

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

ACC

10000/109/671
(VOL. I)

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10000/109/671
(VOL. I)

CORR, STRENGTH & REINFORCEMENTS
SEPT. 1944 - JULY 1945

82

CA Sec

Signal to AFHQ at 81 quotes from letter from PM at 64.

C.C. directs that as a follow up to this signal a copy of PM's further letter at 75 be sent, ~~the~~ with the inclusion of a note that its enclosure is being studied in detail by this HQ.

Office of EC
29/4

Executive Committee

Minute 82 has been carried out on ACT/2601/21/PS

30 April

W. B. D. Langford
CA

E. J. Henderson

94

Ex Com

3433 -

Please see 93. CA Sec is drafting a letter to It first which will reply to a series received from the PM on CCRP ceiling.

4 May 45

E. J. Henderson

Ed. Hudson

83

117

W. Thompson
CA

Do not

26

3433 -

Let Com =

Please See 93. CA See is drafting a letter to It first which will reply to a series received from the PM on CCR R ceiling.

14 Aug 55

5/5

一

95.

Student Foundations

93 (off) v 94 above

11/9/2025

4

561/5/45

To see 55.

11 apr 45

11/13/4

11/4 noted. 2

57note

Informed by Lt Col B.C. that as result of 55 AFHQ
signalled CCS. no reply yet.

19/4

19/4 20/4 21/4

Sh65Ex Com 4

The latest information we have on increase
of CCRR ceiling is to be seen at 55.
There is no copy here of CCS signal referred
to in first line as the information was given
over the telephone. There has been no reply to 55.

26 apr 45

Sh* 79

CC 0845 36.00

note

Informed by Lt Col B.C. that as result of 55 AFHQ signalled CCS. no reply yet.

19/4

[Signature]

65

Ex Comm.

The latest information we have on increase of CCRR ceiling is to be seen at 55. There is no copy here of CCS signal referred to in first line as the information was given over the telephone. There has been no reply to 55.

[Signature]

26 apr 55

79

CC 0845 3432
APR 28 1955

CSO - 501300

Letter submitted for signature by C.T. is an interim reply to 75.

27/4

[Signature] 21/4

44

cos

M. see Bay Upstairs in white 48.
Am I right in saying that CR
has been all the information
required to put up to 5.3?

5 1/2.

Correct. 10/2/2.

5 3/2.

Salome
580

51

So is the latest on our request to increase
CARR ceiling to 65,000. It is a slow process.

22 Feb 45

5 12/2

Ph

Chief Commission.

CC 549
FEB 28 1945

52

A step forward in the slow process began in September!

10/2/2

Exec. Comm.

✓ JWD

3431

Correct. 1/18/2/2.

Exoner
ego

51

2/3/2.

So is the latest on our request to increase
CCRR ceiling to 65,000. It is a slow process.

22 Feb 45

1/1/2

Ph

Chap Commission

52

CC 549
FEB 23 1945

A step forward in the slow process begun in September!

Exec. Comm

✓ 1/18/2

3431

a/Ex Comm

53

7410 50 dated 22 Feb 45 is the last we have
heard of our repeated requests for an increase
in CCRR ceiling. PS/C maintain contact but
like the Patriot unsolved problems it becomes
more & more urgent.

I bring it to your notice so that you can
introduce the topic ^{to the} at a suitable opportunity.

7 Apr 45

Ph

42.

S.O.S.

At 36 is a signed from SACHO instructing the immediate return of the PICKHO Group.

At 40 in Public Safety 3/3's answer, giving details of the move and pointing out that they are retaining the MONTAGNARD Battalion which is now in Sicily, as agreed with G-5.

at 38 is Prime Minister BONCHI's letter to the Chief Commissioner, giving news that he has asked the Prefect and Questore at CATANIA.

22 January 45.

MS/22.1.45

Stu/6/1/45
H.S.O.

(4)

Discussion with G-5 who, having "at last" as they

Say, the information requested are discussed with

G-3 who are sympathetic.

MS/22.1.45

46

V.I. CA Section

In with the witnesses 42-44 a COS
inmate above

Stu/6/1/45

30/1

47

PS

Please see folios 43-44

Handwritten

22 January 45.

MS 22.1.45

21st 45
H.F.S.C.

(25)

Discussion with G.S. who, having at last as they

say, the information required in discussion with

G.S. who are sympathetic. MS 22.1.45.

46

V.I. CA Section

In with be interested 42-44 a C.S.
bureau etc etc

Excluded Right

30/1

47

PS

Please see below as now

1/1/45
after tea

C.A.S.
21.1.45

C.O.S.

48

Reference 43 para 3. The detailed
breakdown, as it is now admitted by AF 11/4; it had
been received some days earlier + had got lost in
a staff Captain's in tray. I took all them
+ all Capt Jackling initially to take when it was

31 Jan 45

5 p.m.

CSO

12

I understand from Col ying that CAS
is fully informed on signal at 11.

28/10

15/28/11

JLH

no
all better by conf. with

CAS, being happy that a CA 40-1.

JLH

At Col

21

Ref 20, I understand AFCC had a meeting with
Brig Hapjith and Public Safety at 1600 hrs today on
this, when Brig Hapjith was going to turn for the
strengthened representations to AFHQ to get the release
date extended beyond December 31st.

8/10/2000

PS JLH

JLH 8/11

CSO

3

Ref 26, to which no reply has yet been received, I
am in daily touch with C.A.Sec. Latest position
is that yet another draft is with DCST who will
not pass it. Looks like being another two or three
days yet.

6 Jan 11

The Lt.

JLH 7/11

JLH

JLH

12/1, ref 31 spoke to Col White. Draft memo being done

Brig Upjohn and Public Safety
 Unit, when Brig Upjohn was going to be seen for the
 strongest representation to AFHQ to get the release
 date extended beyond December 31st

U - 8111

31

CSD

Ref 26, to which no reply has yet been received, I
 am in daily touch with C.A. Sec. Latest position
 is that yet another draft is with DCOS who will
 not pass it. Looks like being another two or three
 days yet.

U - 8111

Thank.

6 Jan 45

U - 711

12/1 ref 31 spoke is Col Wylie. Draft now being done
 by Col Young.

U - 8111

27

May Talbot.

You should note this. It is the view of C.A. Sec that
 nothing else can be done to retain the Picerno Pz.
 which was on loan to CCRR until 15 Feb 45.
 It does not affect dispositions in Sicily, 3424

Sardinia.

19 Jan 45

see 101036

U - 8111

TO: Chief of Staff.

1. Please see 1 and 2. Folio 1 is addressed to Acting Chief Commissioner.

2. I have shown to Col. Chapman and Lt. Col. Wilcox and latter is going to CASERTA tomorrow to see Lt. Col. Mitchell. Col. Chapman is seeing Brig. Upjohn this afternoon.

3 Oct 44

A/cc

For information.

MS/s/x.

TO: Chief of Staff.

FILE

3627

1. I spoke to Col. Wilcox about the clothing for the CC.RA. Public Safety Sub Commission are very satisfied indeed with the present arrangements.

2. Col. Wilcox also said that the general atmosphere at A.F.H.Q. was much more friendly and he hoped to get the extra 5,000 soldiers to replace the CC.RA by about the end of the month.

W. (Lipp) Lm

3 Oct 44

Major,
Office, C of S.

4.

A/c

For information.

MS (s/x)

TO: Chief of Staff.

FILE
3627

1. I spoke to Col. Wilcox about the clothing for the CC.RR. Public Safety Sub Commission are very satisfied indeed with the present arrangements.
2. Col. Wilcox also said that the general atmosphere at A.P.H.Q. was much more friendly and he hoped to get the extra 5,000 soldiers to replace the CC.RR by about the end of the month.

9th October, 1944

Chief Staff Officer,
To the Chief of Staff.

W. Stupp John

MS (s/x)

108

C.S.O.

6.7. I for ~~the~~ from Public Safety & you & COS

will like to read. 14/10

Col. 6.7. 1 think you know the rest of the 3627. I will

follow up. Yes please - 9 days has elapsed. CA Ditcher

is now here MS (s/x)

Ref: AG/14601/21/RS

12 July 1945

JUL 13 1945

My dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I have received your letter of the 6 July 45 and am glad to be able to tell you that authority was granted on 1 July 45 to raise the maximum number of Carabinieri to 65,000 and this has been duly communicated to the Minister of War.

With regard to the remainder of your letter I am reluctant to remove from the North any of the Combat Groups but part of the Garibaldi Regiment has already been moved to the Bari Area. I appreciate your desire that there should be additional battalions of troops in the South of Italy and I am able to inform you that the whole question of the numbers and distribution of Italian Internal Security Troops all over Italy is now under consideration at AFHQ. I hope to be able to give you the Field Marshal's decision shortly.

Very truly yours,

13/ July 1945

ELLEN W. STONE,
Rear Admiral, USNR,
Chief Commissioner.

Professor Ferruccio Parri,
The President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government,
R o m e.

3427
H/7

99

Tel: 735

10 July 1945.

Ref: 3606/99/30.

SUBJECT: Proposal to use Italian Combat Groups
for Internal Security.

TO : Civil Affairs Section.

1. Attached hereto is letter No. 23057 dated 6 July 1945 from the Prime Minister requesting that a Combat Group and other units should be transferred south of the Apennines to assist in maintaining public order in emergency.
2. This letter is sent to you for action as it concerns the overall situation of public safety, but you will, of course, discuss with Land Forces Sub-Commission (LMIA) before preparing a reply for signature by the Chief Commissioner.

[Signature]
Chief Staff Officer,
To Executive Commissioner.

Copy to: Land Forces B/C (LMIA) - With copy of a/m letter.

3428
Noted
PA
11/7

Translation

The President of the Council of Ministers
Minister of the Interior
n. 23057

Rome, 6 July 1945

To Admiral Stone
Chief Commissioner - A.C.

Dear Admiral,

a propos of the preoccupations caused by the weakening of the police forces because of the transfer of important contingents of carabinieri to North Italy, you pointed out in your letter of April 27th, n. 14602/53/P.S., that the maximum number of Carabinieri fixed in Italy is of 50,000 units and that this force must be equally distributed all over Italy, adding that the superior authorities had been requested to raise this number to 60,000 units.

On this subject, it must nevertheless be remembered that in past times, in an emergency, public order was assured by using, exceptionally, the regular forces of the Army stationed all over Italy, and particularly in the main towns of the provinces, especially in the most important ones.

As it is well known the only units which are at present at the exclusive disposal of the Italian military Authorities are the 'gambarda' and 'Aosta' divisions, stationed in Sicily, and the 'Calabria' division stationed in Gardinia, with two battalions detached to Calabria. These units represent the indispensable minimum to maintain order in these regions, and cannot be weakened by sending men to other places.

As in the present state of things there is no possibility of using the Army forces, in the other regions, the advisability of arranging for the co-operation of the Italian troops depending from the Allied Commands for the maintenance of public order, ought to be taken in consideration, and consequently, their equal distribution in the various regions of the peninsula. In particular, I think it would be advisable to transfer South of the Apennines one of the combat teams, for instance the 'Cremona' group which is now stationed in Adria. The most efficient of the pioneers battalions and guards battalions might also do very well.

I shall later on indicate the most appropriate destinations.

I shall be most grateful if you will take this proposal in consideration and intervene with the competent Authorities.

Yours sincerely, 3425

s. Ferruccio Parri

cc - Mr. - 9 July 45

Action: C.A. See

1945 2nd of March

Ex-Com

LAND FORCES

see 99

3606

AG/14601/21/RS

11 May 1945

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I acknowledge receipt of your letter of 29 April 1945 on the subject of the movement North of detachments of Carabinieri. A total of 7,674 was required to complete the total decided upon for the North, but I can inform you that it is not our intention to call forward this force at the present time.

I am glad to inform you that AMG has agreed to the publication of a decree by you increasing the strength of the Carabinieri from 55,000 to 65,000, although for the moment we cannot assume any commitment for the rations and clothing of this additional 10,000. The possibility of arranging for the transfer of rations from existing units to Carabinieri is being explored. In the interval it has been arranged that Carabinieri recovered in the North will be enrolled as special police and will be rationed and paid by the Allied Military Government.

Yours very truly,

Harry W. Stone

HARRY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi
The President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
Rome

(Hatched)

3626

12/5

775617

366
96
10/4453A/73

9 May, 1945

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have received your letter dated 23 April 1945 in which you enclose copy of a letter from your Minister of War to Land Forces Sub-Commission (SMIL) requesting that an additional 10,000 Carabinieri be authorized, and asking approval for a decree to accommodate this increase. I am happy to inform you that instructions have now been received from 1945 that there is no objection to your Government adopting a decree to increase the strength of Carabinieri to 65,000.

This letter should be read in conjunction with my reply of this date in answer to your letter of 23 April 1945.

Yours very truly,

Is/ Elmer W. Stone

ELMER W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi
The President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
Rome.

3423
PA

PA
(Mrs. Malone)

SECRET

3606

EXCOMMISSIONER

93

FX 69806
MAY 031355Z

CONFIDENTIAL ONLY

D/9541
MAY 031945Z
PRIORITY

FROM: AFHQ SIGNED SACRED CITE PHING
TO: ALCON ROME

MAY 4 RECD

SECRET.

Reur 6404 cite ACSCC.

1. We are as yet without reply from Combined Chiefs of Staff on our urgent request for authorization increase Carabinieri ceiling.
2. However, pending reply and action this Headquarters referred to in para 3 below, you may inform President of Council that there is no objection to Government adopting decree increase strength of Carabinieri to 65,000. It must be made clear that no commitment can now be made for the rations or clothing of this additional 10,000.
3. Without regard to final action by CCS, there is being urgently explored here the possibility of transferring ration basis from existing Italian units to Carabinieri. Final action on this must necessarily take some days.

