

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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13TH CORPS, MONTHLY INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARIES
AUG. 1945 - JAN. 1946

39 11/10/10 23/10

49

Ex. (un). 41-47 for 2/1

10/10

50

CSO

We should ask them to put us on the

limited distribution list.

See 51

MS/10/10

CSO

24

is in signature. I think in 10/10 is 10/10
CSO have not hold of the wrong end of
the stick. anyway their letter doesn't appear
to answer your question.

28 7/1

#30

Ex. Commissioner

Please see report from 13 Corps at 728. Passages of witnesses are indicated. There is a well-informed article on the Slovians at 322.

True 9/10.

C.S.O.

(31)

1. PDads to see.

2. Appendix - D to Central Forces Sub Com. for comment.

128/11/10.

Blad (A)
Blad (B)

(32)

Please see report from 13 Corps at 728.

60. 13/10.

34.

C.S.O.

Sen. Thacker.

Kla 11/10

(35)

C.S.O.

See with Hawks

Chief Commissioner.

Attached is submitted for your information/signature/approval.

Noted for [unclear]
MR [unclear]

0618
09/14/55
REC'D

[Handwritten signature]

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324

ExCelent

15

Please see 13 Camp Intelligence Summary at P. Parts of interest are marked but although it is very long I think it is worth reading in full. EWK:da

Ex 17/5.

Placed A.
- B.

(16)

This is an extremely interesting report and shows in the first few pages the extent to which the Belgians are deliberately subverting ATR in V.G. West. Before submission to C.E. may I have your views on whether we should represent to ATRQ the desirability of a disclaimer to Belgians in this attitude.

Please pass quickly

178/2445

(17)

Ex. Com: I thank you for bringing this to my attention. While I agree that this probably represents Belgian policy I don't believe any of the activities (or lack of them) cited are of a sufficiently tangible nature ~~in relation to~~ to have govt. or military representations in Belgium.

Weller Jones
Col. Ad. (Am) 3230. 25/45

This is an extremely interesting report and shows in the first few pages the extent to which the Negroes are deliberately subjugating ATRs in V.C. West. Before submission to C.E. may I have your views on whether we should represent ATRs in the description of a memorandum to Belgrade in this attitude.

Please pass quickly

(17)

W.S. (2nd)

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Weller Jones
Pol. Ad. Ad. (Am) Sept. 25/45

(18)

I agree with Mr. Jones, and indeed as stated in para 3 (d) in p. 2 even action would involve certain dangers. In the above case I am in copies of the report forwarded to the Foreign Office and other Depts. for info.

J.L. Hopkinson

Sept 27

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref: 612/53/EC

8 January 1946

SUBJECT: 13 Corps Monthly Intelligence Summary.

TO : SCAG AND Veneria Giulia.

1. Reference your 13C/AMG/21CA/187 of 3 January 1946.
2. Our letter 612/51/EC of 17 December 1945 referred to the "limited distribution list", in which HQ A.C. wishes to be included.
3. Copies of the monthly intelligence summaries are received at this HQ, but parts 3 and 4 (limited distribution) of summary no. 4 were not received.
4. It would be appreciated if you could arrange for this HQ in future to receive all parts of all reports.

F. H. McCLEARY

Brigadier
Executive Commissioner

See M.54.

322

PA
9/11
B

612 41
HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
13 CORPS

52

TELEPHONE No.: 29794 Ex 10
REFERENCE No.: 13C/AMG/210A/187
SUBJECT: 13 Corps Monthly Intelligence Summary
TO: HQ. AC.
(Executive Commissioner)

Date 3 Jan 46

JAN 7 1946

31
1. Reference your 612/51/EC of 17 Dec, HQ. 13 Corps advised that HQ. AC. are already included on the distribution list of 13 Corps Monthly Intelligence Summary.

For the Senior Civil Affairs Officer :

WDY/rp

W. Drummond Young
W. DRUMMOND YOUNG
Capt, RA,
SO. III (CA)

321

See F.53.

(MISS. S.)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

(51)

Ref: 612/51/EC.

17 December 1945.

SUBJECT: 13 Corps Monthly Intelligence Summary No. 4.

TO : SCAG AMG Venezia Giulia.

Will you please arrange for HQ AC to be included in the limited distribution list for 13 Corps Monthly Intelligence Summaries.

Enc
Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

320

PA
17112
[Signature]

SECRET

13 CORPS MONTHLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 4

DEC 10 1945

for November 1945

Part I The Political Situation in VENETIA GIULIA.

Part II N.E. ITALY

1. General.
2. SIG. PARI in the VENETO.
3. The "Uomo Qualunque" Movement.
4. VENICE Communist Party.
5. VENEZIE Province.
6. TREVISO Province.

Part III Military Security (Limited Distribution)

1. Security of Information.
2. Security of Personnel.
3. Security of Material.
4. Security of Frontiers, Ports and Coastlines.
5. Yugoslav Troops.

Part IV Civil Security (Limited Distribution)

1. Analysis of Arrests.
2. Subversive Movements.
3. German Inspired Organisations.
4. Movement Control.
5. Rumours.
6. Other Matters of General Security Interest.

APPENDICES.

- "A" The CAVODISTIA STRIKE.
- "B" Additions to Glossary of Abbreviations of Italian and Yugoslav Agencies and Organisations. Published in 13 CORPS MONTHLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 3.
- "C" Location List of PSS and CIC (Limited Distribution) X

A.C.
not
included
in distribution

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4 December 1945

J.P. Hargrave
Lt. Col.,
General Staff.

319

See M.48.50.

28
(500)

SECRET.13 CORPS MONTHLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 4
=====PART I
=====The political situation in VENETIA GIULIA.1. GENERAL.

Political interest during the last month has centred mainly on a growth of Italian confidence and nationalistic feeling and the reaction thereto by the pro-Yugoslav organisations. The result has been a wider rift than hitherto between the rival factions, though an interesting development has been an apparently genuine attempt by the Italian Communist Party to bridge the gulf.

The feast of San Giusto, the patron saint of TRIESTE, on 3 Nov and the anniversary of the first Italian landings in this area on 4 Nov 1918, were the occasion for an outburst of Italian demonstrations in TRIESTE, GORIZIA and POLA. The most important and best organised of these took place in TRIESTE on 3 Nov and produced no marked disorders much to the surprise of the pro-Slavs as well as the Italians themselves, who had expected trouble. Attempts made to break it up were firmly dealt with by the Civil Police Force, which subsequently became the object of such abuse by the Communist press and radio BELGRADE.

Reaction to this display of "Italianita" included a demonstration on the following day organised by the pro-Yugoslavs, which was equally protected by the Police but did not succeed in overshadowing the Italian success. A strong protest was also sent by UNIS to the British and United States government demanding the dissolution of the Civil Police Force, deploring the Italian demonstration as a revival of Fascism, and asking amongst other things for the abrogation of General Order No. 11.

On these lines various broadcasts from JUGOSLAVIA followed suit and the local press initiated a vigorous polemic which lasted well into the middle of the month.

FMOC however won a victory over the GCLN on 16-17 Nov when the delegation of British Members of Parliament and journalists paid a short visit to TRIESTE on their way back to ENGLAND from JUGOSLAVIA where they had been observing the Elections. FMOC was warned by LJUBLJANA three days before their arrival, and was thus in a position

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The feast of San Giusto, the patron saint of TRIESTE, on 3 Nov and the anniversary of the first Italian landings in this area on 4 Nov 1948, were the occasion for an outburst of Italian demonstrations in TRIESTE, GORIZIA and PULA. The most important and best organised of these took place in TRIESTE on 3 Nov and produced no marked disorders much to the surprise of the pro-Slavs as well as the Italians themselves, who had expected trouble. Attempts made to break it up were firmly dealt with by the Civil Police Force, which subsequently became the object of much abuse by the Communist press and radio BELLERAJE.

Reaction to this display of "Italianite" included a demonstration on the following day organised by the pro-Yugoslavs, which was equally protected by the Police but did not succeed in overshadowing the Italian success. A strong protest was also sent by UAIS to the British and United States Government demanding the dissolution of the Civil Police Force, deploring the Italian demonstration as a revival of Fascism, and asking amongst other things for the abrogation of General Order No. 11.

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PMCO however won a victory over the GCLN on 16-17 Nov when the delegation of British Members of Parliament and journalists paid a short visit to TRIESTE on their way back to ENGLAND from JUGOSLAVIA where they had been observing the Elections. PMCO was warned by LJUBLJANA three days before their arrival, and was thus in a position to make lavish preparations reminiscent of the expected visit of the Foreign Ministers' delegates in early Oct. The GCLN, completely ignorant of the event, was unable to make any counter preparations.

The Italians at the end of the month show no sign of abating their intransigent nationalist policy. The pro-Yugoslav element for its part, apparently with an eye to the future, is embarking on some form of internal reorganisation the extent and full implications of which remain to be seen.

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2/.....

2. ITALIAN ACTIVITIES.

Probably because of events both in VENEZIA GIULIA and outside, Italian political activity has been on an increasing scale. The Civil Police Force, which now numbers 1500, has afforded the population a greater sense of security. DE GASPERI's proposals for a solution of the local problem have been given wide publicity as also the publication of the Armistice terms and forthcoming Allied economic help. Moreover the increased activity in right-wing circles in ITALY, which have always tended to advocate a firmer Italian line in the VENEZIA GIULIA question, has inevitably had its effect on the attitude of the GCIN.

A fresh outlet for Italian nationalist propaganda has been found in Radio VENEZIA GIULIA, a clandestine transmitter, which began broadcasting on 3 Nov.

The first large public demonstration by the Italians was held on 3 Nov in TRIESTE, and on the following day there were smaller ones in GORIZIA and POLA. There is documentary evidence to show that this first attempt at public activity had been very thoroughly prepared and that the necessity for using force for its protection had been anticipated. Largely owing to the action taken by the Police, the latter contingency was avoided and on the whole the success of the demonstrations surpassed the expectations even of their organisers.

At the present the activities of all GCIN parties are entirely centred on the national aspects of the VENEZIA GIULIA problem and have been little directed towards domestic reconstruction. For this reason a majority of the Italian working class whose main preoccupation is with the latter, still, for lack of an alternative, supports the PCG, which has much to offer them.

Attempts have, however, been made by individual members of the Action Party, led by PINCHERLE, to effect a rapprochement with the left-wing pro-Slav elements, but they have been firmly resisted by the GCIN as a whole. Their attempt to include a Communist representative on a committee for the distribution of relief funds was met with an accusation that they were pro-Slav. This incident had the effect of provoking the resignation of some and the dismissal of other members of this group from the local Action Party, which now remains as uncompromising as ever.

Another instance of Italian disinclination to cooperate with pro-Slav bodies was the recent application by the Sindacati Giuliani for membership of the GCIN. Acceptance of such an application would tie the S.G. irrevocably to a federation which does not include the

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Another instance of Italian disinclination to cooperate with pro-Slav bodies was the recent application by the Sindacati Giuliani for membership of the GCLN. Acceptance of such an application would tie the S.C. irrevocably to a federation which does not include the S.U., and would make cooperation between the two unions virtually impossible.

Signor PARRI viewed this local political attitude with some apprehension and, both directly and indirectly, asked for Allied permission for a personal representative in TRIESTE whose tasks would be to keep ROE informed of developments within VENEZIA GIULIA and, equally important, to exercise a restraining influence over local passions. Moreover, the Pincherle group is supported by Parri in its attempt to establish a newspaper more balanced and constructive than the VOCE LIBERA, organ of the GCLN.

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A constant fear of the moderates in Rome, as represented by MARI, is that the rising crescendo of Italian nationalism in VENEZIA GIULIA, now measurable in direct ratio to Slav activity, will convulse into a new Fascism infectious to the rest of Italy. Such a trend is viewed not only as a menace to the democratic development of the country, but as a factor likely to cause further deterioration in Italo-Yugoslav relations, already far from close. An indication of the imminence of this danger is the support shown to the Christian . . . Democrat leaders from the GCIN, when they spoke publicly in VENICE, PADUA and other towns of the VENETO during widespread demonstrations on 18 Nov, "VENEZIA GIULIA Day".

An interesting sideline during November has been the emergence of various Italian intelligence organizations operating in TRIESTE. These include agents of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Admiralty and the Monarchist Party each passing back information independently to their HQs in Rome by a variety of methods and receiving in return funds for their support. Possibly a more serious threat to security lies in the existence, recently discovered, of a network including the "Divisione SICILIA", the "VIVIDALE Group" and connections in TRIESTE and regular Italian Military circles. This network has a role parallel to that of the Yugoslav organizations in the ISONZO and NATISONE valleys.

The end of the month has been dominated by the Italian government crisis. The GCIN as a whole would accept any solution which would provide support for their local policy. The Socialist party, however, took an independent stand by issuing an order of the day which deplores the action taken by the Liberals and Christian Democrats in Rome and invited the local members of these parties to resign from the GCIN. However, this invitation has not been accepted, the matter has not apparently been pressed, and there now seems no likelihood of a rift within the GCIN.

3. PRO-SLAV ACTIVITIES

These have been mainly limited to countering the activities of the Italian parties and the impression has been given that this has been a period of consolidation and reorganization rather than of expansion.

The fact that the Italians could stage a successful demonstration on a scale comparable to one of their own, was rewarded by the pro-Yugoslavs as a set-back. Their immediate reaction was to try and break up the demonstration but in this they were prevented by the Allied police. They were quick to apply to AMG for permission to hold a counter demonstration the next day. This was followed by a strong protest to the British and American governments, demanding the dissolution of the new Civil Police Force, the abolition of the administration established under General Order No. 11, the restoration of

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The arrival on 16 Nov in VENEZIA GIULIA of the party of British members of Parliament, on their way home from JUGOSLAVIA, caused a fresh outburst of propaganda activity. The FCG, UAIS and affiliated bodies had three days' warning from LJUBLJANA of their arrival and made the most of this time in widespread slogan painting and mass distribution of flags. During their

- 4 -

stay in TRIESTE some of the party were entertained by ENCO, which organised visits to docks and factories, where the guests received deputations from the TRIESTE workers and were generally fêted. The ENCO took every opportunity of presenting its own point of view on the local problem, which the members had already heard vehemently expressed in JUGOSLAVIA. The Members' short stay in TRIESTE was highly organised by ENCO, and they had virtually no time to hear the Italian point of view. Some of them had a short interview with FONDA, president of the GCLN, but he was unprepared for the meeting, had little time to present his argument and thus created a bad impression.

During the second half of the month the various pro-Yugoslav bodies seem to have been concentrating on internal reorganisation. The local Populacean Socialist party, though of separatist views, openly declared itself a member of the TRIESTE NOC. The PCG has also made friendly overtures to the local Anarchist party. These events suggest that part of their policy has been to win over smaller local parties, whose allegiance was still undecided. Recent reports suggest that ENCO HQ is planning to move to Zone B probably AIDUSSINA (C-9300). It would appear, however, that some of its less public sections, including OMA, are to be left behind in TRIESTE. The reasons for this reorganisation are not yet clear. In the light of a further crop of circumstantial rumours about an impending Yugoslav move against TRIESTE, it might be taken to mean that the move is being cleared for purely Fifth Column activity. On the other hand, this move may be merely a security measure, due to the possibility of a prolonged Allied occupation of the area, and a consequent fear of the Allies hardening their attitude towards these organisations refusing co-operation with AMG. In either case little confidence in the possibility of improved relations is apparent.

4. Italo-Slovene relations.

During November the PCI has shown increasing concern over the position of the Italian Communists in VENEZIA GIULIA. Whilst still accepting the principle of an autonomous PCG, regarding it as a necessary improvisation, it has become disturbed over the sectarian and nationalist trend in policy dictated by the Slav element. PCI observers in the area have suggested more than once the setting up in TRIESTE of a small PCI liaison section with the aim of bridging the gulf between AMG and PCG, which they consider to be a tactical mistake of the latter. From their less localised, and therefore less biased viewpoint, they have appreciated that the blame for the present racial and political tension is not attributable to one side alone. Fearing bloodshed if this tension is still extant when the fate of the area is finally decided, their purpose is to improve Italo-Slovene relations by exercising a restraining influence on all extremes. The PCI delegation for Northern ITALY, and in turn the party HQ in ROME have supported this line, and TOGLIATTI is believed to have sent a letter to Marshal TITO, suggesting a

During the second half of the month the various pro-unionist groups seem to have been concentrating on internal reorganisation. The local Republican Socialist party, though of separatist views, openly declared itself a member of the TRIESTE HQ. The PCG has also made friendly overtures to the local Anarchist party. These events suggest that part of their policy has been to win over smaller local parties, whose allegiance was still undecided. Recent reports suggest that ROME HQ is planning to move to Zone B probably AIRESSINA (C-9300). It would appear, however, that some of its less public sections, including ONA, are to be left behind in TRIESTE. The reasons for this reorganisation are not yet clear. In the light of a further crop of circumstantial rumors about an impending Yugoslav move against TRIESTE, it might be taken to mean that the stage is being cleared for purely Fifth Column activity. On the other hand, this move may be merely a security measure, due to the possibility of a prolonged Allied occupation of the area, and a consequent fear of the Allies hardening their attitude towards these organisations refusing co-operation with AMG. In either case little confidence in the possibility of improved relations is apparent.

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A first step towards improved relations would be the fusion of the rival Trade Unions, the Giuliani and the Unici, proposed by the latter. The Giuliani, however, are opposing this fusion, and as a counter measure have applied for affiliation to the CGIL. The Unici have been enlisting the support of the PCI in ROME in an effort to prevent the CGIL from recognising the Giuliani. The whole question of the recognition of the latter is now under examination by the CGIL and three delegates are expected shortly in TRIESTE to examine the question on the spot.

