

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

ACC

10000/109/641
(VOL. I)

Declassified E.O. 12336 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

10000/109/641
(VOL. I)

PATRIOT POLICY
SEPT. 1944 - MAR. 1945

1623

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

1624

Don't know if it is

1799/600/1000

1799/600/1000

1799/600/1000

1799/600/1000

1799/600/1000

1799/600/1000

TO: CDO for VP

99 102-

A)

1. Correspondence in the attached file is really in question of the treatment of partisans as POW.

2. The question of distinctive emblems is referred to a few times but all the legal information about it with reference to the Geneva convention is summed up in the letter which Col. ~~Belmonte~~ wrote at folio 14.

B) 3. A signal of 9 Oct 44 from SECHMED is the beginning of this attempt. It is a request to AC to get the Italian Government to ask treatment of the patriots as POWs. Folio 8.

4. A signal from AC to AFHQ on 19 Oct informs them that the question is being studied. Folio 22.

5. A letter from the VP (prepared for legal by Col. Belmonte) reviews the question of the kinds of emblems which might be adopted and the international consequences of declaring partisans POWs. Folio 64.

6. A repeat signal from AFHQ to AC asks for our action on this question. Folio 24.

7. A signal from AC to AFHQ informs that AAI had turned down the plea of the Italian Government for recognition of patriots because they do not fulfill conditions of uniform. Folio 26.

8. A copy of the letter giving General Harding's reasons for this refusal. Folio 26A.

9. SECHMED repeats to AC the request for patriots as POWs stating that a distinctive fixed emblem and HQI a uniform is required. Folio 30.

11. A signal from Admiral Stone to AFHQ re-stating AC objections to the plan and citing an analogous problem with Yugoslavs. Folio 32.

12. A letter of Brig. Lush to AAI re-opening the question and asking faith be kept. Folio 32.

13. A draft statement proposed for issue by General Alexander that patriots constitute an Army. Folio 41.

Pol Sec

Will you please comment on this 95

16 Dec 44

27

TO : Chief of the Chief of Staff
(attendant: Captain Gordon)

From: Political Section

1. This question of the recognition of the C.L.S.A.I. in the North is, of course, under active discussion between the Chief of Staff and the two Ambassadors, London and Washington, and comes up for discussion at yesterday's meeting of the Political Committee. It is expected that the position as between the Italian Government and the C.L.S.A.I. will be clarified in the course of the next few days and I suggest that instructions to Mr. Smith and Mr. Arnold should be postponed until then.

2. Incidentally, Captain Gordon or the P.S.I. Monitoring Reports have not it wrong. There is no question of the Committee of the C.L.S.A.I. in liberated Italy being declared the representative or part of the Government. The point that has been proposed is that the C.L.S.A.I. should be recognized as the Government's "agent" until Allied Military Government is established.

20 Dec 44

S. L. d'A. WILKINSON
Acting Vice President, Political Section

is expected that the position of between the Italian Government and the C.I.A. will be clarified in the course of the next few days and I suggest that instructions to 4th, 5th and 6th Armies should be postponed until then.

2. Incidentally, Captain Deason of the P.S.A. Monitoring Reports have got it wrong. There is no question of the Guantánamo of the C.I.A. in Italy being declared the representatives or part of the Government. The point that has been proposed is that the C.I.A. should be recognized as the Government's "agents" until Allied Military Government is established.

20 Dec 44

H. L. d'J. BURKIN
Acting Vice President, Political Section

90

C50

Letter based on Minutes 97 for signature.
if approved.

[Signature]

22 Dec 44

1337

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Chief Coordinator

74

1. Will you please see Page 73. the meeting has now been fixed for 1900 hours, Sunday, 15 December.
2. When at AFHQ I made it clear to the I.S. and P.S. that quite apart from the question of whether the French Government should or should not be approached with a view to signing the tri-partite agreement, you did not consider that any discussion should be made in the first paragraph.
3. I think we must take the line that so long as the military side of the S.O.S. activities are unopposed, the political aspect must be left to the Allied Commission. I understand that a telegram has been sent to the Foreign Office setting out the combined views of yourself and the Allied Ambassadors, and Mr. Robinson will try to get a reply before the meeting on Monday.
4. Will you please say whether you will attend the meeting yourself or whether you wish Mr. Robinson or yourself, or possibly both, to go.

As it relates to the total cost

715L

Done by cc. 1
discussed with cc. 2

Intelligence
Chief of Staff

15 Dec 44

Chief Coordinator

1. Since our discussion I have telegraphed I.S. and P.S. who agreed that the main discussion should take place at Sunday's meeting. They stated, however, that there are several subjects in the tri-partite agreement which General Stawell wishes to have discussed and to which they would like some measure of agreement before Sunday's meeting.
2. I suggested, therefore, that the proposed amendments should be brought here either by General Stawell or a member of his staff tomorrow or the next day so that you would have an opportunity of considering them before the full meeting.

15. Dec. 44
Then by cc:
discontinued with cc
7/2

Chief Confidential Officer

1. Since our discussion I have telephoned T.D. and E.D. who agreed that the main discussion should take place at Galt's meeting. They stated, however, that there are several obstacles to the tri-quarterly agreement which General Sowell wishes to have discussed and to which they would like some measure of agreement before Galt's meeting.
2. I suggested, therefore, that the proposed agreement should be brought here either by General Sowell or a member of his staff tomorrow or the next day so that you could have an opportunity of consulting your advisors here before the full meeting. This seemed the only alternative to the today meeting for which T.D. and E.D. otherwise would have promised.

9 Submit Aids Remain

MSZ

15. Dec. 44
cc: 11/51
cc: 11/100

Then by cc: 7/2 - also for 1/2

13. Dec. 44

Chief of Staff

79 Jan 24/39

51

i Col I have put in 50. Perhaps you know where
the conference is to be held? I can find out
nothing.

25/10

62

COS

63 is for your information

29/11

W. J. P. M. J. P. M. J. P. M.

64

100 000

1. Folio 65 from Land Warfare 3/40 replies to Folio 60.
2. I have discussed this with JMO and do not recommend any action be taken on the attending matter for the following reasons:
 - a) The offending portion (underlined) only refers to partisan activities and only conflicts with our policy by implication;
 - b) Whilst Land Warfare 3/40 is Folio 65, para 1 and 4 deal strongly on the subject, they agree against a demand in para 3-a, b and c and the proposed wording in para 2 (d-1, 2, 3 and 4) will be my opinion not achieve anything;
 - c) The JMO states that Stern and Stripes are very uncooperative, even re- publish and the JMO advises against it except in cases where some particularly serious error has occurred.

52

1 agree in the 2nd case

3 Dec 46

2. I have discussed this with [redacted] and [redacted] and the offending cutting for the following reasons:

a) The offending portion (underlined) only refers to partisan officers and only conflicts with our policy by implication;

b) whilst Lord Forster 3/3 in Folio 65, para 1 and 4 feel strongly on the subject, they argue against a demand in para 3-4, b and c and the proposed wording in para 4 (d-1, 2, 3 and 4) will in my opinion not achieve anything;

c) the EDO states that Stars and Stripes are very uncooperative, even neutral, of approaches for the retraction or amendment of ~~the~~ matter which they publish and the EDO advises against it except in cases where some particularly serious error has occurred.

1 agree in view of 2 C above.

Shore
Captain

R Spz.

by

The best course is to send an accurate account

to the SRS grade them to publish it. Ask L. Forster.

Sub Com to submit a draft statement - not in form of a document but purely informative *DR (L/for)*

1450

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Acting Chief Commissioner

39

0

F34

Attached is submitted for your information ~~/signature~~ approval.

Seen by A/CC

MSL

TO : Political Section.

1. Reference your enquiry at 45, we are corresponding with APHJ on this very question and the latest signal which we sent them on 31 October (P-110 36) has not yet received a reply.

2. The refusal of the Italian Government's request by General Alexander referred to in the final para of this signal is at 25A on the file and I think is probably the answer you want for Signor Del Balbo.

CMIS/23.

MA. C.I.
Chief Staff Officer,
to the Chief of Staff.

TO: COS

General Alexander's refusal does not seem to have been communicated to the Italian front, as far as I can see from the file. Armed visit to be discussed with the staff commission.

John (Jack) [unclear]

16. 0 1;
Chief Staff Officer,
to the Chief of Staff.

5

TO: COS

General Alexander's refusal does not seem to have been communicated to the Italian front, as far as I can see from the files. Since this has done now, in a letter from the Chief Commissioner or write it so if I write Sir. De Balgo? I am inclined to think it ought to be put in writing.

94

Agropyron
Pöschke Aachen.
13 NOV 1914

THIS fish was brought to C&G.

apparently in error.

no. Patient's Branch Libr.

14 July 44

7

Rf 48: Distillation water M⁺B⁻, M⁺A⁻ and Rind. HCl-HNO₃. 60 min.

decided to take on this pending reply to the Police informant.

CAL. Planned for improvement at a later stage when more complete.

157-1000

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31

Police

is the only unhelpful reply of them to 25.
Before that it is pieces, Col. Smith you ought to know
that McE. probably discarded him at Co. 1st yesterday and
may have committed 100. If not would you please let
me hear your comments.

How 5210

Pl. 25th

Para 2 has been in file (there's nothing from saying
it was not in my original draft because I was
mainly concerned by the evidence in which
it was based?). We don't necessarily have to explain
that "the Germans" have not accepted it, but
Col. 1 report alleges it.

We should not say that our evidence does
not enable us to claim that these British tanks
do not have a good distinction between it. x
Col. 1 does not want to provide them for
admission. none

32

CD Sec

12/15/46

Prove that the evidence about the Germans

not repeat charges etc.
 Also should we not say that our witnesses does
 not enable us to claim that these patrol bands
 do not 'appear distinct' within etc. &
 that our claim 'was' to provide them for
 admin. reasons

32

Mac (15/12)

CD Sec.

I agree that the evidence about the Germans
 Concession is shaky - but it was worth repeating
 Did you draft reply.

MS/21/12

35

COS / Mr. Caccini; draft signed & reply to 30
 is at 34. If you agree it is 1.3.11 with
 check on the details of para 1, unless
 you consider it sufficient to end para
 1 at the word 'instances'.

15/27/10

Col.

9A

Adm on 8 has been attached to Q, again to Chm

for info - Mr. [unclear]

Re: [unclear] [unclear]

12

CSO

Folio 11 has been to CS since then I have been trying to trace its origin but without success. Suggest that A/CC may hold the clue.

Sh

17/10

8: RA to A/CC informs me that folio 11 is a translation of a document (possibly made by A/CC from a visit to Borneo).

CSO

13 & 14 is a very helpful directive on the legal status of guerrillas.

17/10

L. & S. Dept

19

14/10, 14/10 is the approved copy of directive.

Approved by A. A. 1. Please see above

18/10

from a visit to Rome.

C.S.

13014 is a very helpful narrative on the legal status of guerrillas.

12/10

C.S. 19

Ref 9, 15, 16, 18, 20, 21 and minute at 19, 1 minute from 12 was enough evidence to justify issuing 18 as a decision.

Look you pt. take action.

13.5.54

C.S.

23

Ref 9, 15, 16, 18, 20, 21 and minute at 19, 1 minute from 12 was enough evidence to justify issuing 18 as a decision.

14.10.44

13.5.54

C.S.

18 issued as decision.

11 Oct 44

13.5.54

11840

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CONFIDENTIAL

3201

Cof-5104

54

1204

22 DEC 1944

2-387

21 DEC 44

98

OP-PRINCE

CONFIDENTIAL TO

FOURTH MY HONOR THOSE KINDS OF THINGS WHICH THE MAY HAVE BEEN ORDER OF
DAY PUBLISHED BY ITALIAN GOVERNMENT THIS MORNING BEARING IN PART WITH RELATIONS
WITH GERM TO RELEVANT PARTS IN AN FOLLOWS OUR PERS

FROM TO ADD FOR BARRING OUR UNDER OTHER POLICE AND RELEVANT PARTS FROM IN ALONG
FEDERAL FROM OTHER PARTS

STATE THE GOVERNMENT HAS FOR SOME TIME CLAIMED THAT THE STRONGHOLD OF THE
PATRIOTS IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE NATION'S WAR EFFORTS AND THAT TO THE
COMMITTEE OF LIBERATION OF NORTHERN ITALY OUR AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
GOVERNMENT ITSELF OUR IS ORIGINATED THE WORK OF RECOVERING THE ACTION OF THE
PATRIOTS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST THE FASCIST AND NAZI GOVERNMENTS TO THE
GOVERNMENT IS NOW PLACED TO NOTE THAT ALSO THE ABOVE CHARGED BROUGHT THE
COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION OF NORTHERN ITALY AS THE REPRESENTATIVE ORGAN
OF ALL FREE NAZI FASCIST PARTIES IN THAT TERRITORY OCCUPIED BY THE ARMY TO
GIVE THIS BROUGHTING OUR WHICH IS ADDED TO THAT PROVIDED GIVEN BY THE
ITALIAN GOVERNMENT OUR AND WITH THE AID WHICH WILL BE GRANTED OUR THE COMMITTEE
OF NORTHERN ITALY WILL BE ABLE TO STRENGTHEN THE RESISTANCE STRONGHOLD AGAINST IT HAS

Chief Commissioner

222

102

1351

ALBERT W. STONE
Major General
Chief Commissioner

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CONFIDENTIAL

100

AFHQ

9-397

21 DEC 54

OP-POLSKITY

SUSTAINED FOR MANY MONTHS AND WHICH WILL CONTINUE UNTIL THAT DAY IN WHICH
ITALY CAN NO LONGER SUSTAIN ITSELF AND WILL BE ABLE TO RE-ASSUME OF ALL
ITALIANS CAN TO INCLUDE FORMERLY ITS OWN IDENTITY TO BE QUOTE AND BY
IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAMS SUCH THINGS WILL BECOME

102
403

ATTENTION:
British Ambassador
American Ambassador
Political Section
Chief of Staff
CC files

1350

Chief Commissioner

END

ALBERT S. SPENCER
Major General
Chief Commissioner

CONFIDENTIAL

64
99

Confidential

Ref: 3201/3/208

Ref: 478004

13 December 1944.

SUBJECT: Committee of Liberation.

TO : 9540 Eighth Army.

1. In reply to your letter dated 11 December 1944, reference CA/102/1, it is expected that the relationship between the Italian Government and the C.L.N.A.I. will be clarified in the course of the next few days as a result of discussion now taking place, and I will of course advise you of the result.

2. I would, however, point out that there is no question of the Committee of National Liberation in liberated Italy being declared the representatives or part of the Government. The point that has been proposed is that the Committee of National Liberation in North Italy (C.L.N.A.I.) should be recognized as the Government's agents only during the period of the German occupation and that these representative functions should cease as soon as the territory is liberated and Allied Military Government set up in the normal way.

Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

SUBJECT: Conditions of Liberation.

TO : 1 SMO Light Army.

1. In reply to your letter dated 11 December 1941, reference is made to the fact that the relationship between the Italian Government and the C.I.N.C.I. will be clarified in the course of the next few days as a result of discussions now taking place, and I will of course advise you of the result.

2. I would, however, point out that there is no question of the Conditions of National Liberation in liberated Italy being declared the representatives or part of the Government. The point that has been proposed is that the Committee of National Liberation in Italy (C.I.N.C.I.) should be recognized as the Government's Agents only during the period of the German occupation and that those representative-factional activities should cease as soon as the territory is liberated and allied military Government set up in the normal way.

Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

Copy to: Political Section,
S.M.O. Fifth Army,
Civil Affairs Section, 15 Army Group.

1549

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1843

1644

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~~TOP SECRET~~

CO2 98

AFW:

5-376

20 DEC 44

OP-PRIORITY

Confidential

TORING PD

REIT WITH BARRAGE THIS AFTERNOON AND REPEATEDLY THAT BARRAGE HAS DECIDED NOT
TO MAKE TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT WITH CLEAI AND GOVERNMENT BUT THAT MILITARY
MILITARY AGREEMENT BETWEEN BARRAGE AND CLEAI WOULD BE MADE AND ANY POLITICAL
AGREEMENT SHOULD BE MADE BETWEEN ITALIAN GOVERNMENT AND CLEAI PD

PD HAS REACHED THE BARRAGE AND WHILE BARRAGE AND BATTLE BARRAGE FROM THE
ALONG BARRAGE. FROM BARRAGE

SUCH A POLITICAL AGREEMENT BECAUSE OF ITS POSSIBLE MEANING ON MILITARY
OPERATIONS MUST BE SUBJECT TO BARRAGE APPROVAL PD BARRAGE HAS IN FULL
AGREEMENT WITH BARRAGE DECISION PD HE WILL OPEN BARRAGE IMMEDIATELY
AND WILL SUBMIT TO ME FOR TRANSMITTAL TO THE CHIEF OF POLITICAL
AGREEMENT IS TENTATIVELY AGREED UPON

UNCLASSIFIED

Sir Noel Charles
Hon. Alexander Kirk
Political Section
Chief of Staff
DC Files

see 104

see 107

Chief Commissioner

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ALBERT E. STONE
Rear Admiral
Chief Commissioner

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1000007: Committee (Liberation)

3201

154332

573

15 DEC 1944

Confidential

Re Allied Commission

15 DEC 1944

1. It is noted from P.W.S. monitoring reports that Radio Rome has announced that the new Italian Government will declare the committee to be their representatives and part of the government.
2. The immediate result is that committees are already asking by what right they are relegated to the position of unofficial consultants without either executive or administrative functions.
3. Since this matter is of vital importance both in the administration of presently occupied areas and in our attitude to areas to be occupied in the future, may a policy directive on the position of these committees be promulgated at the earliest possible moment?

HEADQUARTERS
15 DEC 1944
A. G.

1347

TOP SECRET

STATE STATEMENT X-1 DE SHIRI GURINERMAN

Confidential

In dealing with the proposal for the recognition of the CLNAI as the agents of the Italian Government in Northern Italy it should be quite clearly realized where this step would lead us. In order to do so I would briefly recapitulate the history of the CLN movement.

2. The CLN began as the union of the main six parties engaged in underground resistance to the Germans and the Fascists in Rome. These parties have no sort of mandate from the people and are in fact self-appointed bodies. They range from the Communists and Christian-Democrats with undoubtedly a large following to the Action Party who are little more than a group of individuals.

3. By the time the Allies entered Rome, the CLN had become sufficiently powerful to reject the leadership of Marshal Badoglio and insist on the formation of a Government under Signor De Gasperi consisting of their own representatives. Similar committees sprung up in other cities of Italy including Florence, Milan, Turin and Genoa. Owing to the complete elimination of the Germans from Florence, the CLN in that city found themselves to some extent in control of the town for several days, and on the establishment of Allied Military Government they expected to be allowed to retain a considerable share in the administration of the city and adjacent provinces.

4. In the cities of the North the CLN are playing an increasingly powerful role and through their access to funds and the support of Allied subversive organizations they have succeeded in acquiring control over the CLNs of patriots engaged in fighting the enemy. There is a considerable body of evidence to show that their ambition is to play an active role in the administration of Italian territory as and when it is freed from the Germans and Fascists. We have positive knowledge that they intended to assume legislative functions by means of issuing decrees and to exercise other attributes of Government such as the requisitioning of buildings and the arrest of Fascists.

5. In the month of August, the CLNAI put forward a request that they should be recognized as the representatives of the Italian Government in the North. The Allied Military authorities, at that time, did not consider it expedient to support this request since it was considered that such a step could not fail to increase the difficulties of establishing Allied Military Government when the time came. It was also felt that this step would give the Italian Government the right to direct policy in an area in which the orders of the Allied Command must be paramount. The CLNAI did however succeed in establishing contact with the Italian Government through the Italian Legation in Rome and a limited degree of recognition was in fact accorded to them as the co-ordinating body for Anti-Fascist activities in the North.

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6. I consider that the objections to which I have just referred apply even more strongly today. With the Allied armies headed in a North-Easterly direction it seems probable that in a large area of North-Western Italy on a German withdrawal there will for some considerable time, possibly a matter of several weeks, be no Allied troops. During that period the CLNAI must be expected to assume charge of the machinery of Government. Any formal step which may be taken to recognise the CLNAI as the representatives of the Government in the North would make it more difficult to instal Allied Military Government and to make the CLNAI carry out the undertakings given in the Bi-lateral Agreement of the 7th December to hand over their powers. It was for this reason that when that agreement was drafted the paragraph providing for the adherence of the Italian Government to the Agreement was stated in such a way as to limit recognition of the CLNAI to that of the established body representing Anti-Fascist parties in enemy occupied Italian territory.

7. At the same time the CLNAI were asked to concur in a clause in which they fully accepted the Italian Government as the sole legitimate Government in that part of Italy not under Allied Military Government. The draft was so worded as to bind them also to the acceptance of the terms of the Armistice. The CLNAI representatives indicated that they were unwilling to accept such an undertaking and I understand that that is their position today. The British Ambassador has informed me that the British Foreign Office have stated that if the CLNAI will not agree to any such provision it will be necessary to reconsider the whole of British policy towards them.

8. With the example of Greece before our eyes it would be idle to deny that the situation in the North contains the ingredients of the gravest dangers, which may not only have decisive effects on the political future of Italy but may also lead to conditions in which large numbers of Allied troops would have to be diverted from other purposes. Although the Head of the CLNAI is a non-party man it is a fact that the parties of the extreme Left enjoy a preponderating influence in the Committee and in the armed forces under its direction. If during the vacuum period disputes were to arise with the Government in Rome it might well lead to the repudiation of all the obligations into which the CLNAI have entered and even the establishment of an independent Government in open hostility to the Government in Rome.

9. For this reason it is my belief that it is essential that, while making use of the CLN at the present time for the strengthening of resistance and after the enemy withdraws for the maintenance of order, we cannot afford to give them a formal authority which would stiffen them in their attitude towards Allied Military Government or the Italian Government. Signor Bonomi in a speech on the 17th December stated that the Government has now granted full powers to the Committee of National Liberation to give it the necessary authority to carry on the struggle until the final victory. This vague phrase I consider must be made more precise in any document to which the Italian Government are to be a party. I therefore strongly urge that the CLN be accorded no political recognition whatever by the Allies and

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that such recognition as they may be given by the Italian Government should be limited to their acceptance as the co-ordinating body of the forces opposed to Fascism in the North. At the same time they must be required to sign an undertaking to recognise the authority of the Italian Government on the lines which I have already indicated, *if further recognition*

Prepared by Mr. W. L. d'A. Hopkinson
Political Section, Allied Commission

18 December 1944.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner

APC 394

MINUTES OF A MEETING HELD AT HQ ALLIED COMMISSION ON 17 DECEMBER 1944 TO DISCUSS AGREEMENTS TO THE PROPOSED TRI-PARTITE AGREEMENT BETWEEN SACRED, ITALIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE C.I.N.A.I.