DIST

ACTION: SO To Chief Commissioner
INFO: A/President
Executive Commissioner
CA Sec
Land Forces S/C
F.Safety S/C
File

HEADQUARTERS

MAY 1945

A. C.

3422

SECRET

(Spoke 174000 H/5) PA 1/5

(Miss Gordon)

3606 of

92

SUBJECT: Organization of Italian Army
and Carabinieri

LAND FORCES SUB-COM, A.C. (LMA)

G/6

1 May 45

TO : HQ ALLIED COMMISSION
(FOR EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER) ←

77

Ref your 3606/77/20 of 27 April, herewith suggested reply
for paras 3 - 6.

A. Browning

Major General
LMA

WB

*Hold to combine with
CAS reply on CORR
ceiling.*

3/0 7/5

3421

My dear

In reply to paras 3, 4, 5, and 6 of your letter No. 347 dated

25 April 1945:-

1. I realize the force of your arguments and I can assure you that your views are well known and have been fully represented to higher authority by me and my staff, who have been in very close touch with the War Ministry on these matters. But I must point out that:-

(a) All the relative decisions on these matters were given by APHQ under the direction of the combined Chiefs of Staff at WASHINGTON, with a view to obtaining the maximum aid to the War Effort.

(b) The CCS have weighed all the world wide (not Italian only) factors in coming to their decisions.

(c) A major factor influencing their decisions has undoubtedly been that of available supplies, of which, as you know, there is a world wide shortage.

2. With the above in mind, I comment on the individual paragraph of your letter in more detail.

(a) Your para 3

The military personnel of Districts are all officers, varying from 12 (Class I Districts) to 4 (Class IV Districts). The civilian personnel working under their supervision vary similarly from 120 to 42. It was not considered possible to authorize more military personnel and it was agreed between the Ministry of War and MILA that with such a military

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(b) Your para 4

It has been ruled that the shortage of supplies prevents the categories you mention being considered and supplied.

as soldiers. Here again it is a matter of what is possible. "travelling soldiers" on duty take full rations for the whole period. As a concession those going on leave are permitted 2 days rations to help them on their journey.

(c) Your para 5

The Allied War Effort must come first. Every effort has been made to avoid using military buildings.

(d) Your para 6

Here again, the ruling must be observed that only those soldiers who are part of the existing Italian Army authorized by the Allies and who are "in fact effective" can be supplied and considered as such.

3. I need hardly say that the liberation of all ITALY will present new problems which will need to be solved within the bounds of practical possibility.

I can assure your Excellency that everything possible has been and will continue to be done to provide for legitimate Italian interests.

H.E. Signor ~~XXXXXX~~
President of the Council of Ministers

Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

(c) Your para 5

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H.E. SIGMOR BONOMI
President of the Council of Ministers

Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

NS

3419 .

3606
89
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

30 Apr 45.

Ref: AC/14601/21/PS

MAY 2 RECD

SUBJECT : Carabinieri Strength.

TO : AFHQ. G-5 Section.

Reference our Signal 6404 dated 26 Apr 45.

1 The Chief Commissioner directs that a copy of a further letter from the President of the Council of Ministers be forwarded to you.

2 This Commission is studying the letter in detail but your attention is drawn particularly to paragraphs 1 and 2 of the War Department letter. The very strongest possible support to the requested increase is again urged.

For the Chief Commissioner :

G.R. UPJOHN, Brig.
V. OA Section.

Copy to : Land Forces Sub-Commission.

2 Encls : Folios 72,73,74,75 of file 3606/COS.

3418

3606

Translat

The President of the Council of Ministers
Minister of the Interior

n. 15014

Rome, 29 April 1945

Dear Admiral,

The request made by the Allied Commission to have other numerous contingents of Royal Carabinieri immediately destined to the provinces of North Italy places the Italian Government before insuperable difficulties.

As a matter of fact, contingents of Carabinieri amounting to 9650 men have already been withdrawn from the provinces of liberated Italy to be destined to the North.

The situation created in the P.S. services by the withdrawal of these police troops is most difficult as I have already told you: for the lack of army units to destine to services of public order, and the special political conditions, as well as the presence of numerous armed groups in many provinces, and rural delinquency burden heavily the services of the public safety.

However, these 9650 men were given in the hope that the zeal of the contingents which remained at the disposal of the Italian Government would make up for their numeric deficiency, and that the Allied Commission wouldn't make any other request.

On the contrary, I have just been told that the Allied Commission has now asked for two more groups of Carabinieri, the first one of 3500 men and the second one of 5000 men to be ready to leave for the North.

Considering the situation which would be created by such a diminution of the forces at the disposal of the Italian Government, I have to point out that, should these detachments leave, the P.S. Authorities would no longer have the possibility of guaranteeing public order in the provinces and in the capital itself.

I therefore consider that it is my duty to suggest that the Allied Commission should limit its present requests to 3500 men who, nevertheless would have to be left at the disposal of the Italian Government till May the 2nd, and that it shouldn't ask for the second contingent of 5000 carabinieri.

Admiral Hilary W. Stone
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
Rome

EX COMMR DIST

ACTION: CA Sect(2)

INFO: Chief Commr

EX COMMR

3417

BU 5/5
10/10/45

Be assured, my dear Admiral, that my proposals are based on the characteristics of the present situation; not to take them in consideration might have serious consequences.

I feel sure that you will kindly examine them.

Yours very truly,

s. Ivanoe Bonomi

e.g.

3416

AC/14608/13/78

27 April 1945.

My dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I am in receipt of your letter of 19 April 1945 regarding the policing of territory in Northern Italy. Your Excellency's assumption that partisans would be employed as Agents of Public Security is erroneous.

The method of policing will be that the Carabinieri will be the first force to operate and that Public Security Agents, where found, will be employed on their normal duties thereafter. There is no restriction on the employment of Public Security Agents as their numbers are not limited as is the case with the Carabinieri. If, however, any of them are found to be unreliable, due to political or other reasons, replacements will be called on from Rome to assume their duties in newly occupied territory.

Some confusion of ideas may have been caused by the suggestion made at Public Safety Conferences with your Commanding General of Carabinieri. It might be possible, for a temporary period, to treat Carabinieri found in Northern areas, and in excess of the present ceiling of 55,000, as partisans so that they could be fed and paid. If the ceiling is increased to 65,000 then these recovered Carabinieri could be taken on to the new strength.

Yours very truly,

15/ May 1945
ALBERT W. SMITH
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi
The President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
ROM.

3415

AC/14600/53/15

27 April 1948.

My dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I have received your letter of 20 April 1948, regarding the withdrawal of Carabinieri from the South of Italy to police the territory to be occupied in the North.

I attach hereto, as an Appendix, a list of the Carabinieri to be withdrawn from the Legions in occupied Italy. The number involved is approximately 20,000 Carabinieri, 4,000 of which are being moved North at the present time.

Your Excellency's assumption that 4,000 were being taken from Sicily is incorrect. 1,655 are scheduled to be withdrawn from Sicily, representing the figure in excess of the normal Sicilian strength. It is being arranged, moreover, that the Carabinieri from Sicily will be the last to be withdrawn.

I appreciate Your Excellency's remarks in regard to the preservation of law and order, but would point out that the ceiling of Carabinieri is at present fixed at 55,000 and the force must be equally distributed over the whole of Italy. In this connection, very strong representations have been made to higher authority to have the ceiling increased to 65,000, which would, I hope, have the effect of giving a greater degree of security to the country.

Yours very truly,

/s/ Henry V. Stone

HENRY V. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner.

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi
The President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
ROME

APPENDIX "A"

U N I T S	TO BE WITHDRAWN				
	ESTABLISHED STRENGTH	Present Strength	FROM LEGIONS	AT	55000
ALBANIA	1780	6043			
BELGRADE	3071	5623			
BOLZANO	1887	2843			
GENOVA	2521	3003			
MILAN	3078	5617	123753		
PADOVA	1888	2843			
TORINO	1906	2863			
TRIESTE	2461	2993			
VERONA	1397	1673			
VERONA	1655	1974	2622	967	648
VERONA	1658	1957	2884	1246	927
BARI	2433	2908	4369	1896	1381
CARLARI	2337	2795	3673	1336	888
CATANZARO	2290	2737	2717	427	20
FIRENZE	1794	2143	3688	1894	1545
LAZIO	2874	430	4792	1918	1362
LIVORNO	1733	2085	2102	441	109
MESSINA	2235	2783	3125	790	342
NAPOLI	3588	4385	5967	2379	1582
PALERMO	3735	4460	4600	865	140
ROME TIR	4321	5146	4631	316	525
SARAGLIA	4238	4374	5002	69	33
SCHOOLS			5230	5230	5230
HALLING CENTRES			1405		
ATTACHED TO 6TH, 4TH				101	10101
2ND, - HEADQUARTERS					
TO BE RECRUITED					
	55000	65000	51879	19929	23753

Total Required for Northern Legions at 55000

Total Required for Northern Legions at 65000

PADOVA	1888	2483	2622	967	640
TORINO	1906	2545	2884	1346	927
TRIESTE	2461	2793	4369	1936	1381
VERONA	1377	1673	3673	1336	888
ASPIRE	1653	1974	2717	427	20
MONZA	1638	1957	3688	1894	1545
PARI	2439	2785	4792	1918	1362
SALIZADA	2297	2737	2195	451	109
CATANZARO	2292	2143	3125	730	342
PIRENZE	1704	2085	5967	2379	1582
LAZIO	2874	430	4600	865	140
LIVORNO	1733	2085	4631	325	515
MODENA	2835	2783	2002	59	33
NOGLI	3388	4385	5230	5230	5230
PALERMO	3735	4468	1405		
ROME PER	4321	5146			
SCHOOLS	4398	4374			
HOLDING CENTRES					
ATTACHED TO SHIP, AIR					
ETC. - HEADQUARTERS					

TO BE RECRUITED	101	10101
55000	65000	54899
		19429
		23753

Total Required for Northern Regions at 55000

Total Required for Northern Regions at 65000

* To be returned to locations.

CRD/S.

341

3606
A.F.H.Q. G-5

6404

28 Apr 11 1945

PRIORITY

APR 28 1945

CONFIDENTIAL PD

PARA ONE PD URGENT REQUEST RECEIVED FROM PRESIDENT OF COUNCIL OF MINISTERS TO PASS A
DECREE INCREASING STRENGTH OF CARABINIERI TO FORMER CHILING OF SIX FIVE ZERO ZERO ZERO PD
PAREN TO AFHQ G-5 FROM ALGOM CITE ACSOC PAREN PD

PARA TWO PD IN HIS VIEW WITHDRAWAL NOW IN PROGRESS OF TWO ZERO ZERO ZERO ZERO FROM
PRESENTLY LIBERATED ITALY TO NEW BATTLE ZONE MAKES FORCE REMAINING IN SOUTH WHOLLY IN-
ADEQUATE TO COPE WITH LAW AND ORDER PD THE PRIME MINISTER REFERRED IN HIS LETTER TO THE
DANGER OF A RECURRENCE OF RECENT INCIDENT IN ROME AT TIME OF ESCAPE OF ROATTA WHEN
FOULAGE INVADDED GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS AND TO OTHER INCIDENTS IN PROVINCES AND STATED IT
WAS ESSENTIAL TO INCREASE POLICE FORCES TO PRESERVE LAW AND ORDER AND FOR THE APPRE-
HENSION OF OFFENDERS PD

PARA THREE PD ADDITIONAL NUMBERS REQUIRED WILL FORM TWELVE MOBILE BATTALIONS AND FOUR
GROUP HEADQUARTERS PD

PARA FOUR PD THIS COMMISSION VERY STRONGLY SUPPORTS REQUEST AND CONSIDERS IT MOST
UNWISE TO DENY ITALIAN GOVERNMENT RIGHT TO INCREASE THIS FORCE SO ESSENTIAL TO PRESERVA-
TION OF LAW AND ORDER WHICH IS VITAL AT THIS PERIOD PD

Chief Commissioners

ELLERY W. STONE

ELLERY W. STONE, Rear Admiral

NICHOLAS PIOMBINO
CWO USA
Asst Adjutant

3412

PAGE 2
Cable No. 6404

PARA FIVE PD UNDER VAN FOUR EIGHT SEVEN THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT HAVE FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR LAW AND ORDER IN ITALIAN GOVERNMENT TERRITORY AND THEY CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO DISCHARGE THIS LIABILITY IF THEY ARE NOT PERMITTED TO MAINTAIN WHAT THEY CONSIDER TO BE THE MINIMUM ESSENTIAL FORCES FOR THIS PURPOSE PD

PARA SIX PD MOREOVER UNDER TERMS OF PARAGRAPH TWO CHARLIE OF VAN FOUR EIGHT SEVEN ALLIED COMMISSION HAS ABANDONED THE PRACTICE OF APPROVING DECREES ENACTED BY THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT PD

DISTRIBUTION

Public Safety
AMIA
Executive Commissioner
C A Section

(Original to G-5 dispatched
by office of EC. 28 Apr 45.
Copy passed for CC files.)

29
43411

78

Tel: 735

Ref: 3606/78/130.

27 April 1945.

SUBJECT: Organisation of Italian Army and Carabinieri.

TO : Civil Affairs Section.

1. Attached hereto is translation of letter from Prime Minister No. 347 dated 25 April 1945, together with its enclosure from the Minister of War, and copy of the acknowledgement.
2. Will you please prepare a reply to paragraphs 1 and 2 for signature by the Chief Commissioner. 75 76
3. It is suggested that with this reply should be combined also the reply to the Prime Minister's letter dated 23 April on the same subject. 64

Chief Staff Officer,
To Executive Commissioner.

