the Allies by the Italian Government.

d. Advice on agricultural problems.

e. Channeling inquiries from the War Office regarding availability of materials in Italy.

8. Residual Correspondence

The former Sub-Commissions of the Economic Section were active in their fields. Their shrinking or abolition has still left a considerable quantity of correspondence on which writers expect to receive action and replies. In instances the reply is limited to redirection to an appropriate agency, but in many cases some form of action may be justly expected by the writer. The correspondence covers the areas of:

Food
Agriculture
Commerce and Foreign Trade
Industry
Fuels
Transportation
Finance
Surplus Property

In all areas work is continuously underway to clear files and prepare them for the Archives.

9. The present organization with strengths are included on the attached chart, Appendix B.

CHARLES W. WALTON
Colonel, AC
Acting Vice President

Encls (2)
Appendix A
Appendix B

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STATISTICAL SUMMARY

I. Food Ration Scale

The following scale of rationed items is now authorized for normal consumers in Italy:

Ration	Children 0-3 years		Normal Consumers 3-65 years		Normal Consumers 66+ years	
	Amount	Calories per day	Amount	Calories per day	Amount	Calories per day
Daily	gm.		gm.		gm.	
Bread	200	553	200	553	200	553
Milk liquid	250	165	-	-	250	165
Monthly						
Pasta or rice**	500	58	500	58	500	58
Oils and Fats	180	53	180	53	180	53
Sugar	100	14	100	14	100	14
TOTAL		843		678		843

** Pasta ration was omitted in May and June because of wheat shortage.

The supply of other non-rationed food items is adequate to the demand which is small because of high prices. A cost-of-living analysis of five Roman families is attached as Annex "A".

II. June Wheat Situation

	(all figures in Metric Tons) Estimates - 12 June UNRRA
Stocks - 1 June	94,000
Estimated Arrivals	
to June 20	82,000
to June 30	130,000
Estimated Assessings	
to June 20	31,000
to June 30	79,000

(continued)

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[illegible] 160,00 tons.

V. Labor

a. Unemployment

Registered unemployed is 1,334,596 for the month of March, 1946. To this must be added unregistered and concealed unemployment, as, for example, by the retention under the ban on dismissals of workers for whom there is not full employment, which is estimated to bring the total figure of unemployed in Italy to approximately 2 million. This estimated figure has not varied much over the past 12 months.

b. Rates of Wages

The average wage of a male adult worker is about 443 lire per day for a skilled worker, and 414 lire per day for an unskilled worker. The figures apply to the industrial North of Italy but relate also to the Centre and South with a very small difference. The trend of wages may be estimated from the following daily rates for skilled workers in the Centre and South of Italy:

July, 1944	86 lire
February, 1945	140 "
June, 1945	280 "
September, 1945	340 "

c. Cost of Living (Also See report on 5 Roman families - Annex "A")

Only the cost of food can be measured since the cost of clothing and other commodities fluctuate violently from one area to another and from one date to another owing to local supplies and conditions.

d. Food

Taking the year 1940 as a base of 100, the cost of food for a typical family varied according to the following index figures:

March, 1945	2,228
July, 1945	1,603
November, 1945	1,952
January, 1946	2,084
March, 1946	1,661

It will be seen that there is a gradual improvement relative to the early part of 1945 but still a considerable increase relative to the index figure for 1940.

On the other hand supplies available on the official market by ration cards have considerably improved. In March, 1945 only 7 per

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(continued)

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Estimates - 12 June
UNCLA

(continued)

Total Availability	
to June 20	207,000
to June 30	303,000
Estimated Consumption	
to June 20	144,000
to June 30	228,000
Estimated Stocks	
June 20	59,000
June 30	75,000

On the basis of disclosed stocks some areas are now out of wheat or will shortly be faced with a wheat famine. However, there are hidden reserves which tend to come into the markets. Prices of bread and flour have not shown a marked tendency to rise above present high levels, nor have the holdings of the black market vendors disappeared. These facts seem to prove the existence of the hidden stocks as well as to show the influence of the excellent prospect for this year's wheat crop.

III. P.O.L.

The civilian P.O.L. stocks in Italy are as follows:

Motor Gas	60 days'	supply
Kerosene	70 "	"
Fuel Oil	60 "	"
Gas Oil	30 "	"

It is expected that the Gas Oil will be brought up to at least a 60 day level in the near future.

