

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

ACC

10000/104/642
(VOL. II)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

10000/104/642
(VOL. II)

PATRIOT POLICY
DEC. 1944 - MAR. 1945

Declassified by: [illegible] on [illegible] at [illegible]

3001/1

TOP SECRET

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE

117 [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Confidential

[illegible]

THREATS

Value

THE 2007/08 [illegible] of [illegible]

[illegible]

CLOSING

1805

DECLASSIFIED

DATE 08/21/00 BY 1040

ENC 2207/605 - Encl of P. L. ...
... ..

CLOSED

1009/609/602

CONTAINER #1009
FROM: ...
TO: ...
DATE: ...

197

Note: Reference { no 186 513 pages (165 (Final)
has not been received at this HQ. but letter
and 14 pages Tuller spoke on the telephone today
and agreed that letter signed 14/12/77.

22 Feb 78

→ Com 20 1877

[Signature]

207

Letter to issue

Copy of 185,205 & 186 to G.O., PSI Sec

CAS & PRO

MS (11/3)

→ Com 1877

207

Ex. Com

Sir,

File submitted for you to comment on Major Secretary's
report as indicated in the penultimate para of your letter
to Mr. Rayner at 207.

1877

1877

207

Political Adviser

V.P. C.A.S.

I should be grateful for your comment -

207
1877

(See 234, 235, 236)

MS (13/3)

See memo.

17B

177

14 see legend opposite which
refers to a sign which was
not addressed to us. There
is no action necessary.

7/17/12

8/17/12

~~180~~

P. 179. See. No action here but we must find

out what was decided at Sacramento PD meeting

See 189

7/18/12

8/24/12

185

Executive Coordination:

At LA is the Draft Plan for Externals in N.Y. Italy prepared by CA Gen
which was discussed at a meeting of the N.Y. Italy Planning Committee this
evening. The Minutes will be available shortly, but in the meantime you
might like to know the main points:

out what was decided at Sacramento PD meeting
See 189
Ms 20/2

Executive Commission:

185

It is the intent of the plan for Patriots in U.S. Italy prepared by CA Sec. which was discussed at a meeting of the U.S. Italy Planning Committee this morning. The minutes will be available shortly, but in the meantime you might like to know the main points:

1. The meeting agreed that without power to requisition or hire vehicles the scheme just would not work. It is all based on this power.
2. In this connection it was also agreed that even if we get power to requisition and hire, this must only be done by the Allies and the Italians must not be allowed either to requisition or hire.
3. Reference Appendix 'A' at 152, para. 11, it was agreed to include "Commissions" in the documentation register.
4. Reference Appendix 'A' on reverse of 152, para. 5, regarding ratings for the recruiting agencies, Brig. OFFICE agreed to take up with Lord Powers 4/2, so that these recruiting agencies could be utilized by the Italian Army as are the Italian military patriot representatives.
5. The question of vehicles for the Italian military patriot representatives was also discussed, and Brig. OFFICE will bring it up at the next meeting of the Br. Commission.
6. Col. MARSHALL said he would like 3 recruiting agencies in his region; the other two did not express an opinion (only one in his team in Appendix 'A').

23 February 45.

My/np

U.S.A.C.

271

V.P. CAS

Py. Sec. number 170 overleaf.
I have had the "action" changed
to your section.

Examination
17/2

To: *Examine*
172

Hand 170 after

V.P. in number 170 to paper which is
considered with 172, in number with 170
which the 6 sheet with 172000 - which is not
not they planing in 172 21 500
the paper is not the one which is signed &
opposed of 172

RR

17/2
172

CAS See that we are kept informed 17/2

Should the 4th Street will 785017, 14/2/78

Not any planning in 14/2/78

Mr. [unclear] at the [unclear] in [unclear]

opposite of [unclear]

785017

CPS

785017
14/2/78

174

CPS See that we are kept informed 18/2/78

174

Capt. Madden

I will attend meeting on 21/2. Can
you let me know time & place
please. 18/2/78

175

14/2

C50

Ref 174 meeting is in Room 4, 1st floor at
10.00 hrs.

14/2

CSO 159
 Ref revised directive referred to in '66
 I am informed this still rests between
 CRS + DCOS.

Th

7 Feb 68

160
 Directive will be submitted on 7/2 160/82

165
 Draft telegram for discussion with Gen R. D. ...
165/82

(160)

165
 Show to CAO (in presence of DCOS CAS) etc.
 Thought it necessary to will take up at ARMD.
165/82

166
 Los discussed with CAO. We
 have await decision.

166
 11/12

166
 11/12

DS/92

166

has discussed with CAO. We

have a similar decision.

~~very~~
VH/92

8/1/72

169

Executive

Att'y signed a Petition at 168.

It is subject approved by CCS. —
and if approved then we will be 1982
responsible to post a letter for an
unspecified number to up to 3
months. Hospitalization by Italian
military. 17/1/72.

130

This requires coordination between CAO, LFSC,
DECAO & NW Italy Planning. Please ask VP/CAE
to arrange.
17/1/72.

Continued from
memo 151

149 was discussed point by point.

paras 2 and 7 (a) & (b) were agreed to be very obscure and capable of very different interpretation. However, it was thought that like the foodwill of land fairs the principle that Patients were to be (for up to 30 days) to be continued the same & other actions could be made to work.

Ref para 3 - this name has already been made

Para 4 This will replace the paragraph in para 3 to MIRA.

20/11

I agree. I hope that the ambiguity will be solved in a moment.
De (20/11)

1461

148.

TO: COS

Polio 147, personal for Brig. Lush

9 Jan 45

ben

Co. 1st Bn. 8th

If info for

/s/ W. W. Schott
Political Section

150

150174
JAN 19 1945

So to cc

Will to please tell cc that
we are having a meeting
on 20!

See Summary
by VP/Den
Political Branch
Sally

in the dictionary at 149.

Edwin Ryle

19/1/45

Am now 20:

See Summary
by Up/Den
Patrick's Branch
Self

in the decision at 149.

Excluded
19/11/45.

151

At 151 C.I.O. K.C.O.I. (unsub - entry)

C.I.O. has been note of 150.

TA Quamby
19/11/45.

152

Meeting: 20.1.45
by Up/Den (20.1.45)
by Up/Den (20.1.45)
by Up/Den (20.1.45)
by Up/Den (20.1.45)
by Up/Den (20.1.45)
by Up/Den (20.1.45)

P.T.O. has page

128.

Chief of Staff.

1. Reference folio 127, I consider the opening sentence ("Normal source of supply of clothing for patriots is AF") should be challenged. I have not seen this anywhere in writing before. It conflicts with the spirit of 123, where it is said "Patriots coming through our lines will be afforded treatment similar to that accorded to Italian Army" and it is contrary to what we have recommended in our letter to AFHQ of 26 December 1944, paragraph 5(b) (Folio 114).
2. The action on 123 has been altered by Message Centre to the Land Forces Sub-Commission and this, I think, correctly interprets the meaning of the signal although the signal is addressed to AFHQ as well as to Land Forces. 127, however, is sent to both of us for information and Info-Action has therefore, in my opinion, correctly been left distributed between Patriots Branch and Land Forces.
3. I think that before taking up the matter officially with AFHQ we should consult Civil Affairs Section and Land Forces Sub-Commission as to where the responsibility for clothing patriots should lie.

128a

Then action & P. C.A. to be taken up with AFHQ

produce a draft

6 January 1945.

W. J. G. P. H. C.

Lt. Col.
C.S.O.
to C.O.S.

131

We should have a copy of the undertaking - Ref 130.

M. S. L. S. H. K.

131 141

We record

Spoke my Drage ref 138

para 11. He did not think there was anything in it as patriots know each other & meet

we should have a copy of the undertaking - Ref 130.

M. S. LUSH

131

141

For record

Spoke Maj Dwyer ref 138.

para 11. - He did not think there was anything in it as patriots know each other & want non patriots attaching themselves for what they can get out of it.

para 12. - He said the view was held that the army has a political background.

para 13. - In general patriots will not allow themselves to be treated as refugees.

13 Jan 45

142

CSO

At 139 is copy of the undertaking asked for in minutes 131. Do you require any circulation of it?

12 Jan 45

Yes pl. para 13. to be sent to the 1st. Sec. by Col. Smith. Sh.

Chief of Staff

100.00

Defective latent cable in G2J problem, at 100 is the last of proposed agreement between Italian Government and CIA. 110 is SUTTER's report of Clause 3.

26 December 1944.

112

Major
Chief of Staff.

This is the first I have seen of any of these telegrams -
with results that when AFICQ telephoned about
p 1 on 24/10 I never knew nothing about the subject.
What has gone wrong?

112/20/44

Spoke Col. to 112

Col. 112
To be 112

Is 112 Sum by our 112 112

112

Col.

Transferred to file 207/100

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Col

To be sent by

15 12/12 See by ans. 10 12/12

107

121

Col

A. See 106/120

Transferred to file 307/100

Drafted by me

W. J. 12/12

12/12

Copy sent to Sec. 10 12/12

W. J. 12/12

1432

1820

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

32

21

10: AFTER GEORGE FIVE SITE BEGINS

344

13 MAY 45

PRIORITY
MAY 13 1945

Confidential

Handwritten signature/initials

SECRET PD

PARA ONE PD HAVE YOU RECEIVED ANY REPLY TO YOUR MAILABLE FOR NIGHT SIX
FOUR PD

LEADS TO AREA GEORGE FIVE SITE BEGINS FROM ALON SITE ACCAS PARR

PARA TWO PD THE DECISION IS URGENTLY AWAITED PLANNING IS EXTREMELY
DIFFICULT WITHOUT IT

BY SUBMITTER

Base Code
File Branch

1437

Civil Affairs Sec

608

R.A. CRIPPS Col

NICHOLAS PIERRE
CWO USA
Asst Adjutant

Handwritten notes and stamps

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref: 3901/157/52.

11 March 1945.

CONFIDENTIAL
Confidential

My dear Bayner:

Thank you for your letter of 2nd March, which I only received on 9th March, with the news about Major Gavronsky.

The first thing that strikes me is that it is somewhat extraordinary that an officer should be sent to Switzerland to make a report on the political conditions in Northern Italy without consultation or the knowledge of the Chief Commissioner, and secondly, that he should produce a report on 15th February which is sent to the Allied Commission, not as a matter of course, but incidentally, attached to a DI letter from you.

As you know, it is vital that the Allied Commission should receive prompt information about all matters affecting the political situation in Northern Italy. If officers of PVB are being sent to that area or to neighbouring countries, I would ask that the Commission be consulted with regard to any special information which we may wish to acquire and be given information on general and particular subjects as soon as it is available to PVB.

I will comment on Major Gavronsky's report in due course.

I am sending a copy of this correspondence to AFHQ.

Yours sincerely,

(signed) Maurice Lush.

Mr. John Bayner,
Head, P.V.B.,
15th Army Group,
APO 512, US Army.

Copy to: G-5 AFHQ
Pol Div
CA Sec
PR Branch

With copy of previous
correspondence

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

REF. 3201/265/30.

Confidential

Ref. 3201/265/30.

12 March 1945.

SUBJECT: Patriotic Problem in R. ITALY.

TO : VP, CA Section.

1. In reply to your letter RM/16/18/CA of 5 March 1945, herewith for your retention copy of JPS Study No. 2/265 (Final).

2. In accordance with Conclusion 7(c) of the Minutes of SACRED's Political Conference of 20 February 1945, (copy forwarded you under this office letter J201/190/20 of 20 February) the last sentence has been deleted from para 5 of JPS Study No. 2/265 (Final).

/JS.

Chief Staff Officer,
to the Executive Commissioner.

Copy to: 20 to CC (with copy of JPS Study No. 2/265
Pol Adv (Final and to note para 2 above).
Land Forces Sub-Commission (SLIA)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH
P. W. B. UNIT No. 14 - A. P. O. 512

CONFIDENTIAL

2nd March, 1945.

MAR 8 1945

Dear Brigadier

Your letter of the 23rd of February about Major Gavronsky:

The position is this. He is a member of the PWB combat team which is headquartered at Nice with an outpost at Grenoble. This team is known as PWB 'F' Force, the code name being FILTER, and is under the command of Lt. Colonel MacFarlane who was our staff officer at AAI.

The 'F' Force combat team is operating on the same principle as our combat teams with the 5th and 8th Armies with the difference that dissemination of leaflets by air and artillery is very much less, and the gathering of intelligence and the infiltration of material is very much more.

Gavronsky was sent on a mission for the purpose of gathering intelligence material and he returned with a report which I think it will interest you to read and of which I attach a copy. I would be glad to know if you have any comments to make on this report. The question of his going back again for the same purpose is under consideration, but no decision has been made, though I think you will agree from looking at the report that there are opportunities for useful work by an officer with a full knowledge of political background and directives.

Gavronsky is a newcomer to PWB and I do not suppose that he has seen the directive you refer to. I will see to it that he does. MacFarlane of course has it.

I can set your mind at rest that he will not go back to the Committee "and tell them things".

Yours sincerely

John Rayner

Brigadier Lush,
Allied Commission,
ROME.

1436

To: Lt. Col. D. MacFarlane
From: Major J. Gwronski

Subject: Mission to E. Ireland.

TOP SECRET

10th Feb 1948

Confide.

The intention of my mission was

to make a report on political conditions in Northern Italy,
to study the possibilities of obtaining this information regularly,
the possibility of finding new channels for the infiltration
of PWS propaganda into Northern Italy.

1. Political Conditions in Northern Italy.

a) The CLS Movement.

The CLS in Lugano is the representative of the CLSAL and its main channel of communication with Rome. I was impressed by the spirit of friendship and co-operation between its members in spite of different party allegiance. I was generally told that this was the case in most of the local CLSs all over Italy, as common hardships in a common struggle have given rise to many personal friendships. These are generally thought to be so strong that even after liberation they will assure the cohesion of the local CLSs for the task of reconstruction - at least for the time being.

On the other hand I had an equally general impression that co-operation between the various local CLSs is on a very limited scale as local interests usually outweigh those of general policy - a traditional symptom in Italian politics. These local interests are centered round the immediate measures to be taken locally as soon as the Germans are gone. They are mainly to be more or less picturesque forms of vengeance on the life and property of political opponents, but they will prove to be widely different from place to place according to the party allegiance of the local leader. In each of the provincial CLSs the outstanding personality among its members enforces on its program the particular colouring of his own party's political creed. Thus, according to who is the leader, some CLSs are spoken of as Communist, others as Liberal, etc. though this does not denote its constitution - everywhere alike - but its tendency. These differences of tendency result already today in there being more competition than co-operation between the local CLSs, especially as the CLSAL as central organ seems to have very little influence on their activities.

In the Lugano CLS the outstanding personality is the Communist MASSAGUTI and his influence is noticeable in all their publications. The various clandestine papers they publish for the 40,000 Italian interned in Switzerland have all a touch of cleverly concealed Communist propaganda, while the weekly Swiss Society which they send to the CLSAL and which supplies the main information for the clandestine press of Northern Italy, is also not unbiased. This is

usually outweigh those of general policy. These local interests are centered round the immediate measures to be taken locally as soon as the Germans are gone. They are mainly to be more or less picturesque forms of vengeance on the life and property of political opponents, but they will prove to be widely different from place to place according to the party allegiance of the local leader. In each of the provincial CLGs the outstanding personality among its members enforces on its program the particular colouring of his own party's political creed. Thus, according to who is the leader, some CLGs are spoken of as Communist, others as Liberal, etc. though this does not denote its constitution - everywhere alike - but its tendency. These differences of tendency result already today in there being more competition than co-operation between the local CLGs, especially as the CLGAI as central organ seems to have very little influence on their activities.

In the Legnano CLG the outstanding personality is the Communist MASSALUMI and his influence is noticeable in all their publications. The various clandestine papers they publish for the 40,000 Italians interned in Switzerland have all a touch of cleverly concealed Communist propaganda, while the weekly *Il Lavoro* which they send to the CLGAI and which supplies the main information for the clandestine press of Northern Italy, is also not unbiased. This is particularly important seeing that all the information passing both ways between Rome and Milan has to pass through this filter.

All the members of the Legnano CLG agreed so that they are organizing an efficient administration of the country in the transition period between liberation and Anquet, and they seem to feel sure that they will be in a position to assure law and order. But they admit that the moral authority necessary for this task will be largely dependent on the amount of support given them by the Allies: if therefore the Allies want them to fulfill their task efficiently they would like moral support to be given them forthwith by all possible means.

Other Italians I saw are less optimistic on this subject: they think generally that perhaps in the big towns the CLGs might be sufficiently organized to assure law and order, but do not think that this can possibly be the case in provincial districts where even now orders from the CLGAI are seldom obeyed. 133

The Swiss view on the subject is quite pessimistic. The conviction of official circles in Switzerland is that there is very little chance for the CLGs to be able to master the situation after the Germans are gone. I was told that the local CLGs are quarrelling already now and paying no heed to orders coming from the CLGAI. This can only grow worse as soon as they have more freedom to act. The Swiss are convinced that unless a British officer puts in an appearance everywhere on the spot immediately the Germans are gone, the mob will get completely out of control and hold the field - an easy prey to any form of extremism. As the Swiss are the most concerned in what will happen beyond their southern border, their opinion, which can have no good reason for being biased either way, should weigh more than all the information coming from Italy.