Incl:
as above

3410

77

Tel: 735

Ref: 3606/71/20.

27 April 1945.

SUBJECT: Organization of Italian Army and Carabinieri.

TO : Land Forces Sub-Commission (MCLA).

1. Attached hereto is translation of letter from Prime Minister No. 347 dated 25 April 1945, together with its enclosure from the Minister of War, and copy of the acknowledgment.
2. Will you please prepare a reply to paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 for signature by the Chief Commissioner.

Chief Staff Officer,
To Executive Commissioner.

Incl:
as above

3409

Ref/3606/30.

28 April 1945.

My dear Mr. Prime Minister :

This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter No. 347 dated 25 April 1945 on the subject of the strength of the Carabinieri and kindred matters.

The points raised in the War Minister's letter which you enclosed call for examination by more than one Sub-Commission. Consideration is now being given to these matters and I will write to you again as soon as possible.

Yours very truly,

ELINOR W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi
The President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
Rome.

Copy to : Land Forces Sub-Comm. (10014)
Civil Affairs Section.

3407 -

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Translation

The President of the Council of Ministers

347

Rome, 27 April 1945

My dear Sir,

The maintenance of public order represents one of the most important problems for the interior safety of the State.

I therefore take the liberty of drawing your attention on the enclosed memorandum of the Minister of War and especially paragraphs 1 and 2 of the said memorandum.

The urgency to increase the numeric number of the Carabinieri is quite obvious. North Italy having to be garrisoned with about 10 thousand Carabinieri, it is necessary that the 3 Corps should have to be increased of identical forces.

Now, request n. 3 is particularly important. We haven't enough safety troops, in Rome especially. Here, there is one battalion only, which, employed in guard service, can dispose of a few score of men only.

I trust that you, an old and trusted friend of Italy, will speak in favour of our request to the Allied Commission in which you have such an important situation.

Yours very truly,

G. I. Lombardi

Admiral Wilfrid G. B. Jones
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
R.O.M.E.

EC List - 27 APR 45

Action: CA Sec

INFO: Chief Commr
Exec Commr
Land Forces SC
3407

s.c.

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SECRET

State Office

Memorandum, 23 April 1940

TO : His Ex. the President of the Council of Ministers

A. C. A. A.

SUBJECT : Military questions requiring urgent solution.

I expanded on your memorandum, to have been forwarded to the Chief of the Staff, concerning the military character which requires an urgent solution.

1. - Difficulties in the North.

The force of the corps at present allowed by A.C.H.A. is of 20,000 men (of whom 1,000 are employed out of the corps in military command or organization).

To face the military police requirements of the regions which are being liberated and divisions of the necessary mobile police forces in the regions (the battalions arranged in 4 groups); it is necessary and urgent to bring the organization to 65 thousand men.

Without the required regulation, when the North will be liberated, the carabinieri will be all over the Kingdom will be very serious for the requirements of local security, and quite insufficient for the international mobile war.

This is particularly serious because of the impossibility to dispose of safety troops on the whole continent.

2. - Security troops in the North.

On the continent, except for the royal carabinieri, no army troops are available for interior safety. The three divisions for interior safety (Cavalry, Artillery, Infantry, Bersaglieri, etc.) are stationed in Sicily and Calabria (only 600 men in Calabria to watch the coast).

Section 1: Military questions requiring urgent solution.

I referred to your Excellency, to have them forwarded to the allies, and of the dimensions of a military character which require an urgent solution.

1) - DIMENSIONS OF THE CURRENT SITUATION.

The force of the order at present followed by A.S.M. is of 22,000 men (of whom 1,000) are employed out of the corps in military commands or organizations).

To face the military police requirements of the regions which are being liberated and dispose of the necessary mobile police forces in the kingdom (12 battalions arranged in 4 groups), it is necessary and urgent to bring the organization to 65 thousand men.

Without the required regulation, when the north will be liberated, the carabinieri scattered all over the kingdom will be very scarce for the requirements of local security, and quite insufficient for the international public ones.

This is particularly serious because of the impossibility to dispose of safety troops on the whole continent.

2) - SAFETY TROOPS IN THE CAPITAL.

On the continent, except for the royal carabinieri, no army troops are available for interior safety. The three divisions for interior safety ('Cecilia', 'Aquila', 'Sabazia' Divisions - 1) thousand men, are stationed in Sicily and Sardinia (only 500 men in Calabria to watch the plains).

It would be necessary to dispose of safety troops on the continent also, and particularly in the capital. To obtain this, the contingent which, for this category, is at present sized to 15 thousand men, would have to be adequately increased by 22,000 men, and above all, the formation of a safety division in ~~the~~ would have to be authorized.

1420

3) - ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMANDS.

The organs of the territorial, district and depot military commands fixed by A.S.M. are inadequate for the purposes, definite and urgent functions which the said organs have to fulfill.

For instance, the districts can have an average of five men, only; the organization is completed with civilian personnel exclusively; in such conditions, all these organs cannot function.

3400

It must be remembered that many districts are also centres of mobilization for the units and are therefore burdened with the work which

- In favour of registered prisoners of interned soldiers, or soldiers who come back from other states, as long as they haven't been discharged;
- In favour of sick or wounded soldiers who after over 10 days in hospital (from the 6th day on, they are civilian rationed);
- In favour of travelling soldiers (those who start on a journey, according to allied orders are only allowed to take two days rations, while the journey - because of the nature of campaigning - often lasts several days);
and soldiers called under arms
- In favour of draftsmen, for the day on which they present themselves to the division (army rations are only given to those who have been incorporated);
- etc.
- In the cases we have mentioned, the soldiers are considered as civilians by the Allies and treated as such. The system must be revised: the soldiers are obvious and have from their military considerations and from an understanding of reality, they do not need to be explained.

5) - AVAILABLE DIVISIONS

It would be necessary to dispose of a larger number of military buildings. To be able to receive and house the draftsmen adequately would have a good moral effect on the country and for the government.

It would also be possible to separate - as it is obviously necessary - the draftsmen from senior soldiers and soldiers who have been called under arms during the first period of their training.

Only the Allied side can solve this problem and leave at our disposal the necessary minimum of military buildings.

6) - DEFINITION OF THE 'GUARD' & 'MILITIA' DIVISIONS ACCORDING TO THEIR ABILITIES

The troops of these two divisions, stationed in the exposed islands at the time of the invasion, defended fighting against the Japanese ever since September 25th, 1943, at the side of the Allies for the defence of these islands (the 'Guards' alone had about 400 dead and wounded in these actions). Overwhelmed by the enemy, instead of surrendering, in agreement with the Allied authorities, they fought until through luxury and galestines, they were not allowed to carry on their fight against the Japanese in other sectors and are being employed as auxiliary units in the defence of the local English command.

But, after having been at first considered as 'unreliable', the soldiers of the 'Guards' and of the 'Militia' (about 600) were then to all effects placed by the British command in the category of 'co-operating prisoners', though there had been nothing to cause such action to be taken.

72

It is necessary to:

1. review the situation, starting again from where the probability was

degraded.

2. review the situation, for I know of your uncertainty's which to re-

considered the best, and I am sure I will intervene in support of the solution of the

which decision sections which are all of a fundamental and great interest.

via minister

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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*Il Presidente
del Consiglio dei Ministri*

Roma, li 25 aprile 1945

APR 26 RECD

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Caro Ammiraglio,

il mantenimento dell'ordine pubblico rappresenta uno dei problemi più importanti per la sicurezza interna dello Stato.-

Mi permetto di richiamare perciò la Sua attenzione sull'unito pro-memoria del Ministro della Guerra ed in particolar modo sui punti 1 e 2 del pro-memoria stesso.-

L'urgenza di accrescere la forza numerica dei Carabinieri è di tutta evidenza.-Dovendosi presidiare l'Italia del Nord con circa 10 mila Carabinieri, è naturale che si abbia necessità di accrescere l'Arma di altrettante forze.-

Così la richiesta N° 2 è di particolare importanza.-Noi non abbiamo sufficienti truppe di sicurezza, specialmente in Roma.-Qui c'è soltanto un battaglione che, impiegato

Al Sig. Ammiraglio

Ellery W. Stone

Capo della Commissione Alleata

R O M A

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/...



*Al Presidente
del Consiglio dei Ministri*

- 2 -

in servizi di guardia, ha disponibili soltanto poche decine di uomini.-

Io confido che Ella, antico e provato amico dell'Italia, perorerà l'accoglimento di queste nostre richieste presso la Commissione Alleata di cui Ella è così autorevole parte.-

Con i più cordiali saluti.-



*Al Presidente
del Consiglio dei Ministri*

- 2 -

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Con i più cordiali saluti.-

Boissacq

COPIA

MINISTERO DELLA GUERRA
Ufficio Coordinamento

Roma, 23 aprile 1945

A S.E. IL PRESIDENTE IL CONSIGLIO DEI MINISTRI

= R O M A =

OGGETTO: Questioni militari di urgente soluzione.--

Rappresento a V.E., per l'ulteriore seguito presso la parte alleata, alcune delle principali questioni d'indole militare delle quali è necessaria l'urgente soluzione:

1°) - AUMENTO DI 10.000 CARABINIERI.

La forza dell'arma consentita sino al presente dal A.P.H.Q. è di 55.000 uomini (di cui 1.565 impiegati fuori arma presso comandi ed enti militari).

Per poter far fronte alle necessità di polizia militare delle Regioni in corso di liberazione e disporre delle necessarie forze mobili di polizia nel Regno (12 battaglioni ordinati in 4 raggruppamenti) è necessario ed urgente portare l'organico a 65 mila uomini.

Senza il provvedimento richiesto, una volta liberato il Nord, i carabinieri disseminati in tutto il Regno saranno molto scarsi per le esigenze di sicurezza locali, assolutamente insufficienti

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Ciò è particolarmente grave in relazione alla indisponibilità di truppe di sicurezza nell'intero continente.

2°) - TRUPPE DI SICUREZZA NELLA CAPITALE

In continente, eccettuati i carabinieri reali, non sono disponibili truppe dell'esercito per la sicurezza interna. Le tre divisioni di sicurezza interna (Divisioni "Calabria", "Aosta", "Sabaude" - 15 mila uomini) sono dislocate in Sicilia ed in Sardegna (solo 800 uomini in Calabria per la guardia degli impianti).

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sarebbe necessario disporre di truppe di sicurezza anche in continente e particolarmente nella capitale. Per ottenere ciò, bisognerebbe che venisse convenientemente aumentato dall'A.F.H.Q. il contingente oggi fissato per tale categoria in 15 mila ed, in particolare, autorizzata la costituzione di una divisione di sicurezza interna nel Lazio.

3°) - MAGGIORE CONSISTENZA DELL'ORDINAMENTO MILITARE TERRITORIALE

Gli organici dei comandi militari territoriali, dei distretti e dei depositi, fissati dall'A.F.H.Q. sono inadeguati alle molteplici, delicate, pressanti funzioni che detti organi debbono assolvere.

I distretti, ad esempio, non possono avere - in media - più di cinque ufficiali; il completamento dell'organico avviene esclusivamente con personale civile: in tali condizioni, tutti questi organi non possono convenientemente funzionare.

E' da tenere presente che molti distretti sono anche centri di mobilitazione di reparti e quindi gravati anche del lavoro che tale funzione comporta.

Occorrerebbe che la A.F.H.Q. aumentasse opportunamente la quota relativa al personale per l'amministrazione centrale e periferica fissata ora in 27 mila uomini (1° categoria).

4°) - RAZIONAMENTO MILITARE

Gli organi di controllo alleati concedono le razioni viveri in ragione della forza autorizzata e non ammettono deroghe per nessun motivo.

Vi sono invece, situazioni particolari che imporrebbero de-

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Vi sono invece, situazioni particolari che imporrebbero deroghe; ad esempio:

- ai reduci dalla prigionia, da internamento, da altri Stati, finchè non vengono congedati;
- ai militari ammalati e feriti degenti in ospedali oltre il 60 giorno (dal 61° giorno in poi ricevono razionamento civile);

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- 3 -

- ai militari di passaggio (chi si mette in viaggio, per disposizione alleata, può portare solo due giornate di viveri a secco, mentre il viaggio - dati i mezzi di comunicazione - spesso si protrae per più giorni);
- ai richiamati ed alle reclute per il giorno in cui si presentano ai distretti (il razionamento militare viene corrisposto solo agli incorporati);
- ecc.
- Nei casi indicati i militari vengono considerati dagli alleati come civili e come tali trattati. E' necessaria una revisione del sistema: ovvii i motivi, che nascono da considerazioni di umanità e di aderenza alla realtà, tali da non richiedere una particolare illustrazione.

5°) - DISPONIBILITA' ALLOGGIAMENTI MILITARI.

Sarebbe necessario disporre di un maggior numero di immobili militari. Il poter accogliere e sistemare convenientemente i richiamati e le reclute avrebbe indubbi effetti morali rispetto al Paese e nei confronti del Governo. Consentirebbe inoltre di poter separare - per ragioni di opportunità intuitive - le reclute dai soldati richiamati e anziani nel periodo iniziale di addestramento. Da parte alleata può, essa sola, risolvere il problema e lasciare a disposizione almeno il minimo necessario di immobili militari.

6°) - RIMPATRIO ELEMENTI DIVISIONI "CUNEO" E "REGINA" IMPIEGATI

- ecc.

