

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

ACC

10000/109/672
(VOL. II)

CCR
SEP

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

10000/109/672
(VOL. II)

CCRR, STRENGTH & REINFORCEMENTS POLICY
SEPT. 1945 - JULY 1946

~~131~~ 131

A/C.C.

A/C.C.

Letter at 131. Submitted for signature
and a response with min 130

131/14/2 131/14/2

133

Note

Spoke Ed Wilson re 129 - they have
read acknowledgment from AFSA saying
that matter was under consideration
& decision would be given shortly. Therefore
P.S. do not prepare a follow up.

133/20/2

136

A/C.C.

Re 135 for info

135/25/2 135/25/2

138

Signal 137 for info, please answer

137/20/2 137/20/2

140

A/C.C.

Please see p. 137 & 139?

137/26/3

143

that matter was
 & decision would be given shortly. Therefore
 P.S. do not prepare a follow up.

ESB 12/2

136

Ex Comm;

Also Per see 135 for info

ES 25/2

ESB 25/2

ME

MS 12/2 138

Ex Comm
 CSO Signal 137 for info, please answer 2/3

1-20/2

1402

PK/Ex Comm.

Please
 see p. 137 & 139

1-25/2

MS 26/3

MS 14

143

CSO Letter at 142 for info of Ex Comm. please answer

Copy 139 should of cover has gone to 144

MS 1/4

Land Trust

3469

118

14/12

I don't think Ex. C. has seen the final form of 117. It may not, however, be worth forwarding since he knows the contents.

JRS 14/12

121

A/ESO J. 19/11

Re see 120 for info. Distribution of 28 Jan was incorrect (i.e. action to cease instead of 19/11/12) so 19/11/12 have not yet started on it. Am contacting 28/12 following tomorrow.

JRS 29/11

122

CP BV to use 30/1 per.

JRS 29/11

123

Ex. C. A/ESO

Ref. mem. 121

Ex. C. is going to discuss the possibility of cancelling the attack with AFHQ and will let me know at earliest. Perhaps Ex. C. would like to see 120.

J. 30/11

JRS 30/11

④

127

A/ESO

Letter requested by Ex. C. at folio 126

A/ESO 18.12.91

Re see 120 for info. Distribution of 28 Jan was incorrect (i.e. action to C-750 instead of 1971:7). So 1971:7 have not yet started on it. Am contacting staffed following tomorrow.

ES 29/1

122

ep BU to me 30/1 pre.

ES 29/1

123

Ex lann.

A/ESO

Ref min 121

Col Filmer is going to discuss the possibility of reviewing the attack with AFHQ and will let me know at earliest. Perhaps Col Lann would like to see 120.

H.S. 30/1

ES 30/1

127

AKSO

Letter requested by Ex C. at folio 126

ES 2/2

Cont. Br.
C-750 forward

130.

Done 12/2

1. Copies to EMBASSY, Langkines etc.
2. Ack. Mr P. M's letter and say that matter has been referred to higher authorities. See 132.

17/1/92

340

130

CSC Executive Memorandum ¹⁰³

Re: see p. 102. It requests an increase of CRR to 75000 and also brings up the question of arms again.

BOSTON

First find out what CRR
are doing about it.

by 11/5

104

Note - 10102 regarding to R/S info of incrimination. They will investigate
into CRR when completed and submit to DFD. Meanwhile will see.
BOSTON

105

Note - Visited Arthur Wilson (R.S.), who said all was
in hand & would forward copies of correspondence.

BOSTON 25/9

102

C.S.O. Franklin 2/14

106 for info

CRRS 24/3

8/11 3

MON 8 RECD

9:30

115

Note - Folio 122 according to P.S. is full of incriminations. They will investigate into well when straightened out. Submit to AFHQ. Meanwhile will ask. BOSTON

105

Note: Visited Arthur Wilson (P.S.) who said all was in hand & would forward copies of correspondence.

BOS 25/9

C.S.O. 106 for info

106 for info

CDS 26/9

NOV 8 1940
9:30

8/11/7

115

C.S.O. Folio 114 is that letter which was in the CC's bundle of correspondence on the Earl Lewis question. It does not properly belong on that file but shall I have a copy put on it.

WJ 10/11 3467

116

W.E. - Com.

P. 110 - 114 for info.

Tracy
12/11/7

12/11/7

3467

3606 41
INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

CIPHER

Originator's Reference: FA 68612

Date/Time of Origin: 020930B

Message Centre No: B/4355

Date Time Recd: JULY 20 1990 B

Precedence: ROUTINE

FROM: GHQ CAF SIGNED SIGNED CITE PRCCT

TO: TROOPERS

INFO: ALCOM

SECRET

CELLING OF CARABINIERI IS SUBJECT.

1. YOUR 597250A2 (B) 5 JUNE AS CORRECTED BY YOUR 603360A (B) 14 JUNE REFERRED TO
• HYPOTHETICAL FIGURE • FOR CARABINIERI OF 65000.
2. FAN 6212 9 SEPTEMBER 1945 ESTABLISHED CELLING FOR CC.RR IN INTERIM ARMY AT
65000. FAN 6481 6 MARCH 1946 AUTHORIZED INCREASE IN CC.RR TO 75000

AC DIST

INFO: ACTION: EX COMER

INFO: CHIEF COMER

P SAFETY S/C

C.A. SEC

FILE

SKOLETON

OIPHER TELEGRAM

This message will not be distributed outside
British Forces Headquarters of
Heads
within
messages marked

TO TROOPERS

INFO: ALCOM

SECRET

CEILING OF CARABINIERI IS SUBJECT.

