

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

ACC

10000/109/680
(VOL. II)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785011

10000/107/680
(VOL. II)

CONTROL OF MOVEMENT
JUNE 1945 - SEPT. 1946

106.
c.s.o. Please see reply to folio 94 "folios 100 to 102.
109 102

Capt K / in via 06 - men double on. but
some action is still required so I will
try again

109 102

116.

Cost of balloon
Please see folio 110 and enclose for info.
Do you wish a copy to go to G-5 / War?

Dark
109 102

109 109
109 102

109 102

~~cc 80~~ ^{# 95}
Folio 5 for signature please, am
concerned with folio 4

Chief Complainants:

R. H.

Attachment is submitted for your ~~signature~~ ^{return} on March 19th
Letter is based on information received from AFBM
at item 4 in the file. Markay
17/3/46 for the Complainants

~~cc 80~~ ^{# 97}
Be sure Blads must be informed of
the proposed and term of stay
at #4 17/3 Markay Date 17/3/46

A/c.

Minutes - Traffic Control meeting (see draft)
submitted for approval. Also I have this drafted
by key terminals, and if you approve will have it
go to libraries etc for convenience. JFD 4/12

27/4/76

c/c, get final drafts (other) from P.S.
put on file. 4/12/76
See folio: 63-75 -

80

JFD 6/13.

4/12/

File in for info. 4/13

85

C.S.O. faco 84 for release and 1/3

86

Please let me know in due course whether
you are drafting Budget and we to get the
Governing Body's Report. Please copies A & B
to P.S. as per

1/3/76

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 13501

get final draft (photos)
put in file 4/5/2012
See file: 68-75 - P

4/5/0
Jef. 6/13.

File 61 from under 13501/3

CSO - file 84 for info, please add 8/3

86

Alma Lett know in his course what
CS are doing. Bright at use to get the
Gibbons to go ahead. Issue copies 2 & 84
to a PS - after / 13501/3

4/11/

For him

Expo. No. 49 Powers that can come

What do you think that there is a time
~~when we take back~~ when Mr. Marshall
will do
what he wants

for instance
Expo. No. 49

4/12

Is there like once to have all powers are

Mr. S. X.

Mr. 1512 65

Also see 64-10 for info

Expo. 4/12

~~Not to be re-distributed without the written consent of the Director~~

100-416 3/2
4/2

Is there like R&B kind from us

100-416 3/2

Also. Please 64-60 for info
100-416 3/2

411.

113

CC 3613 - 1000-1000-1000

114

May 1968

Sir (Mr. Brit) and
Kiran dev. want know
Copies of 1/2 Back and
other have not checked

5/15

Copy necessary information to issue of Technical Service
12/14/68

See

(115)

CC Ref 118 - This is a flat flat file until
movement of Shabang in Britain - 2 minutes
before return. See attached. 085 14/11
3613 and 15/11 085

(116)

CC Song 3613 is not the one I want
probably is someone by the file because
it was definitely on Bureau. See by attachment

Copy of 112 Park
Mr. Lewis' check
51 13/1

Copy of letter written to Mrs. & Mr. Lewis
11/1/61

(11)

e.e. Ref 118 - Received a flat truck with
movable platform on business - & money
borrowed this morning. See attach. DDBS 16/11
3613 and 15/11 225

(120)

e.e. Sorry 3613 is not the one I mean. It was
probably a economic type of flat because
it was definitely on business. See by yourself.
4044 (Ref. and file) and 16/11
16/11 225

(12)

e.e. Discussed 118 with PS who informed me
that Major Simmons (Ad. Q2 AFHQ and PS) was
expected back and day from London where he
had been to conduct the trials via de Gaulle.
Office of French Rep. units agree to leave the
area while Major SS return.

ABM

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. _____

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

A.P.C. 794

Office of the Executive Commissioner

File 109
H. R.

Ref. : 3610/117/EC

13 September 1946.

SUBJECT: Transfer of travel Control duties.

TO : G-5 Section,
A.T.H.Q.

The attached letter No. GRI 389-506/LD dated 10 September 46 on this subject is forwarded for information.

For the Chief Commissioner:

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

Copy to: Travel Central Sec A.C.

411

100-56700-146

003-56700

SECRET : THREE EYES INFORMATION

00

1. REQUESTED BY THE THIRD SECRETARY, THREE EYES INFORMATION, THIS INFORMATION IS TO BE PROVIDED TO THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, THREE EYES INFORMATION, ON THE SUBJECT OF THE INFORMATION REQUESTED BY THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, THREE EYES INFORMATION, IN A REPORT DATED 20 JUNE 1962, WHICH IS TO BE PREPARED BY THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, THREE EYES INFORMATION, AND IS TO BE PREPARED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS PROVIDED BY THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, THREE EYES INFORMATION.

2. REQUESTED BY THE THIRD SECRETARY, THREE EYES INFORMATION, THIS INFORMATION IS TO BE PROVIDED TO THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, THREE EYES INFORMATION, ON THE SUBJECT OF THE INFORMATION REQUESTED BY THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, THREE EYES INFORMATION, IN A REPORT DATED 20 JUNE 1962, WHICH IS TO BE PREPARED BY THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, THREE EYES INFORMATION, AND IS TO BE PREPARED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS PROVIDED BY THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, THREE EYES INFORMATION.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

115
10 Sept 1946.
Subject : Travel of Central Committee
Chairman Mao Tse-tung
and Com. Li Kenong.

225, Y-256/ho

TO : All concerned.

1. Pursuant to the travel directive, Chairman Mao Tse-tung, Com. Li Kenong, and Com. Chen Geng, members of the Central Committee, the General Secretary, the General Director of the General Staff, and the General Political Commissar of the People's Liberation Army, have been authorized to travel to the Soviet Union, Mongolia, and China.

2. Com. Li Kenong, Com. Chen Geng, Com. Mao Tse-tung, and Com. Geng Shichang, General Secretary, General Director of the General Staff, and General Political Commissar of the People's Liberation Army, will be traveling to the Soviet Union, Mongolia, and China.

3. The members of the Central Committee, the General Secretary, the General Director of the General Staff, and General Political Commissar of the People's Liberation Army, will be traveling to the Soviet Union, Mongolia, and China.

4. All concerned.

Yours truly,

C. M., Director
U. S. Section.

Enclosure: Directive CMC 80-500-1 - Travel notes, 4-7 and 8-11.
Directive CMC 80-500-2 - Travel notes, 4-7 and 8-11.
Directive CMC 80-500-3 - Travel notes, 4-7 and 8-11.

Distribution:

CC (CM) ADP.

1. Direct attachment offices, liaison bureaus, and
Central Section, Foreign Affairs Bureau,
State Department, Washington, D. C.
2. U. S. Consulates, Chinese, (Beijing, Shanghai, Canton, Hong Kong, Macau, etc.)
3. C. I. A., Bureau of Intelligence, (Washington, D. C., New York, Boston, Philadelphia, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle, Honolulu, etc.)
4. Combined Civil Service, (Washington, D. C., New York, Chicago, St. Louis, San Francisco, Seattle, Honolulu, etc.)

Central Travel Society Board, c/o Intelligence Bureau, (New York, Chicago, San Francisco, Seattle, Honolulu, etc.)

WIREGRAM TO STATE, (RECORDED)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

1. Objectives: To gain information on the nature and extent of the
activities of the Chinese Communist Party in North Korea.

2. Targets: To identify and locate the Chinese Communists in
North Korea.

3. Methods: To conduct intelligence operations, including
surveillance, to identify and locate the Chinese Communists in
North Korea.

4. Resources:

5. Personnel:

6. Equipment: To conduct surveillance operations, including
the use of cameras and other electronic equipment.

7. Training: To train personnel in the use of surveillance equipment
and to conduct intelligence operations.

8. Security: To ensure the security of personnel and equipment
used in the operation.

APR

QIN 375/56-1-7

SOURCE : DIA/2/PX 10 October 1965.

10/10/65.

1. Starting to travel 25 Oct 65 while still in transit, in order to effect a better contact with the government, and to facilitate the arrival of the diplomatic mission, the DIA had been requested to make available to the government, through its liaison office, all information concerning the visit of the Chinese delegation to the U.S. and to provide the government with a copy of the DIA's report on the visit.
2. The DIA had been requested to furnish the government with a copy of the DIA's report on the visit of the Chinese delegation to the U.S. and to provide the government with a copy of the DIA's report on the visit.

3. It is the opinion of the DIA that the government may be interested in the following information:

(a) The DIA's report on the visit of the Chinese delegation to the U.S. and to provide the government with a copy of the DIA's report on the visit.

(b) The DIA's report on the visit of the Chinese delegation to the U.S. and to provide the government with a copy of the DIA's report on the visit.

(c) The DIA's report on the visit of the Chinese delegation to the U.S. and to provide the government with a copy of the DIA's report on the visit.

(d) The DIA's report on the visit of the Chinese delegation to the U.S. and to provide the government with a copy of the DIA's report on the visit.

(e) The DIA's report on the visit of the Chinese delegation to the U.S. and to provide the government with a copy of the DIA's report on the visit.

In accordance with the recommendations of the DIA, the DIA has decided to provide the government with a copy of the DIA's report on the visit of the Chinese delegation to the U.S. and to provide the government with a copy of the DIA's report on the visit.

7. C-2, 21-2400,

2020 RELEASE UNDER E.O. 14176

5. A 2211 telephone number is composed of seven digits, the first two being 4 and the last six being 900000.

6. The name of the individual who made the call is John Smith, he is a member of the FBI Laboratory and is engaged in fingerprint identification work.

7. The telephone number 4-1109 is composed of seven digits, the first two being 4 and the last six being 1109. This is the telephone number of the FBI Laboratory, it is used for all calls to the Laboratory. The name of the individual who made the call is John Smith, he is a member of the FBI Laboratory and is engaged in fingerprint identification work.

8. The telephone number 4-1109 is composed of seven digits, the first two being 4 and the last six being 1109. This is the telephone number of the FBI Laboratory, it is used for all calls to the Laboratory. The name of the individual who made the call is John Smith, he is a member of the FBI Laboratory and is engaged in fingerprint identification work.

(c)

9. The telephone number 4-1109 is composed of seven digits, the first two being 4 and the last six being 1109. This is the telephone number of the FBI Laboratory, it is used for all calls to the Laboratory. The name of the individual who made the call is John Smith, he is a member of the FBI Laboratory and is engaged in fingerprint identification work.

(d)

10. The telephone number 4-1109 is composed of seven digits, the first two being 4 and the last six being 1109. This is the telephone number of the FBI Laboratory, it is used for all calls to the Laboratory. The name of the individual who made the call is John Smith, he is a member of the FBI Laboratory and is engaged in fingerprint identification work.

(e)

11. The telephone number 4-1109 is composed of seven digits, the first two being 4 and the last six being 1109. This is the telephone number of the FBI Laboratory, it is used for all calls to the Laboratory. The name of the individual who made the call is John Smith, he is a member of the FBI Laboratory and is engaged in fingerprint identification work.

(f)

12. The telephone number 4-1109 is composed of seven digits, the first two being 4 and the last six being 1109. This is the telephone number of the FBI Laboratory, it is used for all calls to the Laboratory. The name of the individual who made the call is John Smith, he is a member of the FBI Laboratory and is engaged in fingerprint identification work.

(g)

13. The telephone number 4-1109 is composed of seven digits, the first two being 4 and the last six being 1109. This is the telephone number of the FBI Laboratory, it is used for all calls to the Laboratory. The name of the individual who made the call is John Smith, he is a member of the FBI Laboratory and is engaged in fingerprint identification work.

(h)

410

RECORDED IN THE
MATERIALS SECTION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-12-2012 BY SP2 JESSE MCGOWAN

RECORDED IN THE
MATERIALS SECTION
DATE 10-12-2012 BY SP2 JESSE MCGOWAN

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DATE 10-12-2012 BY SP2 JESSE MCGOWAN

113

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

Mr. Vincent T. (John) Doherty, member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the trustee of the First National Bank of Boston, will leave Boston Friday evening to go to the British Museum; will consult with Dr. G. G. Vassall, Curator of Manuscripts, and Dr. R. W. Dyson, Curator of Printed Books, and Dr. W. H. Smith, Curator of the British Library, with whom he has been in touch on several occasions, concerning the manuscript.

Travel funds will be provided by the Board of Governors, but it is understood that Mr. Doherty, for his convenience, will be granted a small amount of money to cover his expenses in London. It is intended to make arrangements to have him accommodated in a hotel near the British Museum, and to provide him with a car during his stay in London.

The public officer who presented the manuscript to the Board of Governors, Mr. J. L. Scott, will accompany him to London and return with him.

610

Chairman,
U.S. Senate,
Committee
on Banking
and Currency.

RECEIVED JULY 10 1945

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. _____

112

AMERICAN AND BRITISH
CIVIL AIR LINES
APO 74.

AMI 300-500/40.

10 September 1946.

SUBJECT : Travel from Italy to Venetia Giulia.

1. The procedure whereby all persons, other than American and British military personnel, desiring to go to Venetia Giulia, make their application at the local post office, who forward it to the American Venetia Giulia Police Force for consideration, is still in effect.

2. However, the American and British Mission in Rome will undertake to obtain the necessary clearance to issue permits for Venetia Giulia, for their respective nationals and persons they may appeal to him.

FOR THE CIVIL GOVERNMENT,

J. W. Brigadier,
V.D. - Section.

4107

3610 50

LL

HEADQUARTERS
MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 512

AC 8004/0002-1

12 July 1944

SUBJ: Travel Clearance into Greece

JUL 12 1944

To : Commander of all Major Commands, Separat. Units and
Institutions Greece

1. The extract quoted below is taken from letter, Office of the Military
Attaché, Athens, Greece, dated 8 June 1944, subject: "Travel clearance into
Greece".

"1. During the past months, there has been a steady flow of American
military personnel, practically all Greek citizens, taking leave in
Greece for the purpose of visiting relatives. This office has noted
that the average person coming into this area has overstayed his
leave from 30 to 60 days. There are hundreds of photos which
have proved this.

"2. Local commanders have granted inadequate leave to personnel
visiting remote portions of the country, especially locations
in inaccessible islands.

"3. No confidence has been taken of the difficulties in
traveling from Athens back to the respective theater.

"4. Several days arrived in Athens with inadequate funds and
with the high cost of living, particularly in the Athens area,
have exhaustd their funds and have been left stranded with no
way of returning to their units. This is clearly exemplified
with the cessation of scheduled military air transport facilities.

