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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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LECTURES BY EX. COMMR.
DEC. 1945 - APR. 1946

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APR 27 1945

1. Our job was to administer the various Provinces of ITALY and the Islands as they progressively became liberated by the advancing Allied Armies. We had to see to it that the Army Commanders, like General Mark Clark, did not have to look over their shoulders as their troops went forward. The prevention of disease and unrest was our watchword and those functions which involved the setting up of local government in newly won territory and the strengthening of the national government particularly in the early days before the liberation of ROME, covered a multitude of activities. The setting up of local government in a town and communes often meant the physical procurement of a man or men who could conduct the first principles of local government and the setting of them down in the Prefettura or Municipio. For we have always gone for indirect control, that is to say, government even in the critical stages of liberation by the Italians themselves. We have never had the staff to carry out direct government, even if that had been our policy.

2. Our machinery worked as follows. At the Headquarters of the Commission we had a number of Sub-Commissions staffed with technical officers having expert knowledge on pretty well all the functions which had to be carried out in the country. These were grouped in Sections. We had a group of Sub-Commissions who concerned themselves with the civil affairs side proper - such as Local Government, Public Safety, Public Health, Justice and Legislation, Education, and Monuments and Fine Arts. We had an Economic Section who devoted themselves to all the Economic problems of occupation, food and the distribution thereof, Industry, Commerce and Shipping. We had a most important Sub-Commission which undertook the rehabilitation of telephone and telegraph communications throughout Italy. We had a Sub-Commission whose duty it was to see that all captured enemy material was collected and turned to the best interests of Allies and Italy. We

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have fled to Italy, the victims of Nazi or other oppression elsewhere.

3. The work of all these Sub-Commissions was, of course, inextricably interwoven and much coordination was needed and effected at HQ.

4. The most important work of course was the projection of the functions of these HQ into the field. This is roughly how we did it. Italy is divided roughly into 14 Provinces which are grouped in some 17 Regions. To a great extent we followed the administrative pattern of Italy in grouping our field forces and we established teams to deal with each Province as it became liberated: these teams consisted of general administration, police officers, a judge, a medical man, a food officer, a transportation officer, and ^{an} officer to deal with labour and industry and generally, a displaced persons officer. Some Provincial teams were large, some small. I doubt if they ever exceeded 15.

These were grouped into Regions and came under control of a Regional Commissioner who, with a staff of representatives of the Sub-Commissions from HQ, was the representative of the Chief Commissioner and Chief Civil Affairs Officer for that group of Provinces. So we achieved decentralisation.

5. But before these provincial teams came into full operation the ground was prepared for them by the spearhead teams of civil affairs officers who were attached to the Armies and worked with the combatant troops throughout the battle. These teams rendered the first aid of local government. Often in the midst of battle they would be found setting up local authorities, getting food into hungry towns, reorganising hospitals and generally bringing confidence and order into stricken minds and places. These spearhead teams remained until the battle had passed on. Then onward would go the spearheads and in their place, the more static provincial teams would be established whose functions were to consolidate the first aid work, to reconstruct from the foundations, and to prepare

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6. And so one had a threefold pattern in liberated Italy. The areas in the battle zones governed by the spearheads, the areas immediately behind under Allied Military Government, and then the areas which progressively

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were handed back to the complete control of the Italian Government.

7. The period of time under the first two forms of administration differed.

8. The unfolding of this pattern throughout Southern and Central Italy was pretty regular: the Armies advanced, sometimes slowly, sometimes more rapidly: there was sudden excursions and long waits. We landed at ANZIO with the troops and had a report on the damage at Monte Cassino Monastery 36 hours after its capture; the passing of food across the Arno during the fighting in Florence was a valiant effort.