PRESENT: Chief Commissioner, Chief of Staff, Lt. Col. Playdell-Bouverie (for General Stawell), Lt. Col. Jackling for G-3, Messrs. Hopkinson and Schott, Major de Haan (for No. 1 Special Force), and Major Timmons for Finance Subcommittee AG.

PAGE- NUMBER	PARA	MATTER OF AGREEMENT	ITEMS DISCUSSED AND DECISION TAKEN
1	1	The delegates consider it essential that C.I.N.A.I. should be recognized as the agent of the Italian Government; both by the Italian Government and the SAC.	Lt. Col. Playdell-Bouverie stated that on military grounds S.O.M. were in favor of the amendment, and that G3 (Special Ops) viewed the changes as essentially political. He could not see why the recognition should not be reciprocal. Admiral Stone pointed out that, the functions of the AG being limited, the opinions of the American and British Governments were being sought by their respective embassies, and that no further discussion on this point was profitable till these arrived.
2	2	Re-wording of Para.	Admiral Stone suggested that since the change was not insisted on, and the first draft had already been submitted to London and Washington it was undesirable to amend unless for very good reason--which there was not. This was agreed.
3	4	To delete the reference to a "Political Head" of the C.I.N.A.I.	Admiral Stone agreed that the words "Political Head" might more properly be replaced by "Chairman" or "President". However such the delegates might deny that they

PROPOSED
AMEND-
MENT

PAGE

NATURE OF
AMENDMENT

3 4 (continued)

VIEWS EXPRESSED AND DECISION TAKEN

had a "chairman" this was disproved by the de facto leadership of Sr. Longhi. Nor could the Italian Government be expected to recognize as agents a committee the members of which could be changed over-night and replaced by men they had never heard of.

To read: "Such authority and such powers of local government and administration as the Allied Military Government chooses to assume."

Admiral Stone pointed out the fallacy in such wording since there was no choice about Field Marshal Alexander's assumption of authority. It was absolute.

Col. Bouverie thought that the amendment arose from the desire of the committee to put on record their desire to co-operate in A.M.B., and that they wished to be able to produce evidence of this on their return to Northern Italy.

Admiral Stone proposed that, to meet this, a letter be given them (as a separate document) under Stimson's signature, quoting A.C.'s current instructions to officers in the field for their guidance in the choice and selection of Italian officials.

Col. Bouverie thought this would satisfy the delegates.

5 5 omission of the words "including such orders to disarm and surrender their arms when required to do so."

Amendment withdrawn.

No discussion.

6 6 Delegates wished to be paid by the government rather than by allies.

Admiral Stone pointed out that in the long run this would be the case whatever happened, and that in the short run they were bound to act against their own interests since the allies could be relied upon to pay more promptly than the Italian Government. In this matter, however, he said

100-100000

NAME OF
SUBJECT

THE HUNTER AND THE HUNTED

6 6 (continued)

that he had no strong views, but that Mr. Broad must
rather represent the views of Mr. Macmillan in his
own capacity.

7 6 Words "through them" to be
substituted for "in command with
them".

Admiral Storr pointed out that by signing such a clause,
No. 1 Special Force would be precluded from dropping
stores to an independent land, when they sight at a
later date wish to support, without such supplies going
through the control of the G.I.I.I.

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Confidential

17 December 1944

RECOMMENDATION ON RECOGNITION OF C.I.S.A.I.

1. Comments on General Hensell's Memorandum

- (4) Allied Commission cannot agree (1) to the word "Agent"; (2) to omission of recognition by Italian Government by C.I.S.A.I. Reasons will be given to Hensell at meeting.
- (8) Original draft to remain. The trend of the new draft is the recognition of C.I.S.A.I. as an independent body.
- (9) Insist on retention. Reasons as in (b).
- (4) and reasons all powers and authority. It is such that to be explicit now as to surrender of arms in order to avoid any misunderstanding. Establishment of ICI and surrender of arms are simultaneous.
- (6) I think we had much better leave the financial details in the agreement.
- (7) We are not so much concerned with the payment of the C.I.S.A.I. as the proper distribution of funds. The amount is a very large one.
- (8) As the C.I.S.A.I. are under command of Hensell I see no reason why there should not be a unilateral clause in the agreement.

2. The whole approach to this matter appears to me to be wrong. If the delegates of the C.I.S.A.I. wish to make any political proposals then they should be discussed between the Allied Commission, Italian Government and themselves, with Commander, still holding a working brief to see that military responsibilities are safeguarded. The present approach is that Commander, still is carrying on political discussions with the delegates on matters in which they are not interested.

1683

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(6) I think we had much better leave the financial details in the agreement.

(7) We are not so much concerned with the prestige of the C.I.N.A.F. as the proper distribution of funds. The amount is a very large one.

(8) As the C.I.N.A.F. are under command of MACVUM I see no reason why there should not be a unilateral clause in the agreement.

2. The whole approach to this matter appears to me to be wrong. If the delegates of the C.I.N.A.F. wish to make any political proposals then the matter should be discussed between the Allied Commission, Italian Government and themselves, with Commander, 304 holding a watching brief to see that military responsibilities are safeguarded. The present approach is that Commander, 304 is carrying on political discussions with the delegates on matters in which they are only indirectly concerned. The whole trend of the delegates' views is one of completely independent action once liberation has been effected. Their suggestions appear to me to have the most dangerous tendency and if, as I am bound to admit, they are supported by his Liaison Officers, we shall have to face a very grave problem.

3. I think it is essential that Liaison Officers be instructed to abide by the terms of the original directive which was sent to them and that any agreement with the C.I.N.A.F. be kept within the limits of the first draft.

R

ENC/21.

Subscribed,
Chief of Staff.

CONFIDENTIAL

Are the military objectives

which may be achieved by
agreement to the new draft

so important that the
danger of the political aspect
can be risked.

I should have thought NOT,
but I don't know what
you think

1838

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Can be noted

I should have thought Not,

but I didn't know what

by 3 think

5

Indication
of the time

TOP SECRET

REF ID: A661177

at SON Liaison Staff,

A. F. N. S.

14th December, 1944

Subject: Occupation of O. S. Italy
by the Italian Government.

Confidential

To: Chief of Staff,
A. F. N. S.

1. The bilateral agreement recently signed between Germany and the Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy (C.N.L.I.) will certainly assist the C.N.L.I. to develop the process of resistance in occupied Italy, but it is suggested that if these forces are to be developed to the full, it is essential that the Italian Government should recognize the C.N.L.I. as its agent in occupied territory.
2. The C.N.L.I. are the shadow of the Italian Government in occupied Italy. They have found together the anti-Fascist movement to lay down policies until the country is clear of the Germans and the Fascists. The Italian Government should only be an Government in Italy and that in the Government represented by the Allies. The Committee suggest that the Italian Government will increase its position in North Italy through the recognition of the C.N.L.I. and the formation of their own field that they will gradually increase their authority through their administration in the Italian Government. It would seem that there is a clear case of a resistance movement in Italy to be formed and which should be subject to the authority of the Italian Government.
3. The main arguments on the military side for the recognition of the C.N.L.I. are as follows:

2. The C.I.V. I.F. are the chiefs of the Italian Government in occupied Italy. They have fused together the anti-Fascist parties into one organization, and as far as we can judge are prepared to lay aside politics until the coming to power of the Germans and the Fascists. The conditions of the Italian Government will be very different in Italy and that is the fundamental principle of the alliance. The conditions suggest that the Italian Government will increase its activities in North Italy through the suspension of the C.I.V. I.F. and the Fascists on their part feel that they will greatly increase their activity through their association with the Italian Government. It would seem that there are now a clear case of a resistance movement which is unified and which wishes to accept the authority of the local government.

3. The main arguments to the military side for the introduction of the C.I.V. I.F. are the result of the Italian Government in particular Italy are as follows:-

- (a) Disruption within the organization will be greatly strengthened. The various sub-conditions will act with a due sense of their responsibility and they will be held responsible for their actions by their Government.
- (b) German losses by the conditions in the case of the Italian Government will carry weight and must be considered. Many measures are likely to be carried into activity, with-out much and other measures of resistance will be more effective.
- (c) Action against the Fascists will be considerably strengthened and the organization will get a measure of protection against reprisals by the Fascists.

1338

/ (6) Results in.....

Declassified E.O. 12958 Section 3.3/NND No. 785617

- 2 - Confidential

- (a) Warlike in occupied territory will be raised and the prestige of the Italian Government will be strengthened when Italian realize that their Government is helping them in their fight. In this connection it is most advisable that the Italian Government should provide the necessary financial backing.
- (b) It will be easier to obtain the necessary credits from the banks in occupied territory. The distribution and accumulation of funds will be more strictly controlled if it is realized that all consumed will be held to account by their own Government.
- (c) Purchase and/or requisition of necessary stores, equipment, food, etc., necessary for maintenance measures will be facilitated.
- (d) It is suggested therefore that no more be discussed and participating, every effort be made to effect an agreement with the U.S.A. on the part of the Italian Government in occupied territory.

W. Starnes

W. Starnes, Maj. Gen.
Quartermaster

1689

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

It is suggested therefore that the new administrative
arrangements, every effort be made to effect an agreement
regarding the U.S.S.R. as the agent of the Russian Government
in occupied territory.

H. Starnes

Headquarters U.S. Army
Central Office

General: 0-3
0-5
NORTH
US POLAR
A.C. ✓
H.A. 202
out London.

COPY NO. 12...

THE SECRETARY

NO. 100

DATE 9/11/72

Confidential

Subject: Recommendation of C.I.N.S. 1.

To: L.S. & P.D.

APPROV.

Attached are two copies of drafts Nos. 1 and 2 of the proposed Trip-Lite Agreement between the Supreme Allied Commander, the Italian Government and the C.I.N.S. 1. Draft No. 1 is an exact copy of the original proposal that was agreed by the Political Committee, 1970. Draft No. 2 is a copy of the text which the delegates prefer to sign.

1. The first major alteration is in Para 1, of the original text (Draft No. 1). The delegates consider it essential that the C.I.N.S. 1 should be recognized as the agent of the Italian Government both by the Italian Government and by the Supreme Allied Commander. They do not consider that there is any reason why they, who are seeking recognition from the Italian Government, should themselves recognize it, and they believe that by seeking recognition from it they are acknowledging its authority.

2. The delegates consider that Para 2 of Draft No. 1 is better worded than Para 2 of Draft No. 2, and would therefore prefer to sign that. Since the meeting is the same they do not insist on the change.

the proposed draft with agreement between the Italian Government and the C.I.A. 4.1. Draft No. 1 is an exact copy of the original proposed text as agreed by the Political Committee, 4.1. Draft No. 2 is a copy of the text which the delegates prefer to sign.

1. The first major alteration is in Para 1. of the original text (Draft No. 1). The delegates consider it essential that the C.I.A. should be recognized as the agent of the Italian Government both by the Italian Government and by the Supreme Allied Commander. They do not consider that there is any reason why they, who are seeking recognition from the Italian Government, should themselves recognize it; and they believe that by seeking recognition from it they are acknowledging its authority.

2. The delegates consider that Para 2. of Draft No. 2 is better worded than Para 2. of Draft No. 1 and would therefore prefer to sign that. Since the meaning is the same they do not insist on the change.

3. It is necessary to delete the reference to a "political House of the C.I.A." in Para 4.1. The word of the C.I.A. is not a political figure and is only acceptable to all parties because he does not represent any political party.

4. A further comment on which the delegates insist is in Para 3. of Draft No. 1. That is the meaning in the second sentence "such authority and such power of local government and administration as the Allied Military Government chooses to assume".

It is the earnest wish of the delegates that at the time of the study withdrawal, the C.I.A. will be allowed by the Allied Military Government to continue to perform these functions which it has shown itself capable of performing. The new phrase "power of local government" should leave any final decision to the discretion of the Allies.

1.3.34

15.....

Confidential

5. The document suggests that the final words of Para 5. of Draft No. 1 should be omitted from the document, that is the words: "including such orders to disarm and surrender their arms when required to do so". They state that they are prepared to sign an agreement containing such a clause, but that they object to it for the following reasons:
- (a) that it implies distrust on the part of the other signatories;
 - (b) that in any case it is implicit in the preceding words: "and will obey orders issued by him or by the Allied Military Government on his behalf".
 - (c) that it is unwise deliberately to draw attention to this attack on a situation which, because it has given rise to such problems in other liberated territories, is delicate in the extreme.

6. It is considered by the document that Para 6. should not contain any more than a general reference to financial arrangements, as this is essentially a political and military agreement. They would prefer to the financial details to appear in a separate tripartite agreement. They do not however insist on this point.

7. In Para 6. the words "whereas they must be substituted for 'in common with them' is the provision of the clause as recommended is to be upheld.

8. The original Para 7. of Draft No. 1 is inaccurately to the document as being unilaterally and in favour of the signatories under a single line to co-operate with and support the Allies. This point was, in fact, clarified in the letter addressed to G.A. by the Supreme Allied Commander on 7 December 1944 and the proposed Para 7. confirms it.

It is considered by the Government that the
should not contain any more than a few
minutes of the subject. The Government is
not at all ready to do it. They will be
informed in a few days. It appears to be
impossible. They do not know what to do.

In Para 6, the words "whereupon they" must be substituted for "in concert with them" in the phrase as the GHQ is a recognized body in its own right.

The original Para 7, of Draft No. 1 is unacceptable to the delegation as being unilateral, and in placing allied missions under an obligation to co-operate with the support of the GHQ. This point was, in fact, clarified in the letter addressed to GHQ by the Supreme Allied Command on 7 December 1944 and the phrase was Par 7, rephrased.

[illegible][illegible]

785017

1603

DRAFT NO. 1.

~~Confidential~~ ~~SECRET~~

COPY OF A DRAFT GIVEN TO MR. LONGHI BY MAJOR GENERAL STANLEY
ON 21st DECEMBER 1944.

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER
MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE OF OPERATIONS, THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT,
AND THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION FOR NORTHERN ITALY.

1. The Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy (CLNAI) is recognized by the Italian Government as the established body representing the anti-fascist parties in enemy occupied Italian territory. The CLNAI for its part accepts the Italian Government recognized by the Allied Government as the successor of the Italian Government which signed the armistice terms, and as the sole legitimate authority in that part of Italy which has now been and may hereafter be handed over to the Italian Government by the Allied Military Government.
2. The Supreme Allied Commander and the Italian

as the established body representing the anti-fascist parties in enemy occupied Italian territory. The CLMARI for its part accepts the Italian Government recognized by the Allied Government as the successor of the Italian Government which signed the armistice terms, and as the sole legitimate authority in that part of ITALY which has now been and may hereafter be handed over to the Italian Government by the Allied Military Government.

2. The Supreme Allied Commander and the Italian Government wish the utmost military co-operation to be established and maintained among the elements which are active in the Resistance movement. The CLMARI will establish and maintain such co-operation as will bring together all active elements in the resistance movement whether they belong to the CLMARI anti-fascist parties or to other anti-fascist organizations.

3. During the period of enemy occupation the GENERAL COMMAND OF THE VOLUNTEERS OF LIBERTY (being the military

Confidential

- 2 -

command of the CLMII will, on behalf of the CLMII, carry out all instructions of the Commander-in-Chief, CLMII, acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander. It is in general the wish of the Supreme Allied Commander and the Italian Government that particular care should be given to all measures which will safeguard the economic resources of the territory against searching, demolitions and like deprivations by the enemy.

4. The Military Head of the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty (being the military command of the CLMII) must be an officer acceptable to the Commander-in-Chief, and acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander. The Political Head of the CLMII will be a person acceptable to the Italian Government.

5. When the enemy withdraws from territory occupied by them the CLMII will exercise its best endeavors to maintain law and order and to continue the safeguarding of the economic resources of the country until such time as Allied Military Government is established. Immediately upon the establishment of Allied Military Government CLMII will relinquish all its duties.

in-Chief, and acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander. The Political Head of the CSMAR will be a person acceptable to the Italian Government.

5. When the enemy withdraws from territory occupied by them the CSMAR will exercise its best endeavors to maintain law and order and to continue the safeguarding of the economic resources of the country until such time as Allied Military Government is established. Immediately upon the establishment of Allied Military Government CSMAR will recognize Allied Military Government and will hand over to that Government all authority and powers of local Government and administration previously assumed. As the enemy withdraws all components of the GENERAL COMMAND OF THE VOLUNTEERS OF LIBERTY in liberated territory will come under direct command of the Commander-in-Chief, and acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander, and will obey any order issued by him or by the Allied Military Government on his behalf, including such orders to disarm and surrender their arms, when required to do so.

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Confidential

- 3 -

6. During the period of enemy occupation of Northern ITALY the utmost maintenance will be given to the GLMEL in common with all other anti-fascist organizations, to meet the needs of their members who are engaged in opposing the enemy in occupied territory; monthly contributions not exceeding 160 million lire will be made in the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander to meet the expenses of the GLMEL and all other anti-fascist organizations.

Subject to the general control of the Commander-in-Chief, All, acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander, this sum will be apportioned in the following areas in the following ratio for the support of all anti-fascist organizations in these areas:-

LIGURIA	20
PIEMONTE	60
LOMBARDIA	45
EMILIA	20
VENETO	35

The above sum and allocations will be subject to variation according to the requirements of the military situation; the various sums will be reduced or increased

the following areas in the following ratio for the support of all anti-fascist organizations in these areas:-

LIIGURIA	20
PIEMONTE	60
LOMBARDIA	25
EMILIA	20
VENETO	35

The above and allocations will be subject to variation according to the requirements of the military situation; the medium was will be reduced proportionately as and when provinces are liberated.

7. Allied Missions attached to the GLHI, to the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty, or to any of their components, will be consulted by them in all matters relating to armed resistance, anti-secrecy and maintenance of order. Orders issued by the Commander-in-Chief, GLI, under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander and transmitted through the missions concerned will to be carried out by GLHI, the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty and their components.

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DRAFT NO. 2.

Confidential

TOP SECRET.

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER,
MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE OF OPERATIONS, THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT,
AND THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION FOR NORTHERN ITALY.

1. The Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy (CLNAI) is recognized by the Italian Government and by the Supreme Allied Commander as the agent of the Italian Government exercising political and administrative powers in the territories occupied by the enemy in Northern Italy until the arrival of the Allied Armies.
2. The CLNAI has the task of coordinating the activities of all anti-Fascist forces, including those of the anti-Fascist forces outside the political parties actually represented in the CLNAI. The CLNAI will consider as its primary task the establishment of the maximum accord and co-operation between all active elements participating in the common struggle against the enemy.

pieces in the territories occupied by the enemy in Northern Italy until the arrival of the Allied armies.

2. The CLNAI has the task of co-ordinating the activities of all anti-Fascist forces, including those of the anti-Fascist forces outside the political parties actually represented in the CLNAI. The CLNAI will consider as its primary task the establishment of the maximum solidarity and co-operation between all active elements participating in the common struggle against the enemy.

3. During the period of enemy occupation the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty (being the Military Command of the CLNAI) will, on behalf of the CLNAI, carry out all instructions of the Commander-in-Chief, 641, acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander. It is in general the wish of the Supreme Allied Commander and the Italian Government that particular care should be given to all measures which will safeguard the economic resources of the territory against搜掠, demolitions, and like depredations by the enemy.

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Confidential

4. The Military Head of the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty must be an officer acceptable to the Commander-in-Chief, all, acting, under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander. *The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall be consulted in all cases.*
5. When the enemy withdraws from territory occupied by them, the CLMIL will exercise its best endeavor to maintain law and order and to continue the functioning of the economic resources of the country until such time as Allied Military Government is established. Immediately upon the establishment of Allied Military Government, the CLMIL will transfer all Allied Military Government and will hand over to that Government such authority and such power of local government and administration as the Allied Military Government chooses to assume. As the enemy withdraws the Corps of the Volunteers of Liberty in liberated territory will come under direct command of the Commander-in-Chief, all, acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander, and will obey any order issued by him or by the Allied Military Government on his behalf.

6. During the period of enemy occupation of territory

Under the administration of Allied Military Government, the CIMA will receive Allied Military Government and will have over to that Government such authority and such powers of local government and administration as the Allied Military Government chooses to assume. As the enemy withdraws the Corps of the Volunteers of Liberty in liberated territory will come under direct command of the Commander-in-Chief, all, acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander, and will obey any order issued by him or by the Allied Military Government on his behalf.

6. During the period of enemy occupation of Northern Italy the utmost financial and material assistance will be given by the Italian Government to the CIMA and through them to all other anti-Fascist organizations in order to meet the needs of their members who are engaged in opposing the enemy in occupied territory.

7. Allied Missions attached to the CIMA, to the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty, or to any of their components, will be made aware of the 1332

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

recognition of the CMAH by the Italian Government and by the Supreme Allied Commander and with the other terms of this agreement, and will be instructed to consult, say CTV, and co-operate fully with the CMAH and its representatives. The CMAH, the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty, and any of their component units, on the other hand, consult those Allied Headquarters in all matters relating to armed resistance, sabotage, etc., in the maintenance of order, and will carry out such instructions as are transmitted through them by the Commander-in-Chief, AII, acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander.

6. This agreement enables the Headquarters of Agreement between the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre of Operations and the Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy signed on 7th December, 1944.

Supreme Allied

Commander, Mediterranean

Theatre of Operations

For the Italian

1675

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under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander.

8.

This agreement shall be the Memorandum of Agreement between the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre of Operations, and the Committee of National Liberation for Northern ITALY signed on 7th December, 1944.

Supreme Allied

Commander, Mediterranean

Theatre of Operations

For the Italian

Government

For the Committee

of National Liberation for

Northern ITALY

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CONFIDENTIAL
1944.