203
Confidential

b) Partisan band. Similar conditions obtain among them. Few of the bands before Fascist or German repressions. People who have good reason to think the quite independently of its party program. The band is called Garibaldi, Matteotti or G.E.L. according to the Party allegiance of its leader, but this allows no inferences as to its composition or program. The latter has usually little to do with politics and is mostly dictated by local necessities. Its main item is usually local vengeance far more than chasing the enemy out of the country. Fascists being hated more than the Germans - and in this all readily follow the leader with but little interest for political niceties. The influence of the central HQ on these bands is therefore very limited especially if they have all they want in the way of arms and indispensable commodities. The fact that a majority of the Maquis leaders are Communist rather makes things easier for the Central HQ than more difficult as might be expected. The Communist Party is the only one having an eminent Communist on his Staff General Valenti can often through his intervention have more influence on Communist leaders than he could ever dream to have on non-Communists, provided of course he can in each case reach an agreement with Gallo which - I am told - is not always easy. Friction between the two is frequent - one being mainly a soldier and the other a political commissar, but in essential matters their cooperation works for the time being and is expected to work so long as instructions from Russia follow the present line. From what I hear Valenti is generally respected and his military efficiency recognized, but he is too much of a regular soldier to be a Maquis leader and he could never compete with the authority of a Parri. Now that Parri has been arrested, but high: change in his favour, but they might also not as he will no longer have any counterbalance to Gallo's political tendencies.

c) Disarmament. All agree that it will not be easy, if requested by immediate and verendatory orders, it will only be a farce: the orders will probably be outwardly complied with, but all arms will be hidden. This expected reluctance to disarm is more a question of ambition than the outcome of some far reaching revolutionary aim. Only a minority have the latter; the majority will even be quite willing to go home provided some official recognition is given to their supposed heroism. It has been suggested - as the best way of handling this delicate problem - that the Partisan "Divisions" should at first be recognized as Allied Forces and militarized under British Officers or Italians specially trained for the purpose - they be given some unspectacular task such as guarding dumps or clearing trenches: this not being sufficiently picturesque to keep up their enthusiasm, they would soon get bored and end would only to give up their arms and go home. This is of course expressed as a hope of a solution, as the most dangerous elements would probably refuse any form of discipline, as the outset; and their conduct would depend on whether any extremist political influence was brought to bear.

might change in his favour, but they might also not as he will no longer have any counterbalance to Gello's political tendencies.

c) Disarmament. All agree that it will not be easy, if requested by immediate and peremptory orders, it will only be a farce: the orders will probably be outwardly complied with, but all arms will be hidden. This expected reluctance to disarm is more a question of ambition than the outcome of some far reaching revolutionary aims. Only a minority have the latter: the majority will soon be quite willing to go home provided some official recognition is given to their supposed heroism. It has been suggested - as the best way of handling this delicate problem - that the Partisans "Divisions" should at first be recognized as Allied Forces and militarized under British Officers or Italians specially trained for the purpose - they be given some unspectacular task such as guarding dumps or clearing trenches: this not being sufficiently picturesque to keep up their enthusiasm, they would soon get bored and and prove only too ready to give up their arms and go home. This is of course expressed as a hazard of a solution, as the most dangerous elements would probably refuse any form of discipline from the outset and their conduct would depend on whether any extremist political influence were brought to bear upon them.

As the disarmament of the Partisans will doubtless be a problem, the question arises as to the advantages of arming them. Various Italians in Switzerland who have constant contacts or even family ties with the Partisan Movement all stressed the point that distributing arms at random without strict discernment when they are given to, is not only dangerous but also useless - the arms being sold or used against Germans: they are usually stored for future domestic use when brandishing them will be less dangerous and more lucrative - or just simply for the black market. All concerned seem to be of the opinion that if some particular action by the Partisans is required, an officer should be sent on the spot and armed given him for that particular purpose and under his personal responsibility but in no case should arms be given without somebody trustworthy being responsible for the exact way they are handled.

1432

If that is the view of reasonable Italians on the subject of the distribution of arms to the Partisans, the Swiss consider it sheer folly under all circumstances and are deeply concerned about it. They see a growing anti-British

202
Confidential

and pro-Communist feeling among all the Partisans: they consider that by now 80% of all Partisans are Communist and as such owe their ultimate allegiance to Russia but never to Great Britain: they may be tactical allies but they are certainly not friends. The Swiss tell me that the Russians are already taking advantage of the situation in order to step into the gap of forsaken British sympathies, as they did a year ago in Italy by giving official recognition to the Badoglio Government behind the back of other Allied Governments. Russian agents are active among them to that effect especially in the Veneto where Italian communists are in contact with Tito's forces, while arms of Russian origin have been seen in the hands of Italian partisans never rest as the Lake Maggiore. The Swiss told me this information has been thoroughly verified. In these circumstances they do not understand the distribution of arms. In their opinion the main problem today is to try and regain as many better than by the distribution of arms at the expense of Communist distribution of food and clothing which - the Swiss suggest - would be a more reasonable policy and more effective in the long run.

Even among the members of the League Club who obviously could not object to arms being sent to their Partisans, I heard no spontaneous complaints as to the lack of arms but I did hear many regrets that Italians had been enticed to join the bands and are now being left in the cold winter with neither food nor warm clothing.

4) Anti-British feeling. All my informants with the one exception of the Communists, started the conversation by depreciating the general growth of anti-British feeling in the last few months. I am told that since I left the Piedmont 18 months ago, popular feeling has changed completely on the subject. Disappointment is general, though the reasons for it vary. The Partisans think themselves left in the lurch. The general population is disillusioned by the air raids; they once, as I remember, used to cheer allied bombers; today they fail to understand that the indiscriminate bombing of suburban districts inhabited solely by workmen, or the strafing of people in the streets or of holiday makers on lake steamers, can be dictated by the necessities of war. And propaganda leads them to believe that there are just atrocious outrages. Anti-Fascist politicians are dismayed at the way they have been treated in the House of Commons and by the German case. They cannot understand why they are not being treated as friends and allies since they have always considered themselves as such. The non-political Italian who has never exposed himself to any Fascist or German reprisals - and there are a majority - hates the Allies today as much as he hates the Germans. The Partisans

4) Anti-British feeling. All my informants with the one exception of the Communists, started the conversation by deprecating the general growth of anti-British feeling in the last few months. I am told that since I left the Piedmont 18 months ago, popular feeling has changed completely on the subject. Disappointment is general, though the reasons for it vary. The Partisans think themselves left in the lurch. The general population is disabused by the air raids: they once, as I remember, used to cheer allied bombers: today they fail to understand that the indiscriminate bombing of suburban districts inhabited solely by workmen, or the strafing of people in the streets or of holiday makers on lake steamers, can be dictated by the necessities of war. And propaganda leads them to believe that these are just spiteful outrages. Anti-Fascist politicians are dismayed at the way they have been treated in the House of Commons and by the *Storn* case. They cannot understand why they are not being treated as friends and allies since they have always considered themselves as such. The non-political Italian who has never exposed himself to any Fascist or German reprisals - and these are a majority - hates the Allies today as much as he hates the Germans. The feeling is general but the conclusions drawn vary with the different parties. The Communists who always have Russia to fall back upon, could afford to go furthest in their anti-British feelings, but they are not dissatisfied at the development as it is and more wind blowing into their sails. All the other anti-Fascist Partisans who have had one string to their bow are just as disappointed but still hope for friendly co-operation with the Allies and more especially Great Britain. Their sympathies may still be regained.

Another source of Anti-British feeling is the current opinion quite generally held in all Northern Italy that Great Britain is a supporter of reactionary and crypto-fascist elements. Hence a general fear that England may prevent the disappearance of institutions which are considered guilty of Fascism and whose survival is desired by no-one. These are the monarchy and the big banking and industrial concerns all of whom are thought to have an anti-social influence.

instituted after liberation. It looks as if there could be no difficulties over that question, unless they are fomented from abroad.

h) Political Parties. The Communists and the Partito d'Azione seem to be the only two parties of importance. This is due less to their numbers than to the dynamic character of their leaders and followers. The Socialists and the Liberals are both an anachronism, and are steadily losing ground to the first two. The Christian Democrats have a great potential basis of power in the organization of the Church. But this power weighs in the balance of political events only when the essential principles of the Church's teaching have to be defended. The forces of Catholicism are politically strong only on the defensive, but never have been and never can be organized into an aggressive political party.

The socialists told me that their party counts twice as many members as the Communist Party and five times as much as the Partito d'Azione. But one active Communist has more influence on political developments than ten inactive Socialists or Liberals.

The Communists are the only Party having its recognized leader in the Bonomi Government, and it is generally supposed that they will follow Tagliacarne's lead blindly. This is not the case with any of the other Parties; some of them intend submitting to the Party leaders now in Rome. These are generally criticised for their subservience to the Allies and for their tendency in extirpating the camouflaged remnants of Fascism.

Feelings in general are radical in all parties both as regards the physical extermination of all thought guilty of Fascism as regards social and economic reforms. The summary court-martialing of hundreds of political opponents in Bulgaria was quoted in all parties as an example to be followed, and I heard no criticism of it even in liberal circles. All parties have agreed on a common programme of social reform comprising a republican constitution, the nationalisation of the key industries and a radical land reform. In this only the Communists have moved towards moderation as they recognise the principle of private property and are ready to co-operate with the Church. Moreover, it is generally believed that on their part this is merely a short-term tactical attitude and not even the Communists believe that essential principles have been dropped for good. But wherever they appear, the Communists are now an example of statesmanship, and conservative devotion to the country's, not only the Proletariat's, supreme interests. This generally produces an ironic smile. But, on the other hand, it is surprising how thoroughly pleased most Communists are to be allowed to co-operate with the exiled shrews of old, and be at last considered decent citizens.

200
Confidential

After an irksome life of revolution and conspiracy, the protracted enjoyment of the luxury of legality may bring about far reaching changes in the mentality of even the most hardened Communist.

The Partito d'Azione is growing in numbers and in moral authority. It has been joined by all the young, dynamic and progressive elements of the educated classes for whom the Socialists or the Liberals were too old-fashioned and too slow. Its growing success is due to the outstanding part played by its members in the Partisan movement but it has, of late, been enhanced by the fact of the Party's refusal to participate in the Bonomi Government. Opposition to Allied pressure is popular. In spite of this, they seem to be the only element of force on which the future Allied occupation can be successfully based. They will be sincere, if not servile, helpers. They are firm believers in Democracy as laid down in the Atlantic Charter, and are against any form of Dictatorship even that of the Proletariate. It is therefore their one and only desire to find a real basis of co-operation with Great Britain. *Faute de mieux*, of course, as they have no alternative.

It will have been noted that throughout this report the word "British" has been used rather than "Allied". This has been done intentionally as during my various conversations it was taken for granted by everyone that the British would be solely responsible for the occupation of Northern Italy.

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Fauts de mieux, of course, as they have no alternative.

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1424

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

3201/80

E.C. (199)

Ref: 121/6/PAT.

4 March 1945.

My dear Mr. Prime Minister,

MIL 9 1945

I refer to my letter of 23 January, reference 121/6/PAT, on the question of payment of patriots who come through the lines or whose activities come to an end when the territory is newly liberated. My letter of 12 February reminds you of the urgency of this matter.

May I also have confirmation that the requests in the sixth paragraph of my letter of 23 January have been complied with?

I am certain that you and your ministers have been deliberating these points and I hope that you will soon be in a position to offer a programme which we can put into effect to our mutual advantage.

Yours very truly,

Signed by HSH

ELIOT V. BROWN
 Rear Admiral, USNR
 Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi,
 The President of the Council of Ministers,
 Italian Government,
R.O.M.E.

S. P. P.

Declassified E.O. 12056 Section 3.3/AND No. 785017

320
 198
 HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
 100 JSA
 Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref: 94/1/PAL.

Tel: 478221

7 March 1945

SUBJECT: Northwest Italy.

TO : Major R.F.T. Gibson,
 No. 5 Detachment,
 No. 1 Special Force.

1. With reference to your letter 12/14/44 of 1 Mar 45 addressed to the Patriots Branch, the Executive Commissioner has now given this matter further consideration.
2. He is of opinion that little would be gained by the entry into ITALY from the North west of a limited number of AG officers. Moreover, these officers might have to wait in FRANCE for a considerable period, during which time they would be out of touch with this HQ.
3. Therefore, whilst thanking you for the trouble you have taken, it has been decided not to proceed with the idea.

gh
 Chief Staff Officer,
 To Executive Commissioner.

Copy to: JSA/10.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

3201
3201
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION.

TS/16/12/CA.

5th March 1945.

SUBJECT: Patriot Problems in Northern Italy.

MAR 6 1945

TO: Executive Commissioner ✓

Reference your letter 3201/194/20 dated 28 February 1945.

- 194
1. The abovementioned letter has been received together with an extract from the Minutes of SACRED's Political Meeting held on 20 February at which JPS Study No. P/265 (Final) was discussed.
 2. Para 2 of your letter states that a copy of the paper JPS Study No. P/265 (Final) has been received by this Headquarters and is being held by the Chief Commissioner's office.
 3. This Section wishes to acquaint itself with the measures to be adopted in dealing with Patriot problems in Northern Italy and, as an investigation it appears that a copy of paper under review is not held by the Chief Commissioner's office, may steps please be taken to make available to this Section the information required.

R. A. GRIFFIN
R. A. GRIFFIN, Col.
CSO CA SECTION.

See 206

1426

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Copy No 14

HEADQUARTERS
15TH ARMY GROUP
APO 777

SECRET
By Auth of
CG, Hq 15th AG
Init: MFC
Date: 2 Mar 1945

Confidential

AG-091.711

JHR/WLO/reh
2 March 1945

MAR 6 1945

SUBJECT: Partisan Problems in NW ITALY.

TO: See Distribution.

1. Attached is a memorandum covering the problems connected with the Partisan movement in North West ITALY, together with the methods suggested for their solution when the area is occupied by the Allies.

2. Fifth Army, Eighth Army, Allied Commission and 2 District are requested to forward their views on the proposals. It is intended that this memorandum, as modified in accordance with the recommendations of the addressees hereof, will form the basis of an Operation Instruction establishing the policy of this Headquarters in the matter. This Operation Instruction will be prepared in final form on 15 March and comments to be considered must be received at this Headquarters prior to that date.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL CLARK:

H. L. Ostler
H. L. OSTLER,
Colonel, A. G. D.,
Adjutant General.

1 Incl - Ltr Hq 15th Army Gp.
"Partisan Problems in NW ITALY."
AG 091.711, dtd 2 March 45.

DISTRIBUTION:

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G-3 Ops	21
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G-5	23
AG	24
	- 1 -

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CH SEC. (3)

Ex-Commissioner

East Sec

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HEADQUARTERS
15TH ARMY GROUP
APO 777

195
Confidential

AG-091.711

25 February 1945

PARTISAN PROBLEMS IN NW ITALY

1. Introduction - On 9 February 1945 a meeting was held at Headquarters 15th Army Group to discuss Partisan problems in NW ITALY and to make recommendations as to the best methods of dealing with them. G-2, G-3, and G-5 were represented at the meeting. The following paragraphs set out the conclusions which were reached.

2. Partisan Arms.

a. The Problem.

The first and chief problem is to determine whether, when, and how the Partisans should be required to hand in their arms, ammunition and explosives after the arrival of the Allies in N. ITALY.

b. Whether Partisans should be Disarmed.

It is considered that the continued possession of arms by large numbers of Partisans (perhaps as many as 100,000), most of whom have strong political allegiances and who have grown accustomed to violence and outlawry, would present a potential danger to Allied security, in that it might lead to or aggravate one or more of the following:

- (1) Armed clashes and disturbances between Italian elements politically opposed to one another.
- (2) Isolated sniping and ambushes against Allied individuals, vehicles etc.
- (3) Organized armed resistance against the Allied forces and Military Government.
- (4) Sabotage.

It is therefore recommended that the Partisans be required to hand in their arms, ammunition and explosives

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Ltr Hq 15th Army Group, "Partisan Problems in NW ITALY.",
AG-091.711, dtd 25 Feb 45.

after the arrival of the Allied Forces.

c. When should Partisans be Disarmed?

It is thought that it would be tactless to include the immediate disarming of the Partisans among the very first acts of the Allied forces or AMG officials on their arrival in any given area, and that such action would probably cause resentment and provoke unfavorable reactions. On the other hand, it is equally undesirable to allow a long interval to elapse before they are disarmed, since experience has shown that the attitude of the Italians towards the Allies tends to deteriorate after the early days of liberation; their high and usually unreasonable hopes can never be satisfied by the Allies, and thus their initial welcome is liable to develop, through disillusionment, into apathy and then bitterness.

It is therefore recommended that the Partisans be required to hand in their arms approximately one week after the arrival of the Allies, or as soon after that as it can properly and appropriately be organized.

d. How should Partisans be Disarmed?

(1) According to normal AMG procedure, two orders or proclamations concerning arms etc. are posted up in every Comune immediately on the arrival of the first Civil Affairs Officer. One states that all arms etc. must be surrendered immediately to a certain official at a certain place; the other states that any person having in his possession any arms etc. without a permit after the date fixed by public notice will be liable to punishment by death or imprisonment.

It is considered that it would be inappropriate to regard the provisions of these particular proclamations as applicable to Partisan bands who have been largely armed by the Allies, and moreover it is thought that very little response would be forthcoming if reliance were placed on this method of disarming the Partisans.

It is therefore recommended that in Northwestern Italy Partisan Leaders be informed that on a date to be announced all weapons will be turned in, and that the occasion will be one of ceremony and with full honors.

(2) In considering the question of method,

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Ltr HQ 15th Arm. Group, "Partisan Problems in NW ITALY.",
AG-091.711, dtd 25 Feb 45.

our main purpose must be to determine what procedure is best calculated to persuade the highest possible proportion of Partisans to hand in their arms etc. when instructed to do so. It is thought that this object can best be achieved by adopting a procedure which is based as far as circumstances permit on organized military lines, and by "sugaring the pill" with some compensating counter-attractions.

It is therefore recommended that the disarming of Partisans should be carried out in conjunction with ceremonial stand-down parades. Such parades will be organized by HQ IV Corps in all areas or centers where Partisan bands or units formerly operated. As early as possible after their arrival, HQ IV Corps should contact the local Partisan leaders and ask them to arrange for the members of their bands or group to parade at a suitable place (e.g. the Provincial Capital or nearest convenient large town), and on a suitable date (e.g. in approximately one week's time). It is preferable that the place and date should be coordinated as far as possible throughout a Province, or even a Region, should the speed of occupation permit, as this would assist the publicity angle and increase the ceremonious nature of the occasion. The Partisans should be instructed to parade with all their arms, and should be informed that arms are to be handed in at the end of the parade. They should also be instructed to collect and dump all their ammunition and explosives at convenient points for subsequent collection. The commander of the nearest Allied Military unit or formation will attend the parade and will be responsible for the collection of arms. The parade should be accompanied by as much ceremony as possible; there should be advanced publicity, flags, a band, speakers etc. At the end of the parade, the formation will be marched to a dump where arms will be deposited before it is dispersed. At that time certificates will be issued on the handing in of fire arms on the basis of exchange; one certificate to each Patriot turning in his individual firearm. The only exceptions to this restriction will be those certified by recognized leaders as wounded Patriots who have already turned in their weapons, those who served in an unarmed capacity, (staff, cooks, etc.) those who served unarmed as part of a heavy weapons crew, and those who were used exclusively in demolition activities. The commander of the nearest Allied Military unit will be responsible for the collection of arms immediately afterwards, as well as for collection of the ammunition and explosives above referred to. CC.RK will NOT take any part in such collection.

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Ltr Hq 15th Army Group, "Partisan Problems in NW ITALY.",
AG 091.711, dtd 25 Feb 45.

(3) It is further recommended that the local action described above should be accompanied by parallel action at the top; a representative of the Allied Commission or of an Allied Military higher headquarters should contact the CLMAG and the CVL and obtain their support and cooperation in the scheme. This Central Committee and Military Command should be asked to inform all local CGLM and Commanders that they desire the latter's fullest assistance in insuring the success of the parades, both as regards numerical attendance and arms collection. PWG should assist with radio propaganda and publicity.