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5. Radio VENEZIA GIULIA

This clandestine transmitter was first heard on 3 Nov, since when its broadcasts have been fully monitored. It broadcasts at regular times twice a day on both short and medium wavelengths. These transmissions last on an average 15 - 20 minutes.

There is a three-fold object behind the programmes of this station. First, to draw to the attention of world opinion the plight of Italians under Yugoslav rule, particularly those deported since the end of hostilities. Secondly, to awaken, and keep at fever pitch, Italian interest in the problem of VENEZIA GIULIA, and thirdly to encourage the Italian element in that area to maintain national consciousness by showing them what is being done on their behalf in ITALY proper. Cases of Yugoslav maltreatment and persecution of Italian nationals in Zone B are typical subject matter, while topics such as PARRI's recent tour of N.E. ITALY and the "VENEZIA GIULIA Day", held in the VENETO on 18 Nov, are elaborately exploited.

The programmes are composed of short discourses on current topics to do with VENEZIA GIULIA, of press extracts concerning the area, and items of local news of the type previously mentioned. Nor does it refrain from attempting to exploit the difficulties in Allied-Yugoslav relations.

There is reason to believe that the GOLF is closely connected with the station, whose sponsors apparently expect the Allies to turn a blind eye to its existence.

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PART II
=====

N.E. ITALY

1. General

Present political interest in the VENETO centres mainly on the Italian government crisis, which had its beginnings in early November when the Liberals demanded that the epuration law should be submitted to the approval of the Consultative Assembly. The crisis was temporarily averted by the acceptance of this request by the government, but it was clear that the Liberals were not satisfied and were determined to force a crisis, not so much on any specific issue as on the general tenor of the government's policy. Their right wing members in particular were uneasy in their position of a conservative force in what they considered was essentially a left wing government, and it was their aim to attract the support of right wing parties not represented in the government. On 24 Nov the Liberal party informed PARRI that his administration no longer enjoyed their confidence. PARRI, who wished to put the onus for breaking up the government clearly on their shoulders, refused to resign and the next day the Liberal Ministers duly sent in their resignations. Any idea of the government continuing without the Liberals was rejected by the Christian Democrats, and on 24 Nov PARRI himself handed his resignation, first to the CDM and then to the Lieutenant General of the Realm.

This news was the signal for demonstrations and strikes throughout Northern ITALY as a protest. In NE ITALY they were held at VENICE, TREVISO and UDINE. The most important of these was held in VENICE on Sunday 25 Nov, where the local secretary of the Liberal Party spoke in favour of a government of the CDM of which he is a strong supporter. On the following day an hours abstention from work took place in all factories and other isolated strikes have since occurred. Though feeling certainly ran high in the first few days, there were no disorders apart from a minor clash in VENICE on 27 Nov when right wing students and workers came to blows. Throughout the area the Christian Democrats associated themselves with the demonstrations, and in most cases the Liberals followed suit.

The crisis is seen in the North primarily as an attempt by the backward, "reactionary", and largely monarchist South, to take the initiative in the government from the more advanced North, which, only recently liberated from fascism and German occupation, is more strongly left wing and republican in outlook. The result has been to accentuate the division in the country between North and South and to increase the dislike of ROME "parliamentarianism".

The crisis is a result of the Liberals of the North having been to suit their

acceptance of this request by the government, not so Liberals were not satisfied and were determined to force a crisis, not so much on any specific issue as on the general tenor of the government's policy. Their right wing members in particular were uneasy in their position of a conservative force in what they considered was essentially a left wing government, and it was their aim to attract the support of right wing parties not represented in the government. On 24 Nov the Liberal party informed PARRI that his administration no longer enjoyed their confidence. PARRI, who wished to put the onus for breaking up the government clearly on their shoulders, refused to resign and the next day the Liberal Ministers duly sent in their resignations. Any idea of the government continuing without the Liberals was rejected by the Christian Democrats, and on 24 Nov PARRI himself handed his resignation, first to the CLN and then to the Lieutenant General of the Realm.

This news was the signal for demonstrations and strikes throughout Northern ITALY as a pretest. In NE ITALY they were held at VENICE, TREVISO and UDINE. The most important of these was held in VENICE on Sunday 25 Nov, where the local secretary of the Liberal Party spoke in favour of a government of the CLN of which he is a strong supporter. On the following day an hours abstention from work took place in all factories and other isolated strikes have since occurred. Though feeling certainly ran high in the first few days, there were no disorders apart from a minor clash in VENICE on 27 Nov when right wing students and workers came to blows. Throughout the area the Christian Democrats associated themselves with the demonstrations, and in most cases the Liberals followed suit.

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The main result for the Liberals of the North has been to split their party. The local Christian Democrats, owing to their party's support of the Liberals in ROME, have lost some of their following, particularly in the factories. On the whole, however, the crisis in ROME has tended to strengthen on the CLN in the North, who regard themselves as the guardians of the achievement of the partisan movement.

2. Sir. PARRI in the VENETO.

From 10 to 12 Nov Sir. PARRI made an informal tour of the VENETO in the course of which he visited UDINE, TREVISO and PADUA. In the last named town he attended the opening of the academic year of the University. He was everywhere received very warmly and nowhere was there any hint of hostile feeling. The brief speeches he made were mainly delivered at closed meetings of the local authorities.

- 2 -

The purpose of this visit was twofold - to acquaint himself with the needs of the area and to make a reasoned statement of the Italian case in VENEZIA GIULIA. In his speech to a meeting of the local Action party in UDINE, PARRI denounced the system of mass deportation, and, after reminding his audience that at the end of the last war he had himself been called a defeatist because he opposed exaggerated nationalist claims, called for justice for ITALY on the basis of Italo-Yugoslav friendship.

In VENICE the irredentist societies staged a small demonstration of their members outside the Doge's Palace and greeted PARRI with rhythmic shouts of FUIE when he appeared on the balcony. His speech to the notabilities, however, only contained a general reference to the question of ITALY's Eastern boundaries, and was confined mainly to an appeal for greater understanding of the difficulties of his government in the face of the present political and economic problems.

At TREVISO PARRI's speech was mainly directed to the needs of the town which was very heavily bombed during the war, and to an appeal for unity of all parties.

At PADUA the 724th academic year opened turbulently. Seating arrangements in the Great Hall of the University entirely broke down, and when PARRI was due to arrive the approaches were barred by a mass of students who broke all the doors in their attempt to force their way in. Like all Italian Universities, PADUA is ultra nationalist in tone, and the entry of PARRI was greeted with cries of TRIESTE and much waving of flags. There were other minor disturbances but PARRI's speech was heard in comparative silence. He dealt mainly with the partisan movement. The behaviour of the students was reminiscent of their pro war demonstrations for "TUNIS, NICE and CORSICA", and PARRI was clearly shocked. Before he left he made a short extempore speech in which he pointed out that the cause of TRIESTE, which was his cause and that of the Italian government, was not served by brawling, but rather, weakened.

3. The Uomo Qualunque Movement.

The movement as a whole has lost some support in ITALY owing to the recent arrest in ROME of the SCALERA brothers (on charges connected with heavily financing the fascist movement in its early days) when it was revealed that they at present hold 60% of the shares in the "Uomo Qualunque". Furthermore there has been a series of disorders in APULIA, where serious clashes occurred between "Uomo Qualunque" supporters and the left wing parties.

In VENICE three of the organisers who originally appeared as personal representatives of GIANNINI have now been expatriated. The movement is now represented by the secretary of the Front,

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In VENICE three of the organisers who originally appeared as personal representatives of GIANNINI have now been expelled. The movement is now completely in the hands of Count LOREDAN, the VENICE secretary of the Front, and his industrial associates, who owned the paper "Il Vaglio", which recently ceased publication as a result of the refusal of its editor to come out for "Uomo Qualunque". A successor has now been found in the dramatic critic of "Il Gazzettino", the VENICE daily, who has applied for permission to publish a weekly to be called "The Liberal Idea". Though the financial backers of the new venture are LOREDAN and his fellow shareholders in "Il Vaglio", it is maintained that the political line of the paper will be "right of the centre". No connection is claimed with the local Liberal Party, which strongly disapproves of the title of the paper.

- 3 -

In general, attacks on the movement in both the British and Italian press have had the effect of dissuading the organisers from coming out into the open, and of frightening off possible sympathisers, though the appointment to the U.O. Committee of representatives of VENEZIA GIULIA refugees has brought in a number of new adherents.

The circulation of the "Uomo Qualunque" paper has dropped in the VENEZIA by about a third, and in VENEZIA from 22,500 to 15,000.

4. VENEZIA Communist Party.

This party, although it claims to have recently increased its membership in the province from 28,000 to 32,000, seems to lack enthusiasm and organisation, and is embarrassed by the eccentricity of some of its local leaders. It is believed that a proposal has been put to ROME for the establishment of an inspectorate of three old party members for the Region to co-ordinate communist activity and propaganda.

5. UDINE Province.

The approach of winter has naturally tended to increase general discontent and with it complaints against both the Italian Government and the Allies. Lack of employment particularly in the industrial areas such as PORCENONE (B-9609), and the exorbitant cost of living have produced a number of incidents. Threats were made, for instance, against the Carabinieri in some villages in the PORCENONE area, when British troops had temporarily moved out. Crime is still prevalent although figures for armed robbery for November show a slight decrease, and the Carabinieri are working more efficiently. There is a considerable feeling amongst Roduci and other circles against the partiality shown to Partisans in civil affairs.

Short strikes took place throughout the province as a protest against the crisis, but it is of interest to note that the local Liberals and Christian Democrats, unlike their colleagues elsewhere in the VENEZIA, have remained loyal to the ROME policy of their parties. The attitude is no doubt partly due to their suspicion, on Nationalist grounds, of the Communists of the TRIULI. This suspicion is shared in varying degrees by the other parties, and Socialist and Action parties have not drawn quite as close to the Communists as might have been expected under the stress of the crisis.

6. TREVISO Province.

The Province continues to give a good example of co-operation between the various political parties; the ROME crisis has filled them with sorrow rather than anger; the Liberals and Christian Democrats await devel-

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6. TREVISO Province.

The Province continues to give a good example of co-operation between the various political parties; the Rome crisis has filled them with sorrow rather than anger; the Liberals and Christian Democrats await developments in the capital without in the meantime disturbing the existing harmony in the CLN.

Non compliance by centadini in the province with the AMG order to render a return of crops and stock led to judicial action. After a large number of arrests and fines the peasants have complied with the order in almost all villages, and the outstanding recalcitrants are likely to follow suit. The Provincial Commissioner's firm action has aroused no protest in provincial political circles; the prevailing opinion appears to be that a check on the over-individualistic peasants is overdue.

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APPENDIX "A" to 13 CORPS MONTHLY
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 4.

THE CAPODISTRIA STRIKE.

On 31 Oct in CAPODISTRIA (E-7963) there was a general strike, which rapidly degenerated into a minor clash between the local population and Yugoslav elements from the interior of Zone B. The importance of this event lay in its being the first known case of organized Italian resistance to Yugoslav occupation, and the subject of a note of protest from the Italians to the Allied Governments.

The strike appears to have been organized by the CLN of CAPODISTRIA, a body composed largely of Communists, a great majority of whom are of Italian nationality. Their object in calling the strike was to protest against the recent introduction by the Yugoslav authorities of the new occupational currency. A subsidiary cause appears to have been discontent with the inefficiency of the local administration.

Fundamentally, the strike was due to a misunderstanding. The new currency measures were declared effective from the date of publication and it seems that the authorities omitted to inform the tradespeople of CAPODISTRIA that they could exchange the new currency for Italian lire for purchases in Zone A. As CAPODISTRIA's trade is mainly with TRIESTE, this was a point that touched them closely.

The strike took the form merely of a closing of all shops and offices. No demonstrations took place. The Yugoslav authorities immediately made contact with the CLN; the misunderstanding was removed and by the same afternoon the strike was called off and some of the shops were reopening.

Presumably with a view to making the CLN see reason, if it should itself stubborn in negotiation, the Yugoslav authorities arranged for demonstrators from the surrounding districts to come into the town. These arrived during the afternoon and some disorders took place. A few deaths were also reported but the past history of one victim suggests that the disturbance provided useful cover for private revenge.

Order was soon restored in CAPODISTRIA itself, but the incident provided first class material for polemics in the TRIESTE press. Each side attempted to justify the opposing point of view using the well-worn arguments familiar to this area, and in the press war which ensued, lasting well into November, all sense of proportion was soon lost.

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The sole effect on CAPODISTRIA itself seems to have been some reshuffling in the local Communist party, which is now said to be toying with the idea of joining the PCI. Two envoys were reported as about to go to ROME to discuss the matter, but this very local matter is presumably completely overshadowed by the far more important issues now being considered by the PCI and the ICG.

RESTRICTEDAPPENDIX "B" to 13 CORPS MONTHLY
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 4Additions to the glossary of abbreviations of Italian and
Jugoslav agencies and organizations published as Appendix "A"
to 13 CORPS MONTHLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 3

APG Giulian Association for Partisans (Associazione Partigiani Giuliana). Sley controlled organization for the welfare of partisans, both Slovene and Italian, previously with the Yugoslav armed forces.

API Association for Italian Partisans (Associazione Partigiani Italiani). This is a branch of the ANPI for VENEZIA GIULIA. Owing to the peculiar status of the area the word National has been omitted. Has not the same local support as the APG.

ORDA (Centieri Riuniti dell' Adriatico). Joint Company of Shipbuilders in ports from MONFALCONE to RUGGIA.

CENTRO PROM Trade Centre (Promot Center). A headquarters of this nature is setting up in TRIESTE as a clearing house for economic and finance dealings between JUGOSLAVIA and VENEZIA GIULIA.

CSI (Cra e Sempre Italia). Little is known of this organization. Thought to include members of the Italian SS. Activities in TRIESTE restricted to chalking their initials on walls.

UIVOD Import and Export Istituto. A telescoped word to include UVOZNI (Import) IZVOZNI (Export) ZAVOD (Institute). This organization deals with trade for Zone B and has a branch in TRIESTE operating under Centro Prom.

PREVOD Food Maintenance Office (Prohramjerini prevod).

C

NOTE: The definition of ORDA in the glossary referred to above should be amended to read as follows:-

APG Giulian Association for Partisans (Associazione Partigiani Giuliana). Slav controlled organization for the welfare of partisans, both Slovene and Italian, previously with the Yugoslav armed forces.

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PREVOD Food Maintenance Office (Prehranjevalni zavod).

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NOTE: The definition of CNA in the glossary referred to above should be amended to read as follows:-

313

Section for People's Defence ("odsek za Zascito Naroda" or "odjeljenje Zastite Naroda"). Yugoslav Secret Political Police.

785017

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref: 612/53

22 October 1945

SUBJECT: Proclamation by the Committee of Military Agitation

TO : Regional Commissioner, Venezia Region
SCAO, Venezia Giulia

1. Reference 13 Corps Monthly Intelligence Summary
no. 2 for September 1945, appendix D (copy of poster put
up all over Venice about 15/16 September 1945).

2. Herewith copy of G.D.I. MIA's comments thereon.

"The proclamation in question is by no means an isolated instance of anti-militaristic propaganda. Articles of a similar nature have frequently appeared in the Italian Press, particularly in the "Voce Repubblicana" as the Italian Army is suspected, not entirely without reason, of having strong monarchist tendencies.

With regard to the sentiment expressed that "We all want to go home", a most understandable wish, it is pointed out that the 1913-1918 Classes inclusive have already been demobilised and further demobilisation will take place in due course (i.e. 1919 Class in Nov).

In view of the policy of freedom of speech and of the press the publishers of this proclamation should only be proceeded against if it is considered that this proclamation constitutes an incitement to mutiny. This Hq. is not entirely satisfied that it does constitute such an incitement nor that any action would be worth-while in this case, particularly as the inevitable reply would be that the Allies take suppressive action solely because they support the House of Savoy."

B. SANDSON

Brigadier
Executive Commissioner

312

PA

61291

36

SUBJECT: Proclamation by the Committee
of Military Agitation

LAND FORCES SUB-COM, A.C. (MMIA)

INT/114/1

18 Oct 45

TO : OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER, A.C.

OCT 19 1945

37

Ref your 612/EC of 12 Oct 45.

1. The proclamation in question is by no means an isolated instance of anti-militaristic propaganda. Articles of a similar nature have frequently appeared in the Italian Press, particularly in the "Voce Repubblicana" as the Italian Army is suspected, not entirely without reason, of having strong monarchist tendencies.
2. With regard to the sentiment expressed that "We all want to go home", a most understandable wish, it is pointed out that the 1913-1918 Classes inclusive have already been demobilised and further demobilisation will take place in due course (i.e. 1919 Class in Nov).
3. In view of the policy of freedom of speech and of the press the publishers of this proclamation should only be proceeded against if it is considered that this proclamation constitutes an incitement to mutiny. This HQ is not entirely satisfied that it does constitute such an incitement nor that any action would be worth-while in this case, particularly as the inevitable reply would be that the Allies take suppressive action solely because they support the House of Savoy.

L. Browning

Major General
MMIA

WB

311

See my 24
6

Miss Sampson

785017

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Executive Commissioner

33

Ref: 612/EC

12 October 45

SUBJECT: Proclamation by the Committee of Military Agitation

TO : Land Forces Subcommittee, AC, (MMIA)

1. Attached please find copy of a poster which was put up
all over Venice about 15/16 September 1945.

2. We would be grateful for your comments on this.

B. SAMPSON

Chief Staff Officer
To Executive Commissioner

(Further action on file 63712/EC)

P A

See 36
See of 32-35

612
1-8mmR

SECRET

13 CORPS MONTHLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 2

for September 1945

OCT - 8 1945

Part I The Political Situation in VENEZIA GIULIA.