IV. Coal.

The civilian stocks of coal in Italy are as follows:

Stocks on hand 1 June 1946	600,000 tons
Estimated June arrivals	300,000 "
Total	900,000 tons
Permitted consumption for June	425,000 tons
Estimated stock June 30, 1946	475,000 tons

It is estimated that consumption will gradually rise to 600,000 tons per month as soon as full shipments from United States, now restricted due to the effects of the coal strike, are resumed.

Sardinian coal production is now averaging approximately 90,000 tons per month.

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[illegible] - [illegible] production [illegible] of approximately 16,000 tons.

V. Labor

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March, 1945	2,223
July, 1945	1,603
November, 1945	1,952
January, 1946	2,084
March, 1946	1,661

It will be seen that there is a gradual improvement relative to the early part of 1945 but still a considerable increase relative to the index figure for 1940.

On the other hand supplies available on the official market by ration cards have considerably improved. In March, 1945 only 7 per

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[illegible] of estimated total [illegible] for [illegible] fully was available by ration card. In March, 1946, nearly 24 per cent of requirements were available on the official market, the remaining 76 per cent having to be obtained on the unofficial or open market.

These figures relate to the position in Rome, which is repeated with slight variations in other districts in Italy.

VI. Transportation

The following Transportation and Shipping Statistical information is furnished:

a. Rail

(1) Comparisons are made between 1938, which is considered the last normal year, and April 1946.

(2) Track
91% of network now in operation.
84% of electric lines electrically operated.
55% of double track rehabilitated.

(3) Tractive Power
Steam 49%
Electric 65%

(4) Rolling Stock
Passenger Coaches 19%
Postal Vans 29%
Baggage Vans 33%
Wagons 65%

(5) Traffic Handled
Passenger Kilometres 90%
Goods ton Kilometres 133%

(6) Fuel Consumption
Monthly consumption May, 1946 compared to 1938; 110,398 to 144,562, whilst 5,703,000 gallons of fuel oil were consumed during May, 1946 compared to nil in 1938.

b. Road

The Director General of Civil Motorization in a letter dated 31 May 1946, gives the following figures for civilian vehicles as of 31 December 1945. It is an estimate and not based on census. The corresponding figures for 31 December 1939, obtained from the same source, are also shown:

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	31 Dec. 1945	31 Dec. 1938
Civilian Cars	120,000	359,700
Motor Buses	3,200	8,328
(Capacity up to 2 tons)	58,000	54,320
Trucks (Capacity from 2 to 4 tons)	21,000	31,900
(Capacity over 4 tons)	11,000	12,680
Trailers for trucks	8,500	14,000
Vans (3 wheels) and Motor Cycles	100,000	170,000
Totals	313,700	656,928

c. Shipping

During the month of May 1946, approximately 200,000 tons of coastwise shipping moved as compared to an approximate average of 800,000 tons per month in 1938.

Reconstruction and rehabilitation of ports and harbors is progressing satisfactorily and loading and discharge rate is increasing monthly.

VII. Electric Power

The following sets forth the position with respect to the rehabilitation of electric power systems of the Islands and the mainland of Italy from the date of liberation to 31 Dec. 1945.

The data is set up by areas in order to reflect the degree of damage and repairs completed as some areas were more severely affected than others.

The date of liberation is the approximate date on which the particular area was liberated.

The data on generating plants covers approximately 90% of the facilities of Italy. The remaining 10% consists of plants of 2000 KW and smaller and small isolated and privately owned plants not connected to any transmission grids. Neither are electric plants installed in industrial plants included whose output is entirely utilized by the particular industry.

The generating plants and transmission line facilities of the Italian State Railways are included since they are inter-connected with the grid systems.

The area "Southern Italy", used below, comprises the mainland beginning at approximately the Volturno and Biferno rivers and extending south to the toe of Italy. "Central Italy" comprises the area from the Volturno and Biferno rivers north to a line across Italy approximately half way between Florence and Bologna excepting the Pescara River plants which are included in Southern Italy since most of their output was utilized there. The area above the inter line is considered Northern Italy.

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a. Generating Facilities (KW name Plate rating)

UTILITIES	Prewar Capacity	Capacity available on liberation Percent	Capacity available 31 Dec. 1945 Percent	Unrepaired capacity Percent
Sardinia	88,000	79%	79%	21%
Sicily	86,900	44%	62%	38%
Southern Italy	409,500	42%	63%	37%
Central Italy	935,850	11%	41%	59%
Northern Italy	4,228,550	80%	95%	5%
SUB. TOTAL UTILITIES	5,749,600	72%	83%	17%
I State RR	242,500	57%	58%	42%
TOTAL ITALY	5,992,100	71%	82%	18%

b. Transmission Lines

The following data pertains to transmission lines of 30,000 volts and above and stated in KM.