(4) It is possible that the parades might be very poorly attended in certain areas, or that a large proportion of those attending might fail to bring their arms. In such cases it should be possible for the Allied Military Commander concerned to judge whether there is some innocent explanation or whether a deliberate attempt is being made by a high proportion (say over 20 per cent) of Partisans to evade the order to hand in their arms.

In the latter event, it is recommended that the parade should be held as arranged; but, before its dispersal, the Allied Military Commander should make it clear to those present that he is not satisfied with the response to the Allied order concerning the surrender of arms; he should inform them, and through them their absent comrades, that those who have failed to hand in their arms must do so at a given place before the end of the next day, and that thereafter any person found still to be in possession of arms etc. will be subject to serious penalties.

(5) It is anticipated that, during the first days of the Allied occupation, a number of armed Partisans will be admitted to the various Partisan Reception Camps which are to be established by AMG in appropriate localities.

It is recommended that the Allied officers in charge of these camps should arrange for any such arms to be turned in to the (nominal) custody of the Senior Partisan in the camp, pending their surrender to the Allied authorities at the time of the parade.

c. Enforcement.

It is recommended that, after such parades have been held, Partisans be regarded as ordinary civilians, who are subject to the provisions of AMG Procla-

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Ltr Hq 15th Ar Group, "Partisan Problem in NW ITALY.",
AG-691.711, dtd 25 Feb 45.

nations, and that any who are later found in possession of
arms, ammunition or explosives without an AGO permit should
be brought to trial before an Allied Military Court.

f. Conclusion.

It is believed that the procedure recom-
mended above offers the best chance of collecting the maxi-
mum quantity of arms etc. from the Partisans.

We should not, however, be justified in
anticipating that it will prove altogether successful, as
it is felt that a certain proportion will insist on retain-
ing and concealing the arms in their possession, whatever
measures are taken by the Allied authorities.

It is felt that the only real and
fundamental method of countering the potential dangers
inherent in the Partisan situation would be to insure that,
when the Allies occupy Northern ITALY, their treatment of
the Partisans and of the Fascists, their handling of the
food, housing and labor problems, and their efforts towards
the general reconstruction of ITALY, were all such as to
satisfy the hopes, expectations and impatience of the
Partisans.

This, however, is an ideal which we
cannot hope to attain, and it would therefore be useless to
rely on this solution to the problem. Nevertheless, it is
evident that the degree of speed and thoroughness with
which the Allied authorities tackle the problem of relief,
reconstruction and epuration, will directly influence, for
better or for worse, the likelihood of trouble arising out
of this Partisan problem.

3. Independent Action by Partisans.

a. The Problem.

The second problem is to determine what
attitude is to be adopted by the Allied authorities towards
independent action by Partisans in the sphere of epuration
and reprisals etc. after the German withdrawal from N.
ITALY.

b. Action taken by Partisans before Allied
arrival.

(1) It is anticipated that, during the

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Ltr Hq 15th Army Group, "Partisan Problems in NW ITALY.",
AG-091.711, 25 Feb 45.

transition period between the German and Allied occupation, the Partisans will take violent and widespread action against Fascists and other such elements; these are likely to suffer death; "beating up", imprisonment, or dismissal from public appointments.

It is recommended that no action be taken by the Allied authorities on their arrival in respect of those cases which involved death, "beating up" or dismissal; with regard to those persons who were imprisoned by the Partisans, it should be the responsibility of AMG Public Safety Officers, assisted by the CIC/PSS, to examine all such cases as quickly as possible, and to decide on their disposal. Such persons would normally be disposed of in one of the following ways:

- (a) Interned.
- (b) Released.
- (c) Detained pending trial as War Criminals, or
- (d) Handed over to the Italian judicial authorities for trial on either criminal or espionage charges.

The examining officers should bear in mind that the release of such prisoners would tend to antagonize the Partisans, and, as a general rule, borderline cases should be disposed of by internment rather than by release.

c. After Allied Arrival.

Since it has been decided that Allied Military Government is to be established as soon as possible in Northern ITALY, it would be illogical, improper and undesirable for the Partisans (or any other such elements) to be authorized to continue taking independent action affecting the liberty of their fellow-countrymen, once the territory has been occupied by Allied forces and Military Government officials.

It is therefore recommended that, after the arrival of the Allies, no further such independent action by Partisans should be tolerated. This should be made clear to all Partisan leaders and GAIN as soon as possible, and thereafter any offenders should be punished.

d. Conclusion.

The foregoing recommendation, although it

SECRET

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172

Ltr Hq 15th Ar Group, "Partisan Problems in NW ITALY".
AG-001.711, dtd 23 Feb 45.

appears the only possible one, may well lead to discontent, demonstrations and anarchy, unless the Allied Military Government and Security authorities carry out the work of "defascistization", including dismissals and internments, with the utmost speed and thoroughness. It is considered that, if the impatience of the Partisans is to be prevented from getting "out of hand", this factor should be regarded as of paramount importance, and that the need for rapid and comprehensive action in the sphere of "epuration" should be a dominating influence in the activities of AMG and C.I. agencies.

4. CARE OF PARTISANS.

a. The Problem.

The first problem is in connection with those Partisans who may continue to be used operationally.

Recommendations.

Administration of Partisans used operationally will be, as at present, the responsibility of the Allied unit which retains them operationally or for future operations.

b. The Problem.

The second and most important problem is to determine the treatment and responsibility for treatment of Partisans who cease to be used operationally.

Recommendations.

That, initially, the treatment of Partisans as regards their feeding, clothing, housing, hospitalization and rehabilitation in general be the responsibility of HQ IV Corps. As soon as control of any part of NW Italy is assumed by AFHQ the responsibility for administration and rehabilitation of Partisans in that part no longer under IV Corps control, will pass to No. 2 District in conjunction with HQ Allied Commission. The staffs of the Regional Commissioners attached to HQ IV Corps will include Patriot teams consisting of one Allied officer and one Italian Army officer for each Province.

(1) Establishment of Partisan Centers.

It is the responsibility of HQ IV Corps

SECRET

1421

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Ltr Hq 15th Army Group, "Partisan Problems in NW ITALY.",
AG-091.711, dtd 25 Feb 45.

to establish, equip and maintain "Centers" where Partisans will be housed, fed and generally administered. These Centers, subject to the development of the tactical situation, will be established at GENOA, LA SPEZIA, IMPERIA, TURIN, CUNEO, ALESSANDRIA, VARESE, MILAN AND PIACENZA.

(2) Food.

AFHQ is responsible for making available and stockpiling in forward areas rations for Partisans on a scale equivalent to that issued to the Italian Military forces. HQ IV Corps is responsible for transportation and distribution of this food to Partisan "Centers".

(3) Clothing.

AFHQ is responsible for making available and stockpiling in forward areas clothing on a minimum essential scale. HQ IV Corps is responsible for transportation and distribution of this clothing to Partisan "Centers".

(4) Pay.

Payment to Partisans is the responsibility of the Italian Government. It is the responsibility of HQ Allied Commission to co-ordinate gratuities contemplated by the Italian Government and insure that funds are made available for this purpose. Distribution of such funds will be the responsibility of HQ IV Corps.

(5) Hospitalization.

It will be the responsibility of HQ IV Corps to evacuate sick or wounded Partisans to Italian Military Hospitals where they will be accorded the same treatment as that given to Italian Military.

(6) Rehabilitation.

It will be the responsibility of HQ IV Corps to insure that the necessary organization is provided to:

- (a) Encourage Patriots to enlist in the Italian Army.
- (b) Provide work through Allied Military Labor Organizations.
- (c) Return as many as possible to their homes.

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Ltr Hq 15th Ar Group, "Partisan Problem in NW ITALY",
AG 091.711, dtd 25 Feb 45.

(4) Supervise general care of Partisans
at Centers.

(7) Collection of Partisans.

It will be the responsibility of HQ IV
Corps to furnish transportation as required to gather up
and transport to "Centers" Partisans from localities where
sizeable bands or groups exist.

(6) Assistance to be rendered by outside
Agencies.

At the time of writing there exist in
this area some fifteen (15) Allied Missions, British, U.S.
and Italian working in close liaison with the larger
Partisan bands. Upon the withdrawal of the enemy forces
and the arrival of the Allies these missions should be able
to provide considerable assistance to local AMG officers
and Military Commanders. The leaders of these missions
will be able to provide considerable information about local
conditions, numbers of Partisans, numbers of arms etc.
Their assistance in establishing relations with Partisans
should be sought by local commanders and AMG officers. In
the near future they will be instructed to reconnoiter for
suitable accommodations for the establishment of the local
Partisan centers. At the proper time they will be in-
structed to present themselves to Military Commanders upon
the arrival of the latter in their areas of activity. HQ
IV Corps will be informed of the locations of these
missions and names of leaders.

5. Action.

It is recommended that the substance of this
memorandum be included in the Operation Instruction which
is to be issued by this HQ concerning the occupation of NW
Italy, and that CG (IV) Corps be directed to include its
essence in instructions to his command. It is further
recommended that HQ Allied Commission, and HQ 2 District,
be requested to issue similar instructions to their person-
nel.

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49

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

A/C 39A

Office of the Executive Commissioner.

Ref: 2007/190/21

26 February 1945

SUBJECT: Patriot Problem in Northern Italy.

TO : Vice President,
Civil Affairs Section.

189

1. Forwarded herewith for your information is an extract from the minutes of SACRED's Political Meeting held on 20th February 1945 at which the above subject was discussed.

2. Only one copy of the paper JWS Study No. 2/265 (Final) referred to therein was received by this HQ and is held by the Chief Commissioner's office.

Copy at
189A

M 8 LUSH

CONFIDENTIAL
Executive Commissioner

/33

1. Reviewed herewith for your information is an extract from the minutes of WICKED's Political Meeting held on 20th February 1945 at which the above subject was discussed.

2. Only one copy of the paper 331 Study No. 2/265 (Final) referred to therein was received by this HQ and is held by the Chief Commissioner's office.

M S LUSH

~~Responsible Commissioner,~~
Executive Commissioner.

See

206

1413

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/WND No.

785017

189

EXTRACT

TOP SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

SAC (P) (A5) 1st Meeting
20th February, 1945

177

RECENT ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

7. PARTISAN PROBLEM IN NORTHERN ITALY
(See Study No. 7/45 (Final))

1694

THE CONFERENCE had before them an interim report, prepared by the Joint Planning Staff, on measures to deal with Partisan problems in Northern Italy.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL RANDING enquired whether there was any political objection to the despatch to Northern Italy of one or more senior liaison officers to improve the Partisan organization and to act as a steady political influence. The despatch of one such officer to Northwest Italy and one to Northeast Italy was under consideration.

ALB MARSHAL BURNETT strongly supported the suggestion to improve liaison with the Italian Partisans in the manner suggested by the Chief of Staff, adding that much effort had been wasted owing to poor organization of air supply reception arrangements.

MR. MACMILLAN expressed the view that there could be no harm in the appointment of such officers if their sole purpose was to increase the efficiency of distribution of supplies. It was important, however, that they should not succumb to the inherent tendency to participate in politics. Officers who did this were on occasions a source of political danger, in that they tended to elevate and distort sectional political views. He felt that, if high grade officers were sent in as proposed, they should be drawn from the ranks of the United States and British Services.

MR. KING supported the views of Mr. Macmillan and emphasized the importance of confining the activities of such officers to operational

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MR. KING supported the views of Mr. Macmillan and emphasized the importance of confining the activities of such officers to operational functions.

MR. MACMILLAN observed that the arrangement for providing the Italian Partisans with funds required careful supervision to ensure that no war chest was built up for use against the Allies after liberation.

MR. ADMIRAL STONE replied that this matter was under discussion by the authorities concerned, and the arrangements proposed were likely in his opinion to afford satisfactory safeguards.

THE JOINT JEE ALLIED COMMANDER.

- (a) Took note with satisfaction of the measures taken or contemplated to deal with Partisan problems in Northern Italy, as described in JPS Study No. 7/265 (Final).
- (b) Took note with satisfaction of Rear Admiral Stone's statement at 'X' above.
- (c) Directed that the Chief of Staff arrange for the deletion of the last sentence of paragraph 6 in all copies of JPS Study No. 7/265 (Final) distributed outside AFHQ, in view of the discussion recorded under Minute 5 above.

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128

TOP SECRET

2/24/45 (Final)

Chief Commission
Allied Commission

100A

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Auth: SAC
Initials: 41
18 Feb 45
Copy No. 34

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

18 February 1945

INTERIM REPORT ON MEASURES TO DEAL WITH
PATRIOT PROBLEMS IN NORTHERN ITALY

Cover Note by AFPS

1. In accordance with terms of reference received from Chief of Staff on 18 February 1945, we have prepared the attached interim report on measures to deal with patriot problems in Northern Italy.
2. In the time available it has not been possible to consult 16 Army Group, Allied Commission, or ANIA.

W. L. K. K. K.

A. L. K. K. K.
Brig. General, U.S.A.
G-3 Plans

L. E. P. K. K.
Air Commission
G-3 Plans

V. ... -2412
Commander
Staff Officer, Plans

Representative concurred in
conference but the time factor has
prevented signatures being obtained.

DISTRIBUTION

2. In the time available it has not been possible to commit to writing the Allied Commission or IOWA.

Representatives concurred in conference but the time factor has prevented signatures being obtained.

DISCUSSION:

List 'A' plus,
CO 18th Army Group
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Commander SOG
British Resident Minister
U.S. Political Advisor
A/C of S. G-8

Copy made

G. L. TOWLER
Brig. General, U.S.A.
G-3 Plans

L. T. FARMER
Air Commodore
W.A.F. Plans

W. ... GALT
Commander
Staff Officer, Plans

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Declassified E.O. 12958 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

1852

1948

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9/260 (Final)

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Auth: SAC
Initials
118 Feb 48
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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

18 February 1948

URGENT INFO FOR ALLIES TO DEAL WITH
PATRIOT PROBLEM IN NORTHERN ITALY

OBJECT

1. To review all plans that have been made for dealing with patriots on the occupation of Northern Italy and to submit recommendations regarding further measures required to provide for:
 - a. The rapid disarmament and absorption into civil life of the Italian Armed Forces of all Italian patriots as the Allied armies advance.
 - b. The prevention of fighting between patriots and Fascist forces remaining behind when the Germans withdraw.
 - c. The prevention of fighting between Slovene and Italian patriots in South-eastern Italy, which would prejudice the security of supply through Trieste and Venetian ports to Austria, and also aggravate the political problems of future frontier settlement.

ATTENTION: 118 FEB 48

2. Current Special Operations Policy

- Instructions for the support of Italian resistance throughout Northern Italy were issued by this Headquarters in a directive dated 4 February 1945 to 15th Army Group, when the following policy was established:
- a. Intermittent suspension of patriot forces to be discouraged.
 - b. Supply to be concentrated largely on non-warlike stores and arms to be supplied only on a selective basis for special tasks.

a. The rapid disarmament and absorption into civil life of the Italian Armed Forces of all Italian patriots as the Allied armies advance.

b. The prevention of fighting between patriots and Fascist forces remaining behind when the Germans withdraw.

c. The prevention of fighting between Slovenes and Italian patriots in North-eastern Italy, which would prejudice the security of supply through Trieste and Venezia Giulia to Austria, and also aggravate the political problems of future frontier settlement.

ITALY RE-ARMED BY CASEY

2. Current Special Operations Policy.

Instructions for the support of Italian resistance throughout Northern Italy were issued by this Headquarters in a directive dated 4 February 1945 to 15th Army Group, when the following policy was established:

a. Indiscriminate expansion of patriot forces to be discouraged.

b. Supply to be concentrated largely on non-warlike stores and arms to be supplied only on a selective basis for special tasks.

c. Preparations to be made for the post-liberation period.

3. Occupational Plans.

The following measures have been taken to prepare for the occupation of Northern Italy.

a. By JWC.

(1) An Operation Instruction "Occupation of Northwest Italy" was issued on 21 December 1944 to 15th Army Group. This was supplemented by telegram F 28818 of 16 February 1945, giving directions as to collecting, disarming, feeding, clothing and paying patriots and for their medical care. 15th Army Group have been requested to forward their plans, based on these instructions, as soon as possible.

(2) The covering approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the scales of food and clothing, envisaged in the instructions given to 15th Army Group, has been asked for in Ref 844 dated 15 February.

(3) A letter is being dispatched to WMA, copy to 15th Army Group, which lays down a general policy for the introduction of patriots into the Italian Army to fill, as far as possible, the 48,000 existing vacancies.

7/2/50 (Final)

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TOP SECRET

under the present ceiling, and instructs WMA to form reconnaissance companies of a strength of 500 each from patriot bands for employment with the five Italian combat groups. (Patriots are now filtering through the lines at a rate of about 500 per week and it is anticipated that on the occupation of Northern Italy it will be possible to absorb about 10,000 patriots in this manner into the Italian Army.) Depending on the success with Italian combat groups, the use of Italian patriot reconnaissance companies with British and U.S. divisions is also envisaged.

1. By 15th Army Group in conjunction with Allied Commission.
It is understood that the following measures have been taken:

- (1) Messages giving detailed anti-search instructions have been prepared for issue to patriots when a German withdrawal becomes evident.
- (2) Discussions are in progress to determine suitable areas for the establishment of patriot reception centers.
- (3) Detailed arrangements are being made for liaison, in the period immediately following liberation, between AMG officers and LAs with patriot bands.

2. By Allied Commission.

A special procedure, additional to the normal processes of establishing Allied Military Government, is planned for dealing with patriots. This involves:

- (1) The provision of regional and provincial patriot teams, each consisting of one AMG "patriot" officer and one Italian military officer, to be joined once the area for which they are responsible is liberated, by a local CMG representative. The immediate duty of these teams will be to contact local patriot leaders.
- (2) The establishment of patriot committees to help AMG officials to discriminate between genuine and bogus patriots.
- (3) The provision of staffs for patriot reception centers.
- (4) The provision of mobile Italian Army recruiting agencies.
- (5) Local re-employment of patriots as far as possible.

Immediately following liberation, between AMG officers and LGs with patriot bands.

C. By Allied Commission.

A special procedure, additional to the normal processes of establishing Allied Military Government, is planned for dealing with patriots. This involves:

- (1) The provision of regional and provincial patriot teams, each consisting of one AMG "patriot" officer and one Italian military officer, to be joined once the area for which they are responsible is liberated, by a local CLM representative. The immediate duty of these teams will be to contact local patriot leaders.
- (2) The establishment of patriot committees to help AMG officials to discriminate between genuine and bogus patriots.
- (3) The provision of staffs for patriot reception centers.
- (4) The provision of mobile Italian Army recruiting agencies.
- (5) Local re-employment of patriots as far as possible through patriot committees.
- (6) Reporting by local committees of "unemployable patriots" to central AMG authority.