Part II N.E. ITALY

1. General.
2. Economic.
3. Banditry.
4. Congress of the CENAI.
5. Elections for the Costituente.
6. The Man in the Street Front.
7. Monarchist Movement.
8. TREVISO Province.
9. UDINE Province.

Part III Military Security

(Limited Distribution)

1. Security of Information.
2. Security of Personnel.
3. Security of Material and Installations.
4. Security of Frontiers, Ports and Coastline.
5. Yugoslav Troops.

Part IV Civil Security

(Limited Distribution)

1. Analysis of Arrests.
2. Subversive Movements.
3. German Inspired Organisations.
4. Movement Control.
5. Rumours.

APPENDICES

- "A" Notes on the Attitude of the Slovene population in VENEZIA GIULIA.
- "B" List of Abbreviations of Italian, Slovene and Yugoslav Organisations.
- "C" The Man in the Street Front.
- "D" Subversive Propaganda in the Italian Army.
- "E" Location List of PSS and CIC (Limited Distribution)

1. General.
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4. Congress of the CLMIA.
5. Elections for the Costituente.
6. The Man in the Street Front.
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(Limited Distribution)

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2. Subversive Movements.
3. German Inspired Organisations.
4. Movement Control.
5. Rascals.

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2 October 1945.

7 OCT 1945

711 L Taylor
Lt Col.,
General Staff.

CONFIDENTIAL

112
J. W. B. 11.11.45
J. W. B. 11.11.45

(Miss Simpson)

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND

No.

785017

13 CORPS MONTHLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.2

PART I

The Political Situation in VENEZIA GIULIA

The most important events of the past month in the Allied occupied zone of VENEZIA GIULIA have been firstly, the two day general strike sponsored by all political parts and caused by Allied Military Government's permission to industries to discharge their idle hands and secondly, the reaction to the utterances from the Foreign Secretaries conference in LONDON. The general strike is dealt with below.

The only official communique issued from LONDON and effecting VENEZIA GIULIA was in the following terms:-

"The Council agreed that the deputies should consider and report on the problem of the Yugoslav and Italian frontier and TRIESTE, with the following terms of reference:-

- (a) To report on the line which will, in the main, be the ethnic line leaving a minimum under alien rule, on the understanding that appropriate investigations will be carried out on the spot before the final delimitation of the frontier.
- (b) To report on an international regime which will assure that the port and transit facilities of TRIESTE will be available for use on equal terms by all international trade and by JUGOSLAVIA, ITALY, and the States of Central Europe, as is customary in other free ports of the world."

Both sides here regard this as vague and there is much speculation as to whether internationalisation is to apply only to the port area or to the whole of the city of TRIESTE. Both sides are attempting to read into the communique their own solution, i.e. that the sovereignty should be Italian or Yugoslav with certain international rights superimposed. Both still stand by their former national claims. On the ethnic question the PCG view is that an ethnic line is unworkable and that the solution should be found locally by plebiscite or negotiations, when presumably their only too well known methods would find full scope. At the present juncture at any rate there would be little likelihood of a plebiscite being impartial. The Italians, who clearly realise that they must lose some territory, stress that the ethnic line should not cut across economic or communication lines.

There has been the usual recrudescence of rumours as to massing of Yugoslav troops on the Morgan Line and the imminence of the arrival of Tito's army, rumours which always prove to be accompanied by such diplomatic discussions.

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There has been the usual recurrence of rumours as to massing of Yugoslav troops on the Morgan Line and the imminence of the arrival of Tito's army, rumours which always crop up as accompanying to such diplomatic discussions. There is, however, no evidence from either of battle to substantiate these, and 4 Army appears to be still of approximately the same strength as it was after the thinning in early August. (4) BULGARIA has also launched, but in a somewhat hesitant manner, propaganda on alleged atrocities and oppression by Italian "fascists and reactionaries" against the Slovene population of VENEZIA GIULIA and the TRIULI, including referring to inflammatory articles in a long since defunct Italian fascist paper printed in TRIESTE. This campaign appears to be Hitler's method regarding the Jewish and racial minorities prior to their incorporation in the Late Third Reich.

+/In fact fighting units have in many cases returned from forward positions leaving the posts on the Morgan Line manned by a species of Yugoslav home guard.

/2....308

- 2 -

Considerable apprehension is known to exist in Italian circles regarding the future of the area and many will undoubtedly leave it, should the area, where they reside, be awarded to the Yugoslavs. This is of course based on the fear of a repetition of what happened during the last Yugoslav occupation. From the PCG side there is considerable evidence that they are making preparations to meet the possible internationalisation of TRIESTE. Many of their compromising documents are reported to have left for Zone B, while the party itself is making preparations to go underground. All members have been directed to join UAIS, which body, as protector of the interests of the working classes, would then provide cover for the activity of the PCG. In addition the PCG is reported to be carrying out a policy of economic penetration starting off with the development of the workers' cooperative system. This would clearly offer further cover for both the PCG and OZNA.

There are some indications that the Communists are losing ground in the area. Complaints have been made at their meetings that attendance at these is growing less, that their propaganda leaflets are not having their accustomed success and that the sales of the LAVORATORE, official organ of the PCG, are falling off, while it has also been stated that general results gained are not commensurate with the party's expenses. However this may be politically, the success and demonstration of solidarity, from the promoters' point of view, of the recent general strike shows that the party's organization is still extremely effective.

As regards the relations between the PCI and PCG, the latter would seem to have consolidated their position of independence in refusing to accept the second nomination by the PCI of a Communist delegate for VENEZIA GIULIA to the ROBE Consulta. The PCG has hitherto refused on the grounds of "autonomy", in fact it has been because the PCG is tied to LJUBLJANA and not MILAN. The second nomination was JAKSETICH, formerly the editor of the LAVORATORE, and now serving a sentence of 18 months on an Allied Military Government charge for illegal possession of arms. However a slight indication of weakness of the Italo-Slovene Communist bloc is the fact that a small number of Italian communists have left the GORIZIA section of the PCG in disgust over the non-cooperation policy under General Order 11 and applied for membership in the Action Party. In addition some of the Italians in fact supported the JAKSETICH nomination despite the official view of the PCG.

This policy of non-cooperation has been given official confirmation by utterances in the LAVORATORE and over the BELGRADE radio which broadcasts a long memorandum by the President of the PMCC. The gist of this was that the PMCC and PMO's had been elected as a result of freely conducted elections in May, that General Order 11 was undemocratic and that therefore the fault was that of Allied Military Government in ignoring the provisions of the Atlantic Charter. In view of the chaotic state of affairs reigning in the area in

addition the PCG is reported to be carrying out a policy of economic penetration starting off with the development of the workers' cooperative system. This would clearly offer further cover for both the PCG and OZNA.

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New administrations with exclusively Italian representation have now been set up under General Order 11 which cover some 66% of the population of Zone A. In none of these is the PCG participating. The remaining 14% consists of three areas in the hinterland which are almost entirely Slovene. In these it is likely that resorts to direct military government will eventually have to be made.

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However it is already clear that the pro Yugoslav elements intend to keep the NOOs and other officially disbanded "popular organs" going as a shadow administration ready to take over should the area or any part of it be awarded to JUGOSLAVIA. Meanwhile they are useful to cover less reputable activities. It is reliably reported, for instance, that GORIZIA NOO has ensured its permanence by moving into other premises complete with files and funds. From there emanate the orders and dispositions for the province following directions from TRIESTE and LJUBLJANA. In the smaller communes the eviction of the NOOs from their premises following on their removal from office, has had considerable effect on their satellite organisations such as the communist sponsored Anti-Fascist Women's and Youth's Unions, who now find themselves without premises. From documents it is clear that the "Municipalit" were being used as political HQ's rather than administrative centres, for instance in many cases persons were both members of the NOO and of the local communist party.

Third General Strike.

For the first time a general strike has been called in Zone A for purely economic reasons; the first on 25th June had as its main object to protest against the disbandment by Allied Military Government of the Difesa Popolare set up by the Yugoslavs, while the second on 18th July was to protest partly against the abolition of other "Popular organs", partly against the arrest of JAKSETICH and others and partly against alleged worsening food conditions.

The reasons for the latest strike was the permission given by Allied Military Government to industries and employers to discharge the idle payrolls, which up to the 22nd September they had been compelled to maintain. In this connection it should be remembered that under the wage agreement in the rest of ITALY, the government pays a high percentage of the wages of such employees and the agreement itself is likely to be continued in a modified form.

For some time the Left wing press has been carrying extremely strong editorials accusing the employers of refusing to bring out their capital so as to assist the economic situation in VENEZIA GIULIA, a refusal based very largely on uncertainty as to the ultimate fate of the disputed area. As soon as the permission for suspension of non-working labour was granted, the attack was directed on to Allied Military Government as well.

This state of affairs clearly effected both opposing national blocs equally and gave them common ground for the first concerted action though the chief motive power in the organisation of the strike was the PCG. After some negotiations with Allied Military Government, it was clear that it would stand by its decision and a general strike was called on from midnight 23rd September. This was backed by both GCM and PCG and their respective trade union federations the Sindacati Giuliani and the Sindacati Unici and the Railway Union. It lasted 48 hours and effected all of Zone A including PCIA. Only public utilities such as water and electricity were exempted. Shops were closed save for the

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The smoothness of the strike and the orderly manner in which it was conducted (there were no incidents or disturbances) was a considerable tribute to the organisation by the promoters and as previously mentioned was **306** first

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occasion on which the rival political blocs have worked together. However the strike ended on a note of discord resulting from the communists inability to avoid the national question, both in some of their leaflets and speeches at the demonstration which they convened. This experience is not likely to assist futura collaboration of the rival bodies.

Change of Policy of the PCG

summarised

The following is the text of a resolution of the Directive Committee of the PCG published in its official organ the *Lavoratore* on 27th September:-

"The population of the Giulian Region has expressed at different times its wish to be annexed to JUGOSLAVIA together with TRIESTE which makes a unity with its hinterland.

The PCG will use all its energy to satisfy this wish of the people. Only such a solution corresponds with the principles of Democracy and the self-determination of the people, guaranteed by the Atlantic Charter.

The annexation of TRIESTE to JUGOSLAVIA as seventh independent federative State guarantees all the national rights to the Italian majority of the city, and so it does to the Italian population in other parts of the Giulian region.

Such a solution completely guarantees the interests of all the nationalities of the Giulian region and only thus the relations between JUGOSLAVIA and ITALY may be settled in a friendly manner. Therefore the PCG invites all representatives of the democratic forces of VENEZIA GIULIA, all political organisations and parties to gather in the movement whose programme is to obtain the admission of VENEZIA GIULIA and TRIESTE to democratic and federative JUGOSLAVIA.

Death to Fascism

- Freedom to the People",

Since the beginning of August the PCG has adopted a policy of ostensible "autonomy", avoiding the national issue in its propaganda and teaching, though underground its obedience to ^{and} affiliation with LJUBLJANA has remained unaffected. The latest manifesto brings the party's known aims into full light and presumably its propaganda will now take on the appropriate slant. The reason for this sudden change is no doubt a tactical one, namely to meet the expected arrival of the Foreign Secretaries' deputies.

Propaganda and Press

Despite the torrent of propaganda from BELGRADE radio and the Jugoslav press voicing Jugoslavica's demand for VENEZIA GIULIA, the TRIESTE pro-Jugoslav press has continued its policy of veiled nationalism and insistence on recent economic problems. This policy is achieved mainly by giving every possible publicity to the progressive democracy of JUGOSLAVIA and comparing it in a favourable light with "reactionary" ITALY and the more localised Allied

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The pro-Italian press has become increasingly loud and wild in its nationalism and attacks on JUGOSLAVIA and the Tito regime. The fate of the Italian deportees, some thousands of whom are still waiting away in Yugoslav concentration camps, provides a continued source of anti-Jugoslav propaganda as to the stories of those fortunate few who managed to trickle across the

Morgan J. King.

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The circulation of the TRIESTE daily press is approximately as follows:-

Paper	Tone	Time	Circulation
Giornale Alleanza	Allied production.	Morning	62,000
Corriere di TRIESTE	Left Wing independent.	"	38,000
Primorski Dnevnik	Pro Yugoslav communist.	"	17,000
Voco Libera.	Pro Italian inter-Party.	Afternoon	40,000
Lavoratore	Pro Yugoslav communist.	"	30,000
Glas Zavesinkov	Allied production	"	5,000

There are also weekly papers in TRIESTE of each of the four main Italian political parties and one favouring autonomy, while in GORIZIA there is a weekly pro Italian paper and a weekly pro Yugoslav paper in Slovenia. The POLA daily press consists of the pro Italian Arena di Pola and the pro Yugoslav Nostro Giornale.

Internal Security

Zone A has been extremely quiet during the past month from the point of view of public safety though individuals continue to be abducted for political reasons and carried across the Morgan Line where their fate remains obscure. However the jumpy state of the Italian nerves is shown by the crop of rumours prior to the first night of the 13 Corps Tattoo. In addition to British and American troops taking part there were small contingents from the Yugoslav detachment and 228 Italian Division from UDINE. The rumours were to the effect that the pro Slav elements had brought up all the seats and were intending to manifest against the Italian contingent - these were so strong that one of the Italian parties in TRIESTE asked for withdrawal of Italian participation. In fact the first night went off without any disturbances while the mainly Italian audience applauded rapturously the appearance of the Italian flag carrying the arms of the House of Savoy.

The absence of any civil police force is still very marked and until this is operating efficiently and strength, confidence in public safety cannot hope to regain normality. It is hoped, however, that the first batch will be shortly on the streets while the Questura has already started to function. Meanwhile the pro Yugoslav press has inveighed against the Allies for re-employing former Italian police officials.

There is clearly a good deal of tension due to the distorted political situation, tension which is only likely to increase with the expected presence in the area of Foreign diplomats representing the somewhat divergent Western and Eastern ideologies. But it is unlikely that this will cause any serious disturbances while the opposing factions are on their best behaviour, knowing the eyes of the world are focussed on the disputed territory.

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Finance of Yugoslav Activities

The maintenance of a large number of Yugoslav inspired bodies with no ostensible means of existence such as the now powerless committees of Liberation and the not inconsiderable number of full time officials needed to run them, seems to suggest that LJUBLJANA must be footing a substantial bill to pay for its activities in Zone A. Furthermore all these bodies indulge in large scale propaganda, while at least one of the pro Yugoslav newspapers is believed to be subsidised from outside the area. According to a reliable report some six million lire were found by LJUBLJANA to subsidise the general strike.

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This means that the Yugoslav authorities must have considerable sums of lire at their disposal. One means of obtaining these is the compulsory exchange of foreign exchange in SLOVENIA. A drive for lire for the benefit of the Yugoslavs has even been reported as far afield as ALBANIA. The latest reports are of Istrian tobacco leaf being sold on the TRIESTE market at exorbitant prices on behalf of the Yugoslav authorities. Furthermore according to a reliable source, the Yugoslav government is printing lire in ZAGREB, presumably for use in Zone B thereby freeing additional Italian or Allied lire for use in Zone A.

Jugoslav Dissidents

A steady but small flow of those anti Tito elements continues to cross the Morgan Line. Some are evacuated down displaced persons channels while a few remain in the area. Their activities are comparatively small; telegrams sent King Petar on the occasion of his birthday, circulation in small numbers of pro monarchist and pro MIHAILOVICH pamphlets and efforts to establish communication with similar elements in JUGOSLAVIA and the rest of Europe. Their presence is referred to every now and then by the TRIESTE pro Yugoslav press which has recently stated that the extradition of such Slovene separatists, Ustashi and Nedic and Ljotic adherents, who were making TRIESTE their meeting place, had been demanded by BELGRADE.

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PART II
=====N.E. ITALY1. GENERAL

Before the LONDON Conference it appeared likely that the results if very unfavourable to ITALY, particularly on the VENEZIA GIULIA question, might lead to a government crisis, in which PARRI and the CLN would resign. The most wild rumours were as a result current, e.g. that a "National Government" would be formed, or that the "Luogotenente" would resign and a regency be set up for his son with a council of generals. The inconclusive results have therefore come as an anti-climax. Italians were prepared for bad news but it was a shock to find themselves apparently treated as a pawn in a game of power politics between the Allies. The immediate effect has been to deepen the prevailing mood of depression and cynicism and has certainly not increased the prestige either of the Allies or of the Italian democratic parties. On the one hand, the reported claims of RUSSIA to a mandate of TRIPOLITANIA came as an unpleasant surprise to the Left Wing parties, which sought to explain them as the result of the failure to install a "progressive" regime in ITALY and of Anglo-American treatment of the country as their exclusive sphere of interest. On the other hand the Right Wing parties, while relieved that the worst has not yet happened, particularly as regards VENEZIA GIULIA, are left with the impression that the peace terms when eventually arrived at, will take little account of Italian claims, and as a reaction are likely to drift more and more towards a barren nationalism. Continuance of the present uncertainty can only benefit anti-Democratic and semi-Fascist tendencies such as are represented in the Fronte dell'Uomo Qualunque (Man in the Street Front) which holds that the war had no idealistic basis and was merely a struggle for supremacy between the great powers, in which ITALY happened to be on the wrong side.