"5. A typical example is the case of Michael Petros, Tech 4, U.S.,
who left Army Hospital in Mackay, Egypt, for 7 days temporary duty
in Greece. His ultimate destination being Rhodes Island, one of
the islands. Travel by military aircraft, rail or Government trans-
port was directed. He left Cairo on April 30, arrived in Rome
May 1; from May 1 to 5, he was in Rome waiting transportation to
Athens. On the 5th he flight an 820 mile flight into Athens.
Upon arrived in Athens, he inquired in this office, if there would
be a boat to Rhodes. It was advised that there was a monthly
boat out of Athens but travel, since advised that at that particular
time of the month travel by canoe would be the time. On the 9th he
left Athens, arrived in Rhodes the 10th. From Rhodes he took a 7
canoe the same day and arrived at his destination, Rhodes, on the
10th. Thus, after 21 days of travel, he reached his destination.
He spent 7 days at Rhodes, leaving there the 17th by means of the
monthly boat, and arrived in Athens the 29th. He reported to this
office without funds for return passage to Egypt. The daily co-
Government billet or passing facilities presented an initial problem,
plus the fact that no Government means of transportation exist.

(K)

9

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Int. No 17030, file AG 900.4/04, p-6, 10 July 1945 (Cont'd)

within and outside other than occasional special flights. On the 5th of Jun. he was advised that he could book passage on a BOAC plane which departs on 8th. However, his orders do not permit travel by commercial aircraft, and so it was necessary to wire his station requesting telegraphic permission for travel by commercial aircraft. Even though this is approved, it is extremely doubtful whether he will be able to depart by the plane leaving Jun. 8, and it is quite possible that he may be detained here for another 10 to 14 days until a return booking can be arranged on a special flight before its departure.

Mr. In the opinion of this office, all personnel requesting leave into Britain should be carefully examined to determine:

(a) Whether the trip is essential or not.

(b) Whether the man has adequate funds to defray his expenses which will average \$100.00 or more for room and board.

(c) Whether his destination is in one of the areas remote and away from the seaport, in which case, funds in the amount of \$100.00 per month will be required.

In addition to the difficulties of traveling to distant areas, there being no pipeline, if communication through GPO, it will take 24 hours for return messages.

Requests for leave or furlough involving travel overseas will be forwarded to their headquarters for approval prior to its:

(a) The trip to sustain.

(b) The travel is non essential and to Africa will be done.

(c) The port facility or location which ports did not visit or not they are located in remote sections of the country.

(d) The amount of leave or furlough to be granted which is to be inclusive of travel time and assignable to leave or furlough.

By COMMAND OF THE CHIEF, GENERAL SHAW

DISTRIBUTION:

Adj. Gen. Secy.
W.M.C. 1945
Section 1, G-3
Adj. Gen. Secy.

Declassified E.O. 13566 Section 3.3 NND No.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COM SION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
Travel Control Division
APO 394, U.S. Army

GBI. 389-506/47

1 April 1946

SUBJECT : Activities of Spanish Consulate.
TO : Assistant Chief of S-5,
Allied Force Headquarters,
APO 512, U.S. Army.

1. Reference your letter G-5 09.112 of 9 March 1946.

2. G-2 RAAO were contacted on 1st March and instructed to deliver the prisoners to the Questura. The prisoners had not contravened any travel regulation. Control by A.P.H.Q. of exit from Italy, other than Venezia Giulia, Austria and Germany, was removed on 5 July 1945.

3. As it is known that both the American and British Embassies are endeavouring to persuade the Italian Government to institute some form of control over exit from Italy, copies of our letter were forwarded to the Embassies.

4. A copy of our letter to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is enclosed.

PAR/ef


JOHN W. CHAPMAN
Colonel, JAGD
Director.

Copy to: Office of the Executive Commissioner.

410
JL
RL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED MISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
Travel Control Division
APO 394 US Army

GSI. 389-506/47

15 March 1946

SUBJECT : Irregular documents issued by
Spanish Consulate, Rome.

TO : Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

1. When the Spanish ship "PUNTA ALMENA" last visited CIVITAVECCHIA three Spanish nationals attempted to take passage for Spain using documents, furnished by the Spanish Consulate, belonging to or made out in the names of three other Spaniards.

2. Particulars are as follows:

<u>Subjects real names</u>	<u>Travelling with documents made out for</u>
Carlos MELIAGO REZA	Juan Don BELTRAN de GUEVARA BILBAO
Marcel VILAROS COURCHOUD	Ramon Don ATUCHA SAGARRAINAGA
Francisco JAURQUIZIRENA	Enrique QUIROZ GOMEZ.

The documents carried are stated to have been handed to their bearers by Spanish Consular or Embassy officials.

3. The following documents made out in the false names were carried:

- (a) Three copies each Repatriation Order issued by Displaced Persons and Repatriation Sub-Commission.
- (b) One documents signed by Salmero Price COMIN, Minister of the Embassy naming the three subjects by their false names and requesting them to be given passage to any Spanish port.
- (c) One document each issued by the Spanish Consul Mario DE LEON bearing three photographs of the subjects, but false names, and certifying that bearers are Spanish nationals.

410/

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

* CONFIDENTIAL

4. Interrogation of the subjects suggests that the authorities knew their three names and identities and that the Repatriation Orders referred to in para 3 (a) above were genuine documents which had been issued in favour of three Spaniards repatriated some months previously.

5. Your comments on the above are invited.

JOHN A. CHAPMAN
Colonel, JAGD.
Director.

SMC/cf.

440

2610-4
FBI - BOSTON

MAP 25 MAR
1/1/28
400-24700
Permit

AM. mixed culture 225 mg/20

AM. yeast, 200 mg 200 ml - 100 ml

REMARKS:

1. The 251 portion was used in this study and the
other 250 and the 551 cultures were used in the
same way. Some variability in activity and yield from culture to
culture is to be expected but there appears to be no
marked difference in activity or yield at this time.
The 250 and 551 cultures were taken at the same time
and were used in equal amounts to reduce the effect of
the culture.

2. AM. yeast was added to a 250 ml Erlenmeyer
flask. Not all, in fact only about 1/3 of the yeast
was used. In this manner the yeast could be easily
removed later. It is suggested in this study that the yeast
be removed, left standing in the bottom of the flask from the
beginning, so that at the time of use the yeast should
not be used.

3. The yeast is probably the greatest hindrance to the activi-
ty of yeast free extracts. The following suggestion is made: That an
extract be made of yeast free yeast. This solution may be a
useful addition to yeast free extracts. A yeast extract may be
used, however, if yeast free yeast is not available. The use of
yeast, however, is difficult through yeast may interfere with the
enzymes, especially those associated with the yeast cell wall.
Consequently, yeast free yeast is recommended.

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PA 60373

1/128

PAGE 20

4. THE DIRECTOR WILL ARRANGE FOR THE WORK OF THE ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS IDENTIFIED IN THIS DOCUMENTATION TO CONTINUE AS LONG AS NECESSARY. HE WOULD BE VISIBLE ATTACHED TO ONE OR TWO OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS AND OBTAIN CLEARANCE FROM THE DIRECTOR AND SECRETARY FOR INDETERMINATE PERIODS OF TIME DURING HIS STAY.
5. ALL ACTIVITIES WILL BE ON HIS OWN RESPONSIBILITY AND EXPENSE.
6. INFORMATION CONCERNING HIS ACTIVITIES IS STRONGLY REQUESTED.

AD-DIST:

INFO AUTHORITY SECRETARY (SO)
INFO CHIEF CONSULERS
DS COMIN
P. HANLEY
DISSEMIN
ELM
PLA T
POLYGRAPHIC

UNIDENTIFIED
1965

4. C.

4401

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. _____

3610 RP
103

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
Travel Control Division
APO 394, U.S. Army

DBI. 389-606/13-5

16 February 1946

SUBJECT : Travel Control - ITALY/GREECE.
TO : SOS., HQ Land Forces - Greece
Copy to : G-2 (CI) AFHQ, CHT.

1. Present arrangements for the control of travel from Greece to Italy require the concurrence of the Italian Government to all applications.

2. In order to obviate delays in referring applications to Rome it has been suggested that an Italian official empowered by the Government to grant or refuse applicants, might be attached to your office in a liaison capacity.

3. This official would be able to advise in all cases of movement between the two countries of individual and standard persons.

4. Your comments on this proposal would be appreciated.

JOHN W. CHAPMAN
Colonel, TAGD
Director.

SSS/cf

For info to: Executive Commissioner.

see M 196-100

3610 AP
162

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
Travel Control Division
APO 394, U.S. Army

381. 389-506/47

22 March 1946

SUBJECT : Activities of Spanish Consulate.

TO : Office of the Executive Commissioner.

1. Reference your 3610/37/30 dated 18 March 1946.
2. A copy of our letter to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs together with AFHQ letter O-5 09.112 of 9 March 1946 and CIC report are attached hereto.
3. The CIC report is somewhat misleading and would appear to have been misunderstood by AC of S., O-5. It is considered that our letter to the Italian Government is a true statement of the facts.
4. O-2 RAAC were contacted on 14 March and instructed to deliver the prisoners to the Questura. The prisoners had not contravened any travel regulation, control of exit from Italy was removed on 5 July 1945.
5. As it is known that both the American and British Embassies are endeavoring to persuade the Italian Government to institute some form of control over exit from Italy copies of our letter were forwarded to the Embassies.

John W. Chapman
Colonel, JAGD
Director.

SMC/cr

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CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
Travel Control Division
APO Y.M., U.S. Army

GFI. 389-506/47

15 March 1946

SUBJECT : Irregular documents issued by
Spanish Consulate, Rome.

TO : Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

1. When the Spanish ship "PUNTA ALMIRANTE" last visited CIVITAVECCHIA three Spanish nationals attempted to take passage for Spain using documents, furnished by the Spanish Consulate, belonging to or made out in the names of three other Spaniards.

2. Particulars are as follows:

<u>Subject's real name</u>	<u>Travelling with documents made out for</u>
Carlos MELIZIO REZA	Juan Don BELTRAN de GUTIERA BILBAO
Marcel VILLAROS COURCHOU	Ramon Don ATUCHA SAGARMINACA
Francisco JAUREGUIBERRIA	Enrique QUIERO GOMEZ.

The documents carried are stated to have been handed to their bearers by Spanish Consular or Embassy officials.

3. The following documents made out in the false names were carried:

- (a) Three copies each Repatriation Order issued by Displaced Persons and Repatriation Sub-Commission.
- (b) One document signed by Salmero Price OOMIN, Minister of the Embassy naming the three subjects by their false names, and requesting them to be given passage to any Spanish port.
- (c) One document each issued by the Spanish Consul Mario DE LEON bearing three photographs of the subjects, but false names, and certifying that bearers are Spanish nationals.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AB

101

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
Travel Control Division
APO 744, U.S. Army

GPO 389-506/47

15 March 1946

SUBJECT : Irregular documents issued by
Spanish Consulate, Rome.

TO : Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

1. When the Spanish ship "PUNTA ALMINA" last visited
CIVITAVECHIA three Spanish nationals attempted to take passage
for Spain using documents, furnished by the Spanish Consulate,
belonging to or made out in the names of three other Spaniards.

2. Particulars are as follows:

Subjects real names

Carlos MELIZIO REZA
Marcel VILAROS COURCHOU
Francisco JAUREQUIZENA

Travelling with documents made out for

Juan Don BELTRAN de GUERRA BILBAO
Ramon Don ATUCHA SAGARMINACA
Enrique QUIERO GOMEZ.

The documents carried are stated to have been handed
to their bearers by Spanish Consular or Embassy officials.

3. The following documents made out in the false names
were carried:

(a) Three copies each Repatriation Order issued by Displaced
Persons and Repatriation Sub-Commission.

(b) One document signed by Balmero Price COMIN, Minister of
the Embassy naming the three subjects by their false names
and requesting them to be given passage to any Spanish port.

(c) One document each issued by the Spanish Consul Mario DE LEON
bearing three photographs of the subjects, but false names,
and certifying that bearers are Spanish nationals.

CONFIDENTIAL

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b. Interrogation of the subjects suggests that the authorities knew their three names and identities and that the Repatriation Orders referred to in para 3(a) above were genuine documents which had been issued in favour of three Spaniards repatriated some months previously.

5. Your comments on the above are invited.

JOHN W. CHAPMAN
Colonel, JAGD
Director.

SMC/ct

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. _____

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CC MISSION

A.P.D. 294

Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref. 3610/185/30

23 March 1946

SUBJECT: Illegal Immigration

TO : G A Section
(attn: P.S. S/S)

-14 refs-

Reference G-5 Section APH letter of 25 February 1946 -
no reference quoted-on the above mentioned subject.

May this office please be advised of your actions in this
matter.

For the Chief Commissioner

C. W. BAKER
C. W. BAKER

Brigadier
Executive Commissioner

4091

Declassified P.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. _____

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

A.P.O. 302

Office of the Executive Commissioner

96

Ref. : 561079/30 ✓

21 March 1946.

To Whom it may concern,

Re: Ref. No. 561079/30 ✓

The attached copy of serial 760020 from G.E., is forwarded

for your information and may soon affect our final decision.

For the undersigned,

A. M. Karpov

Executive Commissioner

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. _____

mf
URGENT

Ref: 3640/4/82

19 March 1946

My dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I have to inform you that with effect from
7 April 1946 it is the intention of the Allied Authorities
to impose Travel Control restrictions on the Morgan Line.

The Yugoslav authorities have been informed
of this decision.

Yours very truly,

John M. Spear

JOHN M. SPEAR
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief Commissioner

Copy to : S.S. S/C

Dr. Alcide De Gasperi,
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government,
Rome.

4097

INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Organization Reference # 62929
Date / Time on Origin MAR 161329A
FROM GHQ CAF SIGNED SIGNED
TO ALCOM

CIPHER
Message Control No. H/779
Date Time Rec'd MAR 170900

Message # ROUTINE

SECRET
SECRET.

FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND YOU MAY INFORM ITALIAN GOVERNMENT ON 19 MARCH THAT JUGOSLAV AUTHORITIES WILL BE INFORMED ALSO ON 19 MARCH OF OUR INTENTION TO IMPOSE TRAVEL CONTROL RESTRICTIONS ON KOREAN LINE. THIS CONTROL OF MOVEMENT WILL BECOME EFFECTIVE 0407 APRIL.

AC-DLT

ACTION: EXEC COMMISSIONER 2
INFO: CHIEF COMMISSIONER
PUBLIC SAFETY (TC)
FILE
SUBJ: 170909Z

SECRET

SECRET.

FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND YOU MAY INFORM ITALIAN GOVERNMENT ON 19 MARCH THAT JUCCISLA
AUTHORITIES WILL BE INFORMED ALSO ON 19 MARCH OF OUR INTENTION TO IMPOSE TRAVEL
CONTROL RESTRICTIONS ON MIGRANT LINE. THIS CONTROL OF MOVEMENT WILL BECOME EFFECTIVE
ON 7 APRIL.

SECRET

AC DLT

ACTION: EXEC COMMISSIONER 2
INFO: CHIEF COMMISSIONER
PUBLIC SAFETY (TC)
FILE
SILENT

SECRET

CIPHER KEYGRAM

This message will not be distributed among
British or U.S. Government Headquarters or
Headquarters of the United Nations
without prior
O.T.P. (see)

6097

(b) (1) b)

Declassified E.O. 13526 Section 3.3 NND No. _____

GBI. 389-506/40

15 March 1946

SUBJECT : Italian Travel Control.
Policy of Ports and Frontiers.

