

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

ACC

10000/109/692
(VOL. II)

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785017

10000/109/692
(VOL. II)

CIVIL DISTURBANCES, SICILY
DEC. 1944, JAN. 1945

190

→ los

Do from Big Cam
opposite is a penthouse
to the Center taken from
the same

12/27/11

(192)

C.O.S.

191 for information (Int'd) E.T. SEEN (Int'd) M.S.L. 27/

(211)

C50.

1. 193-210 is a most complete & interesting report on the disturbances in RAGUSA, prepared by MMIA.
2. Pages 206-207 are a diary of events.
3. I recommend reading passages marked on pages 14-20
4. See particularly lessons brought out by the "Rebellion" page 19 para 7. This in fact makes recommendations but there is no indication of

191 for information (Int'd) E.T.

SEEN (Int'd) M.S.L. 27/

CSO.

211A

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Pages 14-20

4. See particularly "Lessons brought out by the Rebellion" page 19 para 7. This in fact makes recommendation but there is no indication of the action to implement them. ~~Shall~~ With all this information at our disposal should there not ^{be} a conference with R.C. Land Forces ST. CA Sec. ^{5, 21} ₂ reps of it first?

5. I have arranged for R.C. to have a copy of the report.

30 Jan 45

3071

Ehe

V.P.s machine. W/Collins - discussed this p.

COS

~~CSO~~

16/1

Ref 2, para 3, it is to be assumed that condition of emergency no longer exist in Sicily.

Ref 167 ETA of 12 tanks at Palermo is 21 Jan. These you will no doubt remember were referred to on a signal on the main file.

15 Jan 45

(17)

PA

Dictation to reply to Br Carr. M/101

See 174.

176

A/COS

Ref 175 is Special Sitrep from Sicily.

Et. 17/1.

1245 hrs.

177

Chief of Staff

Seen.

K. Woodland

PH
Dedication to my 53rd Ann.
18/10/1
1 Sec 174.

176

A/cos

At 175 i Special Sites from Sicily.

Si 17/1

124544.

177

Chief of Staff

Sec.

Sec. Sec.
17 Jan 45

17/10/45
for Col. 2205.

180

Pl Sec

for the Sec 179

17 Jan 45

17/10/45
for Col. 2205.

181

Thanks.

17/10/45
for Col. 2205.

COS

Please see also 161 which has arrived since minute 160 was written.
The two places named are both in ARGENTO Prov.

15 Jan 45

778 (15/1)

G. Hadden
CaptCopy of minute for Temporary Justice

COS

yesterday's Public Safety Sitrep to
ATMO at file 163 - I am having
doubtful words re-checked

Signed E. Talbot
10/11

161

COS

Sitrep from Sicilian Region despatched yesterday is at 165. This is similar to 2 Dist report (161) of the same date & time.

15 Jan 45

17/15/11

The

11 Jan 45. G.O.S.

134

Two more Sitreps - pages 132, 133.

On 132 No. 3 District states "COMISO still held by rioters". On 133 Brig. CARR says "COMISO controlled about 1000 rioters".

C.A. Sec. are not sure what this latter statement means, but will ring up Brig. CARR to find out.

"Comiso is controlled by about 1000 rioters" *W. Gipp*
Lt. Col.
D.S.O.

12/14/45

g 11/11

136-139 Jan

(140)

g 11/11

143

Col Let's it keep from Brig. Gen at 141.

P142 confirms what you announced at Co meeting today.

ceo

In form R.C. re ~~142~~ or functions

11/11

147

145 and 146 received by hand from Naval Sub Commission. Don't cable prepared for dispatch to R.C., Sicily. See 150.

13 Jan 45.

152

500

Del...

Col. 143. Letter filed from Brig Gen at 141.
 P42 confirms what you announced at Co meeting today.
 144 12/1

142
 Inform R.C. re ~~142~~ previous
 TTS/141.

147
 145 and 146 received by hand from Naval Sub Commission. Draft cable prepared for dispatch to R.C., 31x13. See 140.

13 Jan 45.

152

500

1 MW/141. 13/1 see 151
 Ref 134 Spoke highlights LTSC. When had not seen. See Comm for status.
 14/1 pa

Col. 140
 you have not seen 159. ^{added} AGRIGENTS Prov, where new disorders are reported (para 4), is in Southern Sicily. (but does not appear RAGUSA Prov.)