And as ITALY enters a winter of crisis. How she pulls through depends to a large extent on factors outside her control - the peace terms offered her, the amount of food and raw materials the Allies send. So far there are no immediate signs of trouble from the Right or Left, though rumours continue of a communist uprising for October when Allied Military Government is likely to give up the NORTH. But conditions of unemployment and hunger are not the best circumstances for an election, while the weakness of the central government, the absence of an efficient police force and the abundance of arms, are an invitation to disorder. Though Italians are prone to exaggerate, there is undoubtedly a feeling of uneasiness as to what the next few months will bring.

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The Autumn opens inauspiciously for ITALY. After a disastrous harvest,

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The Autumn opens inauspiciously for ITALY. After a disastrous harvest, the inevitable announcement has been made that the agreement of last July, whereby the state and North Italian industry subsidised the retention in employment of superfluous workers, will not be extending beyond the agreed date of 30 September. While all parties are agreed that the state finances and industry cannot stand the present arrangement, there is a general feeling that wholesale dismissal must be avoided particularly in view of the fact that with increased arrival of coal the situation is likely to improve during the next few months. Though no announcement has so far been made, it is probable that the Italian government will institute a system whereby surplus workers are kept on the strength of their factories, enjoying the advantages of communal kitchens etc, and take it in turns to work or receive a small dole provided by contributions from the state and the employers.

In North East ITALY, which is predominantly agricultural, the effect will not be as serious as in the industrial North West. On the other hand a grave unemployment problem already exists, particularly in TRIESTE, where the surplus population normally emigrated during the lean winter months. In VENICE, where it is estimated that only some 5% to 10% of industrial workers would be affected in any case, the issue has already given rise to some labour troubles.

On 10 Sep a conference was held at VENICE at which local authorities met under-Secretaries of State representing the Government to discuss the unemployment problem. Owing to the absence of unemployment insurance statistics, figures are only approximate, but it was stated that there were believed to be some 200,000 unemployed in the whole of the VENETO West of the ISONZO. In spite of assertions that the policy must be one of work and not doles, it appears that plans for public works envisage the employment of only 12,000 men or just over a twentieth of the existing unemployed.

3. BANDITRY

The Venetian press during the last month has referred to 12 cases of robberies by armed gangs during the period 30 August - 3 September, 5 cases and 2 armed hold-ups during the period 9 - 19 September and 2 during the period 20 - 28 September. Recent arrests have considerably helped the situation but the banditry problem remains serious. The main bands still remain unaffected and are likely to find recruits as unemployment increases during the winter and more and more Italians return from abroad. It is believed that the parties intend, as soon as Allied Military Government leaves, to launch a campaign for a reform in the police force and the recruitment of partisans.

There is no doubt that concern at the present situation is felt by all political parties. The following is a summary of their views, as gathered from members of all political parties.

- (a) The banditry is mainly the work of isolated groups and individuals and is at present non-political. On the other hand if not directed, it will inevitably acquire an organisation. While some of the authors may be ex-partisans the number involved is small, nor is there yet good evidence of fascist responsibility.
- (b) The Communists state that they are genuinely for law and order, and are not secretly preparing for a revolution. The Christian Democrats complain of pressure being put on their supporters in remote areas, but recognise that the Communists are attempting to exercise greater control on their outlying sections.
- (c) The fundamental cause is economic - lack of employment, coupled with disillusion after the high hopes of liberation, and the existence of large amounts of illegal arms.

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- (c) The fundamental cause is economic - lack of employment, coupled with disillusion after the high hopes of liberation, and the existence of large amounts of illegal arms.
- (d) The Carabinieri are inadequate in numbers, do not enjoy the respect of the population and are too frightened of the bandits to take effective action.
- (e) The returning displaced persons include large numbers of common criminals who were released from jail by the fascists and sent as labour to Germany.
- (f) The parties of the Left, particularly, emphasise the provocation to violence represented by the slowness of epuration and the number of prominent Republican fascists at liberty.

4. Congress of the CLNAI

The Congress of the CLNAI held at MILAN at the beginning of September to consider the functions of the CLN organisation in Northern Italy after the transfer of administration to the Italian government, resulted in effect in a decision by all parties to postpone the issue. On the one hand the Christian Democrats and Liberals did not press their demand for the suppression of factory and village CLNs and definition of the role of provincial and regional CLNs as purely consultative. On the other hand the left wing parties (Communists, Socialists and Action Party), while agreeing that the North Italy CLN should be merged in the RME CLN, did not specify what executive powers they claimed for the CLN. At the conclusion a carefully worded motion was passed in which both points of view were expressed. The CLNs were to continue to act in their role as advisors of the prefects and other organs of the Central Government while at the same time taking any independent action which would not adversely affect the working of the regular administration.

The Congress has at least cleared the air to the extent that it has shown that none of the parties are prepared to split the present union on the CLN issue. It will remain for the prefects etc to find a modus vivendi with their local CLNs after the departure of Allied Military Government.

5. Elections for the Costituente

On Sunday 23 Sep a public meeting organised by the Communists, Socialist and Republican Parties was held in the courtyard of the Ducal Palace VENICE to press for the immediate holding of the Constituent Assembly. The meeting was orderly and the display of communist flags moderate. It is estimated that a crowd of some two thousand people, perhaps half of which were party members, attended. The prevention of onlookers who listened without applauding was noticeable and confirmed the general apathy of the Venetians towards party politics. Attacks on the monarchy roused a certain amount of enthusiasm but the greatest applause was reserved for domestic issues such as the housing shortage.

6. The Man in the Street Front.

While it is too early as yet to speak of a swing to the Right, there is no doubt that the reaction to the CLNs claim to represent the Italian people is gathering strength. In this connection the spread of the "Fronto dell'Uomo Qualunque" or "Front of the Man in the Street" movement is of considerable interest. This movement has recently been launched by the paper of the same name and is considered of greater length at Appendix "C". It is opposed to all the parties indiscriminately and calls for good administration without regards to politics. It sets out to represent people with a grievance, "epurated" fascists, returning prisoners of war and internees, salaried workers etc. It is bitterly anti-Communist and in foreign politics strongly nationalistic.

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The Congress has at least cleared the air to the extent that it has shown that none of the parties are prepared to split the present union on the CLM issue. It will remain for the prefects etc to find a *modus vivendi* with their local CLMs after the departure of Allied Military Government.

5. Elections for the Costituente

On Sunday 23 Sep a public meeting organised by the Communists, Socialist and Republican Parties was held in the courtyard of the Ducal Palace VENICE to press for the immediate holding of the Constituent Assembly. The meeting was orderly and the display of communist flags moderate. It is estimated that a crowd of some two thousand people, perhaps half of which were party members, attended. The proportion of onlookers who listened without applauding was noticeable and confirmed the general apathy of the Venetians towards party politics. Attacks on the monarchy roused a certain amount of enthusiasm but the greatest applause was reserved for domestic issues such as the housing shortage.

6. The Man in the Street Front.

While it is too early as yet to speak of a swing to the Right, there is no doubt that the reaction to the CLMs claim to represent the Italian people is gathering strength. In this connection the spread of the "Fronte dell'Uomo Qualunque" or "Man in the Street" movement is of considerable interest. This movement has recently been launched by the paper of the same name and is considered of greater length at Appendix "C". It is opposed to all the parties indiscriminately and calls for good administration without regards to politics. It sets out to represent people with a grievance, "repurated" fascists, returning prisoners of war and internees, salaried workers etc. It is bitterly anti-Communist and in foreign politics strongly nationalistic. Among its covert activities, working nuclei in the Italian armed forces of ex-Republican fascists and anti-Communists is reported. The next few months will show whether the leader, Guglielmo GIANNINI, has the personality to put across his "Fronte" on a national basis, but he certainly has a large body of supporters and, particularly if he comes to an agreement with the monarchists as is already reported in VENICE, the movement may become an important political force. Whether or not it is, as its opponents claim, the new fascism, it will be bitterly opposed by the CLM parties, and any attempt on its part to intervene in the elections would probably result in disorders.

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The "Fronte" has not been started in VENICE under a certain Avv. Nino NARDI, and the first nuclei of "Friends" formed. At the same time the amount of copies of the paper available for distribution in the VENETO has increased from 3,000 a fortnight ago (mainly sold on the black market at 30 lire each) to an admitted 35,000, and is probably more in the region of 50,000, and an extra 10,000 copies are promised for VENICE next week. The total Italian circulation which has already penetrated as far as TRIESTE, is estimated at 700,000.

The clandestine nature of the organization of the movement in VENICE indicates the fear of the leaders that they may shortly have to go underground, and they are believed already to have made preparations by buying up a local anti-Allied satirical weekly.

7. Monarchist Movement

There are two monarchist organizations in VENICE, the Monarchic Front (Fronte Monarchico), and the Italian Democratic Party (Partito Democratico Italiano), and one Monarchist paper, the "Nuovo Risorgimento", which is somewhat thinly disguised as a "political and literary weekly". There is no doubt that discontent with the ineffectiveness of the ROME government and the activities of the CLN politicians has led to a considerable revival of Monarchist sentiment, though the movement is hampered by lack of an efficient organization, the difficulty of exculpating the monarchy from its support of Fascism and for its part in the events of 1943 and the lack of constructive programme.

With the exception of the Liberals and the unimportant Labour Democrat Party, all the CLN parties have now declared for a republic. The Christian Democrat decision was however carried in the face of a large Monarchist minority (which is very strong in the VENETO), and is largely nullified by the party's support of a plebiscite on the institutional issue instead of leaving the question to be decided by the Constituent Assembly which, being elected on a party basis, would almost inevitably vote for a republic. The alarm of the CLN parties at the growth of monarchism in the North is shown by their recent campaign of vilification.

Of greater interest are the relations of the Monarchists with "Uomo Qualunque". While the Monarchist leaders are as ready as any of the CLN to denounce the "Fronte" as merely camouflaged fascism there is good reason to believe that the local Monarchists have recently had conversations with personalities of "Uomo Qualunque" on the basis of a common front against communism. The Monarchists are, however, most unlikely to compromise themselves too far at the moment, in view of the probability that "Uomo Qualunque" will eventually be suppressed, and of unpleasant exposures of the persons financing the movement. If, however, the "Fronte" should develop so far that it appears to have a good chance of success, the Monarchists would probably be prepared to sacrifice their democratic principles in the interests of the

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8. TRIVISO

It is the boast of the Provincial CLN that TRIVISO is the best administered province in the VENETO. This satisfactory state of affairs is in great part due to the high esteem in which the population holds Allied Military Government. Another reason for the generally tranquil turn of events in the province can be found in the co-operative spirit in which the prefect and the party representatives on the CLN work together. A recent example of their happy initiative is the formation of a Reconstruction Committee designed on a thoroughly practical basis.

END

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A certain anxiety was occasioned at the beginning of the month, particularly by elements of the Left, by the arrival of Polish garrison troops in the Northern part of the province. It was feared that the well-known antipathy of the Poles to communism would lead to incidents with civilians, in particular with the Partisans of the Garibaldi Nino Mennetti Division. After a few minor incidents, the situation has settled down and there seems to be a desire to avoid trouble.

The number of unemployed in the province has risen during the past month from 9,000 to a figure estimated between 15,000 and 20,000. This is in large part due to the return to their homes of ex-Partisans and "reduci" from Germany. An effort to combat this serious state of affairs is being made by the CLN who have recently formed a Reconstruction Commission to investigate projects which can employ the largest quantity of labour with the limited materials available.

Banditry has not been so rife in TREVISO as in other parts of the VENETO and appears to be on the decline. But with the arrival of hard winter months and the departure of Allied Military Government, all parties emphasise the necessity of strengthening the inadequate police force.

9. UDINE

The basic problems in the FRIULI are lack of food and unemployment. The former is partly due to the harvest being 30% less than normal. The unemployment problem is perennial in the FRIULI but is more acute than usual since the usual expedient of emigration is not at present possible. Both the CLN and the Prefect put the unemployment figures at 40,000 out of a total population of 800,000. Banditry is not serious. On the other hand Italo-Jugoslav national feeling runs high in border areas and at SAN LEONARDO near CIVIDALE it broke out when the Mayor, a Triestini by birth of strong pro-Italian views, was shot to death with his wife. There is little doubt that the partisans were at one time in close liaison with the Slovenes, though this can largely be explained by the fact that 9 Slovene Corps was the nearest military headquarters, but the desire of everyone to be ruled by the government at ROME and not by that at LJUBLJANA appears to be general and strongly felt, and Slav propaganda is making no headway.

Subversive Propaganda in the Italian Army

At Appendix "D" is a translation of a leaflet which has appeared on the walls of VENICE. In view of recent demonstrations for the "democratisation of the Army" which occurred in Central and Southern Italy, the movement appears

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Subversive Propaganda in the Italian Army

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APPENDIX "A" to 13 CORPS MONTHLY
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.2

Notes on the attitude of the Slovene population of VENEZIA

GIULIA as observed by a pro Allied Slovene.

Five months ago the majority of the Slovenes in Zone A were organised in the Yugoslav Liberation Movement. The main reasons for this were:-

- (a) They desired above all to be rid of their oppressor ITALY and to be incorporated into JUGOSLAVIA regardless of the regime, of which in any case they had had little experience.
- (b) In the Slovene areas of Zone A it was the Partisans who fought the fascists and the Germans for so long, and eventually, as part of Marshal Tito's army, carried out the final round-up, locally, of the enemy in April and May. The first army to arrive therefore after the enemy collapse in ITALY was that of Marshal Tito. The Allied troops were thus regarded as "occupiers" as opposed to the Partisan "liberators".
- (c) As a result of Communist propaganda, it was believed that RUSSIA alone could effect their liberation and annexation to JUGOSLAVIA, whereas the Anglo-American forces were merely extending Italian sovereignty over the area.

The absence of any political freedom for the last 25 years culminating in the fascist dictatorship prevented the Slovenes from any experience of democracy, while their nationalist aspirations told them that JUGOSLAVIA would remain though regimes might come and go; yesterday it was Peter, today Tito and tomorrow who knows.

Soon, however, the first enthusiasm died down. The first disappointment was the establishing of the Morgan Line which clearly showed that RUSSIA was not then prepared wholeheartedly to support Tito's claims to VENEZIA GIULIA. Later, news gradually began to filter through of the situation in LJUBLJANA and the Slovene intellectuals of VENEZIA GIULIA began to realise that another form of dictatorship, rather than democratic freedom, was taking hold of JUGOSLAVIA. The working classes however were unable to see so far. Instead, the propaganda tricks learnt from the fascists were employed and highly successfully in a new role and "DU-CE, DU-CE" became "TI-TO, TI-TO".

The danger of a change in the popular mood was however seen by the LJUBLJANA Communists. Instead of emphasis being laid on "communism and collectivism", they played, during the initial stage of the Allied occupation, on the nationalistic feelings of the Slav element and became violent

be incorporated into JUGOSLAVIA regardless of the regime, of which in any case they had had little experience.

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The danger of a change in the popular mood was however seen by the LJUBLJANA Communists. Instead of emphasis being laid on "communism and collectivism", they played, during the initial stage of the Allied occupation, on the nationalistic feelings of the Slav element and became violent chauvinists, at the same time however preaching Italo-Slovene brotherhood. It is significant that in areas of Italian predominance as well as in LJUBLJANA propaganda was directed on to the usual tenets of the communist creed as opposed to the nationalism which was emphasised in the Slovene areas of VENEZIA GIULIA.

A sideline to this propaganda was the branding of all political opponents of the new totalitarian regime as "reactionaries", "fascists" or "collaborators". This, despite the fact that many, though once actively such, were to be found among the new adherents to the Communists.

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As already mentioned, some of the intellectual and middle class Slovenes turned from this propaganda. They also began to see the results of non-collaboration and sabotage of "the third occupier". Meanwhile, the Italians in so far as they were not communist were prepared to assist the Slovene non-collaboration policy cost the anti-Allied elements good positions and employment, which fell to the Italians. It seemed, however, that the Allied policy was more sympathetic to the Italians e.g. the insistence that VEREZIA GIULIA, though disputed, still remained Italian territory. To the more thinking Slovenes it appeared that this situation had arisen as a result of their bad political tactics. In fact a prominent member of the OF in GORIZIA recently stated that it and other areas would long have been Jugoslav, had King Peter reigned in BELGRADE instead of Tito. They are also apparently beginning to think that the playing up of RUSSIA had been a tactical error.

However, on one thing, both the masses and intellectuals, both those pro and anti Tito are agreed; no Slovene is willing to remain under Italian rule. Those who desire union with JUGOSLAVIA but not with a Communist JUGOSLAVIA are however faced with a great difficulty. They see the necessity of forming a democratic opposition to the Tito regime but fear the consequences of such activity e.g. denunciations to COMRA and immediate or future reprisals. They lack the courage to take action, whether to organise politically or to assist the Allies. "If Tito's men return to GORIZIA, we shall hang, should we collaborate with the Allies in local government, when the OF has proclaimed its sabotage". They then fall easy victims to the Jugoslav whispering campaigns. "Don't forget, we shall return and then we shall see what you have done during the Anglo-American occupation".

The success of this intimidation is increased by the semi official attacks on all who are working for the Allies, those being designated traitors, and on Jugoslav politicians who though not compromised are now living in emigration.

To remedy this situation the necessity is suggested of bringing about the following state of affairs:-

- (a) It will only be possible to organise an opposition movement to Tito's regime when the people have clearly seen that the Western Allies seriously wish to establish democratic government in JUGOSLAVIA. No one will dare organise this during the present totalitarian regime. Speeches like that of Mr Bevin help but the news from LJUBLJANA of oppression of political opponents is too heavy a counter weight.
- (b) More locally, the establishment of police forces in the country districts is necessary to prevent terrorisation from over the Marjan Line. Formerly the Slovenes were used to the presence of the COMRA, now there is no civil police force in Zone A.