UTILITIES	Prewar length KM	Available on liberation Percent	Available 31 Dec. 1945 Percent	Unrepaired Percent
Sardinia	757	100%	100%	none
Sicily	700	62%	100%	none
Southern Italy	3,446	63%	82%	18%
Central Italy	6,686	11%	84%	16%
Northern Italy	23,041	65%	95%	5%
SUB. TOTAL UTILITIES	34,630	55%	91%	9%
I State RR (Est)	11,312 (Est)	41% (Est)	86% (Est)	14% (Est)
TOTAL ITALY	45,942	52%	90%	10%

Note: Above data on I. State Railways transmission lines is estimated due to accurate information not yet being available. Can be considered reasonably accurate.

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c. Substations

The following data pertains to substations of 30,000 volts primary voltage and higher. Ratings are in thousands of KVA.

UTILITIES	Power capacity 1000 of KVA	Available on liberation Percent	Available 31 Dec. 1945 Percent	Unrepaired Percent
Sardinia	87	76%	86%	14%
Sicily	113	84%	91%	9%
Southern Italy	1,304	53%	65%	35%
Central Italy	2,753	20%	45%	55%
Northern Italy	11,897	88%	94%	6%
	16,154	73%	84%	16%
I State RR	1,057	33%	36%	64%
TOTAL ITALY	17,211	71%	81%	19%

d. Completion of Rehabilitation

Based on the present plans of the utility companies, and barring delays, the rehabilitation of generating plants, which are to be restored, will be accomplished in the various areas about as follows:

Sardinia	By the end of 1946
Sicily	" " " " 1947
Southern Italy	" " " " 1947
Central Italy	" " " " 1946
Northern Italy	" " " " 1948
I. State R.R.	

The rehabilitation of substations and transmission lines will keep pace with and will be completed in about the same order as above.

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ANNEX "A"
to
APPENDIX "A"

FOOD PURCHASES BY 5 ROMAN FAMILIES - APRIL 1946 -

Family No.	Type of Family	Daily Calories per capita				Daily cost in Lire per capita of foodstuffs purchased:			
	No. of pers.	Purchased on Ration Cards:	Purch. Free Market	Total	% from ration items:	On Ration Cards:	Free Market	TOTAL:	% for ration items:
I	4 adult women	719	1414	2133	34	7.80	121.20	129.--	6.00
II	7 (1 man (2 women (4 children	759	1456	2215	34	10.--	126.--	136.--	7.35
III	5 (1 man (1 woman (3 children	764	1194	1958	39	10.25	113.75	124.50	8.20
IV	2 adult women	678	1458	2136	32	5.95	145.05	151.--	3.95
V	3(1 man (2 women	775	1295	2070	37	10.75	138.25	149.--	7.20
AVERAGE 4.2		739	1363	2102	35	8.85 (Lire)	128.85 (Lire)	137.90 (Lire)	6.40

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APPENDIX "B"

SECURITY COUNCIL ORGANIZATION CHART



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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Navy Sub Commission APO 394

NSC/5159.
14th June, 1946.

From : Navy Sub Commission, Hq., Allied Commission.
To : Executive Commissioner, Hq., Allied Commission.

Subject : Civil Affairs briefing of Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery.

Reference : Headquarters Allied Commission No.801/224/EC of 1st June 1946.

In accordance with the above quoted reference the following remarks are forwarded :-

The Navy Sub Commission, Headquarters Allied Commission is responsible for all matters relating to policy in connection with the Italian Navy under the Terms of Armistice and the supervision of the general Administration of the Italian Navy not directly affecting the operation of the Italian Fleet under the Cunningham-de-Courten Agreement. It is therefore the executive agency by which decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, as they affect the Italian Navy, are implemented. It is emphasised that in accordance with the terms of the Combined Chiefs of Staff directive No.515/1 dated 19th March, 1944, the Italian Navy is employed under the operational command of the Allied Naval Area Commander, who is the British Naval Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Station. The Chief of the Navy Sub Commission is also the Flag Officer Liaison Italy and as such is responsible to the Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean for the operation of the Italian Fleet.