3. Summary of Present State of Action.

In general, plans for Northwestern Italy are now well advanced. Plans for Northeastern Italy are only commencing but the same procedure will be adopted, subject to modifications as necessary in view of the Slovene difficulty.

PERMANENT ACTION REQUIRED

4. To meet the object stated at paragraph 1 above, the following additional measures are recommended:
5. The Establishment of Closer Links Between the CLM and the AMG Government.
There will be advantages in representatives being credited from each of these organizations to the other, though the domination of suitable persons

TOP SECRET
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1940

TOP SECRET

will present a difficulty. In this connection an exchange of missions between S. C. and the C. I. has also been considered, but in our object is now to play down the patriots, such a course does not appear desirable.

3. Informal Agreement as to Suitable Italians for Military Government Positions.

There will be advantages if the D. G. Government and the C. I. can be induced to agree on lists of suitable candidates for employment as police, etc., under S. C. S. C. could then undertake that, when instituting an Allied Military Government, agreed nominees would be considered for such appointments.

5. In regard to the object at paragraph 1 b, we have assumed that this refers to riots and not to normal operations of war against Fascist formations which may still be complying with German orders. In our opinion, the danger of actual disturbances developing between Fascists and patriots is small and the real danger is that of strife among patriots of diverse political opinions. The measures already taken, supplemented by those suggested at paragraph 4, should deal with this contingency.

5. In regard to the object given at paragraph 1 c, the best insurance will be the speedy occupation of vital areas and the establishment of stable government. Decisions remain urgently required, therefore, as to what form of government is to be imposed, and in what areas it is to be established, in the disputed portions of Southern Italy. Subject to any agreement that may have been made at the Italian Conference, no points of the opinion that to permit government for suitable areas up to the last frontier will prevent the best solution.

See Annex Path, Aug 1940

speedy occupation of vital areas and the establishment of stable government. Decisions must be urgently required, therefore, as to what form of government is to be imposed, and in what areas it is to be established, in the disputed portions of Northeastern Italy. Subject to any agreement that may have been made at the United Nations Conference, no points of the opinion that to postpone government for Vienna will help to the 1950 frontier will prevent the best solution.

See Annex Page, Page 19

Report of the United Nations
Conference on the
Disputed Portions of Northeastern Italy

1411

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APC 234

Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref: KTO/138/10.

23 February 1945.

Mr. Gauranaki located with us today and told me that he had been travelling on the outskirts of Northern Italy making contact with CLAI's, presumably from a distance, and that he was returning further on the same mission, that is to say, putting across to the Italians in Northern Italy Allied policy and propaganda etc.

He spoke as if he had not seen the directive which was issued for the use of PCI officers and HQ's working with the Northern groups and as if he did not know any of the policy with regard to our future treatment of partisans. He also asked me if he could go back and tell the Committee of National Liberation that the Allies would make use of them, etc., etc.

That is his position and what direction has been given, and does that direction tally with the policy of the Committee and HQ's? It struck me that he was giving a little bit in the dark with regard to policy. Although extremely earnest to find out what that policy was and to transmit it to the people in the North.

M. S. L. 138/10

Mr. John Brown

refusing to let the Italians in Southern Italy Allied policy and propaganda etc.

He says as if he had not seen the directive which was issued for the use of PWD officers and his writing with the northern groups and as if he did not know any of the policy with regard to our future treatment of partisans. He also asked me if he could "go back and tell the conditions of national liberation that the Allies would make use of them, etc., etc."

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M. S. 1034

Mr. John Wagner,
Lieut. P.W.D.,
17th Army Group,
APO 512, US Army.

See 205

11/18/72

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

320

Ex. Comm 186

CONFIDENTIAL

EX 31131
FEB 21 1945

EX 232120
SECTION

From: AFHQ, SIGNED SIGNED GITS FRONT
To: 15 ARMY GROUP, ALLIED COMMISSION

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

FEB 22 1945

This should not be referred to in agenda file 27/22 but not reviewed here.

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMO (P) study 2/265 (final) concerning Patriot problem in Northern ITALY is subject.

RECEIVED has approved contents of this paper with exception of last sentence of paragraph 6

MIN

DISCUSSION C & G
INFO A/PROSECUT
CHIEF COMMISSION
EX COMMISSION
FILE (2)
FIGHT

see M.187

See 189

*Seen by
Capt. Horden*

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
22 FEB 1945
4146

TRANSFERS ALLIED COMMISSION.

APC 390

CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION
PATRIOTS BRANCH.

Draft

184
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Ref: S/Pat.

PLAN FOR PATRIOTS IN NORTH WEST AFRICA.

FEB 21 1945

1. INTRODUCTION

In the event of a sudden withdrawal by the enemy from the Regions LIBERIA, SIERRA LEONE and LOMAXIA, it is known that we shall have to deal with large numbers of armed and organized Patriot bands.

2. INTENTION

The intention is to contact the patriots, disarm and disband them, whilst as many as possible into the Italian Armed Forces. Paid employment for the remainder and return them to normal civilian life as quickly as possible.

3. METHOD

A. In each Region a Regional Patriot Officer (RPO) will be appointed, who will be on the staff of the R.C., and the representative in the Region of the Patriots Branch, HQ. A.C.

He is to be a member of the staff of the R.C.
B.C.s will be responsible for appointing such additional officers to work under the RPO as the number of patriots encountered may require.

C. Patriot teams will be formed as required to handle patriots. Each team will consist of one Allied Officer and one officer of the Italian Army nominated by the Ministry of Occupied Italy and approved by Patriots Branch.

D. The RPO will be responsible, through intelligence channels at 15 Army Group and Patria Branch, for ascertaining as far as possible the location of patriot bands in the Region.

E. Having received from the B.C. information as to the location of concentrations of patriots within the Region, the Allied Patriot Officer will open a Patriot Office as near as possible to the location of the patriots.

1. REQUIREMENTS

A. In each Region a Regional Patriot Officer (RPO) will be appointed, who will be on the staff of the R.C., and the representative in the Region of the Patriots Branch, HQ, A.C.

B.C.A. will be responsible for appointing such additional officers to work under the RPO as the number of patriots encountered may require.

B. Patriot teams will be formed as required to handle patriots. Each team will consist of one Allied Officer and one officer of the Italian Army nominated by the Ministry of Occupied Italy and approved by Patriots Branch.

C. The RPO will be responsible, through intelligence channels at 15 Army Group and Patriots Branch, for ascertaining as far as possible the location of patriot bases in the Region.

D. Having received from the HQ information as to the location of concentrations of patriots within the Province, the Allied Patriot Officer will open a Patriot Office as near as possible to the concentration area. It is not possible to disperse patriots to their homes immediately, it will be necessary for him to establish a Patriot Centre where they can be housed until dispersed. For this purpose he will take on a permanent staff of patriots to prepare the Centre for occupation and to maintain it efficiently. His Military Representative should be made responsible for the proper running and interior economy of the Centre. The pay of the patriots taken onto his permanent staff should be met by HQ funds. (See letter dated 17th January 45)

2. The Patriot Officer will:-

- (a) Arrange to draw resources (Italian Military scale as notified later in detail) from HQ or GI Stores. (Authority AMHQ cable 927599 dated 16 Feb. 45)
- (b) Make immediate arrangements, working through the Patriot Leaders, for the disarming of patriots if they have not already been disarmed by the Army.
- (c) Give the help of HQ and Patriots Leaders, aside which of the elements are both side patriots.
- (d) Report to the nearest Military HQ. Details of P.O.R. furnished by patriots and ask for disposal instructions.

2.

- (o) Arrange for wounded patriots to be treated in Italian Military Hospitals. Allied forces will assist the Italian Army who will be responsible for hospitalization. (Authority: ARMA cable #27589 dated 16 Feb. 45)
- (f) Issue necessary clothing of which the minimum ~~potential~~ (Authority: ARMA cable #27589 dated 16 Feb. 45)
- (g) With the help of MCOs and Patriot Leaders, arrange to loan to bona fide patriots the Certificates signed by the Commander-in-Chief.
- (h) Ensure that patriots are interviewed by the Italian Army Recruiting Section which will be attached to each APC.
- (i) Make arrangements for the absorption of patriots into employment through Labour Organizations of the Army and A.C.
- (j) Wherever possible, evacuate patriots to their homes using refugees channels if their homes are a long distance away.
- (k) The conditions outlined above may be given for a maximum of 30 days from the time of receipt and disbursement by the Patriot Officer. All patriots shall have been found employment or dispersed to their homes within that period.

ADMINISTRATION

1. Regional Patriots Officers. A.P.O.s for Regions in North East Italy are as follows:

LIQUORI
FRANZINI
LAMBARTI

B. Payment to Patriots.

The Italian Government

(1) Whenever possible, evacuate patriots to their homes or to a long distance away.

(2) The assistance outlined above may be given for a maximum of 90 days from the time of reception and disbursement by the Patriot Officer. All patriots should have been found, employed or dispersed to their homes within that period.

A. ADMINISTRATIVE

1. Regional Patriot Officers. R.P.O.s for Regions in North West Italy are as follows:

LIGURIA:
PIEMONTE:
VALLE D'AOSTA:

B. Payment to Patriots.

The Italian Government proposes to reward patriots for their services with grants of money, on the following scale:

Normal demobilization money for patriots	500 Lira
For disabled patriot	5,000 "
For family of patriot killed in action	10,000 "

It is the responsibility of the Italian Military Representative with each team to apply for the required funds through the Official Italian Patriot Committee. The distribution of funds will be supervised by the Allied Patriot Officer. Receipts will be obtained for payment and medical rolls will be forwarded to the Italian Organization making the payment.

C. Collection of arms.

Lists will be made of all arms and munition collected from patriots, receipts will be given to each individual and the arms will be placed in safe custody, either in local Carabinieri barracks or with Ordnance. Copy of lists of arms will be forwarded to Patriotic Branch, HQ.

D. Summary

Patriot Officers will forward to their H.Q.s, copy to

183
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Patriots Squad HQ, a weekly report of their activities compiled under the following headings:-

1. Arms surrendered (quantity and type)
2. Number of patriots received at Centre or Office.
3. Number of patriots sent to hospital.
4. Number of patriots collected into the Italian Army.
5. Number of patriots reemployed.
6. Number of patriots returned to their homes.
7. Number of patriots not yet dispersed.
8. The Squad-En-Chief's Certificate.
(a) Number issued (with medical roll)
(b) Number of certificates in stock.

2. Transport

By arrangement with the Italian Government, motor cars may be hired for the use of patriots representing their units in the Programme. Notification of the hiring of cars should be sent to the Patriots Squad HQ as soon as possible.

3. INTER-COMMUNICATION

E.F.O. may correspond directly only on routine and technical matters with Patriots Squad HQ, 47.

183

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Partisan Branch HQ, a weekly report of their activities compiled under the following headings:-

1. Arms surrendered (Quantity and Type)
2. Number of patriots received at Castro or Berlin.
3. Number of patriots sent to hospital.
4. Number of patriots enlisted into the Italian Army.
5. Number of patriots employed.
6. Number of patriots returned to their homes.
7. Number of patriots not yet dispersed.
8. Character of the Party's activities.
9. Number issued (with minimal roll)
10. Number of certificates in stock.

5. ~~Partisan~~

By arrangement with the Italian Government, no one may be hired for the use of partisan representatives working in the Provinces. Notification of the hiring of cars should be sent to the Partisan Branch HQ as soon as possible.

5. ~~Partisan~~

I.P.O. may correspond direct only in routine and technical matters with Partisan Branch HQ, A.C.

F.P.O. may correspond directly only on matters of technical nature with the Director Bureau (Hq. G.O.

1412

Regional Commissioners are asked to submit to Patriotic Branch ...
from 22 Feb. 1945

- (a) an estimate of the total number of Italian Military Patriotic representatives required by them when Reg. are occupied;
- (b) the name of the Regional Patriotic Officer.

Patriotic Branch

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182

2000

DATE OF BIRTH OF S. PATRICK CONNELLEY

1. LOCATION Centres will be established by the RPO, when necessary, near outposts of patriots.
2. COMMAND The Patriot Officer, assisted by the Italian Military Patriot Representative, will control and supervise the administration of the Centre.
3. STAFF Staff for the Centre will be enlisted from Patriots. A Camp Commandant (Nazi Leader), a doctor, a hairdresser, cooks, cleaners and guards will be required. Payment on approved JAG scale will be made by the German Officer.
4. FOURTY Patriots may remain in Centre for a maximum period of 90 days. It is the duty of the Patriot Officer to ensure that they are of their enlisted into the Italian Army, found civil work or returned to their homes.
5. THE PATRIOT OFFICER WITH THE RPO (if available) The Italian Officer who will be available as leader of each Patriot Band that arrives, will form a screening committee and ensure that only genuine patriots are admitted.
6. ENTRANCE No entrance restriction will be paid to anyone. Identification will be obtained and all clothing will be confiscated. Entrance and screening arrangements must be adequate for maximum number expected.
7. ENTRANCE Essential clothing will be issued, as necessary, to the incoming soldier.

1. H. Spence Blomquist
 2. H. Spence Blomquist
 3. H. Spence Blomquist
 4. H. Spence Blomquist
 5. H. Spence Blomquist
 6. H. Spence Blomquist
 7. H. Spence Blomquist
 8. H. Spence Blomquist
 9. H. Spence Blomquist
 10. H. Spence Blomquist

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

5. SHOULDER - Patriotic band that arrived, will form a surrounding committee and ensure that only genuine patriots are admitted.

6. HYGIENE - Particular attention will be paid to hygiene. Disinfectants will be obtained and all clothing will be disinfected. Isolation and washing arrangements must be adequate for maximum number expected.

7. CLOTHING - Essential clothing will be issued, as necessary, up to the following point:

- 1 2' trousers
- 1 2' trousers
- 2 Shirts
- 2 Ties
- 2 Hats
- 1 Pair boots
- 1 Blanket
- 2 Pairs drawers
- 1 Jersey Pullover.

8. ACCOMMODATION - Accommodation should be obtained as far as possible from local sources. Beds should be obtainable from the Italian army. Authority to purchase about otherwise obtainable is contained in letter Ref.

1111

9. FOOD - Rations will be given on the Italian army scale (as later modified) from the end of March. The money element of the Italian army ration scale for local purchase of vegetables, fruit and wine will be sent by the Ministry of Occupied Italy to the Italian Patriotic Representative concerned, who will be responsible for buying this part of the ration and accounting for the funds.

10. DISPATCH - The HQ will try to arrange transport to take any recruits to the Italian Centre and volunteers for labour go to the scene of their work. Patriotic shoes home are at a distance will be organized through Refugee Council.

11. BOOKS - Register will be kept of all patriots entering the Centre, containing the following information: (a) Date of arrival at Centre. (b) Service. (c) Christian Name. (d) Sex. (e) Nationality. (f) Date and Place of Birth. (g) Date of arrival. (h) Date of departure. (i) Immediate destination. This information will be sent to agencies with patriots recorded through Refugee Council.

Organization is included

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APPENDIX "B"

EMPLOYMENT FOR REFUGEES

PRIORITY OF EMPLOYMENT

No. 2. District will give priority of employment to all genuine patriots who hold the Commander-in-Chief's Certificate. The RPO should try to obtain similar priority treatment from other possible employers' labour, for example, Army Labour Officers and their majors.

APPENDIX "C"

ITALIAN AND RECRUITING AGENCIES

1. Establishment

Recruiting agency, consisting of 4 Italian Officers and 6 CRAs, will be attached to each RPO. Land Forces Sub Commission, at the request of Patriotic Branch, will send those recruiting agencies into the field.

2. Control

The RPO has full control over the recruiting agency while it remains attached to him. He can divide it, at his discretion, into detachments which may be sent to work independently in any part of his Region.

3. Salaries

In any areas or Military Government Territory. Recruiting Agencies will be issued with PNL and stores from the source.

*2 from Italian Army
Source as per RPO
of Italian*

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APPENDIX A

ITALIAN MILITARY PRISONERS DISSEMINATION

1. SUMMARY

Summaries of all Italian Military Prisoner Representations must be examined by the Italian Government.

2. DISSEMINATION

(a) Any IPR found to be in possession of mail, or party to, or acting as an agent for, the carrying of mail will be subject to immediate dismissal and severe disciplinary measures. (b) Any IPR engaging in political activities will be dismissed immediately.

3. RATIONING, MAILING AND P.O.L.

IPRs will receive free postal, free billets and a free issue of ration in army brown. (a) 100gms/day of 10 lbs. (b) They will not be allowed 10/100 for reasons of their own, nor will they have supplies from Kaffi or Post Exchange Services. "Free billets" will not be considered to include furniture or bedding. IPRs, if admitted to Allied Officers' messes, will be required to pay the local messing fee.

4. PAY

a. The Italian Government provides funds through A.G. for payment of each IPR at the rate of one hundred (100) lire a day from the time he is called up, and the hundred (100) lire a day from the time when he receives his appointment. Payments are for a seven day week.

b. Lists of IPRs will be sent fortnightly by IPRs to Regional Commissioners who are responsible for seeing that they are paid from 1st on 15th and last day of each month.

c. Regional Commissioners will notify the Regional Finance Officer of the names and locations of all IPRs in the Region. Any change in the personnel of the IPRs or in their location will at once be reported to the Regional Finance Officer by the R.C.

d. The Regional Finance Officer will make arrangements to pay IPRs through his Provincial Finance Officers or their sub-officers.

e. The pay of IPRs will eventually be recovered by A.G. from the Italian Government. It will, therefore, be necessary for all IPRs to be

IGRAs will receive free passes, free billets and a free issue of ration in any area. (Ref 1075/501 of 20 Oct. 44). They will not be allowed IGAs for passes of their own, or all they have supplied from M-PI or Post Exchange Service. "Free billets" will not be construed to include furniture or bedding. IGAs, if admitted to "allied Officers' messes, will be required to pay the local mess hall too.

4. PAY.

a. The Italian Government provides funds through IGRAs for payment of cash IGAs at the rate of one hundred (100) lire a day from the time he is called up, and two hundred (200) lire a day from the time when he receives his appointment. Payments are for a seven day week.

b. Billets of IGAs will be sent fortnightly by wire to Regional Commissioners and are responsible for seeing that they are paid from IGAs on 15th and last day of each month.

c. Regional Commissioners will notify the Regional Finance Officer of the names and locations of all IGAs in the Region. Any change in the personnel of the IGAs or in their location will be reported to the Regional Finance Officer by the R.G.

d. The Regional Finance Officer will make arrangements to pay IGAs through the Provincial Finance Officers or their sub-accountants.

e. The pay of IGAs will eventually be recovered by IGAs from the Italian Government. It will, therefore, be necessary for all IGAs to be paid on a separate payroll, the original copies of which, signed by the IGAs, will be forwarded to the monthly Report of Receipts and Disbursements to the Chief Accountant, etc. He will take the necessary steps to obtain reimbursement from the Italian Government each month.