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6°) - RIMPATRIO ELEMENTI DIVISIONI "CUNEO" E "REGINA" IMPIEGATI COME AUSILIARI IN EGITTO

Le truppe delle due divisioni, dislocate all'atto dello armistizio nelle isole dell'Egeo, hanno, sin dal 9 settembre 1943, combattuto duramente contro i tedeschi, a fianco degli alleati, per la difesa di tali isole (la sola "Cuneo" ha avuto circa 400 tra morti e feriti in tali combattimenti).

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Soverchiate dalla preponderanza nemica, anzichè arrendersi, sono poi passate d'accordo con le autorità alleate, attraverso la Turchia e la Palestina, in Egitto, dove, non avendo potuto ottenere di continuare in altri settori la lotta contro i tedeschi, vengono impiegate come unità ausiliarie alle dipendenze dei locali comandi inglesi.

Senonchè, dopo essere stati inizialmente considerati come "cobelligeranti", i militari della "Cuneo" e della "Regina" (circa 6500) vennero, successivamente, dai comandi inglesi, trasformati a tutti gli effetti nella categoria "prigionieri cooperatori" senza che nulla abbia dato motivo ad un tale provvedimento.

E' necessario che:

- sia revocato il provvedimento preso, e tali truppe siano nuovamente passate nella categoria dei "cobelligeranti";
- sia provveduto al loro collettivo rimpatrio.

Tanto ho rappresentato, sicuro che V.E., così sollecito di ciò che può contribuire alla ricostruzione dell'esercito, vorrà col suo alto intervento promuovere la risoluzione delle questioni indicate, che sono tutte di fondamentale interesse materiale e morale.

IL MINISTRO
F.to Casati

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IL MINISTRO
P.to Casati

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Translation

The President of the Council of Ministers

Rome, 23 April 1945

APR 25 1945

Dear Admiral,

I send you a copy of the letter addressed by Minister Casati to L.F.S.C. - A.C. (M.W.I.A.) to obtain the Carabinieri Corps to be increased of ten thousand units.

From this letter you will learn the reasons which make it advisable to increase our police forces. With the occupation of the North, 9 thousand Carabinieri at least will have to be taken away from liberated Italy, while the conditions of Sicily prevent to diminish the forces which are scattered there.

I have already pointed out to you after the invasion of the Viminale the very great need to increase the armed forces in the Capital. The Government cannot run the risk of seeing its offices invaded again, nor can it remain inactive any longer in front of the incidents which take place in the provinces and which have to remain unpunished because of the lack of police forces.

Will you kindly see that the request of my Minister of War is granted so that the decree may soon be issued.

I hope your answer will be favourable and I remain,

Yours sincerely,

B. I. Bonomi

Admiral STONE
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
Rome

E.O. DIST. - 24 Apr 45

Action : C A Sec (2)
Info : Chief Comar
Ex Comar
Land Forces S/C
(Without enclosures)

3397

Translation

War Department
Ufficio coordinamento

N. 40.677/coord

ROME,

SUBJECT : Interior safety forces

TO : I.F.B.O. - A.O. (M.M.I.A.)

ROMA

As it is well known, the Italian military forces for interior safety are composed of the divisions of interior safety and the M.O.C. Corps.

The interior safety divisions are located in Sicily and Sardinia, where they are mostly used for guard duties; there are no safety units on the mainland (only S.O.V. men in Calabria).

Up to now, the M.O.C. Corps was rather numerous, in liberated Italy, but is getting greatly reduced because of the numerous groups which are being organized for the requirements of the part of Italy which is being liberated (9,000 carabinieri at least are ready; another 10,000 are getting prepared).

When Italy will be entirely liberated, and especially during the critical period of the liberation and immediately afterwards, the carabinieri scattered all over the kingdom will prove to be very scarce for the requirements of local safety (units for territorial service) and will prove insufficient for the requirements of interregional safety (mobile units).

Foreseeing these requirements, the general command of the M.O.C. has been pointing out to the competent organs of A.O. the necessity of raising the force of the Corps from 55,000 to 65,000 men; in this way, 12 battalions (in groupments) would be constituted; they would be mobile and might be transported from one region to another according to particular safety requirements.

I think this increase of force, and the ensuing constitution of mobile battalions are essential elements for the interior safety of the country, at the side of the Allied operating units.

As this is no longer a matter of plain military police, I forward a copy of the draft of the decree for the re-organization of the Corps, which, after obtaining the consent of the Allies, I mean to propose to the Council of Ministers, and I ask for the kind interest of the Mission, which always deal promptly with all fundamental problems.

THE MINISTER

G. A. Casati

Translator

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 725017

REPORT TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

SUBJECT: Draft of a Regency Decree relative to the organic force and regulations of the Royal Carabineers.

The present regulations, sanctioned by laws issued on this subject and still officially in force, though they have in fact been modified for essential requirements, foresee that the R.R.C. Corps must face the various requirements with a force of 99,000 men (excluding the officers and the soldiers doing service in the colonies, or at the various Ministries and dependent organizations) at its disposal.

This force, according to the above mentioned regulations, should be divided between :

- a) - 1 General Command
- b) - Three Division Commands
- c) - Six Brigade Commands
- d) - 1 Central School
- e) - Twenty Territorial Legions
- f) - 1 Legion of Cadets
- g) - 1 Band of the Corps
- h) - Four Battalions
- i) - 1 Cavalry Group
- 1) - 1 Squadron of Carabineers Guards of the King.

Experience has proved that to face the requirements, which are sometimes urgent, imposed by reasons of public order, the various commands, through lack of manpower, had to get the required personnel from the stations, not excluding the rural ones.

As the stations themselves, especially those of the periphery, have a personnel strictly limited to the requirements, the result was that they were sometimes reduced to the state of sheer reference points, which could, what is more, easily be submerged in case of trouble on a large scale, or in case of trouble breaking up simultaneously in various parts of the Kingdom.

Before fascism, the Corps could rely on eight mobile battalions, thanks to which - if only in part - it was able to face the various requirements without troubling the normal functioning of the rural stations, but the past regime thought among other things, that it could also reduce this corps, so that, in fact, in determined periods, the said stations lived an ephemeral life, among difficulties of all sorts, caused by the lack of personnel, and by the requirements of the service which had to be met in the interest of the population.

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- i) - A Cavalry Group
- l) - A Squadron of Carabineers Guards of the King.

Experience has proved that to face the requirements, which are sometimes urgent, imposed by reasons of public order, the various commands, through lack of manpower, had to get the required personnel from the stations, not excluding the rural ones.

As the stations themselves, especially those of the periphery, have a personnel strictly limited to the requirements, the result was that they were sometimes reduced to the state of sheer reference points, which could, what is more, easily be submerged in case of trouble on a large scale, or in case of trouble breaking up simultaneously in various parts of the Kingdom.

Before fascism, the Corps could rely on eight mobile battalions, thanks to which - if only in part - it was able to face the various requirements without troubling the normal functioning of the rural stations, but the past regime thought among other things, that it could also reduce this Corps, so that, in fact, in determined periods, the said stations lived an ephemeral life, among difficulties of all sorts, caused by the lack of personnel, and by the requirements of the service which had to be met in the interest of the population.

To solve the problem in a satisfactory, practical and definitive way, and in the belief that the organization of the territorial Corps - which is, as we have already said, strictly proportioned to the requirements - ought to remain practically unchanged, I emphasize the need:

3395

- a) of increasing the organic force of the Corps - Carabineers Corps, bringing it to 65,000 men (officers included);
- b) of making use of the men who will not be needed for strictly territorial requirements to form 12 mobile battalions and 4 battalions Groupements Commands, the latter entirely autonomous and quite independent from the legions.

I therefore prepared the enclosed draft for a Regency Decree which shows the particulars of the above mentioned modifications, and the new organic characteristic which would in this case be assumed by the Carabineers Corps, and I submit it to your approval.

THE MINISTER

UMBERTO DI SAVOIA
PRINCE OF PIEMONTE, LIEUTENANT GENERAL / L.E.
KINGDOM

By the Authority invested in us:

Considered the R.D.L. 1 February 1920, n. 128 and successive modifications;
Considered the R.D. 30 December 1923, n. 2986 and successive modifications;
Considered the R.D. 2 April 1925, n. 381 and successive modifications;
Considered the R.D.L. 16 May 1925, n. 677 and successive modifications;
Considered the R.D. 26 July 1929, n. 1430 and successive modifications;
Considered the R.D.L. 26 October 1939, n. 2002 and successive modifications;
Considered Law 9 May 1940, n. 368 and successive modifications;
Considered the R.L.D. 30 October 1913, n. 2/81;
Considered the Regency Decree 25 June 1944, n. 151;

On the proposal of the Minister of War in agreement with the Ministers of the Interior and of Treasury,

We have sanctioned and promulgate what follows:

Art. 1

The organic force of the Carabinieri Corps will be of 63,000 men, including the officers.

Art. 2

In this force are not to be included the soldiers who might have to do service in the colonies or at the various Ministries and dependent organs.

Art. 3

The Royal Carabinieri Corps includes:

- 1 General Command
- Three Division Commands;
- Six Brigade Commands;
- 21 Territorial Legion Commands;
- 1 Central School;
- 1 Carabinieri Pupils Legion
- 4 Grouped Commands of Mobile Battalions;
- 12 mobile Battalions

Depending from the RR.CC. Legion of Rome Territorial, it also includes

- 1 RR.CC. Squadron;
- 1 Squadron of King's Guards
- 1 Band of the RR.CC. Corps.

3394

the Interior and of Treasury,

we have sanctioned and promulgate what follows:

Art. 1

The organic force of the Carabinieri Corps will be of 60,000 men, including the officers.

Art. 2

In this force are not to be included the soldiers who might have to do service in the colonies or at the various Ministries and dependent organs.

Art. 3

The Royal Carabinieri Corps includes:

- 1 General Command
- Three Division Commands;
- Six Brigade Commands;
- 21 Territorial Legion Commands;
- 1 Central School;
- 1 Carabinieri Pupils Legion
- 4 Groupment Commands of mobile Battalions;
- 12 mobile Battalions

Depending from the R.R.C.C. Legion of Rome Territorial, it also includes **3394**

- 1 R.R.C.C. Squadron;
- 1 Squadron of King's Guards
- 1 Band of the R.R.C.C. Corps.

Art. 4

The Groupment commands of mobile battalions mentioned in the former article will have their seat in the towns of: Milan, Florence, Rome, Naples, and will have in their dependence the mobile battalions of:

MILAN: Milan - Turin - Genoa - Trieste;

FLORENCE: Florence, Bologna - Ancona;

ROME: Rome - Cagliari;

NAPLES: Naples - Bari - Palermo.

Art. 5

The organic formation of the units mentioned in art. 3 are fixed by the enclosed gradual and numerical tables.

- 2 -

Art. 6

The groupment commands of mobile battalions will depend on the brigade commands in which they will happen to find themselves.

Art. 7

The stations are commanded by non-commissioned officers of various ranks and by first class privates empowered to do so.

Art. 8

The present decree will be in force on the day of its publication in the Gazette officielle of the Kingdom.

We order those it may concern to respect the present decree and see that it is respected as state law.

Rome,1940

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

The present Decree will be in force on the day of its publication in the Gazzetta Ufficiale of the Kingdom.

We order those it may concern to respect the present Decree and see that it is respected as State Law.

Rome,1910

e.o.

3393

36068

TELETYPE

The President of the Council of Ministers
Minister of the Interior

Rome, 20 April 1945

APR 20 RECD

Dear Admiral,

I have been told that 1,000 carabinieri are soon to be taken away from Sicily for the formation of contingents for the provinces of North Italy.

All the RS.M. legions in liberated Italy are contributing to the formation of these contingents, and their organs will therefore be considerably diminished.

Now, generally speaking, ^{if} this is a cause of great preoccupation to all the authorities which have to maintain public order, the reduction of P.S. forces in Sicily, as you can easily understand, is a motive of special preoccupation.

Last January already, the police forces proved quite inadequate to cope with the numerous and simultaneous centers of rebellion; should now forces be removed, nobody could guarantee the maintenance of public order in case of more trouble.

Considering this, I think it necessary for the police forces located in Sicily not to be diminished of a single man, and I want to draw your personal attention on this point, for I feel certain that because of your deep knowledge of our problems, you will certainly take it in due consideration.

Sincerely yours,

S. I. Ronconi

Admiral Henry A. Stone
Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission
R O S E

c.c.

40 23/4
-Molloy J. H.

E.C. DET-20 APR 25

ACTION: CH. Sec. 1

INFO: Case 3392

PAJ-2
Ex. Bureau

3606 A

58

Transmittal

The President of the Council of Ministers
Minister of the Interior
n. 13637

Rome, 15 April 1945

APR 20 REC'D

Dear Admiral,

After having contacted the P.S. sub-commission to examine the question of the employment of the P.S. Guards in the provinces of North Italy after the liberation, the competent P.S. authorities told me about the intention of employing at first only the M.G.C. and later on, of enlisting temporarily partisan elements as P.S. Guards.

I want to draw your personal attention on the very difficult situation which would be created in the P.S. offices by the sudden enlisting of elements which would not be prepared to the technical duties of the police, and above all, by the possible infiltration in the most delicate executive organ of the State of elements bent on causing trouble, and discrediting the representatives of order.

I feel certain that, in the places where it will at first be impossible to do without the collaboration of the partisans for P.S. services, you will kindly ask the competent military authorities to avoid a real recruiting of the said partisans, and in any case, to be most prudent and cautious in choosing the persons to whom such a grave and delicate task is to be entrusted, for I must tell you that I am convinced that a mistaken view of the problem could have most serious consequences for public safety and order.

Truly yours,

B. I. Mussolini

Admiral Allery W. Stone
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
Rome

E.C. DIST-30 APR 45

ACTION E.A. Sec

INFO: Chief of Mission

3391

E. C. Stone

B/U 23/4
Noted

e.e.