It is assumed that the operational command will not alter and no problem of this nature should confront the successors of the Navy Sub Commission.

2. The work of the Navy Sub Commission can be conveniently divided into four broad divisions :

(A) Administration : this division is responsible for such matters as the enforcement of Armistice Terms. Port Organisation, Legal and Financial Matters, Transportation, Repair and Salvage, Mercantile Marine and general administrative questions.

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(B) Personnel : this division is responsible for such matters as the Allocation, Training, Discipline, Control of the Movement of Personnel as well as certain duties which are now diminishing in connection with the Exemption of Civilians from Military Service, return of deserters, Prisoners of War and the appointment and removal of Italian Officers in the more important appointments.

This section will also be responsible for the reduction of the Italian Naval Personnel to the strength eventually agreed upon by the terms of the Peace Treaty.

(C) Supply : in accordance with the policy of the Combined Chiefs of Staff concerning the repair, maintenance and supply of Italian Naval vessels, laid down in C.C.S.515 dated 19th March, 1944, the United Kingdom is primarily responsible for the maintenance of the Italian Navy. This involves the supply of food, medicine, fuel Motor Transport, Naval stores and equipment for which the supply division is responsible.

The predominant problems confronting the supply section at present are :-

(a) Food : The Italian Government having assumed the responsibility for feeding the Italian Armed Forces as from the 1st June, 1946, and teething troubles are expected to arise.

(b) The supply of minesweeping stores, equipment and coal for the maintenance and operation of the British minesweeping trawlers which have been transferred to the Italian Navy to assist in the clearance of mines from Italian waters.

(c) Questions arising out of the transfer of responsibility to the Italian Government for the fuelling of the Italian Navy trawlers whereby POL products and coal for the maintenance of Italian Naval vessels are included in the Italian Government's overall import programme.

(d) The turn over of surplus naval stores and equipment to the Italian Navy.

As regards future problems that may confront the supply division, these are mainly dependent on any changes that may be made in the Combined Chiefs of Staff policy towards the Italian Navy as a result of the signing of the Peace Treaty with Italy.

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(D) Liaison : is the personal link between the Italian Ministry of Marine and the Navy Sub Commission. This division is also responsible for the collection of data on the Italian Navy, Maintenance of records of the activities of the Italian Navy, dissemination of information on organisation and policy of the Ministry of Marine, and the disposal of captured enemy material.

3. Most of the above duties can be expected to continue in a varying degree and will confront the successors of the Navy Sub Commission. The more important residual problems which will continue to arise are as follows :-

(a) Requests for information on Naval Vessels and Merchant Ships between Italian Government Ministries and Allied Governments.

(b) Status of rehabilitation of Italian shipbuilding industry.

(c) Disposition of Captured Enemy Material.

(d) Survey of War Materials held by the Italian Navy.

(e) Status of Italian Navy in regard to material condition of ships and training of personnel.

(f) Navy Sub Commission responsibilities and control over matters pertaining to the Merchant Marine.

(g) The major problem of reducing the Italian Navy in Ships and personnel to the size eventually agreed upon under the terms of the Peace Treaty.

4. There is no problem at present in this Sub Commission relative to the preponderance of British personnel. Every effort has been made to maintain equal representation of British and U.S. personnel and distribution of duties equitably.

COMMODORE, U. S. NAVY,
FOR REAR ADMIRAL,
CHIEF, NAVY SUB COMMISSION.

RG 331
ACC - Italy
Box 209
Folder 10000/109/316
"5601 - 5598"
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Date

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

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GSA FORM 7117

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801/36

IMMEDIATE

CFF/cp

306.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 794
DISPLACED PERSONS AND REPATRIATION SUB-COMMISSION

DPR/3-4/EA Tel. 489081 Ext. 392 13 June, 1946

JUN 18 1946

SUBJECT : Civil Affairs Briefing of Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery.

TO : Executive Commissioner, A.C.

1. Reference your letter 801/224/EC dated 11 June 1946.

2. Attached herewith in triplicate notes on the problems of the maintenance and disposal of displaced persons and the probable future commitments of the military in respect thereof.

For the Director:

C.F. Fothergill

C.F. FOTHERGILL
Lt. Colonel,
Deputy Director.

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2 Spare copies

(EC)

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NOTES ON ALIEN PROBLEM IN ITALY

1. The overall problem at present is the resettlement or repatriation of some 200,000 persons. These persons at present are mainly unrepatriable.