5. HIRING OF MOTOR CARS.

a. Motor vehicles may be hired for the use of IGAs. It is the responsibility of the Regional Finance Officer to obtain covering authority from the Italian Government. The cost will not exceed 100 lire a day including driver's pay.

b. The Sub-accountant taking the payment will obtain a receipt on a payment voucher, 7/73, in triplicate (keeping two originals and one duplicate) and will mark them clearly to show that the payments in question are in respect of the hire of vehicles for IGAs.

c. The two originals will then be sent, with the monthly Report of Receipts and Disbursements, to the Chief Accountant at HQ. Such expenditure will subsequently be recovered from the Italian Government by IGAs in the same way as pay of IGAs.

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ATTACHMENT

PRISONERS OF WAR

Instructions to Allied Patriot Officers.

1. It is possible that Patriot Bands may arrive either:-

- (a) Escorting enemy prisoners of war, or
- (b) With enemy troops in their trucks who have joined the patriots to fight the main German forces for political or other reasons.

2. Instructions will be issued by 15 Army Group as to the treatment of such enemy troops and, in the mean time, the following principles will be observed:-

- (a) Allied Patriot Officers' action will be governed by the knowledge that no negotiations can take place with the enemy except on the basis of unconditional surrender.
- (b) It must be clearly understood that Allied Patriot Officers are not in a position to guarantee treatment as prisoners of war to those who have surrendered to patriots, before the prisoners are received into Allied custody.
- (c) Allied Patriot Officers should at once transmit to the nearest Military Centre offers by enemy detachments of unconditional surrender to the Allies. The Military authorities should be informed of the full circumstances and they will decide whether such surrender can be accepted.
- (d) Until surrender is accepted by Allied Command, prisoners in patriots' hands are a Patriot and not an Allied responsibility.

TOP SECRET

Confidential

179

19 February 1945

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH RUSSIAN, HALFORD AND SHERIDAN -
MAJOR [REDACTED] (ASSISTANT TO COLONEL, RUSSE).

1. The Major said that the system of financing the Patriots does not work and it has been suggested that in the future distribution of funds be made not through the CIGI but through British and American authorities working with the Patriots.
2. There has been no direct evidence of fraud in the distribution of these funds but there is little positive information, some negative information and a large lack of any information at all. It is known that since December 15, 1944, three and a half million lire were received by the 5th Army Commander at Florence from the CIGI (CIGI), and one million by the Comando Union of Rome - a total of 4 1/2 million lire.
3. Positive information of a non-receipt of funds has been obtained from Piedmont (which receives 40% of the total monthly allotment), Reggio Emilia and Modena. The difficulty at these places seems to be a failure of the money market and efforts on Switzerland cannot be negotiated for lack of funds. In these instances, the CIGI is held blameless.
4. There have been no reports regarding the receipt or non-receipt of funds from the Po Valley where cover has been very poor, and also no reports from North East Italy.
5. In addition to the cases mentioned above, it is known that the Italian Ministry of War, through the 5th Army, has supplied 15 million lire over the line to the Comando Union of Rome. Similarly, 3 millions were supplied to the CIGI and CI in Apulia and an additional two million to individual Patriot leaders in Apulia.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

3201
INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Originator's Reference: **FL 27830**
Date/Time of Origin: **YFB NPT**

Message Group No: **D/2169**
Date/Time Rec'd: **YFB 162055A**
Precedence: **IMMEDIATE**

FROM: **AFHQ SIGNED SACRED CITY FRONT**
TO: **HR 15 ARMY GROUP INFO (2) COMPANY A 2-71 INFANTRY SQUADRON ON BN (3) 10**
DETACHMENT NO 1 SPECIAL FORCE (4) SCOTQ (5) ALCON
1 FEB 17 1945

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Your 02218 February 8th (not to last 2 addressees).

1. Governing principle is that no negotiations with enemy take place except on basis of their unconditional surrender.
2. Enemy proposals for desertion to Italian Partisans as PW or to join them subsequently in fighting against the Germans must be dealt with according their judgement by the Partisan formations themselves. Our missions are not in a position to guarantee either treatment PW who surrender to Partisans or to enter into any commitment therewith and beyond making this fact clear should not attempt influence decision one way or the other. This does not of course preclude missions from general subversive activity with a view to inducing enemy without opposition or mutiny.
3. Offers by enemy detachments or formations to surrender unconditionally to Allied (not Partisan) forces should be at once transmitted by missions to you. It is then for you to decide each case on its merits (having regard to location enemy request and other circumstances) whether such surrender can be accepted and pass instructions to the field as to the action to be taken by the enemy formation to enable you to do so. Function of mission is to transmit ~~offer~~ offer and your instructions. Missions capacity for accepting surrender themselves is obviously limited by their ability to guard and otherwise look after the PW.

See Map. NO

1877
- 2 -
TOP SECRET

(TX 27530 continued)

176
Confidential

Setting up of 3% cages in enemy occupied territory not considered practicable.

A. General future policy towards Carabinieri is to encourage revival.

INFO
C. A. 244, FBI
INFO-ACTION: ~~President or General~~
INFO: A/President
Chief Commissioner
~~Executive Commissioner~~
~~Special Agent in Charge~~
File

Copy No 1	INFO-ACTION:
" " 2	INFO: A/President
" " 3	Chief Commissioner
" " 4	Executive Commissioner
" " 5	Special Agent in Charge
" " 6	File

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET 3201

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
INCOMING MESSAGE

FEB 17 1945

Confidential

TO: ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME

SIGNAL MESSAGE CENTER No: 800/16

FROM: AFHQ, SIGNET, RACHET

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET

REFERENCE No: F-27059

PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE

DATE AND TIME OF ORIGIN: FEB 15/1151 OFFICE OF ORIGIN: CITE PRAT

TOP SECRET.

FROM: AFHQ, SIGNET, RACHET

The following is paraphrase of our F-26918 to 15 Army Group forwarding our Operation Instruction dated 21 December 44 and Administrative Instruction dated 25 January 45 on occupation of Northwest Italy.

1. Occupation of Northwest Italy may take place earlier than thought due to Russian successes.
2. Subject to approval of Combined Chiefs of Staff the following policy is dealing with the Partisans is proposed by RACHET. Recognition of assistance to Allied cause will be basis of treatment together with necessity that they be disarmed, disbanded, placed in employment as quickly as possible. Those and until they are taken into existing categories of Italians they will not yet not be treated as belonging to any existing category. Areas of assembly will be specified as soon as arrangements for reception can be made. These areas must be selected considering availability from Partisan viewpoint as well as other factors. Disarmament of Partisans will take place on entering

The following is paraphrase of our Y-2698B to 15 Army Group furthering our Operation Instruction dated 21 December 44 and Administrative Instruction dated 25 January 45 on occupation of Northwest Italy.

1. Occupation of Northwest Italy may take place earlier than thought due to Russian successes.
2. Subject to approval of Combined Chiefs of Staff the following policy in dealing with the Partisans is proposed by SACRED. Recognition of assistance to Allied cause will be basis of treatment together with necessity that they be disarmed, disbanded, placed in employment as quickly as possible. Unless and until they are taken into existing categories of Italians they will not yet not be treated as belonging to any existing category. Areas of assembly will be specified as soon as arrangements for reception can be made. These areas must be selected considering suitability from Partisan viewpoint as well as other factors. Disarmament of Partisans will take place on entering reception areas. Paragraphs three, four and five outline assistance, after disarmament, that will be rendered them until final disposition has been made. The Allied Commission will be responsible for the final disposition and should aim at a completion date of three months.

(continued....)

TOP SECRET

DATE and TIME of RECEIPT FEB 16/1945

Distribution:

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

1000 200-1
BU 21/25/12

TOP SECRET

ARMY CARE & CRUISE OF THE 1945 (continued)

167
Confidential

3. During phase 1 Army Headquarters (together with Allied Military Government of the Army Headquarters) will feed and clothe personnel in areas concerned; Armed will supply necessary food and clothing for this purpose as follows:

a. Italian Military Forces ration scale as modified later in detail will apply.

b. Minimum essential scale of clothing will be issued from military sources.

4. Italian Government will be responsible for pay. Necessary arrangements with the Italian Government will be made by the Allied Commission who will notify 15 Army Group of arrangements including rate of pay.

5. United States and British will assist Italian Military who will be responsible for hospitalization.

6. Amplification of paragraph 3, 4 and 5 will be furnished later in a detailed Administrative Memorandum. Approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff is being requested for issue of rations and clothing outlined in paragraphs 3 a. and b.

EXEMPTION FROM THE COMMISSION

ACTION: Commission on the Army Care & Cruise (2)

1000;

Commissioner

Chief Commissioner

Secretary

Head of the 15 Army Group

ments with the Italian Government will be made by the Allied Commission who will notify 15 Army Group of arrangements including rate of pay.

5. United States and British will assist Italian Military who will be responsible for hospitalization.

6. Amplification of paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 will be furnished later in a detailed Administrative Memorandum. Approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff is being requested for issues of rations and clothing outlined in paragraphs 3 a. and b.

DISTRIBUTION BY CASE CONTROL
ACTION: *Administrative Case Aff Section (2)*

INFO: ~~Administrative~~
Chief Commissioner
~~Administrative~~

Land Forces S/C (Moria)
Political Section
A/President

ECOM SEC (2)

Re Center Case Control

Q 100, 13, has in copy over. Rec. 17 Feb. 48

TOP SECRET

146

Ref. 12V/6/797

12 February 1945

FEB 13 1945

My dear Mr. Prime Minister,

On 23 January I wrote you a letter Ref. 12V/6/797 about the question of payments being made to patriots who come through the lines or who are met with in newly liberated territory.

In my letter I pointed out that certain irregular pay -
ments were being made. I requested that immediate steps be taken to
correct these conditions, and that instructions, as a temporary measure,
be issued at once that no patriot representatives be sent into Military
Government Territory without the written consent of Patriots Branch of
the Allied Commission.

In addition I asked that the present haphazard method of
recompensation of patriots be replaced by an approved governmental system.

May I remind you, my dear Mr. Prime Minister, that the
situation is urgent and that an answer to my letter of 23 January will
hasten a solution of this important problem.

Yours very truly,

WILSON W. SMITH
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi
The President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
Rome

1883
Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/UNCL No. 785017

3201

File

107

Extract of Minutes of Chief of Staff's Meeting held on 2 February 1965.

Patriota. CA Sec said the position was highly unsatisfactory and they had prepared a draft telegram to AFHQ. A new draft Directive had been prepared by AFHQ which altered the whole position and returned us almost to where we had started. CJS asked CA Sec for a short note on the matter and he would take it up with Gen. Robertson.

1404

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394.
PATRIOTS BRANCH.

ALLIED MESSAGE.

Subject: Handling of Patriots

To: Chief of Staff (For discussion with CAS, AFHQ.)

1. By Directive dated 13th January 1945 under reference AFHQ/035000-0 addressed to CCA Fifth and Eighth Armies by President of AC, the following determinations were made:

(a) Patriots were made an Allied responsibility for dispersal after a period not exceeding 30 days.

(b) AFHQ was authorized to provide up to 2,000 sets of reconditioned clothing to the following scale:

- 1 pair of boots
- 2 pairs of socks
- 1 pair of trousers (wool)
- 1 shirt (wool)
- 1 jersey, pullover or equivalent

plus one blanket if within the limits of availability.

(c) Authority was granted for the issue of Italian military rations through the agency of AFHQ.

(d) Allied Commission was to maintain suitable reception camps and arrange for Italian army hospitalization for sick and wounded patriots to the extent that operations permit.

2. Chief of Staff AFHQ in his note to C3 dated 26th January 1945 stated that plans must include the issue of orders and instructions to Partisans to report to certain centres where they would be properly cared for and provided with food, clothing and money.

3. At a meeting convened by C3 AFHQ on Monday, 28th January,

plus one blanket if within the limits of availability.

- (c) Authority was granted for the issue of Italian military rations through the agency of MIA.
- (d) Allied Commission was to maintain suitable reception camps and arrange for Italian army hospitalization for sick and wounded patriots to the extent that operations permit.
2. Chief of Staff AMO in his note to G3 dated 26th January 1945 stated that plans must include the issue of orders and instructions to Partisans to report to certain centres where they would be properly cared for and provided with food, clothing and money.
3. At a meeting convened by G3 AMO on Monday the 20th January, it was recommended that the provision of food and clothing should be undertaken as a military commitment based on a period of three months with numbers up to 100,000. It was agreed that money for Partisans should be provided by the Italian Government and issued through AMO. No difficulty was foreseen in this latter respect.

4. By letter dated 5th February from G3 Section AMO addressed to this HQ, reference HQ/aa, it was stated that AMO have now only under consideration the provision of food and clothing to a specified number of Patriots for an agreed period. This appears to conflict with the recommendations at 3 above. 140.

5. Furthermore a new draft directive has been received in this HQ on the 8th February 1945, (the only copy is at present with Colonel Craig who is at Caserta) stating:

- (a) that rations would be a civilian responsibility with possible sanitation from military sources;
- (b) that hospitalization would be civilian;
- (c) clothing would be provided but on an unspecified scale.

6. It will therefore be seen that at present there is no

copy filed on file 3209/EC

/clear

163

2.

clear determination as to the responsibilities with regard to the provision of food, clothing and hospitalization for patriots, and it is therefore important to make detailed plans for their handling in the future, in particular with regard to the Northwest Provinces. It is urgently requested that an authority be given for the drawing of Italian military ration scale for patriots for a period of 90 days if necessary, for each patriot and up to a maximum number of 100,000; that authority for clothing from military sources up to the maximum of 100,000 patriots on the scale laid down also be given and that hospitalization be a military commitment until such time as the patients can be received in civilian hospitals and suitable facilities exist; and that of course the financial arrangements remain an Italian Government responsibility with MI 2 as the agency supervising the distribution.

1287
Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/KND No. 785017

1402

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

OUTGOING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMAND

CALL	CRT NR	PRIORITY
TRANSMISSION INSTRUCTIONS	FROM	DATE TIME
TO	INFO INSTRUCTIONS	IR
Originator do not write above this line		

TO AFHQ PERSONAL FOR CHIEF OF STAFF

REF NO 1365

DATE 8 Feb.

PRIORITY

See name of person

CONFIDENTIAL PD

PARA ONE PD SUBJECT IS PROVISION OF CLOTHING AND FOOD FOR PATRIOTS PD
PARA TWO PD IN YOUR NOTE CHARLIE SUGAR SLANT SIX EIGHT DATED TWO SIX JANUARY
FOUR FIVE TO ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF GEORGE THREE YOU STATED THAT PLANS MUST
INCLUDE THE ISSUE OF ORDERS AND INSTRUCTIONS TO PARTICIPANTS TO REPORT TO
CERTAIN CENTRES WHERE THEY WOULD BE PROPERLY CARED FOR AND PROVIDED WITH FOOD
CLOTHING AND MONEY PD

PARA TO AFHQ PERSONAL FOR CHIEF OF STAFF FROM HQ ALONG WITH PAREN

PARA THREE PD AT MEETING CONVENED BY ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF GEORGE THREE ON
MONDAY TWENTYNINE JANUARY IT WAS RECOMMENDED THAT PROVISION OF FOOD AND
CLOTHING SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN AS A MILITARY COMMITMENT BUT I AM NOW IMPOSED
BY ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF GEORGE FIVE PAREN REFERENCE TO LETTER HQ SUGAR JIG
SLANT ABLE SUGAR FIVE PRESUMED PAREN YOU NOW ONLY HAVE UNDER CONSIDERATION THE
PROVISION OF FOOD AND CLOTHING TO A SPECIFIED NUMBER OF PATRIOTS FOR AN AGREED
PERIOD PD

PARA FOUR PD THIS NOW QUEEN STRONGLY RECOMMENDS THAT THE PROVISION OF FOOD AND
CLOTHING TO PATRIOTS BE ENLARGED AS A MILITARY COMMITMENT AND IT IS

OFFICE OF ORIGIN

TEL NO

ORIGINATOR'S SIGNATURE

ACKNOWLEDGED

1401

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NWD No. 785017

OUTGOING MESSAGE

1 RAB 5

2015

2. The Classification, excepting **NO CLEAR BY AVE MEANS**, will be inserted as the last word of the text. Grades are

TOP SECRET
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTED
IS CLEAR BY ANY MEANS

When an identification appears at the beginning of the text the message will record IN C-BAE.

1. Precedence: (indicate one)
 () Routine
 () Priority
 () Immediate
 () Deferred

Only in exceptional cases will a precedence higher than **PRIORITY** be
used in this country. Do not use **SECRET** or **TOP SECRET** unless you have been trained

[The page contains several lines of extremely faint, illegible text, likely bleed-through from the reverse side.]

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

OUTGOING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

61

CALL	EXT NO	PRIORITY
TRANSMISSION INSTRUCTIONS	FROM	DATE TIME
TO	MSG INSTRUCTIONS	CR ST

Originator do not write above this line

TO	DATE	PRIORITY
REF No		

On back of page 1

IMPOSSIBLE TO MAKE DETAILED PLANS FOR THE HANDLING OF PATRIOTS UNTIL I AM INFORMED EXACTLY WHAT PROVISION WILL BE UNDERTAKEN BY YOU PD

PARA FIVE PD REQUEST YOU URGENTLY TO GIVE ME AUTHORITY PERHAPS ABLE PASS TO DRAW ON ITALIAN MILITARY RATIONS SCALE FOR PATRIOTS UP TO NINE ZERO DAYS IF NECESSARY FOR EACH PATRIOT UP TO A MAXIMUM OF ONE ZERO ZERO ZERO ZERO ZERO PERHAPS ABLE PASS TO DRAW FROM ALLIED SOURCES CLOTHING UP TO A MAXIMUM OF ONE ZERO ZERO ZERO ZERO ZERO PATRIOTS ON THE SCALE LAID DOWN IN PARAGRAPH THREE OF YOUR ABLE GEORGE FOUR ZERO ZERO HANT THREE THREE GEORGE HANT GEORGE DASH OBOR DATED ONE THREE JANUARY PD

PARA SIX PD FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE MADE WITH THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

AC DISTRIBUTION:

Chief Commissioner:
CA Section :
Patriots Branch:

by 6 3209/EC

OFFICE OF ORIGIN: Chief of Staff

TEL No 289

ORIGINATOR'S SIGNATURE

Authenticated:

NICHOLAS FIORINO
CWO USA

Asst: Adjutant
1400

188

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

OUTGOING MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION
GRADE
PRIORITY

ROUTING SLIP

1. The Classification, excepting "IN CLEAR BY ANY MEANS", will be marked as the first word of the text. Grades are:

TOP SECRET
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTED
IN CLEAR BY ANY MEANS

2. The word "TOP SECRET" shall be used only when the message is of such a nature that its disclosure would be injurious to the national defense.

