

1716

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

ACC

10000/109/505

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10000/109/505

ROATTA CASE
JAN.-MAR. 1945

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3461

Exec. Comm.

Noted

DW
CC

6/2/3

1719

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C.S.O.

Please see Folios 8 & 10 on RONTA's escape. No comment has been made on these folios so it is therefore not clear whether they have been seen or not.

D.H.
7.5.45.

Seen. Refiling necessary. 18/7/3.

1720

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14

16.

Source

Revised with yr please

Say what action resulted from

15?

by 9/3.

3460

17.

The film was shown at the P.W.B. studio at 1500 hrs today. It contains clear evidence that the bomb was thrown by a member of the crowd.

Public Safety S/C have custody of the film & P.W.B. are printing 'stills' of that portion of the film which shows the incident.

Mr Stewart Brown has undertaken to see that these reach the houses of the Italian Post; to use them as they see fit.

V.A.D.
9/3.

MS (9/3.

Ex. 1000

40

650

785017

16.

Source

Proceed with yr please
Say what action resulted from

15?

9/3.

3460

17.

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It contains clear evidence that the bomb was thrown by a
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reach the houses of the Indian Post: to use them as they see fit.

1 A Q.
9/3.

MS/9/3.

Examine

CSO

40

22-31 is the Report of a Commission of Enquiry
on the escape of ROATTA.

33-38 is a Report on the entry of demonstrators
to the Viminal Palace following ROATTA's escape.

16/3/65

H.17/3



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ALLIED [REDACTED] COMMISSION
INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Demonstration at Viminale

FILE NO.

TO

Ex C.

15 Mar 1945
MAR 16 1945

Another interesting report on the Viminale
incident. Note that on this occasion the

P.S. were concerned NOT the CCRK. The general
inefficiency is appalling. Until they have

improved morale I doubt whether the formation
of a mobile squad (see bottom ps) will help.

3453

[Signature]

TRANSLATION.

MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR

14 MAR 1945

Rome, 9 March, 1945.

To His Excellency the President of the Council of Ministers.

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that as a result of the enquiry ordered into the responsibility for the deplorable recent irruption of demonstrators into the Viminal Palace, the following has been ascertained:-

In view of the meeting called for 1600 hours on the 6th instant in the Colosseum, as a result of the escape of Roatta, I personally approached the Questore of Rome with the most urgent recommendations for the utmost efficiency in the Public Order Service under his control, services which, in my actual words, must on that occasion be considered as the "proof by fire" of the Public Security of the Capital.

To this end the Questore issued his ordinance, which was sent to me for information as it was also sent to the Cabinet of the Ministry of the Interior.

As regards the Viminal, the Questura had laid down that the order service should be entrusted to Head Commissario Dott. Francesco Saverio CACACE, Director of the P.S. Magna-napoli Office, the district being within his jurisdiction: this functionary was to have been and was actually assisted by the Acting Commissari Donnetti and Quartuccio and by the Vice Commissari D'Elia and Ventura. For as much as concerned the protection of the Viminal Palace Dr. Cacace was to reach previous agreement with the P.S. Directing Office of the Palace itself, under the Command of Acting Commissario Dr. Locurcio. The Questura placed at the disposal of Dr. Cacace for the occasion 200 cadet agents in uniform, besides the personnel of his own Commissariato amounting to 50 persons, of whom only about 10 were in uniform.

Dr. Locurcio had at his disposal 390 men, all the nucleus of the Ministry: here it is well to point out that these men were and are now in civilian clothes, and this, not only because many of them have no uniforms, but also on account of an order given personally some time ago by His Excellency Canevari before I assumed the charge of Head of the Police.

For the order and security service under his direction Dr. Locurcio had distributed the force as follows: 150 men were ordered to protect the entrance gate to the Presidency; 150 men the entrance to the Viminal Palace and the

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For the order and security service under his direction Dr. Locurcio had distributed the force as follows: 150 men were ordered to protect the entrance gate to the Presidency; 150 men the principal entrance to the Viminal Palace and the balustrade of the small piazza in front of the Palace so as to complete the barricade, ordered by Dr. Cacace, of the two slopes leading to the Palace; 22 men were ordered to protect the entrance in Via Panisperna; 10 the entrance in Via Venezia; 4 platoons were on look-out duty; 50 men were held in reserve. These agents at the disposition of Dr. Locurcio were commanded by Major Magnano and by Captain Melilli.

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The members of the Force and the functionaries at the disposal of Dr. Casace were employed in the protection of the slopes leading up to the Palace and were divided into four barricade cordons of 50 men each commanded by a P.S. functionary; of these, two cordons were placed at the top of the slopes exactly at the height of the two iron gates; and the others half way down the slopes.

At about 1730 hours groups of demonstrators began to arrive from via Agostino De Pretis and from via Palermo who were withheld. A little later numerous demonstrators arrived from via Viminale and from Piazza Esquilino; in a short time therefore the whole piazza was filled with demonstrators, who, with the exception of some disorderly fanatics, for the most part seemed fairly calm.

Suddenly there spread like lightning the news that in Piazza del Quirinale some demonstrators had been killed by the Carabinieri; this news produced in the crowd spasms of indignation and rebellion; after a few moments there arrived in the piazza, coming from via Nazionale, a motor car bearing the bleeding corpse of a man; it was known that this man had died a short while previously in Piazza Quirinale after the explosion of a hand-grenade, and it was noted that the crowd, as is the way with crowds, without knowing exactly what had happened, assumed a menacing attitude and became disposed to violence; in spite of this they were at first held back at the slopes and even seemed to be quietening down, when a commission composed of members of various parties was seen to be approaching the Palace from the left towards the Presidency of the Council. Suddenly the motor car bearing the corpse which had stopped in the middle of the piazza was seen to move with a decisive acceleration up the right slope leading to the Palace and after a space had opened up in the first cordon of agents, under the command of Vice Commissario Bonnetti, it forced also the second cordon, under the command of Vice Commissario D'Elia, in spite of the fact that this second cordon was re-enforced by the first which had fallen back from its previous position. The crowd then following through and rendered bolder by the fact of an obstacle surmounted, advanced freely with the motor car up to the principal entrance of the Palace, through which, forcing the door, which nonetheless had been closed a few moments before by Vice Brigadier Novelli Pietro, about 300 demonstrators poured, shouting loudly, into the precincts of the Ministry, carrying the corpse of Mancini which they deposited on the table in the anti-chamber of my office.

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The absolute calm and tranquillity of all the functionaries, employees and agents who were present in the offices and in

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The absolute calm and tranquility of all the functionaries, employees and agents who were present in the offices and in the central corridor of the General Directorate of Public Security in that extremely delicate moment served to calm the spirits of the younger and most excited of the demonstrators who had evidently been ready to commit any violence and as a result of this, added to the calmer attitude of the majority, with the exception of a few broken windows on the staircase, no violence was committed on persons or things, and all the demonstrators finally went away spontaneously or nearly so

36/ when they were informed that the commission of party representatives had left the Ministry satisfied after having been received first by His Excellency the Undersecretary for the Interior and then by Your Excellency.

The demonstrators left behind the corpse, which after examination by a Doctor was transported the same evening to the mortuary.