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- (b) More locally, the establishment of police forces in the country districts is necessary to prevent terrorisation from over the Korcan Line. Formerly the Slovenes were used to the presence of the COPEL, now there is no civil police force in Zone A.
- (c) A change in the attitude of the Slovene working class is only possible after a clear statement that the Slovene areas will not remain Italian. Anti Allied propaganda is working hard on the line that the Allies intend to deliver the Slovenes again to the Italians.

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APPENDIX 'B' TO 13 CORPS MONTHLY
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 2

List of abbreviations of Italian, Slovene and Yugoslav Organisations referred to in intelligence reports of this HQ. (Note:- This list is supplemental to that issued as Appendix 'B' to 13 Corps Periodical Intelligence Summary No. 5.)

ANPI	National Association for Italian Partisans (Associazione Nazionale per i Partigiani Italiani). Association to look after welfare of ex Italian partisans.
CVL	Corpo Volontario della Liberta. Clandestine Italian Nationalist movement in GORIZIA.
FSLA	Front for Free Adriatic State (Fronte per il Stato Libero del Adriatico). Small autonomous movement.
GCLN	Giulian Committee of National Liberation. Pro Italian Committee in Trieste drawn from four main Italian parties. Never wielded any administrative power and went underground during Yugoslav occupation.
HSS	Croat Peasant Party (Hrvatski Seljacka Stranka). Croat political party opposing Tito regime.
MOS	Town Liberation Council (Mostni Osvoobodilni Snot). New name for NOC.
PCG	Giulian Communist Party (Partito Comunista Giuliano). Italo-Slovene body ostensibly autonomous but controlled by BELGRADE.
SU	Sindicati Unici. PCG controlled federation of trade unions in VENEZIA GIULIA.
SG	Sindicati Giuliani. GCLN controlled federation of trade unions in VENEZIA GIULIA.
Zone A	Allied occupied area of VENEZIA GIULIA.
Zone B	Yugoslav occupied area of VENEZIA GIULIA.

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"The Front of the Man in the Street" (Fronte dell'Uomo Qualunque)

"L'Uomo Qualunque" is a paper which started last Nov or Dec as a political offshoot from the Rome satirical weekly "Cantachiero". Its success has been fantastic, and it is now the most widely read paper in Italy.

The nearest equivalent to "L'Uomo Qualunque" is the pre-war French periodical "Gringoire". Most of the paper is devoted to vindictive and very witty personal attacks on the C.L.N. politicians, particularly the Communists, and to exposure by its readers of scandals in the provinces. The "Man in the Street" whom it claims to represent, is the "petit bourgeois", and its thesis is that the political parties are bankrupt; what is required is a strong government which can administer the state. On the grounds of efficiency it is bitterly opposed to the present "epuration" policy, particularly as it affects ex-Fascist industrialists, technicians and civil servants. It is strongly nationalist, anti-Russian, anti-Yugoslav and anti-Partisan in tone; the war had no ideological basis but was merely a struggle for power between the Allies and Germany in which Italy was foolish enough to come in on the wrong side; the professional politicians have shown themselves incapable of getting the country going again and should be replaced by technical experts - bankers, business men, financiers, agriculturists and civil servants - who can be found only by the oppressed middle class.

After being rejected by the Liberal Party, "L'Uomo Qualunque" is now founding its own political movement to be called "Fronte dell'Uomo Qualunque". The organization is intended to cover all Italy and is avowedly based on that of the Communist Party. From five to fifty "friends" will comprise a "nucleus" with a "nucleus leader"; up to seven "nuclei" will form a "group". All the groups in a province will be represented in the provincial "centres", which in turn are organized in Regional Unions. The whole edifice will be crowned by the National Front, the President of which will be elected at the First Congress to be held shortly, and will presumably be the editor of "L'Uomo Qualunque", Guglielmo GIANNINI, a former popular author of light comedies and a journalist of considerable brilliance.

The importance of the "Uomo Qualunque" movement should not be exaggerated, but while much of its success is undoubtedly due to the entertainment value of its weekly, there is no doubt that it reflects the opinions of a large number of Italians who are completely disillusioned with their new democratic parties. Army Officers, "epurated" Fascists, industrialists and the black coated workers, whose economic plight is perhaps worse than that of any other class in Italy, are among the chief supporters of the movement. The paper

represent, is the "petit bourgeois", and its nucleus is made up of political parties are bankrupt; what is required is a strong government which can administer the state". On the grounds of efficiency it is bitterly opposed to the present "epuration" policy, particularly as it affects ex-Fascist industrialists, technicians and civil servants. It is strongly nationalist, anti-Russian, anti-Yugoslav and anti-partisan in tone; the war had no ideological basis but was merely a struggle for power between the Allies and Germany in which Italy was foolish enough to come in on the wrong side; the professional politicians have shown themselves incapable of getting the country going again and should be replaced by technical experts - bankers, business men, financiers, agriculturists and civil servants - who can be found only by the oppressed middle class.

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The movement is still in its infancy. There is no doubt that its spread will be bitterly opposed by the C.L.N., particularly Left wing parties. Hitherto they have not wished to give the movement free publicity by indulging in polemics. Earlier in the year, however, the paper was for a time suspended and an unsuccessful attempt made to "epurate" GIANNINI on the grounds of a Fascist past. A demand that the paper be banned again was made at the recent C.L.N. Congress at

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MILAN, but was wisely rejected on the grounds that it would merely go underground. For the C.L.N. parties the movement with its contempt for party politics, its appeal to the "proletariat" and the middle classes and its call for a strong administration at all costs, is too reminiscent of the beginnings of Fascism, and they consider could only result in the imposition of a police state. After 20 years of persecution and 18 months of partisan warfare the Left Wing leaders would not hesitate to resist any such attempt by force.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

APPENDIX "D" TO 13 COMPS MONTHLY

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 2.

Poster put up all over Venice, about 15/16 Sept. 45.

The poster is very well printed and surmounted by an Italian tricolour.

It is presumably connected with the recent soldiers' demonstrations in Emilia and Romagna. The movement has appeared so far only among Italian Service troops.

LIBERTY FRATERNITY EQUALITY

The Voice of the Italian Soldiers

Brothers, listen to the cry of pain which goes up from our brothers who are still under arms, constrained to support that traitorous House of Savoy which is now trying with underhand manoeuvres to regain power.

WE DO NOT WANT our fate to be in the hands of a man who has shown himself unworthy of leading us, who flung us into the slaughter of this disastrous war, and then betrayed us in the most critical moment. WE DO NOT WANT for our leader a man who by tradition is the patron of the people's enemies. We soldiers no longer want to be exploited by war-mongering generals, and by ambitious and unscrupulous officers.

WE WANT and we have the right to have, that holy liberty for which suffered our brothers who are now returning from German prison camps, and our partisans behind the enemy lines, and our families under the Nazi-Fascist oppression.

WE ALL WANT TO GO HOME to reconstruct our Italy, our beloved Italy which will be republican, because the monarchy is a synonym of and tyranny, of oppression of the people and continual warlike adventures, must disappear from the constitution of our country.

We also want our liberty not to be menaced again; if we wish to safeguard the prosperity and safety of our children LET US DO AWAY ONCE AND FOR ALL with militarism and those who sustain it.

Once more the fate of the country depends on us! This is the moment to speak clearly and to act. Our fallen call for justice and justice will be done.

Long Live the Italian Republic.

Down with the criminal Fascist King.

Down with the criminal Fascist King. it is the promoter of wars,

LIBERTY

FRATERNITY

EQUALITY

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Long Live the Italian Republic.

Down with the criminal Fascist King.

Down with militarism once and for all; it is the promoter of wars, of disorders and of bloodshed.

The Committee of Military Agitation.
(The Italian Soldiers)

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13 CORPS MONTHLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 1

for August 1945

SEP 11 1945

SECRET

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5 September 1945.

W. J. J. J.
Lt-Col.,
General Staff.

W. J. J. J.
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SECRET

13 CORPS MONTHLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 1

NOTE:

This summary will henceforth replace 13 Corps Periodical Intelligence Summary, the last issue of which was No. 6 dated 8 Aug 45, and 13 Corps Security Intelligence Report, the last issue of which was No. 52 dated 10 Aug 45.

PART I

Review of the Political Situation in VENEZIA GIULIA 8 to 31 Aug 45.1. GENERAL

The month has seen two major developments in Yugoslav policy regarding VENEZIA GIULIA. The first was aimed at disavowing Yugoslav influence in local affairs including the organization of the civil administration and the local Italian and Slav Communists, but at the same time retaining full underground control of them. This policy started with the easing of pressure on VENEZIA GIULIA by thinning out the Yugoslav forces on the Morgan Line including the departure of 1 Tank Army and the absence of all reference to demands for the annexation of VENEZIA GIULIA in the Yugoslav Communist propaganda machine. It culminated in the forming of the Giulian Communist Party (PCG) which to the outside world declares that it owes allegiance neither to Italy nor to Yugoslavia while it is known covertly to obey implicitly and solely the directives from LJUBLJANA and BELGRADE. The second was due to the impact on this policy of the belief that the Foreign Secretaries will settle at their September conference the final disposal of this area. This necessitated a renewal of propaganda through external media on the lines that VENEZIA GIULIA belongs to Yugoslavia, while within the area a plebiscite is being organized to gain signatures favouring part or the whole of VENEZIA GIULIA being incorporated in Yugoslavia. The PCG has endeavoured to disown organizing this campaign and its official organ stated that the organizers were "the will of the people". It is, however, clear that the PCG through its executives, UGIS and the Sindacati Unici etc., is the responsible body.

The policy of the Yugoslav inspired bodies in the area, mostly those set up during the period of Yugoslav occupation, has continued to adhere to the aim to undermine and obstruct the work of AMG. This policy

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1. GENERAL

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The policy of the Yugoslav inspired bodies in the area, mostly those set up during the period of Yugoslav occupation, has continued to adhere to the directive to undermine and obstruct the work of AMG. This policy has recently crystallised into one of publicly avowed non-cooperation as a result of the introduction of AMG General Order 11. This order reintroduces in a modified form the pre-8 Sept Italian administrative machine with Italian and Slovene representation based proportionately, as far as is possible, on ethnological figures, and giving AMG complete power over the appointment of all major officials. The result is to sweep away the last remaining vestiges of executive power from those bodies such as the FMOO, NOO's and other committees "popularly" elected during the Yugoslav occupation. Those still retained a great deal of power largely owing to the absence of any organised opposition or representation on them of the pro-Italian faction. This policy of non cooperation has now been extended to all public or semi-public bodies and appointments which assist AMG and are filled by Slovenes

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or adherents of the PCG. The Regional and Area Committees have accordingly refused to nominate candidates for the new administration while all Slovenes and Italian Communists have withdrawn from Agricultural, Housing, Education and similar Committees, the Slovene instructors in the new civil police have resigned and high ranking Slovene officials have resigned from their advisory and administrative positions. As regards Allied troops the counterpart of this policy of non-cooperation is of course that of Slovene non-fraternisation which in the hinterland has for long been strictly observed.

The PCG answer to the Order is to demand elections for which they claim they are politically ripe pointing to those carried out during the Yugoslav occupation as an example. In those the electorate was presented in many cases with the facts accomplished and a number of persons were appointed on committees without their own previous knowledge or consent. The full blast of the powerful propaganda machine at the PCG's disposal has accordingly been turned on to this counter demand.

This policy has resulted in leaving AMG faced with a number of alternatives, all extremely unsatisfactory:-

- (a) to form an exclusively pro-Italian and therefore unrepresentative administration in those areas where the Italians feel themselves strong enough to risk the intimidation which is rife in the area.
- (b) to resort to direct military government with its accompanying difficulties of finding sufficient personnel.
- (c) to rescind General Order 11.
- (d) to ask for Yugoslav cooperation through diplomatic channels and thereby substantially weaken the position of AMG. In TRIESTE district (excluding the city) there exists at the moment no administration in the predominantly Slovene communes and an administration with no PCG representation in those with a large Italian majority; while in the mixed areas the Italians are only prepared to serve if adequate military protection is given to them.

The Communist bloc is furthermore now in a position to sit on the fence and bring the whole weight of its propaganda to bear on AMG during the times ahead. These will become increasingly difficult owing to the advent of winter with its attendant shortages of food and fuel and the increase of unemployment when firms pay off their inflated pay rolls idle owing to lack of raw materials and which hitherto they have been compelled by AMG to maintain.

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"Italianite" has increased considerably in strength in the littoral. Meetings large and small of the main political parties have been held in many towns and in some cases representatives have come from Zone B. There has also been wider movement and numbers of the local Action, Socialist and Christian Democrat parties have attended the party congresses at ROVE where the fate of VENEZIA GIULIA has been increasingly discussed. The Italian government, unlike BELGRADE, has clearly had very little knowledge as to VENEZIA GIULIAN affairs and these visits together with the reports from the special emissaries of PABRI and others are helping to inform ROVE of local problems. The representatives at the MILAN conference of CLN's will also serve the same purpose.

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The PCG's view of effectiveness of the GCLM is evidently shared in Italian political circles since it has been told it must become more effective before it can expect further assistance from ROVE. Its great weakness is lack of leaders, a remedy for which will probably have to be sought from outside this area.

As previously emphasised however, the growing strength of the Italian movement is increasing the rift between it and the PCG bloc. There appears now to exist no common ground between the two. As a result of the Italians having their demonstrations dispersed by PCG organised counter-demonstrations, they have frequently been reported to be organising various types of action squads for the defence of their activities.

The rift is also emphasised in the inability of the two trade union federations, the Sindacati Uniti (PCG) and Sindacati Giuliani (GCLN) to arrive at any compromise. After a protracted and wordy newspaper battle fought in the *Lavoratore* (official organ of the PCG) and the *Voce Libera* (GCLN) in which both federations have protested their willingness to meet the other provided they gave nothing away, the setting up of a coordinating body appears to have failed. Some sort of agreement however, is believed to have been reached to meet joint action in the case of strikes. It is unlikely however, that even this will work in practice.

The good name of the Italians is not helped by the nationalistic attitude of their two papers, *Voce* (TRIESTE) and *L'Arena di Pola* (POLA). This appears all the more violent in view of the absence of chauvinistic claims in the PCG press which is still adhering to the directive to this effect, though as mentioned above, recent international developments have forced BELGRADE to revive their claims in the Yugoslav propaganda machine operating within that country.

Between these two opposing factions there is believed to be growing an increasing movement favouring autonomy. Some nine small groups including the *Fronte per il Stato Adriatico* are reported as about to fuse while negotiations are in progress for the publication of a paper favouring this solution. Were the movement to get under way there would probably be a substantial backing from the Italian commercial and middle-classes and the more moderate Slovenes, especially Catholics, to whom the ways of democracy as interpreted by Jugoslavia are becoming more and more anti-pathetic.

In this connection the following extract from a work by a great authority on the Balkans, Mr Seaton-Watson written during the first world war is of interest:-

"The essence of the problem is to leave as few minorities as possible on the wrong side of the final line and to strike an average between ethnography and geography. Historic rights will not bring us far towards the solution for while Dalmatia might conceivably be claimed in the name of her Venetian conquerors - hardly a title which the League of Nations is likely to accept - it would then be necessary to renounce TRIESTE, which voluntarily placed itself under the protection of the Habsburgs in 1382, and has ever since owed its entire prosperity to the connection with its hinterland to the North. It is neither on historical nor on economic, but

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THE PLEBISCITE

This measure first became apparent during the second week of August. It appears to have been carried out on a considerable scale and has been reported in operation throughout both zones of VENETIA GIULIA. Although the Slovene version claims the Friuli, the only area outside VENETIA GIULIA where it has been reported in progress is Tarvisio. The Italian version demands inclusion of TRIESTE in Jugoslavia "in the form of an autonomous city" while the Slovene extends to the whole of VENETIA GIULIA and the Friuli and demands simply the union of these areas to Jugoslavia. The measure has been given great publicity by the press of both sides while the Allied controlled papers have issued a warning advising the public to report at once any intimidation in this connection. The move is known to be PCG - UAS inspired though they cannot claim it in view of the avowed "autonomous" policy of the PCG. The methods reported used for obtaining signatures are similar to those used in the population census recently attempted by the same bodies, trickery, bribery and intimidation. It is, however, believed that quite large numbers of the working classes have not signed despite extravagant claims made by the PCG press which described the "rapturous reception by the people of the canvassers", some of whom were detained by the Allied Police for intimidation.

INTERNAL SECURITY

Although the area has been superficially quiet the internal security situation can in no way be said to be satisfactory until there is an effective and adequate civil police force. Intimidation is widespread and there are not infrequent cases of persons disappearing and on occasion being murdered, for political reasons - investigations usually prove abortive owing to witnesses refusing to come forward, and invariably declining to sign written statements, through fear of reprisals. There were many cases of intimidation reported in connection with the plebiscite. In addition to other similar incidents the doctor and chief instructor for the new civil police force have resigned owing to threats against their relatives EAST of the Morgan Line. The fact that most residents of the MIG Zone have relatives living in the Yugoslav occupied area causes a vicious circle to arise. Pressure is brought on such residents by threats of violence to their relatives, threats which are easy to implement owing to the absence of any movement control on the Morgan Line. Meanwhile the police this side of the line are hamstrung owing to the inherent difficulties of their being exclusively Allied personnel and to the unwillingness of potential witnesses.