MEMORANDUM BY THE CIVIL DELEGATION.

The CIVIL Delegation request that in the Tripartite agreement with the Allied Supreme Command and with the Italian Government, no explicit mention should be made of the "distancing of Partisans and of the handing over of arms" - vide last sentence, Paragraph 5, of the bi-lateral agreement - for the following reasons :-

1. The agreement may be made public, and nothing can discourage the Bands and reduce their fighting potentiality more than the prospect of being distanced and disarmed.
2. The inclusion of that point would reduce the moral value of the document as a support for the prestige of the CIVIL, of the Cite of the Volunteers of Liberty, and especially of its central command.
3. The problem of the future of the CIV is undoubtedly one of the most important and most delicate for the resistance movement in Northern Italy. The CIVIL Delegation have to see their best in every concession to preserve the spirit.

can disorganize, the enemy and reduce their fighting potentiality more than the prospect of being disarmed and dispersed.

2. The inclusion of that point would reduce the moral value of the document as a support for the prestige of the CVL. If the Corps of the Volunteers of Liberty, and especially if its general command.

3. The problem of the future of the CVL is undoubtedly one of the most important and most delicate for the resistance movement in Northern Italy. The CVL's Delegation have done their best in every occasion to convince the Allied authorities of the advantage of using the Partisan forces in the war against Germany and in the suppression of the Fascist Guerrilla. They have also stressed the necessity for proceeding, in time, to the mobilization of the Partisans in a gradual and rational manner, in close agreement with the responsible leaders of the movement and in taking advantage of their authority.

These leaders, with the formula that the "General

Command of the CVL in liberated territory will come under

1330

- 2 - Confidential

the direct command of the Commander-in-Chief " contained in the agreement in question, already pledged themselves to execute loyally all the orders that the Supreme Allied Command may give, including that of disbanding and disarming the Partisans.

Furthermore, they request that the description of "disbanding and disarming" should not be put at this stage in a form that would crush or weaken the hopes of the CLMCL or the CVL, that the Allied authorities will adopt the point of view expressed above.

In any case it does not seem that the best way of obtaining the discipline and obedience requested by the Supreme Allied Command from the Partisan forces is to confront them abruptly with the bleak prospect of being disbanded and disarmed.

THE CLMCL DELEGATION

(Sgd)

FILIPPO LONCHI
.....

Supreme Allied Command from the Partisan forces in the
confront them abruptly with the bleak prospect of being
disbanded and dispersed.

THE CLINT DELEGATION

(Sgt)	PIETRO LONGHI...
"	KARLHARTIG...
"	SOGNO...

1328

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

1-6-79

SECRET
Confidential

REF. 3831/71/001

15 December 1944

AIDE MEMOIRE FOR CHIEF COMMISSIONER.

1. Instances have occurred recently in which, at the initiation of Commander, S.O.M.F.O. and No. 1 Special Force, matters connected with the C.L.N.A.I. in North Italy and affecting the Italian Government have been discussed without previous reference to the Allied Commission and in the absence of representatives of the Allied Commission. At a meeting on 23 November under the chairmanship of SACRED the recognition of the C.L.N.A.I. was brought up. This resulted in a meeting at the Allied Commission in which a draft agreement, which could either be bi-lateral or tripartite, was agreed upon for submission to SACRED. SACRED in fact signed the bi-lateral agreement but since then Commander, S.O.M.F.O. has pressed for recognition of the C.L.N.A.I. by the Italian Government as their agent in the North and the signing of a tri-partite agreement.
2. It is admitted that so long as the military side of S.O.M.F. activities are safeguarded, the political aspect of the partisan movement and the C.L.N.A.I. as it relates to the Italian Government must be left to the Allied Commission. That is to say that matters of policy should be referred by Commander, S.O.M.F.O. to the Allied Commission either directly or through his representatives in Rome. The matter of the recognition of the C.L.N.A.I. by the Italian Government is a question for serious consideration by the Allied Commission for it affects not only the Italian Government and its relations with the C.L.N.A.I. when Northern Italy is liberated but it affects also the Allied Military Government and its relations with the C.L.N.A.I. immediately on liberation. It may well be that the C.L.N.A.I. may read into official recognition by the Italian Government a measure of authority which would militate against their full acceptance and cooperation with AMG when set up.
3. These and cognate matters which affect the Italian Government should, it is admitted, be referred to the Allied Commission for prior consideration and possible consultation with the Italian Government at political meetings.

ALLIED **Confidential**

Inter Service and Political Secretariat

13th December, 1944.

Brigadier W.A. Lush,
Allied Commission

15 DEC 1944

SUBJECT:- Agreement with Italian Partisans

Reference conversation Brigadier Lush - Colonel Lascelles today's date.

65 It appears that Major General Stawell is at present at MONOPOLI with the CLMAI delegates who have not yet returned to the North of Italy. He has already taken up with them the question of the tri-partite agreement on the basis circulated under Paper No. PC (44) 144 and they have certain objections to the phrasing - one of which concerns the first paragraph which you mentioned. It appears that they regard the existing phrasing as conferring no recognition at all, and that they wish to be recognised as the agents of the Italian Government in Northern Italy.

Major General Stawell will be returning to this Headquarters on Saturday 16th December and will be proceeding to England next Tuesday 19th December. It is suggested that a fully briefed representative of the Allied Commission be at this headquarters on the morning of Sunday 17th December in order that any differences of view on the Allied side regarding the text of the proposed tri-partite agreement may be finally settled before General Stawell's departure.

J. M. Lascelles
J. M. LASCELLES
COLONEL
SECRETARY.

Monday 11.00 hrs

CONF.

SECRET

Dec 44

EXTRACT FROM MINUTES OF SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE (POLITICAL MEETING) HELD ON SATURDAY,
9 DECEMBER, 1944—Ref: PG(44) 35th Meeting of
10th December, 1944.

(Original on File 6509/COS).

MINUTE No. 8.

Confidential

8. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS.

(Paper No. PG (44) 144 and Annexure).

THE COMMITTEE had before them a record of a meeting held by the Chief of Staff at which there had been drawn up a draft memorandum of agreement between the Supreme Allied Commander, the Italian Government and the Committee of National Liberation for Northern ITALY (CLNAI). The agreement had been so drafted that, by the omission of certain passages, it could be converted into a bilateral agreement between the Supreme Allied Commander and the CLNAI. The annexure to this paper described how, in view of the delay that would be necessary before the new Italian Government could sign the agreement and the urgent need of the CLNAI delegates to return to Northern Italy, the Supreme Allied Commander had decided to proceed immediately with the bilateral agreement and to return the delegation. It was reported to the Committee that this agreement had subsequently been signed and that it was hoped that the agreement of the Italian Government to convert it into a tripartite agreement would be secured at a later date.

THE COMMITTEE took note of the above.

1683

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

72

Tel. 735

Ref. 3201/72/008

14 December 1944

SUBJECT: Patriots.

TO : FRO

1. Attached is a draft submitted by Land Forces S/O (MIA) as a counter to the incorrect statement which appeared in the Stars and Stripes issue dated 29 Nov 44.

2. It is requested that you submit draft of a letter to "Stars and Stripes" covering this statement.

[Signature]
Chief Staff Officer,
To the Chief of Staff.

1320

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 1.3/MND No. 785017

3201

Subject: Recd 110g of Patriots
for alien Army.

CONFIDENTIAL

Land Forces Sub Com., AD.
(M.M.I.A.)

TS/O/19

12 Dec 44

18 DEC 1944

Chief of Staff
H.Q., A.C.

Reference your letter Ref/3807/69/008 dated 7 Dec 44.

Attached is short draft of what is considered suitable
for publication in the Press.

see P2

J. M. G. L. G. L. G. L.
Major General,
M.M.I.A.

1324

1683
Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Ref/3201/56/008.

Tel : 795

7 December 1944

SUBJECT : Recruiting of Patriots for Italian Army.

TO : Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMA) 65

1. Thank you for your letter TL/6/19 of 3 December 44.
2. In view of your remarks the Chief Commissioner considers it would be better to send to "Stars and Stripes" an accurate account of the patriot recruiting situation rather than a despatch.
3. Will you please submit draft of a statement suitable for forwarding to "Stars and Stripes."

M. S. LUSH

Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

1363

BU
12
12
-H. Lush
12

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785617

Italian Partisans Recruited For Army

ROME, May 26—Partisan forces now in liberated positions will be allowed to join the regular Italian army, Italian military authorities announced today, adding that recruiting centers have already been opened.

Partisan forces will be allowed to join the regular army in their own areas where possible. It was said military forces recruited to regular army units will undergo a period of training to familiarize them with the use of modern equipment.

The decision, said military authorities, is in response to the expressed demands of the Partisans for an opportunity to continue their struggle for the liberation of Italy. In further testimony to this trend, a spokesman said, Partisan forces will be asked to join the Italian army organizations will be attached to advance Allied units as far as to be able to contact Partisan bands in early-war territory as soon as possible.

More than 200,000 have been recruited, particularly in Tuscany, Umbria, Marche and Abruzzi.

1X01
SECRET

SUBJECT: Recruits of Partisans for Italian Army.

Confidential Forces Sub-Com. A.C.
TS/MA/19
3 Dec 44

4 DEC 1944

TO : Chief of Staff A.C.

60

Ref your XMM/IRD dated 27 Nov.

1. I am shocked to read the "Stars and Stripes" article. It is completely false and completely contrary to our policy, as you know.
2. I have enquired of the Ministry of War and they know nothing as to where the information came from to the "Stars and Stripes". They did not give it.
3. My staff also enquired the source from the "Stars and Stripes". The latter, after much talk, were not able to produce the original, but only a translation of the original - which is understood to have been an undated typed draft purporting to have come from M of W.
4. The whole business stinks of political misdeeds on someone. I think the "Stars and Stripes" should be taken to task for issuing such a statement without proper check or authority, particularly on a subject which is notoriously controversial with political implications.
5. As regards the document:

(a) I think we have never yet stated specifically in the Press that Patriots are NOT allowed to enlist as whole hands.

(b) If we specifically say so now, we incriminate ourselves.

3. My staff also acquired the source from the "Stars and Stripes". The latter, after much talk, were not able to produce the original, but only a translation of the original - which is understood to have been an unaltered typed draft purporting to have come from K of K.

4. The whole business stinks of political maneuver somewhere. I think the "Stars and Stripes" should be taken to task for issuing such a statement without proper check or authority, particularly on a subject which is notoriously controversial with political implications.

5. As regards the document -

(a) I think we have never yet stated specifically in the Green that Patriots are NOT allowed to enlist as whole bands.

(b) If we specifically say so now, we lay ourselves open to a press campaign to ask, "why not?"

(c) I think we do not want this and to have to explain that we wish to avoid any suspicion or chance of the introduction of political "cells" into the Army, which would lay the seeds of future army internal strife. The Army must be completely neutral. Maybe that is what the people who had the statement inserted in the "Stars and Stripes" want to do, so as to mix political capital out of it.

(d) Perhaps, therefore, we should word the document carefully, but vaguely, without being too specific. We should, I think, bring out the following:-

- (1) That the information the "Stars and Stripes" feebly acted on was not official and that in fact, no military authorities (Italian or British) authorized it.

1322

Confidential

5. (d) (contd)

(15) that recruiting centers for patriots have been in being for months according to an agreed policy, whereby any patriot can volunteer to join the Regular Army.

(16) that, like any other soldier, no guarantee can be given to any patriot as to where he will serve or what job will be allotted to him on induction. This is total war and a lorry driver is pulling his weight in his own sphere just as much as a soldier in the front line is in his.

(17) that the "Stars and Stripes" with regrets having issued a statement which gives a false impression.

1/10/1947

Major General
M.H.B.

see 69

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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ser

Major General
U.S.A.

COPY.

SECRET.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS.

PC(44)144 - Annexure.
5 December 1944.

K 504

Confidential

POLITICAL COMMITTEE.

RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS.

Note by Secretary.

1. In accordance with Conclusion (b) of Paper No. PC(44)144 dated 30th November, the delegation from the Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy (CLNAI) have been detained in Rome. It would now appear however, that there is likely to be some delay before a new Italian Government is formed, and further delay before the proposal for the recognition of the CLNAI can be submitted to the new government when formed.
2. G-2 in a recent appreciation gave the opinion that the enemy may evacuate Northwest Italy this month. It is apparent, therefore, that no time West Italy are to be effective.
3. The delegation feel that they should return, if not to Italy, at any rate to SWITZERLAND. They feel that their prolonged absence at this critical juncture may be mis-constructed by their adherents in Northern Italy. Time is needed to distribute the funds authorized by the Supreme Allied Commander, and generally to make the money work. Also plans for anti-aircraft are held up pending the return of Signor PAKI, the military member of the delegation.
4. The Supreme Allied Command has accordingly directed that Commander,
ACM:-
(a) Bring the delegation to APHQ, in order to sign on 6 December 1944 the bi-lateral form of agreement attached to Paper No. PC(44)144 dated 30 Nov 44.
(b) Subsequently arrange for the return of the delegation to Northern Italy at times and by means dictated by security. (The Chairman of the Committee is likely to remain in SWITZERLAND on his way to Northern Italy for some time, to complete financial arrangements).
5. The delegation are very disappointed that the primary object of their visit, namely, recognition by the Italian Government, has not as far been met but they hope that this may materialize in the future.

5. The delegation feel that they should return, if not to ITALY, at any rate to SWITZERLAND. They feel that their prolonged absence at this critical juncture may be mis-construed by their adherents in Northern ITALY. Time is needed to distribute the funds authorized by the Supreme Allied Commander, and generally to make the money work. Also plans for anti-aircraft are held up pending the return of Signor FAUZI, the military member of the delegation.

4. The Supreme Allied Command has accordingly directed that Commander, SCOM:-

(a) Bring the delegation to APHQ, in order to sign on 6 December 1944 the bi-lateral form of agreement attached to Paper No. PC(44)144 dated 30 Nov 44.

(b) Subsequently arrange for the return of the delegation to Northern ITALY at times and by means dictated by security. (The Chairman of the Committee is likely to remain in SWITZERLAND on his way to Northern ITALY for some time, to complete financial arrangements).

5. The delegation are very disappointed that the primary object of their visit, namely, recognition by the Italian Government, has not so far been achieved but they hope that this may materialise in the near future. In any case no announcement of such recognition could be made until they are safely back in North West ITALY and under cover. All that would then be required would be a radio announcement by the Italian Government.

6. It is therefore recommended that:-

(a) Conclusion (a) of Paper No. PC(44)144 dated 30 November 1944 should stand

(b) Commander, SCOM should secure the signature of the delegation to a document undertaking to accept the Italian Government's participation in a tripartite agreement if this can be secured on the terms set out in the draft attached to Paper No. PC(44)144 dated 30 November 1944.

(Sgd) J. H. LASHCHINS,
COLONEL
SECRETARY

See 72A

1693
Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 1.3/NND No. 785617

CONF.

SECRET.

633

Extract from Minutes of Supreme Allied
Commander's 34th Political Committee
Meeting held on Thursday, 30th November.

Ref: PC(44) 34th Meeting dated 1st Dec 44
(Original in File 6509).

Confidential

MINUTE No. 3.

3. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS.
(Previous references PC (44) 33rd Meeting - Minute 6).

LIEUTENANT GENERAL GAMMELL stated that the Allied Commission believed that the question of recognition of the Committee of National Liberation in Northern Italy had been one of the factors contributing to the Italian Cabinet crisis. Alternative tripartite and bilateral memoranda of agreement had now been drafted but no further action would be taken until the new Italian Cabinet had been formed and the Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission had reported as to the possibility of obtaining the Italian Government's adherence to the proposed agreement. The military advantages of their participation were considerable but might have to be over-ridden by political considerations, in which case the bilateral form of agreement between the Supreme Allied Commander and the Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy would be used. He added that on the recommendation of Commander, 3CM it was proposed to increase the monthly contribution to the Committee from 100 million lire to 160 million lire.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note with approval of the above.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

PC (44) 144
14th November 1944

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS.

K.430

SECRET
COPY NO.....

POLITICAL MEETING.

RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS.

RECORD OF A MEETING HELD AT THE
SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S OFFICE
FREDERICK ROBERT 1530 HOURS ON MON-
DAY 29th NOVEMBER 1944.

PRESENT:-

Lieut. General Sir James A.H. Gansell,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander.

Mr. P. Brind, representing
British Resident Minister

Major General W.A.M. Ramsell,
Commander, SSM TC.

Brigadier General C. Spofford,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

Colonel G.L. King,
G-3 Special Operations.

Colonel T.R. Mann,
Deputy Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5

Colonel F.T. Hammond,
G-5

Colonel J.R. Kings,
AAI.

Colonel Joseph Rodridge,
CWS

Major W.H. Subling,
AAI

Lieutenant A.R. Bullen,
G-5

ABSENT:-

Major W.E. Ross.

Brigadier General C. Spofford,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
Colonel G.L. King,
G-3 Special Operations.

Colonel T.E. Keen,
Deputy Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5

AAI.

Colonel Joseph Rodridge,
OSS

Major W.H. Stuhling,
AAI

Lieutenant A.M. Bullock,
G-5

SECRETARY:

Major W.E. Ross.

THE MEETING had before them:-

- (a) A third draft memorandum of agreement between the Supreme Allied Commander, the Italian Government and the Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy (CLNAI) - not fully concurred in by the U.S. Political Adviser, G-5 and the Allied Commission - arising out of PC(44) 33rd Meeting, conclusion 6.
- (b) A note by G-5 raising certain objections to the draft memorandum of agreement at (a) above.

BRIGADIER GENERAL SPOFFORD stated that Mr. Kirk and the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, who both had strong views on the proposed agreement, had been unable to come down from Rome for the meeting owing to the Italian Cabinet crisis. They had both pointed out however that a definite agreement could not be reached until there was a new Italian Government with which to discuss it and had also reported that recognition of the Patriot movement had been one of the factors contributing to the cabinet crisis. He understood that the Allied Commission was of the opinion that the Italian Government should not be a party to this agreement but that it should be a military instrument between the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER and the CLNAI.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL GARNELL proposed that the meeting should agree on two alternative memoranda, covering tripartite and bilateral agreements respectively.

See Auto 63C.

PA

-2- Confidential 636

He pointed out in a connection that no part of the assistance being employed by the Allied Governments to demand either the Italian Government's adherence to such an agreement or their recognition of the Partisan movement.

MAJOR GENERAL STANWELL observed that recognition of the movement by the Italian Government was most desirable since it was in a much stronger position than the Supreme Allied Commander to order industrialists and other wavers to cooperate. He estimated that the value of the agreement would be halved if the Italian Government were not a party to it. He urged that the monthly contributions be raised to a maximum of 160 million lire instead of the 100 million lire previously suggested, pointing out that even at the higher figure the cost of resistance would be cheaper than in other countries.

Replying to a question by Lieutenant General Gamsell, he stated that the funds would be supplied in Allied Military lire by the Deputy Paymaster in Chief, AFHQ to the Allied Commission who would in turn pass them over to the Italian Government for transfer in metropolitan lire to Northern Italy through banks and other agencies. Any sum which might be sent direct to the field by SOE/ONS would be part of the maximum monthly figure of 160 million lire. He agreed, therefore, with Lieutenant General Gamsell that it should be stated in the proposed agreement that the funds were being made available "on the authority of the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER".

COLONEL KIEP queried whether there might not be some difficulty over the proposed method of payment with the American financial authorities.

MR. BRAD stated that the Foreign Office were in favour of the proposed agreement but wished a clause inserted so as to safeguard any risk of the CLMCI coming under the control of a particular political party. He suggested, therefore, that a paragraph 4, reading as follows, be inserted in the draft agreement:

"The Military Head of the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty (being the Military Command of CLMCI) must be an officer acceptable to the Commander-in-Chief, AAI, acting under the authority of the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER. The Political Head of the CLMCI must be a person acceptable to the Italian Government".

MAJOR GENERAL STANWELL reported that the CLMCI delegates were anxious to return to occupied Italy as early as possible. If it was now proposed to await the formation of a new Italian Government it would be necessary either to hold Signor Longhi, much against his will, or to let him go, in which case his signature to the agreement, which was most desirable, would not be obtained.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF:-

(a) Instructed the Secretary:-

(1) To bring the draft agreement

MR. HECARD stated that the Foreign Office were in favour of the proposed agreement but wished a clause inserted so as to safeguard any risk of the CLNAI coming under the control of a particular political party. He suggested, therefore, that a paragraph 4, reading as follows, be inserted in the draft agreement:

"The Military Head of the General Commander of the Volunteers of Liberty (being the Military Command of CLNAI) must be an officer acceptable to the Commander-in-Chief, AAI, acting under the authority of the SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER. The Political Head of the CLNAI must be a person acceptable to the Italian Government".

MAJOR GENERAL STAVELL reported that the CLNAI delegates were anxious to return to occupied Italy as early as possible. If it was now proposed to await the formation of a new Italian Government it would be necessary either to hold Signor Longhi, much against his will, or to let him go, in which case his signature to the agreement, which was most desirable, would not be obtained.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF:-

(a) Instructed the Secretary:-

(i) To bring the draft memoranda of agreement as inserted in discussion (attached) before the first meeting of the Political Committee following the formation of a new Italian Government.

(ii) To send the amended draft agreements to the U.S. Political Adviser and the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission enquiring of them whether they wished to suggest any major modifications prior to their submission to the Political Committee.

(iii) To invite the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, to report to the Political Committee at its first meeting following the formation of a new Italian Government, as to the feasibility of obtaining the latter's adherence to the form of tripartite agreement proposed bearing in mind Major General Stavell's statement at "I" above.

(b) Directed that Commander, SCM ensure that Signor Longhi and other delegates of the CLNAI remain in liberated Italy until the signature of the proposed agreement and that he take all other steps to ensure that secrecy were observed regarding these negotiations.

(Sgd) W.E. MOSE,
MAJOR.

COPY.

SECRET

X 480

DEPT MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE 3 ARMY ALLIED
COMMANDER MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE OF OPERATIONS, THE ITALIAN
GOVERNMENT AND THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION FOR
NORTHERN ITALY.