APRIL GEORGE FIVE

5165

11 Apr

OPS PRIORITY

SECRET PD

PARA ONE PD UNDERSTAND SIGNAL FROM CHARLIE CHARLIE SUGAR REFERS INCREASE OF CHARLIE CHARLIE ROGER ROGER BUILDING AND RECOMMENDS THAT NUMBERS FOR NORTHERN ITALY BE INCREASED BY TRANSFER OF FURTHER CHARLIE CHARLIE ROGER ROGER FROM THE SOUTH TO BE REPLACED BY RECRUITMENT OF ADDITIONAL CIVIL POLICE PD

BASED TO APRIL GEORGE FIVE FROM HQ ALCON SITE A500 PAREN

PARA TWO PD SITUATION NOW IS THAT NINE SIX ZERO ZERO CHARLIE CHARLIE ROGER ROGER ARE ALREADY BEING WITHDRAWN FROM LIBERATED ITALY FOR THE NORTH PD THIS LEAVES THE SMALLEST MINIMUM OF CHARLIE CHARLIE ROGER ROGER IN THE SOUTH AND IT IS IMPRACTICABLE TO WITHDRAW MORE WITHOUT GRAVEST RISK OF OUTBREAK OF FURTHER CIVIL DISORDER WHICH MAY AFFECT ALLIED WAR EFFORT PD DUE TO CMA IN VIEW OF PRESENT DISORDERS CMA MANY INFORMED OBSERVERS BELIEVE THAT LIMIT HAS BEEN REACHED PD PARA THREE PD RECRUITMENT OF CIVIL POLICE TO REPLACE ANY FURTHER WITHDRAWALS OF CHARLIE CHARLIE ROGER ROGER IMPOSSIBLE AND IMPRACTICABLE FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS DOUGH ABL PD THE PERIOD REQUIRED FOR SELECTION CMA TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION OF SUCH A FORCE WOULD RENDER IT INEFFECTIVE DURING THE CRITICAL PERIOD PD BASED PD THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT HAS NO MEANS OF SUPPLYING UNIFORMS CMA ARMS OR EQUIPMENT PD CHARLIE PD SUCH A FORCE AT THIS BIRTH WOULD LACK MORALE GATHERED FROM EXPERIENCE AND ALSO RESPECT OF TRUCULENT SECTION OF POPULATION PD PARA FOUR PD REQUEST URGENT RECONSIDERATION OF POSITION

INT DISTRIBUTION :-

Exec Comm
Pub Safety S/C
Land Forces S/C

339

Civil Affairs Section

NICHOLAS PIERBINO
CWO USA
Asst Adjutant

G. N. UPPER BRIG

54

Tel: 735

Ref: 3606/54/BO.

10 April 1945.

SUBJECT: Strength of CC.RR.

TO : Civil Affairs Section.

1. It is understood that Public Safety Sub-Commission recently sent a signal to APHQ with reference to the latter's FX 31016 dated 21 February 1945 and that in reply you were sent copy of a signal from APHQ to OCS.
2. Will you kindly send copies of these signals to this Office so that it is informed of the latest position.
3. It would be appreciated if you would constantly bear in mind the importance of keeping this Office advised of developments in matters affecting policy by sending relevant copies of correspondence.

-NAF B&B.

Major E. Talbot

Chief Staff Officer,
To Executive Commissioner.

B/O 12/11
-Robert J. [Signature]

3389

3606 E. X. COMMISSIONER

~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY No 5 (50)

FA 31016
FEB 211500A

FEB 22 1945
D/2813
FEB 220900A
PRIORITY

PROT: AFHQ SIGNED ALEXANDER SITE PHOTO

To : AGWAR FOR COMBINED C.O.S. AND ANSOG FOR BIRTHS C.O.S. RTD DRAFT
ALCON MIA 15 ARMY GROUP

TOP-SECRET

This is NAF 868. Para 4 NAF 773 and para 3 VAN 448 are references.

1. Breakdown of international commitment of 124000 provides for ceiling of 56000 in respect of Carabinieri. This ceiling now full and strength fully engaged policing liberated ITALY.

2. Considered problem maintaining public order in thickly populated industrial areas of north when liberated will necessitate (a) redistribution of present Carabinieri strength throughout ITALY involving withdrawal GCHH personnel from base areas for duty in the north.

(b) Increase of 10000 in GCHH ceiling to facilitate this redistribution over the extended area in which police duties will become necessary when northern provinces are occupied.

3. To cover the suggested GCHH increase, approval is sought to an increase in the over-all ceiling of the Italian military forces by raising the international commitment from 124000 to 134000.

N.B. This message will not be distributed outside British or U.S. Govt departments or Hq or re transmitted even in cipher without being heavily paraphrased.

Dist
over

~~TOP SECRET~~

see M 51053253

TOP SECRET

CLASSIFIED

Dist

- | | |
|---|---------------------------|
| 1 | Info-Action - P Safety SC |
| 2 | " " " Forces SC |
| 3 | Info - A/President |
| 4 | Chief Commissioner |
| 5 | Ex Com |
| 6 | CA Sec |
| 7 | File |

The following information is being furnished to you for your information. This information was obtained from the records of the Department of Defense and is being furnished to you for your information. It is not to be distributed outside your agency without the express written approval of the Department of Defense. The information is being furnished to you for your information and is not to be distributed outside your agency without the express written approval of the Department of Defense.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

MEMOIRE FOR DISCUSSION WITH A.F.H.Q. (44)

29th January 45.

There appear to be two fallacies in this letter:-

1. We have never received G-5's OLA.12 of December 21st.
2. That the Chief Commissioner should have to submit a detailed breakdown of the Carabinieri in order that it should be studied by G-3 Org., who are an organisation of highly qualified military officers but know nothing about police duties.

The Chief Commissioner, as advised by his Public Safety Sub-Commission and his Civil Affairs Section, requires a force of 65,000 Carabinieri to establish law and order throughout Italy, for which he is responsible to the Supreme Allied Commander. How those are broken down is his concern and no staff study by unqualified military officers can be the slightest use in advising the Supreme Allied Commander. The only adviser on this particular point can be the Chief Commissioner. I have yet to learn that either G-3 or G-5 contain one officer who is qualified in police duties.

MSL

Brigadier.
Chief of Staff.

PIA *[initials]*
see Minutes 45 to 46.
3387

~~SECRET~~

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
AFC 512

26 January 1945.

CONFIDENTIAL JAN 28 1945

By *John H. Hume*

I think it would be well for me to put on record the present position with regard to the suggested increase in ceiling for the Carabinieri, particularly in view of your telephone call yesterday.

It is quite clear from the files in this office both that G-3 (Org) are aware of your request for an increase of the ceiling, and that AC have been told that until they can submit a detailed projection of the anticipated strength of the Carabinieri to cover the next several months and to show the sources from which the increased strength will be derived, no final decision can be come to at this Headquarters. See particularly this Headquarters' letter of the 21st December (for the attention of the Chief Commissioner, under reference G-5: 514.12). This appears to dispose of the suggestion made by the Chief Commissioner in his letter of the 11th January (under reference AC/14601/31/PS) that he had had no acknowledgment of his letter of the 28th November.

13 — Until we receive a detailed breakdown of the Carabinieri strength, the disposition of its numbers, and the tasks upon which they are engaged, I am quite sure (and this was emphasized yesterday at a G-3 (Org) Conference) that this Headquarters will not listen to any suggestion of increase of ceiling. You promised us such a breakdown in paragraph 4 of the letter of 7 January, which has now (18 January) been received in part, and until we get the full story, I am afraid that nothing satisfactory will be done. Young's visit here today has been very helpful, and he has promised to let us have further data, upon which we can present a proper picture to G-3.

A-2A — You will have had this morning a signal from this Headquarters making IMIA responsible for controlling the rations issued to the Carabinieri to make sure that the ceiling strength of 35,000 is not exceeded.

In the meantime, however, we have been asked by G-3 to put up a staff study which will relate the question of suggested increase of ceiling for Carabinieri to the question of the increase of the ceiling of the Italian Army by 100,000. This is the subject of a request made in the Chief Commissioner's letter of the 16th of January (reference 3207/13/COB), paragraph 10.

3386

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONFIDENTIAL

I must emphasize, however, that it is not accurate to say that G-3 are unaware of the problem. We cannot assist you as we should like until you give us the ammunition for which this Headquarters has been asking since the G-3 (Org) letter of 2nd November, copy of which was sent to you enclosed in our letter of 4 November (Reference G-5: 014.12).

Yours sincerely,

Tom Rieu Hean

Brigadier M. S. Lush,
Chief of Staff,
HQ, Allied Commission,
APO 394.

CONFIDENTIAL

3385

3606
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APO 394.

AG/14601/21/PS.

Tel. 489081 - 380.

26th January, 1945.

SUBJECT : Strength of Royal Carabinieri. JAN 28 1945

TO : The Commanding General, Royal Carabinieri.

1. As you know, the application to increase the strength of the CC.RR to 65,000 is now under consideration by AFHQ. Approval has not yet been given and in the meantime it is important to ensure that the strength of the CC.RR does not exceed its authorized establishment, i.e., 55,000.

2. I should be glad therefore if you would give special consideration to this matter.

3. It has, however, been agreed that CC.RR on leave for more than 30 days, as well as those who have been sick for more than 60 days, do not count on the effective establishment, and, for the purposes of considering the strength as 55,000, these categories need no longer be shown by you in the official returns.

John W. Chapman

JOHN W. CHAPMAN,
Colonel, J.A.G.D.,
Director, Public Safety
Sub-Commission.

Copy to : AFHQ, G-5,
O of S, A.C.,
VP. CA. Sec.
EMIA.

AEY/en.

PA *[initials]*
3384

DATE 2/24 DIST: C/9111
JAN 29 1945
ROUTINE

10 : ALCOX ACTION, MSLA FOR INFO

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

19/12/2017

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

LIST

ACTION: Public Safety SC
INFO: A/President
Chief Commissioner
C.O.B.
C.A. Sec
Econ Sec
Land Forces SC
File 2
Float

WELLS, n. 12128

3382

3606
2040
AFH

225

20 January 1945

PRIORITY

SECRET PD

SUBJECT IS RETURN OF PIGENO GROUP TO ITALIAN ARMY PD

PAREN TO AFH FROM HQ ALCOM PAREN PD

PARA ONE PD REFERENCE YOUR FOX XRAY EIGHT SIX SIX SEVEN NINE DATED ONE SEVEN JAN PD

PARA TWO PD ALL TROOPS TRANSFERRED TO CHARLIE CHARLIE ROGER ROGER ARE AVAILABLE FOR
RETURN WITH EXCEPTION OF MONTEGRANERO BATTALION NOW IN SICILY AND AGREED BY GEORGE FIVE
TO REMAIN WITH CHARLIE CHARLIE ROGER ROGER PD

PARA THREE PD TROOPS WILL BE AVAILABLE AT FOLLOWING POINTS AS FROM MIDNIGHT TWO EIGHT
JAN FOUR FIVE CMA AND WILL BE WARNED IN ACCORDANCE WITH DETAILED MOVEMENT INSTRUCTIONS
WHEN RECEIVED FROM YOU PD

PARA FOUR PD NAPLES TWO ZERO OFFICERS FOUR SIX SIX ORS TWO FOUR TONS STORES CMA
CHIETI FOM ORTONA ONE EIGHT OFFICERS FOUR THREE NINE ORS TWO FOUR TONS STORES CMA
ROME FOUR ZERO OFFICERS NINE THREE NINE ORS TWO FOUR TONS STORES CMA BARI NINE OFFICERS
FOUR ONE ONE ORS TWO FOUR TONS STORES PD

PARA FIVE PD THE TWO ZERO OFFICERS FOUR EIGHT ZERO MEN TWO FOUR TONS STORES AT MARTINA
FRANCA WERE NOT MOVED TO CATANZARO AND HAVE NOT BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO CHARLIE CHARLIE
ROGER ROGER PD

PUBLIC SAFETY S/C

Ext 365

F.J. WILSON, Lt Col

NICHOLAS PIOMBINO
CWO, USA
Asst Adjutant

3382

(39)

PARA SIX PD THE TWO FIVE OFFICERS FOUR SEVEN FIVE QRS OF CORSEDANTI OF CAGLIARI ARE
STILL IN SARDINIA PD

DISTRIBUTION:

OO
OOS
OAS
IRGLA

PAGE TWO CABLE NUMBER 225 TO AFHQ.

3381

3606

38

Translation

The President of the Council of
Ministers
Minister of the Interior

Rome, 16 January 1945

n. 1223

Dear Admiral,

I received your letter 14607/2/PS in reference with the incidents which took place in Catania.

As I have already informed the P.S. Subcommission, having felt that the intervention of the armed force had been neither efficacious, nor timely to repress the trouble in Catania, I gave orders for the immediate substitution of the Prefect and of the Questore.

Later on, a P.S. General Inspector was sent there to find out about the technical responsibility of the various persons who were to maintain order.

A propos of a definite use of the public force in case of new trouble in Sicily, orders have been given, through the High Commissioner for Sicily, to all competent organs; these regulations have already been enforced with good results in Ragusa and in Naro.

Sincerely yours,

s. I. Bonomi,

Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone
Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission
Rome

C o S DIST - 17 Jan 45

Action : C.A. Section
Info : Chief Commissioner
C o S 3380

e.c.

Copy on file 3618/cos

3606
~~SECRET~~

36

7186579
JAN 17/1932

075143
JAN 18/0830
GP-PRIORITY

From: AFHQ SIGNED SIGNED CITY: PRIST.