9. But when the North fell in one swoop we really were extended. We had with great difficulty organised five Regional teams of about 800 officers in all to cover this large and most important part of Italy and some ten million people. The deployment of military government really had to hurry them and it was achieved. Here we found administratively much assistance and politically some embarrassment from the C.L.N's who, as the leaders of the partisan movement, had established a remarkable administrative and economic organisation. By previous arrangement they had agreed to hand over all executive authority to AMG on arrival and we used their structure and their advice extensively. But it was not always easy for them because of their political aspirations to remain silent administratively. Finally, we handed over the Northern Regions to the Italian Government on December 31st. *Idem 9 V.6.*

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10. In the meantime, and particularly since the establishment of the Italian Government in Rome, a great deal of work on governmental level was being done at the HQ of the Commission. Here again our policy was to encourage the Italian Government to assume gradually and progressively the fullest responsibility for the government of the areas handed over to them and to prepare to take responsibility for areas about to be handed over to them in the future. The latter aspect of our work, the planning for military government, was done in close consultation with the Italian Government, both in the field of local government, for instance, the appointment of Prefects to Provinces and other local authorities, and in the planning for the distribution of food. From the outset there was far less control over the Italian Government, at any rate at Ministerial level, than has been generally imagined. But particularly in the economic side because in the initial stages the Italian Government had no contacts in the outside world, the Allied Commission had to take the initiative in the programming for the import of food and medical supplies, of clothing, and fuel for the maintenance of the population, and of raw materials and transportation for the rehabilitation of Italy to a degree which would enable her to make the best use of her local resources. At HQ the Sub-Commissions dealt daily with the Ministries of the Italian Government. But our dealings were those of advisors who had resources at our disposal which we tried to persuade the Italian Government to use in the best possible manner. It was the Allied Commission, of course under the Supreme Allied Commander as President, who fought for the importation of sufficient foodstuffs to maintain the bread ration at 200 grams and then, for a period, at 300 grams, and ~~transit via~~ ^{P540} assisted the Ministries to organize the distribution of supplies which came into the country. But the control, and particularly since February 1945 after the issuance of Mr. Harold Macmillan's memorandum, was gradually and very distinctly reduced and throughout last year more and more responsibility

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conducts all its internal affairs without reference to us, and such matters as commercial treaties with foreign countries, foreign exchange, are now ~~entirely~~ in the hands of the Italian Government. So the Allied Commission in its present form ^{has} ~~is~~ only a few residual functions. It is still the Supreme Allied Commander's instrument for the execution of such Armistice Terms as need implementation. These affect chiefly the armed forces of Italy for the control of which the Service Sub-Commissions have been set up. It still has an important role in the management and maintenance of the many thousands of displaced persons of non-Italian nationality still in this country. It remains the organization through which the Supreme Allied Commander deals with the Italian Government and is the channel for the government in its communications and representations which it may make to Allied Force Headquarters and, through them to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, who may continue to transmit directives on the combined views of the two governments on matters of major policy.

11. The Service Sub-Commissions have acted in a dual capacity. They have, of course, controlled the strength of the Italian forces as required under the Armistice Terms. But they have also, and perhaps this is their most important role, been constituted as advisory missions to the Italian Navy, Army and Air Force, and have, particularly in respect of the last two services, built up a post-Armistice armed force which were of the greatest value to the Allied armies in Italy during the period of hostilities ~~until~~ in which they fought alongside the Allied troops and continue to be of value in safeguarding the lines of communication of the Allied forces and of law order in Italy since hostilities ceased. ~~XXXX~~ 1539

12. So we have seen the Allied Commission first spreading the carpet of military government and as the battle went forward, ensuring law and order, preventing disease and unrest, giving confidence to the Italian local authorities after the initial shock of defeat and battle and destruction,

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12. So we have seen the Allied Commission first spreading the carpet of military government and as the battle went forward, ensuring law and order, preventing disease and unrest, giving confidence to the Italian local authorities after the initial shock of defeat and battle and destruction, building up the authority of the new government in Italy on democratic lines, and of the local authorities in the Provinces, reorganising the armed services of the country, maintaining the thousands of displaced persons, and, finally, handing over full responsibility to the Italian Government in preparation for the final stage which is the election of the Constituent and referendum which ~~will~~ we hope will lead in a short time to the completion of the Peace Treaty and the introduction of Italy as a member of the United Nations. ^{her entry} into the various international organizations