TO : Ministry of the Interior.

COPY TO : Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

1. Reference our letter GBI. 389-506/40 of 15 March 1946.
2. With the withdrawal of Allied Security Control personnel from Ports and Frontiers in Italy and the impending cancellation of the Allied Force Permit system, this Commission recommends that measures be taken by the Italian Authorities considerably to increase the vigilance of their Immigration, Customs and Coastguard Services.
3. With the resumption of full responsibility for these controls by the Italian Government it is recommended that the strongest measures be taken to organise the services with a view to the prevention of unauthorised movement into and out of the country both in cases of individual movement and in bodies of repatriates returning from Displaced Persons and Refugee Camps.
4. It is further recommended that clear instructions be given to all personnel of these services on correct documentation of travellers and on action to be taken in cases of infringement of regulations.

BRIGADIER,
Executive Commissioner.

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91/2

GBI. 389-506/40

15 March 1946

SUBJECT : Italian Travel Control.

TO : Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Ministry of the Interior.

1. A study has been made of the conditions covering Italian Travel Control with a view to the early withdrawal of Allied personnel carrying out this work.

2. It is felt that the Italian Authorities should now assume full responsibility for these controls. The right however to reimpose Military Control of movement by exercising the power of refusal or over-riding approval will be retained by the Allied Authorities, but will not be exercised unless required by military necessity. The following outline of procedure covering each aspect of the problem is submitted.

3. ENTRY INTO ITALY FROM ABROAD.

This problem divides itself into three categories, procedure for the control of which are given below:

(a) Entry from countries in which the Italian Government has Diplomatic representation. This class of travel is already controlled by the Italian Authorities under normal peace-time conditions, visas being granted or refused without prior reference to the Allied Military Authorities.

Particulars of visas granted are supplied by the Italian Authorities to this Commission for checking against records held. It is requested that this practice should continue.

(b) Entry from countries in which the Italian Government has no representation. This travel is now controlled by means of the Allied Force Permit system operated by the Military Authorities and applications to enter Italian territory are subject to the approval of the Italian Government.

1091

92

The Allied Military Authorities do not feel justified in continuing to exercise this control and propose to abolish the system with effect from 25 March 1946.

It is assumed that the Italian Government and the Governments of the countries concerned will make alternative arrangements to control movement between their respective countries by the installation of visa issuing agencies. In this event it is requested that particulars of all visas granted should also be supplied to this Commission for checking against records.

(c) Entry into Italy from countries under Allied Military occupation. Applications received in these countries are now handled through Allied Military channels and the concurrence of the Italian Authorities is obtained by the Travel Control Division of this Commission.

It is proposed to eliminate the participation of the Military Authorities in Italy by arranging for the installation of Italian Liaison Officers at Military Permit Offices in Austria and Germany who would be empowered by the Italian Government to grant or refuse permission to enter this country on their behalf.

Applications to enter Austria or Germany from Italy would be received at Jusstura throughout the country and would be forwarded to the Italian Liaison Officer concerned through proper channels for submission to the Allied Military Permit Office. In approved cases, the permit would be returned to the Jusstura from which the application originated.

In appropriate cases, the applications of Allied nationals for entry into Austria or Germany may be submitted to the Allied Military Permit Officer through their respective diplomatic or consular channels.

4. The agreement of the Italian Authorities to the principles outlined above is solicited.

4/11

BRIGADIER,
Executive Commissioner.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3 NND No.

3/6/46
ALLIED MILITARY AUTHORITIES
APC 512

AG 202.47 010-0

15 March 1946

89

AMENDMENT - General Control - Entry into FRG other than territory under
Allied Military Government.

To: Addressees listed below:

In view of the circumstances, File AG 202.47 010-0, dated 27 November
1945 is modified effective 25 March 1946.

1. The Allied Force Permit system for control of entry into FRG will
continue to be operated after 25 March 1946 from all countries except Germany
in accordance with responsibility for exercising this control will return to the
British Control Zone.

2. United States and British Services personnel do not require visas and
may enter FRG on production of valid travel orders.

FOR THE ALLIED MILITARY AUTHORITIES, BIRMINGHAM, ENGLAND

Gen. Sec. Office,
B.M.A., Birmingham,
England, M.S.
M.C. Adjutant General

- Definitions:
- British Military Commission - BRMC.
 - U.S. Directorate General - U.S.D.G.
 - U.S. Logistics Section - U.S.L.S.
 - U.S. Logistics Section - D.B.M.C.
 - British Military Control - BMC.
 - British Control Council - BCC.
 - U.S. Student C.C. - U.S.S.C.
 - British Military Liaison - B.M.L.
 - U.S. Military Liaison - U.S.M.L.
 - U.S. M.R. - U.S. M.R.
 - British Military Control - BMC.
 - Allied Control Commission - ACC.
 - Allied Control Commission - AAC.
 - U.S.A.T. - U.S.A.T.
 - Combined Forces Control Council - C.F.C.
 - Combined Travel Security Board - C.T.S.B.
 - Ministers for War, War Office - M.W., W.O.
 - Army Air Council - A.A.C.
 - Army Air Council - A.A.C. (British Air Ministry), London, U.K.
 - Travel Bureau, Central Committee for Germany (British Element), Berlin, U.S.S.R.

Dated t88

4089

CAIT R

Declassified E.O. 13526 Section 3.3(b)(D) No.

[Larson, 46-012, #1 851-0
and 017 March, 06, 1954]

Differences: (Cont'd)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. _____

Ref. : 3619/77/0

8 March 1966.

Subject: Activities of Soviet Consultant.

To : [unclear] (Traffic Control Sec.)

84

1. Ref letter No. 91094, ref. of 9 March from the Assistant Chief of Staff G-3, AFM to this HQ, passed to you for action.
2. It is requested that you advise this office of your action taken, and forward copy of your reply.

For the Chief Coordinator:

A. W. Kroll

cc: [unclear]
[unclear] [unclear]

0
cc: M. S.
[unclear]

408

af

g

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. _____

3610

911

LONDON POLICE INFORMATION
SAC Section
ATO 510

0-5, 001,112

7 March 1946

SUBJECT: Activities of Spanish Consulate.

W.H. 1

To : Headquarters, Allied Control Commission,
APO 704.

1. Attached are extracts from a report from OTC concerning the issue of false passes to three Italian subjects by the Spanish Consulate in Rome. It will be observed that these included forged entries of names issued by the S. S. Division, Allied Commission.

2. A recommendation was made on 20 February 1946 that the three persons concerned, then held by OTC in the Banbury Prison at Rome, should be handed over to the Italian authorities for legal action for infraction of the traffic control regulations. You should inquire direct from A.A.C. whether this has been done.

3. Action in regard to the alleged issue of forged documents by the Spanish Consulate would appear to lie with the Italian Government who are responsible for travel control. A copy of the attached report should, therefore, be passed to the appropriate Italian authorities, who should be asked for their comments on the information of this Headquarters.

BY COMMAND OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR,

R. L. H.

A. L. HANSON
Brigadier General, AAC
Assistant Chief of Staff, SAC

Incl. as above

Action copy to Public Safety Sec.

16 Mar 83 AM 87

87

1087

(cont'd)

CHB

1. Information, Mexico, 1940-1941
and 1942, Mexico, 1942.

2. Villages (Mexican), Mexico, 1940-1941
and 1942, Mexico, 1942.

3. Names (Mexican), Mexico, 1940-1941
and 1942, Mexico, 1942.

4. Information on Family (Mexican).

5. Information on Individuals (Mexican).
This information includes the following:
Name, Age, Sex, Nationality, Ethnic group, Race,
Physical description, including race, color, height, weight,
and other descriptive features; place of birth, place of residence,
and place of death; education received, education
level, and family background; occupation or calling, and that those
individuals are now living or dead.

6. Information on Groups (Mexican) and Religious (Mexican) organiza-

7. Information on Indians (Mexican) about subjects who are Natives of
Mexico and Indians from Mexico, Canada, United States, and
elsewhere.

Information

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Information</u>	<u>Information</u>	<u>Information</u>
1. Name	John	John	John
2. Age	40 years	40 years	40 years
3. Sex	Male	Male	Male
4. Nationality	Mexican	Mexican	Mexican
5. Ethnic group	Mexican	Mexican	Mexican
6. Place of birth	United States	United States	United States

8. Information on Indians (Mexican) concerning their right to live, and
rights of autonomy.

44D

1. In 1943, the Spanish Foreign Minister, Dr. Jose Calvo Sotelo, and his wife, Mrs. Jose Calvo Sotelo, were received by the Spanish Ambassador to the United States, Mr. Luis Carrero, at the Spanish Embassy in Washington.

2. Mr. Carrero was received by the Spanish Ambassador.

3. All available maps in the agency library were examined.

4. In 1943, Spain had also referred a request of the Spanish Ambassador to the United States to the Spanish Foreign Minister because the facilities of the Spanish Foreign Office were limited. The name of the Spanish Foreign Minister was given as "Mr. Jose Calvo Sotelo".

5. When arrested, Calvo Sotelo was to be SP400, 27-102-1160, or 27-102-102-1160. The following names, all Spanish, are listed in Spanish and their true name, and they are to be referred to as "Spanish Agents" or "Spanish Spies":

6. (a) The name of Captain R. de Otero, 27-102-1160, Spanish Foreign Agent, Spanish Air Force, and engineer, killed Spanish Spy, ABC 2000, code name 1000-1000-1000-1000.

7. (b) The name of Captain Pedro G. de la Torre, 27-102-1160, Spanish Foreign Agent, Spanish Air Force, and engineer, killed Spanish Spy, ABC 2000, code name 1000-1000-1000-1000.

8. (c) One additional Spanish Foreign Agent, identified as Captain Pedro G. de la Torre, Spanish Air Force, and engineer, killed Spanish Spy, ABC 2000, code name 1000-1000-1000-1000.

9. (d) Captain Jose Lopez, 27-102-1160, Spanish Foreign Agent, Spanish Air Force, engineer, and photographs of Captain Jose Lopez, Spanish Foreign Agent, Spanish Spy.

10. Captain Jose Lopez, 27-102-1160, Spanish Foreign Agent, Spanish Air Force, engineer, and photographs of Captain Jose Lopez, Spanish Foreign Agent, Spanish Spy.

11. Different names of the investigation agents, individuals, and members of the Spanish and Peruvian Air Forces, including identification of the Spanish Foreign Agent, Spanish Spy.

12. Captain Jose Lopez, Spanish Foreign Agent, Spanish Spy, and photographs of Captain Jose Lopez, Spanish Foreign Agent, Spanish Spy.

13. The true name, address and telephone number of Captain Jose Lopez, Spanish Foreign Agent, Spanish Spy.

1084
The information which I have been able to obtain concerning the present status of the British Council and its activities includes the following:

The chief purpose of the organization is to promote friendly relations between the United Kingdom and other countries.

The organization has been active in this field since 1919, and has been instrumental in establishing friendly relations between the United Kingdom and many countries. It has conducted over 10,000 tours, organized thousands of exhibitions, and has promoted cultural exchange between the United Kingdom and other countries. It has also helped to establish the British Council in many countries throughout the world.

Although most of the work of the British Council is educational, it also carries on a variety of other activities such as research, publishing, and giving lectures and conferences. In addition, it has a large number of members, mostly from the United Kingdom, who are interested in the work of the organization and help to support its activities.

The organization is divided into several branches, each with its own administrative and financial resources. The main branch is located in London, and there are smaller branches in other parts of the United Kingdom.

The organization has been active in many countries, including the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and many others. It has also established branches in many countries, including the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and many others.

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(40)

Callahan, who was then in command of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were interviewed by the Committee.

Mr. John T. Nichols, Director of Defense Intelligence, told the Agent he had been informed by Mr. Callahan that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been asked to furnish information concerning the Cuban missile crisis.

Mr. Nichols, according to Agent, told the Agent that he had been informed by Mr. Callahan that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been asked to furnish information concerning the Cuban missile crisis to the Committee. He said that Mr. Callahan had been asked to furnish the information because it was believed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been in contact with the Cuban missile crisis in their capacity as members of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Agent was told that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been asked to furnish information concerning the Cuban missile crisis to the Committee.

Agent asked Mr. Nichols if he had been informed of any information concerning the Cuban missile crisis which had been furnished to the Committee by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mr. Nichols advised Agent that he had been informed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had furnished information concerning the Cuban missile crisis to the Committee.

Agent asked Mr. Nichols if he had been informed of any information concerning the Cuban missile crisis which had been furnished to the Committee by the Defense Intelligence Agency. Mr. Nichols advised Agent that he had been informed that the Defense Intelligence Agency had furnished information concerning the Cuban missile crisis to the Committee.

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44E

in addition to the three original, three additional
copies were furnished to the British Government on 10 August 1945
as specimens. In the event of major difficulties, additional certificates
of authenticity may be issued by the British Government
and these will be available for all subsequent requests of the British.

3. Certified photocopies of copies of these documents should be
sent to the U.S. Embassy in London, England, from time to time to GPO,

CONFIDENTIAL

The information contained herein is subject to automatic
downgrading to secret level for the sake of continuing security. The same
information, when submitted to the Commission, constitutes classified
information in respect hereto notwithstanding the fact that it has been
declassified or downgraded prior to its submission to the Commission. Dec. 14, 1945
The above rules are reflected in GPO.

4. Information supplied by the U.S. Embassy to the British
Government, London, England, shall remain confidential
unless otherwise agreed upon in writing. This is to prevent
any unauthorized disclosure of information to other
countries.

5. The U.S. Embassy, London, England, shall be responsible
for the safekeeping of all documents and papers furnished
to the British Government under this code. Since the Commission has no
control of any information furnished to the U.S. Embassy, it is requested
that care be taken. As far as possible a copy of the information
should be available for inspection immediately upon request up to one month.
Any person having knowledge of the contents of any document
or paper should immediately report the same to the U.S. Embassy.
Such documents should be treated as confidential papers of the
U.S. Government. Confidential information should never be
disclosed, accidentally or otherwise, to any person, firm, organization or
institution, foreign or domestic, or to any member of the press or
any other individual, without the express written consent of the
U.S. Embassy, London, England.

6. In case of the breakdown or loss of the code, information
concerning the same may be furnished, provided the same appears to be
absolutely necessary, to the British Government.

Declassified E.O. 13556 Section 3.3/NND No. _____

3610 A

6/10/68

83

4/310
JUN 8 1968

AMERICAN

Urgent

EX 66216.

V1172

AIR, AIRSEA LACON

ACTION: 1. ISA 000031 BILLBOARD

2. 0001. EX 13 CONC ALCON FOR PSC DUE TO CG 1001.