3. The word "SECRET" shall be used only when the message is of such a nature that its disclosure would be injurious to the national defense.

4. The word "CONFIDENTIAL" shall be used only when the message is of such a nature that its disclosure would be injurious to the national defense.

5. The word "RESTRICTED" shall be used only when the message is of such a nature that its disclosure would be injurious to the national defense.

6. The word "IN CLEAR BY ANY MEANS" shall be used only when the message is of such a nature that its disclosure would be injurious to the national defense.

7. The word "TOP SECRET" shall be used only when the message is of such a nature that its disclosure would be injurious to the national defense.

8. The word "SECRET" shall be used only when the message is of such a nature that its disclosure would be injurious to the national defense.

9. The word "CONFIDENTIAL" shall be used only when the message is of such a nature that its disclosure would be injurious to the national defense.

10. The word "RESTRICTED" shall be used only when the message is of such a nature that its disclosure would be injurious to the national defense.

RESTRICTED

TOP SECRET
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTED
IN CLEAR BY ANY MEANS

2/20/52 J. J. J.

OUTGOING MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION

GRADE

CLASSIFICATION

GRADE

OUTGOING MESSAGE

3201 file 150
Extract of Minutes of Chief of Staff's Meeting held on 30 January 1945

Partisans in the North.

CHS read a memorandum addressed to G-3 by Gen. Harding which pointed out that as a result of Russian successes we might be in possession of Northern Italy sooner than was anticipated and the problem of disarming and disbanding patriots would arise.

The meeting at AFHQ was exploratory and no decisions were reached in connection with CHS and patriots. It was estimated that there would be a total of 100,000 patriots, comprising 33,000 in N.W. and 67,000 in N.E. Italy. Feeding and clothing was a military commitment and could not be done through the Italian Army. CHS had no charter and moreover, no clothing.

The patriots would be regarded as returned prisoners of war, not as part of the Italian Army. CHS said we would be more likely to get what we wanted from the CHS on that basis.

13577

3207

157

MEMORANDUM

JAN 27 1945

File No.

1. Lt. Col. BREWSTER (MIA) rang up to say that:

1. Gen. BREWSTER had agreed that Last Forces Sub Commission would correspond direct to Regional Commissioners on the call-up.

2. General BREWSTER could not spare an officer to go to SHAW to study the patriot problem.

26 Jan 45.

OK

Told about to LOS

Put in appropriate file 39-

Screened at. 8427/1

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 1.3/NND No. 785017

3201
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394
Office of the Chief of Staff

Ref: 3201/ /OCS.

24 January 1945.

SUBJECT: Patriots.

JAN 25 1945

TO : DCS, CA Section.

Have we told SCAG's Armies and Regions, AND, the contents of the new direction from A.P.H.Q. on patriots? They want to know.

WEL/SG.

C. O. S. ✓

M. S. L.
Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

A revised - complete directive on Patriots
is now before me for approval.

Further instructions have been given

25 Jan 45

1337

WEL/SG

WEL/SG

3201
ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 93A
Office of the Chief Commissioner

Ref. 121/4747.

23 January, 1945.

JAN 23 1945

My dear Mr. Prime Minister,

My attention has been drawn to the question of making payments to patriots who come through the lines or who are set with in newly liberated territory.

So far patriot representatives have been provided with funds by the I.N.P.C. and have been making payments of varied amounts to patriots. Sometimes such dissatisfaction has been caused because representatives have run out of cash and have not been able to make any further payments.

On the 12th January one of your patriot representatives inserted an advertisement in a newspaper in Florence stating that the families of patriots who had been killed fighting, if they belonged to the Communist, Social Democrat, or Liberal Party, would be paid 10,000 lire. I have, of course, issued instructions that this advertisement is to be cancelled and payments made to the families of deceased patriots without reference to their political party.

It has also been reported to me that a representative of the Ministry of Occupied Italy has been sent to the neighbourhood of Florence - without consulting the Patriots Branch here - with a large sum of money for distribution to patriots. I have ordered an immediate investigation and his recall.

These are two examples of the present haphazard and unsatisfactory system of remunerating patriots and it cannot be allowed to continue in Military Government Territory.

As a matter of urgency therefore, my dear Prime Minister, I must ask you to give immediate instructions as a temporary measure, that no patriot representatives will be sent into Military Government Territory except with the consent, to be obtained in writing, of an officer of the Patriots Branch of the Allied Commission; and further that such representative be furnished with written instructions by the appropriate Ministry stating the amount of currency which he is carrying and the exact terms upon which he is to distribute such currency amongst patriots or their dependents.

With regard to the future I would ask you to consider getting the remuneration of patriots onto a proper governmental basis so that the present haphazard system may be terminated.

In particular I ask you to consider:-

- (a) The proper budgetary appropriation of a sufficient sum to remunerate patriots; it is of course impossible to say how many patriots will ultimately be met, but purely as a guide I doubt if the number is likely to exceed 10,000 in the next three months.
- (b) The basis on which the payment should be made. This has varied in the past and you will no doubt want to consider whether every patriot should be paid a flat rate or whether the sum should vary according to his financial means, injuries received, or some other basis. The latter method would give rise to some complications and it would be necessary to lay down with the utmost clarity the principles upon which a variation is to be made in each case. Certainly no discrimination should be made on the basis of political beliefs or party membership. The amount to be paid is entirely for you to determine.

I ask you, my dear Prime Minister, to give this matter your most urgent consideration, for much difficulty is being met with every day as patriots come through owing to the lack of a coordinated policy on the part of your patriot representatives.

Yours very truly,

W. Ellery W. Stone

WILLIAM W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief Commissioner

Sic Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi,
The President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government.
Rome.

CONFIDENTIAL

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 612

3201
RHF/13a

AP 649

CC 156

AG 400/033 080-0

13 January 1945

SUBJECT: Rations, Clothing, Hospitalization and Transportation
for Patriots.

TO : Commanding General, Fifth Army, APO 464.
Commander, Eighth Army.
President, Allied Commission
PCR: Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA).

1. Patriots who come from enemy territory will be regarded as an Allied responsibility for the whole of the period during which it is necessary to hold them for screening, determination as to their future status or other purposes. This period will not exceed thirty (30) days.

2. The agency through which the above mentioned Allied responsibility will be carried out is the MMIA, which will make available to the appropriate organization of the Allied Commission the necessary clothing, supplies (paragraphs 3 and 4) and hospitalization facilities (paragraph 7 b). (This does not relieve AC/AMG of the normal responsibilities with regard to organization, screening, etc, as outlined in paragraph 7 b).

3. Authority is granted for the issue by MMIA of up to two thousand (2000) sets of reconditioned clothing on the following scale:

1 pair boots	1 jersey pullover or equivalent
2 pairs socks	1 gas cape or raincoat equivalent
1 pair trousers, wool	1 mess tin or equivalent.
1 shirt, wool	

The addition of a blanket to this scale is authorized within the limits of availability. No issue in excess of this ceiling will be made without authority of this headquarters. Wool outer garments will be dyed either black or rust brown prior to issue.

4. Up to one thousand (1000) sets of British clothing and one thousand (1000) sets of United States clothing will be made available in due course to replace the reconditioned Italian clothing issued in accordance with paragraph 3 above.

5. The Allied Commission will take all possible steps to ensure that reconditioning of Italian Army and salvage clothing and boots is carried out with the greatest possible speed, in order that it may assume this commitment in full as soon as possible.

CONFIDENTIAL

Ltr APHQ, file AG 400/033 GEG-O
dtd 13 January 1945 (Cont'd)

6. Authority is granted for issue of Italian military rations. These rations will be drawn through the agency of WMIA. They will count against the totals authorized for US-ITI and BR-ITI ceilings, and will be accounted for on an equal basis.

7. Responsibility.

a. Armies will collect, disarm and transport Italian patriots to reception camps. They will issue Italian military rations, furnish emergency hospitalization during the period of army control and provide facilities for disinfection and sterilization out of normal resources as far as operational commitments allow.

b. Allied Commission will maintain suitable reception camps, arrange for Italian Army Hospitalization of sick or wounded to the extent that operations permit, evacuate such casualties as soon as possible to Italian civil hospitals, issue Italian military rations, provide clothing subject to availability (paragraph 5), disperse patriots as rapidly as possible and ensure that calls on military supplies are kept to the minimum.

By command of Field Marshal ALEXANDER:

/s/ C. W. Christenberry
C. W. CHRISTENBERRY,
Colonel, AGD,
Acting Adjutant General.

1590

CONFIDENTIAL

1. With the exception of other countries, notably Greece, in which the Allied Commission has followed closely the workings of international cooperation in Italy. The pattern here has followed that which presumably was delineated in other belligerent countries. Machinery to the extent pursued in Spain where an external force and material were provided to support left forces in their struggle against conservative forces in power, attempt is made from within to gain control over executive organizations and political movements with the ultimate view of admitting them to obtain control of the country. The example of the Spanish regime is indicative of the danger to any country of the possibility of setting up a dictatorial regime with the support of armed bands whose sole livelihood was obtained by force of arms and whose members were susceptible to political influences whose policy is based on force. This danger is greater where the country has been defeated and, of a weary and dejected people, the members of the bands capture perhaps the most virile elements.

2. Italian Communists suggest the Government, maintain an attitude of cooperation with the Italian and some to attract them into by extending their popular influence through propaganda and also by a well organized system. In the military side, they want to establish for their own political purposes, persons who are aiding the war effort behind the lines, armed, fed and clothed and encouraged by the presence of Allied officers. The fact of political bargaining which prevented the formation of the present Government of Italy of Communist Italy was allotted to an anti-Communist party, undoubtedly will afford the party an opportunity.

to any country of the possibility of setting up a totalitarian regime with the support of armed bands whose sole livelihood was obtained by force of arms and whose conduct was comparable to political influence whose policy is based on force. ¹³⁹ The danger is greater where the country has been defeated and, of a victory and defeated people, the members of the band carrying perhaps the most virile element.

2. Italian Communists support the Government, maintain an attitude of cooperation with the British and now to attain these ends by maintaining their political influence through propaganda and aid given by a well organized system. In the military side, they seek to control for their own political purposes, a force who are aiding the war effort behind the lines; armed, fed and armed and encouraged by the presence of Allied officers. The fact political bargaining which prevented the formation of the present for hundreds of thousands of troops in Italy was allotted to an armed Communist Party, undoubtedly will afford the party an opportunity influence in the North.

3. It is reliably reported that the Communist Party in Italy is preparing its propaganda program and making an appeal to the Party based primarily on regularly controlled matters. The loss incurs Party union, in turn, presumably is mobilized by Soviet agents.

4. It is well-known that of over 200,000 Italian prisoners taken in the North of Italy, the most organized ones are those sent to the Soviet Union only to be employed in a future general strike by which which to end the war effort. Military Government officials state that since the first announcement by the Italian Government by the Italian Government of the conditions of

Confidential

- 2 -

Northern Italy (C.I.I.) as its representative in the struggle against the enemy behind the lines and as the organ of the anti-fascist struggle in enemy-occupied territory, the Communist Party has been strengthening its organization and struggling to form a counter-party system, in the pursuit of which the population has been incited, interference made in labor and other matters and a general feeling of unrest created which is not voluntary to the war effort.

5. Allied intelligence sources in the North report that at least one Communist organization in the Po Valley is active in creating conditions which will delay the departure of the German leg from North West Italy in order that the Yugoslav army gain time in which to occupy Istria. Similarly, German influence in the Centre even (that region north of Udine) reportedly is increasing. The Director of a Catholic (Communist) formation is reported to have stated that all Catholic units in that area have placed themselves under the operational control of the Germans, following a Communist Party directive for North West Italy.

6. Following another line, the Communist Party in the Delta area (independent under a frontal attack on the sub-division of the C.I.I./I. of Delta and attempted to deprive it of authority. The party made a propaganda drive to turn the people against the C.I.I./I. when others it incited and operationally. Members of Communist Party formations attempted to disband anti-Communist formations and to disband their members. Finally, they persuaded the Delta and neo-fascists to stand up the area, in the course of which two important Italian newspapers were destroyed.

7. Possible indication of the international aspect of this Communist activity in the North West Italian, I.C.I. recently received a secret but anonymous communication from a source known to it actually to be a high-ranking officer in the Italian Intelligence Service who claims to reveal persons, which contains the following state-

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 185017

gain him in status to country Interim. Similarly, however influence in the Berlin area (that region north of Berlin) reportedly is increasing. The Chairman of a Cardinal (Communist) Commission is reported to have stated that all Cardinal Bishops in that area have placed themselves under the operational control of the "Lovers", following a Communist Party directive for North East Italy.

6. Following another line, the Communist Party in the Berlin area (West) made a frontal attack on the sub-Committee of the C.I.L.A. of Berlin and attempted to deprive it of authority. The Party made a propaganda drive to turn the people against the C.I.L.A. since others it endorsed systematically. Members of Communist Patriotic Fronts attempted to disband non-Communist formations and to disband their members. Finally, they provided the Berlin and non-Berlin to clean up the area, in the course of which two important Patriotic Fronts were destroyed.

7. Recently indicative of the informational aspect of this Communist activity the six Swiss sub-Committee, S.I., recently received a secret but anonymous communication from a source known to it actually to be a high-ranking officer in the Italian Intelligence Service who claims to remain unknown, which contains the following statement from a French officer attributed to a "Winter and organization" for Italian Intelligence who gives the Mediterranean and Adriatic Frontiers into France.

"The French Government has not said a very considerable sum of money for the financing of this work and has organized several points, most numbers and living quarters for these people."

"Next, according to what this French officer has said, this is not being done out of any particular sympathy for the Italians, but rather to organize operations in French territory, who at this time is observing or fighting Patriotic fronts in France and Italy."

"The behaviour of Great Britain in these countries is very unfortunately criticized in Italian and French circles and is being closely watched. It is their opinion that if Great Britain persists in such political conduct she will bring about her own destruction."

145
Confidential

- 3 -

8. Further to local Communist reaction to the situation in Greece, young Communists in Paris recently expressed themselves by initiating anti-allied activities which involved the kidnapping of Allied officers. The German "Vormarsch" publication immediately responded to this attitude saying that "the war action was broken out between Britain and the Greek fighters for freedom is having an enormous demoralizing effect on the partisans of Northern Italy who clearly are in favor of Stalin." It added that by appealing to the partisans to cease fighting for the latter, Marshal Alexander deliberately intended to disturb their movement, to avoid having later to fight them.

9. From conversations had with various informants in Paris including the disident Minister to the Vatican and C.I.B., (European Agency), it may be inferred that the Communists have no desire to deal with any subversive organization in Hungary other than that set up by themselves. It is stated that C.I.B. has been able to maintain but the appointment of consultations with that country, and that an organization existing therein with which C.I.B. has dealt, has received a flat refusal by the Hungarians to its offer of assistance. Similar but unspecified reports of the refusal by the Soviets to cooperate with subversive elements other than their own have been received regarding Albania, Bulgaria and Rumania.

End

element similar to the Nation and C.I.C. regarding Agents, it may be inferred that the Nations have no desire to deal with any subversive organization in any way other than that set up by themselves. It is stated that C.I.C. has been able to maintain but the cooperation of organizations with that variety, and that an organization existing therein with which C.I.C. has dealt, has received a flat refusal by the Nations to its offer of assistance. Similar but unspecified response of the National by the Nations to co-operate with subversive elements other than their own have been received regarding Alliance, Bulgaria and America.

END.

1391

- 3 -

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/MND No. 785017

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

3201

711-1454

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Extract of Minutes of Chief of Staff's Meeting held on 16 January 1945.

XX

(M) 14 1945

Patriots. Col Sec drew attention to an advertisement in a Florence newspaper that a death payment of 10,000 lire would be paid by a certain individual to the families of dead patriots who had been members of one of three parties. COS Col Sec said that he had ruled that there should be no discrimination and the payment should apply to all dead patriots or that no payment be made at all. COS would take up the matter during his visit to Florence.

COPY (signed in the margin)

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

K 14

SAC (P) (OR) 682
7 January 1945

REPRODUCTION
COPY No. 32

SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE (POLITICAL)

RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS.

Note by the Secretary

1. It was stated by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission at SAC (P) (44) 37th Meeting (Minute 3) that the Italian Government was about to issue a statement concerning the agreements executed between the Committee of National Liberation for NORTHERN ITALY, on the one hand, and the Allied Command and the Italian Government, respectively, on the other.

2. Attached at ALONG "A" is a translation by the Allied Commission of the bulletin published by the Italian Government in the Italian newspapers on 31 December 1944 after the meeting of the Council of Ministers of 30 December, of which the Supreme Allied Commander is informed is requested to take note.

(signed) J. H. LASCHELLS,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

APPROPRIATE DISTRIBUTION Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.
(Copy Nos. 31-33).

the bulletin published by the Italian Government in the Italian newspapers on 31 December 1944, after the meeting of the Council of Ministers of 30 December, of which the Supreme Allied Commander in conference is requested to take note.

(Signed) J. R. LASHLEY,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

AFHQ DISTRIBUTION:

Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.
(Copy Nos. 31-33).

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Copy No. 34 - Chief Commissioner
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Seen on file in/for
for

1389

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

COPY

RECEIVED

K 14

ANEX "A"

143

PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

PRESS OFFICE

The President of the Council informs to have received the following message from the Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy:

"The Committee of Liberation of Northern Italy, confronted with the urgent task that the anti-Nazi liberation war imposes on the new Italian democracy, conscious of the responsibilities of all people anxious for a free man's peace in this moment in which war is nearing its ultimate phase;

"Re-affirms its unity in the struggle and in the work of reconstruction which are to give once more independence, civil dignity and freedom to Italy within the frame of the permanent, just collaboration among the nations;

"Takes in consideration the statements by the representatives of the Socialist and Action Parties in the CLN for Northern Italy, with which they affirm their solidarity with the action that the Government is carrying on in view of the war of liberation;

"Expresses the certainty that the creation of a Ministry for Occupied Italy will help towards increasing the aid given to the glorious soldiers of liberty and to all the fighting people of Northern Italy and pledges itself to give its active collaboration to this task;

"Addresses itself with gratitude to the fighters who on the mountains, in the valleys, in the towns of our invaded country are defending Italy, and who with their sacrifice are laying down the basis of the democratic rebirth of the Italian people, and invites them to strengthen their unswerving struggle against the Nazi Fascist enemy in the spirit of national unity."