1. YOUR 597250A2 (B) 5 JUNE AS CORRECTED BY YOUR 60336CA (B) 14 JUNE REFERRED TO
• HYPOTHETICAL FIGURE • FOR CARABINIERI OF 65000 •
2. FAN 6212 9 SEPTEMBER 1945 ESTABLISHED CEILING FOR CC.HR IN INTERIM ARMY AT
65000. FAN 6481 6 MARCH 1946 AUTHORIZED INCREASE IN CC.HR TO 75000

AC DIST

INFO: ACTION: EA COMER

INFO: CHIEF COMER

P SAFETY S/C

C.A. SEC

FILE

SKELETON

CIPHER TELEGRAM

This message will not be distributed outside British or Commonwealth Departments or Headquarters. It is classified even in Cipher without reference to the (M. messages marked O.T.P. (M. messages marked (used).

3466

~~SECRET~~

(CARTON)

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Office of the Chief Commissioner

APO 394

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 151

Ref: 6/14/46

17 June 1946

SUBJECT: Police agencies - Gen.

JUN 21 1946

TO: ALLIED MILITARY COMMISSION
Rome (S-5 Section)

1. I wish to draw your attention to the present situation as regards the strength and armament of the police forces and agencies in Italy.

2. Interior strengths and types of armament have been laid down by the G.M. for the Italian Navy, Air Force and Army (including G.M.) which are controlled by their respective Service Sub-Commissions.

The G.M. numbering 75,000, although a Corps of the Italian Army, form a large part of the existing police forces in Italy. Considered as a police force they are very heavily armed.

3. As regards other police forces and agencies no limit has been placed on their strength and armament which matters have been left in the hands of the Italian Government.

Their present approximate strengths are as follows:

Public safety agents	...	45,000
Railway Police	...	6,000
Finance Guards	...	31,000
Forest Guards	...	6,000
Local Police	...	7,000
Total	...	95,000

The above strength is not considered in any way excessive especially having regard to the fact that their duties now include those previously carried out by the disbanded Fascist Militia which numbered about 130,000.

4. It is, however, the armament of these police forces (which do not include G.M.) which calls for comment.

It is estimated that these police forces and agencies are now armed with:

Tank	...	5
Armoured Cars	...	30
Heavy Machine Guns	...	1000
Light Machine Guns	...	10000
Snipers	...	70000
Pistols	...	60000

3465

-2-

150
The armament of these police forces usually consists of the least two items, that is submachine guns and pistols for defensive purposes.

As far as is known the tanks and armored cars are vehicles which were taken over by the Public Safety Agents from the disbanded Colonial African Police Force. Unconfirmed information is that manufacture of further armored cars may be in hand.

As regards automatic weapons, this has been addressed in the past in the policy of new automatic weapons being held by the Public Safety Agents and Frontier Guards. All such weapons were to be controlled and to be in the nature of authorized releases in conjunction with land through subordination from stocks from factories or from captured enemy material.

Moreover, the Public Safety Officers in the North when dealing with disorganized and inadequate police forces in the early days of liberation arranged the issue of automatic weapons to these police agencies from local captured enemy material. Further, in agreement with the policy laid down and with the military authorities, large numbers of partisans were granted on to the police agencies. These partisans brought with them the modern weapons in their possession.

There is evidence, however, that the Italian Government have been adopting such means as purchase of arms on what can be termed a black market through which the number of automatic weapons held has been considerably increased recently.

5. As regards control of production and of transit of arms and munitions, some control was exercised over factories in the North by the Allied military authorities in the early days of liberation. Such control as existed, however, was never handed on and with the departure of military staffs has ceased. The Commission, as has been reported, never possessed the numerical or technical staff necessary to exercise adequate control and the situation in this respect deteriorated, as the G.I. was withdrawn from the North and continuous redeployment and release of personnel took place.

6. One cause put forward by the Italian authorities for the heavy arming of the police forces is that it is necessitated by the large quantity of modern weapons in the hands of the civilian population. While the state of law and order may have called for the maintenance of heavily armed police reserves in certain districts there would appear to be some question as to justification for such scale of armaments on these grounds alone as has recently taken place.

The disadvantages of divided control and of having a large proportion of the police provided by the Army have undoubtedly been important factors in this matter. It seems clear that the heavy arming of the Public Safety Agents has also a political basis and has been expedient by the feeling that they should be as well armed as the G.I.

-3-

3464

7. As regards any provision in the existing or any revised Armistice Treaty or in any Peace Treaty it is not known whether such a formidable armed police force in addition to the recognized armed military forces was or is contemplated. It is pointed out, however, that depending upon the political situation such armed police forces are potentially either a valuable addition or a serious menace to the recognized armed forces.

8. Instructions are requested as to whether:

(a) We should request or advise the Italian Government to reduce the amount of police agencies to a more reasonable scale.

(b) We should adopt attitude that this is purely an Italian internal matter, particularly in view of the forthcoming revision in the Armistice Treaty.

1/1 E-13 V. 1000

WILLIAM W. TUCKER
Deputy Chief, WFO
Chief Coordinator

HEA

S ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

~~SECRET~~
CONFIDENTIAL

Ref: 3606/148/EC.