From the trend of events it was obvious first of all that the two gates at the top of the slopes, especially the one of the right-hand side of the Viminal Palace, that one, that is, from which, as has been related above, the car with the corpse and many of the demonstrators approached the Palace, was not, and is not now, in working order. This was ascertained as far back as early in February last, when, foreseeing possible disturbances in the Piazza, experiments were carried out at the request of the Special Office at the Viminal Palace: this gate, controlled electrically, raised itself a few centimetres and then stuck; investigations revealed damage to the transmission gear caused by the breakage of some of the teeth. Therefore the Head Electrician of the Ministry, Maresciallo Mecozzi, with his note of the 3rd February last, addressed to the competent Supplies Office of the Ministry, reported the necessity of entrusting the repair work to a specialist firm; also the other gate did not function properly as a result of damage to wires caused by the excessive damp in the cellars. The Supplies Officer, Sig. Lodato, having informed the civil engineers, requested the intervention of the firm S.A.P.O.V. for the necessary repairs and it was found that the work would take a long time as the Supplies Officer reported on the 5th February last to the Superior Civil Administrative Office at the Ministry of the Interior, Directorate of General Affairs.

The Supplies Officer himself, with his letter of the 24th February, solicited the Civil Engineers Office with regard to this work and on the 28th February he received vague verbal assurances: actually no repairs were undertaken by the 6th instant.

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The Director of the Special P.S. Office at the Viminal, Dr. Locurcio on the 5th or on the morning of the 6th, in view of the announced meeting and its probable developments, should have interested the Supplies Officer and through him the Head Electrician to examine the possibility of closing, even by hand in case of need, these gates, but he failed to do so. This is pointed out because on the morning of the 7th it was found that the left gate, with a little persuasion and care could be closed electrically, and even the right one with a special manoeuvre, with a small crane or similar means,

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But not only for lack of such justifiable foresight must the Director of this Office be indicted, who is entrusted with the charge of caring for the security of the interior and the entrances to the Viminal Palace: he did not request and

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obtain from the Supplies Officer, or in his stead, from the competent superior administrative office, on whom the Supplies Office depends, a solid internal lock for the ground-floor shutters, neither did he see that fixtures were applied where they were missing. Further, he did not ascertain, and this is still more serious, that the principal entrance door to the Palace closed properly; it was afterwards proved, in fact, that this door had the lower bolt-slot filled with earth so that the upright iron bar could only enter into it a very small way, at most for about a centimetre, and as the iron bar itself was warped it could not enter the ~~main~~^{upper} bolt-slot, in this way the door only just closed and most insecurely, therefore it could not fail to yield to violent pressure. That the iron bar only just reached the slot is proved by the fact that forced open with violence, as occurred on the 6th instant, it has left no mark on the floor.

There was grave negligence on the part of Dott. Lucurcio but - it is only just to recognise - also on the part of the NCO on duty, Vice-Brigadier Novelli Pietro, who did not report the state of the door or inform his superior officers.

It has also had to be remarked that the division in civil clothes at the disposal of Dott. Lucurcio did not function as it could have and should have if it had not been broken up into small groups - small just because they were in civil clothes - under the orders of NCOs of proved discipline, who knew the men personally, at the opportune moment they confused themselves with the crowd and remained inactive; the officers lost sight of them, while the functionary absented himself to accompany the Commission to the Presidency omitted to charge another functionary to substitute him.

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Still more serious negligence is to be noted on the part of the Director of the Maganapoli Commissariat, Dott. Cacace, because, having asked Dott. Lucurcio to accompany the Commission above-mentioned, he did not provide for the sufficient guarding of the principal entrance to the Ministry as he should have and could have done; when the cordons which were barricading the slopes could no longer hold the crowd, particularly that on the left in front of the Viminal, he could with the hundred men in uniform have barricaded the door: energetic intervention on the part of the force in uniform and that in civil clothes would very probably, if not certainly, have prevented the main entrance door being opened with violence, in any case it would have limited as much as possible the influx of the crowd, especially if these

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Finally serious negligence must be attributed to the

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Questura, because, even though informed immediately by Dott. Cacace of the urgent necessity of re-enforcements, these arrived very late, about 2000 hours, that is to say, when order had been restored and the piazza cleared.

But this is not all: from the interior of the Ministry when the demonstrators rushed in bringing with them the corpse and it looked as though there would have been who knows what violence on the part of the most excited and the functionaries present had no nucleus of public force to control them or beat them back, the Questore, although present in his office, in spite of continual telephonic messages from the various functionaries at my dependence and from me personally, asking for immediate re-enforcements, which he might have called out from other districts, only adhered to the request with much delay and in a totally inadequate manner; so that, if, as has been said, the calm of the functionaries present in the Ministry and the good sense of some of the demonstrators themselves, had not prevailed, there might have been very serious damages and other excesses. With much delay there finally arrived a section in uniform with no functionary which remained inactive in a courtyard on the ground-floor of the Ministry, when it had been made quite clear to the Questore that two groups were necessary, who approaching, from the two side corridors, the main corridor on the 2nd floor, invaded by demonstrators, would have been able with adequate means to invite the demonstrators to withdraw or to push them out and prevent them from reaching other offices which they had been attempting to do and which for some time had been menaced.

Finally it is to be pointed out that the Questore omitted to hold in readiness and use where and when it was necessary the section of 80 mounted P.S. guards, which remained unused in barracks.

In conclusion, immediate responsibility falls, in ~~my~~ 452 opinion, in consequence of investigations, on the functionary Locurcio, director of the Palazzo Viminale Commissariat, as well as on Head Commissario Dott. Cacace, for lack of the necessary foresight and energy; the Questore is also not immune from responsibility for not having responded with the requisite urgency and resolution to the repeated requests of the General Directorate of Public Security. For these reasons I have held it opportune to substitute these functionaries.

All the same I must report that factors contributing to this unpleasant event were not only the negligences, above set out, of the Functionaries, but, above all, the lack of rapid means of locomotion which would allow the speedy

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33/

400 men belonging to the nucleus of the Ministry and notoriously, as I have on many previous occasions had the honour to report to Your Excellency, in great part animated by the same sentiments which filled the demonstrators.

I attach the report which has been presented to me by Head Commissario Buccelli, director of the Special Presidential Squadron, composed of two functionaries and 45 men.

With due respect,

THE HEAD OF THE POLICE.

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ea.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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ALLIED ~~CONTROL~~ COMMISSION
INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT:

Roatta.

TO

EcC.

FILE No.

22/31

15 Nov 1945

MAR 16 1945

An excellent report by the Commission
appointed to investigate Roatta's escape.

I think the conclusions of the report are
probably correct; culpable negligence by the
Guards compounded (as usual) by me with
insufficient supervision by the ofrs.

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G. W. H.

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17 CA Section 31

TRANSLATION.

His Excellency
The President of the Council
of Ministers,
Ministry of the Interior,
R O M E.

The Commission of Enquiry, constituted with Presidential Decree of the 5th instant, with the charge of "ascertaining the deficiency in the guard service ordered for General Mario Roatta, prisoner, and investigating any other question connected with the escape of this prisoner from the Military Hospital of Rome", has the honour to present to Your Excellency, with the present report, the results of the investigations carried out.

With ordinance dated 19th January last, the President of the High Court of Justice, H.E. Lorenzo MORONI, authorised the reception into the Ciampielli Clinic in Via G. Battista Morgani of General Mario Roatta, who was at that time in custody in the Officers' detention camp at Forte Boccea. It is in fact revealed from the report of a visit made to him by Doctor Major General Prof. Virginio De Bernardis that General Roatta was in a condition which necessitated his reception into an establishment for cure, particularly where first-aid would be at hand on account of further attacks of angina pectoris, which is always dangerous to life".

However, when this ordinance was transmitted for execution to the Questore of Rome, he, with his letter of the 21st January, 1945, pointed out to the High Commissioner for the Punishment of Fascist Crimes that he could not assume the responsibility for adequate vigilance of the prisoner in the Clinic named, which, on account of its situation and the particular characteristics of its structure, did not offer any guarantee of security.