SECRET

SECRET

RECORDED 0001 399 OR 15 FEBRUARY AND OTHER SIGNALS. OVERLAY CONTROL OF NUMBER
1000 ALL AIR SIGNALS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THROUGH ACTUAL DATE FOR THE FIXES. RECORDED
IN AIR JOURNAL GOVERNMENT TO RECORD WITH DOCUMENTATION 2018 & IMMEDIATELY

4000

1000 ACTION 7 JUNEY 10 2

1000 1 CHIEF COMMISSIONER

EX 000100 1000

1000

1000

CIPHER TELEGRAM

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Department of Defense. It has been approved for release under the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) program guidelines and is protected by copyright laws. Distribution outside the DoD complex is subject to the restrictions of law. This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Department of Defense. It has been approved for release under the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) program guidelines and is protected by copyright laws. Distribution outside the DoD complex is subject to the restrictions of law.



SECRET

4000

83

Declassified E.O. 12856 Section 3.3 NND No. _____

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
Travel Control Division
APO 394, U.S. Army

OBI. 389-506/40

March 1946.

SUBJECT : Travel Control - VENEZIA GIULIA
TO : (1) G.S.I(b), H.Q., XIII Corps
(ii) H.Q., Venezia Giulia Police Force
(Attn: Captain BOIT).

1. Attached for your information are copies of letters despatched to the Italian Government regarding the appointment of Liaison Officers to UDINE Province.

2. The gentlemen nominated for this task are:

- (1) Conte Justo Giusti del Giardino
- (2) Signor Guido Relli

3. A copy of the instructions given to their representatives by the Italian Authorities will be forwarded to you for information as soon as received.

JOHN W. CHAPMAN
Colonel, JAGD
Director.

See M-82

4
W 5/3
(a)

3/1

631. 385-96/DO

+ March 1915

SUBJECT : Travel Control between TERRITORIAL
and other Italian provinces.

To : The Ministry of the Interior
The Minister of Local Affairs.

1. In order to better about a more efficient control of movement
between TERRITORIAL and other Italian provinces a regulation of movement
procedures is proposed.
2. It is suggested that the Italian Government should appoint a
mission officer and send him to be attached to a military delegation
at Tripoli. This officer would be empowered to enforce or refuse movements
from to other parts of Italy on behalf of the Italian Government.
Laws to control other parts of Italy would be left to the central offices to regulate.
3. He would pay frequent visits to the central offices to regulate
and to S.M. Circulars for the purpose of executing instructions and to
submit applications to enter the Italian-American regiment from other
Italian provinces.
He would also pay frequent visits to the Italian national army
Chancery in Tripoli and address to address on behalf of Italian national army
represent the Italian Government's views.
4. Applications to enter the Italian-American regiment from
other parts of Italy would be presented at ministerial office and be forwarded directly
to the Ministry of War in Tripoli. Requests in Tripoli, would be
conveyed to the central office regulating the regulation.
5. It will be recommended that the right to move troops between
the provinces of Italy and the provinces of the Italian colonies which are governed by
Dormitory laws the recommendations of the Italian Foreign Office be followed
in case two young men

SUBJECT : Travel Control between VENEZIA Giulia
and other Italian provinces.

TO : The Ministry of the Interior
The Minister of Foreign Affairs.

1. In order to bring about a more efficient control of movement
between VENEZIA Giulia and other Italian provinces a revision of present
procedures is proposed.

2. It is proposed that the Italian Government should nominate a
liaison officer and shall cause to be attached to it military information
officers. This officer would be endowed to move or receive instructions
from the other parts of Italy on behalf of the Italian Government.

3. He would represent directly to the military office in TRIESTE
and to the M.I. corps for the purpose of examining applications and to
submit applications to enter the Anglo-American occupied zone from other
Italian provinces.

He would also pay liaison visits to the displaced persons
camp in TRIESTE and propose to advise on moves of Italian national and
represent the Italian Government's views.

4. Applications to enter the Anglo-American occupied zone from
other parts of Italy would be received at TRIESTE and be forwarded di-
rectly to the Military Control Office in TRIESTE. Resulting proposals will be
submitted to the Committee coordinating the administration.

5. It will be understood that the right to move persons between
the provinces of VENEZIA Giulia would be reserved by M.I.
Some but the procedures of the liaison officer would be followed
in case two (two) movements into other parts of Italy.

BUSCONE,
Executive Committee,

4070

Declassified P.O. 12356 Section 3.3 NND No. _____

RESTRICTED

SCA

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMINCH
Public Safety Sub-Commission
Travel Control Division
XCO 304, U.S. Army

OAI. 380-506/40

1 March 1946

SUBJECT : Travel Control - VENEZIA GIULIA.

TO : Ministero degli Affari Interni
(Attn: Mr. ALBERGATI).

1. Reference our letter OAI. 380-506/40 of 1 March 1946.
2. Headquarters, XIII Corps now states that arrangements have been made for the appointment of your representative to UDINE Province.
3. It would be appreciated therefore if you could arrange for them to proceed to the Headquarters of the TURINIAN ALPINE Battalion (formerly 517 Italian Guards Bn.) at LOVATIA near UDINE.
4. This Unit is charged with the control of the VENEZIA GIULIA provincial boundary and is provided with transportation, accommodation, etc., and is thought to be the most suitable unit to which these gentlemen could be attached.
5. Please supply personal particulars of these representatives to this office so that passes to allow their movement between TRIESTE and UDINE can be provided.
6. After establishing themselves at LOVATIA it is requested that contact should be made with Q.M.C.H.Q., Main H.Q., XIII Corps, UDINE - (Major CANTIER or Captain BOVIO) and with Captain BULF, M.C., VENEZIA GIULIA Police Force (Permit Office) TRIESTE where they will be assured of all co-operation and assistance.
7. It would be appreciated if a copy of your instructions to these officers regarding the control of movement between the Province and other parts of ITALY, could be supplied to this office for information.

Copy to: (i) Ministry of Interior
(ii) XIII Corps for OAI's
(iii) VGI

JOHN W. O'LEARY
Colonel, USA
Director.

407*

RESTRICTED

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. _____

G 202

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3610/Q

79

ALLIED FORCES HEADQUARTERS
O-5 Section
APU 512

O-5:

25 February 1946

SUBJ CT: Illegal Immigration into Italy.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission,
APO 361.

b7

Reference is made to minutes of meeting on relaxation of traffic controls issued under reference 3610/QC of 12 February and the draft letter to the Italian Government implementing the decisions set out therein.

1. It is desired to modify the provisions of paragraph 3 of the enclosed letter (Draft B) to the Italian Government subject "Italian Travel Control, Policy of Ports and Frontiers." The Italian Government should be made aware that their responsibility for the prevention of unauthorized movement into and out of Italy includes the screening of all bodies or restrictions set aside for Displaced Persons and Refugee Camps.

2. You are therefore requested to urge the Italian Government to submit without delay a plan for the rigorous screening of such persons both at the Italian frontiers and at source in the European Displaced Persons and Refugee Camps. In receipt of such a plan every effort will be made to afford to the Italian Government such facilities as they deem necessary to permit the effective assumption by them of this responsibility.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

R. L. ...

QH
cc

F. G. ... PARSONS,
Brigadier,
acting Assistant Chief of Staff, O-5.

Copy to:

C-2
Brit Polad

Original to PSC

4
(4000) 60

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 185617

RECORDED

16

76

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
Travel Control Division
APO 100, U.S. Army

001. 300-100/10

19 February 1946

SUBJECT: Travel Control

TO : U.S. Embassy
Mr. Embassy
D-2, A.Y.D. 100.

8-70

for Chairman

1. Enclosed are draft copies of four letters produced in accordance with the minutes of the meeting on relaxation of travel control.

2. It is proposed to forward these letters to the Italian authorities when the concurrence of addressees to the letter has been obtained.

3. It would be appreciated if a reply could be given as soon as possible.

JOHN T. CHAPMAN
Colonel, JAGG
Director.

Copy to: Displaced Persons Sub-Commission.

2/2 1976

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RECORDED

MAPS "A"

001. 100-56760

15 February 1946

- (1) Italian Travel Control
(2) Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Ministry of the Interior.

1. A study has been made of the conditions covering Italian travel control with a view to the early withdrawal of allied controls now in effect.

2. It is felt that the Italian authorities should now assume full responsibility for these controls and the following outline of procedure covering each aspect of the problem is submitted for consideration.

3. ENTRY INTO ITALY FROM ABROAD.

This problem divides itself into three categories, procedures for the control of which are given below:

- (a) Entry from countries in which the Italian Government has diplomatic representation. This class of travel is already controlled by the Italian authorities under normal executive conditions, visas being granted or refused without refernce to the Allied Military Authorities.

74

Particulars of visas granted are supplied by the Italian Authorities to this Commission for checking against records held. It is requested that this practice should continue.

(b) Entry from countries in which the Italian Government has no representation. This travel is now controlled by means of the Allied Force Permit system operated by the Military Authorities and application to enter Italian territory are subject to the approval of the Italian Government.

The Allied military authorities do not feel justified in continuing to exercise this control and propose shortly to abolish the system.

It is assumed that the Italian Government and the Governments of the countries concerned will make alternative arrangements to control movement between their respective countries by the installation of visa issuing agencies. In this event it is suggested that particulars of all visas granted should also be supplied to this Commission for checking against records.

(c) Entry into Italy from countries under Allied Military occupation.

Applications received in these countries are now handled through Allied Military channels and the concurrence of the Italian Authorities is obtained by the Travel Control Division of this Commission.

It is proposed to eliminate the participation of the Military Authorities in Italy by arranging for the installation of Italian liaison Officers at Military Permit Offices in Austria

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 78307

JW

and Germany who would be empowered by the Italian Government to grant or refuse permission to enter this country on their behalf.

Applications to enter Austria or Germany from Italy would be received at Questura throughout the country and would be forwarded direct to the Italian liaison officer concerned for submission to the Allied Military Transit Office and, in approved cases, the permit would be sent direct to the Questura from which the application originated.

b. The agreement of the Italian authorities to the principles outlined above is solicited.

BRIGADIER,
Acting Chief Commissioner.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. _____

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
Travel Control Division
APO 394, U.S. Army

TD

MSI. 389-506/.....

...February 1946

SUBJECT : Italian Travel Control - Policy of Ports and Frontiers.

To : Ministry of the Interior.

1. Reference our letter.....of.....
2. With the withdrawal of Allied Security Control personnel from Ports and Frontiers in Italy and the impending cancellation of the Allied Force Permit system, this Commission recommends that measures be taken by the Italian Authorities considerably to increase the vigilance of their Immigration, Customs and Coastguard Services.
3. With the resumption of full responsibility for these controls by the Italian Government it is recommended that the strongest measures should be taken to organise the services with a view to the prevention of unauthorised movement into and out of the country.
4. It is further recommended that clear instructions should be issued to all personnel of these services on correct documentation of travellers and on action to be taken in cases of infringement of regulations.

MSI/af

Body
Action by

John T. Chapman
Colonel, JAGU
Director,

407.1

SECRET 40*

TL

GSI. 380-506/40

15 February 1948

SUBJECT: Internal security measures
for the control of aliens.

TO: Ministry of the Interior.

1. This Government has given further consideration to the question of control of aliens in the country referred to in your letter of 16/02/48/47 dated 5 Jan. and our reply reference AD/19755/5/25 dated 5 February.

2. Subject to the conditions mentioned in my letter, it is felt that energetic measures can be taken to bring about an improvement in a situation which is at present extremely confused.

3. Your consideration is therefore invited of the suggestion that the Italian Authorities should proceed to the documentation of all aliens in the country with a view to classifying them and arranging for the disposal of undesirable elements.

4. It has been suggested that this procedure might take the following form:

(a) Require all aliens to register their presence at Quattro.

This would be done in nationality groups on specified dates.

(b) Record particulars of all such aliens including personal details, time, date, place and authority for entering the

country, current activity, original mandate, reason for presence in country.

- (c) Provide aliens with document showing that they have registered.
- (d) Form control index by nationalities and classify cases into groups indicating the action the Italian Authorities wish to take, i.e. "undesirable-for deportation", "acceptable", "sojourner to be limited to 2 months", etc.
- (e) Organise transit cases into which aliens illegally in the country and whose deportation can be arranged could be placed leaving their documents.
- (f) Reinforce all normal alien control measures, i.e. registration at hotels, requirement to report to police at intervals, etc.

6. The Italian Police could then proceed to the arrest of those aliens who had failed to register.

7. By these means, it is felt that a proper appreciation of the situation could be made and, when the necessary information had been collected, the Italian Authorities could approach this Commission regarding the disposal of undesirable groups.

8. Your comments on the above suggestions would be appreciated.

KINGSTON,
Acting Chief Commissioner.

MEMO #2

b9
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GSI, 389-506740

15 February 1946

PROPOSAL : Travel Control between VENEZIA GIULIA
and other Italian Provinces.

TO : The Ministry of the Interior
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

1. In order to bring about a more efficient control of movement between VENEZIA GIULIA and other Italian provinces a revision of present procedure is proposed.

2. It is suggested that the Italian Government should appoint a liaison officer who shall staff to be attached to a military commission at QMHQ who would be authorized to approve or refuse applications to enter other parts of Italy on behalf of the Italian Government.

3. This officer would pay frequent visits to the ports of entry in VENEZIA for the purpose of examining applications and to submit applications to enter the Anglo-American occupied zone from other Italian provinces.

He would also pay liaison visits to the Displaced Persons Camps in UMBRIA and TOSCANA to advise on cases of Italian nationals and represent the Italian Government's views.

4. Applications to enter the Anglo-American occupied zone from other parts of Italy would be received at QmHQ and be forwarded

direct to this office for transmission to the Military Permit Office in TRIPOLI. Permits approved would be handed to him for despatch to the Quesada originating the application.

5. It will be appreciated that the right to move persons between the Provinces of QUITO and PROVINCIA SUCRE would be reserved by H.Q. C.I.T Corps but the recommendations of the liaison officer would be followed in cases involving movement into other parts of Italy.

BRIGADIER,
Acting Chief Commissioner.

4069

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10, VACANT

1610/EC

ARMED FORCES INFORMATION CENTER OF THE UNITED STATES
HEADQUARTERS, ARMY SECURITY AGENCEY, WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
12 SEPTEMBER 1946.

Chairman:
Assistant Chief Commissioner,
Commissioner U. S. Marshals, FBI, MC.

Present : Mr. E. Gabley Jones, U.S. Embassy.
Mr. H. Schneider, G-3 Embassy.
Mr. J. Leibler, British Embassy.
Mr. F. Norton, British Embassy.
Mr. J. Lee, British Embassy.
Col. G. M. Tamm, Public Safety G/C, AC.
Lt-Col. J. E. Pritchard, Displaced Persons S/C, AC.
Mr. J. E. Young, AC.
Major J. L. Johnson, AC.
Major J. A. Brown, Displaced Persons S/C, AC.