23 April 1946

SUBJECT: Ceiling of O.O.R.R. in Interim
Italian Armed Forces.

TO : Civil Affairs Section.
Land Forces S/G (MIA)

By authority of their letter AE 091.711 GOT-O dated
16 April 46, AFHQ signal number FX 61311 dated 22 February 46 is
downgraded to SECRET.

A. W. Kinsely.

Chief Staff Officer,
To the Executive Commissioner.

Copy to : Chief Commissioner.

3462

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

.....
: ~~SECRET~~ :
: Auth: SAC-MED :
: Initials: TCT :
: Date: 16 April 1946 :
:

AG 091.711 GCT-0

APR 18 1946

SUBJECT: Ceasing of Carabinieri in Interim Italian Armed Forces.

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington 25, D. C. FOR: The Combined Chiefs
of Staff
Cabinet Office, London, FOR: The British Chiefs of Staff
President, Allied Commission, APO 394

In accordance with paragraph 16, AR 380-5, cable, this headquarters,
reference number FX 61311, dated 22 February 1946, is downgraded to SECRET.

FOR THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, MEDITERRANEAN THEATER:

Ralph C. Tilley
RALPH C. TILLEY
Colonel, AGO
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2 - Each addressee
- 2 - G-2
- 2 - G-(3D)
- 2 - G-3 AFHQ
- 2 - G-3 LTO
- 2 - G-4
- 2 - G-5
- 2 - CAO
- 2 - Brit POLAD
- 2 - US POLAD
- 2 - SACS
- 2 - "Q"
- 2 - AG Records

~~SECRET~~

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

146

Ref: 3606/146/EC.

2 April 1946.

SUBJECT: Carabinieri.

TO : Land Forces Sub-Commission. (1001A)

139

The attached letter AC/14601/21/25 dated 22 March 46, from the Chief Commissioner to the Italian Prime Minister, is passed to you for information.

A. W. Knisely.

Chief Staff Officer,
To the Executive Commissioner.

Incl.

3460

Pa
L

3606

40

EC TH

TRANSLATION

THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS.

No. 53005/54052/2/1.6.1

Rome, 29 March, 1946.

Dear Admiral,

Will you please express to the Allied Supreme Commander the gratitude of the Italian Government and mine for allowing the Carabinieri to be increased from 65,000 to 75,000 units. This gives us a new evidence of the friendship and understanding for our needs in the work of moral rehabilitation and material reconstruction of our Country. This work could not be carried out in any satisfactory manner if the law and public order were not secured and enforced, with traditional zeal, by the Carabinieri.

I also want to express to you, dear Admiral, my deep gratitude for transmitting to the Supreme Allied Commander, and supporting our request.

With best regards,

Yours sincerely,

(s) Benito Mussolini.

Admiral Ellery V. Stone
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
Rome.

(GR)

EC Dict APR 1 1946

ACTION - LAWYER FORCES SK

INFO - CASEC

EC

C.C.

3459

EC Dict

(CAPT K)

5378

3606

ALLIED COMMISSION

~~SECRET~~

142

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT : Increase in Strength of OERR from 65,000 to 75,000

LAND FORCES SUB COM, A.C. (MFA)

SD/94

28 Mar 46

TO : War Ministry

MAR 30 1946

Information has been received from AFHQ that under authority Combined Chiefs of Staff signal F 648 ref W 80895 dated 16 Mar 46, the ceiling of the ITALIAN Interia Army may be raised from two hundred and five thousand to two hundred and fifteen thousand in order to include seventy five thousand OERR instead of sixty five thousand OERR as at present.

Major General
M M I A

Copy to : A.C. ✓

Internal : G(Proc)

A

Q

OERR

War Diary (Two)

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

See Memo 143, 144

CONFIDENTIAL

345x

Ask
(over X)

3166

H/1220

MAR 261645B

IMPORTANT

MMIA

APHQ

INFO: AC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

REFERENCE FX 61311 DATED 22 FEBRUARY AND GHQ F 63137 DATED 21 MARCH ADDRESSED ALCOM.

REQUEST QUOTATION REFERENCE AND DATE CHIEFS OF STAFF SIGNAL AUTHORIZING INCREASE IN CEILING ITALIAN ARMY FROM 205,000 TO 215,000 TO INCLUDE 75,000 CC RR INSTEAD OF 65,000 CC RR AS AT PRESENT.

AC DIST

INFO ACTION:

PUBLIC SAFETY S/C

~~SEC COMMISSIONER~~

INFO:

CHIEF COMMISSIONER

EX COM

CAS

FILE

SKELETON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

3457

17/3

(CHPT K)

AG/14501/21/P3

22 March 1946

My Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I refer to your letter dated 26th January 1946 on the subject of the increase of Carabinieri strength to 75,000.

This matter was referred to Allied Force Headquarters, and I am very glad to be able to inform you that the Supreme Allied Commander has approved the increase in strength from 65,000 to 75,000.

I have also been asked to inform you that this increase is without prejudice to any decision which may subsequently be taken in the Peace Treaty.

Yours Very Truly

/s/ Henry W. Stone

HENRY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR.
Chief Commissioner.

Dr. ANTONIO DI GASPERI
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government,
Rome.

Copy to: G. Lm
G. Lm ✓

3450

2/5

(ATTN) + (C.S.)