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He insisted therefore on the necessity of revoking the order of the High Court, pointing out that the Military Hospital and even Forte Boccea itself or at least Regina Coeli, could more conveniently give the necessary treatments to the prisoner in their infirmaries."

Also the Commander of the Carabinieri Internal Group of Rome, Lt. Colonel Aniello PECORELLI, associated himself

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Also the Commander of the Carabinieri Internal Group of Rome, Lt. Colonel Aniello PECORELLI, associated himself with the observations of the Questore, maintaining that it would be opportune to receive the General into the infirmary at Regina Coeli and suspending the execution of the ordinance while awaiting further instructions.

| The Acting High Commissioner replied to the Questore

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and to the Group Commander on the 24th January stating that General Roatta's family had complained of the inobservance of the order issued by the President of the High Court, and ordering the P.S. and the Carabinieri to come to agreement themselves as regards the choice of clinic and the necessary vigilance.

Carabinieri Lt. Col. Pecorelli and the commander of the Rome Internal Company, Captain Giorgio GENIOLA, attentively examined the precincts of the Military Hospital, which had recently transferred to the building of the ex Virgilio school, situated between the Via Giulia and the Lungotevere dei Tevere, and chose an internal room on the first floor of the building, in which it would be possible to establish an adequate guard.

With his letter of the 25 January, the Questore communicated to the Acting High Commissioner and for information to the High Court of Justice, that the Military Hospital had been chosen and that the transfer of the prisoner from Forte Boccea had been arranged with the Carabinieri Force.

A fixed post of 12 Carabinieri under the command of Head Maresciallo MIRABILE Onofrio was instituted and detached from the 2nd Mobile Company. Two interchanging guard patrols were arranged, one in the courtyard on to which the window opened, and another in the corridor to watch the door and the adjacent anti-room.

The Ponte P.S. Commissariat arranged another service outside the Hospital with two patrols of Agents in civil clothes, placed in via Giulia near the principal entrance and on the Lungotevere near the back entrance.

Captain Giorgio Geniola drew up written instructions for the Carabinieri in which he detailed the duties of the two patrols, emphasising the necessity of preventing the access of persons, stopping suspected individuals, of watching to see that no explosives were placed in the vicinity, of adopting a correct and dignified attitude, saluting General Roatta when he entered or left his room, of preventing anyone from entering the room, except those persons who were duly authorised, the wife or defending Council of Roatta and the Hospital personnel, and of keeping note of conversations.

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Carabinieri Lt. Col. Pecorelli and the commander of the Rome Internal Company, Captain Giorgio GENIOLA, attentively examined the precincts of the Military Hospital, which had recently transferred to the building of the ex Virgilio school, situated between the Via Giulia and the Lungotevere dei Rebaldi, and chose an internal room on the first floor of the building, in which it would be possible to establish an adequate guard.

With his letter of the 25 January, the Questore communicated to the Acting High Commissioner and for information to the High Court of Justice, that the Military Hospital had been chosen and that the transfer of the prisoner from Forte Boccea had been arranged with the Carabinieri Force.

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Then by word of mouth he particularly recommended to the soldiers the scrupulous execution of their duty, calling their attention to the delicacy and importance of the charge entrusted to them.

The Commander of the Internal Group, in confirming

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the above instructions, further ordered that the Commanders of the Tenenze of Prati, S. Lorenzo in Lucina, and St. Peter's should carry out inspection tours, day and night, at different hours, according to a programme drawn up, to ensure that the services were proceeding regularly.

The guard service arranged in this way, on the 26th January at 10 o'clock the prisoner was transferred from Forte Boccea to the Military Hospital. On this occasion Roatta, commenting on the excessive number of the Public Force in his vicinity, asked Captain Geniola - in the presence of Lt. Col. Pecorelli - to tell the Carabinieri not be too severe because he gave his word of honour that he would never try to escape; a thing which obviously he could not even try to do given his age and his condition. Geniola replied that, even taking note of the pledge of honour, all the same he was obliged to see that the charge of the Carabinieri was carried out. He also gave Roatta their instructions to read, asking him not to put the Carabinieri in the position of having to infringe them.

The instructions were infringed the following day. It came about that Maresciallo Mirabile thought it better to replace the patrol with a stationary guard, who stood outside Roatta's door and followed him each time he left his room. The Maresciallo maintains that he told the Captain of this and that the Captain had approved, while Captain Geniola, denying having given his consent to the change, points out that he confirmed the original instructions with his letter of the 28th January, sent to the Tenenza of Prati and received by them.

For the first two weeks General Roatta remained closed in his room, leaving it only to go to the lavatory, or to take a little in the corridor and each time he left the room he told the NCO, who followed him with the guard.

In the morning he was called for by his escort and taken to the High Court of Justice to assist at the trial: in the afternoon his wife came to see him, the ex-Ord. 3449 Officer Lt. Col. Angelo FERRAZZI and often his Defending Councils.

The guarding Carabinieri never asked for the permits to converse with the prisoner and did not assist at the conversations.

Then, after some days it came about that the prisoner began to stop and talk with the Officers he met in the corridors. It should be noted in fact that in order to reach the lavatory Roatta traversed the corridor next to

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Then, after some days it came about that the prisoner began to stop and talk with the Officers he met in the corridors. It should be noted in fact that in order to reach the lavatory Roatta traversed the corridor next to his room and turned into a second corridor onto which opened the doors of rooms Nos. 3, 4 and 5 occupied by several sick officers. Tanned upon by many of them, he liked to spend some time with them followed at a discrete distance ./. .

by the guard.

Little by little he went farther afield until he reached a third corridor, at the bottom of which there is a statue of the Sacred Heart of Jesus. And from the corridors he went into various rooms without the Carabinieri following him. In some of the rooms the sick officers played at chess, at draughts or cards, and the prisoner played with some of the officers. In fact this became a habit nearly every evening from 2100 hours to about 2300 hours, while the guard walked up and down outside.

In the third corridor, on the far side of the operating theatre, there is a small anti-room onto which open the doors of three small rooms; in the first there is at present Colonel Lener, nursed by his wife, while in the others are Colonel Giovanni Catta and Lt. Col. De Florentis. Sometimes Roatta went to visit these officers.

On the morning of the 3rd March, M.E. Taddeo Orlando, visiting the Military Hospital for a radiographic examination, casually met Roatta, who was waiting near the staircase for his escort which should take him to the trial at the High Court. The two Generals conversed together about a recent radio-transmission from Yugoslavia which cited Roatta as a war criminal, with a few remarks from Roatta about the trial actually proceeding. And finally, on the 4th March, in the afternoon the prisoner received the usual visit from his wife. At about 1500 hours they both went to visit Colonel Lener and his wife staying in the room with them for about half an hour. At about 1700 hours, Roatta, accompanied by his wife and Maresciallo Mirabile, went up to the floor above, where in a small chapel some officers had gathered to recite the Rosary. The Doctor Major Giulio Barbaro noticed that both Roatta and his wife were very agitated. Then they went back to their room, where Lt. Col. Teruzzi joined them. Mrs. Roatta and ~~Forzi~~ ^{Forzi} left at about 2030 hours, accompanied by the prisoner to the vicinity of the statue of the Sacred Heart.