The civil police force itself is finding great difficulties in getting started. Among others have been the discovery that 12 of the 35 instructors had been sent from Slovenia with orders to penetrate it while more recently Slovene instructors have resigned in accordance with the policy of non-cooperation. For the moment therefore the only candidates left are

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However as against this and in spite of the uncertainty as to the ultimate disposal of the disputed area some confidence among commercial classes is felt since recently fairly appreciable deposits have for the first time been made in the banks while large numbers of Italian commercial

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men have been applying for permits to enter VENEZIA GIULIA for business reasons. Furthermore a number of small limited companies have been formed in the area, believed with local Italian capital.

There have been the usual evidence of demonstrations during the period under review. The most notable being in TRIESTE on the 16th and 19th and MONFALCONE and GORIZIA on the 17th. That on the 19th was the second organised by the Italian faction and for the second time was broken up by PCG adherents. There were in all cases the usual incidents over the Italian flag and persons attacked as "fascists" (a word now completely without any significance and used to portray, in the left wing vocabulary, any person opposed to their policy, including on occasion AMG). In each case a number of arrests were made. A number of small demonstrations have also taken place in the country towns, mostly directed against General Order No. 11.

JUGOSLAV REACTIONARY PARTIES

An increasing number of persons hostile to Tito's regime are collecting in VENEZIA GIULIA. These come from such bodies as the Croat Peasant Party (HSS), Slovene Clerical Party, Chetniks, Demobrans etc. The greater number are those who have escaped from Yugoslavia and crossed the Morgan Line (at present an open demarcation line) while a smaller number have also made their way up from the camps in the FORLI areato which many thousands were evacuated during the period of the collapse of the German army in NE ITALY. Although not sufficiently numerous or powerful to constitute a danger to Tito's regime at present, they have connections with emigré circles and are attempting to establish communications with the various bands increasingly reported in active operations against the present Yugoslav state.

The TRIESTE Yugoslav controlled press has several times attacked the Allies for supporting the criminals who want to make TRIESTE a fortress of original Yugoslav reaction".

UAIS and the PCG

At Appendix "A" is an eye-witness account of the first UAIS congress for both zones of VENEZIA GIULIA. This is now the most powerful political body in the area and is virtually the executive organ of the PCG. The congress in fact formed the back-ground for the final stages of the emergence of the Italo-Slovene Communists as the "autonomous" or Giulian party. The directive committee consisting of 5 Italians, 6 Slovenes and 2 Croats was elected at the PCG congress held on the day following that of UAIS and the Lavoratore was designated its official organ. An Italian communist of local standing has confidentially admitted that the forming of the PCG was instigated by BELGRADE, whose pressure the more moderate of the local Italian communists were unable to withstand.

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The Communists are reported to be tightening up their cell organisations and something in the nature of the "block-leiter" system (political informers operating on a street basis) is believed to be being introduced into some of the TRIESTE working class districts. The Communists have themselves admitted that "Italianite" in the area has gained ground while the first signs are appearing that their "Balkan" methods are by no means aiding the advancement of their cause locally. They are of course now almost cut off from the influence of the policy of moderation and cooperation which has been noticeable in the Italian Communist Party.

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PART II

N.E. ITALY1. Political Situation in the VENETO

The main factor in the political situation in the VENETO is the approaching transfer of administration to the Italian Government. This prospect has had the immediate effect of increasingly general concern at the prevalence of lawlessness in the area. While it is easy to exaggerate the problem (there have, for example, been in fact only 7 reported murders in VENICE province since liberation), there is no doubt that there has been an alarming increase in robberies with violence, particularly in country districts. All parties are united in urging energetic measures to deal with a situation which not only discredits democratic institutions in general, but also the partisan movement which has undoubtedly supplied a proportion of the arms and the men involved. Perhaps the most serious aspect of the SCIO incident was that the attack on the prison and the murder of its inmates was ordered by the leader of a recognised partisan brigade.

It is generally agreed that this state of affairs has resulted in a swing towards the so-called "parties of order", i.e. the Christian Democrats and Liberals, and away from the Left, which by promises of land reform had made a certain amount of progress even among the peasants. There is no doubt that the Communists and Socialists fully realise that the prevalence of public disorder plays into the hands of their political opponents and the Communists, while publicly throwing the blame on reactionary forces anxious to discredit the Left, have in fact begun discreet "epuration" of their more violent members. The VENETO Regional Committee of National Liberation, on the proposal of the Socialists, supported by the Communists, has recommended to AMG the recruitment in each province by a commission consisting of Allied, Carabinieri and CLN representatives, of partisans as auxiliary police for the maintenance of public order, and the internment of large numbers of ex-Fascists during the transition from AMG.

Though the Christian Democrats and Liberals did not oppose these proposals, the Christian Democrat Leader, Avv. GATTO, subsequently stated that he was completely opposed to what he described as "party" police, and that the only method was to increase the Carabinieri; the CLN was in any case "dominated by the Communists".

The proposal to raise a CLN sponsored police force raises the question, which is further discussed below, of the future of the whole CLN organisation when Northern Italy is handed over to the Italian Government. On this question a cleavage of opinion has developed between the Christian Democrats, Liberals and Labour Democrats (where they exist in Northern Italy) on the one hand, and the Communists, Socialists and Action Party on the other. The former propose that the CLNAI HQ in MILAN should virtually cease to exist and that only the

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On 31 Aug a meeting of CLNAI was held to discuss the question. Whatever formula is adopted to define the function of the CLN, its application will certainly vary according to local conditions. In the VENETO, which is mainly agricultural, the CLN movement is by no means as developed as in the more industrial areas of LOMBARDY and PIEMONTE. Any attempt to extend unduly its powers will certainly be resisted by the Christian Democrats who are by general

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admission, if not the most active, numerically the strongest party. On the other hand the authority of any "advice" the CLN may offer will inevitably be increased by the fact that it is addressed not to AMG but to a prefect who in almost every case is a local political personality originally nominated by the CLN.

A problem of some importance is presented by the "Reduci" (ex internees and PW returning from Germany), particularly in VENICE which is still crowded with refugees from all parts of Italy, including many Fascists who moved North with the Germans, and where the addition of 3-4,000 returning inhabitants has seriously aggravated the unemployment problem. The speech of Sig. LUSSU, the Minister of Post-War Reconstruction, who visited VENICE for an Action Party meeting, was interrupted by their leader, and on 25 Aug they held a demonstration in St. Marks Square. The main demand was for the removal of the AMG order forbidding the large scale dismissal of employees. This order had in fact already lapsed and it is difficult to see that the majority of the "Reduci", who voluntarily went to work in Germany, have any real claim to preferential treatment. They have, however, got a strong organisation going and appear to intend applying pressure tactics to get their claims recognised.

In general, relations between the various political parties have improved. In TREVISO, the situation appears to be much better and in UDINE the Communists and Christian Democrats are reported to have reached an agreement not to indulge in polemics at each other's expense. The labour situation in VENICE has been quiet since the general strike some six weeks ago apart from a six day strike by the waiters, a small unauthorised effort by the undertakers and a threat by the barbers.

2. Notes on TREVISO

(a) General

The political situation in Treviso Province appears to be generally satisfactory. The chief cause for worry is the increasing activity of small gangs of armed bandits, who are responsible for acts of robbery and hold-ups, particularly by night. It is, however, emphasised by all sources that, in all probability, these acts are the expression of unruly and discontented individuals and are neither the emanation of any political party nor of any partisan organisation. Despite the fact that their activity is on a smaller scale than in the area South and East, the Provincial CLN is very concerned about the matter and urges the formation of a new police force comprised of reliable ex-partisans to supplement the CCRR. The number of murders committed in the province since the liberation is small. There is little evidence of Tito propaganda and it appears that

inhabitants has seriously aggravated the unemployment problem. The speech of Sig. LUSU, the Minister of Post-War Reconstruction, who visited VENICE for an Action Party meeting, was interrupted by their leader, and on 25 Aug they held a demonstration in St. Marks Square. The main demand was for the removal of the AMG order forbidding the large scale dismissal of employees. This order had in fact already lapsed and it is difficult to see that the majority of the "reduci", who voluntarily went to work in Germany, have any real claim to preferential treatment. They have, however, got a strong organisation going and appear to intend applying pressure tactics to get their claims recognised.

In general, relations between the various political parties have improved. In TREVISO, the situation appears to be much better and in UDINE the Communists and Christian Democrats are reported to have reached an agreement not to indulge in polemics at each other's expense. The labour situation in VENICE has been quiet since the general strike some six weeks ago apart from a six day strike by the waiters, a small unauthorised effort by the undertakers and a threat by the barbers.

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(b) Views of the Vice-Prefect of Treviso (an elderly Socialist).

CLM Treviso Province is the best CLM in Veneto; the complete absence of party rivalry assuring smooth working. The operations of small armed bands of robbers are causing considerable anxiety in the province. These bands are definitely not organised by the Communist Party as is evidenced by the fact that the urgent necessity of increasing the police force was first raised a month ago by the Communist member of the CLM. As regards the present police force, of the 1,100 Carabinieri in the province, after discounting the number deployed as guards etc, only 327 are responsible for ordinary police duties. That is to say, only 4 per commune, and these are without bicycles. It is suggested that a new

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police force be recruited from reliable ex partisans either on a provincial or a communal basis to operate in coordination with the CCRR., but under its own leaders. This project would meet with the approval of the colonel commanding CCRR.

Powers of the CLN should be increased during the period between the withdrawal of AMG and the Italian elections. This is generally agreed by the CLN though some Christian Democrats and Liberals think otherwise. To split the unity of the CLN front would be disastrous. It is not true to say that the parties of the left wish for early elections in opposition to those of the right. The majority of all parties in the North (himself included) think the elections should be held over till the Spring to give the people a chance to regain their political sense. It is Rome that is pressing for early elections. The parties of the left wish the elections of the Costituente to precede the Administrative elections. The Christian Democrats think otherwise as the priests, who dominate the country districts, hope thus to increase their powers.

The time is not yet ripe for the fusion of the Socialist with the Communist Party. This fusion will later become necessary; fusion with the Christian Democrat Party is also desirable in the future, in order that all parties of the people may form a united front. The local Socialist Party has already asked the Communist Party to expunge its more violent elements, and this the Communists are doing now. (Included is the expulsion of some of its more violent intellectuals).

The economic situation is dominated by the unemployment figures. In Treviso town there are over 5,000 unemployed out of a total population of 50,000. The situation is being aggravated by the return of ex internees etc., and in this respect some constructive plan is hoped for as a result of the recent visit of Emilio Lussu, Minister of Post-War Assistance, to Treviso. The food situation in the country districts is aggravated by the egoism of the peasant and his reluctance to sell his produce in the open market.

3. Slav Activity in the VENETO.

There is known to be a considerable coming and going of Yugoslavs in the area, a movement which is facilitated by the absence of any control on the Morgan Line or VENEZIA GIULIAN boundary. There is also strong though so far not conclusive evidence of traffic by boat with Jugoslavia. One of the principal organisers of pro-Slav activity is "Achille" (Prof FANCINI) an ex Garibaldi formation commander. He is established in VENICE but is believed to make visits to Yugoslav controlled territory to obtain funds.

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In view of the strength of anti-Slav feeling in the VENETO it appears most unlikely that the official Communist Party is actively involved. The Communists have already lost many supporters as a result of their inability, for ideological reasons, to adopt the same nationalistic attitude on the TRIESTE issue as the other Italian parties. The setting up of the independent Giulian Communist Party was accepted on the Italian side as relieving the Italian Communist Party as far as possible of responsibility for the activities of Italian Communists in VENEZIA GIULIA, and it is believed that BELLEGRI, the representative of FOGLIATTI for the negotiations, took a very strong line during a subsequent tour of UDINE Province on the importance of the Communist organisations in FRIULI keeping clear of intrigue with the Slavs. ACHILLE himself appears to be very little seen at the headquarters of the VENICE Communist Party and, though he certainly has an organisation, is probably playing a lone hand.

9/ During the.....

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During the clandestine period the Slavs had every opportunity to penetrate the Italian Garibaldi partisans West of the ISONZO, and some Italian leaders perhaps played with the idea of a Soviet Socialist Republic of FRIULI in the Yugoslav confederation. After our arrival, Slav influence was kept alive by the reluctance of many of the partisans to give up their arms and the desire of some more unscrupulous Left Wing leaders to retain influence in their areas. Now that the political situation has to some extent crystallised, the danger is that the Slav sympathisers may resort to extremism, particularly in the formation of their dissident underground organisation. The recent disturbances at PORTO GRUARO (E-18) were certainly fomented by discontented elements, many with criminal records; on the other hand the Slav issue seems to have faded into the background. Similarly in TREVISO Province, where considerable Slav infiltration had taken place, there is a wide-spread feeling (unconfirmed by any direct evidence) that recent acts of banditry are in part attributable to extremists who were formerly under Slav influence. The Communist Party in VENICE has already started wide-spread epuration, and as a preliminary step has submitted the names of all its members to the police to check up on their past records.

4. The SCIO Prison Murders.

On 6 Sept the trial opens at VICENZA of 15 ex partisans responsible for the murder by machine gun fire on 6 Jul of 55 political prisoners who were being held in SCIO gaol. There appears little doubt that the attack was ordered by the "Mertiri della Val Leogra" Bn (CAREMI Partisan Division) which had actually sent a letter to the local CLN saying they would "execute justice" unless the CLN acted. The "Val Leogra" Bn was one of the most effective partisan units in the VENETO (three of the partisans awaiting trial are actually due to be decorated shortly by Gen CLARK at MILAN) and, although the divisional HQ does not seem to have been involved, the incident has served to discredit the whole partisan movement. The VENETO Regional Partisan HQ has arranged for the defence, and it is understood from the Commander, Colonel RIZZONI, that he will, without condoning the crime, give evidence for the defence in order to point out the achievements of the unit before liberation, the difficulty for men who have been living for years a life of outlawry to return to civilised conditions, and the provocation provided by the undeniable slowness of the past few months of epuration in the VENETO. He considered that, while the incident is generally condemned and the sentences should be of great severity, the passing of the death sentence would cause considerable indignation in Northern Italy.

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5. The Administrative Elections.

Apart from the CLN question, the most important issue at present is the date of the administrative elections (for mayors, town councils etc). The Christian Democrats and Liberals are anxious to hold these as soon as possible and before the general elections for the Constituent Assembly. Their main reason is probably that they believe that, despite the noise which the politically more active parties of the Left make, the people, particularly in the country districts, are tired of unsettled conditions and the aftermath of the partisan insurrection, and that the result of the administrative elections would, contrary to what has been the case in France, reveal a swing to the right, which would certainly affect voting at the elections for the Constituent Assembly. Moreover, since the Left was generally far more active in the resistance movement, in many districts which are predominantly

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Christian Democrat power is in the hands of Communist, and in some cases extremist, mayors and CLN's who were appointed at the time of Liberation mainly owing to their partisan prowess. The Christian Democrats are genuinely perturbed by the interference which they have received in organising political activity in remoter areas. While they admit that these "threats" are made mainly by irresponsible young men brought up under Fascism and are at variance with the policy and interests of the Communist Party, they consider that the holding of administrative elections first would lessen the danger of duress being applied to their supporters in the general elections, and would provide a test of the possibility of holding genuinely free elections at the present time.

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MONTHLY

APPENDIX "A" TO 13 CORPS ~~PERIODIC~~
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 3.1.

First U.A.I.S. Congress held in TRIESTE on 12 Aug 45.

1. GENERAL.

The first impression of the Congress was of the exceptionally good organization. Tickets and badges of delegates were carefully examined at the door by stalwart female attendants, and pockets felt for possible arms; Red Cross nurses were in attendance and walked round offering glasses of lemonade; a microphone and loud speaker had been arranged; flash light photographs were being taken continuously and there was a large contingent of journalists including a TANJUG representative.

The decoration of the hall had obviously been carefully thought out so far as not to offend any Italian susceptibilities. All round the body of the room were Trieste flags at regular intervals, with a large size Stars and Stripes and a Red Ensign on either side of the hall. Behind the platform was a large Italian tricolour flanked by a Jugoslav flag and a Russian flag, with a Fiume flag in the corner. On the gallery behind the platform were drawings of TRUMAN, ATTLEE and STALIN, while on the wall behind a much smaller drawing of TITO was balanced by Garibaldi.

Comment 1.

Allied observers on arrival were ushered up to front seats and welcomed with great warmth. A speech of welcome by the President was greeted with much applause and cries of 'Viva gli Alleati' and 'Viva ATTLEE'.

It is estimated that some 2,000 delegates from the various UAIS functioning on both sides of the MORGAN LINE, including a large proportion of women, were present. The proceedings were completely orderly. There was a considerable amount of cheer-leading and slogan crying; sometimes, particularly when the audience indulged in rhythmical shouting of 'Vi-va, vi-va, vi-va' or 'Ti-to, Ti-to, Ti-to', (even 'Att-lee, Att-lee, Att-lee'), it was impossible for anyone who knew Italy before the war not to hear echoes of the familiar 'Du-co, Du-co, Du-co' chant. On the other hand, the meeting was conducted in a very friendly and informal way; there is no doubt that there was a basis of genuine enthusiasm, and the slogan shouting, for which women were mainly responsible, was clearly unpopular with a considerable section of the audience and was at one stage checked by the chairman.

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All voting was by show of hands, and was in every case unanimous. The forms of democracy were, however, carefully observed. A suggestion that no discussion on a motion was necessary met with an indignant statement by the chairman that in a democracy everyone should be free to express his opinion. There was, moreover, at least one speech opposing aspects of the official programme and a certain amount of animated discussion took place on some non-official proposals. The general impression was of far more spontaneity about the speeches and the conduct of the congress than might have been expected.