3606 *P* *Exp. Comm.* 131

F 63137
MAR. 20 16 17 B

H/941
MAR. 21 09 00
IMPORTANT

GHQ CMF SIGNED SACMED
ALCOM ROME

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

Subject is increase in strength of CC RM. Rewr AC/14601/21/PS dated 9 February refers.

1. Request by the Italian prime Minister to increase the size of the carabinieri from 65000 to (75000 ?) is approved.
2. You will inform the Italian Government that this increase is without prejudice to any decision which may subsequently be taken in the peace treaty.

AC DIST

~~SECRET~~
CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION P. SAFETY SC
INRO. CHIEF COMMISSIONER
EX COMM
CIVIL AFFAIRS
FILE
SKELETON

See 139

CIPHER TELEGRAM

This message will not be distributed outside
British or U.S. Government Departments or
Headquarters of U.S. Forces in Italy
without the approval of the
O.T.P. Room

HEADQUARTERS
21 MAR 1943 455

9
(corr K)

See 138

A
2/30

I ICOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Originator's Reference: PX 61311

Date/Time of Origin: FEB 22 1745A

Message Centre No: G/9730

Date Time Rec'd: FEB 23 1230A

Precedence: IMPORTANT

FROM: FREEDOM SIGNED SACKED

TO: ACTION ACHAR WASHINGTON FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF CABINET OFFICES LONDON

FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF, INFO ALDOM.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~TOP SECRET~~

THIS IS N.A.P. 1117

SUBJECT IS CEILING OF CARABINIERI IN INTERIM ITALIAN ARMED FORCES.

1. In MAP 1051 I stated that no overall alteration to the establishment of

Carabinieri was necessary and in PAR 621 you authorised a ceiling of

65,000.

2. Under pre war conditions forces in charge of the various services of public

order in ITALY amounted to 207,000. Of these some 150,000 belonging to

Fascist Specialist Militia (now suppressed) such as railway, harbour,

frontier, customs and forest militia. In spite of re-activation of some

of these on democratic lines carabinieri are now called upon to carry out

some of these tasks in addition to their normal duties with consequent

shortage of personnel for their primary police role and hence an inability

to maintain law and order effectively.

3. Furthermore with the return of all metropolitan Italy less the provinces of

UDINE and VENEZIA GIULIA to the control of the Italian Government the latter

has now far greater responsibilities than when my recommendation

1051 was made.

4. To assist the Italian Government therefore and to cater for requirements for

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOP SECRET

THIS IS N.A.P. 1117

SUBJECT IS CEILING OF CARABINIERI IN INTERIM ITALIAN ARMED FORCES.

1. In NAP 1051 I stated that no overall alteration to the establishment of Carabinieri was necessary and in PAN 621 you authorized a ceiling of 65,000.
2. Under pre war conditions forces in charge of the various services of public order in ITALY amounted to 207,000. Of these some 130,000 belonging to Fascist Specialist Militia (now suppressed) such as railway, harbour, frontier, customs and forest militia. In spite of re-activation of some of these on democratic lines carabinieri are now called upon to carry out some of these tasks in addition to their normal duties with consequent shortage of personnel for their primary police role and hence an inability to maintain law and order effectively.
3. Furthermore with the return of all metropolitan Italy less the provinces of UDINE and VENEZIA GIULIA to the control of the Italian Government the latter has now far greater responsibilities than when my recommendation in NAP 1051 was made.
4. To assist the Italian Government therefore and to cater for requirements for which the present ceiling of the carabinieri is not designed recommend that the ceiling of the Interim Italian Army including carabinieri approved by you in para 4 PAN 621 be increased to 215,000 to allow the ceiling of the carabinieri to be raised to 75,000. Food clothing and equipment of

INFO - ACTION

~~TOP SECRET~~

See M.136

RECEIVED
16 FEB 1946

INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Original's Reference:
 Date/Time of Origin:
 Message Centre No: G/9730 Continues
 Date Time Rec'd:
 Precedence:

FROM:

TO :

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL
INFO-AC
TOP SECRET.

PAGE TWO OF PX 61311.

of carabinieri is now the Italian responsibility and therefore there will be no additional Allied Commitment.

INFO - ACTION

Copy No 1&2 Info/Action Executive Commissioner (2)

" " 3
" " 4
" " 5
" " 6

Info

Chief Commissioner

Civil Affairs Section

Land Forces S/C

File

Skelton

AC DIST

OTHER TELEGRAM

This message will not be distributed outside British or U.S. Government Headquarters or retransmitted without being paraphrased. (Message O.T.P. need not be paraphrased.)

OTHER TELEGRAM
This message will not be distributed outside British or U.S. Government Headquarters or retransmitted without being paraphrased. (Message O.T.P. need not be paraphrased.)

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET.

of carabinieri is now the Italian responsibility and therefore there will be no additional Allied Commitment.

INFO - ACTION	Copy No	1&2	Info/Action	AC DIST	
				Executive Commissioner (2)	Chief Commissioner
	"	"	Info		
	"	"		Civil Affairs Section	
	"	"		Land Forces S/C	
	"	"		File	
	"	"		Skelton	

HEADQUARTERS
73 FEB 1946
A C.

OPIPER TELEGRAM
This message will not be distributed outside British or U.S. Government Headquarters or retransmitted even in cipher without being paraphrased. (Messages in O.T.P. need not be paraphrased.)

OPIPER TELEGRAM
This message will not be distributed outside British or U.S. Government Headquarters or retransmitted even in cipher without being paraphrased. (Messages in O.T.P. need not be paraphrased.)