~~Confidential~~

1. The Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy (CLNAI) is
recognised by the Italian Government as the established body representing
the anti-fascist parties in enemy occupied Italian territory. The CLNAI
for its part accepts the Italian Government recognised by the Allied
Governments as the successor of the Italian Government, which signed the
armistice terms and as the sole legitimate authority in that part of
Italy which has now been and may hereafter be handed over to the Italian
Government by the Allied Military Government.
2. The Supreme Allied Commander and the Italian Government wish the
utmost military cooperation to be established and maintained among the
elements which are active in the resistance movement. The CLNAI will
establish and maintain such cooperation as will bring together all active
elements in the resistance movement whether they belong to the CLNAI anti-
fascist parties or to other anti-fascist organizations.
3. During the period of enemy occupation the GENERAL COMMAND OF THE
VOLONTARIOS OF LIBERTY (being the military command of the CLNAI) will, on
behalf of the CLNAI, carry out all instructions of the Commander-in-Chief,
AAI, acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander. It is
in general the wish of the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER and the Italian Govern-

most military cooperation to be established and maintained among the elements which are active in the resistance movement. The CLNAI will establish and maintain such cooperation as will bring together all active elements in the resistance movement whether they belong to the CLNAI anti-fascist parties or to other anti-fascist organizations.

3. During the period of enemy occupation the GENERAL COMMAND OF THE VOLUNTEERS OF LIBERTY (being the military command of the CLNAI) will, on behalf of the CLNAI, carry out all instructions of the Commander-in-Chief, AAI, acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander. It is in general the wish of the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER and the Italian Government that particular care should be given to all measures which will safeguard the economic resources of the territory against scorching, demolitions and like depredation by the enemy.

4. The Military Head of the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty (being the military command of the CLNAI) must be an officer acceptable to the Commander-in-Chief, AAI, acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander. The Political Head of the CLNAI will be a person acceptable to the Italian Government.

5. When the enemy withdraws from territory occupied by them the CLNAI will exercise its best endeavours to maintain law and order and to continue the safeguarding of the economic resources of the country until such time as Allied Military Government is established. Immediately upon the establishment of Allied Military Government, CLNAI will recognize Allied Military Government and will hand

-2-

over to that Government all authority and powers previously assumed. As the enemy withdraws all elements of the SUPREMACY OF THE VOLUNTARIAN OF LIBERTY in liberated territory will come under direct command of the Commander-in-Chief, AAI, acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander, and will obey any order issued by him or by Allied Military Government on his behalf, including such orders to disarm and surrender their arms, when required to do so.

5. During the period of enemy occupation of Northern Italy the utmost assistance will be given to the CLMFI in common with all other anti-fascist organizations, to meet the needs of their members who are engaged in opposing the enemy in occupied territory; monthly contribution not exceeding 160 million lire will be made on the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander to meet the expenses of the CLMFI and all other anti-fascist organizations.

Subject to the general control of the Commander-in-Chief, AAI, acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander, this sum will be apportioned to the following areas in the following ratio for the support of all anti-fascist organizations in these areas:

LIGURIA.....	20
PIEMONTE.....	60
LAZIO.....	25
EMILIA.....	20
VENETO.....	35

The above sum and allocations will be subject to variation according to the requirements of the military situation; the maximum sum will be reduced proportionately as and when Provinces are liberated.

7. Allied Missions attached to the CLMFI in the

the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander, this sum will be apportioned to the following areas in the following ratio for the support of all anti-fascist organizations in those areas:

LIGURIA.....	20
PIEMONTE.....	60
LOMBARDIA.....	25
EMILIA.....	20
VENETO.....	35

The above sum and allocations will be subject to variation according to the requirements of the military situation; the maximum sum will be reduced proportionately as and when Provinces are liberated.

7. Allied Missions attached to the CLNAI, to the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty, or to any of their components, will be consulted by them in all matters relating to armed resistance, anti-sabotage and maintenance of order. Orders issued by the Commander-in-Chief, ALI, under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander and transmitted through the missions concerned will be carried out by CLNAI, the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty and their components.

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER
MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE OF OPERATIONS.....1315...

FOR THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT.....

FOR THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL
LIBERATION FOR NORTHERN ITALY.....

NOTE. PARAGRAPHS UNCHANGED WOULD BE OMITTED IF THE AGREEMENT WERE MADE ONLY BETWEEN
THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER AND THE CLNAI.

1702

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

CONFIDENTIAL

November 1944

28 NOV 1944

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I am enclosing a copy of the draft agreement on Patriots. The insertion "(by the Italian Government)" in the second line has been made in accordance with a suggestion of Mr. Kirk's for the purpose of having this point discussed at Caserta. If the insertion is approved, the parentheses would of course be removed in the final text.

I am requesting General Canali to postpone consideration of this agreement until next week's meeting in order that both Mr. Kirk and myself may be able to take part in the discussion.

Sincerely,

/s/ Henry W. Stone

HENRY W. STONE
Commodore, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Encl.

Sir Noel Charles, Bt., K.C.M.G.
The British Ambassador
British Embassy
24 Via II Settembre
Rome

cc: Political Section
Chief of Staff
'A' Files

1314

1314
23

TOP SECRET

DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN
COMMISSIONER EMILIO DI GIACOMO, CHIEF OF THE
GOVERNMENT AND THE COMMISSION OF NATIONAL LIBERATION FOR
NORTHERN ITALY

1. The Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy (C.N.L.I.) is recognized (by the Italian Government) as the established body representing anti-fascist parties in enemy occupied Italian territory. The C.N.L.I. for its part accepts the Italian Government, recognized by the Allied Governments as the successor to the Italian Government which signed the armistice terms, as the sole legitimate authority in that part of Italy which has now been and may hereafter be handed over to the Italian Government by the Allied Military Government.
2. The SUPREME ALLIED COMMISSION and the Italian Government with the utmost co-operation to be established and maintained among the elements which are active in the resistance movement. The C.N.L.I. will establish and maintain such co-operation as will bring together all active elements in the resistance movement whether they belong to the C.N.L.I. anti-fascist parties or to other anti-fascist organizations.
3. During the period of enemy occupation the SUPREME ALLIED COMMISSION OF LIGURIA (being the military command of the C.N.L.I.) will, on behalf of the C.N.L.I., carry out all instructions of the Commander-in-Chief, A.I.I. It is in general the wish of the SUPREME ALLIED COMMISSION and the Italian Government that particular care should be given to all measures which will

2. The SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER and the Italian Government wish the utmost co-operation to be established and maintained among the elements which are active in the resistance movement. The C.I.E.A.I. will establish and maintain such co-operation as will bring together all active elements in the resistance movement whether they belong to the C.I.E.A.I. anti-fascist parties or to other anti-fascist organizations.

3. During the period of enemy occupation the GENERAL COMMAND OF THE RESISTANCE OF LIBERTY (being the military command of the C.I.E.A.I.) will, on behalf of the C.I.E.A.I., carry out all instructions of the Commander-in-Chief, A.A.I. It is in general the wish of the SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER and the Italian Government that particular care should be given to all measures which will safeguard the economic resources of the territory against搜捕ing, demolition and line deprivation by the enemy.

4. When the enemy withdraws from territory occupied by them the C.I.E.A.I. will exercise its best endeavours to maintain law and order and to continue the safeguarding of the economic resources of the country until such time as Allied Military Government is established. Immediately upon the establishment of Allied Military Government, C.I.E.A.I. will recognize Allied Military Government and will hand over to that Government all authority and powers of local government and administration previously assumed. As the enemy withdraws all components of the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty in liberated territory will come under direct command of the Commander-in-Chief, A.A.I. and will obey any order issued by him or by Allied Military Government.

- 1 -
TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Confidential

on his behalf, including orders to disarm and surrender their arms, when required to do so.

5. During the period of enemy occupation of Northern Italy the utmost assistance will be given to the C.I.M.A.I. in common with all other anti-fascist organizations, to meet the needs of their members who are engaged in opposing the enemy in occupied territory; a monthly contribution not exceeding 100 million lire will be made to meet the expenses of the C.I.M.A.I. and all other anti-fascist organizations.

Subject to the general control of the Commander-in-Chief, A.S.I., this sum will be apportioned to the following areas in the following ratio for the support of all anti-fascist organizations in those areas:

LIURIA	12%
PIEMONTE	37%
LOMBARDIA	16%
EMILIA	16%
VENETO	13%

The above sum and allocations will be subject to variation according to the requirements of the military situation: the maximum sum will be reduced proportionately as and when Provinces are liberated.

6. Allied missions attached to the C.I.M.A.I., to the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty, or any of their components, will be requested in all matters connected with the execution of this agreement and in particular in matters relating to armed resistance, anti-aircraft, and maintenance of

LIBERIA 150
 PIEMONTE 370
 LOMBARDIA 16
 SARINIA 16
 VENETI 18

The above sum and allocations will be subject to variation according to the requirements of the military situation: the maximum sum will be reduced proportionately as and when Provinces are liberated.

6. Allied missions attached to the C.L.S.A.I., to the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty, or any of their components, will be consulted in all matters connected with the execution of this agreement and in particular to matters relating to armed resistance, anti-aircraft, and maintenance of order. Orders issued by the Commander-in-Chief, A.A.I. and transmitted through the missions concerned will be carried out by C.L.S.A.I., the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty and their components.

SECRETARY ALLIED COMMAND,
 MEDITERRANEAN DIVISION OF OPERATIONS

1312

FOR THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

FOR THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL
 LIBERATION FOR NORTHERN ITALY

1707

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

File (60)

Office of the Chief of Staff.

Recruiting of Partisans for Italian
Army.
Laird Forces Sub-Com.

320/cos

27th November, 4.

The Chief Commissioner would be glad to know whether you can give any indication as to the source of the report in the attached extract from the "Stars and Stripes" which appeared today, and if you would make recommendations for a comment to be published.

WEL/JS.

1752

W. J. Sullivan,
Chief of Staff.

1708

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Ref. 2891/124.
Ref. 2891/124.
Confidential

SUBJECT: Proposed Agreement between GCHQ, Italian Government and G.L.N.A.I.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
Lt. Major Ross, Inter Service and Political Secretariat,
Chief of Staff Section.

1. I refer to your telegram 785087 of 24 November and forward herewith 25 copies of a draft memorandum of the agreed terms of recognition of the Italian Committee of National Liberation in Northern Italy, resulting from the meeting convened by your telegram.

2. The amendments made in ink in Line 2, Para 1, has been suggested by the US Political Adviser and the amendment in the last line of Para 4 by HQ AAI, since the meeting was held.

MSL/32.

MS Live
Brigadier,
Chief of Staff,
for the Chief Commissioner.

Copy to: bscg/ccs.

1310

1184

Confidential

SECRET

DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SUPREMACY ALLIED
COMMANDEES, ANTI-FASCIST MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE ITALIAN
GOVERNMENT AND THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION FOR
NORTHERN ITALY.

1. The Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy (C.N.L.N.I.)
(by the Italian Govt)
is recognized as the established body representing the anti-Fascist parties in
every occupied Italian territory. The C.N.L.N.I. for its part recognizes the
Italian Government, recognized by the Allied Governments as the successor of the
Italian Government which signed the armistice terms, as the sole legitimate
authority in that part of Italy which has now been and may hereafter be handed
over to the Italian Government by the Allied Military Government.

2. The SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDEES and the Italian Government wish the utmost
co-operation to be established and maintained among the elements which are active
in the resistance movement. The C.N.L.N.I. will establish and maintain such
co-operation as will bring together all active elements in the resistance move-
ment whether they belong to the C.N.L.N.I. anti-Fascist parties or to other anti-
Fascist organizations.

3. During the period of every occupation the SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDEES OF THE
VOLUNTARIES OF LIBERTY (being the military command of the C.N.L.N.I.) will, on
behalf of the C.N.L.N.I., carry out all instructions of the Committee of National
Liberation. It is to ensure the plan of the SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDEES and the
Italian Government that particular care should be given to all measures which
will safeguard the economic resources of the territory against expropriation,
confiscation and like expropriation.

2. The SUPREMACY ALLIED GOVERNMENT and the Italian Government, with the utmost co-operation to be established and maintained among the elements which are active in the resistance movement. The G.I.N.A.I. will establish and maintain such co-operation as will bring together all active elements in the resistance movement whether they belong to the G.I.N.A.I. anti-fascist parties or to other anti-fascist organizations.

3. During the period of enemy occupation the GENERAL COMMAND OF THE VOLUNTEERS OF LIBERTY (being the military command of the G.I.N.A.I.) will, on behalf of the G.I.N.A.I., carry out all instructions of the Commander-in-Chief, I.N.A.I. It is in general the wish of the SUPREMACY ALLIED GOVERNMENT and the Italian Government that particular care should be given to all measures which will safeguard the economic resources of the territory against搜掠, conditions and like degradation by the enemy.

4. When the enemy withdraws from territory occupied by them the G.I.N.A.I. will exercise its best endeavours to maintain law and order and to maintain the safeguarding of the economic resources of the country until such time as Allied Military Government is established. Immediately upon the establishment of Allied Military Government, G.I.N.A.I. will recognise Allied Military Government and will hand over to that Government all authority and powers of local government and administration previously assumed. As the enemy withdraws all components of the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty in liberated territory will come under direct control of the Commander-in-Chief, I.N.A.I. and

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will obey any order issued by him or by Allied Military Government or the British, including orders to disarm and surrender their arms, as required to do so.

5. During the period of enemy occupation of Northern Italy the utmost assistance will be given to the C.I.N.C.I. in co-operation with all other anti-Fascist organizations, to meet the needs of their members who are engaged in opposing the enemy in occupied territory: a monthly contribution not exceeding 100 million lire will be made to meet the expenses of the C.I.N.C.I. and all other anti-Fascist organizations.

Subject to the general control of the Commander-in-Chief, A.M.I., these men will be appointed to the following areas in the following ratio for the support of all anti-Fascist organizations in these areas:

LAZIO	134
PIEMONTE	574
EMILIA	16
VALLE	16
VALLE	16

The above men and allocations will be subject to variation according to the requirements of the military situation: the numbers men will be reduced proportionately as and when previous men are liberated.

6. Allied relations attached to the C.I.N.C.I., to the General Command of the Volontiers of Liberty, or any of their components, will be consulted in all matters connected with the execution of this agreement and in particular in matters relating to armed resistance, anti-aircraft, and maintenance of order.

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The above are not allocations will be subject to variation according to the requirements of the military situation. The maximum sum will be reduced proportionately as and when provisions are liberated.

5. Allied allocations attached to the C.I.N.C.P., to the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty, or any of their components, will be allocated in all matters connected with the execution of this agreement and in particular to matters relating to armed resistance, anti-aircraft, and maintenance of order. Orders issued by the Commander-in-Chief, A.A.F., and transmitted through the channels concerned will be carried out by C.I.N.C.P., the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty and their components.

1304

THROUGH ALLIED CHANNELS,
RECOMMENDED, THROUGH THE CHIEF OF STAFF

FOR THE ALLIED GOVERNMENT

FOR THE COMMISSIONER OF NATIONAL
LIBERATION FOR HONGKONG ISLAND

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/RND No.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/AND No.

785017

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CO Refy AAI telephoned to say

that CGS AAI welcomed & approved the draft
agreement with our amendment. End of para 6 for H
and when R

58

FINANCING OF RESISTANCE IN NORTHERN ITALY

The military committees of the COMITATO DI LIBERAZIONE NAZIONALE ALTA ITALIA require a total monthly commitment of 160 million Italian lire.

This sum is composed as under:

- (a) Approximately 90,000 patriots are operating under the jurisdiction of the military committees of the CLNAI. In order to survive during the winter each one requires 1900 lire per month. Total 171 million lire per month. (This sum is to be distributed through the regional committees to the units under their respective control.)

- (b) In addition the regional committees themselves require a total of 25 million lire per month for internal expenses for the items enumerated below:

Normal running expenses.
Communications and couriers.
Transport.
Special anti-aircraft measures.

LIEBOWITZ SAIT MALS ALTA ITALIA requires a total monthly amount of 160 million Italian lire.

This sum is computed as under:

(a) Approximately 90,000 patriots are operating under the jurisdiction of the military committees of the CLAI. In order to survive during the winter each man requires 1800 lire per month. TOTAL 135 million lire per month. (This sum is to be distributed through the regional committees to the units under their respective control.)

(b) In addition the regional committees themselves require a total of 25 million lire per month for internal expenses for the items enumerated below:

- Normal running expenses.
- Communications and couriers.
- Transport.
- Special anti-scorch measures.
- Safe houses.
- Information services.
- Relief for families of victims.

Included in these 25 million lire per month are running expenses for city groups in the safe houses.

The total arrived at is therefore 160 million lire per month.

1300

25th November, 1944

TOP SECRET

15 November 1944

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

TOP SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS

E 459

RECORD OF MEETING HELD IN THE OFFICE OF THE
SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER AT 1600 HOURS ON
THURSDAY 23RD NOVEMBER, 1944.

PRESENT:

General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson,
Supreme Allied Commander,
Mediterranean Theatre

ABSENT:

Major General T. M. Stawell,
Commander, S.O.M.F.C.

Commander G. B. Holdsworth,
No. 1, Special Force

Major M. Vincent,
No. 1 Special Force.

ITALIAN

Signor Longhi,
President, C.I.A.I.

Signor Porri,
Joint Deputy Commander,
Military Committee,
C.I.A.I.

Signor Moro,
Representing Joint
Deputy Commander,
Military Committee,
C.I.A.I.

SECRETARY

Colonel J. A. Macdowell

1. SUMMARY OF ITALIAN MOVEMENT

SIGNOR LONGHI, in reply to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander, stated that the total number of Partisans under the control of C.I.A.I. now amounted to almost 90,000, most of whom were located in the mountains. There were approximately twice as many Partisans in the towns, for the most part were untrained and difficult to organize. The movement was strongest in PIEDMONT but efforts were being made to reinforce the movement in EMILIA and VENETO. The movement was not so strong in TREVISO or VERONA. GUILLS, where there were respectively considerable Austrian and Slovene populations.

2. FUTURE POLICY FOR THE ITALIAN PARTISANS

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1305

Signal Wire,
Representing Joint
Deputy Commander,
Military Committee,
CMA.I.

SECRET

Colonel J.H. Lasceller

1305

1. STRATEGY OF PARTISAN MOVEMENT

STANIS LOMBT, in reply to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander, stated that the total number of Partisans under the control of GILLI now amounted to almost 90,000, most of whom were located in the mountains. There were approximately twice as many Partisans in the towns, who for the most part were unarmed and difficult to organize. The movement was strongest in PHILMONT but efforts were being made to reinforce the movement in MILL and VENETO. The movement was not so strong in VITTHING or VESZEL GULLI, where there were respectively considerable Austrian and Slovene populations.

2. FUTURE POLICY FOR WILLIAM F. STANLEY

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that it was difficult to predict how operations in WILLI would develop over the next few months, but his policy was to assist the Partisans as much as possible to enable them to carry out their activities throughout the winter. They should not, however, expect a great increase in their numbers during the winter. There was a limit to the amount of supplies which could be sent in during the winter months, owing to bad weather and the limited number of aircraft available. He considered that the Partisans should carry on their activities against the enemy within the capabilities allowed by the volume of supplies and should try to build up against the time when the Germans withdrew.

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HONOR LAMONT said that the Committee such suggested General
recent proclamation urging the Partisans to limit their activities
during the winter. It is unprofitable to lay restraint upon Partisans
operating at some distance from their bases. It was no easy, in order to
maintain Partisan formations in being and at a high level of efficiency to
conduct active operations at all times.

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HONOR LAMONT pointed out that the situation was different from that of the Partisans in FRANCE or YUGOSLAVIA in that the
Italian Partisans had to deal with the Italian fascists as well as with the
Germans. While the composition of the Fascist military formations was mixed
and desertions were frequent, there were some thousands of desperados who
constituted a formidable opposition.

4. RECOGNITION OF CHIEF

HONOR LAMONT urged that official recognition should be given to the
Chief, which had united all anti-fascist Partisan groups. General Cadorna
had been placed in command of their operations. The Committee required an
appropriate mandate from the Italian Government, which should carry the
explicit approval of the Supreme Allied Commander. Conventions had already
taken place with members of the Italian Government, who supported the need
for recognition completely and unreservedly.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER replied that the Allied Commission would
shortly be suggesting to the Italian Government that the time was now ripe
for recognition of the Committee. He recognized the urgency of this question
in the delegation's point of view and the terms of recognition would shortly
be discussed with the Italian Government. Questions for determination would
include finances, supplies and the laying down of arms after liberation. The
procedure for dealing with Partisans after liberation would also be discussed.

HONOR LAMONT said that the Committee wished the Partisans after libera-
tion to be incorporated in the Italian Army up to the numbers permissible.

5. ANTI-GERMAN POLICY

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER enquired what steps were being taken to
prevent the enemy from carrying out a scorched earth policy when he withdrew.

HONOR LAMONT replied that, passively, essential machinery parts were
being hidden in the country. Actively, precise defense tasks had been
assigned to formations in industrial areas, but they were short of anti-air
weapons and of resources for defense against tanks and armored cars.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER suggested that workers should be armed in
advance to prevent the operation of German demolition squads, which were
usually small in number. He mentioned the successes achieved by French
and Greek workers in this connection.

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5. WILSON'S POLICY

THE SUPREMACY LAUCHI OBSERVED that steps were being taken to prevent the enemy from carrying out a scorched earth policy when he withdrew.

STANIS LAUCHI replied that, passively, essential machinery parts were being hidden in the country. Actively, precise defense tanks had been assigned to formations in industrial areas, but they were short of automatic weapons and of resources for defense against tanks and armored cars.

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6. FINANCE

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STANIS LAUCHI OBSERVED that the Partisans would be incurring expenditures in the towns to arms stocks of food in the factories, and that this expenditure could not satisfactorily be covered if payment to the Partisans were made on a 'per capita' basis as had been suggested.

STANIS LAUCHI said that he had heard the sum of 100 million lire per month mentioned as an appropriate payment to the Committee. He did not consider that this was enough and estimated that 160 million lire per month would be required. He added that discussions with members of the Italian Government indicated that the Italian Government were willing to pay this amount.

THE SUPREMACY LAUCHI OBSERVED suggested that a block grant to each specific area might be made in addition to payment on a 'per capita' basis.