Later Roatta came out of his room to walk the corridor: he had on a pair of dark trousers and a dressing-gown. He went to room No. 4 to call Major Rosi Bernardini Clemente, with whom he continued to walk the corridor for about a quarter of an hour. A Carabinieri passed armed with a machine-gun rifle. Seeing him Roatta must certainly have been alarmed: he stopped him to ask if the Carabinieri on guard duty had been armed with machine-guns and was tranquilized on receiving the reply that the gun was that particular Carabinieri's normal armament. After this, while Major

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Rossi returned after 5 or 10 minutes and met the General

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as he was coming out of the room. They continued their walk together in the corridor, both entering the room again shortly afterwards.

The Carabinieri Evangelista Filippini, who was doing guard duty, lost sight of him at this point; he affirms that Roatta - watching until his back was turned to the door - must have slipped out again into the corridor and round the corner towards the statue. It is certain that after a few moments he looked for him and at once called the other Carabinieri: they all went out and searched on the Lungotevere and in the via Giulia, without finding him.

The prisoner Mario Roatta had escaped, presumably on the side of the Lungotevere dei Tevere.

It is to be excluded that General Roatta could have passed out of the principal entrance in via Giulia because the conformation of the buildings and the lock on the door in front of which are stationed a corps of guards all render escape impossible. However, it does appear probable that he got over the boundary wall which gives onto the Lungotevere dei Tevere, protected by the darkness of the cold night, the more so because the sealing of the wall is facilitated in one place by small steps on the inside, as can be seen from the photograph attached, P.9, of the enclosed file of photographs.

To reach this wall from the corridor in the hospital where the Carabinieri was (see photograph P. 4) the prisoner could have followed one of two ways: either that of the entrance corridor (see photograph P. 5) through the so-called parlour and the glass door of the ~~394~~³⁴⁷ still easier behind it (Photographs P. 6 and 7); or by the way of the room occupied by Colonel Lenor and his wife, a room from which he could have descended into the outer courtyard by way of the window, only about 2 metres above the ground (see photograph No. 8).

The first hypothesis seemed more likely to Captain Geniola because the glass door was found open, which Corporal Marocchini Antonio had left locked and because the gate facing it, even though it remained closed, could easily be scaled.

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It is not impossible, however, that Roatta may have followed ways different to those mentioned - which are the shortest - other possibilities existing once he had escaped the vigilance of the Carabinieri.

The Commission intends to affirm with a sure conscience that the escape was not the result of a sudden decision on

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the part of Roatta but was carried out on the basis of a preordained plan, studied in all its particulars and well meditated. For this the prisoner must necessarily have been in touch with other people, who it has not for the moment been possible to identify, and who had ready in the vicinity means to cause him to get away immediately.

The person who most certainly was the intermediary between Roatta and those on the outside has however been identified in the person of Major Rossi Bernardini Clemente, who absented himself a little before the actual escape and went towards the "parlour", presumably to see if the moment was propitious and everything alright. It is also to be noted that this Major approached the General most willingly, followed with particular interest the fortunes of Roatta, so much so that he often went to assist at the trial.

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The facts reconstructed in this way, the Commission makes the observation that the Military Hospital was chosen for Roatta in common agreement between the P.S. and the Carabinieri, following the regular order of the Acting High Commissioner for the Punishment of Fascist Crimes; the delegation of the selection of hospital would seem justified by the fact that the guardianship of officers is by regulation confided to the Carabinieri Force, and therefore they, together with the P.S., should search for the place most adapted for safe custody.

The communication made in this regard to the Acting High Commissioner was sent also for information to the President of the High Court of Justice, so that the competent Juridical Authorities implicitly approved the measure taken.

Even if the preceding ordinance of the High Court was not modified as regards the Ciancarelli Clinic, this was merely an omission in procedure and not substantial.

The room chosen inside the Hospital lent ~~344~~ ³⁴⁴ to surveillance: not only were the precincts of the building more adapted to custody but further presented the advantage that the Carabinieri could ledge in the small room next door, so that they could constitute an insuperable barrier in front of the entrance door. As can be seen from the attached plan of the building, Roatta's room, the two small rooms occupied by the Carabinieri and the small corridor, ~~form a separate enclosure, by which the prisoner was~~

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The guard strength employed for the service was sufficient.

A foregone conclusion for the efficacy of the surveillance, however, was that Roatta should not habitually leave

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the room assigned to him and that his leaving it should constitute an exceptional fact to be surrounded with all necessary precautions and within the limits fixed by word of mouth by Captain Geniola in arranging the service.

Instead of which it is obvious that the service was wanting; it should have established, precisely because it dealt more with a prisoner than with a General, that Roatta should not leave his room except for special justified reasons; it should have borne in mind the obligation to assist at conversations with outsiders; and adhered to the other instructions which prison regulations and also those of the Carabinieri Force lay down for the custody of prisoners.

Further, the instructions for the service prescribed that, besides the defending councils, his wife could also visit Roatta, for her visits, however, a regular authorisation issued each time by the Juridical Authorities should have been necessary.

Captain Geniola states that before drawing up the service instructions he had a telephone conversation with Judge Itali RORINO of the High Commissariat, who authorised the concession, while it appears that the Magistrate had understood that he was only giving a permission for that day. It may be that there was a misunderstanding, but it is certain that, in any case, it would have been correct for Captain Geniola to ask for a written order from the High Commissariat, the competent authority for the release of permits for visits.

The defects in the written order should have been pointed out by the Commander of the Internal Group, Lt. Col. Aniello Pecorelli, to whom it was communicated and who approved it entirely, adding only some instructions for the inspections to be carried out by three different officers of the Carabinieri.

Then, in the execution of the service, as has been said, not only were the service instructions violated but also the most elementary rules for the custody of prisoners; rules which, quite apart from specific instructions given by his superiors, should have been well-known to the NCO commanding the nucleus on guard service, Euresciallo Mirabile Onofrio.

The Commission is already making the enquiry as to whether, given the exceptional importance of the service and the personality of the prisoner, it would not have been more opportune to entrust the command of the fixed post to

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The Commission is already making the enquiry as to whether, given the exceptional importance of the service and the personality of the prisoner, it would not have been more opportune to entrust the command of the fixed post to an Officer. IN ANY CASE the Commander should have been chosen from among personnel selected for proved ability, while Maresciallo Mirabile Onofrio showed himself to be weak, confused in the specific attributes demanded of him, and without understanding of the delicacy of his task. He was lavish with concessions to the prisoner, and, although informed of them by Vice-Brigadier GALLI Gherardo, omitted

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to inform his superiors of the abuses committed by Roatta. Further, instead of taking his turn on night-duty with the other NCOs under him, he never passed a night in the building.

If some of these concessions allowed by the Maresciallo from an excess of reverence towards his superior could not prejudice the surveillance, others, on the other hand - such as allowing the guard to remain outside in the corridor while the prisoner entered the rooms - constituted a practical interruption of the surveillance. This frustrated the aim of isolating the prisoner and preventing him from having communications with outsiders availing himself of the services of the other sick officers - some of whom could leave and enter the hospital.

Vice-Brigadier Galli Gherardo, who seems to be quick, energetic and capable, assumed full responsibility for the service during the long absences of the Maresciallo. In his quality of acting Commander he should have observed, and caused to be scrupulously observed, the instructions received. It may perhaps be said in his favour that the Maresciallo, to whom he had pointed out the irregularities which were taking place, counselled him to let them go, given the rank of the prisoner. Rather naturally, influenced by the mistaken criteria of the Maresciallo, he did not inform any other superior in time. There resulted a relaxation of vigilance at the actual moment when it would have been more opportune to intensify it on account of the requirements of the Public Ministry which had asked life-sentence for Roatta, and also on account of the request for extradition as a war criminal made by the Yugoslav Government, both of which had seriously disturbed Roatta.