1. The members who convened after a general discussion on the various aspects of travel of displaced persons, AC, and it was agreed that, due to rapidly changing personnel, circumstances, and the fact that the security interests involved in the movement of personnel or equipment abroad should be protected, no method of referring the country by the Italian Government more specifically to the transfer of full responsibility was desirable.
2. It was also pointed out that the right to impose military control of movement by the government of Italy or its usual or existing liaison channels, or travel controls, should be retained.
3. It was also pointed out that the fact that the security of personnel of various authorities, particularly those without reference to military authorities to print or refuse visas without reference to liaison authorities to transmit to DPMO for check against records.
- In the event of unavoidable elements being found, appropriate action should be requested of the Italian authorities.
- b) PROVISIONS WHICH THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT HAS REQUESTED.
- Approval was given to the action taken to empower the Italian authorities to print or refuse visas without reference to liaison authorities to check against records.

Col. G. P. Davis, AFHQ,
Col. J. J. S. Public Safety S/C, G.
Lt Col. J. P. Fothergill, Displaced Persons S/C, G.
Lt Col. J. E. Young, AFHQ,
Major V. S. M. onds, AFHQ,
Lieut G. Shurton, Displaced Persons S/C, G.

1. The meeting was opened with a general discussion on the various aspects of travel on behalf of personnel in G, and it was agreed that, due to rapidly diminishing personnel resources, and the fact that the security informant had been used to a very great extent, the transfer of full responsibility to the Italian authorities was desirable.
2. It was decided that military security requirements would be satisfied if particular use of liaison authorisation to enter the country by the Italian Government was subjected to AFHQ for check against records held.
3. It was also pointed out that the right to impose military control of movement by the exercise of a power of refusal or overriding approval should be retained if such a measure was required.

Agreement was reached on the method of transferring the various documents of travel control from military channels, as follows:-

a) From countries in which the Italian Government has representation.

Approval was given to the action taken to empower the Italian authorities to grant or refuse visas without reference to United Nations military authorities. Particulars of visas would, however, be submitted to AFHQ for check against records. In the event of undesirable elements being found, appropriate action would be requested of the Italian authorities.

b) Travel from countries without foreign office representation.

It was agreed that action proposed in refusing to act further in the issue of permits on behalf of the Italian Government was desirable. On receipt of Foreign Office and State Department approval of this project, a letter informing the Italian Government that the Displaced Persons Permit system was to be abolished would be despatched by AFHQ. A draft for this letter would be prepared in advance, and circulated for concurrence. Other action proposed in AFHQ memorandum of 9 February 1946 para 4 (b) was also approved.

c) VENEZUELA, CUBA, TRINIDAD CONTROL

It was agreed that the present procedure would be continued until further notice, and that DIA Control would come under DIA Control. It was suggested that DIA Control would be responsible for all security measures to receive information and request prompt answers from DIA Control.

It was suggested that the DIA Control Government had the power to prohibit Cuban liaison officers from entering into U.S. territory, the right to remove individuals from between VENEZUELA, CUBA, and U.S. without being held responsible.

It was decided that as DIA liaison offices were in U.S. territory, the right to remove individuals from between VENEZUELA, CUBA, and U.S. would have to be reserved.

The Italian Government could be asked to give a weekly or monthly report on the number of persons coming across the border individually or as displaced persons.

d) Travel between U.S., ISRAEL, and GREECE.

"Starting consideration of proposals in control units travel via land, sea, or air into or through Israel, or through Greece into Italy. It was agreed that only VENEZUELA and GREECE were now necessary.

It was decided that this control was primarily the responsibility of the Italian Government and that only VENEZUELA, GREECE, and ITALY should be assigned to constitute a controller.

5. The question of exit from the country was also discussed and the controller recommended that only VENEZUELA and GREECE were now necessary. That war criminals would be able to leave without presenting through DIA controls. It was pointed out that Italy had already withdrawn its controls. In order that only VENEZUELA and GREECE were now necessary, it was necessary that only VENEZUELA and GREECE be assigned to constitute a controller.

It was decided that this control was primarily the responsibility of the Italian Government and that only VENEZUELA, GREECE, and ITALY should be assigned to constitute a controller.

6. The problem of Italian policies of ports, coasts and waters was also ventilated with particular reference to the DIA Control and it was concluded that lack of adequate shipping and personnel was the crucial point.

It was felt, however, that it was very necessary to take the preliminary steps towards this enable the Italian authorities to take the necessary steps towards this

and ordered these concessions did, in fact, except in the case of certain very limited categories.

It was felt, however, that it was very necessary to take the preliminary steps towards this enable the Italian authorities to take the necessary steps towards this

level, "arrangements would have to be made to ensure that the Italian authorities could not be compelled to give up their rights to the territory of Italy. It was also necessary to make arrangements to the effect that voluntary deportation laws that did not cover all Italian subjects to be authorized to return to Italy. All diplomatic efforts were directed to this end.

It was appreciated that the Italian government should have to be given the right to bring their subjects back to Italy.

6. The problem of Italian soliciting of ports, consisting of visitors who had come to Italy to seek opportunities for seafaring, had already been presented to the Italian Government and they should be given the right to do so.

It was decided that this control was primarily the responsibility of the Italian Government and they should be given the right to maintain a frontier measure of control.

7. The question of entry into the country was also discussed and the controller of the Italian Government said that only aliens and foreigners were now necessary.

It was decided that the "right of entry" in the United States should be granted to citizens of the United States in detail, of application to visitors from other countries. It was pointed out that this had already been done by the Italian Government to the extent of granting Aliens

United States citizens in detail, of application to visitors from other countries.

- a) Further modification of proposals to control this travel was agreed upon.
b) Travel between Italy, Sicily, and Sardinia.

The Italian Government could be asked to give a waiver or modify the right to move individuals from Sicily to Italy, Sicily, and Sardinia, and could be asked to give a waiver or modify the right to move individuals from Sicily to Italy, Sicily, and Sardinia.

It was suggested that the Italian Government could be asked to take into account the existing conditions in Italy, Sicily, and Sardinia.

It was decided that the Italian Government could probably seen the situation at a large number of ports, and that the Italian Government could be asked to take into account the existing conditions in Italy, Sicily, and Sardinia.

Secondly, we would have to be prepared.

er 654 was informed that they should be exposed to literature various voluntary societies which had been organized to help those who had lost their homes due to the recent inundation. Several telegrams were sent to different towns.

6. It was learned that the subject had been in contact with the problem which concerned the voluntary societies, particularly as far as helping those who had lost their homes due to the recent inundation was concerned. It was also learned that he had been in contact with the government and the voluntary societies, and also with the voluntary societies which concerned the voluntary societies.
7. Similarly the subject had been much interested in the result of the flood which concerned the voluntary societies.

It was learned that the subject had been in contact with the voluntary societies which concerned the voluntary societies, particularly as far as helping those who had lost their homes due to the recent inundation was concerned. The voluntary societies which concerned the voluntary societies, particularly as far as helping those who had lost their homes due to the recent inundation was concerned. The voluntary societies which concerned the voluntary societies, particularly as far as helping those who had lost their homes due to the recent inundation was concerned. The voluntary societies which concerned the voluntary societies, particularly as far as helping those who had lost their homes due to the recent inundation was concerned.

The voluntary societies which concerned the voluntary societies, particularly as far as helping those who had lost their homes due to the recent inundation was concerned. The voluntary societies which concerned the voluntary societies, particularly as far as helping those who had lost their homes due to the recent inundation was concerned.

X. CONCLUSION:

It was learned that the voluntary societies which concerned the voluntary societies which concerned the voluntary societies, particularly as far as helping those who had lost their homes due to the recent inundation was concerned.

7
Date: October,
1946
by: [Signature]

DISTRIBUTION:

7-2, 256, (6)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. _____

DISTRIBUTION:

4
22, 1954. (6)
SAC, FBI, D.C.
Field Office, D.C.
FBI Laboratory, D.C.
FBI, D.C., (2)

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Detailed reasons for classification of this document are contained in the following statement:
It is believed that disclosure of this information would be detrimental to the national security of the United States.
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b) Information concerning the conduct of the Vietnam War.
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d) Information concerning the conduct of the Cuban Missile Crisis.
e) Information concerning the conduct of the Space Shuttle Program.
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i) Information concerning the conduct of the Iraq War.
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k) Information concerning the conduct of the Yemen Civil War.
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o) Information concerning the conduct of the Rwandan Civil War.
p) Information concerning the conduct of the Burmese Civil War.
q) Information concerning the conduct of the Cambodian Civil War.
r) Information concerning the conduct of the Vietnamese Civil War.
s) Information concerning the conduct of the Indonesian Civil War.
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s) All members of the FBI Office of the Executive Secretary.
t) All members of the FBI Office of the General Counsel.
u) All members of the FBI Office of the Executive Secretary.
v) All members of the FBI Office of the General Counsel.
w) All members of the FBI Office of the Executive Secretary.
x) All members of the FBI Office of the General Counsel.
y) All members of the FBI Office of the Executive Secretary.
z) All members of the FBI Office of the General Counsel.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
Travel Control Division
APO 394, U.S.Army

500-4
9 February 1946

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT : Measures taken to bring about cessation
of Travel Control Section.

1. The following steps have been taken to deal with each facet of the controls presently exercised by CI III Section.

COUNTRIES WITH ITALIAN FOREIGN OFFICE REPRESENTATION

(a) Italian Government has been advised through Allied Commission that Military Authorities no longer require to give prior approval to applications received by them for visas.

They have been asked to supply particulars of such visas, which will be sent to G-2 where they can be checked against records.

The next move in this category will be to decide when it is no longer necessary to retain this measure of control and to inform the Italian Government that particulars of visas are no longer required.

(b) COUNTRIES WITHOUT ITALIAN REPRESENTATION

A staff study has been prepared which proposes to withdraw the Allied Force Permit system as from 1st March 1946 (copy attached). G-5 and "A" Branch have already concurred in this recommendation. USPOLAD has indicated personal agreement but has referred one or two points to WASHINGTON. BRITPOLAD has the matter under study but an approval is confidently expected. Foreign Office direction has also been sought.

If approval is obtained this will mean that movement from the following countries will cease: Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece, Egypt, Palestine, French North Africa, Hungary, Syria, Lebanon and certain distant countries which will not be affected to any great extent.

Action necessary will be

- (1) Inform the Italian Government and make strong representations regarding the policing of the Adriatic coast, the briefing of Public Safety personnel at ports and the measures to be taken to dispose of illegal entrants. Arrangements will also be necessary for G-2 (CI) Balkans Section to be advised of all such cases.
- (2) Inform Military formations concerned and rescind those instructions which apply.
- (3) Request USPOLAD and BRITPOLAD to advise affected Embassies, Consulates, etc. and arrange for them to inform the Governments of the countries to which they are appointed that they can no longer act in the capacity of permit issuing agencies.
- (4) Inform British Military Missions as in (3) above.

(c) VENEZIA GIULIA TRAVEL CONTROL

Following the recent meeting in TRIESTE decisions have been made to modify present procedure so that the entire responsibility for travel security in the province will rest with XIII Corps. The following action has been instituted:

ENTRY INTO THE PROVINCE

Italian Government to be requested to instruct all Questure to receive applications and to forward acceptable categories to Permit Office Venezia Giulia Police Force. Permits for approved applicants will be returned direct to the Questure concerned.

Advice on the categories of applicant acceptable to XIII Corps is awaited before the instructions to Questure can be formulated.

ENTRY INTO OTHER PARTS OF ITALY FROM THE PROVINCE

A memorandum has been composed for circulation to G-2, BRITPOLAD and USPOLAD suggesting the appointment of an Italian liaison officer to UDINE who would work with the Trieste Permit Office and the DP Camps to represent the views of the Italian Government on the entry of persons into the rest of the country. Agreement to this proposal would eliminate the work now being carried out by our staff in Rome. This is being followed up by CI III.

4

(d) TRAVEL CONTROL BETWEEN ITALY, AUSTRIA AND GERMANY

It is felt that AFHQ must continue to act as permit issuing agency in this case. Proposed action is that applications for movement from Italy will be received by Questura and passed to G-2 A.F.H.Q. whence they will be referred to the Command concerned. Permits approved will be passed to Questura for transmission to the applicant.

ENTRY ITALY FROM AUSTRIA OR GERMANY

A memorandum is in circulation suggesting the appointment of Italian Liaison Officers to VIENNA, INNSBRUCK etc. who would be empowered to approve entry on behalf of the Italian Government. This is being followed up and, in the event of approval, a strong recommendation to G-5 to bring pressure on Austria to accept these men is indicated.

CAPT. HALPHYDE,

An officer of this section, who still has four months to serve will be available to carry out the CI III work which will still be necessary.

JOHN W. CHAPMAN
Colonel, JAGD
Director.

BSS/cf

COPY

61041

COPY

AIRFIELD FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

6 February 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Chief of Staff

SUBJECT : Cessation of Travel Control Machinery by G-2 Branch,

I. DISCUSSION

1. Control of travel into Italy is at present divided into two main categories:-

- (a) From countries in which the Italian Government has established Diplomatic or Consular representation by means of a check against AFHQ records of persons to whom visas have been granted by the Italian Authorities.
- (b) From countries in which the Italian Government is not represented by means of the Allied Force Permit system.

Under this system, applications are received by Permit Officers at American or British Military Missions or Embassies etc., are transmitted to this headquarters and through Allied Commission to the Italian Authorities. A co-ordinated decision is then returned to the permit issuing office.

2. From the Military Security point of view this rather elaborate machinery is no longer considered necessary in view of the following factors:-

- (a) The great increase in the influx of travellers of various categories as conditions return to normal renders the existing security records progressively less valuable and, in fact, an extremely small percentage of traces is being found.
- (b) The considerable reduction of Military Forces and installations in this country, for the protection of which this procedure was instituted, no longer justifies the retention of officers and other ranks on work which should properly be an Italian Civil Service function.
- (c) Present policy is to return the maximum degree of authority to the Italian Government and it is felt that the retention of the Allied Force Permit system will delay the resumption of relations between Italy and the Balkan countries.
- (d) Permit officers will, of course, also be released and Military Missions will in some cases be withdrawn. In Albania for example, it is understood that the British Military Mission which acts as permit issuing agency at present will cease to operate in ~~the~~ ^{near} future.

(e) All officers experienced in this work and at present employed in it are due for release from the service before 15 April 1946.

2. Conclusions to be drawn from the foregoing are:-

(a) That security considerations do not justify the retention of the Allied Force Permit system or the continued employment of the officers engaged in this work.

(b) That the possibility of some resumption of contact between the Italian Authorities and those of the countries in which they have no representation will be increased by the abolition of the Allied Force Permit system.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. That the Allied Force Permit system for entry into Italy be withdrawn as from 1st March 1946.
2. That Permit issuing offices be advised by the appropriate departments that they will cease to operate this system with effect from 1st March 1946 and that they should advise the local Authorities to that effect.
3. That AFHQ directive on Travel Control be rescinded. (TAB A).
4. That the Italian Government be advised through Allied Commission of this decision.

III. CONCURRENCES.

BRIT POLAD _____ "A" BRANCH _____

US POLAD. _____ G-5 _____

GEORGE S. SMITH
Brigadier General, USA.
A.C. of S., G-2

Declassified E.O. 13556 Section 3.3/NND No.