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THE SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMISSIONER pointed out the necessity for carrying on Partisan activities behind the enemy lines even after part of the territory had been liberated, adding that this called for a series of dispersal centres from which funds could be distributed.

GENERAL LOMSHI undertook to discuss further the possibility of forming a series of areas of appropriate size in Northern Italy for the dispersment of funds in connection with the Committee's anti-scorch policy. He added that, owing to the difficulty of arranging for funds to be available at the appropriate place and time, considerable latitude must be allowed at the Committee. The ceiling agreed would not be exceeded, and within this ceiling no more would be disbursed than was necessary.

7. RECEIPTS

COMMISSIONER HOLDS-ORTH pointed out that the timing and the consistency of PAC programme for the Partisans in ITALY could be materially improved.

THE SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMISSIONER replied that he was prepared to write to London on this subject and instructed Commander Moldamorth to provide him with the necessary material.

8. ALLIED EX-PRISONERS OF WAR WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS

GENERAL LOMSHI, in reply to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander, said that there were from 4 to 5 thousand British and United States ex-prisoners of war at large in Northern Italy, but not more than 5 to 6 hundred of these were fighting with the Partisans.

REFERENCE

- Supreme Allied Commander
- Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
- Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
- 1st Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
- Commander High Seas Fleet
- Chief of Staff
- Chief Administrative Officer
- Deputy Chief of Staff

John R. L. Schell
J. R. L. SCHILLER,
Colonel,
Secretary.

COPY 10

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- 2
- 3-4
- 5-11
- 12-13
- 14
- 15

the copy of this subject and instructed Commander Holdsworth to provide him with the necessary material.

8. ALLIED EX-PRISONERS OF WAR WITH ITALIAN FURTHERING

SIR: In reply to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander, said that there were from 4 to 5 thousand British and United States ex-prisoners of war at large in Northern Italy, but not more than 5 to 6 hundred of these were fighting with the Partisans.

to be amended
2. H. L. SCHELES,
Colonel,
Secretary.

DISTRIBUTION

- Supreme Allied Commander
- Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
- Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
- Chief of Staff
- Chief Administrative Officer
- Deputy Chief of Staff
- U.S. Political Advisor
- British Resident Minister
- Director, RCB
- Secretary General Staff
- G-1 (4)
- G-1 (5)
- G-2
- G-3
- G-3 (Op Ops)
- G-4 (4)
- G-4 (5)
- G-5
- IS & RS
- Chief, Liaison Section
- Chief, Intelligence, Allied Commission
- Commander, SMCVO
- (Incl. 1 copy for Commander Holdsworth)
- Supers

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SECURITY OF STATE

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/HND No.

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Recd 23 Nov 44

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

INCOMING MESSAGE

INFO - ACTION

TO: ALL, INFO: ALLIED COMMISSION

SIGNAL MESSAGE CENTER NO: 34/25

FROM: AFHQ SIGNED SACHS

REFERENCE NO: FX 57627

DATE AND TIME OF ORIGIN: 2500 111 OFFICE OF ORIGIN: CITE: FROCT

CLASSIFICATION:

PRECEDENCE:

URGENT

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SECRET.

SACHS desires that qualified representative of AAI be present at 1800 hrs 25th repeat 25th November at HQ ALLIED COMMISSION Rome to discuss in conference terms of recognition of Italian committee of national liberation in northern ITALY by SAC and the Italian

REFERENCE No: FA 10021 PRECEDENCE: URGENT
DATE AND TIME OF ORIGIN: NOV 21 OFFICE OF ORIGIN: CITE: FAXOT

Confidential

SECRET.

SACRED desires that qualified representative of AAI be present at 1500 hrs 25th repeat 25th November at HQ ALLIED COMMISSION ROSS to discuss in conference terms of recognition of Italian committee of national liberation in northern ITALY by SAC and the Italian Government also to consider improvement of methods and means for disposal of liberated Italian patriots.

DISTRIBUTION:

HEADQUARTERS
5 NOV 1944
A. C.
Inf-Net - C.D.S. ②
Inf - Chief Comm'n's office
PA Sec
Pol. Sec.
Patriots B.B. 1382
File

INFO - ACTION

DATE and TIME of RECEIPT

Distribution:

Copy passed to SO to CC.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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SECRET

Extract from Minutes of the 33rd meeting of
Supreme Allied Commander's Political Meeting held
on Tuesday, 21st November, 1944.

Ref: PC(44) 33rd Meeting dated 22nd November -
Original in File 6509/008.

MINUTE No. 6

Confidential

6. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS.

(Paper No. PC(44) 137).

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper:-

- (a) Recommending the terms of a draft memorandum of Agreement which it was proposed to encourage the Italian Government to enter into with the Committee of National Liberation in Northern ITALY.
- (b) Suggesting a procedure for the disposal of Italian patriots liberated by the Allied armies.

MAJOR GENERAL STIRRELL, amplifying the paper, stated that representatives of the Committee of National Liberation for Northern ITALY were at present in Rome and had had preliminary discussions with the Italian Government and himself. They felt that recognition would give them a greater measure of control over the various sub-committees in the North and would increase their influence with industrialists which they deemed to be particularly desirable in view of the anti-scorch policy now being pursued. They also believed that recognition would give them greater protection from reprisals from the Fascists, whom they feared more than the Germans.

MR. MACMILLAN pointed out that, although past experience in other countries had shown that the recognition of liberation movements entailed dangerous political consequences, the military advantage in this instance appeared to dictate it. It might be more logical for the proposed agreement to be entered into between the Supreme Allied Commander and the Committee of National Liberation in Northern ITALY but such a procedure would involve the practical difficulty of

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COMMODORE STONE reported that he had had a preliminary discussion with the Italian Prime Minister, who was opposed to the Committee's proposal that it should exercise control in liberated areas until the Italian Government was established. He added that the Committee's representatives had indicated to the Italian Government that their proposals carried the agreement of Mr. Macmillan and himself which in fact was untrue. He had not yet discussed the question of funds with the Italian Government but he believed that they might find it possible to furnish the 100 million metropolitan lire monthly provided the equivalent were made available to them in liberated Italy in Allied military currency. This would remove the practical objection to the conclusion of an agreement between the Committee and the Supreme Allied Commander.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL GASKELL observed that it might be more desirable to enter into a tripartite agreement.

MR. KIRK concurred in Lieutenant General Gaskell's suggestion but suggested that no compulsion be used and that the Italian Government merely be invited to be a party to the agreement.

MR. MACMILLAN thought that some limit should be set to the monetary assistance given to the Committee. He suggested that this should be framed on the basis of a given sum per month per head, the total sum not to exceed a fixed amount. Subject to the addition of such a clause and to rewording of paras 5 and 8 designed to secure a greater measure of Allied control he thought that the agreement as submitted could serve as a basis of further discussions between representatives of AFHQ, IAI and the Allied Commission.

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

THE SUPREMACY ALLY COMMANDER:

- (a) Directed that the Allied Commission invite the Italian Government to furnish to the Allied Military authorities for payment of the Committee of National Liberation in Northern Italy some 100 million metropolitan lire a month in exchange for the equivalent in Allied military currency and to join in a tri-partite agreement, reporting to the next meeting of the Political Committee as to the Italian Government's reactions.
- (b) Directed that G-3 in conjunction with the Chief Administrative Officer, NAAP, AAI, SCW and the Allied Commission,
 - (1) draw up a revised draft memorandum of agreement in the light of the above discussion,
 - (11) examine the proposed procedure for the disposal of liberated patriots, and recommend what action should be taken in this matter and by whom.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/KND No.

785017

1300

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 1.3/NND No. 785017

Copy for copies

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(9)
Tel: 489081
Ext: 363

Ref: 3452/PM

21 November 1944.

SUBJECT: Wounded Patriots.

22 Nov Recd

TO: Headquarters, Allied Armies in Italy.

1. The Allied Commission has under consideration the handling of wounded Italian Patriots. The following points and recommendations are submitted for your comments.
2. Since Patriot activities in enemy territory are conducted under the direction of AAI, it is hardly necessary to restate the valuable services which they have performed for the Allied Armies in Italy.
3. For humane as well as military reasons this Headquarters requests that the whole question of reception and hospitalization of wounded patriots be reviewed by your HQ. At present there is no well defined policy for this important problem.
4. It appears that in the Fifth Army area, wounded patriots in many cases, are passed through military channels to the Italian Army hospital depot attached to Fifth Army, but the practice is not uniform, and in other cases they are passed to civilian hospitals. In Eighth Army area also the practice is not uniform, and most of the Patriots, after being passed through Army channels finally arrive in a civilian hospital.
5. This treatment offers little encouragement to patriots, for although the technical treatment to be found in Italian civilian hospitals may be as good as in the military hospitals, there are three disadvantages:
 - a) Immediately after an area is liberated the civilian hospitals may be exceedingly short of essential medical supplies just at the moment when they are most required.
 - b) Civilian hospitals only receive civilian hospital rations which are on a much lower scale than Italian Army rations.
 - c) Cigarettes and other small personal items which may be available in military hospitals are never available in civilian hospitals.
6. It seems essential in the interests, not only of justice and gratitude, but also in the maintenance of Patriot morale and effectiveness, that Patriots should receive proper hospital treatment when wounded in fighting on the side of the Allies. This question may become even more serious when larger bands are met with in the North.

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7. It is felt that if Patriots cannot be dealt with in Italian military hospitals this fact may well become known to Patriots in the North and that they may be less willing to undertake the valuable services which they are at present rendering to the Allies.

8. Accordingly it is requested that authority be given for the treatment in Italian Military hospitals, when available, of all Patriots wounded in operation on the side of the Allies. It is further requested that, in cases where no Italian military hospital is readily available, authority may be given for wounded Italian Patriots to be received in Allied hospitals, as is the case at present when soldiers of other belligerent nations - e.g. Greeks, Poles, Brazilians - are wounded.

9. As you are aware, although there are now only about 800 wounded Patriots, considerably larger numbers may be expected with operations in Northern Regions, when a definite policy on this question may be an operational necessity as well as a humane gesture.

For the Chief Commissioner:

M. S. LUSH

Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

Copy to : AFHQ, G-2 Section.
DCCAO, Civil Affairs Section, HQ AAI.
Patriots Branch.
Land Forces Sub-Commission.
Political Section
Commander Holdsworth, No. 1 Special Force, GEF.

BASIC NEWS

SUPPLEMENT

13 November 1944

REVIEW OF ITALIAN CAMPAIGN

ROME, November 12. — A spokesman for General Sir Harold Alexander, commander-in-chief of the Allied Armies in Italy, broadcasting over Radio Rome last night reviewed the Italian campaign. Here is the text of his broadcast:

The Battle of Italy has reached a stage when the time has come for stock-taking. The situation is an appropriate one for a survey of the situation. Whilst it goes without saying that there are certain important factors in warfare of which nobody is ever, let alone the general public, aware of from century to century, whatever may be the nature of the campaign at the disposal of a commander.

It will be a constructive contribution to an appraisal of the present situation of the campaign in Italy if we remember for a moment the events of the past few months, not only in Italy, but also in the rest of Europe we must not forget the interdependence of the various fronts and their ramifications in each other. The objective of the Allied Armies in Italy was, and is, to destroy the German divisions and to drive them out of Italy. That was, at its core, the main objective. The objective, on the other hand, of those who are planning the way for the defeat of Germany from the larger standpoint of the map of all Europe, will be to make it necessary for the Germans to keep so many troops as possible in Italy, so that they can not be sent to other fronts where the greatest possible number of troops. These two objectives are, in fact, interdependent, interlocking, but a man's thought should be clear that they are not the same. The first objective, the objective, can be measured by the facts. At 30 German divisions employed in Italy since May 11 last, when the summer campaign started, 14,000 were lost, killed, 100,000 wounded, and 10,000 taken prisoner. Since the landing on the mainland of Italy, the Allies have advanced 100 miles (160 miles) of the most difficult fighting country in the world, at an average rate, not a very spectacular one, of about 100 yards a day, and from the larger point of view of pushing down German troops, there are still in Italy more than 20 German divisions, many of the highest quality, the strength of the Germans in this front being higher in proportion than anywhere else. These are troops badly needed for the defence of Germany itself, in the Eastern and Western borders.

It must be pointed out that in the history of war that in the present strategic picture, Italy's part should be one to contribute chiefly to the success in the pushing down of the enemy within her borders, but the division of it is becoming a reality and it will prove to have played a vital part, if not a decisive one, in the pushing down of the war in the various fronts and thus would have been a very important part of the war.

1671

The extent of the dependence of a local campaign on large planning is well shown by the summer offensive in Italy which opened on May 12th, planned long before Te Mow's visit. It had an additional objective to those already mentioned: to produce a first class victory over the Germans just before the forced Peace was launched in November, so that the invasion from the West would start off with the added impetus of a sense of a new triumph of Allied Armies coming from another point of the campaign. And as the world knows, the planning of the offensive culminated in the liberation of Rome two days before the Alps landed in France. The plan was carefully laid. The big step was recognized as almost 100% insured before the last verdict, so that the attack could be launched with complete assurance, with the maximum strength and the greatest possible element of surprise. The attack was in, and some days later the entire grip of General Alexander's "Double Sweep" - the big Army as we designated it, Allied, in turn subjected to attack at the moment when the Germans had drawn off forces to face the big Army Group in the last victory. Rome was liberated, and the Allies advanced on to Florence and, spreading the local area, secured decisive loss, the German tank, standing from Plan 10 through the most disastrous situation that is today.

Here again the broader plans of the European picture made a suggestion of further intimacy. French and American divisions, with supplies and transport, had to be withdrawn from Italy for the operations in southern France; the success of which, in turn, gave aid to General Klumbauer's advance to the West. Nevertheless, the propaganda, again staffed and serviced, met with success. The 8th Army moved quickly across to the Adriatic coast, broke through the Gothic Line, and again, following more near General Alexander's double punch, broke the 10th Army.

out Libya which has been accumulating from the Comandante in Chief and the Prime of the world. The Patriots of Italy now is the Patria of all Europe. To help drive the enemy from the country. They too now have sufficient money to leave, winter.

It is going to be a hard winter for the Patriots. The summer campaign has ended. They are going to be hard put to it for food and supplies, for winter clothes and only local resources but also actually draining the dropping of enemy by air, nights of weather in which it will be possible to fly will be less in the coming months, though the Allies will do their best to deliver supplies, and the larger groups will not be able to operate as much as the way that they have during the past months. Their main line for the winter is to be low, and indeed there are the instructions to them issued from General Alexander's headquarters. They will conserve their ammunition, and keep their weapons cool, and they will be right not to take unnecessary risks. A Targa of opportunity. They will of course take advantage of Sicily, Germany and France and Spain and the Italian Communist Party will fight them back of course, and the special operations, instructions for which reach the Patriots by other means than leaders and the Italian Communist Party program, will continue to be carried out. Their intelligence work will go on, and anti-aircraft protection will be taken, but the summer season of open Patriot warfare is over, and the winter campaign of covert activity, preparation, and waiting is beginning.

The first plan of the campaign in Italy is now being planned, and it is for that the Patriots no less than the enemy, will prepare. When the time comes the orders will be given, and the first phase will begin.

NEW SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS TO THE PATRIOTS

From General Sir H. H. Alexander, Commander-in-Chief Allied Armies in Italy

Previous the summer campaign has ended and the winter campaign is beginning. The coming of the rain and the mud inevitably means a slowing down of the tempo of battle.

The instructions, therefore, to Patriots are as follows:

1. You will come for the rain being from Japanese-organized activity.
2. You will conserve your ammunition and hold yourselves in preparation and readiness for fresh orders.
3. You will listen whenever possible to the Italian Communist radio program broadcast from this headquarters so that you will be aware of any fresh orders or changes in the situation.

4. This does not mean that you will neglect positions which cause you very severe the risk is not too great of destroying German and Russian and managing according to the general instructions you already have.

5. You will continue to collect intelligence about the enemy's movements and formations, provide intelligence, placing it in the situation, and also report them to the appropriate quarters.

6. These instructions do not, of course, affect such operations as will be ordered by headquarters from time to time of you for other reasons.

The main is, then, to prepare, and to wait until the time comes for the first blow.

Finally, Patriot leaders will ensure to their own complete satisfaction and greatest preparation for their co-operation during the campaign of the winter.

(P-12)

TOP SECRET

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO SSA

Confidential

20 November 1944

NOTES ON A MEETING WITH MAJOR GENERAL STANLEY AND COMMANDER HOLDSWORTH,
COMMANDING OFFICER, NO. 1 SPECIAL FORCE, SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 1944.

Also present -- Colonel Graffey-Smith.

1. Commander Holdsworth told Commander Stone that it had been decided to continue full and in fact increased support materially to the Patriot Movement in Northern Italy throughout the Winter so as to avoid a wide scale "Warsaw". This material assistance was to be effected by increased air lift.

2. No. 1 Special Force believed that the time was now ripe for the Italian Government to recognize the National Committee of Liberation as their agents in Northern Italy, and also stated that the financial needs of the patriots would be one hundred million lire a month (figure based on S.O.S. and C.S.S. estimates).

3. Colonel Graffey-Smith said that the supply of one hundred million lire a month could be arranged without undue difficulty, either through the agency of the Italian Government, or, if it was considered desirable, without even their knowledge. Commander Holdsworth said that he believed the scheme was for certain business houses in the North to loan the money against a guarantee from the Italian Government in the South. Colonel Graffey-Smith replied that this proposal might have political implications as some houses in the North were not persons grateful with the Government. Commander Holdsworth said that the President of the CLNAI now in Rome would be asked exactly how he proposed the scheme should be carried out.

4. Commander Stone said that he was opposed to tying up the recognition of the CLNAI by the Italian Government with the problem of the supply and maintenance of the organization during the Winter. They seemed to him quite different problems to be handled separately. Why should the Italian Government not make available these funds to the CLNAI, letting it be known in the North that they were giving this support to their fellow countrymen, without taking the grave step of giving them uncontrolled agency? Commander Holdsworth said that the CLNAI was now so powerful that if the present Italian Government did not now recognize them and grant them authority to act in the North on their behalf, it would antagonize the CLNAI with disastrous results to the future unit of this country. It was the urgent wish of the CLNAI to be recognized.

5. Commander Stone said that this was a matter for the Italian Government to decide for themselves. On no account was it a decision which should be imposed upon them by the Allies, and that if he were

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

TOP SECRET

Confidential

H4B

the Prime Minister he would be reluctant to delegate broad, unrestricted powers to the CISA, in view of the experience of similar movements in other countries. Non-recognition of the CISA would at least give second the possibility of to "trade".

5. The summing up of the Chief Commissioner amounted to:

a. He recognized the need of considerable financial support to be given by the Government to the resistance movement in the North.

b. He was advised by his financial adviser that the figure of 100 million lire a month was well within the means of the Italian Government.

c. He believed this was a problem for decision by the Italian Government. He was for recognition of the CISA if it brought them into the Government "fold", but against it if it merely meant a general outbreak in the North of the occurrences which had taken place in Florence.

6. Commander Holdsworth said that he would take the temperature of the newly arrived delegates of the CISA and report.

7. Commodore Stone said that he would have a wholly informal exploratory discussion with Bonad before the political meeting on Tuesday, 21 November.

J. A. MAYLE
Major, R. A.
Staff Officer to CG

REF ID:
TOP SECRET

Confidential HQ S.O.M.

18th November, 1944.

Supreme Allied Commander
A.F.H.Q.

In accordance with your instructions I forward herewith
for consideration at the next Political Meeting

- (a) A memorandum which it is suggested the
ITALIAN Government be advised to forward
to the COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION
for Northern ITALY.
- (b) A note on the disposal of ITALIAN Patriots
liberated by the Allied Armies.

(Sgd)

F. STAMMEL

Major General
Comd. S.O.M.

TOP SECRET

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Confidential HHD

SUBJECT: Recognition of the Committee of National Liberation for Northern ITALY by the Supreme Allied Command and the Italian Government.

INTRODUCTION

In Northern ITALY a COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION has been in existence for some time past. It is composed of representatives of the five main anti-Fascist parties. Its main object is to co-ordinate resistance to the enemy in occupied territory. It is especially powerful in the large industrial districts.

It is considered that the time is now appropriate when this Committee should receive official recognition both by the Supreme Allied Command and the Italian Government.

It is thought that by working through the Committee and its Sub-Committees a considerable measure of success will be achieved in organizing anti-sabotage and in maintaining law and order until the Allied Military Government can take charge.

It is proposed therefore that the ITALIAN Government be advised to recognize the COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION and a draft memorandum to this effect is attached for consideration.

TOP SECRET

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/AND No. 785017

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DRAFT MEMORANDUM FROM ITALIAN GOVERNMENT REGARDING RECOGNITION OF
AND INSTRUCTIONS TO THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION FOR
NORTHERN ITALY.

1. The Italian Government appoints the CLNAI (COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION FOR NORTHERN ITALY) as their agents in enemy occupied territory of Northern ITALY for the purposes and period specified below.
2. The Italian Government recognizes the CLNAI as the constituent body representing the five anti-fascist parties i.e. (in alphabetical order) Action Party, Christian-Democratic Party, Communist Party, Liberal Party and Socialist Party.
3. The Italian Government wishes the utmost cooperation to be established and maintained among the elements which are active in the resistance movement. The Italian Government instructs the CLNAI to establish and maintain such cooperation which will bring together all active elements in the resistance movement whether they belong to the five anti-fascist parties or to other anti-fascist organizations.
4. During the period of enemy occupation the CLNAI will carry out the instructions of the SUPREME ALLIED COMMAND which will direct the patriots in their operations against the enemy. It is the wish of the Italian Government that particular care should be given to all measures which will safeguard the economic resources of the territory at present occupied by the enemy.
5. When the enemy withdraws from occupied territory the CLNAI and its attendant committees will exercise their best endeavours to maintain law and order and to safeguard the economic resources of the country until such time as Allied Military Government takes charge.
6. The Italian Government notifies the CLNAI that the SUPREME ALLIED GOVERNMENT is pleased to accept General Raffaele CADOREA as head of the Military Committee of the CLNAI and Messrs. PARI and GALLI as General CADOREA's joint deputy commanders. The Italian Government instructs the CLNAI to proceed with the appointment of General CADOREA, of Mr PARI and Mr GALLI to their respective posts.
7. The Italian Government will give its utmost assistance to the CLNAI to meet the needs of the patriots who are engaging the enemy in occupied territory.