Among those present apart from the speakers were:

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STOKA, Secretary of the Trieste Council of Liberation, who though not on the platform took a considerable share in organising the proceedings;

PELLEGRINI, an Inspector of the Milan Communist Party;
SOLIERE HERMANNO, Administrative Secretary of the Trieste Federation of the Communist Party, and
REGENT IVAN, delegate designate for the Rmo Consulta and one of the leading pro Yugoslav Communists.

2. THE SPEECHES.

All speeches were delivered in Italian or Slovene according to the speaker's race: those delivered in Slovene were translated into Italian, but the reverse process was evidently not considered necessary.

After brief opening remarks by the opening chairman, SESTAN Giusoppe, an elderly elementary schoolmaster whose handling of the meeting throughout was eminently friendly and tactful, the congress proceeded to the election of officials from lists submitted by the executive. All elections were made on the show of hands and were unanimous. The first speaker was Dr. PUC, who referred briefly to the intrigues of what he described as the "Fascist anti-Fascists", and warned his audience to be on their guard against attempts to break working-class unity. He was followed by POGASSI, whose speech consisted entirely of a review of the struggle against Fascism in various countries, concluding with a brief reference to the "popular will", which was greeted with great applause. He was followed by a former member of the International Brigade in Spain and partisan, SEGALA, who spoke as representing ISTRIA.

The main event of the day was the reading by KREIGER Boris, vice president of the P.N.O.O. of the statement of U.A.I.S. policy. The following is a summary of the main points:

The first congress of the U.A.I.S. was borne of the efforts by the people to solve the conflicts between nationalities in the area. The people were determined to put an end to racial problems as they have been ended in JUGOSLAVIA by Marshal TITO. They had followed with sympathy the partisan movement in Northern ITALY; in their own area a new movement had come about as a result of the efforts of the Croats of ISTRIA in 7 Corps, of the Slovenes in 9 Corps, and of the Italians in the Garibaldi Brigades. The Congress was the product of this unity.

The eventual fate of VENEZIA GIULIA had not yet been decided.

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The eventual fate of VENEZIA GIULIA had not yet been decided. The line of demarcation drawn by the Allies and not two peoples. The reaction was trying to utilize the existence of this line to divide the people, but the only result was to make them more united. The unity of the Giulian area could not be shaken. They had not fought to belong to JUGOSLAVIA or ITALY, but for their new political and democratic organizations.

Fundamentally it was a question of the sovereignty of the people. The Atlantic Charter guaranteed the right of the people to decide on their own future. The people of VENEZIA GIULIA refused to allow outside interference in this. Like the Yugoslavs, like the North Italian partisans, their watch-word was "We do not want the old order, we do not want anyone to impose his will on us". The old order had led to Fascism. They demanded their rights under the Atlantic Charter.

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It was said that the U.A.I.S. was pro-Slav and anti-Italian. This was a lie. The aim of U.A.I.S. was to introduce the popular democracy under which the Slav countries, particularly Soviet Russia and JUGOSLAVIA, were going forward. They believed that Italian people, too, wished to progress on the same lines. It was on this basis that they would base the "fretollanza" between ITALY and JUGOSLAVIA and the EAST. They would fight both Italian and Jugoslav chauvinism. Under the mask of anti-Slav sentiment the reaction was endeavouring to wreck the institutions created by the people. Their watch-word was "marcis indietro" (reverse gear). They were trying to re-impose the old system of prefects and "sindaci", but the people wanted to exercise power themselves. SPAIN was an example; all the forms of reaction supported General FRANCO and SPAIN was now the last refuge of Fascism. GREECE illustrated how quickly the restitution of the old authority resulted in a decline into Fascism.

At the Congress of the Italian Socialist Party, Signor NENNI had proposed a coalition of Italian and Slav elements and the revival of the C.L.Ns. But their fight was to preserve their popular organisations. To comply would mean allying themselves with those who took no part in the fight, or who collaborated with the enemy.

It would mean breaking the unity of the people and going back 4 years. Only those who were afraid of the people wished to go back. The people wished to go forward. To organise on the basis of the parties meant giving power to generals without armies. It would make democracy ridiculous and mean establishing the control of the minority over the majority. Such collaboration was welcome only to those who regretted the end of Fascism.

The programme he proposed was:

- (i) Unity of VENEZIA GIULIA. TRIESTE was inseparable from the hinterland. Otherwise no economic development was possible.
- (ii) The fight against the survivals of Fascism. Fascists were again to be seen in the streets, (cries of "opuration").
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- (iii) The fight to preserve their rights acquired during the struggle. It had been suggested that their organs should become merely consultative. But the establishment of the power of the people was the fundamental victory of their war which they could not abandon. To concession was possible on this point. The popular Tribunals and the "Difesa Popolare" must be re-established. The reaction was

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- (iv) Unmasking of speculation, black market dealings and exploitation of the people. This could only be done by the people. They must develop in the people a sense of reconstruction and of work.

It was sometimes thought that the task of the "Sindacati Uniti" was always the same: in fact it was completely different if power was in the hands of the people or, as had happened, control had been in most cases taken away from the workers.

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- (v) Consolidation of "fretellanza" between Italians and Slovenes and breaking any attempt to divide them.
- (vi) Allied Military Government was a temporary phenomenon. They wished to support the efforts of the allies for reconstruction but laid it down that collaboration was only possible if the popular power was recognised. Only so could their problems be solved.

It was impossible to re-introduce the pre-1939 order and Fascist legislation. In this case under the best of circumstances all they would get would be freedom of speech while the authorities could act as they pleased, (cries of "we want our liberators back" i.e. the Yugoslavs). The Atlantic Charter guaranteed democracy. Re-introduction of the old order meant depriving the people of the democracy it had created, (cries of "respect for the Atlantic Charter"). Democracy was not only a word, but meant the freedom of the people to create the organs they desired.

They could not allow that parties claim power on semi-technical grounds. They would welcome other groups and parties in U.A.I.S. but only in respect of real influence among the people. This influence could be ascertained by free elections within the Councils of Liberation to be held on a secret ballot. In these elections the C.L.N. parties were free to participate.

All replies to their offers of collaboration had been negative and showed no appreciation of the popular power. The first reply demanded the dissolution of their organisations and the constitution of new councils on the basis of party, i.e. the control of the majority by the minority. The second reply suggested the dissolution of the councils and the attaching to prefects etc of the consultative committees chosen on the basis of a false census.

This was all café talk and the parties were now organising propaganda on Goebbels methods, using propaganda, not argument. They took no part in the fighting and their main interest was anti-Communism. EUROPE could recognise the contribution of Communists throughout the world, and, in VENEZIA GIULIA, they had contributed more than any other party and had always been ready to collaborate with anyone.

The Catholic Press was most guilty. The Bishops collaborated with the Germans and Fascists and issued circulars against the partisans. They never protested against the burnings and deportations

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The Voce Libera followed suit. They organised foreign correspondents to visit the "Foibe" to collect "evidence", but not to visit burnt villages. They try to find the body of some Carabinieri who may possibly not have been Fascist, but were in the pay of the Fascists, (it was tacitly admitted that there were Carabinieri down the Foibe). Calumnies of this kind were only of service to those who followed in the tracks of Goebbels. Now they were collecting the White Guards, Mihailovitch Cotniks, Ustachi and other Yugoslav traitors in TRIESTE.

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The town was becoming full of war criminals (cries of "Fojbe" and "moro"). There had even been attempts on the lives of some of us who had fought. They were accused of not being democrats but their accusers, as in GREECE, showed what their democracy would be once they had power. This method was the first to deceive the people and then strike. The Italians who claimed to be defending the "Italianità" of TRIESTE showed by their support of the White Guard that they were concerned not with the Slav peril but with the peril of the "popular power".

The recent election in ENGLAND showed that the English people wished for real democracy, (cries of ATTLEE and wild applause), and that the Atlantic Charter be respected and international speculation restricted. Their fight was against international forces. They must work to extend the popular organization in every factory, school and street. They should encourage political discussions, and work till there was not a corner of TRIESTE where Fascists and White Guards could find refuge from punishment (cries of "Fojbe"). They must open the people's eyes to those who are trying to deceive them.

They were always ready to collaborate with all groups but were not waiting for their favours, if they did not wish to come in they could go their own way.

The struggle would go on till they had won the fruits of the struggle, (cries of "we want JAMSETICH").

As before their watch-word was Death to Fascism! Liberty to the People!

3. THE DISCUSSION.

The afternoon was devoted mainly to discussion of KREIGER's report.

In fact few of the speeches did more than refer to the fact that the report was so complete as to require no further comment. A young Croat priest from ISTRIA who was greeted with prolonged applause and

cries of "long live the people's priests", read a long speech in which he accounted his experiences with the partisans, denied that Communism persecuted religion and stated that, as a son of the people himself, his place was to minister to the people. A representative from FIUME denied stories of massacres there while admitting that in the first days of liberation some excesses might have been committed. In spite of economic difficulties progress in reconstruction was being made and Italo-Slovene unity increasing.

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A violent speech denouncing the abolition of the Popular Tribunals and Difesa Popolare was made by a certain RICCIUTI from GORIZIA. The tone of his speech was very much disapproved of by PELLEGRINI, who was sitting next to an allied officer. An elderly delegate paid a very warm tribute to the allies and invited the Congress to stand in silence for a minute in memory of all who had fallen in the war.

The most interesting contribution was made by a speaker who, after recalling that the main need was for unity, pointed out to KREIGER that the Sig. MENNI, to whom he had referred, was Comrade MENNI, head of the Italian Socialist Party which had a pact of union with the Communist Party. He considered MENNI's proposal should receive the closest attention. In view of the importance of arriving at a solution he was doubtful whether the impossibility of separating TRIESTE from the hinterland was as axiomatic as KREIGER claims.

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The speech received a fair amount of applause.

KREIGER wound up the discussion by pointing out that the programme had received almost no criticism. As regards the NENNI proposals, he repeated that the claim for "party" involved the domination of the minority and he thought NENNI was misinformed in the situation in TRIESTE. His remarks on parity and the CLNs had only referred to VENEZIA GIULIA and not to the CLNs in the rest of ITALY. The programme was then put to a show of hands and passed unanimously.

Finally a proposal that a manifestation should take place on 9 Sep to celebrate the fall of Fascism, (comment: a certain confusion with 25 July and 8 Sep is apparent), met with opposition, and it was voted that the decision should rest with the Executive Committee.

When the allied officers left there was a spontaneous and prolonged storm of applause and continuous shouts of "Viva gli Alleati".

COMMENTS.

1. Both the presentation of the speeches at the Congress must be viewed against the background of what are believed to be the latest Belgrade directives to the "Autonomous Communist Party of VENEZIA GIULIA". From all the evidence available those appear to be,
 - (a) To lay off Jugoslav chauvinism
 - (b) To stress the fact that the disposal of VENEZIA GIULIA is not yet settled.
 - (c) To emphasise efforts to foster Italo-Slovene "fratellanza".
 - (d) To deny the Jugoslav control of U.I.S. and its affiliated organs, but
 - (e) That despite the above the Belgrade direction will continue to be obeyed.
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 - (a) To lay off Yugoslav chauvinism
 - (b) To stress the fact that the disposal of VENEZIA GIULIA is not yet settled.
 - (c) To emphasise efforts to foster Italo-Slovene "fratellanza".
 - (d) To deny the Yugoslav control of U.A.I.S. and its affiliated organs, but
 - (e) That despite the above the Belgrade direction will continue to be obeyed.
2. It is emphasised that the delegates by their very presence showed their agreement to the basic programme.
3. Further emphasis on points mentioned in para 1 above.
4. The "minority" refers to the GCLN and the pro-Italian element of VENEZIA GIULIA which in TRIESTE area probably represents a majority though in VENEZIA GIULIA as a whole a minority.
5. Reference to the recent abortive negotiations between GCLN and the PNOC/UAIS.
6. Refers to the Italian racial census of 1921 known to have been biased.
7. Possibly a reference to the presence in TRIESTE of members of the Great Fascist Party and other persons unfavourable to TITO.

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APPENDIX "B" TO 13 CORPS MONTHLY
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 1

The Church in the Province of GORIZIA

GENERAL

The archdiocese of GORIZIA comprises the whole of the province, and is, therefore, cut in two by the MORGAN LINE. From the point of view of pastoral direction and administration, the line would appear to present a real barrier, and there seems to be little contact between the clergy in this zone and their colleagues in Yugoslav administered territory. Against this blow to diocesan unity, however, must be balanced the fact that the Church, under AMG, is able to function much more freely than it could during the Slav interregnum, when even the person of the Archbishop, Monsignor MARGOTTI, was not free from the hands of the OZNA.

ITALIAN CLERGY

Under the provisions of the Concordat between the Vatican and the Italian State (11 Feb 1929), the clergy are forbidden to take an active part in politics. It would, however, be demanding an almost superhuman restraint to imagine that they have no definite political orientation of their own. Among the Italian political parties, it gives its blessing mainly to the Christian Democrats, whose attempt to combine right wing traditionalism with a measure of social betterment harmonises most closely with its own attitude towards the new problems and new demands of the mid-twentieth century. The Church and the Christian Democrats do not always see eye to eye, however, the question of secular education being an ancient bone of contention. Yet in spite of this marked preference, the Church can claim, with some justice, to be the party of order, supporting whatever legally constituted government happens to be in power.

The outlook of the Church in VENEZIA GIULIA is, of course, dominated by its opposition to Communism in general, and the Slav brand in particular. It sees in Communism a triple-headed monster: socially, as threatening the dissolution of society; politically, as inaugurating mob rule and mob violence; and ethnically, as representing the negation of the spirit. The clergy have, therefore, declared something in the nature of a holy war against Communism, combatting it with all the force of their moral authority, and making it their special mission to protect the young people against its virus. This propagandist activity is carried on largely through the AZIONE CATTOLICA ITALIANA, yet another of those a-political welfare organisations which are so plentiful in the area. Like its deadly enemy, the UAST, the ACI attempts to organise every section of the population.

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SLOVENE CLERGY

During the Fascist regime, the Slovane priesthood held the cause of Slav nationalism in trust, surreptitiously fostering national consciousness, and combatting, as best they could, the calculated Italian policy of racial submission. Their ultimate aim was the incorporation of VENEZIA GIULIA, as federal state, in a democratic Yugoslav union. Particular emphasis was laid on the federal aspect of this union. There was a twofold reason for

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this; political and religious. The fear of Serbian dominance is a traditional factor in Yugoslav politics, while the existence of two other recognised religions made the argument for affiliation, rather than complete absorption even more compelling.

This also explains why the majority of the Slovene clergy turned to TITO, rather than MILKALOVICH, after the collapse of JUGOSLAVIA. In the beginning, the communist inspiration of the OSVOBODILNA FRONTA was kept carefully in the background, and the National Front of Liberation, combining all parties in the struggle against the Fascist invader, presented an attractive enough picture. Together with seventeen other Slovene parties, the Slovene Clericals pledged their allegiance. It was not until the days of premature optimism in September 1943, that the Communist directors of the OF showed their hand. This portent rather tempered the enthusiasm of the Slovene clergy, and from that date onwards, their adherence was increasingly more cautious; indeed, it is alleged that, in 1944, four priests were murdered in this area alone, for inveighing against Communism from the pulpit. The liberation, and the subsequent forty days of Slav Government, confirmed the clergy in their fears, with the result that, nowadays the number who try to harmonise TITO with the concept of the Divine is negligible. Outwardly, they still formed part of the OF dutifully repeating slogans and going through the gestures, but their support is purely perfunctory. Indeed, many of them prefer continued subservience under ITALY to the "liberty" they were promised under JUGOSLAVIA.

It is alleged that, across the MORGAN LINE, the priesthood is subject to the strictest supervision. An unconfirmed report states that, around LJUBLJANA, where discontent appears to be widespread, the clergy, supported by the peasantry, are venturing into opposition, an opposition, apparently, which is being countered by the usual Slav arguments. Another report claims that candidates for a living must satisfy the most rigorous political third degree, before their employment is approved by the authorities. Moreover, recent reports seem to show that the old Slovene Clerical Party, directed from ROME, and supported by Yugoslav émigrés, is still actively intriguing.

The official Slav line towards the church is rather non-committal, contenting itself with the usual platitudes about the "integral role of the Church in the new democracy, when it has been purged of its Fascist elements", occasional insistence on which is presumably intended to prevent the alienation of the peasants.

The attitude of the rank and file tends sometimes to be much more violent. A young Communist seiden, when questioned on the subject, reported with undeniable vehemence, if somewhat dubious logic: "Don't talk to me about the Church, for God's sake". The emotional thrill of

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APPENDIX 'C' TO 13 CORPS MONTHLY
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.1

The Future of the C.L.N. in North Italy

The Committee of National Liberation under German occupation was virtually the shadow government of Northern Italy. It consisted, as in allied occupied Italy, of the union of the six main political parties, viz, Communists, Socialists, Christian Democrats, Action Party, Liberals and Labour Democrats, though the last named party which exists almost in Southern Italy alone, was rarely represented.

The organisation of the C.L.N. was broadly as follows:

North Italy C.L.N. (CLNAI) HQ at MILAN
Regional C.L.Ns (e.g. LOMBARDY, VENETO, EMILIA-ROMAGNA)
Provincial C.L.Ns
District C.L.Ns in the countryside (C.L.N. mandamentali)
Commune C.L.Ns
Factory C.L.Ns (formed originally as part of the "anti-scorch" campaign).