To: ALGOM, INFO: NSIA

CONFIDENTIAL

JAN 18 1945

SECRET.

Reference your 3606/003 of 31 December last.

1. Urgent operational requirements of ITALIAN ARMY for reinforcements necessitate immediate return of 3000 troops PIERRE combat group at present on loan to you for CRR duties.

2. To facilitate move you will forward earliest this Headquarters statement of entraining points, together with numbers of personnel and dates of readiness.

see 40

CASAC (2)

DIST

Actions: C o B (4)
Info: A/President
Chief Commissioner
L Forces
CA Sec
P Safety
File

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

3388 Noted

3666
Copy of
SUBJECT : increase of authorised establishment of CC.RR.

Land Forces Sub Com, A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)
SD/28
16 Jan 45

Chief of Staff,
A.C.

JAN 17 1945

Ref your AC/14601/21/25 of 11 Jan :-

1. I feel I must remark on the sentence in para 2 which says that : " 16% of the total strength in any day are ineffective", partly because your letter may effect the Army ceiling with which I as G.O.C., M.M.I.A. am vitally concerned and partly because this may be the subject of query by A.P.H.Q.

2. The term "ineffective" as applied to a strength state means the difference between the "posted strength" and the "fighting strength" i.e. bodies actually doing duty.

3. On enquiry from Public Safety Sub Commission, I am informed that the 16% included :-

(a) Sick		1200 equals	...	2% of 55,000
(b) Leave	...	5000 "	...	9% of "
(Only 5% is authorised by AFHQ)				
(c) A.W.O.L.	...	100	...	
(d) Attached to Army Units..	1865 equals	...	3%	
(e) Detached on special duty	2000 "	...	4%	

TOTAL	10:65	"	...	13 %

- of these : -

(d) and (e) do not come within the term "ineffective" as they are actually doing duty.

(b) can only be 5%

(a) and (c) are correctly "ineffective" which means that the "ineffectives" really are :-

Sick	1200	equals	2% of 55,000
Leave	2750	equals	5% "
AWOL	100	-	

that : 10% of the total strength of the Army ceiling with which I as G.O.O., because your letter may effect the Army ceiling with which I as G.O.O., M.M.I.A. am vitally concerned and partly because this may be the subject of query by A.F.H.Q.

2. The term "ineffective" as applied to a strength state means the difference between the "posted strength" and the "fighting strength" i.e. bodies actually doing duty.

3. On enquiry from Public Safety Sub Commission, I am informed that the 16% included :-

(a) Sick	 1200 equals	... 2% of 55,000
(b) Leave	... 5000 "	... 9% of
(Only 5% is authorised by AFHQ)		
(c) A.W.O.L.	... 100	
(d) Attached to Army Units..	1865 equals	... 3%
(e) Detached on special duty	2000 "	... 4%

TOTAL	10165 "	... 18 %

- of these :-

(d) and (e) do not come within the term "ineffective" as they are actually doing duty.

(b) can only be 5%

(a) and (c) are correctly "ineffective" which means that the "ineffectives" really are :-

Sick	1200	equals	2% of 55,000
Leave	2750	equals	5% "
AWOL	100	-	

TOTAL	4050	equals	7% "

5. (a) Army units proper count them "ineffectives" on the above basis and have, for obvious reasons, a greater difference than CC.RR. between "posted strength" and "fighting strength" i.e. a greater % of real "ineffectives".

(b) As a basis of comparison therefore (in connection with bids for ceiling authorisation) the fair and proper figure of "ineffectives" in CC.RR. is 7 %.

tvs.LB.

Major General, 3382
M.M.I.A.

(ORIGINAL PASSED TO C.A. SEC - 14 Jan)

Ref: 10/11501/24/10.

1. *Journal of Management Education*, 1994, 18(1), 1-10.

JAN 01 1945

Abstract: Increase of cultivated establishment of *Neobubalus*.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters, Atr: 3-5 Section.

1. I have received no reply to, nor acknowledgment of, my letter AC/1452/70 dated 26 November 1964 and I am therefore addressing you on the subject de novo.

2. The strength of the C.S.M. has now reached, in fact, exceeded its approved establishment of 55,000. Our experience is that 16% of the total strength in any day are ineffective. The number is sufficient and only just sufficient to maintain law and order in BARCELONA, VALENCIA (where the situation is grave) and ITALY up to the ROMA-INN line.

3. We must look forward in the future to occupying AIZAK and picking up in that territory many thousands of C.C.s. Hitherto these C.C.s found on liberation have been invaluable. Under present regulations we cannot employ them and must immediately disband them unless we have discharged a similar number in Central and southern TIBET. To reduce this number would be folly.

4. Security in Europe, even in the liberated territories, has deteriorated greatly in the last two months, will become worse until Allied reverses in France and embarrasments in Greece are forgotten, and may be almost non-existent in the North after a hard winter, much Allied bombing, and with devastation and unemployment the only hope in the spring. All our experience proves that the strength of those whose object is to destroy constitutional government in this and any country is gathering: that there organization is extensive and well paid. We know that there is dynamite in the North. I cannot ask US officers to enter the territory and undertake the responsibility of maintaining order without an adequate, and a more than adequate, police force. I cannot tell you that law and order will be maintained unless I have that force.

5. It is imperative in my mind that we should continue receipt of \$5,000 over and above the ceiling of 50,000 authorized and even now slightly exceeded and I propose to continue to do so up to a ceiling of 65,000 unless I receive contrary orders after you have considered what has been written above and reconsidered my letter of 28th November.

23
1. I have received no reply to, nor acknowledgment of, my letter AC/14622/70 dated 28 November 1944, and I am therefore addressing you on the subject de novo.

2. The strength of the CC.RA has now reached, in fact, exceeded its approved establishment of 55,000. Our experience is that 10% of the total strength in any day are ineffective. The number is sufficient and only just sufficient to maintain law and order in LAMARCA, CHILLA (where the situation is grave) and ITALL up to the RIMEL-ISA line.

3. We must look forward in the future to occupying N.ITALI and picking up in that territory many thousands of CC.RA. hitherto these CC.RA found on liberation have been invaluable. Under present regulations we cannot employ them and must immediately disband them unless we have discharged a similar number in Central and Southern ITALY. To reduce this number would be folly.

4. Security in Europe, even in the liberated territories, has deteriorated greatly in the last two months, will become worse until Allied reverses in FRANCE and embarrasments in GERMANY are forgotten, and may be almost non-existent in the North after a hard winter, such Allied bombing, and with devastation and unemployment the only hope in the spring. All our experience prove that the strength of those whose object is to destroy constitutional government in this and any country is gathering: that there organization is extensive and well paid. We know that there is dynamite in the North. I cannot ask AG officers to enter the territory and undertake the responsibility of maintaining order without an adequate, and a more than adequate, police force. I cannot tell you that law and order will be maintained unless I have that force.

5. It is imperative in my mind that we should continue recruitment of CC.RA over and above the ceiling of 55,000 authorized and even now slightly exceeded and I propose to continue to do so up to a ceiling of 65,000 unless I receive contrary orders after you have considered what has been written above and reconsidered my letter of 28th November.

Copy to: Chief of Staff
Land Forces Sub-Com

ELBERT W. SNOW
Rear Admiral, USMC
Chief Quartermaster

3377

TRAINING AND READING CARABINIERI

JAN 3/4

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

REF. AC/14601/21/75

REF. 478134

SUBJECT: Pismo Group - Strength of Carabinieri.

7th January, 1945.

TO : APL, G-5 Section.

JAN - 9 1945

1. With reference to my letter 4546/200 of the 1st December, 1944, and my subsequent letter of the 1st January, 1945, and also to the visit of Colonel Murray Mitchell to this office, I feel that some further explanation is necessary for you to arrive at a proper conclusion in your consideration of the return of the 3,000 troops comprising the Pismo Group from their present duties with the Carabinieri.

2. So far as the strength of the Carabinieri is concerned the latest official figures as of 9th December last show an over-all strength of 54,836. Although no later figures are available there is no doubt that at the present time the strength, which has been increasing rapidly over the past two months, has now exceeded the authorized establishment of 55,000. This figure does, of course, show a considerable increase over the last official return sent to you from this Consulate, but the reason for this apparent inconsistency is that the Dublin Safety Sub-Commission have always followed the Carabinieri instruction showing only the effective strength when supplying you with over-all figures. In future a more realistic return will be forwarded.

3. The position at the present time is that of a strength of 55,000, 5,767 are ineffective (i.e. either sick or on leave), in addition to which there are 1,465 being employed on military police duties and 974 employed by other agencies, none of these are therefore available for civil police work. In short, it will be seen that out of an authorized establishment of 55,000 no less than 8,206 have to be deducted for the reasons mentioned above.

4. At the present time the whole question of Carabinieri strength and its disposition is being examined by the Lord Forster and Public Safety Sub-Commission in conjunction with the Carabinieri, and I hope by the middle of next week to be able to forward you figures which will be accepted by all concerned.

5. So far as paragraphs 2(a) and 3(a) of my letter of the 1st December are concerned, it has now been established that, in fact, no Army

7. As a matter of interest, you may like to know that the figure of 55,900 Carabinieri, as quoted in my letter of the 31st December, was arrived at by adding to the official Carabinieri figure of 1st December, 1946, i.e. 54,131, firstly 700 recruits who joined the service between the 1st and 9th December, secondly 400 Carabinieri who have arrived in Toronto, having been returned from the Balkans, and thirdly 500 Italian troops who are being seconded to the Carabinieri in Berlin.

8. To summarize, therefore, there is no doubt that in fact the Carabinieri have already announced their authorized establishment of 55,900, although 5,400 of this total are ineffective for employment on civil police duties, but nevertheless have to be carried on its official strength.

9. Since revealing the the Carabinieri is revealing not only by recruit intake, but also by the return of personnel from the north of Italy and from prisoners of war camps, the authorized establishment of 55,900 is being steadily exceeded day by day. The matter which is of paramount importance therefore is the decision of your Headquarters in response to our long standing request for an increase in the Carabinieri establishment, see my 10/12/46/13 dated 21st December.

Yours the Chief Constable

MS Duke
Inspector,
Chief of Staff.

[illegible]

recently increased number of anti-Communist
and other religious groups in the United States.
being steadily increasing in the number of
membership requests for an individual
long standing request for membership.

more than three hundred million

13th of Sept.
 Brimley
 5th
 1894

575

File that

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Chief of Staff

Tel: 478733

Ref. 3606/CDS

1st January, 1945.

SUBJECT: 3000 Troops Piacenza Group.

TO : AFHQ, G-3 Org.
AFHQ, G-5 Section.

1. Reference this Commission's letter 3606/CDS, dated 31st December, 1944, and in confirmation of telephone conversation 1st January (Brig. Upjohn Capt. Woodward, G-5) it is pointed out that further investigation of the figures show that some 3,500 OC.RR are carrying out provost duties with the Italian army although only 1,300 are authorised for this purpose.

2. It follows that some 1,700 OC.RR are at present carried in the Carabinieri establishment of 55,000 though in fact not engaged in the maintenance of civilian law and order.

For the Chief Commissioner:

Brigadier.
Chief of Staff.

Copy to: Land Forces Sub-Commission.
Public Safety Sub-Commission.
Civil Affairs Section.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMAND

Ref. 3604/006

11th December 1944

SUBJECT: 3000 Troops (PHEM) GROUP

TO : AFHQ (G-3 (Mg.))

Reference your signal re shortage of manpower in the Italian Army.

1. At the request of G.C. Land Forces Sub Commission A.C. (MIA) a meeting was held to discuss the immediate return of the 3000 soldiers lent to the CC. SR from PHEM Combat Group at a time when the CC. SR were 6000 short of the authorized ceiling of 55,000. The following were present:

G.C. Land Forces Sub Commission A.C. (MIA)
 Chief of Staff A.C.
 Deputy Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs
 2nd L.C., Land Forces Sub Commission A.C. (MIA)
 Deputy Director, Public Safety Sub Commission, A.C.

2. The representations made for the retention of the 3000 with the CC. SR are as follows:

- (a) This 3000 was originally required to partly fill the shortage of 6000 CC. SR and so that an equivalent number of experienced CC. SR could be released for duty when the NORTH of ITALY was liberated.
- (b) It remains the considered opinion of this Commission that without an increase in the CC. SR ceiling to 65,000 it will be impossible to maintain law and order in ITALY. This opinion is fortified by the recent events in GERMANY which may give encouragement to lawlessness in the NORTH.
- (c) Though it is understood certain Allied and Italian troops will be allotted for internal security in NORTHERN ITALY, nevertheless the great burden of public security will fall mainly on CC. SR.
- (d) The undesirability of altering an AFHQ Order effective until 15th February.

3. The representations made for the return of these 3000 personnel to the Army are as follows:

- (a) There is a very urgent need for trained reinforcements for existing combat groups and for volunteers for operational purposes with the Allies.
 For a variety of reasons, call-ups have been far short of expectation. Though all possible steps have been taken and are being taken to

CC Land Forces Sub Commission A.C. (MILA)

Chief of Staff A.C.

Deputy Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs

2nd L.C. Land Forces Sub Commission A.C. (MILA)

Deputy Director, Public Safety Sub Commission, A.C.

2. The representations made for the retention of the 3000 with the CC, RR are as follows:

- (a) This 3000 was originally required to partly fill the shortage of 6000 CC, RR and so that an equivalent number of experienced CC, RR could be released for duty when the WFFH of ITALY was liberated.
- (b) It remains the considered opinion of this Commission that without an increase in the CC, RR ceiling to 65,000 it will be impossible to maintain law and order in S. ITALY. This opinion is fortified by the recent events in GREECE which may give encouragement to lawlessness in the WFFH.
- (c) Though it is understood certain Allied and Italian troops will be allotted for internal security in NORTHERN ITALY, nevertheless the great burden of public security will fall mainly on CC, RR.
- (d) The undesirability of altering an AFHQ Order effective until 15th February.