~~TOP SECRET~~

3453

132

Ref: 3606/132/23

16 February 1946

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I acknowledge your letter 58557/34033.1/1.2.1 dated 26 January 1946 regarding the increase in strength of the CC.RR.

I have strongly recommended your request to higher authority and hope to be able to let you know further news at the earliest opportunity.

Very truly yours,

M. S. LUSH

Brigadier,
Acting Chief Commissioner.

Dott. Alcide De Gasperi
President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
Rome.

See item 131

3452

129

13 1946

9 February 1946.

Ref: AC/4601/21/PS.

SUBJECT: Increase in Strength of CC.RR.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
Attn: G-5 Section.

120

1. The Italian Prime Minister has now raised with me officially the question brought up by his predecessor of an increase of 10,000 in the strength of the CC.RR, thus raising the ceiling of the corps from 65,000 to 75,000. I attach his letter which represents the views of the Italian Government as a whole and, in my opinion, of the local government authorities and, one might even say, the Italian public generally.

2. The Prime Minister bases his case mainly on the comparatively weak strength of the forces of law and order and on the present unsatisfactory state of public order.

3. As regards the strength of the police forces, Dr. de Gasperi points out that before the war, with efficient communications and means of transport and with normal conditions prevailing, the forces in charge of the various services of public order amounted to 207,000 men, without counting the CC.RR.

Of these forces, 130,000 belonged to Fascist specialist militia such as railroad, harbour, frontier, custom, forest militia. Generally speaking these specialist militia have been suppressed and though some of them are being reactivated on democratic lines, it is a fact that the CC.RR are now carrying out tasks extraneous to their normal duties and will be compelled to do so for some time to come.

4. The extent to which the CC.RR strength is affected by employment on such tasks was fully set out in my letter AC/4601/21/PS of 7 Nov 1945 when this matter was last under consideration. It was then decided by your HQ that an increase was not to be recommended at that time.

5. You will be fully aware of the existing unsatisfactory state of public order in certain parts of Italy. There do not seem to be grounds for expecting any improvement in existing conditions, especially having regard to the present shortage of basic foods and the prevalence of areas illegally held.

6. The first Italian elections since the downfall of Fascism are due to commence on 10 March. At first these local elections will cover only a small part of the country. It is however anticipated that local elections will be followed by national elections in April or May, and even after this further and possibly the majority of local elections will follow. The country is

-1-

Cc/ To Cn Com
Ec Com

LAND FORCES HQ
US & BR Embassies (See 4/5)

See M 130 413 3451

See 7-137

-2-

128

therefore faced with a considerable period during which security and public order will be of paramount importance to the Government and to the country as a whole, at a time when their efforts to implement the policy of democratic government will be on trial before the world, and at a time when the Allied troops in Italy may be considerably reduced.

7. I submit, however, that there is an even more cogent reason for acceding to the request of the Prime Minister than those given above. The whole of Italy has now been liberated in accordance with the policy of the Allied Governments that the Italian Government should assume the full responsibility for the administration and control of their country. Italy has thereby become virtually a sovereign state entitled to determine the strength of the forces of law and order necessary to enable its citizens to live under peaceful and stable conditions. The Italian Government might justifiably plead that to give them the task of governing their country and at the same time to refuse them the means with which to do so would be to place them in a position which no Government could accept.

8. The last request for an increase in the manpower ceiling of the CC.RR was not recommended by your HQ on the grounds that the needs of the Italian Government could be best met by improvement in the quality, organization and distribution of the existing forces of 65,000. Every effort is being made to this end, and definite improvement has resulted, though the full reorganization must inevitably take time and the immediate future is all important. Moreover, the Prime Minister points out that the extraneous duties which must be performed by the existing forces militate against the effectiveness of their strength and the steps now being taken by the Italian Government with the assistance of the Land Forces and Public Safety Sub-Commissions cannot make up entirely for shortage of men.

9. In this connection I must point out that the CC.RR are the "first line" of the police forces in this country and the counterpart of the city and village police in the US and Great Britain. If a satisfactory state of public order is to be attained within a reasonable time it is essential that the CC.RR should regain confidence in themselves and thereby the confidence of the public. In this respect and because the CC.RR must be scattered in the many communes of the provinces, numbers play an important part. I understand that a project is now being discussed by the head of the CC.RR and the Minister of War whereby some three quarters of the increase asked for would be devoted to reinforcing the detachments of village and city police which have fallen in many cases to very small figures; and to form the remaining 2,500 into five reserve battalions for use as necessary.

10. I also understand that the Italian Government would find no great difficulty in recruiting the additional numbers and that they could in fact obtain about 5,000 men at once out of ex-CC.RR, many of whom have already applied for re-employment.

11. GOC Land Forces Sub-Commission, whom I have naturally consulted with regard to this proposal, is in agreement with me that the increase should now be permitted and I therefore strongly recommend that the request of the Prime Minister who has a very heavy responsibility in this matter, and whom, I submit, we must support to the fullest extent in the exercise of his responsibilities, should be granted.

/s/ Ellery W. Stone
ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

3450

Subject : Increase of CC.RR from 65,000 to 75,000

Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C.,
(M.M.I.A.)
R O M E.

SD/47

31 Jan. 45.

To : H.Q. A.C. (for Executive Commissioner).