Information contained herein is unclassified
and retains full protection under E.O. 13556

09/05/2018

Subject: Control of Italian Warships

Joint Chiefs of Staff, W.D.
Washington, D.C. 20330

Attn: CIO

12-56-100

FEB 11 1948

To: [REDACTED] (Secty of the Navy), Washington, D.C.

Instructions given in our letter dated 17 July 1947 relating to
are hereby cancelled as they are no longer
pertinent to present conditions within the requirements of
the present situation.

1. Requests for supplies and equipment

2. Requests for supplies

(a)

No more than one hundred thousand dollars per month
for supplies to be used in connection with the Italian
Government's naval forces.

(b)

No more than one hundred thousand dollars per month
for supplies to be used in connection with the Italian
Government's naval forces.

(c)

No more than one hundred thousand dollars per month
for supplies to be used in connection with the Italian
Government's naval forces.

No more than one hundred thousand dollars per month
for supplies to be used in connection with the Italian
Government's naval forces.

Instructions given in our letter dated 17 July 1947 relating to
are hereby cancelled as they are no longer
pertinent to present conditions within the requirements of
the present situation.

Instructions given in our letter dated 17 July 1947 relating to
are hereby cancelled as they are no longer
pertinent to present conditions within the requirements of
the present situation.

09/05/2018

100-11189

- (a) For purposes of travel authorizations within the US, contractors or
affiliates must submit two hours in advance of travel, a revised
travel request to contract manager, via e-mail.
- (b) To cover (a), contractors must submit their travel requests to
the contract manager via e-mail at least 24 hours in advance of travel.
- (c) All travel authorizations must be submitted via e-mail to the contract manager via e-mail at least 24 hours in advance of travel.

1. **PROVIDE TRAVEL REQUEST**
and
2. **APPROVAL**
and
3. **TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION**
and
4. **TRAVEL DOCUMENTATION**
and
5. **TRAVEL PAYMENT**
and
6. **TRAVEL REPORT**
and
7. **TRAVEL CLOSURE**

The following documentation is required for each trip:
1. **TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION** (see below)
2. **TRAVEL PAYMENT** (see below)

(a)

To cover (a) above, all travel authorizations must be submitted via e-mail to the contract manager via e-mail at least 24 hours in advance of travel.

(b)

To cover (b) above, all travel authorizations must be submitted via e-mail to the contract manager via e-mail at least 24 hours in advance of travel.

To cover (c) above, all travel authorizations must be submitted via e-mail to the contract manager via e-mail at least 24 hours in advance of travel.

To cover (d) above, all travel authorizations must be submitted via e-mail to the contract manager via e-mail at least 24 hours in advance of travel.

To cover (e) above, all travel authorizations must be submitted via e-mail to the contract manager via e-mail at least 24 hours in advance of travel.

2/12

1/20/2012

- 35
- (a) Declassification (b)(1) from some time this summer probably
by my father, L.L.C. or L.L.C. son, John J. Loso, Poughkeepsie,
New York, to me, John J. Loso, Poughkeepsie, New York.
Declassification (b)(1) from some time this summer probably
by my father, L.L.C. or L.L.C. son, John J. Loso, Poughkeepsie,
New York, to me, John J. Loso, Poughkeepsie, New York.
Declassification (b)(1) from some time this summer probably
by my father, L.L.C. or L.L.C. son, John J. Loso, Poughkeepsie,
New York, to me, John J. Loso, Poughkeepsie, New York.
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Declassification (b)(1) from some time this summer probably
by my father, L.L.C. or L.L.C. son, John J. Loso, Poughkeepsie,
New York, to me, John J. Loso, Poughkeepsie, New York.

LAWSON 192

The following are the names of the persons
and their addresses:

NAME	ADDRESS
11 0 756 9 0 820	17 0 860 0 0 927
22 0 755 10 0 821	25 0 926 0 0 928
33 0 650 11 0 722	36 0 927 0 0 929
44 0 637 12 0 723	47 0 928 0 0 930
55 0 624 13 0 724	56 0 929 0 0 931
66 0 625 14 0 725	67 0 930 0 0 932
77 0 626 15 0 726	78 0 931 0 0 933
88 0 627 16 0 727	89 0 932 0 0 934
99 0 628 17 0 728	90 0 933 0 0 935
10 0 629 18 0 729	11 0 934 0 0 936
11 0 630 19 0 730	12 0 935 0 0 937
12 0 631 20 0 731	13 0 936 0 0 938
13 0 632 21 0 732	14 0 937 0 0 939
14 0 633 22 0 733	15 0 938 0 0 940
15 0 634 23 0 734	16 0 939 0 0 941
16 0 635 24 0 735	17 0 940 0 0 942
17 0 636 25 0 736	18 0 941 0 0 943
18 0 637 26 0 737	19 0 942 0 0 944
19 0 638 27 0 738	20 0 943 0 0 945
20 0 639 28 0 739	21 0 944 0 0 946
21 0 640 29 0 740	22 0 945 0 0 947
22 0 641 30 0 741	23 0 946 0 0 948
23 0 642 31 0 742	24 0 947 0 0 949
24 0 643 32 0 743	25 0 948 0 0 950
25 0 644 33 0 744	26 0 949 0 0 951
26 0 645 34 0 745	27 0 950 0 0 952
27 0 646 35 0 746	28 0 951 0 0 953
28 0 647 36 0 747	29 0 952 0 0 954
29 0 648 37 0 748	30 0 953 0 0 955
30 0 649 38 0 749	31 0 954 0 0 956
31 0 650 39 0 750	32 0 955 0 0 957
32 0 651 40 0 751	33 0 956 0 0 958
33 0 652 41 0 752	34 0 957 0 0 959
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36 0 655 44 0 755	37 0 960 0 0 962
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49 0 668 57 0 768	50 0 973 0 0 975
50 0 669 58 0 769	51 0 974 0 0 976
51 0 670 59 0 770	52 0 975 0 0 977
52 0 671 60 0 771	53 0 976 0 0 978
53 0 672 61 0 772	54 0 977 0 0 979
54 0 673 62 0 773	55 0 978 0 0 980
55 0 674 63 0 774	56 0 979 0 0 981
56 0 675 64 0 775	57 0 980 0 0 982
57 0 676 65 0 776	58 0 981 0 0 983
58 0 677 66 0 777	59 0 982 0 0 984
59 0 678 67 0 778	60 0 983 0 0 985
60 0 679 68 0 779	61 0 984 0 0 986
61 0 680 69 0 780	62 0 985 0 0 987
62 0 681 70 0 781	63 0 986 0 0 988
63 0 682 71 0 782	64 0 987 0 0 989
64 0 683 72 0 783	65 0 988 0 0 990
65 0 684 73 0 784	66 0 989 0 0 991
66 0 685 74 0 785	67 0 990 0 0 992
67 0 686 75 0 786	68 0 991 0 0 993
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74 0 693 82 0 793	75 0 998 0 0 1000

Documentation above is to be handled before an agent.

(P) If the Jigosity information reported in Part (e) expected before the release of the test has been able to complete his journey, substitution from an oxidation should be made to Abs. Hg, if desired.

742 P-conv

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for Re-jigosity.

The following are the test numbers of the latest 14112 and PCL Update.

252252 742

Number Line.	Test No.	Sheet 3 and 4.	200,000 Scale.
1	C 7361.	2)	C 8937.
2	C 7055.	10)	C 6927.
3	C 6950.	11)	C 7754.
4	C 6347.	12)	C 7425.
5	C 5765.	13)	C 7520.
6	C 7052.	14)	C 7516.
7	C 6645.	15)	C 7617.
8	C 8034.	16)	C 7610.

POLARIZING - Total sheet 36,777, 20,000 Scale.

1	019392.	9)	905892.	17)	915300.	25)	924860.
2	360391.	10)	910393.	18)	940694.	26)	925856.
3	570897.	11)	920396.	19)	950895.	27)	938650.
4	870895.	12)	925396.	20)	977897.	28)	917846.
5	990895.	13)	928900.	21)	950894.	29)	913840.
6	832897.	14)	930590.	22)	925850.	30)	910635.
7)	890898.	15)	940591.	23)	945878.	31)	905830.
8)	900898.	16)	943302.	24)	925878.	32)	900825.

4060

Declassified S.O. 12356 Section 3, 3/NND No.

0228

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. _____

3101
JULY 1968

B. G.

PA 60580 CIRCA 21001
PA 121461A

0/9206

FAB 131530

PA 031218Z

SECRET

APR. 21/68 000000
MOSCOW, RUSSIA

INFO: CIRCULAR 56 APRIL 24/68 0100 ALLOWS FOR POSSIBLE POLITICAL CONTROL.

REBUTTAL.

1. APR 24/68/219 OF 7 REBUTTAL.

1. THIS DOCUMENT WAS COMPILED:
2. ON THE DATE OF 27 MARCH 1968 IN THE NAME OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERAL SECURITY SERVICE.
IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE INTERNAL RULES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERAL SECURITY SERVICE.
YOUR SUBJECT HAS BEEN RECORDED AND IS BEING MAINTAINED SEPARATELY FROM
ALL OTHER INFORMATION AND IS SUBJECT TO SEPARATE MONITORING. YOUR SUBJECT
HAS BEEN MADE READABLE AND IS SUBJECT TO SEPARATE MONITORING. YOUR SUBJECT
IS ALSO SUBJECT TO SEPARATE MONITORING IN RUSSIA AND HAS BEEN COOPERATING WITH
RUSSIAN INVESTIGATORS.

SECRET

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL TELEGRAM
This message will not be distributed outside
the [redacted] Department by [redacted]
[redacted] without [redacted] approval
O.T.P. need not go through [redacted] if [redacted] marked
with a circled "C" [redacted]

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4059

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

0228

3634

Place, Boundary

xx

56

I 400
170915A

17554
JAN 18 1946

IMPORTANT

MATH 13 00020

INFO: INFO ALDO VENZIA ITALIA POLICE FORC JAN 18 1946

CO DTM

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject is control of movement across western boundary of Venezia Giulia.

1. At present permits for travel in both directions across this boundary are issued by the Venezia Giulia police and by A.C. offices in Venezia Giulia and Udine province. The police alone issue an average of 1300 permits daily. In addition A.C. Rome issue a limited number of permits and quotore throughout Italy makes innumerable applications to the Venezia Giulia police by telegram.
2. Owing to the number of applications and fact that many arrive by post they are not screened by U.S.S. Present policy is to allow all applications provided names do not occur on black list of security organizations and provided reasons advanced are not obviously false. This means that the system of control is largely nominal. -e are however committed by APPA of the Duino agreement to ensuring that Italians non resident in Venezia Giulia obtain the approval of the allied authorities for entry into zone A. This entails the maintenance of a control on the western boundary which is also desirable for security reasons.
3. The present volume of applications now exceeds the capabilities of local authorities and makes it necessary to review both the grounds for and means of issue of permits.
4. May experts on travel and frontier control from AFHQ and A.C. be despatched here soonest to confer on the above. A letter G 3 T 379 - 506/1EE of 7 Jan subject entry into Venezia Giulia from countries other than Italy addressed Venezia Giulia police and not to AFHQ can then be discussed at same time.

AC DIST

INFO ACTION: PUBLIC SAFETY (TRAVEL CONTROL)

INFO: CHIEF OF INFORMATION

INFO COMMISSIONER, 2

C A SEC

FILE

4054

PA
211
JL

CO DTM
(Cont'd.)

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
Travel Control Division
APO 394, US Army

AMC 389-306/10-2

7 January 1946

SUBJECT : Entry Venezia Giulia from countries
other than Italy proper.

TO : Venezia Giulia Police Force
III Corps C.M.C.

1. The Italian Consular system is now in operation
from those countries with whom diplomatic relations have been
re-established and as a result the question of the issuance
of permits overseas for entry Venezia Giulia province has
arisen.

2. The British Foreign Office was the first to raise
this point and it has been agreed that while the Visa Department
of the Italian Embassy in London shall give visa for entry into
Italy proper, permits for entry Venezia Giulia shall be issued
by the Military Permit Officer after reference to A.P.H.Q. Similar
arrangements are being made in other countries.

3. Your views are requested as to what form the permit
should take. The present arrangement with the MPC London is that
he shall issue an Allied Force Permit endorsed "Valid for Venezia
Giulia". It is thought, however, that in view of the large number
of countries involved some form of Consular endorsement by the
British or US Passport Control Officer's might be more suitable.

4. Under present regulations all applications for entry
Venezia Giulia must be referred to III Corps. It is thought that
the time can come for permits or Consular endorsements to be issued
to certain categories without prior reference, viz.:

- a) Diplomatic and Consular officials of the United
Nations.
- b) British or American members of officially
authorized bands of music, etc., to consist of not less than 4057
members.
- c) Persons in the眷属 categories of III Corps.

- 2 -

54

- (3) Trained compensated agents,
 (4) British or American employees of any of the
 mentioned war service associations.

5. A list of the countries where there is Italian representation abroad is given below:

Afghanistan	Honduras
Argentina	Luxembourg
Belgium	Nicaragua
Brazil	Norway
Bulgaria	Panama
Canada	Peru
Chile	Poland
Colombia	Portugal
Costa Rica	Rumania
Cuba	San Marino
Czechoslovakia	Spain
Denmark	Spanish Morocco
Dominican Republic	Sweden
Eire	Switzerland
El Salvador	Tangier
Ecuador	Turkey
France	Uruguay
Great Britain and British Commonwealth	U.S.A.
Greece	U.S.S.R.
Haiti	Vatican
Iceland	Venezuela

6. In those countries where there is no Italian representation we shall continue to refer applications for entry Venezia should as far as possible.

7. Your telephone comment or concurrence on the above suggestions and question to requested.

S. S. C. /cc

JOHN W. CRAVEN
 Colonel, JAGB.
 Director.

4056

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 1023

HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE COMMISSION

ATTACHMENT TO THE DIRECTOR-COMMISSIONER

Ref: 36100/20

December 1965

SUBJECT: Travel Control

cc: 1. 2d Distribution below

Attachment A out of the joint instructions received from AFHQ regarding travel costs being issued to you for your information.

At the Chief Commandant

Director
for Executive Commissions

DISTRIBUTION:

Group II - Headquarters

Copy to file work/SC

✓ 105

105BA

8

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. _____

19360-2

L. L. Brown

52

C43562

6/4936
DEC 05 1945A

ROUTINE

APRIL

ACTION: 13 CORPS (MADI), INFO: ALCOM FOR PERM TRAVEL

DEC 5 1945

UNCLASSIFIED.

Reur 1303 December 1. ALCOM expediting action with Italian authorities and MADI on acute situation of Italian frontier personnel and will advise of progress.