Following information received from Allied HQs, the President of the Council has stated, and the Council acknowledged, that the declaration dated December 21st according to which the Allied Command would have recognized the Committee of Liberation of Northern Italy as the organ representing all anti-

Takes in consideration the statements by the representatives of the Socialist and Action Parties in the CLM for Northern Italy, with which they affirm their solidarity with the action that the Government is carrying on in view of the war of liberation;

Expresses the certainty that the creation of a Ministry for Occupied Italy will help towards increasing the aid given to the glorious soldiers of liberty and to all the fighting people of Northern Italy and pledges itself to give its active collaboration to this task;

Addresses itself with gratitude to the fighters who on the mountains, in the valleys, in the towns of our invaded country are defending Italy, and who with their sacrifice are laying down the basis of the democratic rebirth of the Italian people, and invites them to strengthen their unswerving struggle against the Nazi Fascist enemy in the spirit of national unity."

Following information received from Allied HQs, the President of the Council has stated, and the Council acknowledged, that the declaration dated December 21st according to which the Allied Command would have recognized the Committee of Liberation of Northern Italy as the organ representing all anti-Fascist parties in enemy occupied territory, is inaccurate. The Allied military authorities have not accorded any form of political recognition of the aforesaid Committee of Northern Italy, but they have agreed with it on military measures aiming to the prosecution of the war behind the enemy lines. On the other hand the Italian Government, having a wider sphere of action, has recognized the CLM as the organ of the anti-Fascist parties in the still occupied territories. As the consequence of this the Government have delegated the Committee of Liberation of Northern Italy to represent them in the struggle that the patriots are waging against the Fascists and the Germans in the not yet liberated territories.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/HND No. 785017

TOP SECRET

ALLIED FORUM HEADQUARTERS
G-3 Section
APO 512

740/mjm

10 January 1945

140

TOP SECRET

FILE : G-5/100 Top Secret

SUBJECT : Financing the UNAI

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission, APO 374.
Office of the Chief of Staff.

1. Reference your letter (3201/131/COS.) dated 8 January.
There is attached hereto copy of the undertaking as requested.

For the Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

Frank A. Southard Jr.
FRANK A. SOUTHARD JR.,
Commander, U.S.S.R.,
Financial Advisor.

Encl. 1
as above.

TOP SECRET

1387

TOP SECRET

CCNY

TOP SECRET

Confidential 139

1. The Italian Government undertakes, on demand, to make available to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater of Operations (hereafter referred to as SACMED) through the Allied Financial Agency, lire to the amount already paid or to be paid on the authority of SACMED to the accredited representatives of the Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale per l'Alta Italia (hereafter referred to as CLNAI).

2. The amount of Lit. 210 Millions (two hundred and ten million lire) was made available by SACMED during the month of December 1944 to the accredited representatives of the CLNAI. The Italian Government undertakes to reimburse this amount to SACMED through the Allied Financial Agency on or before 30 December 1944.

3. As regards subsequent payments the Italian Government undertakes to furnish, on demand, to SACMED, through the Allied Financial Agency, such amounts as may be requested by SACMED not to exceed Lit. 160 millions (one hundred and sixty million lire) per month.

ROME, 28 December 1944.

THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

/s/ Franco Bonomi

PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, MEDITERRANEAN
THEATER OF OPERATIONS

ACQUITTED

/s/ W. B. Alexander

Field Marshal

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

1386

3201

ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
LOANQUILA REGION

Section Per Unit 14, AUG 512.

Rel. 1902/1903

TO: J. M. L. L.
FROM: J. M. L. L.
SUB: J. M. L. L.

SUBJECT: Patriots.

Dear

1. Reference our conversation of last evening relating to the Patriots in VIAREGGIO.
2. I have since seen Vigi. Muller who spent 10 days there organising the camp - he returned on the 26th. He more or less confirms what I told you from my observations; it would seem he has done a good job of work at the camp and I understand Major Muller had at VIAREGGIO is forwarding a report on his activities.
3. Muller, in his remarks to me mentioned the following points which are, I think, worth noting.
 - (1.a.) He felt it was a pity to close down the camp when it had become nicely organized, considering the cost and effort that has been made.
 - (1.b.) Accommodations found, blankets supplied, feeding arrangements, exotherms, supplies and local contractors organized, water supply, sanitary arrangements and lighting connected up, infirmary and a small hospital (5 beds) - all properly set up within the 10 or 12 days.
 - (11.a.) It seems that many refugees come from neighboring towns north of the line; they had lived in the hills for 7/10 days or so and presented themselves as patriots, hoping for better treatment.
 - (11.b.) Genuine patriots do know each other.
 - (11.c.) Genuine patriots however do resent being subjected to discipline once they are disarmed - e.g., they refuse to take orders from the Carabinieri or to be sent to a place not to their liking, such as to PERIA.
 - (11.d.) Many genuine patriots claim they would like to continue fighting the enemy on their own but they are definitely opposed to being

During the camp, he returned on the 16th. He was or less confirms what I told you from my observations; it would seem he has done a good job of work at the camp and I understand Major Mallon KAO at VIAREGIO is forwarding a report on his activities.

3. Muller, in his remarks to me mentioned the following points which are, I think, worth noting.

(i.a.) He felt it was a pity to close down the camp when it had become nicely organized, considering the cost and effort that had been made.

(i.b.) Accommodations found, blankets supplied, feeding arrangements, cookhouse, supplies and local contacts organized, water supply, sanitary arrangements and lighting connected up, infirmary and a small hospital (5 beds) - all properly set up within the 10 or 12 days.

(ii.a.) It seems that many refugees came from neighboring towns south of the line; they had lived in the hills for 7/10 days or so and presented themselves as patriots, hoping for better treatment.

(ii.b.) Genuine patriots do know each other.

(ii.c.) Genuine patriots however do resent being subjected to discipline once they are disarmed - e.g., they refuse to take orders from the Carabinieri or to be sent to a place not to their liking, such as to FERRIA.

(ii.d.) Many genuine patriots claim they would like to continue fighting the enemy on their own but they are definitely opposed to joining the Italian Army which they consider a political instrument upholding the House of Savoy.

(ii.e.) Some genuine patriots present themselves as refugees in the hope of early repatriation and/or in order to avoid military service and/or to avoid further fighting altogether.

138

F. E. GILBERT

LT. COL. G. GILBERT

Copy to Major Dwyer - Patrick Be under cover of a 3/10 letter.

CSO

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132

you have seen, but I am not sure if
you know about supply at 203

135/136

135

10 Jan 45

Copy for this team

at present index for the present

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/MND No. 785017

1384

3201 ~~4429~~ 140 (136)

Confidential

10:1 AM 3-5 SECTION

9236

7 Jan

PRIORITY
- 9 1945

SECRET PD

PARA ONE PD CLOTHING FOR PATRIOTS IS CURRENT PD YOUR FOR MAY SEVEN NINETEEN
FIVE ZERO FIVE NINETEEN PD

PARA TWO PD YOUR SIGNAL NOT ENTIRELY UNDERSTOOD PD LAND PLACES ARE COMMISSION
HOLD IS PART OF ALONG PD

PARA THREE PD ALONG HAS MANY OTHERS DEMANDS ON ACCUMULATED CLOTHING WHICH
MUST BE MET TO PREVENT DISORDER AND UNREST FOR EXAMPLE REFUGEEES DISPLACED
PERSONS DEVIATED AREAS BELFAVE AND TO SECURE EFFICIENT FUNCTIONING OF
ESSENTIAL SERVICES FOR EXAMPLE POLICE FORCES AND HEAVY WEARING PD

PARA TO AMPLI SEVEN FIVE SECTION FROM HQ ALONG FROM CIVIL AFFAIRS SERVICE
PAPER

PARA FOUR PD FURTHER IF WE ARE TO SUPPLY CLOTHING FOR ENTHUSIAST UP TO ESTIMATES
GIVEN BY SPECIAL FORCES FOR EXAMPLE ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND THE SUPPLY IS UNLIKELY
TO MEET THE DEMAND PD A SMALL SUPPLY IS NOW BEING MANUFACTURED BY FIVE ARMY
AND BUT THIS WILL ONLY PROVIDE FIVE THOUSAND GARMENTS PD

see serial 4
1387

721

135

Confidential

FINALLY IT IS THE CONSIDERED OPINION OF ALCOM THAT MENHLE FIGHTING PATRIOTS WHO PERFORM SERVICES OF GREAT MILITARY VALUE TO ALLIED FORCES SHOULD BE TREATED AS A MILITARY COMMITMENT SEE OUR ONE TWO ONE BLANT VAF DATED TWO SIX DECEMBER PD PARA FIVE PD RECOMMEND THAT ALCOM BE DIRECTED TO INSTRUCT LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION TO CONTINUE SUPPLY OF CLOTHING TO PATRIOTS FROM MILITARY SOURCES

AD DISTRIBUTION

Chief of Staff
Patriots Branch
Land Forces Sub Commission

Copy file 3209/EC

Civil Affairs Section

437

NICHOLAS PIONNIER
CWO, USA
AME Agent

1382

1281

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 1.3/NND No. 785017

3201
0
134
FX 78505
JAN 031736A

6401

JAN 032130A

PRIORITY

JAN - 8 1945

FROM: AFHQ SIGNED SIGNED CITY FUSI, FIKDS, FIKAR.

TO: 8 ARMY, INFO : 15 ARMY GP, 5 ARMY, ALDOM, LAND FORCES HQ (MMIA)

CONFIDENTIAL.

Ref Q 2050 of 21 December.

Clothing for Patriots, Normal source of supply of clothing for patriots is AG. Temporarily they cannot discharge this obligation. As an interim measure MMIA will make available immediately for Patriots a total of 2000 sets claims listed in FX 75600 of 28 December, for distribution in Army areas. AG, coordinating with MMIA, will provide this HQ with an estimate of the date by which reconditioned clothing and equipment for Patriots will be equal to the demand.

Dist

Info-Action - Patriots Br (2)
Land Forces (2)
Info - Chief Commissioner
C o S
CA Sec
File

ACTION COPY FILE 3201/103

INFO

4409/103

3209/103

1381A

SECRET

0670
JAN 08 1964

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

Confidential

C/7116
JAN 09 1964
MOVING

133

FROM: MIA

TO: ACTION: AFHQ INFO: MTCUSA, 5 ARMY, COPY TO HQ ALCON, AG, ST,

File 12 for 12/12/63
4 to 30 12/12/63

SECRET.

Ref in para 15 of AMS 5 ARMY letter file 109/2 of 25 December subject handling of Partisans. This provides Partisans before being accepted in Italian Army will be evacuated to Italian Army Military Hospitals for treatment and is contrary to par 30 of AFHQ letter 22 September file AG-400/109 D-O. Italian Army hospital facilities limited in forward areas to bare essential accommodation for effective troops and any such commitment will necessitate increase of IYI-ITI personnel and facilities including allocation of accommodations in buildings which is now very limited on account of Allied requirements. Also nations for such patients would be on IYI-ITI account which exact stand the strains under present ceilings. These people are civilians until absorbed in Italian Army and civilian hospitals should be made available for them as far normal refugees. This is not Italian Army responsibility. Request clarification of instructions.

End

Info-action - Patriots Dr (2)

Info - A/President

Chief Commissioner

HEADQUARTERS

Hospitals for treatment and is contrary to par 3b of AFHQ Letter 22 September file 45-400/103 D-C. Italian Army hospital facilities limited in forward areas to bare essential accommodation for effective troops and any such commitment will necessitate increase of IIT-ITI personnel and facilities including allocation of accommodations in buildings which is now very limited on account of Allied requirements. Also rations for such patients would be on IIT-ITI account which cannot stand the strain under present sailings. These people are civilians until absorbed in Italian Army and civilian hospitals should be made available for them as for normal refugees. This is not Italian Army responsibility. Request clarification of instructions.

Dist

Info-Action - Patriots Br (2)

Info - A/President

Chief Commissioner

G C B

F Health

CA Sec

File (2)

Fleet

HEADQUARTERS
6 JAN 95

A. C.

SECRET

1380

1921

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/AND No. 785017

132

Ref: 438730

Ref: 300/10/100.

8 January 1940.

Subject: Memorandum of the 1000.

To: C-5 Section,
AFM.

130

Reference your C-5/100 dated 4 January.

I regret that in error the copy of the undertaking which you sent us was handed to the Italian Government before we took a copy of it. Can you please let us have a copy for our files, as otherwise I shall have to ask the Italian Government.

Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

See 140

TOP SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

Confidential
JAN - 6 1945

~~TOP SECRET~~

4 January 1945

File: G-5/100

Subject: Financing of the CINAJ.

To : The Chief Commissioner,
Allied Commission, APO 394.

1. There is returned herewith for transmission to the Italian Government the carbon copy of the undertaking by the Italian Government to reimburse the Supreme Allied Commander for amounts of money paid on his authority to the CINAJ. The original and this copy have been signed by the Supreme Allied Commander.

T. R. HUGHES

T. R. HUGHES, Colonel,
Acting Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5.

Incl:

Document as above
dtd HUGHES, 28 Dec. 44.

cc. CC "A" Files
C of S

Delivered:

1/5/45

"EWS"

1378

TOP SECRET

SECRET.

SECRET.

139
Confidential

Extract from Minutes of Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Political) held on 30th December 1944.

Ref: SAC (P) (44) 37th Meeting dated 30th Dec 1944
(Original on File 217/005).

3. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS

(Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 161 and Annexure)

THE CONFERENCE had before them the text of an agreement signed between the Italian Government and the Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy (CLNAI) defining their mutual relations, which had received the approval of the Supreme Allied Commander.

SEAR ADMIRAL STONE stated that the Italian Government would shortly announce the fact of the Agreement and at the same time issue a retraction of the statement formerly made concerning the recognition of the CLNAI by the Allied Military Command.

THE CONFERENCE:

Took note of the terms of the agreement between the Italian Government and the CLNAI, as set forth in Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 161.

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000

CONFIDENTIAL

127

PK 78505

6401

JAN 031736A

JAN 032130A

PRIORITY

FROM: AFHQ SIGNED SACRED CITY MORG, MORG, MORG.

TO : 8 ARMY, INFO: 15 ARMY GP, 5 ARMY, ALOOM, LAND FORCES BC (MCLA)

CONFIDENTIAL.

Ref Q 2050 of 21 December.

Clothing for Patriots. Normal source of supply of clothing for patriots is AC. Temporarily they cannot discharge this obligation. As an interim measure MCLA will make available immediately for Patriots a total of 2000 sets of clothes listed in PK 75600 of 28 December, for distribution in Army areas. AC, coordinating with MCLA, will provide this Hq with an estimate of the date by which reconditioned clothing and equipment for Patriots will be equal to the demand.

List

Info-action - Patriots Br (2)
" " Land Forces (2)
Info - Chief Commissioner
C O S
CA Sec
File

See Memo 128.

Copy to 3209/EC

CONFIDENTIAL

1378

1925

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.1/AND No. 785017

SECRET

Confidential

126

Ref: 1201/008

1st January 1952

Chief Commissioner.

1. King Commander Bear gave some interesting information at your Chief of Staff's meeting this morning.
2. He said that recently, and especially since the public announcement of the recognition of the CLNAI by the Italian Government, there had been a marked change (for the worse) in the attitude of the Committees in S Army area. Their attitude apparently is that since recognition has been given to them they are less inclined to accept Allied Military Government and if they do accept it, do so unwillingly. He told us that as usual the Communist party was extremely well organised and was probably at the source of this change. He said that his impression was that there existed underground considerable political turmoil.
3. One of the obvious remedies to this is, firstly to explain to SACAG's and SO's in the North the exact position between the Allied military authorities, the Italian Government and the CLNAI. I asked Political Section some days ago to prepare a memorandum on this and I hope it will soon be ready. Secondly, I think we should make public the fact that the CLNAI Central Committee, to which the Committees in S Army area do look, have agreed to hand over their powers and authority to AMG as soon as the area is liberated. It is important that this should be done and I see no reason why that part of SACAG's agreement should not be made public.
4. Mr. Hopkinson gave the interesting information that in a District in PIEMONTE the Communist section of the CLNAI had broken away from the Committee and had, so he heard, denounced other partisans to the Germans.
5. All this information goes to prove how extremely difficult the handling of the patriots in the North will be.

WHL/SG.

MSL
Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

127
COPY.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS.
Confidential

SAC(P)(44)161 Annexure.
29th December 1944

TOP SECRET

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE (POLITICAL)

RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS.

Note by Secretary.

1. It is notified for information that the Supreme Allied Commander has already approved paragraphs (1) and (2) of the agreement set out in para 1 of paper No. SAC (P) (44) 161 (see telegram F74148 of 25 December from PHILM to Allied Commission). By implication he has also approved para (3) of the agreement in question (see telegram quoted above and telegram No. S-405 of 27 December to PHILM from the Allied Commission.)

2. Para 3 of paper No. SAC (P) (44) 161 is therefore cancelled. Instead the Conference is requested to take note of the terms of the agreement reached between the Italian Government and the CLMHI as set forth in paragraph 1 of paper No. SAC(P) (44) 161.

(Sgd) J.H. LANCELLOTT,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission. Copy Nos. 31-33.

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BY CHIEF OF STAFF: Copy No. 31 - 30 to CC
32 - COS
33 - Pol Sec

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

the Conference is requested to be held at the same time as the conference between the Italian Government and the CLMIF as set forth in paragraph 1 of paper No. SAC(P) (44) 161.

(Sgd) J.H. LASHLEY,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION: Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission. Copy Nos. 31-33.

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See my copy of it

See on

1374

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Concordance Transferred

120

Letter from Rear Admiral Elmer H. Stone to
PAC Bonome

Subject: Ministry for Occupied Italy.

file 3207/105

1373

TOP
SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

SAC(P) (44) 161
27th December 1944

TOP SECRET
CONF. NO. 31.

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE (POLITICAL)

RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS

Note by Secretary.

Confidential

1. On the basis of an exchange of telegrams with HQ. Allied Commission, this HQ has been informed that the following agreement was signed on 26th December by the Italian Government, represented by BONOMI, and the CLNAI, represented by MARE:

"(1) The Italian Government recognizes the Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy as the organ of the Anti-Fascist parties in the territory occupied by the enemy.

(2) The Italian Government delegates the Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy to represent it in the struggle that the Patriots have undertaken against the Fascists and the Germans in the part of Italy not yet liberated.

(3) The Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy agrees to act towards this end as delegate of the Italian Government which is recognized by the Allied Governments as the successor of the Government which signed the Armistice Conditions and is the only legitimate authority in such part of Italy as has already been or will later on be returned to the Italian Government by the Allied Military Government."

2. The foregoing agreement was concluded after the parties were brought together pursuant to the direction of the Supreme Allied Commander, who further directed that their agreement should be subject to his approval (SAC (P) (44) 50th Meeting, minute 4).