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	<u>US.</u>	<u>BR.</u>
Maximum Officer Strength.....	875	894
Minimum " "	163	231

Displaced Persons, Numbers of DPs handled in Camps:

Italian.....	Approx. 1,000,000
Non-Italian.....	" 1,000,000

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Displaced Persons, Numbers of DPs handled in Camps:

Italian..... Approx. 1,000,000

Non-Italian..... " 1,000,000

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SUMMARY OF AMG.

1. At the close of December 1945, Allied Military Government, with the exception of VENEZIA GIULIA and the Province of UDINE, came to an end. Thus the first attempt at rehabilitating a conquered country under the direction of the Allies was also terminated.
2. Allied Military Government was planned at BOUZAREA and CHREA, NORTH AFRICA, in the early months of 1943. Its officers landed with the armies invading SICILY on 10 July 1943, and from that date to 31 December 1945 they were engaged in the difficult and often disappointing task of endeavouring to create order out of chaos, and economic stability out of devastation and ruin.
3. Moreover, the policy underlying the administration of military government underwent many changes. AMGOT in SICILY was planned for the occupation of an enemy territory. Throughout ITALY it has been based on the administration of the territory of a cobelligent, to whom the responsibility for self-government was handed over in various stages. (In APULIA Allied Military Government never functioned at all). After the occupation of ROME and the establishment of the six party Government, it became advantageous to effect this handover more rapidly than before. ROME, for instance, was under AMG for a period of weeks only. Although the slow down in the advance of the Allies during the winter of 1944 kept regions under AMG longer than was perhaps politically or administratively desirable (at any rate in the eyes of the Italians) more and more was done to assimilate military government with the principles desired by the Italian Government.
4. More Italian courts were set up, and as the Italian Government established itself more firmly, more Italian legislation was made applicable to military government areas. In planning for the Northern Regions of LIGURIA, PIEMONTE, LOMBARDIA and VENEZIA, great stress was laid on the increased use of Italian local government and economic machinery and the necessity of administering with an even lighter hand and with increased regard for a rapid turnover to the Italian Government. That this was not effected made the task of Allied Military Government in the North even more difficult.
5. A letter from the Chief Commissioner to Regions in the North and the letter from the Italian Prime Minister which are printed below are adequate tribute to the great work done by officers of Allied Military Government in the twelve Regions into which ITALY was divided.

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Translation.

The President of the Council of Ministers

10951.14/1.1.26.

Dear Admiral,

Since the greatest part of the national territory is now being handed back to Italian Administration, it is a pleasure for me to tell you how deeply the Italian Government appreciates the work done by the Allied Military Government for over two years, through memorable events, against all kinds of difficulties and with unchanged feelings of sympathy towards our country.

Such feelings were always answered by those of the population, who considered the organisers of the Allied Military Government sincere collaborators of our reconstruction, while it welcomed the victorious soldiers of the United Nations as liberators.

I am happy to remind you that while the liberation war was raging, AMG had to cope with the worst difficulties; keep away the ghost of famine, bring relief to the refugees, prevent the spreading of epidemics, rehabilitate public services and private industry in devastated areas.

The way in which such difficulties were overcome with intelligent energy and abundant means will remain a vivid and grateful memory with the Italians.

I beg you, my dear Admiral, to express to the Allied Military Government the gratitude of the Italian Government and the Italian Nation, and I trust that the friendly attitude inspired by the action of the United Nations will be maintained and confirmed.

Believe me,

Sincerely yours,

/s/

De Gasperi.

Admiral Ellery W. Stone
Chief Commissioner,
Allied Commission,
Rome.

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