Into this complexity of irregularities there enters a defective control on the part of the superiors. Lt. Col. Pecorelli did order that three junior officers should carry out turns of inspection day and night, entrusting to the Commander of the Internal Company the task of issuing the necessary instructions.

These inspections, undertaken for the most part at night, did not have the desired effect, because the inspecting officers never came to know of the irregularities of the service.

Nothing can be brought against Lt. VESCOVO Giambattista and Lt. FILIPPI Mario as regards their charge, the execution of which was limited to the night hours, when Roatta was asleep in his room and the guards were in their place.

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On the other hand Lt. PASQUA Pietro, Commander of the Prati Penenza, in whose jurisdiction is the Military Hospital, must be indicated as not having accounted himself with the manner in which the service was proceeding, by going to the Hospital at hours other than those fixed for inspection, or by assuming indirect information.

From what has been ascertained it would appear that nothing can be brought against P.S. Agents GILLO Gaetano and GALLONI Vincenzo, on patrol service on the Lungotevere dei Rebalai at the time at which General Roatta escaped. It seems certain that they were patrolling the boundary wall of the Hospital, but it is not surprising, given the darkness of the night, that someone should have passed unobserved at a moment when they were at a certain distance from the entrance gate.

Finally, the Commission has examined attentively the hypothesis that all this complacent indulgence in the treatment of the prisoner was arranged purposely with the aim of assisting his escape.

Undoubtedly insufficient directions and instructions, superficial control or the absence of control on the part of superiors, relaxation in the execution of the services on the part of those on guard, have created an atmosphere adapted for escape, which cannot be considered as the effect of a single infraction or omission, but rather as a consequence of a mixture of contributing causes. Also influential in this respect is that spontaneous sentiment of regard and reverence towards one who has occupied the highest positions in the military hierarchy, a sentiment which was also manifest among the officers under treatment in the hospital.

The attitude of General Roatta himself also contributed, who tried in every possible way to undermine the confidence of those on guard, and succeeded in fact in reducing them to a real state of embarrassment. These deficiencies cannot assuredly be said to have been produced by fraud.

But above all it should be remembered that the custody of Roatta was entrusted to officers who shine for their patriotism such as Lt. Col. Aniello Recorelli, who after the armistice lived in difficult conditions in the bush to escape from Fascist persecution, and Captain Giorgio Geniola, who distinguished himself in the struggle against the Nazi-Fascists, took an active part in the Clandestine Military Resistance Movement with the Caruso Band, took the place of Captain Aversa who was shot in the massacre at the Ardeatine Caves, was arrested and tortured in the Prisons at Via Tasso and escaped death only because then Rome was liberated. Those officers offer the fullest guarantees in the sense that they never could have lent themselves to favour the escape of Roatta. Neither must it be lost sight of that Captain Geniola, immediately

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Therefore, the Commission has formed the sure and

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precise conviction that the deplorable fact of the escape of such an important prisoner is due only and exclusively to culpable deficiency in vigilance.

Investigations so far carried out to identify the essential outside accomplices of Roatta have been without result.

For the reasons exposed above, responsibility for the deficiencies, within the limits assigned to each one, would appear to fall, in the penal category, on Maresciallo Mirabile Onofrio, Vice Brigadier Galli Cherardo, the Carabinieri Filippini Evangelista and Major Rosi Bernardini Clemente, for who denunciations are being made to the Juridical Authorities. Responsibility of a purely disciplinary nature falls on Captain Giorgio Genicla and Lt. Pietro Pasqua for the deficiencies already noted in their regard. Lt. Col. Anselmo Pecorelli is not immune from censure as he could better have guided the work of his subordinates and at least have eliminated the infringements in the service instructions which have been brought to light.

Rome, 9th March, 1945.

14 MAR 1945

THE PRESIDENT
(Giuseppe Verza)

MEMBERS

(Giuseppe Solimando) (Amilcare Patrignani)

ee.

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Rome, 9th March, 1945.

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(Giuseppe Solimando) (Amilcare Patrignani)

ea.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

A.P.O. 394

PUBLIC SAFETY SUB COMMISSION

SECURITY DIVISION

REF : SD/601

7 March 1945

MAR 10 1945

SUBJECT : Communist Demonstration, Rome 6.3.45

TO : Director, Public Safety Sub Commission, Security Division

1. On Tuesday 6th March 1945 it was learned that a mass demonstration of the Left political parties was to take place at 1600 hours in the vicinity of Piazza del Colosseo, Rome, and in consequence I arranged for Gaston and Sabetta, the two civilian assistants employed in this Division to attend and the following is a summary of their respective reports.

2. Shortly before 1600 hours a crowd of approximately 8,000 or 9,000 people had gathered. Many red flags together with a few Italian tricolour on which was the Communist insignia were in evidence. A large number of the demonstrators carried placards, the main slogans were "Forward to the Quirinale"; "Down with Monarchy"; "Down with the King"; "Death to the King"; "Does the Government want another Carretta case"; "Death to Taddeo Orlando, the war criminal"; "Down with the Carabinieri"; "Let us purge the police"; "Buffoons, where is Roatta"; "What is under the cloaks of the priests?". These placards appeared to have been hurriedly prepared, not properly printed.

3. The crowd was composed of working class persons and unemployed. It seemed evident that most were members of the dissident Communist parties and not of the recognised Partito Comunista Italiano of which Togliatti is the leader. There were a number of partisans present dressed in British battle dress with red neckerchiefs, some were members of the Potente Brigade.

4. The meeting was declared open by Avv. GRISOLIA, a member of the Socialist Party, he commenced his address by saying "We must not only fight the Fascists in the North but the Fascists in liberated Italy. Down with the Fascist Monarchy".

5. GRISOLIA was followed by GARBINI a member of "Associazione Mutilati D'Italia" (Association of Italian Disabled Men). His speech was generally inflammatory. On the name of BONOMI being mentioned there was much booing and cries of "Down with Bonomi". He recalled that on 26th July 1943, after the fall of Fascism he addressed the people in Piazza Colonna after the speech of Bonomi, and he then demanded that all the higher Fascist officials should be arrested and hanged in the Piazza del Popolo. This did not happen, the people had been betrayed by BADOLIO and the time had now come when a Committee of Public Safety should be

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"Let us hang the accomplice of Fascism"; "let us go to the Quirinale". The impression is that this speech was the most inflammatory and was undoubtedly a means of stirring up fervent and enthusiasm amongst the people. It is interesting to note that this morning's Press does not give much prominence to GARIBINI's speech.

6. SPARTELLA of the "Movimento Comunista d'Italia", a dissident organization, followed GARIBINI. This speaker was also inclined to be outspoken and the crowd by this time, about 1635 hours, were becoming restive. The main theme of SPARTELLA's address was that the workers had been waiting eight months for the Government to take some strong action against the Fascists and their accomplices but they had failed to take action so the people must take steps themselves.

7. The next speaker was MASSINI, of the General Federation of Labour, he claimed that ROSTA was arrested too late, the trial was too long and that he should have already been judged and shot by a People's Tribunal. He went on to say that for years the Anti-Fascists had been kept in terrible prisons without trial and today the late Fascists were kept in hospitals with all comfort and it was not surprising that they escaped with the support of the Monarchy. The speech was frequently interrupted by booing and similar shouts to those mentioned previously.

8. A young partisan named Aldo TURI who had lost a leg, then mounted the terrace and waving a crutch commenced by saying he had fought for 18 months, losing a leg and many relatives. He then claimed that the Government would not allow him to take any action against the accomplices the men who had killed his relatives and companions. He finished by saying "That is enough let us go to the Quirinale".