Reference Signor de GASPERI's D/O letter to Chief Commissioner
No. 58557/34083.1/1.2.1 dated 26 January on the above subject :

1. I agree re the paramount importance of the CC.RR and, as you know, they are being given first priority re clothing, equipment etc. Also I am not opposed in principle to the increase in the CC.RR ceiling by 10,000 as above, but my feeling has always been that

(a) much more effective use could be made of the 65,000 CC.RR by certain re-organization and provision of equipment

(b) A.P.H.Q. and the Combined Chiefs of Staff would be unlikely to accede to the request for increase while there was difficulty in equipping and arming even 65,000.

2. As regards (a) above, I have not had time yet to examine the whole problem of the CC.RR and put forward any major proposals but, from a quick preliminary survey by my new CC.RR Section, the following are in hand and are being discussed in principle today with General BRUNETTI:-

(a) there appear to be some 3,000 CC.RR wrongly or wastefully employed by either the Italian Government or the Allies. Steps are being taken to remedy this. I may mention that the 17,000 "withheld from the service" mentioned in the 5th paragraph of Signor de GASPERI's letter include sick, those on leave, those used by Allies or Italian Government on extraneous duties and include the 3,000 mentioned above. In any army or formation, sick and leave personnel are automatically borne by the unit on whose strength these are on. This however is a point in favour of de GASPERI's request for an increase on the grounds that the effective strength (i.e. those actually

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3449

(b) The head of my CC.RR Section informs me that he thinks that CC.RR duties can be re-organized so as to save perhaps some 4,000 men, but this of course would take time to put into effect, and is dependent on provision of transport and signal equipment.

(c) I understand that 2,700 allowed for the TRIESTE Legion has not been activated. There seems no reason why this number should not be recruited now and used as a special reinforcement in NORTH ITALY.

You will see that the above totals up to 9,700 men, which in due course can be made available to the CC.RR, compared with the 10,000 asked for by

See 129

/de GASPERI.

125

de GASPERI. Also I am not clear as to where the Italian Government expect to get these extra 10,000. If they intend to recall discharged CC.RR, presumably they can get them fairly quickly; but if they intend to get them by normal process of selection and training, obviously it would be some time before these extra men would be available.

3. I bring the above to your notice for such action as you may wish to take. There would seem to be no reason why we should not continue to take steps as in para 2 while at the same time asking for the extra 10,000 - particularly as the clothing, arming and equipping of the CC.RR is now gathering force, though the transport situation still depends on the provision of the vehicles owed by A.R.A.R. to the Ministry of War, who intend to put them at the disposal of the CC.RR. I understand that you have still not received a reply from de GASPERI to your letter in this connection.

L. Browning

Major General.
Land Forces Sub Commissioner, A.C. (ADTIA).

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L. Browning

Major General.
Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C. (MILA).

/LGO

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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124

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

Inter-Office Memorandum.

TO: Executive Commissioner.

I should like to draw your attention to Para 12 of the Minutes of the Chief Commissioner's Conference of 9 Jan 46 and to the correction inserted at the foot of the Minutes of the Meeting of 16 Jan 46, regarding the question of an increase in the Carabinieri, which it is understood the present Prime Minister is raising again. ~ 120

I consider that the policy of using any increase in the CC.RR. to create further Mobile Battalions is very much open to question.

CC.RR., although part of the Italian Army, are normally primarily a police force and the first line of that force.

In my opinion the first principle should be to reorganise, train and establish them so that they have, or regain, the confidence of the public. They represent the equivalent of the village policemen in UK.

It may be difficult to do this in the present state of lawlessness in this country but I feel it is wrong to work on the principle of basing the organisation of the CC.RR. on a number of striking forces.

I feel there is a strong tendency on foot to "militarise" the Carabinieri in its capacity as a police force. If the increase is approved, I feel the matter is one which requires careful consideration and, being a police-operational matter, is really one for the Italian Government, advised by Public Safety Sub-Commission if any advice is required.

MC

Tel. Ext. 525.
26 Jan 46.

M. CARR. Brig.
VP CA Section.

Copy to RS. S/C

Is/She to Brig Hope on these general lines

PA

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NS 30/1

Translation

The President of the Council of Ministers

58557/ 34083.1/1.2.1

Rome, 26 January 1946

28 1945

Dear Admiral,

some time ago, the Italian Government asked the Allied Commission to be allowed to raise the number of the Carabinieri from 65 to 70 thousand units. Regarding this proposition, A.M.I.A. considered that the service of the Carabinieri would in fact be improved by bettering their equipment and armament and giving them better means of transport, instead of increasing their number.

The steps suggested by A.M.I.A. would doubtless be most useful; however they cannot make up for the scarcity of the men.

Before the war, with efficient communications and transport means, active industries, a general state of well-being, in short, in normal living conditions, the forces in charge of the various services of public order amounted to 207 thousand men, without counting the Guardia di Finanza.

Of such men, 130 thousand belonged to the militia specialized in the various services (railroad, harbors, road, post and telegraph, frontier, coast and forest militia). Such specialized Corps were suppressed, and the Carabinieri were entrusted with tasks which, in normal times, were carried out by thousands of agents, who, among other things had special competence and outfits.

However, the Carabinieri Corps must now supply not only soldiers for the above mentioned services which are not included among the special duties of the Corps, but also the men that are continually requested by the Allied Army Forces, by various other allied organizations and by various organs of the Italian Government. Thus about 17,000 men are withheld from the service, and to this figure, we must add another 6 thousand carabinieri forming 12 battalions that must be kept as movable reserve.