3. The Supreme Allied Commander is accordingly invited to approve the agreement quoted in paragraph 1 above and to direct the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission to notify the Italian Government and the CLNAI of such approval.

(2) The Italian Government delegates the Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy to represent it in the struggle that the Patriots have undertaken against the Fascists and the Germans in the part of ITALY NOT yet liberated.

(3) The Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy agrees to act towards this end as delegate of the Italian Government which is recognised by the Allied Governments as the successor of the Government which signed the Armistice Conditions and is the only legitimate authority in such part of ITALY as has already been or will later on be returned to the Italian Government by the Allied Military Government."

2. The foregoing agreement was concluded after the parties were brought together pursuant to the direction of the Supreme Allied Commander, who further directed that their agreement should be subject to his approval (SAC (P) (44) 36th Meeting, minute 4).

3. The Supreme Allied Commander is accordingly invited to approve the agreement quoted in paragraph 1 above and to direct the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission to notify the Italian Government and the CLNAI of such approval.

(Sgd) J.H. LAUGHELL,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander	1
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Commander in Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-12
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN	13-14
Chief of Staff	15
Chief Administrative Officer	16
Deputy Chief of Staff	17
U.S. Political Adviser	18-20
British Resident Minister	21-24
Director, PWS	25
Secretary, General Staff	26
Secretary, IS & PS	27-29
Chief, Liaison Section	30
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	31-33
G-1(A)	34
G-1(B)	35
G-2	36-37
G-3	38-39
G-3 Special Operations	40
G-4(A)	41
G-4(B)	42
G-5	43-45
Spares	46-50

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See 124
124

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

RE REPLY

3201

CO2

17

Confidential

1789

2-403

27 DEC 44

REPLY IMMEDIATE

27 DEC 1944

TOP SECRET

PAGE ONE OF POLITICAL AGREEMENT SIGNED BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND

CLAY REPRESENTED BY GOVERNMENT AND CLAY FOR CLAY TO

FORM TO WHO FOR DANCE AND WILL BEAR FILLER AND FILLER BEARER FROM H. JONES

RECEIVED FROM FROM F. JONES

PAGE TWO OF AGREEMENT CONSISTS OF THREE PARAGRAPHS THE FIRST TWO OF WHICH ARE

HAVE APPROVED UP FOLLOWING IS THAT OF NEW BEING PARAGRAPH ONE PARAGRAPH

THE CLAY AGREES TO ALL TOWARD THIS END AS BEHOLDING OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

WHICH IS RECOGNIZED BY THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS AS THE SUCCESSOR OF THE GOVERNMENT

WHICH SIGNED THE APPLICABLE CONSTITUTION AND IS THE ONLY LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY IN

SUCH PART OF ITALY AS HAS ALREADY BEEN OR WILL LATER ON BE RETURNED TO THE

ITALIAN GOVERNMENT BY THE ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND WANTS

RECEIVED

Sir Noel Charles
Hon. Alexander Kirk
Political Section
Chief of Staff
CC File

in file 178
178

Chief Commissioner

1373

222

ELBERT W. STONE
Rear Admiral
Chief Commissioner

RE REPLY

1932
Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

Folios 113 to 116 transferred to
File 3209/KC

Ref 121/PAT of 26 Dec

1370

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTINGENT COMMISSION
H.Q. 3 U.S. ARMY
APO 394

Ref/9.3/ /CA

SUBJECT: Marriage Regulations.

TO :

Reference this Headquarters letter 9.3/22/CA of 1 April 1964 there is forwarded to you for verification Form "C" in connection with the above proposed marriage. Please return Form "C" along with report on the lines indicated in par-

3201

CD 8157
HO

IRE 111111

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Incoming Message

Ans

TO : ACTING AD FOR STAFF MEMO 3-401 OF 23 NOVEMBER

FROM: AFRO: DICKED DICKED

REF NO. F-74348

DEC 25/1004A

17/25
26 DEC 1944
FATHEIT

CITE: FROED

Confidential

TOP SECRET

Clauses 1 and 2 agreed but clause 3 of proposed agreement needs strengthening. Request you require this clause be redrawn so that it shall contain the wording of the second sentence to the first paragraph of the draft tripartite agreement or wording in substantially similar terms. The sentence above referred to reads as follows:

"ELRAI for its part accepts the Italian Government recognized by the Allied governments as the successor of the Italian government which signed the Armistice Terms and as the sole legitimate authority in that part of Italy which has now been and may hereafter be handed over to the Italian Government by the Allied Military Government

DISSEMINATION:

Action: 30 to Chief Commissioner
Info: Political Section
Chief of Staff
"A" Files

cc. Sir Noel Charles
Hon. Alexander Kirk

1369

IRE 111111

0021 3201

HOA

PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

Dear Admiral,

This is the formula I have prepared.

The Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy implicitly recognizes the Italian Government inasmuch as it accepts to be its representative and delegate. But -- and this is the advantage of my formula -- the Committee remains in a subordinate position and does not have the least character of a de facto Government.

With my very best wishes,

/s/ I. Mammì

23 December 1944

3601

TOP SECRET

1100

CONFIDENTIAL

Confidential

The Italian Government recognizes the Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy as the organ of the anti-Fascist parties in the territory occupied by the enemy.

The Italian Government delegates the Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy to represent it in the struggle that the patriots have undertaken against the Fascists and the Germans in the part of Italy not yet liberated.

The Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy accepts to act to this end as delegate and representative of the Italian Government with which it will keep in liaison through its President.

The Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy

The Italian Government has taken note of the fact that military relations between SALCED and the Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy have been dealt with separately.

1357

THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION OF NORTHERN ITALY

1368

1937

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/HNO No. 785017

TOP SECRET 3201

CO 106 109

AFH

24 DEC 1944

3-401

23
28 DEC

21037 IMMEDIATE

Confidential

TOP SECRET PD

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF AGREEMENT PROPOSED TO BE EXECUTED BETWEEN ITALIAN GOVERNMENT AND CHARLES LOVE HAS BEEN ITHE PROVIDED S.V. WORK WITH IT CLM

PARA 1 PD THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT AGREES TO THE UNITED STATES POLICE AND MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM THE FOLLOWING

THESE STATES FEDERAL POLICE

QUOTE

PARA ONE PD THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZES THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION OF NORTHERN ITALY AS THE ORGAN OF THE ANTI FASCIST PARTIES IN THE TERRITORY OCCUPIED BY THE ENEMY PD

PARA TWO PD THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT DELEGATES THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION OF NORTHERN ITALY TO REPRESENT IT IN THE SENSES THAT THE PATRIOTS HAVE UNDERTAKEN AGAINST THE FASCISTS AND THE GERMAN IN THE PART OF ITALY NOT YET LIBERATED PD

PARA THREE PD THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION OF NORTHERN ITALY AGREES TO ACT IN THIS WAY AS DELEGATE OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT WITH WHICH IT WILL KEEP IN CONTACT THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT PD UNQUOTE

CURRENT CLM IS MAY WISH TO CONSIDER AMENDING A CHANGE IN THIRD PARAGRAPH TO PROVIDE FOR MORE CLEARLY DEFINED AGREEMENTS BY THE COMMITTEE OF THE AUTHORITY OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT THAT IS OFFERED BY BOTH SIDES IN LIBERATION PD

TOP SECRET

1362

1938

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

TOP SECRET

23
Outgoing Message S-402, 23 Dec 44, continued:

Confidential ^{EOS} 108

I AM INFORMED THAT THIS ASPECT HAS BEEN STARKLY STRESSED IN TELEGRAMS FROM THE
FOREIGN OFFICE TO THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR AND TO BRITISH EMBASSIES PD
PARA GRATEFUL FOR REPLY BY EARLIEST CONVENIENCE WHETHER AS TO APPROVAL OR
SUCH MODIFICATIONS AS YOU DESIRE ME TO REQUEST PD

AUTHENTICATED:

ELBERT H. CROMBIE
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief Commissioner

DISTRIBUTION:
Sir Noel Charles
Hon. Alexander Kirk
Political Section
Chief of Staff
'A' Files

TOP SECRET

1384

320/100
TOP SECRET

COS (104)
107

Confidential

AFHQ

7-400

22 DEC

(98)

IMMEDIATE

REF SUBJECT IS

396
FURNISH TO BY SUBJECT AREA THERE HAVE BEEN THE ALSO MEMBERS ONE MORE PAGE
ONE WAS REPRESENTATIVE THAT ABOUT FOLLOWING POINTS WERE A DECLARATION MADE BY
GOVERNMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE CHARGE AND ONE

PAGE 2 THE TWO ABOVE ARE UNITED STATES AND ALLIED ARMY FROM H. H. HARRIS
FURNISH FROM AREA PAGE

PAGE ONE PD THE ALLIED MILITARY COMMAND HAS PLACED ITSELF IN POSSESSION ONE
REPRESENTATIVE CHARLES HAN LOVE AS THE ONLY REPRESENTATIVE POLITICAL ORGAN IN THE OCCUPIED
AREAS UNTIL THE APPOINTMENT OF THEIR OWN PD

PAGE TWO PD THE LEADERS OF THE ORGANIZED MOVEMENT IN THE AREA HAVE AGREED TO SUBMIT
COMPLETELY TO THE DIRECTIVES ISSUED BY THE ALLIED GOVERNMENT PD

PAGE THREE PD THE MOVEMENT GROUPS HAN LOVE WILL INDICATE TO THE ALLIED THE CIVILIAN
OFFICIALS DURING THE TRANSITION WITH THE ALLIED ACTIVITIES DURING THE TRANSITION
PERIOD PD

PAGE FOUR PD THE ALLIED GOVERNMENT HAS PLACED ITSELF IN POSITION AFTER THE LIAISON
OF ALLIED ITALY AND THE ALLIED ARMY AND THE ALLIED GOVERNMENT IS WITH THE CHARLES HAN
LOVE GROUPS WILL BE REPRESENTED PD

1363

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

TOP SECRET

103
106

Outgoing Message 2-400, 22 Dec 64, continued

Confidential

GOVERNMENTS OF THE EAST AND MIDDLE EASTERN REPORTED INTERVIEW AND INVITATION
GIVING KING IS HIGHLY INTERESTED IN THE AND WILL IN SHORT HAVE STRONG EFFECT IN THE
SOUTH

ATTENTION: FBI

ELBERT H. PRINCE
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief Commissioner

DISSEMINATION:
Sec. Alexander Kirk
Mr. Noel Charles
Chief of Staff
Political Section
Mr. Files

TOP SECRET

785017

32

102

Confidential

0-3/0

42 1380 100

01-553-073

10/20/2008 10:20

SEE MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELETYPE REGARD THREE NEW ARMS PD

FROM 19 APRIL THE BOMBED ON 19012 0000Z 1904P AND 0000Z 1904P FROM AN AIRCRAFT
PARALLEL WITH STONE TOWN

HIGHER BUREAU TOLD ME LAST NIGHT THAT AN ORDER OF THE "NY WAS BEING ISSUED BUT
THAT HE SHOULD NOT REGARD IT TOO SERIOUSLY PD THE WILL NOT BE A BUREAU ONE
THAT BRING DISAPPROPRIATE THE POSITION HE DEMANDS THAT CLARK HAS BEEN ASSIGNED
POLITICAL RECOGNITION BY AREA PD IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES HIS MAY WISE TO IMPROVE
A STATEMENT CLARIFYING THE POSITION OR AT LEAST ^{TO} _{BY} INDUCE ME TO SEND A PERSONAL
COMMUNICATION TO BUREAU TO GET THE RECORD STRAIGHT PD

~~Classification:~~
~~British Ambassador~~
~~British Ambassador~~
~~Political Section~~
~~Chief of Staff~~
~~CG Files~~

Chief Constable

11-11-11

ELIOT G. STONE
 1948-1950
 Chief Commissioner

1362

五生五 既熟與諸君

SECRET.

EXTRACT FROM MINUTES OF SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE (POLITICAL) HELD ON TUESDAY, 19th DECEMBER
1944 - Ref: SAC(P) (44) 36th Meeting dated
19th December, 1944.

(Original on File 217/008.) Confidential

4. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS.

(Paper No. PC (44) 144 and Annexure
Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 154).

In addition to papers which had been considered at their previous meeting, the CONFERENCE had before them a paper pointing out that the delegates of the CLNAI had certain objections to the draft memorandum of Agreement between the Supreme Allied Commander, the Italian Government and the Committee of National Liberation in Northern Italy.

Mr. KIMM said he was in favour of any agreement which the Italian Government were prepared, of their own volition, to enter into with the CLNAI. On the other hand, there should not be any Allied attempt to dictate to, or to exert pressure on, either party since such action, apart from being an undesirable intervention in Italian internal affairs, might result in the establishment in Northern ITALY of an authority which might later oppose the RHEX Government.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE pointed out that the first paragraph of the draft Agreement circulated with PC (44) 144 had been drawn so as to provide for the participation of the Italian Government in the military agreement, between the Supreme Allied Commander and the CLNAI, which had already been signed. The Italian Prime Minister had stated to him that he was prepared to recognise the CLNAI in these terms, or alternatively in the terms which had been suggested in August, but he was not willing to designate them as the agents of his Government in Northern ITALY. On the other hand, he understood that the CLNAI were not willing to recognise the Italian Government in the terms proposed.

MAJOR GENERAL STANBELL said that, according to the views which the delegates had expressed to him, the CLNAI were now prepared to recognise the Italian Government. He was of opinion that their recognition by the Italian Government as the latter's agents would produce much improved resistance activities in Northern ITALY and would also decrease the problems to be met when that area was occupied. He explained that the Allied authorities had up till now been acting as intermediaries in regard to discussions between the Italian government and the CLNAI and he urged that the time had now come for the remaining CLNAI

dictate to, or to exert pressure on, either party since such action, apart from being an undesirable intervention in Italian internal affairs, might result in the establishment in Northern Italy of an authority which might later oppose the ROME Government.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that an agreement between the Italian Government and the CLNAI would be advantageous. He would now, however, consider any modification of his existing agreement with the CLNAI; nor was he willing to enter into a tripartite agreement with that body and the Italian Government, since this would embroil him in any future differences between the CLNAI and the ROME Government. He agreed that representatives of the CLNAI and the Italian Government should be brought together and allowed to work out an agreement between themselves but as military considerations were involved such an agreement must be subject to his approval.

MAJOR GENERAL ROCKES considered that such an agreement would have two advantages. It would strengthen the hand of the Italian Government after the occupation of Northern Italy and meanwhile it would strengthen the partisans and enable them to carry out increased activities. He observed that payments were at present being provided from British sources to the CLNAI and that it had been suggested that if the Italian Government did not agree to take over responsibility for these payments they should become a joint British and US account. Whatever the financial procedure adopted, however, the commitment would eventually be shouldered by the Italian Government under the existing general financial arrangements.

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MR. BROAD said that the Foreign Office regarded the conclusion of a tripartite agreement as essential, but had not given their reasons for this view. They felt it important that the Supreme Allied Commander should have the power to terminate the agreement when required.

AIR MARSHAL GLEESON and REAR ADMIRAL STONE supported the Supreme Allied Commander's view that a bilateral agreement, subject to his approval, should be concluded between the Italian Government and the CIGAL, if this could be done without Allied pressure.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

- (a) Directed that no further action be taken towards concluding a tripartite agreement between himself, the Italian Government and the CIGAL.
- (b) Directed that the Allied Commission arrange to put the remaining delegate of the CIGAL in touch with the Italian Government with a view to the conclusion between these two authorities, subject to his approval, of a voluntary bilateral agreement to govern their mutual relations.
- (c) Directed that his existing military agreement with the CIGAL remain unchanged.

.....End of Extract.

1945

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

136P

.....End of Extract.

COPY.

SAC(P)(44)154.
16 December 1944

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS **Confidential**

SECRET
COPY NO.....

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS

Note by Secretary.

1. A draft for a tripartite agreement, between the Supreme Allied Commander, the Italian Government and the Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy (CLNAI), was circulated with paper No. PC(44)144. Owing to the delay in the formation of the new Italian Government, it later became necessary, as explained in paper No. PC(44)144 Annexure, to return the CLNAI delegation without this agreement having been signed. Instead, the signatures of the delegation were obtained to a bipartite agreement between the Supreme Allied Commander and the CLNAI.

2. However, in accordance with the sense of the discussions at PC(44)144th Meeting, Minute 3 and PC(44)155th Meeting, Minute 8, Commander SCARF discussed the draft tripartite agreement with the CLNAI delegates before their return to Northern Italy. It appeared that the delegation had certain objections to this draft, of which the more important were:-

(a) In regard to Paragraph 1 of the draft agreement, the delegates considered it essential that the CLNAI should be recognised as the agents of the Italian Government both by the Italian Government and by the Supreme Allied Commander. They do not consider that there is any reason why they, who are seeking recognition from the Italian Government, should themselves recognise it, and they believe that by seeking recognition from it they are acknowledging its authority.

(b) The delegates objected to the inclusion of the words "including such orders to disarm and surrender their arms when required to do so" at the end of Paragraph 5 of the draft agreement. They consider that such wording:-

(1) Implies distrust on the part of the other signatories.

(2) Is unnecessary because it is implicit in the preceding words "and will obey orders issued by him or by the Allied Military Government on his behalf".

(a) In regard to Paragraph 1 of the draft agreement, the delegates considered it essential that the CLMHI should be recognized as the agents of the Italian Government both by the Italian Government and by the Supreme Allied Commander. They do not consider that there is any reason why they, who are seeking recognition from the Italian Government, should themselves recognize it, and they believe that by seeking recognition from it they are acknowledging its authority.

(b) The delegates objected to the inclusion of the words "including such orders to disarm and surrender their arms when required to do so" at the end of Paragraph 5 of the draft agreement. They consider that such wording:-

(i) implies distrust on the part of the other signatories.

(ii) Is unnecessary because it is implicit in the preceding words "and will obey orders issued by him or by the Allied Military Government on his behalf".

(iii) Is unwise in that it unnecessarily draws attention at this stage to a situation which, because it has given rise to such problems in other liberated territories, is delicate to the extreme.

3. On the other hand, the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, has expressed the view that the Italian Government should not be requested to confer on the CLMHI any more definite recognition than is contained in Paragraph 1 of the existing draft.

4. A further meeting is therefore being held in Rome on Sunday, 17th December, between the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission and representatives of Commander SCIRO and G-5. As a result of this meeting, it is hoped to lay before the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference a revised draft memorandum of agreement, which the Supreme Allied Commander will be invited to approve for transmission to the Italian Government.

(Sgd) J. H. LASHLIES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION.

Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, Copy Nos. 31-35.

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OCS " " 32

1948