9. The crowd by this time was seething with excitement and shouted that they had heard enough and demanded to be led to the Quirinale. Approximately 3,000 people left the meeting and went in the direction of the Quirinale.

10. About 5,000 persons remained at Piazza del Colosseo where they were addressed by Egle GUARDI of "Unione Donne Italiane", a woman who said she wanted to see all the King and accomplices of Fascism hanged in the Piazza del Popolo; De DOMINICIS, of the "Federazione Comunista Libertaria", said there was a barricade, on one side were the Monarchists and on the other "the people"; Franco RODANO, from "Partito della Significa-Cristiana"; REALE of "Partito Azioni"; and CALEVARI from "Partito Socialista" asked the demonstrators to go to the Viminale (Ministry of the Interior) to demand the resignation of BONOMI. The last speaker was Velio SPANO, editor of the Communist daily newspaper "Unita" and a member of the Executive Committee of "Partito Comunista Italiano", his speech was based on the theme that in Bulgaria, Roumania and France the leaders of the old regimes had been swiftly dealt with and shot, in Italy it seemed that CARUSO was the only guilty one and it was not therefore surprising that the CARRETTA affair had taken place. He went on further to say that support must be given to the demands of the Executive Committee for (i) the removal of the CGeneral Commanding CC.RR., (ii) the dismissal of the Chief of Police, FERRARI, and (iii) a new policy for the control of the police and Epuration. He claimed that the Communist Party would support the present Government and continue to collaborate with them if these demands were met.

11. GRISOLIA then closed the meeting and the crowd remaining, voiced their intentions of going to the Quirinale

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12. At Quirinale, by this time roughly 1715 hours there was a crowd of about 3,000 booing and shouting threats against the King, Luogotenente, and the Monarchy. Stones and sticks were being thrown against

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the main door and windows of the palace.

13. A platoon of about 15 foot Carabinieri were in front of the main door preventing the crowd from forcing the door. Within a few minutes about 20 mounted Carabinieri arrived and tried to disperse the crowd by the use of sabres.. At the same time four or five lorries containing Armed Questura agents arrived from the Direction of Via Nazionale.

14. An explosion took place within the crowd and subsequent enquiries indicate that a certain Giuseppe LASAGNA Mancini when preparing a home made grenade to throw against the Carabinieri it exploded in his hands and killed him and wounded others.

15. The CC.RR. then fired a small number of rounds into the air. A second explosion then took place and was due to a grenade being thrown towards the lorries containing the Questura agents. The grenade fell short and a Polish Officer who was passing through the square was killed, some other people were wounded. Following this incident the Questura agents were seen to fire quite a number of rounds into the air.

16. The crowd suddenly dispersed, people running in all directions shouting against the "criminal Carabinieri" and the "Criminal police". The square quickly emptied except for about 200 or 300 people and the corpse of MANCINI, the other body having been immediately moved to another part of the palace.

17. A small lorry passing through the square was commandeered and the body of MANCINI, wrapped in a red flag, was taken by his companions to the Viminale.

18. It appears that on arrival at the Viminale the crowd gained admittance through the failure of the Questura agents to take action against them and the body of MANCINI was placed in the office of FERRARI where it was guarded by his late companions. Many red flags were displayed from the windows of the Ministry. The crowd outside continually shouted "Resignation" and demanded to interview BONOMI.

19. To pacify the crowd SPANO addressed them from a window of the Viminale that a deputation would be received by BONOMI. And later the crowd dispersed without further incidents.

A.H. Ellis Capt.

A.H. ELLIS,
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A.H. ELLIS,
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CONFIDENTIAL

Preliminary Report on Communist Demonstration at Colosseum
Rome, at 4 P.M., 6th March, 1945.

The Communist Party had given orders that all workmen not employed on allied work should down tools at 3 P.M., and attend the meeting at the Colosseum. They were provided with roughly prepared banners - "Down with the King" - "Down with the Royal Family" etc. The crowd thus assembled in the Colosseum at 3.30 p.m. were not representative of the people, but chiefly workers of the lower class and unemployed: middle and upper class were absent.

At 3.30 p.m. the crowd was beginning to murmur: "We want to go to the Quirinal". Between 4 and 4.10 men and women began to make speeches. In front of the microphone, which became more and more inflammatory. They attacked the King and the Prince of Piedmont chiefly and also, to a lesser degree, the Government. The Communist Velio Spano, was to have spoken, presumably at 4 o'clock, but he did not arrive until 5 P.M.

At least half the crowd of between 8 and 10 thousand people became so frenzied at about 4.10 as a result of the improvised speeches that they went off to the Quirinal. The half that remained listened to Velio Spano's speech at 5 o'clock, which was quite moderate in tone. Then it was over they too drifted to the Quirinal.

At this time a crowd of about 2,000 persons had already assembled in front of the Quirinal of which the front ranks were trying to force the door with sticks and pressure. CC.PP. were holding them back. **3438** CC.PP. cordon was about to give way, mounted CC.PP. and foot re-enforcements came on to the scene. The mounted men fired into the air. Straightway a hand-grenade was thrown into the crowd by person unknown and a second one was directed against the CC.PP. Then the latter began to fire into the crowd. The crowd retreated from the Piazza but only into the side streets, and the cries that they wanted to kill the King and hang the Prince in the Piazza del Popolo became more insistent. They also cried out against the CC.PP. for firing on them when they were unarmed.

This would appear to be a political demonstration, being the escape of Roatta as a pretext, coupled with the accusations against the CC.PP. in general.

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This would appear to be a political demonstration, using the escape of Ronatta as a pretext, coupled with the accusations against the CC.RR in general.

There were a few civilian casualties, number unknown, and after a short interval the crowd was dispersed by the CC.RR.

6. Mar. 1945.

Walker P. Oberly
LSC
Dep. Dir. P/S Section

1764

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394

JAQ/hjp

15

8 March 1945
MAR 8 1945

TO: Executive Commissioner

The Admiral has received a message from Bonomi that they believe PWB have in their possession a movie of the incident outside the Quirinale, and specifically of the grenade throwing incident. Bonomi believes that the film clearly shows that the grenade was thrown by a person in the crowd.

The Admiral feels that it is not impossible that this portion of the film may be deliberately excised by someone at PWB and he therefore requests that you obtain a copy of this film at once from PWB, not revealing that it is at the Italian Government's request but merely stating that you wish the film to be deposited with us for a few days for reasons of public safety and to assist the inquiry which is being carried out.

Do you wish me to go ahead in your name, or would you prefer to deal with the matter personally when you come out of the conference?

3437

Tony is going ahead as above
at his suggestion

JAD
J.A.Q.

Go ahead W/SB

1765

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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13.