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

Confidential 447

During the period of enemy occupation of Northern ITALY the Italian Government is willing to make a monthly contribution to the expenses of the CIAM.

To meet current needs the sum of 100 million lire will be made available.

This sum will be apportioned as follows :

LIPIA	(Amounts to be
PIEMONTE	specified after
LOMBARDIA	consultation
EMILIA	with representatives
VENETO	from the North)

100,000,000

In deciding the magnitude and apportionment of each subsequent monthly contribution the Italian Government will be guided by the military and economic situation obtaining in each Province.

8. Allied missions, attached to the CIAM and its sub-committees, will be consulted in all matters relating to armed resistance, anti-aircraft, and maintenance of law and order. The detailed orders issued by Allied Military Authority to the missions concerned will be respected by CIAM.

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Confidential H43

SUBJECT: Disposal of ITALIAN Patriots
liberated by the Allied Armies.

1. The present arrangements for the reception and disposal of ITALIAN Patriots liberated by the Allied Armies are inadequate.

There are indications that the resistance movement in Northern ITALY is being adversely affected by the apparent lack of consideration shown to Patriots when liberated.

It is suggested therefore in view of the very much larger numbers of Patriots who will have to be dealt with in the near future, the present machinery should be strengthened.

2. The Patriots Branch of the Allied Commission is the official body dealing with this problem.

It is understood that this Branch has not the executive authority or facilities to deal adequately with Patriots when liberated.

3. It is suggested therefore, that arrangements on the following lines are required:

(a) In the zone of the Armies patriots should be received, rationed, accommodated and, when necessary, clothed until their possible future, military or civil, can be ascertained. Arms and equipment, if any, should be collected and handed over to the Air Packing Station to be established at MILAN in the vicinity of SIRMIO, from whence it will be redelivered to patriots in occupied territory. It would appear that A.M.C. is the more appropriate parent body for the Patriots Branch.

(b) Arrangements should be made to reserve a proportion of the ceiling allotted to the ITALIAN Army for those Patriots suitable and willing to enlist in the ITALIAN Armed Forces. Alternatively, should the ceiling be complete, arrangements should be made to make room for those patriots of high medical category by eliminating personnel of lower medical category or of skilled personnel.

(c) Those Patriots not wishing to undertake military duty should be provided, when necessary, with suitable clothing and the means to proceed to their homes or to places where work can be found for them.

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DEPARTMENT OF LIBERATION OF NORTHERN ITALY

Confidential

Since last May the R. Ministry of Foreign Affairs has continuously maintained a close contact - through the Royal Legation in Bern - with the Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy, supplying it with funds, helps and every possible support.

Above-mentioned contact was started by the following telegram dated May 17th from Bern: "National Liberation Committee Northern Italy has decided to fully collaborate with government, asks for full power and sufficient means to wage struggle for common aim".

And with its message dated May 19th last the Committee of Liberation reaffirmed the necessity to strengthen the activity of the resistance movement and the general political situation with a military, diplomatic and occult action in Switzerland, since the possibility of a practical cooperation between the political parties in Italy and official Italian bodies in Switzerland has failed up to date. And added: "it is possible and necessary the cooperation of the Italian Official representatives with the operating forces of anti-fascism". The Royal Government is asked to grant the Delegation, in view of this purpose, an official recognition with the military and diplomatic missions, so as its activities and enterprises in the field and with specific purpose of resistance might be carried out through their participation".

The public opinion was informed of what above through a communiqué issued on the "Corriere di Palermo" on May 25th last; "The National Liberation Committee of Northern Italy has decided to give its full collaboration to the Italian Government. It requests to be re-recognized by the Italian Government as authorized connection and to be given sufficient means to wage the struggle for the common goal". The Italian Government have answered to the Committee stating their happiness for the reaffirmed collaboration and issuing immediate instructions to the requested effect.

It is superfluous to emphasize the importance of the above-mentioned message which proves the full and utter solidarity of all Italians this and that side of the battle line in the struggle against the German aggressor".

On May 31st last the Liberation Committee urged a "solemn declaration recognizing the National Liberation Committee for Northern Italy as central authority for the whole resistance activity, both political and military. The Committee's powers should be clearly stated by the Government from which orders should be issued to Northern Italy populations to the effect of having the orders of the Committee complied with".

CONFIDENTIAL

On August 14th the Government have sent to the Committee of Liberation, through the E. War Ministry and the A. Legation in Bern, the following solemn declaration agreed between the interested Ministers and signed by M.E. Bonomi: "The Italian Government recognizes the Committee of Liberation of Northern Italy as coordinating authority of all resistance activities."

The Committee is therefore authorized to issue all the orders and instructions that will be necessary to organize the resistance all over the occupied territory, to unify the assistance, to carry out the best distribution of supplies, to establish liaisons, to unify the criterions and the instructions aiming to strengthen the action of the patriots according to the varying local situations.

The Liberation Committee, following up the advance of the troops and availing itself of all the authorities that are cooperating in the resistance is authorized to insure public order, discipline and assistance to the population in the zones which happen to be in war areas, until the Allied Commands and the official Italian Authorities will be contacted.

The Italian Government appeals to all North Italian population to the effect that all directions which will be issued by the Liberation Committee should be complied with; and maximum cooperation should be given to the Liberation Committee with that same discipline, unselfishness and patriotic feelings which are turning the resistance movement of Italy's northern regions into one of the most important contributions which are paid by Italy for the liberation of the National territory, and for its forthcoming rebirth.

The obelligerent Legations in Switzerland and the Swiss Government have been informed of such a message.

On September 2nd the Military Command of the National Liberation Committee for Northern Italy sent a message to the Italian Government and the Ministry of War recommending the formation of an unified "Patriote Rg" and a further tightening of the bounds with the regular armed forces.

On September 4th the Government sent a replying message.

3201 43
3 November 1944

TO: Chief of Staff Section (attn: Lt.Col. G.W.I. Shipp).
Civil Affairs Section, Patriots Branch.
Land Forces Sub-Commission, (NMLA).

15 NOV Recd

FROM: Political Section

1. Sig. Del Balzo of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in handing me the enclosed copy of Sig. Bonomi's letter to the Acting Chief Commissioner of the 2nd August, said that the Italian Government was still anxious for the issuance of a statement on the lines proposed.

2. From an examination of the file it appears that this request was submitted to General Alexander by the Acting Chief Commissioner on the 8th of August, but that no reply has been received. Is there any information available here on the subject? If not, I would propose to take the matter up at General Alexander's Headquarters when I go there the end of next week.

H. L. d'A. Hopkinson

H. L. d'A. HOPKINSON
Acting Vice President, Political Section

COPY

TRANSLATION

Rome, August 2, 1944

Dear Admiral,

As you are aware, the Allied Control Commission has recently adopted several practical measures in recognition of the contribution given by Italian patriots to the allied war effort against the Germans. The Italian Government have also acted on the same lines.

The Italian Government are of the opinion that such measures could be very usefully developed and integrated in a statement to be issued by the Allied High Command in Italy, of which I take leave to enclose a draft copy.

You will note that the aim of the statement is that of considering the patriots, who are fighting with unabated vigour and considerable self-sacrifice in the occupied territory, as an integral part of the Italian Corps of Liberation and of the Allied Expeditionary Forces in Italy under the leadership of the Commander-in-Chief, General Alexander.

Such recognition would not only place them under the protection of the rules of warfare, but would undoubtedly give them encouragement and incentive of particular significance and importance. I need hardly stress the important place the patriots' movement occupies within the framework of our national life and in the consciousness of the Country.

I have no doubt, therefore, that you will give the matter your most earnest consideration in the interest not only of our own, but also of the common war effort.

Thanking you in advance for the kind interest I feel sure you will take in the matter,

Believe me, Yours very sincerely.

1745

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/WNO No. 785617

ROUGH TRANSLATION OF DRAFT STATOSOM

The Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Expeditionary Forces in Italy has issued the following statement:

1. - The Italian patriots constitute a fighting army, under the leadership of regularly appointed Officers and is a part of the Italian Corps of Liberation and of the Allied Expeditionary Forces in Italy.
 2. - Italian patriots bear their arms openly against the Germans and have received precise instructions to conduct the war against the enemy according to the rules of warfare. They wear a badge which has been duly notified in accordance with international rules. General Alexander considers these troops as one of the armies at present under his command.
 3. - The status of regular fighting troops as an integral part of the Allied Expeditionary Forces in the war against Germany places them under the protection of International Conventions. Any reprisal that has been, or should henceforth be, exercised against the patriots organizations and the patriots themselves, would, therefore, represent a violation of the rules of warfare which are binding also on Germany.
- The Allied Chief Command will make every effort in order that the authors of any atrocity committed against troops acting under its orders shall be placed under trial and duly punished.

END,

TOP SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

PLAN 200

PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN TO NORTHWEST ITALY

Outline:

To refuse to a minimum the calls upon allied armies in Italy to maintain order in North-West Italy as soon as the Germans withdraw from it by propagandizing directed at North-West Italy immediately.

Information:

There is the possibility of unrest in North-West Italy when the Germans withdraw, because of the friction between the various parties, who may be striving to gain predominance to take the responsibility of government in their own hands.

Of the five parties, the two strongest are the Communist and the Socialist. The indications are that they would not be likely to depart from the directives given them respectively by Togliatti, Communist Minister without portfolio, and Ferrini, Secretary of the Socialist party.

The people of North-West Italy as a whole are more developed politically and more capable of discipline than those of the south. This factor could work adversely or in our favour.

The present indications of rivalry would seem to be due to lack of confidence in the Italian Government in

Italy when the Germans were driven out, who may be striving to gain between the various parties, who may be striving to gain predominance to take the responsibility of government in their own hands.

Of the five parties, the two strongest are the Communist and the Socialist. The indications are that they would not be likely to depart from the directives given them respectively by Togliatti, Communist Minister without portfolio, and Petrucci, Secretary of the Socialist Party.

The people of North-West Italy as a whole are more developed politically and more capable of discipline than those of the south. This factor could work adversely or in our favour.

The present indications of rivalry would seem to be due to lack of confidence in the Italian Government in Rome, and to some extent in the intentions of the Allies.

This lack of confidence is due partly to lack of knowledge of what is happening in liberated Italy, increased by German and Fascist propaganda attacking the Italian Government and the Allied administration.

Plans:

To undertake a campaign of propaganda directed to North Italy generally, but in fact specifically aimed at North-West Italy, to build up the confidence in the Italian Government, emphasizing that it is a coalition government supported by all parties and emphasizing also the support given to it by the Allies.

Methods:

The methods of our disposal are:

- (a) Pamphlets
- (b) Radio
- (c) Agents

This is result of a meeting between Col. de Caux and Mr. Ryan.

Copy to Alex

11 Jan

1748

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785617

QUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief of Staff

Confidential

Tel: 478730

Ref: 3217

29 October 1944.

SUBJECT: Partisan Policy in North West Italy.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Forces in Italy.

1. Commander Haldenorth, No.1 Special Force, came to see me today and expressed anxiety about the policy to be adopted towards partisans in North West Italy. He tells me that HAF have asked him to reduce his supply requirements so that more supplies can be made available in the Balkans. If he does this it means that he cannot support the existing patriot effort in North and North West Italy which we have called out, that his own teams already in the field may have to be withdrawn and that he will not be able to send the further teams he has promised and which have been waiting to go in for some time past. He is of the opinion that a commitment has in fact been entered into with the Committee of National Liberation for North West Italy to send them these missions. The CIL has been asked if they can receive them; they have replied that they both can and wish to receive them. He therefore thinks that any failure to send these missions, let alone withdrawal of existing teams, will be construed by them as a breach of faith on our part, with which opinion I agree.

2. The Allied Commission is chiefly concerned with the effects that such alteration of policy would have both from the political as well as from the administrative point of view. Politically I consider that such a failure would be most undesirable since it would be bound to cause political unrest, if not now, certainly when we occupy the country. Administratively it would be undesirable because there would be a large number of discontented people in the area, prejudiced against the Allies and a potential cause of unrest in an area in which the future situation is already so complicated that any additional disturbing factor should, if possible, be eliminated.

3. Quite apart from these two possible effects I cannot emphasize too strongly the importance which I attach to the anti-terror policy which the partisans have been ordered to adopt. Every power station and every factory saved by the partisans from demolition may alter the history of Italy.

For the Acting Chief Commissioner:

M. S. LUSH

Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

cc Political Dept
S.C.C.A. A.H.
Lt Col. Clark
Lt Col. Kirk

(Copy handed to Major Trenchard 2 Nov 44)

1749

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/AND No. 785017

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
AND JMA
Office of the Chief of Staff

SECRET

37

Confidential

Tel: 478803

21 October 1944.

Ref: 3201/37/CMS.

SUBJECT: Statement giving Recognition to Patriots.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters,
G-5 Section.

1. Reference my signal 5210 dated 21 October 1944, SACMOP's P 42679 dated 23 October 1944 and the last paragraph of my signal 5706 of today.
2. Copy of 16/1/44(Ops) dated 25 August 1944 from Chief of General Staff, HQ AAL, is enclosed.

For the Acting Chief Commissioner:

(SAC) L. T. T. T.

Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

Incl
as above

1282

282

1758

Declassified E.O. 12958 Section 3.3/NND No.

785617

SECRET

36
5706

AMHQ

AC HQ

5706

11 Oct 44

Confidential

SECRET

PRIORITY

SECRET PD

PARA ONE PD YOUR FOX FOUR TWO SIX NINE NINE OF TWO THREE OCTOBER PD

PARAS TO AMHQ FOR CHANGE PAGE FIVE FROM AC HQ PLANN

PARA TWO PD EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT GERMANS HAVE ONLY ACQUIRED PW STATUS IN A SINGLE INSTANCE PD

PARA THREE PD THESE BASES HAVE ALREADY PROVEN DIFFICULT TO HANDLE WHEN OVERRUN BY ALLIED FORCES AND I DO NOT WISH BY OUR ACTION TO CREATE A MORE DIFFICULT PROBLEM FOR ARE AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES BY BUILDING PATRIOTS INTO A POSITION ANALOGOUS TO THE PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION OF THE YUGOSLAV PARTISANS OR FRENCH RESIST PD

PARA FOUR PD ALTHOUGH ITALIAN GOVERNMENT DESIRED TO MAKE A STATEMENT I WOULD RECORD YOU THAT GENERAL ALVARADO REFUSED A PREVIOUS REQUEST WITH PARA THREE OF MY FIVE TWO ONE DSD OF TWO ONE OCTOBER PD HIS REASONS FOR SO REFUSING ARE CONTAINED IN A LETTER TO ALLIED COMMISSION A COPY OF WHICH WE ARE FORWARDEDING YOU

NICHOLAS V. DEMENOFF
Major 4081
Adjutant

SECRET

DEAL

SECRET

706

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34

Confidential

TO: AFM

SECRET

PARA ONE TO THE FLEET OF 23 OCT.

PARA TWO PD EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT USAGM HAS ONLY ACCUSED PD STATE
IN A SINGLE INSTANCE PD

PARA THREE PD THERE WOULD HAVE ALREADY BEEN DIFFICULTY IN HANDLING WHEN
OVERSEEN BY ALLIED FORCES AND I AM NOT SURE WE CAN EXPECT TO CREATE A MORE
DIFFICULTY FOR OUR OWN AND ALLIED AUTHORITIES BY BUILDING UPON THE
THE A POSITION ANALYSIS AT THE PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION OF THE
MIDDLE EASTERN IN PERSIAN HADIS PD

PARA FOUR PD ALTHOUGH ITALIAN GOVERNMENT DESIGNED TO MAKE A STATEMENT
I WOULD REMIND YOU THAT GENERAL ALEXANDER REFUSED A PREVIOUS REQUEST
VIA PARA THREE OF MY INFO OF 21 OCTOBER PD HIS REASONS FOR SO REFUSING
ARE CONTAINED IN A LETTER TO ALLIED COMMISSION & CAPTAIN WHICH WE ARE
FORWARDING YOU

↑
H. H. H. 20/10

A/CC.

The reasons for General Alexander's refusal are
rather lengthy for a signal. Would it not
meet the case to send the above signal &
forward a copy of General Harding's letter at
to General Clarke; he has never had it

250

1281

SECRET

TAB.
2012-44

Your F 1699 of 23 Oct.

33

1. I regret that evidence shows that
Germans have only acceded P.W. status
to Partisans in a single instance reported
by a B.L.O. in ...

2. These bands have not according to
our information even yet fixed distribution
centers recognizable at a distance. To
provide them on our account now would
have serious drawbacks if operationally feasible.

3. These bands have ^{already} proven difficult
to handle when overrun by Allied Forces and
by our own action.
We do not wish ~~to~~ to create
a more difficult problem for AMG to
deal with by building Partisans into positions
analogous to Yugoslav Partisans or French
Maquis.

1753

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/RND No. 785017

33

Your F 4699 of 13 Oct.

1. I regret that evidence shows that
Germans have only acceded P.W. status
to Partisans in a single instance reported
by a G.B.L.O. in ...

2. These bands have not acceding to
our information even after fixed distribution
entirely recognizable at a distance. To
provide them on our account now would
have serious drawbacks if operationally feasible.

3. These bands have ^{already} proven difficult
to handle when overrun by Allied Forces and
by our own action
we do not wish ~~to create~~ to create
a more difficult problem for AMG to
deal with by building Partisans into British
analogue to Yugoslav Partisans or French
Maquis.

1278

SECRET

AL' IEO CONTROL COMMISSION S 30

INCOMING MESSAGE

8871

Confidential

TO: ACC

SIGNAL MESSAGE CENTER No: 88/23

FROM: AFHQ SIGNED SACHED

CLASSIFICATION:

REFERENCE No: Z 42699

PRECEDENCE:

PRIORITY: 2

DATE AND TIME OF ORIGIN: OCT 23 1530A OFFICE OF ORIGIN: CITE PHOEG

SECRET. Status of Partisans is subject.

1. Your 5210 indicates in paragraph 2 that Germans have accorded PR status to Partisans. It would appear unwise for us to ask for less than is already conceded.
2. The Italian Government according to your paragraph three desires to make a statement on the subject; the combined Chiefs of Staff desire to have it made, and the Germans are prepared to concede the substance of the statement. The position of ACC in not facilitating the making of a statement not understood.
3. In reply to your 1A the HAGUE CONVENTION does not set any conditions as to uniform other than the wearing of a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance.
4. The Italian Government has agreed to treat ITALIAN Neo-Fascists as Prisoners of War.

Dist

REFERENCE NO: Y 42699

PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY

DATE AND TIME OF ORIGIN: OCT 23 1530A OFFICE OF ORIGIN: CITE PHOEG

SECRET. Status of Partisans is subject.

1. Your 5210 indicates in paragraph 2 that Germans have accorded PW status to Partisans. It would appear unwise for us to ask for less than is already conceded.
2. The Italian Government according to your paragraph three desires to make a statement on the subject; the combined Chiefs of Staff desire to have it made, and the Germans are prepared to concede the substance of the statement. The position of ACC is not facilitating the making of a statement not understood.
3. In reply to your 1A the HAGUE CONVENTION does not set any conditions as to uniform other than the wearing of a fixed distinctive emblem recognisable at a distance.
4. The Italian Government has agreed to treat ITALIAN Neo-Fascists as Prisoners of War.

ACTION

see 36

Dist
Action - C O S (2)
Info - A/CC
File (K)

RECEIVED
ACTION
ACC
127

SECRET

DATE and TIME of RECEIPT OCT 23 2000A

Distribution:

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

3201-44 CDS - Section 29

MANAGERS
ALLIED MILITARY COMMISSION
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION
APO 39L

as per to see

11

Ref: 9/3.3/4

21 Oct '44

CONCERN: Treatment of Civilians in Liberations

NO: (See Distribution below).

1. Recent events have made it desirable to clarify the position and standing of local Civilians in Liberations, and to lay down the policy to be adopted by AMM officers in their dealings with these bodies.

2. In Allied Military Government territory the Provincial Commissioner is the local representative of the Military Government in respect to his province and he is responsible for the conduct of affairs therein.

3. In exercising his functions the Provincial Commissioner uses the local civil administration; where a Prefect has been appointed he is head of and represents the local civil administration and is the person to whom the Provincial Commissioner gives his orders. The Prefect on his part is responsible to the Provincial Commissioner for seeing that the orders given by the latter are fully and properly carried out.

4. It follows therefore that the Provincial Commissioner must in his part give his full support and weight of authority to the Prefect in the exercise of his duties. If the Provincial Commissioner is longer has confidence in the Prefect, it is his duty to ask his Regional Commissioner or the LCAO, and also to have him removed, in consultation with HQ AMM, but while the Prefect continues to exist, such confidence the Provincial Commissioner must be stated above him his full support and authority.

5. The local Civilian in Liberations has no official standing in the conduct of affairs within the Province. Its members must not be permitted to exercise any executive functions, to appoint, suspend or remove, or to set up any Committee of Inquiry, or to do any executive work within the Province.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 1.3/WND No.

785017

3. In carrying out his functions the Provisional Commissioner uses the local civil administration; that is a Prefect has been appointed on the basis of and represents the local civilian administration and is the person to whom the Provisional Commissioner gives his orders. The Prefect on his part is responsible to the Provisional Commissioner for seeing that the orders given by the latter are fully and properly carried out.

[illegible]

5. The Lead Candidate in Librarians has no official standing in the conduct of affairs within the Province. Its members may not be permitted to receive any executive functions, to appoint Candidates or vice versa, or to set up any Combinations of Inquiry, or to do any execution acts within the Province.

If it becomes desirable to appoint Candidates or Combinations of Inquiry into any matter, it is the duty of the Provincial Candidate to give the proper instructions to the Prefect.

6. At the same time the President's instructions must be given with courtesy and their advice and views may be sought by the Provisional Commander or the President. It is entirely a matter for the Provisional Commander, after consultation with the President, to consider whether in any particular case the advice of the President is to be followed or rejected. If the President attempts to exercise executive functions and to usurp the authority of the President they must be stopped at once. If instructions to that effect are not followed by the President then the Provisional Commander will take steps to ensure that his orders are carried out, and as a last resort, dissolve the Committee. If necessary the Provisional Commander, subject to the concurrence of the National Conferenceist or SOLO Army, can most of all ask the local military Commander to assist him for this purpose.