The remaining force is quite inadequate to carry out the service of local detached commands where where the prevention and repression work of the Carabinieri takes place in very difficult conditions. In the provinces and in isolated places where incidents and riots trouble public order more frequently, police duties are entrusted to the Carabinieri Corps only, for the activity and service of the Public Safety Corps are limited to the towns.

To the problems of a general character regarding the safeguard of public order, and are of vital importance, we must add, in a near future, those which are relative to the organization of the elections. The Italian

Admiral Ellery A. Stone
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
Rome

See M321-3

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CA See

- 2 -

119

Government is aware that voting must take place in a regime of utmost freedom and order if the elections are to be the first step towards the concrete reestablishment of a democratic administration procedure.

This is why I wanted to bring once more to your attention the problem regarding the increasing of the number of the Carabinieri, so that you may efficaciously support the request of the Italian Government with A.F.M.C., hoping that approval may be granted in time for the new contingent to take up its duties before the beginning of the electoral period.

Believe me,

Sincerely yours,

A. De Gasperi

a/s

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114

Ref: AG/14601/21/PS

12 December 1945

My dear Mr. Prime Minister, ¹⁰²

I refer to Professor Ferruccio Parri's letter dated 7th September 1945 on the subject of the increase of Carabinieri strength to 75,000.

This matter has been referred to Allied Force Headquarters, but it is regretted that the Supreme Allied Commander is not prepared at this time to consider an increase in the manpower ceiling of the Carabinieri.

Yours very truly,

ELLERY W. STONE

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Dr. Alcide De Gasperi
President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
Rome

See M. 118

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CRS 14/12

(CAPT O)

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
A P O 394

AC/14601/21/PS

7 November 1945

SUBJECT : Strength of Carabinieri

NOV 9 1945

TO : AFHQ G-5 Section

1. I am forwarding copy of a letter dated 7 September 45 received from the President of the Council of Ministers, in which he requests an increase in the strength of the Carabinieri from 65,000 to 75,000. The delay in dealing with this matter has been due to the necessity of checking the figures quoted by the President and also of obtaining a breakdown of the number of men listed as not available for normal Carabinieri police duties. You will recall that at the SACRED Political meeting on August 2, 1945, it was ruled that the strength of the Italian Army cannot be altered in existing circumstances. On this premise, any increase in the strength of the Carabinieri would have to be included in the composition of the Italian Army as laid down in the peace treaty or any prior document which preceded it.

2. The President of the Council bases his request in general on the fact that the present strength of the Carabinieri does not, after making allowances for ineffectives, permit of the 4,809 Carabinieri stations being manned. While the present Carabinieri strength is approximately that of pre-war this deficiency in personnel is brought about by two main factors :

Firstly, owing to the abolition of certain fascist militias, and owing to emergency conditions, Carabinieri are being employed on work outside their normal duties.

Secondly, there is the recent formation of 12 mobile battalions which at full strength should absorb 7,000 men.

(Capt BRAYGREEN)

344

- 2 -

3. After consultation with the Commanding General CC.RR., some minor adjustments are necessary in the figures given in the letter of the President of the Council of Ministers but they are of such a minor nature that they do not affect the main question.

4. The reduction of the effective strength available for station duty from 65,000 to the 42,940 given in the President's letter is brought about as follows :

The TRINITE Legion has not been activated, thus reducing the strength to 62,100. (Not 62,000 as quoted in the President's letter)

The Officer strength of the force is 1,760, causing a reduction to 60,340. (Not 61,450 as quoted in the President's letter)

17,600 (not 17,700 as quoted in the President's letter) are not available owing to detached duties, leaves, sickness, etc., as explained in Appendix A, thus reducing the strength to the figure of 42,740 given by the President of the Council.

As explained at items 10 and 11 of Appendix A, 2,600 of the total non-effectives are performing normal police duties and should, therefore, be added to the strength available for manning stations, thus bringing the figure to 45,340. But when the 7,000 for the 12 Mobile Battalions is deducted, the actual strength available for manning stations on the President's calculations becomes 38,340.

5. In the last part of his letter, the President makes a request for the issue to Carabinieri of the stock of automatic arms at the Berretta factory, Brescia. This matter is already under discussion with your Headquarters and an application for the release of 44,000 automatic rifles has already been made by our letter Ref.AC/14601/11/PS dated 14 September. In your reply ref: 3-5 : 000.5 dated

- 3 -

15 October it is mentioned that the matter is still under discussion.

6. MMIA have raised the question as to the extent to which the present commitments of the Carabinieri might be covered by an increase in mobility, armament and communications rather than in manpower. The most important of these three factors is mobility and it seems doubtful whether, in existing conditions, sufficient POL will be available in this country to make the forces of law and order really mobile.

I recommend that the strength of the CC.RR be increased by 10,000.

ELLERY W. STONE,
Rear Admiral, USNR,
Chief Commissioner.

Copy to : Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA)
Public Safety Sub-Commission.