DIAF

INFO ACTION: PUBLIC SAFETY S/C

INFO: CHIEF COMMISSIONS:
SEND CMM (2)
MAIL
FILE (2)
FLOAT

Teleph with Regency Cables - cable 1303 of 1 Dec
and record at this HQ. 40.11

DMG (512)

J. H. Jr.

~~RESTRICTED~~

3610 41

74/6

by Command

49

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
ADO 512

to 30/11/1945

27 November 1945

136

SUBJ: Travel Control - Entry Into ITALY Other Than Territory Under
Allied Military Government.

TO: /all concerned.

30 NOV 1945

W/CC

1. Doctor, this message re. A.D.O. 3610 30/11/1945, dated 2 October 1945, subject: "Travel Control - Entry into Italy", is rescinded and the following substituted therefor:

2. The Allied Force Permit system for entry into Italy is in the process of being withdrawn and will be replaced by the usual Ordinary Visa Control except for travel from areas in which the Italian Government is not represented (i.e., Germany, Austria, Yugoslavia, Albania, and Greece) where the Allied Force Permit system will remain in force.

3. Effective 1 December 1945, entry into Italy will be permitted to the following categories of travel:

- Persons in possession of an Italian entry visa issued by Italian Embassies, Legations or Consulates abroad.
- Persons in possession of a valid Italian passport.
- US Service Personnel in possession of valid travel orders.
- British Service Personnel in possession of valid travel orders.
- Persons in possession of an Allied Force Travel or Joint Orders of Staff Permit issued prior to 31 October 1945.

4. Effective 11 December 1945, the issue of military permits for entry into Italy will cease from all areas in which the Italian Government has diplomatic or consular representation.

5. For information as to countries whose citizens are Italian or presents their consent to whom applicants may be deferred to, given below:

Afghanistan	India
Argentina	Czechoslovakia
Bolivia	Denmark
Brazil	Democratic Republic
China	Egypt
Colombia	El Salvador
Costa Rica	Greece
	Iraq
	Ireland
	Iran
	Italy
	Jordan
	Kuwait
	Liberia
	Morocco
	Nicaragua
	Panama
	Peru
	Portugal
	Romania
	Saudi Arabia
	Singapore
	Tunisia
	Venezuela
	Yugoslavia

40.5

(CARTO)

22 Nov

for 30.51

RUMBLE

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. _____

RECORDED

TELE, CPW, AG 322/1, 001-0,
1962 November 27 (Cont'd)

Cameroon	Peru
Central	Spain
Colombia	United States (Continued)
Costa Rica	Sweden
Cuba	The Gambia
Dominican	Thailand
Egypt	Togo
El Salvador	Tunisia
Equador	Uganda
Eritrea	Yemen
Eswatini	Zimbabwe
Egypt	Zurich, Switzerland

1. Executive instructions will be issued concerning regulations for entry into Ethiopia, via Addis Ababa, and Djibouti Province which extends to Djibouti and to the port of Massawa via Djibouti and Eritrea.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

Colonel J. M.
Chief Adjutant General

RECORDED
1962 November 27

RECORDED

1971, APRIL 20 1971 1-2
1971, APRIL 20 1971 (cont'd)

204-10000-1

1. - Informed of decision to 20000-1
2. - Informed of decision to 20000-2
3. - Informed of decision to 20000-3
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AC DIST
SO to Chief Commander
Supt Commissioner
C.A. See
Sgt See
Icon See
P. Safety S/p 2
Security
LIASON DIV
DISPER S/p
Adjt

4052

Declassified S.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. _____

DISPATCHES

Mr. [REDACTED], P.O./P. OPI-9,
dated 27 November 1945 (CONT'D)

DISPATCHES (cont'd)

- 3 - 1st Art. 47 Plaza Nuit - Diagonal Hwy. 100 512
(from ODI 004-49)
1 - Personnel Traffic Control, Constitución Airport, 100 512
1 - Pan Am, British Embassy, 100 512
1 - US Post, US Embassy, 100 512
1 - British Committee, Matilde
1 - US Consulate, Mariano
1 - British Consulate, Rio-1
1 - British Consulate, Fulcrum
1 - US Consulate, Puerto
1 - British Consulate, Puerto (Tina Soc.)
1 - US Consulate, Puerto
1 - US Consulate, London
1 - British Embassy, Paris
1 - US Embassy, Paris
1 - British Consulate, Salgris
1 - US Embassy, Salgris
1 - Interim Civil Administration
1 - First Commission Austria (SC)
3 - ODI 1st Art. Frontier Control
p/o SSI (B) 1/2 Distinct, CIE
1 - US Consulate, London, U. K.
1 - DSO Gibraltar
1 - DSO Cyprus
1 - DSO Malta
1 - DSO Re-establis.
1 - DSO
1 - DS (C) 1/2
1 - British Passport Control Officer, Stockholm
1 - US Consulate

TRANSLATION

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the French Representative

N. 2713

Rome, 8 November 1945

NOV 13 1945

MEMORANDUM

The French Government intends to come to an agreement with the Italian Government, aiming to facilitate the movement of both Italian and French citizens to and from the two countries.

The regulation presently in force, according to which any requests for entry in Italy are submitted for approval of the Allied Commission, resulted, practically, in the prohibition to enter Italy of French citizens.

Such a situation being prolonged will bring nothing but prejudice to the French interests in Italy. Therefore, the French Government takes this opportunity to submit to the American and British Governments, through the French Embassies in London and Washington, the following scheme of agreement:

a) As long as the allied control in Italy will subsist, all French and Italian nationals, in possession of an order of mission issued by the French Government and duly provided with passports regularly approved on exit from France, will be granted, the maximum space of time of 48 hours, on presentation of such documents and without reporting to the Military Authorities, a visa enabling them to go to the place of destination in Italy.

b) When the allied control will cease in Northern Italy, another plan, which should be negotiated soon, will be put into effect.

The Allied Commission's approval is requested:

- 1) On the placing into execution of the above mentioned agreement in case the allied control will not end in Italy.
- 2) On the negotiation with France, by the Italian Government, of the other plan. A request on the same terms, will be, of course, addressed to the Allied Commission by the Italian Government.

10.57 AM 8

8 Novembre 5

N° 2713.

—OO& AIDE MEMOIRE 800C—

Le Gouvernement français a l'intention de conclure avec le Gouvernement italien un accord à grande circulation destiné à faciliter les mouvements des personnes de nationalité française ou italienne entre les deux pays.

La règlementation en vigueur qui soumet à l'autorisation du Quartier général Allié toute demande d'entrée en Italie a, dans la pratique, abouti à prohiber les entrées en Italie des ressortissants français. Le préjudice ainsi causé ne saurait se prolonger sans compromettre gravement les intérêts français en Italie.

Le Gouvernement français a donc saisi, par l'intermédiaire de ses Ambassades à Londres et à Washington les Gouvernements britannique et américain en leur soumettant un projet d'accord dont l'économie serait la suivante :

- a) - Tant que le contrôle allié subsisterait en Italie du Nord, les Ressortissants français ou italiens munis d'un ordre de mission du Gouvernement français et détenteurs d'un passeport national régulièrement visé à la sortie par le Gouvernement français devraient obtenir, dans un délai maximum de 48 heures, sur présentation de ces documents et sans référence aux autorités militaires en Italie, un visa leur permettant

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Le Gouvernement français a donc sollicité, par l'intermédiaire de ses Ambassades à Londres et à Washington les Gouvernements britannique et américain en leur soumettant un projet d'accord dont l'économie serait la suivante :

a) — Tant que le contrôle allié subsisterait en Italie du Nord, les Ressortissants français ou italiens munis d'un ordre de mission du Gouvernement français et détenteurs d'un passeport national régulièrement visé à la sortie par le gouvernement français devraient obtenir, dans un délai maximum de 48 heures, sur présentation de ces documents et sans référence aux autorités militaires en Italie, un visa leur permettant de se rendre à leur point de destination en Italie.

..../....

b)- Quand le contrôle allié prendra fin en Italie du Nord, un accord à grande circulation, qui serait négocié dès maintenant, entrerait en vigueur.

L'assentiment de la Commission Alliée est demandé :

1°)- à la mise en pratique de la réglementation envisagée pour le cas où le contrôle allié ne prendrait pas fin en Italie du Nord;

2°)- à la négociation par l'Italie d'un accord à grande circulation avec la France.

Une demande dans ce sens va sans doute être adressée à la Commission Alliée par le Gouvernement italien.

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2°)- à la négociation par l'Italie d'un accord à grande circulation avec la France.
Une demande dans ce sens va sans doute être adressée à la Commission Alliée par le Gouvernement italien.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. _____

360 91

115

COL. 20, 73

U.S. AIR FORCE

REF ID: A61342/2

29 October 1945.

RECD : Authorization for travel.

TO : U.S.A. STAFF
DISPATCH OFFICE.
AUGUSTA.

Joining by road over 100 miles and travel to K.M. R.P.

Reference A.C.F.O. Memorandum No. 33 of 23 June 1945. "Instruction
to U.S. Staff Officer regarding letter reference A.C. 371.2/173 ORI-1 of 16 June 1945
regarding to U.S.A."

579/22

1. The permission deviation on the Chief Commandant in A.C. F.O.
No. 33/1 is continuing separately by road in excess of 100 miles
granted to U.S. (2) Staff.

2. The temporary requests for travel and/or transit and "days" are
granted over 100 miles to do so in excess of 100 miles
it can be expected later than 100 miles to be included in the
application.

3. Likewise upon the justification of the route or the purpose, it can be
granted that the permission can be granted to do so under the routes
have been completed with no day or no purpose are included.

4. It is not contemplated that you do so and it would not be
advised to do so unless greater than 100 miles. On the
other hand, if it is considered, any further travel into the country should be
undertaken by U.S. (2) Staff. It is requested therefore that drivers proceeding
nearer the untraveled boundary are not authorized to travel beyond the
limits specified in their Movement Orders.

IN VICE PRESIDENT, AIR FORCE, U.S. AIR FORCE.

K. H. B. C.
Colonel
C-1 (2),
U.S., Allied Command.

Copied to : U.S. of the Executive Commandor.
Commandant, Communications Section.

Copy to 579/22

404

Declassified E.O. 13556 Section 3.3/NND No.

3603 Ex Com

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(W)

MARSHAL AIR FORCE
APO 312

AS 31-492/102 dated

9 September 1945.

SERIALIZED

RECORDED: Documentation for entry into Switzerland.

TO: U.S. Consul

(W)

From: This Headquarters, File and subject as above,
dated 15 August 1945 is reissued and the following substituted:

Order to large number of military personnel arriving at
the Swiss Federal Railways for documentation and according to visiting
arrangements, the following information concerning entry into that coun-
try is issued for your information and compliance:

1. ENTRY OF MILITARY PERSONNEL - Entry of British service
Personnel is also to be similarly interpreted given below:

- (1) Date of official business. Prior arrangements
to remain with the Swiss Government will be
obtained through G-1(B) from Headquarters. The
phrase "G-1B 020.100000.10" will be quoted
on travel orders.
- (2) Concurrence leave. Personnel authorized to ac-
tive billeted or compensated leave must be in
possession of a valid British passport and Swiss
entry visa.

British passport to obtainable from British Consul-
late in Geneva, Tel. and 32-04 or 32-05 for
personnel in service.

British visas are obtainable from Swiss legation
Tours.

Full details of compensation leave are given
in G-1(B) section 4/200/10 or 10 variants.

- (3) Entry of military personnel by land: Through
arrangements under the "Munro" system, members
of these parties are not entitled to travel
while transiting through the country.

2. ENTRY OF NON-SERVICE PERSONNEL - Entry as stated
British Consul arranged in 15 June 1945 with (3) mentioned
(Special Agent, FOUSA) liaison Party is, contains full particu-
lars of these arrangements.

4047

~~RESTRICTED~~

ltr, AFHQ, file #30-382/105 O&I-O,
dtd 9 September 1943 (Cont'd)

- (1) Duty or official business requiring advance clearance with the Swiss Government which will be obtained through this headquarters. Travel orders must include the phrase "SWISS CLEARANCE OBTAINED."
- (2) Organized seven-day conducted tours under AFHQ orders. Individual members may not leave the tour party at any time during stay in Switzerland.
- (3) United States personnel are permitted to enter Switzerland for the purpose of visiting blood relatives. Procedure is the same as for conducted tours except that AFHQ orders will specify name, address, and relationship of person to be visited, and include phrase "SWISS CLEARANCE OBTAINED."

• CIVILIANS:

- (1) Swiss Nationals may enter on production of valid passport.
- (2) Other Nationalities require valid national passport with Swiss entry visa obtainable from Swiss legation, Rome.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD INTELLIGENCE BUREAU

C. W. Robins Jr.
C. W. ROBINS JR.
Colonel, USA
Adj'tant General

DISPOSITION:

100 - 342

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 1024

RESTRICTED

1st, AFM, File AG 210.482/107 021-0,
06 September 1945 (Cont'd)

- (1) Duty or official business requiring advance clearance with the Swiss Government which will be obtained through this headquarters. Travel orders must include the phrase "SWISS CLEARANCE OBTAINED."
- (2) Organized seven-day conducted tours under USOISL orders. Individual members may not leave the tour party at any time during stay in Switzerland.
- (3) United States personnel are permitted to enter Switzerland for the purpose of visiting blood relatives. Procedure is the same as for organized tours except that USOISL orders will specify name, address, and relationship of person to be visited, and include phrase "SWISS CLEARANCE OBTAINED."

a. CIVILIANS:

- (1) Swiss Nationals may enter on production of valid passport.
- (2) Other Nationalities require valid national passport with Swiss entry visas obtainable from Swiss legation, Rome.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER.

W. A. Anderson
C. V. COOPER
Colonel, USA
Assistant General

DISTRIBUTION:

"C"

100 - G-2

360

Refugee

W

MILITARY FORCES HEADQUARTERS
APO 510

TO: MO. 40213 (1-1)

16 August 1945

AUG 1945

RE: Documentation for Entry into Switzerland

TO: All Concerned

Owing to the imminent arrival of numbers of military personnel at the Swiss Frontier during the visit Switzerland, the following information covering entry into that country is issued for your information and guidance:

a. BRITISH SERVICE PERSONNEL.

- (1) British service personnel are only allowed to enter Switzerland individually when on duty or official business. Prior concurrence is obtained from the Swiss Government in all cases and can be obtained through G-1 (Pr) SW.
- (2) Only exception to above are parties of military personnel in transit through Switzerland under the "TROLEX" scheme. Members of these parties are not permitted to detain while travelling through the country.

b. UNITED STATES SERVICE PERSONNEL - Entry of United States Service personnel is divided into three (3) categories: (1) Civil Service (2) Individual (3) Military. Information Number 27, contains full particulars of these categories.

- (1) Duty or official business requiring advance clearance with the Swiss Government through G-1 (Pr), Swiss Headquarters.
- (2) Organized group may conduct tours under MCUSA orders, provided members may not leave the tour party at any time during stay in Switzerland.
- (3) United States personnel are permitted to enter Switzerland for the purpose of visiting their relatives. Procedure is the same as for conducted tours except that MCUSA orders must specify name, address, and relationship of person to be visited.

c. CIVILIANS

- (1) Refugees may enter on production of valid passport.