[illegible]

Group 1	All test material 47 (1-50)
Group 2	4
Group 3	All test material 59 (6-80)

TO: Chief of Staff:

Patriot Memorandum.

1. The Prime Minister in this memorandum is striking at the fundamental policy towards patriots, to disarm and return them to civilian life at the first moment ~~as~~ they ~~come~~ ^{are} of the Allied lines.

2. It is true that he says that many of them will automatically return to civilian life on their own choice, but he wishes the remainder to retain their arms and to use them as an organisation for a certain length of time (para.4). To do this he wants a representative from the Ministry of War to arrive with the first Allied authorities.

3. This wish is apparently inspired by unsatisfactory treatment of the patriots, but I think it is really an attempt to get a territorial military organisation in the liberated areas (see para.6).

4. Do you wish to discuss this with Brig. Upjohn before seeing the Acting Chief Commissioner?

5. I have found out from Major Quayle that the A/C Capt. Tins likes the patriot days and has almost certainly discussed it with Gen. Alexander. He has not shown any interest in it recently.

19 Oct 44.

C.S.O., 1270
Office, Chief of Staff.

Discussed with A/C
No action Mr (2112)

TRANSMISSION

REGULATIONS FOR PATRIOTS

The regulations in force for the patriots in the regions which have been liberated cause some trouble which make it advisable to revise the said regulations; this revision is very necessary for towards North Italy, the bands get stronger and better organized, and the trouble caused by the enforcement of the present regulations becomes more serious.

As it is well known, when the Allied troops reach the villages, the bands of patriots, which had been employed for liaison and for the reorganization of civilian life, are dissolved and disarmed; this is the hope of reinstating the patriots in a legal statute, and employing those who are under draft obligation according to the Italian law.

When carried into effect, the disarmament of the patriots causes great bitterness and resentment among them; they think that their work is neither acknowledged nor appreciated. The true patriots give up their arms reluctantly, and the more restless elements hide them.

great advantages would be derived from keeping the bands going for a certain length of time; their discontent wouldn't be reduced, it would be easier to judge the activity and merits of everyone in particular, and make correct lists of all true patriots, this without mentioning the fundamental advantage of being able to make use of them as an organization for a certain length of time.

The elimination of many would take place automatically after a few days, because of the requests of those who should want to go back to civilian life.

For this to take place in a well regulated way, it would be necessary for a representative of the Department of War to arrive with the first Allied authorities; he would be able to give the patriots immediate orientation for their future. Of course, such foodstuffs and clothes as represent the minimum of material help needed ought to arrive at the same time as the representative of the Department of War. This is in relation with the need for a territorial military organization, even small, in the liberated regions; we have several times mentioned this. The difficulty in getting a certain number of food rations must be overcome at all costs.

Advantages such as safety, order and tranquillity in the liberated regions seem to justify the enforcement of the suggested regulations; together with the distribution of a certain number of food rations and of a certain quantity of clothes.

1760

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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SECRET

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21 Oct 44

SECRET

PRIORITY

000 10710

SECRET PD YOUR FOR THREE SIX SEVEN THREE SIX OF NIGHT OUTPOST CIRM FROM PD PARA ONE AND RELATED AAI FOR THIS MAINFRAME FROM AGO IN PARA PARA ONE PD THERE SEEM TO BE
 THOSE SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF SUGGESTION FROM AAI
 FROM ACCORDING TO REPORTS PARTISANS DO NOT APPEAR TO FULFILL COMMITMENTS OF UNIFORM
 LAID DOWN BY HAGUE CONVENTION AND IT IS PROBABLY TOO LATE TO REOPEN THIS PD FROM NAIR
 FROM IF ACTIVE ITEMS WERE TAKEN BY US TO REOPEN AAI WE SHOULD BE IN DANGER OF BUILDING
 UP PATRIOT MOVEMENT INTO A MILITARY ORGANIZATION WHICH BASED ON EXPERIENCE MAY BECOME
 EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO HANDLE WHEN MILITARY GOVERNMENT IS SET UP PD FROM CHARLES FROM
 WHEN KILLING DEACTIVES IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO BRING THEM AS FROM MOVING INTO
 THE ITALIAN AREA PD PARA TWO PD SECRET REPORT HAS STATED THAT GERMANS HAVE APPROVED IN
 STATUS TO REOPEN PARTISANS PD PARA THREE PD COMBINED IN CHIEF AAI ON TWO FIVE AGENT
 REAPPROVED A SIMILAR SUGGESTION FROM ITALIAN GOVERNMENT PD FOR THESE REASONS WE WOULD
 NOT BE IN FAVOR OF PURSUING SUGGESTION

1479

L.F. JENNINGS, Jr.
 1st Lt AGO
 ARMY

Int. Dist.
 C.A. Sec
 Pol. Sec

SECRET

C O P Y

SECRET

25A

X
0
Confidential
CONFIDENTIAL IN ITALY

16/1/3(CHE)

SUBJECT: Statement Giving Recognition to Italian Patriots.

TO : A. C. C.

25 August 1944

Reference your A/OC M2.5 dated 8 August.

1. The Commander-in-Chief has given careful consideration to the proposal put forward by the Prime Minister of the Italian Government, but he does not consider that the proposed statement is desirable or could be substantiated. The Patriots do not wear distinctive uniform according to the rules of warfare and do not all bear their arms openly. They cannot be said to have the status of regular fighting troops as an integral part of the Allied Armies in Italy or even of the Italian Regular Army.

2. The Commander-in-Chief greatly appreciates the actions of the Patriots in Northern Italy and the assistance that they are giving to his campaign. Public recognition of their activities in their desire to hasten the liberation of their country from the Nazi-Fascist yoke is given to the *ITALIE LIBERATE* broadcasts, which emanate from this Headquarters and which give them their instructions.

3. It has already been made clear to the enemy through FWB broadcasts that any enemy who take mass reprisals against the civil population as a result of Patriot activities will be dealt with as war criminals. A copy of the latest broadcast on this subject is attached for your information. This will continually be kept before the enemy through the agency of FWB.

[C. Hardy]

LIEUT.-GENERAL,
CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

SECRET

8433 24

ACTION AGO

For INFORMATION ONLY

URGENT REQUIRED S-0000

740463

OCT 18 1964

URGENT

CITE: P-0000

19 OCT Recd

Confidential

SECRET. Reference our E36036 of 8 October. Reply urgently required as to position in this matter.

Sec 22
(Comment in Transmission)

SECRET

ACTION: C.A. Sec 3

INFO: C.A.S. Sec

1/00

Pol Sec

Army Sec

Directorate Dr

I. Sec

File (S)

SECRET



1272

OCT 19 1964

SECRET

file
3201
22

9087

AFHQ

ADD HQ
5087

19 Oct 44

Confidential
8

SECRET
PRIORITY
CDS Sec.

SECRET PD BEING DISCLOSED FULLY AT THIS HEADQUARTERS IN THE MATTER REFERRED TO
IN YOUR FAX THREE SIX EIGHT THREE SIX OF REPLY OCTOBER PD PARA 10 AND THE OTHER
FIVE PAGES ADD HQ PARA INFORMATION CDS MEMORANDUM HAVE DISSEMINATED PD REPLY WILL
BE SENT EARLIEST

25

L. F. BENTLEY, Jr.
1st Lt ADD
ADJUTANT
1271

SECRET

SUBJECT: Comitato di Liberazione.

320144 Local Govt Sec 21

Adv Headquarters,
Allied Armies in Italy.

16/10/44 (Ops)

16 Oct 44.

18 OCT Recd

Chief of Staff,
H.Q., Allied Control Commission.

Reference your 1021/4/1/60/INT dated 11 Oct, with which you enclosed a Directive which you propose for use of ABC Officers.

General Harding suggests that paragraph 5 might with advantage be worded as follows, in order that there should be no doubt in the minds of ABC officers regarding our attitude towards the Comitato should they not immediately "see the line".

"5. At the same time the Comitato di Liberazione must be treated with courtesy and their advice and views may be sought by the Provincial Commissioner or the Prefect. It is entirely a matter for the Provincial Commissioner after consultation with the Prefect to consider whether in any particular case the advice of the Comitato is to be followed or rejected. If the Comitato attempt to exercise executive functions and to usurp the authority of the Prefect they must be stopped at once. If instructions to that effect are not followed by the Comitato then the Provincial Commissioner will take steps to ensure that his orders are carried out and as a last resort dissolve the Comitato. If necessary the Provincial Commissioner, subject to the concurrence of the Regional Commissioner or MAC Army concerned, will ask the local military commander to assist him for this purpose."

I telephoned the suggested amendment to Prince James, who said that he would pass them to your Headquarters. This letter is therefore only an explanation.

17/10/44

17/10/44

to usurp the authority of the Prefect they must be stopped at once. If instructions to that effect are not followed by the Comitate then the Provincial Commissioner will take steps to ensure that his orders are carried out and as a last resort dissolve the Comitate. If necessary the Provincial Commissioner, subject to the concurrence of the Regional Commissioner or SACO Army concerned, will ask the local military commander to assist him for this purpose.

I telephoned the suggested amendment to Friend James, who said that he would pass them to your headquarters. This letter is therefore only in explanation.

22/11/63

Mailbox

for
Lieut General,
Chief of General Staff.

1271

SUBJECT: Comitato di Liberazione

32014 Local Govt Ltr 9m 21

Adv Headquarters,
Allied Armies in Italy.

16/10/44

16 Oct 44.

18 OCT Recd

Chief of Staff,
R.G., Allied Control Commission.

Reference your letter of 11 Oct, with which you enclosed a Directive which you propose for use of AMI Officers.

General Harding suggests that paragraph 6 might with advantage be amended as follows, in order that there should be no doubt in the minds of AMI officers regarding our attitude towards the Comitato should they not immediately "use the line".

"6. At the same time the Comitato di Liberazione must be treated with courtesy and their advice and views may be sought by the Provincial Commissioner or the Prefect. It is entirely a matter for the Provincial Commissioner after consultation with the Prefect to consider whether in any particular case the advice of the Comitato is to be followed or rejected. If the Comitato attempts to exercise executive functions and to usurp the authority of the Prefect they must be stopped at once. If contravention to that effect are not followed by the Comitato then the Provincial Commissioner will take steps to ensure that his orders are carried out and as a last resort dissolve the Comitato. If necessary the Provincial Commissioner, subject to the concurrence of the Regional Commissioner or MGAF Army concerned, will ask the local military commander to assist him for this purpose."

I telephoned the suggested amendment to Friend James, who said that he could pass them to your Headquarters. This letter is therefore only in explanation.

Attended by

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Commissioner after consultation with the Provincial Commissioner in any particular case the advice of the Comitate is to be followed or rejected. If the Comitate attempt to exercise executive functions and to usurp the authority of the Prefect they must be stopped at once. If instructions to that effect are not followed by the Comitate then the Provincial Commissioner will take steps to ensure that his orders are carried out and as a last resort dissolve the Comitate. If necessary the Provincial Commissioner, subject to the concurrence of the Regional Commissioner or SDAO Army concerned, will ask the local military commander to assist him for this purpose.

I telephoned the suggested amendment to Primal Jones, who said that he would pass them to your Headquarters. This letter is therefore only an explanation.

12/1/76

Handwritten signature

for
Lieut General,
Chief of General Staff.

127

520124

720 20

Subject: Com Do di Liberazione

1. All Affairs Section
HQ Allied Armies in Italy
THU: PUPPER 132

To: Chief of Staff, A.C.O. ✓
30340

DOCAO/S/5A
26 Oct 44

18 OCT Recd

1. The H.C.S. telephoned me this morning and asked me to say that the C.O.S. approved, in principle, the proposed directive for the use of AAG officers. He wished, however, to make para. 6, with your concurrence, rather more downright as it was his view that if the Comitato di Liberazione had a loophole, they might take a mile where only a yard was intended.

2. The suggested phraseology of para. 6 is as follows:

"At the same time the Comitato di Liberazione must be treated with courtesy and their advice and views may be sought by the Provincial Commissioner or the Prefect. It is entirely a matter for the Provincial Commissioner after consultation with the Prefect to consider whether in any particular case the advice of the Comitato is to be followed or rejected. If the Comitato attempts to exercise executive functions and to usurp the authority of the Prefect they must be stopped at once. If instructions to that effect are not followed by the Comitato then the Provincial Commissioner will take steps to ensure that his orders are carried out and as a last resort dissolve the Comitato. If necessary, the Provincial Commissioner, subject to the concurrence of the Regional Commissioner, or AAG Army Commander, will ask the local military commander to assist him for this purpose."

3. You will receive confirmation in writing from the H.C.S. in 48 hours.

Thurston Jones
Lt. Col., DMO

rec 10

whether in any particular, give the advice of the Comptroller is to be followed or rejected. If the Comptroller attempts to exercise executive functions and to usurp the authority of the Prefect they must be stopped at once. If instructions to that effect are not followed by the Comptroller then the Provincial Commissioner will take steps to ensure that his orders are carried out and as a last resort dissolve the Comptroller. If necessary, the Provincial Commissioner, subject to the concurrence of the Regional Commissioner or the Army concerned, will ask the local military commander to assist him for this purpose.

3. You will receive confirmation in writing from the R.C.S. in 48 hours.

Christophers

Lt. Col., 1950

see 10

1201

18.
TREATMENT OF COMITATI DI LIBERAZIONE.

1. Recent events have made it desirable to clarify the position and standing of local Comitati di Liberazione, and to lay down the policy to be adopted by AME officers in their dealings with these bodies.
2. In Allied Military Government territory the Provincial Commissioner who is the local representative of the Military Governor is supreme in his province and he is responsible for the conduct of affairs there.
3. In carrying out his functions the Provincial Commissioner uses the local civil administration where a Prefect has been appointed he is head of and represents the local civilian administration and is the person to whom the Provincial Commissioner gives his orders. The Prefect on his part is responsible to the Provincial Commissioner for seeing that the orders given by the latter are fully and properly carried out.
4. It follows therefore that the Provincial Commissioner must on his part give his full support and weight of authority to the Prefect in the discharge of his duties. If the Provincial Commissioner no longer has confidence in the Prefect, it is his duty to ask his Regional Commissioner or the SCAG, AME Army to have him removed, in consultation with HQ AGC, but while the Prefect continues to enjoy such confidence the Provincial Commissioner must as stated above give him his full support and authority.
5. The local Comitato di Liberazione has no official standing in the conduct of affairs within the Province. Its members must not be permitted to assume any executive functions, to appoint Commissioners or managers, or to set up any Commissions of Enquiry, or do any other executive acts within the Province. If it becomes desirable to appoint Commissioners or Commissions of Enquiry into any matter, it is the duty of the Provincial Commissioner to give the proper instructions to the Prefect.
6. At the same time the Comitato di Liberazione must be treated with courtesy and their advice and views may be sought by the Provincial Commissioner or the Prefect. It is entirely a matter for the Provincial Commissioner, after consultation with the Prefect, to consider whether in any particular case the advice of the Comitato is to be followed or rejected. If the Comitato attempt to exercise executive functions and to usurp the authority of the Prefect they must be stopped at once. If instructions to that effect are not followed by the Comitato then the Provincial Commissioner will take steps to ensure that his orders are carried out and, as a last resort, dissolve the Comitato. If necessary, the Provincial Commissioner, subject to the concurrence of the Regional Commissioner or S.J.A.C., may recommend, will ask the local Military Commander to assist him for this purpose.

5. The local Comitato di Liberazione has no official standing in the conduct of affairs within the Province. Its members must not be permitted to assume any executive functions, to appoint Commissioners or managers, or to set up any Commissions of Enquiry, or do any other executive acts within the Province. If it becomes desirable to appoint Commissioners or Commissions of Enquiry into any matter, it is the duty of the Provincial Commissioner to give the proper instructions to the Prefect.

6. At the same time the Comitato di Liberazione must be treated with courtesy and their advice and views may be sought by the Provincial Commissioner or the Prefect. It is entirely a matter for the Provincial Commissioner, after consultation with the Prefect, to consider whether in any particular case the advice of the Comitato is to be followed or rejected. If the Comitato attempt to exercise executive functions and to usurp the authority of the Prefect they must be stopped at once. If instructions to that effect are not followed by the Comitato then the Provincial Commissioner will take steps to ensure that his orders are carried out and, as a last resort, dissolve the Comitato. If necessary, the Provincial Commissioner, subject to the concurrence of the Regional Commissioner or J.C.A.C., Army concerned, will ask the local Military Commander to assist him for this purpose.

1205

1372

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/HND No. 785017

C.O.J.

17

Colonel Spicer, who has not
yet returned is in possession
of the only copy of the
directive referred to by Lt
Col. Friend-James. I submit
the attached as it stands
for information

PR
16/10

DECATO

Please include in Director's
file 17/11

16

MEMORANDUM

TO: Chief of Staff,
Deputy Chief of Staff, Forward.

16.16.52

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Lt. Colonel Priest-James.

Lt. Colonel Priest-James rang me up this afternoon and dictated the Memorandum below which is being sent off from his office today:-

The D.C.C.S. telephoned me this morning and asked me to say that the C.O.S. approved in principle the proposed directive for the use of A.M.G. officers. He wished, however, to make Paragraph 6, with your concurrence, rather more down-right, as it was his view that if the Comitate di Liberazione had a long-haul they might take a wife where only a yard was intended.

The suggested phraseology of Paragraph 6 should be as follows:-

"At the same time the Comitate di Liberazione must be treated with courtesy and their advice and views may be sought by the Provincial Commissioner or the Prefect."

It is entirely a matter for the Provincial Commissioner, after consultation with the Prefect, to consider whether in any particular case the advice of the Comitate is to be followed or rejected. If the Comitate attempts to usurp executive functions and to usurp the authority of the Prefect they must be stopped at once. If instructions to that effect are not followed by the Comitate then the Provincial Commissioner will take steps to ensure that his orders are carried out and, as a last resort, dissolve the Comitate. If necessary, the Provincial Commissioner, subject to the concurrence of the Regional Commissioner or S.C.A.O., may consider, will ask the local Military Commander to assist him for this purpose."

P. Russell

File to Chief of Staff.

and their advice and views may be sought by the Provincial Commissioner or the Prefect.

It is entirely a matter for the Provincial Commissioner, after consultation with the Prefect, to consider whether in any particular case the advice of the Committee is to be followed or rejected. If the Committee attempts to exercise executive functions and to usurp the authority of the Prefect they must be stopped at once. If instructions to that effect are not followed by the Committee then the Provincial Commissioner will take steps to ensure that his orders are carried out and, as a last resort, dissolve the Committee. If necessary, the Provincial Commissioner, subject to the concurrence of the Regional Commissioner or S.C.A.O., Army concerned, will ask the local Military Commander to assist him for this purpose."

P. Russell

P.A. to Chief of Staff.

Dec 10-9

1971

15 TREATMENT OF COMITATI DI LIBERAZIONE II

1. Recent events have made it desirable to clarify the position and standing of local Comitati di Liberazione, and to lay down the policy to be adopted by ASG officers in their dealings with these bodies.
2. In Allied Military Government territory the Provincial Commissioner who is the local representative of the Military Governor is supreme in his province and he is responsible for the conduct of affairs there.
3. In carrying out his functions the Provincial Commissioner uses the local civil administration; where a Prefect has been appointed he is head of and represents the local civilian administration and in the person to whom the Provincial Commissioner gives his orders. The Prefect on his part is responsible to the Provincial Commissioner for seeing that the orders given by the latter are fully and properly carried out.
4. It follows therefore that the Provincial Commissioner must on his part give his full support and weight of authority to the Prefect in the discharge of his duties. If the Provincial Commissioner no longer has confidence in the Prefect, it is his duty to ask his Regional Command officer or the JMO, ASG Army to have him removed, in consultation with HQ AGF, but while the Prefect continues to enjoy such confidence the Provincial Commissioner must as stated above give him his full support and authority.
5. The local Comitato di Liberazione has no official standing in the conduct of affairs within the Province. Its members must not be permitted to assume any executive functions, to appoint Commissioners or managers, or to set up any Committees of Inquiry, or do any other executive acts within the Province. If it becomes desirable to appoint Commissioners or Committees of Inquiry into any matter, it is the duty of the Provincial Commissioner to give the proper instructions to the Prefect.

6. At the same time the Comitato di Liberazione can fulfill many useful functions in an advisory and consultative capacity. They must always be treated with courtesy and their advice and views may be sought by the Provincial Commissioner or the Prefect. It is entirely a matter for the Provincial Commissioner after consultation with the Prefect to consider whether in any particular case the advice of the Comitato is to be followed or rejected. If the Comitato attempt to exercise executive functions and to usurp the authority of the Prefect they must be informed courteously but firmly that their activities in this direction must immediately cease. If these instructions are not followed by the Comitato then it is the duty of the Provincial Commissioner to take steps to bring them into line.

5. The local Comitate di Liberazione has no official standing in the conduct of affairs within the Province. Its members must not be permitted to exercise any executive functions; to appoint Commissioners or managers, or to set up any Commissions of Inquiry, or do any other executive acts within the Province. If it becomes desirable to appoint Commissioners or Commissions of Inquiry into any matter, it is the duty of the Provincial Commissioner to give the proper instructions to the Prefect.

6. At the same time the Comitate di Liberazione can fulfill many useful functions in an advisory and consultative capacity. They must always be treated with courtesy and their advice and views may be sought by the Provincial Commissioner or the Prefect. It is entirely a matter for the Provincial Commissioner after consultation with the Prefect to consider whether in any particular case the advice of the Comitate is to be followed or rejected. If the Comitate attempt to exercise executive functions and to usurp the authority of the Prefect they must be informed courteously but firmly that their activities in this direction must immediately cease. If these instructions are not followed by the Comitate then it is the duty of the Provincial Commissioner to take steps to insist upon his orders being carried out and ultimately as a last resort to dissolve the Comitate. If necessary the Provincial Commissioner, subject to the concurrence of the Regional Commissioner or SOAD Army concerned, may ask the local military commander to assist him for this purpose.

2701 73417
cos. Lu

SECRET
HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CENTRAL COMMAND
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION
APO 394

14

Confidential 17 OCT 1944

SUBJECT: Enemy Partisans.