ATTN: FOR SACRED AND GEORGE DASH FIVE

3089

7 March 1945

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

SECRET FD

SUBJECT IS ROATTAS ESCAPE FD

PARIS TO ATTN: FOR SACRED AND GEORGE DASH FIVE FROM HQ ALCON CITE ALCOX PARAN
PARA ONE FD PUBLIC REACTION TO ROATTAS ESCAPE AS REFLECTED IN THE PRESS OF
SIX MARCH HAS BEEN VERY SHARP FD BY TWO HUNDRED THREE FIVE REFERS FD LEFT
WING PAPERS INDICATELY SUGGEST THAT REACTIONARY FASCIST ELEMENTS IN
ADMINISTRATION FACILITATED ESCAPE IN ORDER TO PREVENT ROATTAS FROM MAKING
STATEMENTS DAMAGING TO THEMSELVES IN COURT FD COMMUNIST PARTY ISSUED
COMMUNIQUE DEMANDING PARAN ARREST PARAN REMOVAL OF COMMANDER OF CARABINIERI AND
CHIEF OF POLICE PARAN HARBOR PARAN SUSPENSION OF SERVICE PARAN PRESUMABLY
SUGAR ITEM MIKE PARAN WHICH QUOTE AVERAGE SUSPECTS OF HAVING ORGANIZED THE
FLIGHT UNQUOTE PARAN CHARLES PARAN SETTING UP OF COMMISSION OF INQUIRY OF THREE
MEMBERS FD LIBERAL AND CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT PAPERS TOOK CALMER VIEW FD
PARA TWO FD MINISTRY OF INTERIOR ISSUED COMMUNIQUE MORNING FIVE MARCH
ANNOUNCING THAT IMMEDIATE INQUIRY HAD BEEN MADE AND THAT THIS HAD SHOWN GRAVE
DEFICIENCIES IN THE SYSTEM OF SUPERVISION FD MINISTRY HAS SET UP A SPECIAL
COMMISSION COMPOSED OF A MAGISTRATE OR AN INSPECTOR OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND A
SENIOR OFFICER OF THE CARABINIERI TO ESTABLISH BOTH THE DIRECT AND INDIRECT

3438

Major E. Talbot

1766

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

(12)

- 2 -

RESPONSIBILITY TO ALL THE CARABINIERI GUARDING ROASTA HAVE BEEN DETAILED TO
SEVERAL MEASURES HAVE BEEN TAKEN AGAINST THEIR IMMEDIATE SUPERIORS TO OFFICERS
IN ATTENDANCE ON ROASTA HAVE BEEN ARRESTED TO REWARD OF MILLION LIRE HAS BEEN
OFFERED FOR DEFINITE NEWS LEADING TO ROASTA'S CAPTURE TO COMMANDER OF
CARABINIERI CHIEF COMMANDING CHIEF HAS BEEN RELIEVED OF HIS POST FROM SIX MARCH FORTH

Int. Dist.

US Ambassador
British Ambassador
Chief Commissioner
Pol. Adviser
CA Sec.
Land Forces 3/C.

3435

3434

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

PO Adv.

11.

(6.)

Will you please draft a follow up
 signal giving public reaction, newspaper
 comment & Gov action in Roatta escape.

Our 2535 ref.

MS/6/3

Ex. Com.

Draft herewith.

See as dispatched
 in final form -
 13.

Stt
 6/12/57

3434

1768

785017

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

1005

10

MAR 7 1945

AFHQ GEORGE FIVE

3075

6 March

OP'S PRIORITY

SECRET PD

PARA ONE PD AS A RESULT OF ROATAS ESCAPE A DEMONSTRATION TOOK PLACE TODAY AT THE PLAZZALE DEL COLOSSEO PD APPROXIMATELY TEN THOUSAND PERSONS ATTENDED CMA SYMPOSES WERE MADE BY VARIOUS PERSONS AND PROCEEDINGS QUITE ORDERLY PD PARAH TO AFHQ GEORGE FIVE FROM ALCON CITE ACAS PAINTERPARA TWO PD AFTERWARDS A CROWD OF APPROXIMATELY TWO THOUSAND PERSONS PROCEEDED TO THE QUIRINALE PD THE CROWD ATTEMPTED TO FORCE THE GATES BUT WERE PREVENTED BY OCOR PD TWO GRENADES WERE THROWN BY PERSONS IN THE CROWD WHICH WAS LATER DISPENSED AFTER A VOLLEY HAD BEEN FIRED OVERHEAD PD SOME CASUALTIES CMA NUMBERS AT PRESENT UNKNOWN PD PARA THREE PD PURPOSE OF MAIN DEMONSTRATION APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN DIRECTED AGAINST PRESENT GOVERNMENT PD THAT OF THE TWO THOUSAND HOOLIGANS AGAINST THE ROYAL HOUSE PD SITUATION IN HAND PD PARA FOUR PD CHARLIE ITEM GEORGE LONDON ORDERED ALL WORKERS OTHER THAN THOSE ON ALLIED WORK TO ATTEND DEMONSTRATION

IFT DISTRIBUTION
 Chief Commissioner
 Ex Commissioner
 Public Safety S/C
 Political Section
 Land Forces S/C
 Econ. Section

Civil Affairs Section

Ext. 608

NICHOLAS POMBINO
 OWO USA
 Asst Adjutant

3433

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

AFHQ GEORGE FIVE

3085

6 MARCH

OPS PRIORITY

S SECRET PD

7.
PARA ONE PD MY PRECEDING TELEGRAM PD ITALIAN REPORT RECEIVED THIS
EVENING STATES THAT AFTER SUFFERING CASUALTIES FROM OUR FIRE
OPPOSITE QUINQUE GROUND PROCEEDING VENTURE CARRYING BODY OF ONE OF
THEIR MEMBERS KILLED WHICH THEY LAID AT OR NEAR DOOR OF OFFICE OF
PRIME MINISTER WITH NORMAL PROTEST PD CROWD ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN
INTRODUCED TO PRESIDENTIAL OFFICES BY COMMUNIST OFFICER OUR PD
PAREN TO AFHQ GEORGE FIVE FROM ALGERIA CITY AGEXC PAREN

PARA TWO PD ITALIAN GOVERNMENT VIEWED SITUATION AS SERIOUS BUT HAVE
MATTER IN HAND AND MEET TOMORROW WEDNESDAY TO DELIBERATE

Copy to: Chief Commissioner
Land Forces S/C
CA Sec (Pub. Saf. S/C)
U. S. EMBASSY
BRITISH EMBASSY
POLITICAL ADVISERS.

EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER

EX. 343

NICHOLAS FIORINO
CWO USA
Asst Adjutant

3432

1005.

Lya

8.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
PUBLIC RELATIONS BRANCH

26C/PL/PRB

8 March 1945.

Press Release - Immediate

MAR 6 1945

All Allied police agencies in liberated Italy, including military government areas, have been requested to assist in the apprehension of General Mario Roatta, the Allied Commission announced today.

General Roatta, who escaped from the Hospital Celio on the night of March 4-5, is wanted by the Italian police for trial on charges of crimes against the Italian State. The fugitive was said to have been wearing hospital pyjamas when he escaped.

Data on Roatta now being circulated to police agencies includes the following facts:

Gen. ROATTA Mario of Giovanni Battista and
Risconlar Antonietta.

Born at Modena on 2nd January, 1887.

Address in Rome, Via Aureliana N. 63

Married to Mariola Ines

Height: 1.68 m. (5 ft. 6 1/2 ins)

Hair: Brown going slightly bald in front

Eyes and Eyelashes: Brown

Nose: Aquiline

Face: Oval

Chin: Regular

Clean shaven, wears spectacles and speaks with a
Northern Italian accent.

3431

PASSED FOR PUBLICATION BY FIELD PRESS CENSORS

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

1770

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Northern Italian accent.

PASSED FOR FURNIGATION BY FIELD PRESS CENSORS

3431

1772

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

(7.)