4046

REFUGEE

PA
226

New Jersey

Declassified F.O. 12356 Section 3.3 NND No. _____

RESTRICTED

Ltr, AFHQ, CIO AG 210, 2/193 GSI-Q,
and 16 Mar 45 (Cont'd)

- (1) Other nationalities require valid National passport with
Swiss entry visa obtainable from Swiss Consulate in Italy.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL MONTGOMERY:

Montgomery
C. in CHIEF OF STAFF
Colonel, A.D.
Adj'tant General

DISTRIBUTION:

100 - G-2

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3 NND No.

AG/14018/3/4/70

August, 1945.

My dear Mr. Prime Minister,

Mr. 1945

The Allied Military Authorities are giving active consideration to the possibility of transferring to the Italian Government responsibility for the control of travel into and out of Italy.

It is understood from preliminary discussion that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs would be prepared at any time, on the termination of the present system by which such travel is regulated by means of Allied Military permits, to reinstitute a normal visa system for regulation entry into Italy.

During the discussion it was indicated that the Allied Military authorities might desire to stipulate, as a condition of the transfer of responsibility, that Italian visas should in no case be withheld in respect of applications by United States citizens or British subjects (including those of the Dominions and Colonies) when sponsored by the Allied Military authorities or by United States or British Departments of State or Ministries. The Duke del Palmo, on behalf of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, expressed the opinion that such stipulation would be acceptable.

As regards travel from Italy to other countries it was intimated by the Allied representatives at the exploratory discussion (Major Wm. J. Ballance of the Allied Commission and Major A.R. Bennett of AMHQ) that the present requirement of Military exit-permits (Military Travel Authorizations) for departure from Italy, will probably be terminated in the near future, and the Duke del Palmo considered that the Italian Government would not wish subsequently to introduce any form of exit visa.

At the request of the Duke del Palmo, Major Bennett undertook to provide for information a memorandum

- 1 -
of the present general principles governing the granting of Allied Military permits for entering and leaving Italy. This is attached hereto.

Separate discussions have taken place with Dott. Ferrari, Chief of the Ufficio Finanziario, of the Ministry of the Interior, to explore the possibility of transferring to a centralised Italian organisation the responsibility for control of travel at the Italian land frontiers, sea ports and airports. Such an organisation can hardly be said to exist at present, and it was clear from a subsequent meeting with officials of the department that a major problem exists in rapidly organising the necessary control system.

No doubt an adequate number of officials could be appointed at short notice and placed at the sea and air ports, and at approved crossing-points on the land frontiers, and no doubt the cooperation of the C.R.D. and R. Guardie di Finanza would be forthcoming for preventive duty elsewhere than at approved entry and exit points; but it appears that a considerable initiative is needed to integrate the service as a whole, to institute consistent methods, to devise systems of documentation, to provide central direction and to maintain central records.

The Allied authorities appreciate the difficulties, and are prepared to advise and help in the early stages. For example, it would perhaps be desired to establish speedy means of direct communication between the ports and frontier crossing points and the controlling authority in Rome. It was suggested at the meeting that the Ministry of the Interior should submit as early as possible a scheme of operation for the controls, with special reference to such present obstacles to its implementation.

The Allied authorities would be agreeable to the appointment of Italian officials to work with the present Allied controls, particularly at the sea ports, so that they might gain experience of present methods during the remaining period before transfer of responsibility. It is emphasized, however, that such experience would cover only the exceptional military

- 3 -

methods of control now being employed for military purposes, with central direction and control emanating from the Military Headquarters at Casserta; and that this would have only a limited value as a preparation for normal civil control with a different direction and different documentation.

It is most strongly urged, therefore, that urgent thought should be given to devising a detailed plan and indoctrinating officials accordingly. If the Italian Government should consider it wise to institute a national Immigration Service somewhat on the model of those in the United States and Great Britain, full account should be taken of the comprehensive nature of the responsibilities involved; to quote one example, there is the question of shore-leave for merchant seamen and the signing on and off of seamen of all nationalities on ships of all nationalities.

It may well be that the allied authorities will decide to transfer responsibility to the Italian Government before more than a nucleus port and frontier control service can be established; but it is considered that undue alarm need not be felt at the prospect, because for some time to come means of transportation to and from Italy will inevitably be very restricted and for the greater part operated by US and British authorities, who will still be able to allocate passengers according to the present principle of preference to individuals travelling in the mutual allied and Italian interest.

I should be grateful if you would favour me with your comments.

Yours very truly,

WCB/G
Professor Ferruccio Parri,
The President of the Council
of the Ministers
Italian Government
None.

SIR M. W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR,
Chief Commissioner.

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GENERAL PRINCIPLES

1. As a general rule, travel into and out of Italy is permitted only for purposes which will assist the Allied Military administration or the economic rehabilitation of Italy. Travel for purely personal (including private commercial) reasons is not permitted.

2. The principle exceptions to the above general rule, are as follows:

a) Travel to Italy

- (i) Journeys for strong compassionate reasons, limited to nationals of the United Nations and of Italy.
- (ii) Visitors to the Vatican, sponsored by the Vatican
- (iii) Swiss nationals visiting their property or relatives in Italy

b) Travel from Italy

- (i) Officials of the Vatican, when appointed permanently to positions outside Italy
- (ii) Swiss nationals permanently resident in Italy, to visit Switzerland

c) To and from Italy

- (i) Accredited diplomats
- (ii) Repatriates and displaced persons
- (iii) Scholars, artists and members of the learned professions, who are nationals of the United Nations or of Italy, for the purpose of free trade in knowledge and learning between Italy and the United Nations.
- (iv) Merchant seamen, for reasons of employment.

104

106

Ref: 3610/106/HO.

12 July 1945.

SUBJECT: Entry into Italy.

TO : Regional Commissioner,
LOMBARDIA Region.

1. When you last saw Brigadier Lush, you made inquiries about the refusal of entry at Chiasso of Emilio Jarach. The Brigadier has made enquiries at these Headquarters and it appears that Jarach's repatriation is being dealt with by Displaced Persons.

2. Jarach is No. 7 on a list of 46 persons whose repatriation from Switzerland to Italy has been specially recommended to APHQ by these Headquarters. The list has not yet been approved. I am afraid his entry will be held up until approval is received from APHQ.

105-APR

P.M.C.R.

PA to Executive Commissioner.

4041

105

CONFIDENTIAL - COMINT
COMINT Safety Sub-Commission
ABO 394

106. SUBJECT LINE

ABO : 40600

AC 106 204/212/50

June 1945

JUL 4 1945

REMARKS : Entry to the
COMINT safety.

4. Office of the Executive Comptroller
(Accounting, like Russell).

1. Reference is made to AC 106 204/212/50 dated 25 June, 1945, stating no above name was added to either COMINT or COMINTA.
2. The reparation of version is being made in an unclassified report and regularized sub-commission (Capt. Russell) at whom your letter has been referred.
3. Is you been determined that classification is to be in line with paragraph known reparation with Switzerland to code had been specially recommended by JAMES DODD, COMINTA. The said letter has been approved.
4. Is would make that para 3 above will fully
be null if it has been advised by reason of the fact referred to in
paragraph 3.

the balance may

for going to
Colonel, COMINT
106/106

July 4 1945 COMINT
ARMED FORCES, COMINT

see 106
40600

(*)
106/106

0254

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3-3/NND No.

105A
105B

JUL 3 19

114

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3 NND No.

RECORDED AND INDEXED BY MURKIN 1-15 1968
TAKEN IN 1968 BY THE FBI BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
AT THE REQUEST OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

OF THE UNITED STATES AGENT FOR THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOR THE PURPOSE OF OBTAINING INFORMATION CONCERNING
THE COVERT OPERATION.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE UNDER E.O. 14176 BY

THE DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WILLIAM R. FORD

APR 1968
FBI - WASH. D.C.

RECORDED AND INDEXED BY MURKIN 1-15 1968
TAKEN IN 1968 BY THE FBI BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
AT THE REQUEST OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WILLIAM R. FORD

APR 1968
FBI - WASH. D.C.

APR 1968
FBI - WASH. D.C.

DE S I G N A T U R E

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
A F C 522

5
SAC 441 25

THE AMERICAN COMMANDER

32

23 June 1945

INTRA-SATELLITE TRAVEL

JUN 23 1945

AFC Administrative Memoranda Number 70, 1943; Numbers 3 and 55, both dated 20 May 1943; Section 17, Number 1 and Section 1, Number 4, both 1944, are rescinded and the following substituted therefor:

The following instructions concerning intra-satellite travel are published for the information, guidance and compliance by all concerned.

1. For the purpose of this memorandum, the frontier boundary will be considered to include all territory, except Malta and Gibraltar, located within the extreme limits of either the AFUSA or AFC boundary.

Commanders to whom authority is delegated to issue travel orders will determine the need for and mode of travel necessary for the accomplishment of the following missions, secure liaison and security clearances when necessary, and then issue written travel orders. However, only those commanders so specifically authorized by their Headquarters, in separate and specific instructions, to authorize travel by aircraft will issue orders authorizing or directing travel by aircraft.

Subject to the exceptions contained in paragraph 2 below, and without proportion to the British system of unit movement orders listed by respective commanders within the limits of their competence, the following commanders are authorized to issue orders directing travel of personnel assigned or attached to their respective commands, and of American or British civilians, as applicable, who are assigned or attached to, or reside within their respective commands, to destinations within the geographical limits of their commands, or to geographical areas and units under the jurisdiction of, or assigned to other major commands, provided the concurrence of the other major commander is obtained in advance.

- Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean
Commander-in-Chief of Army Groups and Armies
Commanding General, MAAF
Commanding General, AF/ATO
Commanding General of Air Forces
Commanding General, AACG/ATO
Acting C-in-C AF/ATO
Commanding Generals and Commanding Officers of Provinces and Major Commands
General Officers Commanding Districts (British)
Commanding General, Royal Land Forces, Greece
Commanding Officer, RIMA
Commanding General, The Replacement and Training Command
Commanding General, Rome Army, AF/USA
Commanding General, Rome Army Allied Command
Director, Military Railway Service, Italy

4-2-1948 220

Administrative Form #33 (Cont'd)

Commanding Officer, Headquarters Command, Allied Forces
Chief Commissar for, Allied Commission
Commanding General, US Military Representation, AGO Rumania
Commanding General, US Military Representation, AGO Bulgaria
Commanding General, US Military Representative, AGO Hungary
Commissioner, AGO Rumania, British Mission
Commissioner, AGO Bulgaria, British Mission
Commissioner, AGO Hungary, British Mission
Commanding General, US Army Control Council (Austria)
Deputy Chief Commissioner (Military) Allied Commission for Austria
(British)

Requests for travel to geographical areas and units under the jurisdiction of, or assigned to other major commands will contain name, grade, nature of visit, localities to be visited, expected time of arrival, mode of travel and estimated length of stay.

a. The following types of cases will be referred to AFIC for approval:

- b. Requests for travel to units and Detachments for other than personnel of the British Armed Services.

c. Requests for travel to points in French North Africa by personnel

aboard:

- (1) Personnel of the British Armed Services.
- (2) Personnel of the French Armed Services.
- (3) ADL and Shore Warfare Divisions.

d. Personnel departing from Greece whose travel has been approved by AFIC or Headquarters, AFHQ.

e. The following codes of travel will be used:

- a. Surface as necessary.
- b. Air:

(1) Priority for air transportation will be granted only to ensure that the time element and/or type of mission justifies it.

(2) All travel to be performed via Air Transport Command or Naval Air Transport Service facilities (NAT) will be governed by the provisions of War Department Circular 151, 1944, as amended, to be subsequently implemented by an AFIC Directive subject: "Procedures Concerning Air Transportation via the Air Transport Command or Naval Air Transport Service".

(3) Each commander or chief of staff section must be certain that the mission of the individual concerned justifies the request and that other means of transportation are less practicable, before he is given a reason for air travel to be presented for preparation of orders.

(4) Under no circumstances will air travel be approved solely for the convenience of the individual concerned.

4-2-1948 220

REGISTERED

Authorization memo #33 (Cont'd)

b. Rail - Rail use must be made of existing rail schedules, and when possible, travel will be planned sufficiently in advance to permit utilization of this mode of transportation.

b. Government Motor Transportation:

(1) Government motor transportation will not be authorized for transporting individuals to points more than 100 miles distant from points of origin except when it is uneconomical or militarily impracticable to accomplish the mission by any other means of transportation. Whenever possible two or more individuals will use the same vehicle.

(2) Scheduled military bus service will be used to the maximum extent practicable.

(3) Where applicable and necessary, all travel orders not involving assignment of motor transportation for principal portion of travel to be performed will include authorization for the appropriate command, having military responsibility in the area in which initial destination is located, to furnish such motor transportation as may be required for local travel in furtherance of the official mission. Need for such special motor transportation, other than that which is normally furnished for short distances and duration by local motor vehicles, may be indicated in cables which advise interested Headquarters of the expected time of arrival.

c. Upon request of the Delgate, American Red Cross, or an authorized representative, final authority to request for travel of American Red Cross personnel within the Mediterranean Theater of Operations may be taken by the Commanders concerned, with or reference of higher Headquarters. In cases involving unusual circumstances, reports may be forwarded to this Headquarters for final action.

d. Air travel for personnel requests:

e. The Chairman, Air Priorities Board, is authorized to consider on its own merits, each request for travel for compassionate reasons which has been personally submitted by an officer of the Allied Forces of the grade of Colonel or higher grade, or his equivalent in the other services. In case of travel for temporary duty for rehabilitation, recuperation and recovery, the Chairman, Air Priorities Board, is authorized to grant優先權 for travel by aircraft in accordance with provisions of Section V, War Department Circular Number 30, 1944. Compensation to persons include compensation leave or furlough, compassionate posting, and emergency notation, and temporary duty for rehabilitation, recuperation, and recovery.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 183017

REF ID: A2256

AF Administrative Memo 433 (Cont'd)

b. Priority rating for air travel solely in connection with leave or
travel other than for compassionate reasons is not authorized and will not be
assigned except as in c. below.

c. Lieutenant Colonels or officers of equivalent rank and above,
proceeding to the U.S. under "Leave in Addition to PYTHO" or similar scheme may
be granted air priority when such officers hold operational commands or positions
in this theater, the importance of which necessitates that they return in a
minimum amount of time.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALBAMER:

C. C. Christenberry
C. C. CHRISTENBERRY
Colonel, AF
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

C

REGISTRED

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. _____

3610
S/.. on 30/6

Entry into ITALY.

Director,
Public Safety Sub-Commission.

23rd June

4

JUN 27 1945

I am directed by the Executive Commissioner to forward to you the attached note, given to him by Colonel Poletti, regarding the refusal of entry at Chiasso of Emilio Jarach. The Executive Commissioner would be glad if you would investigate this matter and inform him of the result.

(Sgd) P Russell
PA to Executive Commissioner.

4034

B/u SP L
PA to EC

See 105
See 106