APPENDIX A

DETAILS OF THE 17,600 CC.RR SAID
NOT TO BE AVAILABLE ARE AS SHOWN BELOW:

1.	Mobilised with Italian Army	1.865
2.	With Air Ministry (Security of Airfields).	635
3.	With Railway and Dock Police	1.306
4.	With E.N.A.C. (National Transportation Goods) E.N.D.S.I. (National Distribution aid to Italy) Enforcement of Wheat Regulations.....	850
5.	For Prison Security	200
6.	For Special Services with Allies.....	550
7.	Various Duties with the Ministries (General Attorney and Judicial Office - High Court of Justice - General Attorney and Military Tribunal Inspectorate of Industry, Commerce & Labour High Commissioners - Expiration Commissions etc).....	1.094
Total...		6.500
8.	Absent on (Ordinary leave - Sick - Convalescence - Hospital - Patrimonial etc.) about 10% of the strength.....	6.000
9.	Under Training (Central School and Cadet Legion Rome).....	2.500
10.	Over-strength in the Legions of Sicily by agreement Italian Government/AC	900
11.	Over-strength in the Legions of Venezia...	1.700
Total		11.100
Complete Total		17.600

Item 1 is the approved Mobilised strength with
the Italian Army and is in accordance with
the Order of Battle.

Item 3 represents the number of men who, in con-
junction with Agents of Public Security form
the Railway and Dock Police. Both these
services were performed by Fascist Militia

- 2 -

APPENDIX A

prior to our occupation. The Militia were disbanded and their duties taken over by existing Police agencies with no increase in strength.

Item 4 represents the men who have taken over the duties of the Fascist Traffic Police which was disbanded, and also those dealing specially with amassing regulations.

Item 2, 5, 6 and 7 are proper and necessary duties.

Item 8 represents the usual loss due to the causes mentioned and is a proper percentage.

Item 9 represents the strength under training at the central School. Florence, and the Cadet Legion Rome, and is in fact below the strength authorized by the Order of Battle.

Item 10 represents overstrength in Sicily. These extra 900 men have to be balanced by a similar reduction on the mainland, but this circumstance has been brought about by Public Safety conditions and the men concerned are in fact performing ordinary Police duty. Their retention in Sicily is by agreement between the Italian Government and this Commission.

Item 11 represents overstrength in Venezia where large numbers of carabinieri were recuperated. At the moment this has been balanced by a similar reduction in the rest of Italy. However, steps are now being taken to reduce the Venezia strength to that authorized in the Order of Battle, and therefore the men concerned will become available for regular duty.

The strength mentioned in Items 10 and 11 totals 2,600. These men are performing normal police duty and should therefore be subtracted from the total of 17,600 stated not to be available for station duty. The total thus becomes 15,000.

C O P Y

Translation

The President of the Council of Ministers
Minister of the Interior
n. 34203

Rome, 7 September 45

Dear Admiral,

as you know, my Government wishes to handle with the necessary firmness the problem of public order in Italy, fully to reestablish respect for the law.

The CC.RR Corps, whose collaboration is able and trustworthy, is one of our best instruments to reach this aim.

However, considering the numerous duties entrusted to it, the organization of the Corps is still insufficient, so that I must draw your kind attention on the advisability of granting a further increase of the CC.RR corps, to reach 75 thousand units.

On this subject, I must inform you that from the present force of 62,000 units (besides the Trieste Legion) 1760 officers included must be deducted.

Of the remaining 60,240 men, we must not consider 17,700 enlisted men who are not available and cannot be made available, for part of them is on leave, part is attached to special services, part is being detained with the legions of the Veneto by the express wish of the Allied Authorities.

The result is that 42,540 men are available; this figure is inferior to the already insufficient number required for the 4800 CC.RR stations, which ought to amount to 44,670 units. It seems obvious that the number of men of the stations cannot be further reduced, for it is sometimes of two elements only, while on the other hand we must form 13 mobile battalions, amounting as a whole to 7 thousand units:

I trust that this short report will show how urgent it is to increase the Corps in number; during the last few days, the War Department sent an official request to the commission.

However, the wished-for reinforcement of the CC.RR Corps depends not only on the increase of the number of the Carabinieri, but also on the improvement of their armament.

You already know, my dear Admiral, the particular importance of this problem. Unfortunately, the present armament of the Carabinieri is entirely inadequate considering the situation and the requirements. It is enough to say that personal equipment has remained what it was half a century ago, i.e. a rifle, Mod. 1891, and a pistol which some of the men don't even have. Such a situation cannot but have a fatal effect on the morale and spirit of the Carabinieri who are often obliged to face, in conditions of obvious inferiority, gangs of delinquents more numerous than themselves, and equipped with portable weapons and bombs.

I therefore trust in your kind interest about this matter. In particular, I beg you to intervene personally, so that kind consideration may be given to the proposal made by the Comando Generale of the Corps to obtain that the Carabinieri be allotted 44,000 automatic rifles 'Mitra' and 3000 pistols at present in the Beretta weapon factory, at Gardone Val di Trompia; up to now, the Land Forces Sub Commission hasn't granted this request for it stated that such arms must be considered as war booty.

I thank you, my dear Admiral, for taking this matter in consideration, considering its importance, it deserves to be dealt with without delay.

Yours sincerely,

s. Ferruccio Parri

Trans. e/c

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SEY

Approved: _____

Approved: _____

See my 107

See my 107

See my 107

(CARE BEARING)

Major Kemsley

3436 PA 19

Translation

The President of the Council of Ministers
Minister of the Interior
n. 34203

Rome, 7 September 1945

SEP 11 1945

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Admiral Henry H. Stone
Chief Commissioner

- 2 -

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Yours sincerely,

S. Ferruccio Parri

trans. s/o

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ACTION: CASE

INFO: CHIEF COMAR

EXEC COMAR

LAND FORCES SC

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