3. The representations made for the return of these 3000 personnel to the Army are as follows:

- (a) There is a very urgent need for trained reinforcements for existing combat groups and for volunteers for operational purposes with the Allies.
For a variety of reasons, call-ups have been far short of expectation. Though all possible steps have been taken and are being taken to produce more soldiers for the Italian Army, yet the number of "free" reinforcements has fallen to a very low figure.
The strength return as at 9 Dec shows 12,503 as carried under the "Reinforcement's" category, for RS-IT's. Of these 5000 are already in process of assignment to RS-IT service units. A further 5500 have since been sent forward as reinforcements for combat groups or towards the volunteer programme. As a result, the approximate figure of "free" reinforcements actually available at this present time is only 2000.
RS-IT's have no "free" reinforcements except those carried in US service ceiling.
RS-IT's show 5,953 personnel in their reinforcement category but in fact there are no "free" reinforcements as 4500 were used in SALONIKA awaiting shipment to the mainland and subsequent assignment to categories while the balance, i.e. 1400 were personnel in transit or contained in small units ordered to be disbanded but not at that time assigned.

/sheet 2...

Sheet 2

Para 2 (cont'd)

(b) The Italian Army is short of its ceiling by some 15,000 whereas the Carabinieri strength as at 19 Dec was 55,900, not including the ~~Monte Cassino~~ Battalion of 800 transferred to CC. NR for absorption though it is probable that not all of those can be absorbed. The CC. NR is thus over its ceiling of 55,000 and has 3000 P.C. personnel on loan as well.

(c) In addition, it is pointed out that one Regiment and three Army Guard Battalions, total 2500 personnel, have been earmarked to assist in the maintenance of public security in ~~WINTER~~ Italy vide ADM. letter B 1720 of 21 Dec.

4. It would appear that you can ~~only~~ decide whether the immediate operational needs of the Italian Army should take preference over the long term responsibility of ensuring adequate forces to maintain law and order in the NORTH, or vice versa taking into account the strength situation and demands mentioned above.

I am therefore submitting the case to you for decision. As an alternative I would ask that 3000 troops or a portion thereof be taken from service units in the rear areas and posted to the Carabinieri, thus relieving the trained reinforcements.

BY ORDER OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

M S Cusk

Brigadier,
Chief of Staff

Copy to: Land Forces Sub Commission (LSCA)
Public Safety Sub Commission
C.S. Section

(e) In addition, it is pointed out that one Regiment HQ and three Army Guard Battalions, total 2500 personnel, have been earmarked to assist in the maintenance of public security in Southern ITALY vide AFHQ letter H 1720 of 25 Dec.

4. It would appear that you can ^{only} decide whether the immediate operational needs of the Italian Army should take preference over the long term responsibility of ensuring adequate forces to maintain law and order in the NORTH, or vice versa taking into account the strength situation and demands mentioned above.

It is therefore submitting the case to you for decision. As an alternative I would ask that 1000 troops or a portion thereof be taken from service units in the rear areas and posted to the CALABRIAN, thus reinforcing the trained reinforcements.

BY ORDER OF THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER

MS Lusk

Brigadier,
Chief of Staff

Copy to:- Land Forces Sub Commission (LFA)
Public Safety Sub Commission
C.A. Section

3372

ALLIED [REDACTED] COMMISSION
INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

27

SUBJECT: *Piceno Group*

FILE NO.

TO : *Col. (for personal attention of
Brigadier Genl.)*

31st Dec

1944
DEC 31 1944

See Serial copy at 29.

1. *Attached draft which has been prepared following the
Conference this morning, is submitted.*
2. *Copies are being circulated by hand to
Lt Col. Foxess J.C.
P.S. J.C.*

14.30 hrs.

R.H. Chappin 337!
U.

3606

21 DEC 1944

26

TO: DODS, OA Section

1. The AFHQ letter gave us a first rate opportunity of submitting the case of the CC.RR for consideration at the highest level. We know that neither in strength nor in quality are the CC.RR up to standard; we know that much could be done by the Allied authorities and by the Italian Government to improve matters.

2. But the draft submitted fails to seize that opportunity to make a case for assisting and improving the conditions of the Carabinieri. Rather does it appear to say that all is as well as can be.

3. My detailed criticisms are:

- (a) Para 2 refers to ROMS only - although the original subject referred to CC.RR in ROMS we are directed to write about CC.RR all over Italy.
- (b) Para 5 dismisses out of hand the great problem of clothing the Carabinieri. Reports from all over the country say how bad is the morale of the police force on this score.
- (c) Para 7 concludes by saying that since 30 Oct a more moderate tone has been observed in the press, yet on 25 Nov (Folio 31, File 3606/COS) the Chief Commissioner found it necessary to write letter (on PS File) threatening repressive measures against newspapers.
- (d) Para 9. The case for increasing the ceiling of the Carabinieri was put up in Public Safety letter dated 27 Nov (Folio 37, File 3606/cps). In this the ceiling figure demanded is 65,000. I consider it is only confusing the issue to talk now of 70,000.
- (e) Para 10. sub-para (b) gives a figure of 3,500 - over what period?
 sub-para (d) - I do not think this should be mentioned.
 sub-para (e) - we have estimates of the strengths we shall find in the North.
 sub-para (f) - the numbers of PW for repatriation have been estimated by PS.

4. Let us make another attempt to send a full, accurate and convincing statement and record our recommendations as to the reform of the CC.RR, their conditions, the approach to them of public and government.

5. Please resubmit a really good draft.

21 Dec. 44

/s/ V. S. L.
 Brigadier
 Chief of Staff

NOTE: This is a copy of COS Minute on PS
 file AC/14622/PS.

3/0 23/12/44

221
Net: 500.

Ref: 3606/211

2 December 1964

24
SUBJECT: Caribbean.

TO : CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION.

1. I attach a copy of a letter to the Chief Commissioner from AMB. The relevant extract of the Political Meeting which is referred to reads as follows:-

"The Supreme Allied Commander directed that the Chief Commander, Allied Commission, will report at an early meeting of the Political Committee in the feasibility of increasing the strength and improving the conditions of service of the Caribbean."

2. Will you please forward the report noted f.r. or if this is not yet ready, supply information to enable the Chief Commissioner to reply to AMB.

SS
Delegation,
Chief of Staff.

Copy to: SO to O3.

BU 14 Dec

24
SUBJECT: Caribbean.

TO : Civil Affairs Section.

1. I attach copy of a letter to the Chief Commissioner from AMM. The relevant extract of the Political Meeting which is referred to reads as follows:-

"The Supreme Allied Commander Directed that the Chief Commissioner, Allied Caribbean, will report at an early meeting of the Political Committee on the feasibility of increasing the strength and improving the conditions of service of the Caribbean."

2. Will you please furnish the report asked for, or if this is not yet ready, supply information to enable the Chief Commissioner to reply to AMM.

SS

Original,
Chief of Staff.

Copy to: SO to CG.

BU 14 Dec

3369

(24)

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Inter-Service and Political Secretariat

7 December 1944

Subject : Security Situation in ROME.

To : Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.

6509/105.

Your attention is drawn to Conclusion A (b) of PC (44) 33rd Meeting, in which you are directed to examine and report at an early meeting of the Political Committee on the feasibility of increasing the strength and improving the conditions of service of the carabinieri. It is requested that a report may be furnished on the present status of this matter.

J. H. LASCHLES,
Colonel,
Secretary.

see ~~to~~ 25

3368

R

3606
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394.

AG/14622/PB.

23th November, 1944.

1 DEC Recd

SUBJECT : Strength of Carabinieri.

TO : G-5, AFHQ, APO 512.

1. Reference your G-5, 014.12 of the 4th November, 1944, enclosing copy of a letter from G-3, AFHQ HSD/424, dated 2nd November, 1944, and our reply of even number, dated 9th November, 1944.
2. The reply mentioned in para. 1, dealt with the provision of 5,000 soldiers to the Carabinieri. This letter deals with the ceiling of Carabinieri establishment.
3. The ceiling of 55,000 Carabinieri as the total strength of all Italy is totally inadequate. 55,000 was the normal peacetime strength of Carabinieri, but by Decree of Marshal Badoglio dated 25th July, 1943, the strength was fixed at 65,000 exclusive of colonial detachments. This still is the legally authorized strength.
4. Since the occupation of Italy by the Allied Armies, the Fascist Police Militias (Road, Port and Railway) have been disbanded and the duties hitherto performed by them have been undertaken by the Carabinieri. The strength of these special Police Agencies totalled 16,300.
5. The uncertain state of public order following in the wake of war, coupled with economic difficulties and accentuated political differences and activities, warrant a substantial increase over the strength provided for normal peacetime conditions. Many additional duties have been placed upon the Carabinieri as a result of the Allied occupation and liberation of Italy. Some of these duties are as follows:
 - a. Checking the movement of civilians, especially at Army Control lines and at other critical points.
 - b. Dealing with refugees.
 - c. Guarding and escorting civilian supplies provided

(22)

by the Allied Nations.

- d. Joint patrolling with Allied Military Police in congested areas because of possible affrays between civilians and troops.
- e. Apprehending prostitutes in an effort to reduce the incidence of venereal disease among troops.
- f. Maintaining check posts to prevent black market activities and to reduce illegal use of petrol.
- g. Assisting in enforcing harvest regulations, and olive oil control.

6. Beyond the Pisa Rimini line the normal peacetime dispositions of the Carabinieri Regale were approximately 23,000. This area is largely industrial, thickly populated, and has been long under German domination. 44,000 Carabinieri are already in service south of the Pisa Rimini line. It is essential therefore that the ceiling of Carabinieri be increased to 65,000 in order to make available for the north a strength comparable to that provided in peace time. This would be the minimum strength necessary to maintain public order.

7. It must be appreciated that if the strength of Carabinieri is below that considered essential, then any failure by the police services to deal with public safety conditions, will necessitate troops being diverted from combat duties to restore the situation.

8. It is the considered judgment of the Allied Commission that the irreducible minimum strength for the Carabinieri Regale for the whole of Italy be fixed at 65,000.

/s/ ELLERY W STONE

ELLERY W. STONE,
Commodore, USNR,
Chief Commissioner.

Copy passed ²for A files 30 Nov 3366

785017

20

To: G FIVE AFHQ ACTION INFO AAI LAND FOR SUB COMMISSION MMIA

From: HQ ALLIED COMMISSION PUBLIC SAFETY S/C

RESTRICTED

6150

PRIORITY

7/11/44

Public Safety S/C.

18 NOV Recd

RESTRICTED PD

PARA ONE PD REFERENCE YOUR LETTER G PD FIVE SLANT ZERO ONE FOUR

PD ONE TWO DATED FOURTH NOVEMBER FORTY FOUR PD

PARA TWO G FIVE AFHQ ACTION INFO AAI LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION

MMIA FROM HQ ALLIED COMMISSION PARA

PARA TWO PD REQUESTED THAT MOVEMENT OF FIVE THOUSAND ITALIAN

MILITARY TRANSFERRED TO CHARLIE CHARLIE ROGER ROGER BE SUSPENDED

PENDING FURTHER DISCUSSION ON RELEASE DATE PD

Internal: A/C.C.
C. of S.
C.A. Section
Public Safety

Please see Serial 21

3365

COPY

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

COS (19)
In file
Rec'd 4/12

G-5: 014.12

4 November 1944

SUBJECT: Carabinieri Reali

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission, APO 394.

1. Reference telephone conversation Col Chapman -
Lt Col. Jackman, herewith as promised is copy of G-3 Memo
HSD/424 of 2 Nov.

2. It is requested that a progress report on the matter
be submitted to reach this HQ without fail by 15 Nov. 44.

For Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5

/s/ T.B. Jackman
Lt Colonel

Incl: as above

COPY

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-3 SECTION

2 NOV 44

FILE NO : HSD/424

SUBJECT : The increase of Carabinieri

TO : G-5

1. Reference AG 014.12/137 GUT-0 of 27 Oct 44, copy to you.

2. As you are aware, the Carabinieri are at present some 10,000 in number beneath the ceiling figure, and we have recently had to provide 5,000 Army personnel to assist. These Army personnel must be returned without fail by 31 Dec 44.

3. You have requested an increase of 10,000 in the Carabinieri ceiling. Operations will require the use of all Army personnel within the Army ceiling, and it is regretted that it is quite impossible to transfer Army ceiling to Carabinieri.

4. I would like to suggest therefore, that you should inform the Public Safety Sub Commission that they should take immediate steps to carry out the following :-

- (a) To recruit 10,000 Carabinieri forthwith, in order that the soldiers can be returned to the Army, and
- (b) To carry out an examination of the present Carabinieri organisation to determine whether the numbers allotted cannot be made to go further.

5. If I might suggest it I should recommend that an experienced police officer from ENGLAND, INDIA or PALESTINE might be brought for a period of a few months, to see if he could not make some helpful suggestions.

6. I must add that with present operational needs, it

(18)

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- (b) To carry out an examination of the present Carabinieri organisation to determine whether the numbers allotted cannot be made to go further.

5. If I might suggest it I should recommend that an experienced police officer from ENGLAND, INDIA or PALESTINE might be brought for a period of a few months, to see if he could not make some helpful suggestions.

6. I must add that with present operational needs, it is quite impossible to allow recruiting for the Carabinieri within the Army, as this would entail the removal of the better type of man of which there is already a great shortage.