Supported, and to a greater or lesser extent controlled, by the C.L.N., was the Volunteer Corps of Liberty (C.V.L.), which was responsible for organising the partisan movement.

The extent to which the C.L.N. movement was fully organised before liberation varied from area to area. As a result a very large proportion of the C.L.Ns were formed, or only started to function effectively (e.g. the VENICE Province C.L.N.) after the arrival of the Allies. At the same time a large number of extraneous members have been admitted in many areas (e.g. representatives of women's and youth organisations or of non-C.L.N. parties such as the Christian Socialists, late Christian Communists, and even the occasional old fashioned Anarchist). Moreover the attitude of the parties to the C.L.N. varies considerably. The Communists, Socialist and Action Party are out-and-out supporters of the movement as representing the only democratic institution whereby the will of the people can be expressed, however remotely, till the elections. The Christian Democrats and Liberals are largely lukewarm in their support, while the leader of the Labour Democrats has called for the

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Nevertheless, with behind it the prestige of having organised the partisan "insurrection", the C.L.N. remains the most important political force in Northern Italy, even in the VENETO where the mass of the population are peasants who, so far as they have any political consciousness, are Christian Democrats. The general expectation that the administration of Northern Italy will shortly be transferred to the Italian Government has raised afresh the question of the future of the C.L.Ns and their relations with the central government and its administrative organs in Northern Italy.

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The position vis-a-vis the allies is clear - while the C.L.N. was recognised as the representative of the Italian Government before liberation, its role once military government was established became purely consultative. There is no doubt that this was a severe disappointment which was only tempered by the fact that, in most areas (and in the VENETO almost without exception) the prefects and the senior local government officials nominated by the C.L.N. were confirmed in office by A.M.G. After four months, during which the C.L.N. has talked and passed interminable resolutions, the sense of frustration has increased, particularly among the Left wing parties who believed that the C.L.N. would play an executive part in the government of Northern Italy, at least till the Constituent Assembly decided the future constitution of the country. The strike, which was called in VENICE some six weeks ago as a protest against the failure of A.M.G. to consult it before appointing an Epuration Commission, was primarily due to the desire of the C.L.N. to draw the attention of the population to its effective existence and the walls of VENICE are still plastered with injunctions to "appreciate the C.L.N."

The handing over of power to a weak central government can only result in an increase in the authority of the Northern C.L.N.s, and the Left wing parties are already demanding that the C.L.N. should be given executive powers in Northern Italy. The Christian Democrats and Liberals on the other hand consider that the C.L.N. should remain merely consultative, advising the prefects instead of A.M.G. In some respects the issue is between regionalisation and centralisation. The regionalists won the first round with the failure of the attempt by BONOMI to impose on the North prefects etc, appointed in the normal way from civil servants of the Ministry of the Interior, who had served the Fascist Government and escaped epuration mainly because they happened to be on the right side of the line in September 1943. This failure meant in effect the break down of the centralised "Napoleonic" system of local government adopted by Italy when she was first united, and developed by the Fascists to the point that prefects and police chiefs in Northern Italy were normally Southerners and vice-versa. BONOMI's successor is himself a prominent member of the North Italy C.L.N. Regional autonomy has already been promised to Sicily, Sardinia and the disputed frontier districts and, to a greater or lesser degree, will almost certainly be introduced elsewhere when the Constituent Assembly works out Italy's future constitution. In the interim period, however, there will be, once A.M.G. goes, no regional organisation in

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On 31st Aug - 1st Sep an important meeting of the CLNAI was to be held in MILAN as a result of which proposals will be presented to the Italian Government. It is believed that the Christian Democrats and Liberals will propose the virtual abolition of the CLNAI by merging with the ROME C.L.N. HQ, which consists of the heads of the six parties and only meets in a government crisis.

They would retain/3....

- 3 -

They would retain only the provincial and possibly regional C.L.Ns to represent to the prefect the agreed point of view of the political parties, dissolving the Commune and District C.L.Ns, which they consider superfluous owing to the existence of local juntas and, above all any factory and village C.L.Ns, since they suspect these of being a manoeuvre by the Left to start workers and peasants Soviets in the name of the Resistance Movement. Moreover, as the Action Party in spite of its middle class (and in some cases industrialist backing) as a rule votes with the Socialists and Communists, the two "parties of order" see themselves continually in a minority in the normally 5 party North Italy C.L.Ns.

The Left wing parties base their claim for extending the powers of the C.L.N. in the interim period on the necessity for the Resistance Movement to make its voice heard, on the fact that till the election the C.L.N. is the only means whereby the popular opinion can be expressed and on the general distrust, after years of Fascist bureaucracy, of interference from Rome, particularly in view of the undoubted achievements and experience of the C.L.N. in organising immediate reconstruction. Exactly what powers are claimed is not clear. The most explicit utterances so far are those of MORANDI, President of the North Italy C.L.N., at a congress of the BOLAGNA C.L.N. on 26 Aug, and of LONGO, Communist representative on the North Italy C.L.N., in ROME on the same day. MORANDI claimed for the C.L.N. the right to take independent action in many fields such as housing, schools, rationing, epuration "without having on every occasion to apply to the constituted authority". LONGO stated the right of the C.L.N. to continue its work of getting going again the economic and industrial life of Northern Italy and claimed that the factory and village C.L.Ns were not class organs since they represented all parties.

It is difficult to see how the two points of view can be reconciled. Presumably some compromise and not too precise formula will be arrived at and the application worked out according to local conditions and the strength of the C.L.N. movement in various areas. Even in the most favourable circumstances it is difficult to see how the C.L.N. organisation can be satisfactorily grafted on to the existing administrative set-up without introducing radical changes, which should properly be reserved for the Constituent Assembly. The C.L.N. was formed at a time when there was a basis of agreement in the fight against

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The whole controversy illustrates the importance of the Constituent Assembly giving Italy as soon as possible a workable and genuinely representative administration, and the present state of uncertainty which paralyses all governmental action. In the meantime, with all its defects and without in any way affecting the essential unity of Italy, which the Left least of all is anxious to prejudice, the C.L.N. represents the only organ whereby the more progressive North can get on with the job of reconstruction without being weighed down by the ROME bureaucratic machine and competition with the needs of the South.

APPENDIX "D" TO 13 CORPS MONTHLY
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 1

NOTES ON SLOVENIA
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The Partisan Movement will perhaps be considered by History as the most characteristic phenomenon of the past war. While it drew its original impulse and dominating motive from patriotism, at the same time it provided an outlet for the urge to social reform which had been, by one method or another, suppressed in most countries of Europe. The Partisans in JUGOSLAVIA represented in fact the Communist impulse seizing its chance. The defeat of Germany was only the first item on their programme: victory on the battle-field was to signify also triumph at home. The degree in which the Partisans have been able to make themselves felt varies from country to country; and JUGOSLAVIA has the distinction of being the only country in which they have completely taken over the government. Slovenia presents us with the spectacle of a country being run by Partisans; and the result of the experiment may well be decisive for the future of Europe.

The Slovenes, in the form of that fusion of all parties known as the Freedom Front (OF), make no secret of their aims. These are:-

- (a) The union of all Slovenes in a federal Slovenia as part of democratic, federal JUGOSLAVIA.
- (b) The protection and development of democratic gains.
- (c) Inter-Slav unity, with RUSSIA primus inter pares.
- (d) Abolition of private enterprise and of large estates.

This means a complete break with the past. As Boris Kidric, President of the first Slovene Government, put it in a speech to workers' delegates on 21 Aug: "To-day we have a new form of State, a People's State, a State of labourers, peasants, and working intelligentsia... We have destroyed the old State; now we must build our new State". Such breaks with the past are not made without a guillotine. It follows that an essential aspect of present day life in Slovenia is the ruthless elimination of all who in any way can be suspected of not being in sympathy with the new regime. Europe seems to be only dimly aware of assisting today at a "French Revolution" on an even greater scale. There are differences of detail of course: the "foibe" replaces the guillotine; the ideals of Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité are called "Progressive Democracy", "Social Justice", and "Italo-Slovene Brotherhood"; women do not knit round the scaffold, but form themselves into the Women's Anti-fascist League, and are prominent among the more violent demonstrators in the street; the King is not beheaded, but merely recommended to stay in exile, and English indignation is less vocal; the

The defeat of Germany was only the first item on their programme: victory on the battle-field was to signify also triumph at home. The degree in which the Partisans have been able to make themselves felt varies from country to country, and JUGOSLAVIA has the distinction of being the only country in which they have completely taken over the government. Slovenia presents us with the spectacle of a country being run by Partisans; and the result of the experiment may well be decisive for the future of Europe.

The Slovenes, in the form of that fusion of all parties known as the Freedom Front (OF), make no secret of their aims. These are:-

- (a) The union of all Slovenes in a federal Slovenia as part of democratic, federal JUGOSLAVIA.
- (b) The protection and development of democratic gains.
- (c) Inter-Slav unity, with RUSSIA primus inter pares.
- (d) Abolition of private enterprise and of large estates.

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We shall not understand what is happening on the other side of the Morgan Line, if we do not appreciate that the followers of Tito are imbued with a blind faith in the justice of their cause. Convinced that they are ushering in a terrestrial paradise, they naturally believe that the end justifies the means. If these means sometimes appear to us cruel and dishonest, for them they are redeemed by the necessity of establishing at any price the regime that corresponds to their ideals. The goal is too dazzling to be imperilled by the tolerance of opponents, and so all measures are justified that conduce to the removal of opponents. This is perhaps

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the real sense in which their regime can be branded as totalitarian, for their fanaticism is of the Nazi type, unquestioning and ruthless. One who has returned to Slovenia after a long absence states that the people make a curious impression on him of being hypnotized by their propaganda, so as to believe whatever is told them by the Party with the most childish ingenuity. The following remarks are intended to show how far their conception of freedom and justice must therefore differ from ours.

The threat to the regime is felt to come rather from the middle classes and bourgeoisie. Thus, to take an extreme case, at LESKOVIC in Serbia all members of the liberal professions, clerical workers and middle-men were arrested and sent to work in Macedonia or otherwise eliminated. The socialization of industry involves the removal of numerous industrialists, and irredentist claims against ITALY mean that all Italians other than sympathetic Communists are automatically enemies. In the province of TRIESTE during the Yugoslav occupation 3000 Italians are reported to have been executed and 17,000 arrested, of whom ^{in Slovenia} thousands are still interned. The number of Slovenes said to have been eliminated by Partisans is even greater; and, to judge by the condition of those fit enough to make the journey, the comparison to Dachau made by returning inmates of BROWNIC and other Slovene camps is not wholly unjustified. Boris Kidric has announced that 90% of all industry and banks in Slovenia has been taken over by the State. The fate of the proprietors is indicated by his description of them as "traitors and political or economic collaborators", which title is intended to be the moral justification of the act.

The physical removal of opponents is only one of the means by which a revolutionary party maintains itself in power. Less dangerous individuals can be rendered harmless by the confiscation of their property, which needs only a suitable verdict before a court. One example will serve - the trial of Mr. Medic, a shirt manufacturer in NOVIGATO. The judge accused him of taking 150 shirts for the Domobranci:-

Mr. M.

"Of course I made them; I was forced to do so. But don't forget that I manufactured at least one thousand shirts for the Partisans".

Judge.

"Have you anything more to say in your defence?"

Mr. M.

"Every month I gave 100,000 Lira to the Partisan Movement".

Judge

"Not enough".

Mr. Medic was sentenced to the loss of 75% of his property.

Another effective method consists in tampering with electoral rolls. Secretaries of the CP are said to have received instructions to prevent

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The physical removal of opponents is only one of the means by which a revolutionary party maintains itself in power. Less dangerous individuals can be rendered harmless by the confiscation of their property, which needs only a suitable verdict before a court. One example will serve - the trial of Mr. Kodic, a shirt manufacturer in NOVO MESTO. The judge accused him of making 150 shirts for the Domobran.

Mr. K.

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Another effective method consists in tampering with electoral rolls. Secretaries of the OF are said to have received instructions to prevent from voting for the Constituent Assembly all non-supporters of the regime, especially those who might vote against the official list of candidates.

The desire for territorial aggrandisement shown in the violent irredentist campaign carried on for the Slovene Littoral (VEREZIA GIULIA), Carinthia, and Eastern Macedonia (as North GRECE is euphemistically called) derives in part from the natural wish to include all Slavs in the country's borders, and to acquire fresh sources of wealth, and in part from the necessity of maintaining popularity by emphasising the "natural rights" of the nation. This latter totalitarian feature is only one of many. The existence of an ubiquitous Secret Police (OZNA), permeating the whole life of the nation and creating an oppressive atmosphere of suspicion and distrust, constitutes yet another difference from freedom as Western Democracy understands it.

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Xenophobia is another phenomenon one would expect to find, and indeed this seems to form a special part of the communist doctrine instilled into young soldiers. The foreigners against whom their passions are inflamed as their "worst enemies" are the British and, to a lesser extent, the Americans. Help afforded in the struggle against the Germans is not forgotten, but minimized in comparison with that given by the Russians. Even UNRRA is being paid for. This hostility is increased by confidence in Russian support, the most visible sign of which is the presence of Russians in OZNA.

The drive to obtain foreign currency is necessitated by the need for propaganda and espionage in the claimed territories. During the Yugoslav occupation of TRIESTE several million lire were removed from the Bank of Italy. It is forbidden to possess foreign currency, but those who exchange Italian lire or American dollars find that they cannot receive more than 5,000 dinars, the rest being credited to them. Such ingenuity is shown in obtaining Italian lire that a brothel being run by five Slovene women in TRIESTE is suspected of having this as its primary purpose.

The reconstruction of the country is taken very seriously. Posters call on all to play their part, and broadcasts give prominence to restored stretches of railway, revived industries, and credits allotted to Industry, Commerce, Agriculture and Education. Some feeling has been caused, however, by the failure of the Army to join in this work; and it is pointed out that what transport there is would be more usefully employed in the distribution of food than in troop-movements, transfer of captured war-material, or the carriage of young students to their party-meetings. If the reported handing-over of UNRRA - supplied vehicles to the Army is true, it may contribute to making the Army unpopular. Certainly public posters think it worthwhile to remind citizens of what they owe to the Army. (An indication that all is not well with the economic situation is given by the reaction of a well-known industrialist, a sympathiser with the regime, who returned from a German concentration camp full of ideas for reconstruction, and who is reported to have said after one week in Ljubljana: "Nothing can be done in such conditions. I shall not even try to do anything". One reason for this must be the absence of experienced personnel consequent on the socialisation of industry. Another is the acute shortage of man-power due to the absence of demobilisation. So far only a few specialists have been released; and this has had the secondary effect of causing some discontent among specialist personnel left in the Army owing to their increased work. A further cause of discontent in the Army is the difference between officers' food and none. It is clear from these facts that reconstruction is being held up by

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A regime such as emerges from the above account is certainly going to encounter resistance. Its degree will vary from province to province; but those who resist may be divided into two classes: the old and the new Reaction. The old reactionaries are the "fascists" who were always anti-communist and collaborated with the Germans and the Italians.

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These are:-

- (a) The Chetniks of Mihajlovic, who is reported to be at the head of a considerable force in Bosnia, Western Serbia and Montenegro. In Slovenia they are represented by the "Blue Guards", which are part of the Domobran (Home Guard); and the area of ZOMLA is said to be held by them. Their aim is the restoration of the monarchy and the constitution of April 1941.
- (b) The Great Peasant Party (HSS), formerly led by Macek, who is now in exile and denounced by the present Yugoslav government. They desire a Republican Federal State, and are almost pathetically pro-Allied.
- (c) The Clerical Movement, led by the Bishop of Zagreb, Stepinac. The Slovene Clerical Party was vigorously collaborationist and formed its own "White Guard" to assist the Germans against the Partisans. At present Slovene clergy view the future with gloom, though collaborators have been found even in the proposal to found a Slovene Catholic Church separate from Rome. It is believed that the above three groups are ready to sink their differences and to pool their resources in resistance to the regime. In this case they would probably place themselves under the supreme command of Mihajlovic.
- (d) The Great Ustasha (Party Militia) and Domobran (Conscript Croat Army). The 50,000 mixed Chetniks and Ustasha reported to be hiding in the woods of Croatia are apparently gradually coalescing.
- (e) The volunteer guard of the Serbian quisling Nedic.
- (f) Dissidents known as "Kerisari" on the Bosnia-Dalmatian border.

The new reactionaries are all those who do not sympathize with Communism or abhor the methods used to enforce it. The government is aware of their existence and occasionally tries conciliation instead of liquidation. Thus even before 3 Sept 1943 communist emissaries in Istria were instructed to avoid communist propaganda, because the population was too attached to private property, the family, and the Church; and at present Istrian priests have been told to incorporate eulogistic references to Tito in their sermons. Meanwhile, assertions continue to be reported from the army to the Chetniks, Tito's own militia being mentioned in this connection.

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This rather paradoxical picture of a new Resistance Movement growing up out of the old, and of Partisans creating their own reaction in the form of "White Partisans", who lurk in the woods and mountains preparing a new liberation, might seem to forebode the Spanish experience for JUGOSLAVIA. The relative strength of the opposing parties, however, makes it unlikely that Europe will be treated to the spectacle of an International Brigade of the Centre or even Right. The forces of Tito are strongly entrenched and consist of all the modern means of repression; the White Partisans are split up, demoralized, and cut off from normal sources of supply. It is doubtful whether they can ever be more than a thorn in the side of Tito's Government. How far their existence can hinder internal development and hamper foreign policy is another question.

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