TO: Regional Commanders, Liguria, Piemonte, Lombardia, Venezia and Emilia Romagna (Area Milan), SACs 9th & 8th Armies.

1. The arrest and prosecution of members of the civil population for bearing arms against the Allied Forces raise very difficult problems of international law.

2. In some cases no official answer exists to these problems and in others the answers given are based upon the nature of many years ago and are manifestly impractical in present day conditions.

3. The following comparison is based upon the official text books of international law, but the actual answers suggested to the problems raised are intended as a guide in practice and are not propounded for scientific juridical analysis.

4. Civilians are entitled to bear arms against the enemy if, but only if, they comply with the following conditions:-

- a. (i) They are commanded by a person responsible for their subordination and
- (ii) They wear a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance; and
- (iii) They carry arms openly; and
- (iv) They conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war; and possibly also - but as to this see para 5 -
- (v) They are receiving instruction by our forces, or

b. They form part of a home defense.

5. The following answers are suggested to some of the questions which naturally arise out of these conditions.

6. a.

(i) Guerrilla warfare is officially recognized. It is felt therefore that it is unnecessary for the commander to be given notification of his subordinates - or even in direct communication, provided that

4. (i) They are commanded by a person responsible for their subordinates; and
 - (ii) They wear a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance; and
 - (iii) They carry arms openly; and
 - (iv) They conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war; and possibly also - but as to this see para 9.
 - (v) They are resisting invasion by our forces, or
5. They form part of a lawful force.
 6. The following answers are suggested to some of the questions which naturally arise out of these conditions.

6. 1.

(1)

Gerrilla warfare is officially recognized. It is felt therefore that it is unnecessary for the commander to be within ear-shot of his subordinates - or even in wireless communication, provided that he has in fact allotted a role to his subordinates and left him to carry it out. If in fact there exists any organization, this should be treated as an adequate compliance with this condition and a statement by the "commander" that he was acting under orders should, if believed, be sufficient evidence of compliance with this condition.

7. 2.

(ii)

What is meant by fixed? Distinctive emblem? A distance? Fixed cannot be taken to mean irremovable since the British Home Guard wore originally only a removable armband. If at any material time the emblem can be shown to have been removed, obviously the accused was not "wearing" it. The word must therefore be taken to mean "established" or "recognized". In other words it is sufficient if all members of some force wear the same emblem, which by this uniformity becomes established, but it is inadequate if the "recognized" emblem used has been of the most casual nature. Italian partisans habitually wear red scarfs as their only emblem. The safest course is to accept any identifiable peculiarity of clothing or mark, especially worn and recognizable "at a distance", as a distinctive emblem for this purpose.

- 1 -

SECRET

1265

A reasonable test for the distance at which the action must be recognizable would seem to be that when the viewer is exposed to view the emblem must be recognizable at convenient small arms range - 100 to 500 yards - in normal light and by the naked eye. It must be appreciated that it is a question of fact in each case whether, in the full circumstances, a particular uniform is sufficient. The standard is plainly not high for arm bands have been considered by the Allies to be sufficient both for the British line band and the R.P.I.

8. A.

(iii) & (iv) is not thought that any difficulty arises on these conditions.

9. Text book writers add that in order for members of the civil population to be protected, they must be visible during the period of invasion, and that this right to resist ceases on occupation. In view, however, of the declaration that, in occupied France, the IFF are to be treated as part of the armed forces it is very doubtful how far this requirement can now be pressed. The other requirements in paragraph 4 A would seem to provide sufficient safeguards against the ordinary soldier, and it appears dangerous to insist upon a condition which is manifestly at variance with the declared policy of the United Nations.

10. As to a larve en masse - there are 2 kinds of larve which for convenience may be called "spontaneous" and "directed".

A "spontaneous" larve occurs when the inhabitants of a territory which has not been occupied... the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading troops without having had time to organize.

A "directed" larve consists of members of the peaceful population who under similar circumstances are called to arms by a lieutenant and that same part, if an irregular part, of the armed forces.

11. In the case of a spontaneous larve it would seem that if they do take up arms spontaneously on the approach of the enemy they are only required to carry their arms openly and observe the laws and customs of war. Their rights as a larve en masse and even occupation but if thereafter they comply with the requirements of para 4 A (i)-(iv) the remarks in para 5 appear to apply.

10. As to a levee en masse - there are 2 kinds of levees which for convenience may be called "spontaneous" and "directed".

A "spontaneous" levee occurs when

- the inhabitants of a territory which has not been occupied....to approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading troops without having had time to organize".

A "directed" levee consists of

- members of the peaceful population who under similar circumstances are called to arms by a belligerent and thus make part, if an irregular part, of the armed forces".

11. In the case of a spontaneous levee it would seem that if they do take up arms spontaneously &c the approach of the enemy they are only required to carry their arms openly and observe the laws and customs of war. Their rights as a levee en masse end upon occupation but if thereafter they comply with the requirements of para 4 A (1)-(17) the remarks in para 9 appear to apply.

12. The question that arises is what proportion of a local population is required to constitute a levee en masse. There is no definite answer to this, and perhaps theoretically there might be a case for a levee. In practice the test suggested is that there should be either (1) the mass of populated areas) a substantial body of men or (2) in other words) a substantial portion of the population.

13. In the case of a directed levee the people are called to form part of the armed forces. Obviously there must be a call to arms! If there is, are the citizens who answer required to conform to the laws of nations of the armed forces (para 4 A (1)-(16)) and do they remain members of the armed forces after occupation?

14. The practical answers appear to be:

(a) During the armistice stage they have the same status as a spontaneous levee, save that all citizens who answer the call and fight with the regular forces should be privileged, irrespective of their number.

(b) After occupation they have no rights unless they comply with the conditions - para 4 A (1)-(17).

13
Confidential

15. Finally it is emphasized that these instructions are intended only as a guide and that cases of difficulty will be referred to Legal Sub-Commission before prosecutions are instituted. While sniping by civilians must be of course vigorously suppressed and offenders punished in Allied Military Courts it is plain that grave harm by way of reprisals on our own POWs in German hands may result if any investigation is undertaken against enemy partisans when any case can be made for claiming protection for them under the rules which have been discussed above.

BY COMMAND OF JOINT CHIEF OF STAFF:

G. R. Mearns

G. R. MEARNS, Brigadier
V.D., C.B., D.S.O.,
Deputy Chief of Staff.

7782

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

1264

SECRET

3201

13A

Confidential

TOP SECRET

ALLIED FORCES HEADQUARTERS
INFORMATION AND CENSORSHIP SECTION
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH
ITALIAN FRONTIER HEADQUARTERS

DIRECTIVE ON ITALIAN PATRIOTS.

1. The campaign has reached a stage where a reaffirmation of our directive for propaganda to the patriots in Northern Italy is necessary. The purpose of this directive is to put the patriot activities into the proper perspective vis a vis the Allied Armies in Italy and the Italian Regular Army.
2. It is necessary not only because of the emergence of a new stage in the campaign but also because publicity given the patriots has inceptible grown to a point where it is out of proportion to the war effort in Italy not only of the Allies but also the Italian army.
3. A further reason is that there is evidence that certain elements in Italy are likely to make and indeed already to some extent have been making political capital out of the activities of the patriots, using as their basis Allied publicity.
4. The position is that the patriots have done and are doing damage behind the enemy lines. By their action they have harassed the enemy lines of communication and so have increased the enemy's security problem and have thereby contained a proportion of troops which might otherwise have been employed in the front line. To help them in their task the patriots have been supplied with arms, ammunition and supplies by the Allies. Without this aid the patriots would not have been able to take any effective action.
5. It must not be forgotten that not all patriots risk their lives to aid the Allied armies. Many have become patriots to avoid the German conscription of labour and deportation to Germany.
6. The strength of the patriots lies in their dispersion over the widest possible area, thus forcing the enemy to take the maximum security precautions. It is when they concentrate that their weakness is evident. They then offer a worth while target for enemy attack. In pitched battles they must suffer and are forced to disperse.
7. It is incorrect, therefore, to speak of the patriots as liberating any particular area; if they are in control of any one place it is because the Germans have withdrawn from that place and are for the moment not taking action. We should remember that it is the Allies who are liberating Italy with the help of the patriots. The patriots are unable to liberate of their own accord.

1263

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TOP SECRET

8. The patriots should not be regarded as existing as a body other than while fighting on the other side of the line. As soon as Allied armies overtake them their activities as fighting patriots cease and they become Italian citizens.

9. The foregoing is back ground to the recent directive to play down very gradually the activities of patriots to liberated Italy and to the rest of the world. It is essential that the qualification "very gradually" should be observed in order that there be no appearance of a new directive to this effect. We are fully aware of the part played by the patriots, for which they should have full credit.

10. The output in Italia Combatta is not affected by this and will continue on strictly military lines as in previous directives. The purpose of Italia Combatta is to give the over-all direction to the patriot movement and to give it maximum encouragement. The caution against the use of the term "liberation" noted above will be observed.

11. Activities of the Italian army will be played up fully both in Italia Combatta and in liberated Italy.

13.10.44

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/AND No. 785017

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HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394
handed 24/10/44

Ref. AOC/N/1/60/Int.

11th October 1944

SUBJECT : Comitato di Liberazione

15 OCT Recd

TO : HQ, Allied Armies in Italy

1. The attitude of the Comitato di Liberazione in VERONA has recently caused difficulty in the administration and embarrassment to the Italian Prefect. The Comitato, while undoubtedly performing good work in the early stages of occupation, is reported to have exercised executive functions which conflict with the position and authority of the Prefect whom we must recognize as the sole official representing the local civil administration.

2. It is reported that the Comitato has ordered nominations of various commissaries (or managers) of public concerns; that it has issued orders for operation and suspension of appointment of employees in public offices; that it has ordered the arrest and supervision of various persons; that it has directed the transfer of persons to concentration camps and has almost entirely ignored (to his natural embarrassment) the Prefect of the Province, who was appointed by AMG in consultation with the Italian Government.

3. It is quite probable that we shall meet with similar difficulties from Comitato in other parts of Northern Italy where their position is already strong.

4. I have therefore prepared a directive for the use of AMG officers which, if it has your approval, will be used as a basis on which to deal with the difficulties in VERONA and with any similar situation which may be found further North.

Rec 20
M.E. IDH

Brigadier
Chief of Staff,
For Acting Chief Commissioner

1262

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/WND No. 785017

FUNCTIONS OF COMITATO DI LIBERAZIONE

9

1. Recent events have made it desirable to clarify the position and standing of local Comitati di Liberazione, and to lay down the policy to be adopted by all officers in their dealings with these bodies.
2. In Allied Military Government territory the Provincial Commissioner who is the local representative of the Military Governor is supreme in his province and he is responsible for the conduct of affairs there.
3. In carrying out his functions the Provincial Commissioner uses the local civil administration, where a Prefect has been appointed he is head of and represents the local civilian administration and is the person to whom the Provincial Commissioner gives his orders. The Prefect on his part is responsible to the Provincial Commissioner for seeing that the orders given by the latter are fully and properly carried out.
4. It follows therefore that the Provincial Commissioner must on his part give his full support and weight of authority to the Prefect in the discharge of his duties. If the Provincial Commissioner no longer has confidence in the Prefect it is his duty to ask HQ AGC, through the Regional Commissioner or HQ AGC Army concerned, to remove him, but while the Prefect continues to enjoy such confidence the Provincial Commissioner must as stated above give him his full support and authority.
5. The local Comitato di Liberazione has no official standing in the conduct of affairs within the Province. Its members must not be permitted to exercise any executive functions, to appoint Commissioners or managers, or to set up any Committees of Inquiry, or do any other executive work within the Province. If it becomes desirable to appoint Commissioners or Committees of Inquiry into any matter, it is the duty of the Provincial Commissioner to give the proper instructions to the Prefect.
6. At the same time the Comitato di Liberazione can fulfill many useful functions in an advisory and consultative capacity. They must always be furnished with courtesy and their advice and views may be sought by the Provincial Commissioner or the Prefect. It is entirely a matter for the Provincial Commissioner after consultation with the Prefect to consider whether in any particular case the advice of the Comitato is to be followed or not. If the Comitato attempt to exercise executive functions and to

5. The local Comitate di Liberations has no official standing in the conduct of affairs within the Province. Its members must not be permitted to assume any executive functions, to appoint Commissioners or managers, or to set up any Commissions of Inquiry, or to any other executive acts within the Province. If it becomes desirable to appoint Commissioners or Commissions of Inquiry into any matter, it is the duty of the Provincial Comissionary to give the proper instructions to the Prefect.

6. At the same time the Comitate di Liberations can fulfill many useful functions in an advisory and consultative capacity. They must always be treated with courtesy and their advice and views may be sought by the Provincial Comissionary or the Prefect. It is entirely a matter for the Provincial Comissionary after consultation with the Prefect to consider whether in any particular case the advice of the Comitate is to be followed or rejected. If the Comitate attempts to exercise executive functions and to usurp the authority of the Prefect they must be informed courteously but firmly that their activities in this direction must immediately cease. If these instructions are not followed by the Comitate then it is the duty of the Provincial Comissionary to take steps to insist upon his orders being carried out and ultimately as a last resort to dissolve the Comitate. If necessary the Provincial Comissionary, subject to the concurrence of the Regional Comissionary or SCAD Army concerned, may ask the local military commander to assist him for this purpose.

~~Chatter~~ 1261
Amv Dec 15

SECRET

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

INCOMING MESSAGE

8

7379

TO: AOC

FROM: AFHQ SIGNED SIGNED
 REFERENCE No: P 35036
 DATE AND TIME OF ORIGIN: OCT 08 17 45A
 SIGNAL MESSAGE CENTER No: 25/09
 CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
 PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE
 OFFICE OF ORIGIN: CITE P1020

SECRET. Suggestion by combined Chiefs of Staff that if Italian Partisans fulfill conditions of Article 1 of Regulations appended to HAGUE Convention Number IV of 1907 a statement should be prepared for issuance by the Italian Govt stating the facts and demanding treatment as Prisoners of War in the event of capture by enemy. Such statement is to be submitted to this Hq and will not be issued until released here.

ACTION

Dist
 C.A. Sullivan (3)
 Action -
 Info - Pol Sec
 Army SC
 Patriots Br
 IPTW SC
 A/SC

Partisans fulfill conditions of Article 1 of Regulations appended to HAGUE Convention Number IV of 1907 a statement should be prepared for issuance by the Italian Govt stating the facts and demanding treatment as Prisoners of War in the event of capture by enemy. Such statement is to be submitted to this Hq and will not be issued until released here.

ACTION

See 22
125

Dist
CA Lulu
Action - ~~CA Lulu~~ (3)
Info - Pol Sec
Army SC
Futuristic Dr
IPON SC
A/CC
File

HEADQUARTERS
A. C. C.

SECRET

DATE and TIME of RECEIPT COT 090854A

Distribution:

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

7

To: Cos. ✓

① Buy Ulman article in to
find the attack and
all other to article
make a note — 6

② Let Council that the policy
should be dropped as
agreed, and as soon as
possible

R. R. G. Jr.

7 Oct 64

I don't think we can stop
this — but we can fix it
down. M/S (7/11259)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

6

Extract from 'Maple Leaf' dated Friday 6 October 44.

Call to Partisans
Against the Russian Government
After C. C. in Italy, in a recent
1944, promising, would Italian
Partisans in Northern Italy to im-
pale the German soldiers by every
means at their disposal. "When
the enemy is withdrawing, then
it is the time to show your courage
and the Italy made and not all
from the invaders," the General
said.

1258

To ~~CSO~~ C.O.S. / 1-4 5

I enclose herewith a further memo on Patient activities. All reports seem to be tending the same way i.e. that patients are overdone. I indicated that you have already asked P.W.B. to restrict their broadcasts to the minimum operational necessities.

Do you not think the time has come to consider a basic change in our policy? Perhaps you would like to bring this up at the next COS meeting.

6 Oct

GPR

1257

CSO

This is an odd way to produce suggestions for a basic change in policy! M/L/A

1793
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MINISTERO DELLE CORPORAZIONI
IL DIRETTORE GENERALE
DEL LAVORO E DELLA PROVVIDENZA SOCIALE

1794
Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

0 0 4
TO BE RETURNED TO POLITICAL SECTION

4 October 1944

To: Colonel McCarthy, Patriots Branch

From: Political Section

1-3

The attached memorandum from Colonel Wayne is on the lines of a good deal of the discussion at the last Stone meeting and I do not think that you or I would want to cavil at the opinion expressed. But surely the proper place to send such a letter would be to A.A.I.P. After all, it is they who laid down patriot policy north of the line; our job being simply with the aftermath.

Would you pass this to the Chief-of-Staff when you have finished with it for eventual return to Political Section.

HAC
H. A. SACCAIA

1258

0 HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
FIFTH ARMY
APO 444

3
10th September 1944.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL.

Harold Caccia, Esq.,
Political Section,
S2 ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION.

Dear Harold.

1-2

You remember our conversation the other day in Siena about Partisans - or Patriots? On returning here I happened to meet a chap (a Major) who deals with them on the other side and has lived with them. His views, I found, were even stronger than my own! Attached are some brief notes of his. As to the value of these people on the other side, it is not for AMG to have an opinion: the whole thing however is food for thought.

I wish we could see you up here sometimes.

Yours

Ed

Colonel R.B. Mayne.

CONFIDENTIAL

2
Florence, 29th September 1944.

In my opinion the time has come for serious thought to be given to future policy towards the Partisans. It must be clearly understood that I am not fully informed as to what is still being given to Patriots, nor to what extent our authorities intend to utilize them in the ensuing months of this war.

In the part of Italy still under Axis control there are x patriots. Each month very expensive services are made for the purpose of supplying these patriots with, among other things, arms.

In liberated Italy there are x highly paid officers of the Allied Army working full time on "Patriot Problems" (I exclude other ranks, typists, motor-car drivers, signallers, etc., etc.).

Patriots have been extremely useful in liberating Italy; had there been no Patriots whatsoever in Italy some months might well have been added to the Allied time table.

HOWEVER, the patriots have now served their purpose. Their propaganda value has been enormous, - their psychological value on the Germans and Fascists has likewise been enormous; - but, their military value (never very great) is nil. The Germans, belatedly have now got the measure of the patriots. Their action of last week in shooting two influential members of the Comitato di Liberazione, in Bologna, the fierce and ruthless reprisals executed by the Germans, the periodic "razzamenti" are the Germans' answer to his Patriot Problem.

From now on every single weapon infiltrated to patriots in Northern Italy is a weapon the more, which will one day have to be forced out of unwilling hands.

This may be unfortunate for certain small groups of good men badly in need of arms but I submit this is of no importance when a large view is taken.

In spite of the popular opinion I am convinced that the expense of coping with "Patriot Problems" from now on, far outweighs the value they have had and might have, in the future.

0 - 2 - Confidential

Again, in my opinion the policy should be:

- a. Ignore the patriots from now on.
- b. Let patriots in occupied territory do what they wish.
- c. Let our forward elements make contact with and utilize the services of such patriots as they meet, as, and how, the immediate military situation demands.
- d. Let it be known in newly liberated territory that any Italian, as distinct from patriot, who wishes to continue fighting the Hun can do so by joining the Corpo Italiano della Liberazione.
- e. That all elements, irrespective of what they may claim to have done, or to have been, be considered as civilians, with the rights, responsibilities and duties of civilians and citizens.

The Patriot Problem then resolves itself into nothing more than a problem of occupied enemy territory. The Allied Military Government has its own machinery for maintaining law and order among civilians. Any civilian, for example, found in possession of arms, (and note that I use the word "civilian" and not "patriot") should, after due warning, be given the severest punishment as an example to others (civilians) who might consider it a good thing to harbour arms.

3201

CSO

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
INTERIOR AND COMMISSION
APO 394

95/Pat

16.9.44

SUBJECT: Formation of Italian Patriot Committee

For distribution below.

The Italian Government have set up an Italian Patriot Committee under the Chairmanship of the Prime Minister with the following terms of reference:-

1. The Commission will be called "Commissions per i Patrioti".
2. It will be provided over by the Prime Minister and, in his absence, the Under Secretary of State to the Presidency.
3. The members will be:-

M. Mario R. L. L. L., Under Secretary of State for War.

M. L. L. L. L., Under Secretary of State for Press and Information.

Dr. L. L. L. L. or other representatives of the C. L. L. N.

General C. L. L. L. (Military)

4. The directives of the Commission will be carried out by a corresponding "Ufficio Patrioti". The work will be undertaken by military and civilian personnel.

5. The head of this, Lt. Col. R. L. L. L., will also be Secretary of the "Commissions".

In their relations with the Allied Control Commission and the AG and AG Section, Officers of this Commission will reciprocally deal with this Italian Patriot Committee through the Patriot Branch and not direct.

324

1799

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

324.5

1158 (M.L.)

(U.S. LHM) Brigadier, Executive Organization.

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A/C C.

For Information

Q.

NTB

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1. Mario P. ... Chief Secretary of State for ...

2. ... Under Secretary of State for ...

3. ... or other representatives of the ...

4. The directives of the Organization will be carried out by a corresponding "Officio Patriote". The work will be undertaken by military and civilian personnel.

5. The head of this, Lt. Col. ... will also be Secretary of the "Organization".

In their relations with the allied Control Organization and the ... this Committee will deal with the Patriot Branch of the ... and ... Section. Officers of this Organization will reciprocally deal with this Italian Patriot Committee through the Patriot Branch and not direct.

Material

2 (Group 1)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

A/CG 324.5 (95/PAT)

6 September 1944

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am writing to thank you for your letter of 4 September 1944 in which you explain how you propose to set up the "Commissione per i Patrioti". I am pleased to think that this Commission can start work immediately and have instructed our Patriot Branch to arrange with you without delay details in connection with procedure and requirements.

I agree with you that a commission should be made for the information of the Patriots in Northern Italy in order to explain to them that your Committee has started to operate.

I am making arrangements for this to be done.

Yours very truly,

ELBERT W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Coordinator

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi,
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government,
Rome.

Ms ACC Secy Gen
DISPATCHED
Date Time 7 Sept 1944
By May Ck
Initials JTS

(Drafted by Patriot Branch RC & RI Sect)

c.e. Col. McCarthy - Patriot Branch.

FILES A-B

1801