7. As this is a matter directly affecting the efficiency of the Italian Army I would be grateful if you would inform me by 15 Nov as to the steps that will be taken by the Public Safety Sub Commission to increase the numbers of Carabinieri.

/s/ J L C WAPIER
/t/ J L C WAPIER

Brigadier GS.,
G-3 Org Sub Sec.

JLGM/JPH

3367

COPY

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION
APO 394.

Ref. ACC/14622/TS.

28th October, 1944

SUBJECT: Carabinieri

TO : G-5 Section, A.F.H.Q.

1. Following your cable PX43589, dated 25th October, 1944, addressed to A.A.I., for action and Army Sub-Commission for information, arrangements are now being made for the provision of 5,000 Italian soldiers to assist the Carabinieri. This matter was the subject of discussion between the Army Sub-Commission and the Public Safety Sub-Commission of this Headquarters on the 27th October, 1944. However, the Army Sub-Commission have emphatically declared that these soldiers must be returned to the Italian Army for combat duties by the 31st December, 1944, and that there is no prospect whatever of retaining their services beyond this date.

2. When, during the preliminary stages, this matter was being discussed between representatives of your Headquarters and Public Safety Sub-Commission, it was appreciated that the secondment of Italian Military personnel for auxiliary police purposes was an arrangement intended only to augment the Carabinieri until their numbers had grown sufficiently to enable them to deal with their police responsibilities following the liberation of the north of Italy. Therefore, in this sense, the provision was of a temporary character only. On the other hand however, it was never envisaged that the signing of the 31st December, 1944 (first indicated by your Headquarters in a cable addressed to A.A.I. No. PX38508, dated 14th October, 1944) was to be anything more than a date beyond which new approval would be required of these men. This view was, I understand, confirmed by Lt. Col. Murray Mitchell in his telephone conversation with Col. Young of Public Safety Commission on the 27th October, 1944.

TO : G-5 Section, A.A.I.

1. Following your cable FX43589, dated 25th October, 1944, addressed to A.A.I., for action and Army Sub-Commission for information, arrangements are now being made for the provision of 5,000 Italian soldiers to assist the Carabinieri. This matter was the subject of discussion between the Army Sub-Commission and the Public Safety Sub-Commission of this Headquarters on the 27th October, 1944. However, the Army Sub-Commission have emphatically declared that these soldiers must be returned to the Italian Army for combat duties by the 31st December, 1944, and that there is no prospect whatever of retaining their services beyond this date.

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3. You will appreciate that if the assertion of the Army Sub-Commission had been correct no useful purpose would have been served in expending so much time and trouble to incorporate these men into the ranks of the Carabinieri for so short a time. I would be glad, therefore, to have your assurance that my interpretation is the correct one and that the date on which these 5,000 Italian soldiers are to return to their normal military duties is one subject to your decision following representations from this Commission.

4. I quite understand that you will require to have some

3362

- 2 -

16
indication of the time which these men will be required and I can assure you that my own desire is to give you some definite appreciation of future public safety requirements. However, these matter presents some difficulty since the facts which will influence this need are subject very considerably to military operations and to future developments which at the present time can only be estimated. I therefore give you a recapitulation of the circumstances affecting these arrangements.

5. At present, having regard to the position of the Army line and the amount of Italian territory liberated, the numbers of Carabinieri available are no more than sufficient to discharge their existing police responsibilities. Beyond any questions, as the military advance progresses and particularly having regard to the industrial and economic situation which are bound to influence the condition of Public Safety in the north of Italy, the present numbers will be entirely inadequate, to the extent that one should seriously doubt the effectiveness of the Carabinieri to deal with such situations as can be logically anticipated. There are, however, two main sources of augmentation of the Carabinieri strength, one which is being vigorously exploited at the present time and the other which will be just as zealously pursued when the opportunity arises. I refer firstly to the recruiting intake into the Carabinieri and secondly to the re-enlistment of men who have been disbanded or temporarily out of the Police service by living have been under enemy control. Figures now available indicate that by means of recruiting the Carabinieri strength is being increased at the rate of approximately 500 per month, and there is every reason to suppose that this figure will be more than in the present circumstances a substantial increase of this figure should be anticipated.

6. As regards the second factor, it is, of course, quite impossible to say how many Carabinieri are likely to be re-enlisted into the service by means of the replacement Centres which have been set up to deal with this procedure, but a fairly accurate estimate can be given a comparatively short time after any substantial Military advance has been made.

AS regards the second factor, it is, of course, quite likely to be

made.

7. From the aspect of Public Safety, I have no doubt that the most serious of our problems are to be encountered in the north, and accordingly, as you knew, the 5,000 soldiers will be utilized to replace an equivalent number of trained Carabinieri from central and southern Italy, including Sicily, so that this dilution of police strength in these areas will enable an equivalent concentration to be made available in the north. If I may refer to figures I would remind you that the present authorised establishment of the Carabinieri is 55,000 men. This Commission is strongly of the opinion that this figure is inadequate and indeed, your Headquarters is

(15)

- 3 -

already considering an application for the increase of this establishment by an addition of ten to fifteen thousand men. At the present time, however, the strength of available Carabinieri is only 43,000, which is little more than two-thirds of the minimum strength this Commission recommends for the maintenance of law and order in Italy.

8. Having regard to these facts I ask for your authority firstly, that, in principle, the 5,000 Italian soldiers may be retained for police purposes until the strength of the Carabinieri reaches 55,000, after which they be progressively released as the Carabinieri establishment exceeds this figure. Secondly that specific agreement be given for the retention of these men until the 31st March, 1945, by which time the future conditions affecting this matter will have been much more clearly defined.

9. I regret that I am not able to place before you a more specific plan for the eventual release of these men, but under the circumstances I do not feel that it is possible for me to give you a more definite appreciation than I have done in this letter. I take the opportunity to emphasize that the maintenance of law and order in the north of Italy is a matter which is receiving very serious consideration and that the Chief Commissioner feels that unless these 5,000 men will be available for the period which I have in mind, he will not be able to accept, with any proper confidence, the responsibility for the preservation of law and order with a strength of Carabinieri so inadequate to meet their onerous duties in the north.

FOR THE ACTING CHIEF COMMISSIONER :

Brigadier,
V.P. C.A. Section,
Det. C.O.S.

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FOR THE ACTING CHIEF COMMISSIONER :

Brigadier,
V.P. C.A. Section,
Dep. C.O.S.

3360

~~SECRET~~

ALLIED FORCES HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

COPY

RMF/lg

CO 114

6/13

AG 014.12/137 GCT-0

27 October 1944

SUBJECT: Carabinieri Reali.

TO : Deputy President, Allied Control Commission, APO 390

1. The authorized strength of the Italian Carabinieri has been established at 55,000. Latest report indicates that the strength of the Carabinieri is approximately 45,000.

2. Representations have been made to this headquarters that the ceiling of 55,000 Carabinieri, as the total strength of all Italy, is inadequate and that an increase of 10,000 be made to the ceiling.

3. In view of the fact that the Carabinieri are at present understrength to the same amount as the suggested increase, it is requested that before further consideration is given to increasing the overall ceiling of the Carabinieri, steps be taken to make up the deficiency by recruitment and such other means as may be available.

4. It is desired that the deficiency be made up by 31 December 1944.

By command of General WILSON:

/s/ R.H. Freese

/t/ R.H. FRESE,
Captain, AGD,
Asst Adjutant General.

3359

Strength of 33rd in Sicily.

F1 100 Recd

Messina Legion	3513
Palermo Legion	4770

Total	8283
-------	------

Training School - Palermo	506
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Strength return 28th September, 1944.

PA 4/n
PA 4/n

3606 of C.O.S.
~~SECRET~~

(11)
9090

ACTION AAI, INFO: MEDIA, ACC

144/25

AFHQ SIGNED SAC

OCT 251352A

CONFIDENTIAL
PRIORITY
CITE: FHGT

SECRET. 1. Provision of 5000 Italian soldiers to assist Carabinieri is subject. *n/r*

2. Request you arrange provision of personnel as in our EX 38608 of 14 Oct by 31 Oct. Personnel will be provided from PICENO Div. No drivers will be used for these duties.

3. This answers your SD 1169 of 15 Oct letters follows. *n/r*

Dist

Info - Action - Army S/C (2)

Info - A/CC

C O S

C A Sec.

Pub Safety

File (2)

Float

RECEIVED
27 OCT 1944
A.C.C.

~~SECRET~~

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL
30/4

3358

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission.

6 October 44.

Tel. 499081
Ext. 489

SUBJECT : Strength of Carabinieri
TO : Director of Public Safety.

1. On the 4th October I visited AFHQ and discussed with Lieut. Col. J. Murray Mitchell, C.S., the following matters:

- a) the immediate provision of 5000 Italian troops to release 5000 trained Carabinieri for policing the north of Italy;
- b) the raising of the Carabinieri strength from 55000 to a minimum of 65000 (or 70000 if circumstances warrant).

It was decided to deal with the two questions separately.

2. After discussing the objections to providing any troops whatever for this purpose (as set out in MEIA letter SD/28 dated 22 September 44) a meeting was attended by the following:

Brigadier J.L.C. Harrier,
Colonel C.E. Lewis-Harris,
Lieut. Col. J.M. Mitchell,
Lieut. Col. A.F. Wilcox,

C.S. AFHQ
C.S. AFHQ
C.S. AFHQ
HQ. A.C.C. (Public safety)

3. It was agreed:

- a) that 5000 Italian troops should be provided for CC.RR. duties;
- b) that the transfer should be on a temporary basis (no time limit was specified)
- c) that the date of transfer should be on or about 20 October 44.
- d) that, in order to obviate extensive troop movements, it would be preferable to transfer troops direct to the undermentioned CC.RR. Legion Headquarters from Italian units in the vicinity:

CC.RR. Legion HQ.

Troops required

Palermo
Messina
Cagliari
Oristano
Rome
Rome (Lazio)
Ancona

700
700
700
700
800
700
700

3357

5000

- 2 -

(a) that the most suitable troops should be selected in conjunction with representatives from CC.RR. HQ.

4. The decision of the meeting was embodied in a memorandum from Brig. General Spofford, G-5, to Lieut. Gen. Sir J.A.H. Gammell, Chief of Staff, AFHQ. The Chief of Staff will read the recommendations on 9th October 1944, and it is probable that HQ A.A.I. will be consulted before a final decision is reached.

5. On 6th October 1944 the second question. - i.e. raising the ceiling of the Carabinieri - was discussed. A memorandum from Brig. General Spofford, G.5, to the Chief of Staff, AFHQ, was prepared recommending that the authorized strength of the Carabinieri be increased to 65000 with authority to increase to 70000 if circumstances warrant.

6. The officers named in paragraph 2 of this report again met on 6th October 1944. Brigadier Napier expressed himself as being sympathetic towards the recommended increase in strength, but stated that before the memorandum could be laid before the Chief of Staff it would be necessary for G.3 to set out in detail the effect on the Italian Army. Brigadier Napier proposed to consult A.A.I. Col. Lewin Harris suggested that a representative of Public Safety Sub-Commission should be present at any consultations with A.A.I., and Brigadier Napier agreed.

7. There is now nothing more that can be done by HQ. A.C.C. or G.5, AFHQ. It is a matter of awaiting notification from AFHQ :

- (i) That the transfer of 5000 troops to the CC.RR. has been finally approved.
- (ii) That a representative of Public Safety Sub-Commission is required to consult with A.A.I. regarding any objections they may raise to increasing the CC.RR. ceiling.

8. Lieut. Col. Mitchell asked me to point out to HQ. A.C.C. that while the strongest possible recommendation for the transfer of 5000 troops has been made to the Chief of Staff it must not be assumed that the Chief of Staff's final approval will be automatic.

A.F. WILCOX.
Lieut. Col. G.L.
Public Safety Sub-Commission.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Office of the Acting Chief Commissioner
APO 394

2
SAS/dfe

1000 014.13

30 September 1944

1 OCT Recd

TO: Brigadier Lush, Executive Commissioner ✓
Brigadier Upjohn, Admin. Section
Colonel Chapman

I had a telephone call this morning from Lt. Col. Mitchell of G-5 AFHQ with reference to my recent letter on Carabinieri. He stated that AFHQ had decided to press to secure us additional bodies on a temporary basis for the next three or four months--leaving to be handled as a separate issue the question of permanent increase in the Carabinieri strength or ceiling.

He further stated that G-5 felt that notwithstanding the possibility of our securing additional temporary personnel, ACC should put into effect urgently such recommendations made by General Browning on a long term basis for reorganizing and improving the efficiency of the CC.MR. as we approve.

W
MILTON W. STONE
Captain, USNR

Acting Chief Commissioner

3352

Noted
10/1/44
[Signature]

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

JMM/mit

G-5: 014.12

30 September 1944

2 OCT Recd

Captain Eliery Stone,
Acting Chief Commissioner,
Allied Control Commission,
APO 394.

Dear Captain Stone:

Confirming conversation on the telephone and in reference to your letter Ref. 4/12.B/A.S. of 23 September, subject "Carabinieri", it is hoped we will be able to make arrangements to provide you for a temporary period of 3 or 4 months 5,000 bodies of a type useful to your problem. It will need two or three more days to get a decision on this.

In the meantime we are not pressing the matter of the ceiling, desiring not to muddy the water pending decision on this point. As soon as a decision is received, we will then proceed on the ceiling. As the troops, if and when available, will most likely be at your disposal only for a matter of months, we presume that you will continue aggressively to pursue your long term policy for obtaining suitable volunteers from civil life.

Very truly yours,

J. Murray Mitchell
J. MURRAY MITCHELL
Lt. Colonel, AUS.

cc: "A" files



3354