ATTN

6 March

OF PRIORITY

~~300~~
3016

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AS A RESULT OF BOATTA ESCAPE DOMINI DESIGNED NEMISTE GENERAL ORLANDO COMMANDING
 GENERAL CHAIEN CHAIEN RIVER RIVER BY GENERAL SOGO PD
PAPER TO AME FOR SACHED AME FOR GEORGE DASH FIVE FROM IN ALICE FROM STONE PAPER
 LATTER HAS CONQUERED HEMORE LITER OCCUPATION AND IS NOW HEAD OF MILITARY
 TRIBUNAL PD IN REQUESTING APPOINTMENT TO BE DOMINI AMED FOR IMMEDIATE FULFILL AS
 HE WISHED TO MAKE APPOINTMENT PRIOR TO LEAS DISCONTINUATION ONE FIVE ZERO ZERO
 HOURS TODAY PD IN VIEW OF CIRCUMSTANCES AND URGENCY AND SINCE THERE IS NOTHING
 AGAINST SOGO I STATED THAT YOU WOULD NOT OPPOSE PD
 PARA TWO PD GOVERNMENT IS ALSO CONSIDERING TRANSFER OF SUGAR ITEM RIVER FROM
 COMMANO SUPPLIED TO MINISTRY FOR WAR PD ON THIS POINT DOMINI WILL AT MY
 REQUEST SUBMIT FORMAL PROPOSAL FOR YOUR APPROVAL BEFORE PUTTING IT INTO EFFECT

Copy to: Chief Commissioner
 Land Forces Sub-Com
 Ch Sec (Pub Inf S/O)
 U.S. EMBASSY
 BRITISH EMBASSY
 POLITICAL ADVISERS.
 M. S. LUSH
 Executive Commissioner
 23

3430
5428

Brig.
Ex. Com.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

AFHQ

2935

5 March 1945

PRIORITY

MAR 5 1945

CONFIDENTIAL PD

SUBJECT IS GENERAL ROATTA

PAREN TO AFHQ FROM ALCOM CITE ACPSE PD

ON THE NIGHT OF FOUR MARCH ONE NINE FOUR FIVE GENERAL MARIO ROATTA WHO
IS BEING TRIED BY THE ITALIAN HIGH COMMISSION FOR THE PUNISHMENT OF FASCIST
CRIMES ESCAPED FROM AN ITALIAN MILITARY HOSPITAL IN ROME PD STEPS ARE
BEING TAKEN TO RECAPTURE HIM PD FULL PARTICULARS ARE BEING CIRCULATED
TO ALL ALLIED PAREN INCLUDING ARMY PAREN AND ITALIAN POLICE AGENCIES PD

Copy to:

HQ 15 Army Group
Chief Commissioner
Executive Commissioner ✓

3429

Public Safety S/c

365

A.F. Wilcox LT COL

NICHOLAS PIOMBINO
CWO, USA
Asst. Adjutant

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

1005

JAQ/efe

5.

CC 2610

2 March 1945

MAR 2 - 1945

Dear Signora Roatta:

I wish to inform you that your letter to the President and to the Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission has been received and has been read by both of them personally.

I am directed by the Chief Commissioner to tell you that, while both he and Mr. Macmillan have every sympathy with you personally in your distress, as the trial is entirely an Italian affair, they are not prepared to intervene in any way which would influence the findings of the court.

Very sincerely,

/s/ J. A. Quayle

J. A. QUAYLE
Major, R. A.
Staff Officer to the
Chief Commissioner

Signora Ines Roatta
Via Aureliana 63
Roma

3428

Copies to: A/President
U.S. Embassy
British Embassy
Ex. Comm'r.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

1005
CONFIDENTIAL
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394

FEB 5 1945

SECRET
AIDR MEMOIRE

It is the understanding of the British and American Governments that the following procedure regarding the introduction of evidence related to Allied policy will be followed in the trial of General Roatta and his associates:

If and when it is desired to introduce evidence regarding military operations which might have been taken by the Allies around the period of the armistice, or regarding documents or alleged copies of documents having to do with Allied policy before and during the war, it is understood that such evidence will be referred to the competent Allied Authorities in Rome for decision as to whether it may be introduced into the trial and as to the appropriate action to be taken in the premises.

DISTRIBUTION:

Original & 1 Copy - Delivered by hand to Prime Minister
1130 hours 6 February 1945. E.W.S.
1 Copy - COS
1 Copy - CA

3427

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

3
JAN 20 1945

AFHQ

TO: AND PRIVATE
AFHQ PERSONAL/ FOR GENERAL HARDING

S-417

19 January 1945

URGENT

TOPSEC PD

FURTHER MY SUGAR FOUR ONE FIVE PD MARIO BERLINGUER DEPUTY HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR THE PUNISHMENT OF FASCIST CRIMES HAS JUST ASSURED
ME THAT IN ADDITION TO THE INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY PRIME MINISTER
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE COURT HE CMA BERLINGUER CMA WILL BE PRESENT
IN COURT AS ADVISOR TO THE GOVERNMENT PROSECUTOR
AND PRIVATE
PAREN TO AFHQ PERSONAL/ FOR GENERAL HARDING FROM HQ ALCOM SIGNED
ADMIRAL STONE PAREN
TO INSURE THAT THE TYPE OF EVIDENCE DESCRIBED IN YOUR FOX EIGHT FIVE
NINE SIX THREE IS NOT INTRODUCED BY THE PROSECUTION

DISTRIBUTION:

Hon. Alexander Kirk
Sir Noel Charles
Chief of Staff
Political Section
Adjutant (Skeleton Copy)

3428

PA 18
Chief Commissioner
222

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL
ELERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral
Chief Commissioner

AFHQ

AFHQ

S-415

18 January 1945

URGENT

TOPSEC PD

PARA ONE PD YOUR FOX EIGHT FIVE NINE SIX THREE OF SIXTEEN JAN PD THE
PRIME MINISTER STATES HE HAD ALREADY ISSUED NECESSARY INSTRUCTIONS TO THE
PRESIDENT OF THE COURT BUT WILL REHEW THESE INSTRUCTIONS BOTH ORALLY AND
IN WRITING IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE OPENING OF THE TRIAL PD

PAREN TO AFHQ PERSONAL FOR GENERAL HANDING FROM HQ ALCOM SIGNED ADMIRAL
STONE PAREN

PARA TWO PD AM SATISFIED NO FURTHER STEPS NEED BE TAKEN AT THIS TIME

DISTRIBUTION:

Hon. Alexander Kirk
Sir Noel Charles
Chief of Staff
Political Section
~~Adjutant (Signal Section)~~

Chief Commissioner

222

MILERY W. STONE
REAR ADMIRAL
Chief Commissioner

~~TOP~~ SECRET

1778

785017

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

~~TOP SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

CONFIDENTIAL

Incoming Message

/nd

TO: Allied Commission private for Admiral Stone

N 91/16

FROM: AFHQ From General Harding Cite PHOS

URGENT

REF NO: F-85963

JAN 17 1942

TIME SENT: Jan 161434A

TIME RECEIVED: Jan 161817A

TOP SECRET

see 2.

1. SACRED has been in discussion with the British Resident Minister and United States Political Adviser regarding the possibility of the introduction into the trial of General Mario Roatta of evidence affecting military operations at the time of the Italian Armistice or of documents relating to British or United States policy before or during the war. As a result he wishes you to approach the Italian Prime Minister informally and to request him to take the necessary steps during the trial to forbid the introduction of evidence affecting military operations which might have been undertaken by the Allies around the period of the Armistice or of documents which might be produced as actually being or alleged to be copies of Allied documents or records about British or United States policy both before and during the war.

2. If your representations are unsuccessful you should report the fact immediately to me so that SACRED can consider what further steps should be taken.

See 40

PWK

DISTRIBUTION (Controlled by Office of CC)

ACTION: Chief Commissioner
 INFO: Hon. Alexander Kirk
 Chief of Staff
 Political Section
 Adjutant (Skeleton Copy)

CONFIDENTIAL

~~TOP SECRET~~