2. The figure of 200,000 is broken down as follows :-

(a)	POLCORPS and Civilian Poles	120,000
(b)	Jews (In UNRRA Camps 10,000 balance J.D.C. Camps, Hostels and living in towns)	30,000
(c)	SHPs at present under G-1 (Yugoslavs, Chetniks and Ukranians)	20,000
(d)	Yugoslav Displaced Persons (In D.P. Camps and working for Allies 10,000 remaining 10,000 living precariously in towns and country)	20,000
(e)	Repatriables (Germans, Chinese, Greeks, etc.)	2,000
(f)	Miscellaneous Nationalities (Including those of undeterminate nationality)	8,000

3. Future action regarding categories shown in para 2.

(a) - POLCORPS and Civilian Poles majority resettled.
(b) - Jews in care of UNRRA and being resettled.
(c) - (d) & (e) leave balance of 50,000 of whom :-

20,000	S.E.P.	G-1 responsibility
10,000	Yugoslavs	out-side Camps
20,000		Remain D.P.R.S.C. responsibility.

4. The remaining 20,000 which will be D.P.R.S.C. responsibility consist of :-

Yugoslavs at least	10,000
Poles " "	2,000
Miscellaneous Nationalities and Indeterminate Nationalities	8,000

5. Conclusion.

The maintenance in Italy and the arrangements for the resettlement of these 20,000 persons is likely to remain a military commitment until such time as a civilian organisation (U.N.O.) can take over.

The necessary military personnel to administer these refugees is extremely small and removes the responsibility from the Italian Government of dealing with persons who are viewed with suspicion by their parent Governments.

[illegible] individuals from forcible repatriation,

(In UNRRA Camps 10,000 balance J.D.C. Camps, Hostels and living in towns)

(c) SEPs at present under G-1 — 20,000
(Yugoslavs, Chetniks and Ukrainians)

(d) Yugoslav Displaced Persons — 20,000
(In D.P. Camps and working for Allies 10,000 remaining 10,000 living precariously in towns and country)

(e) Repatriables — 2,000
(Germans, Chinese, Greeks, etc.)

(f) Miscellaneous Nationalities — 8,000
(Including those of undeterminate nationality)

3. Future action regarding categories shown in para 2.

(a) - POLCORPS and Civilian Poles majority resettled.
(b) - Jews in care of UNRRA and being resettled.
(c) - (d) & (e) leave balance of 50,000 of whom :-

20,000	S.E.P.	G-1 responsibility
10,000	Yugoslavs	out-side Camps
20,000		Remain D.P.R.S.C. responsibility.

4. The remaining 20,000 which will be D.P.R.S.C. responsibility consist of :-

Yugoslavs at least	10,000
Poles " "	2,000
Miscellaneous Nationalities and Indeterminate Nationalities	8,000

5. Conclusion.

The maintenance in Italy and the arrangements for the resettlement of these 20,000 persons is likely to remain a military commitment until such time as a civilian organisation (U.N.O.) can take over.

The necessary military personnel to administer these refugees is extremely small and removes the responsibility from the Italian Government of dealing with persons who are viewed with suspicion by their parent Governments.

It further protects these individuals from forcible repatriation, with regard to which, there appears no machinery to compel the Italian Government to maintain the Allied Policy of not forcibly repatriating dissidents, except through Diplomatic channels.

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 794
Communications Sub-Commission HHS/ec

ADM.183.CS.22. 13 June 1946

JUN 14 1946

SUBJECT: Civil Affairs Briefing of Field Marshall Viscount Montgomery.

TO : Executive Commissioner.
Alcom Headquarters.

1. In accordance with your memorandum of 11 June 1946, ref. 801/224/EC, submitted herewith suggested briefing on Communications Sub-Commission.

2. The field of activity of the Communications Sub-Commission comprises postal, telephone, telegraph and radio and in these fields it acts as the principal liason agency between the Allied Military and Italian civilian agencies. In the past it has also acted in an advisory capacity to the Italian Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications but this role is expected to cease with the closing of the Allied Commission.

3. The necessity of maintaining liason with the Italian Government, however, will remain regardless of the future of the Allied Commission. All liason on technical matters will be carried out by Signals and transfer of this work is already under way. Liason on policy matters affecting both telecommunications and postal matters cannot properly be handled by Signals and it is therefore proposed that this work be retained by whatever body succeeds the Allied Commission.

H.H. Scudder
H.H.SCUDDER,
Col.Sig.C.
Director.

(CAPT K)

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