15 Jan 45

15/1
 14/1

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358
~~SECRET~~

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

THB/TBJ/sls

G-5: 000.5

31 January 1945

SUBJECT: Sicily Disturbances.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission, APO 394.

1. Reference is made to the very full joint report dated 18 January prepared by MMIA and PWB on the "Rebellion in the Province of Ragusa 5/11 January" copies of which were forwarded to this Headquarters and to Headquarters Allied Commission under MMIA reference G/33 of 26 January.
2. Particular reference is made to paragraph 7b of the above report recommending specific action so far as concerns the Carabinieri involved in the disturbances.
3. It is requested that this Headquarters be informed of the action which is being or has been taken by the Italian Government so far as the Carabinieri are concerned.

T. R. Henn
T. R. HENN, Colonel,
Acting Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5.

3067

(ORIGINAL PASSED TO C.A.SEC FOR ACTION)
1 FEB 45.

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PERSONAL AND SECRET.

20

Ref: 3518/212/003.

1st February 1945.

I am sending you an excellent report by Lt.Col.Howard of Land Forces Sub-Commission and Major Hanley of P.W.B. on the disturbances round RAGUSA. It brings to my mind the point which I have mentioned before which is, that in the event of a disturbance of considerable dimensions such as happened at RAGUSA, the Chief Commissioner does require from yourself an overall report on the causes, events and results. We are getting our sitreps in the ordinary course of events but should have liked to have submitted to him simultaneously with this report your own views from the political and administrative aspect. I have no doubt that a report is on the way and you may feel that a report written at a later date will be framed in better perspective.

I note also that at the evening meetings at Area HQ there was no representative of the Allied Commission except Lt.Col.Howard. I have no doubt your officer was in close touch with Area but I am a little puzzled at (a) the absence of news, and (b) apparent lack of contact between either your Provincial Officer or Public Safety officer and, for instance, the writers of the report.

Since dictating the above I have read your letter of 22nd January and note that you are taking steps to have day to day reports sent in the event of a repetition of the disorders. The above relates to an overall report on any particular unusual event.

Brigadier M. Carr, OBE, MC,
Regional Commissioner,
Allied Commission,
SICILIA REGION.

5066

PA 2/2

3617

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SUBJECT: Report on the Rebellion in the Province
of RAJUSA 5/11 January 1945

JAN 27 1945

209

211

LAND FORCES SUB-COM. A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)
File No. G/23
26 January 1945

TO : ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
RE: ALLIED COMMISSION
P.R.O. (NAME) (3) -
3 DISTRICT

Chief of Staff Sec.

218

1. Herewith copies of a Report on the Rebellion in the RAJUSA Province compiled jointly by Lt. Col. HOWARD, MMIA, and Maj. MANLEY, P.W.B..
2. This report contains valuable information and outlines in some detail, the military and political situation in RAJUSA.
3. It is considered that the lessons brought out by the Rebellion will be of good value in any disturbances which may occur in the future.
4. MMIA sees no objection to P.R.O. making what use of the report he thinks fit.

[Signature]
Major General
M. M. I. A.

~~SECRET~~REPORT C. THE REBELLION IN THE PROVINCE OFRAGUSA 5/11 JANUARY 1945.1. OBJECT OF REPORT:-

The object of this report is to give the facts, in so far as they are known, about the rebellion in the Province of RAGUSA which lasted from the 5th to the 11th of January 1945, and to comment on the action taken by the Italian Civil and Military Authorities to restore order.

The report has been compiled jointly by Lt-Col. the Hon. H. A. C. Howard, Coldstream Guards (MMIA) and by Major. I. Manley, Intelligence Corps (RSE).

This is a confidential report no parts of which will be reproduced in other reports for information without prior reference to the Land Forces Sub Commission AG (MMIA), nor will it be shown to any person not directly concerned.

A sketch map attached as Appendix 'A' shows the area covered by the rebellion and the main roads and towns affected.

The distribution list is attached as

Appendix 'I'.

2. DIARY OF EVENTS:-

Wed. 3 Jan.:- Demonstrations and riots reported from larger towns in Province of RAGUSA and part of Province of SYRACUSE. Those participating claimed that pretext for demonstrations was the call up.

RAGUSA - Demonstration. Trouble began when CCR arrested 28 persons in street after curfew and 9 men for ignoring call up.

1 Bn. (250 all ranks) from 139 Inf. Regt. PALERMO arrived of which 70 were sent to MODICA.

AVOLA - During night 3/4 Jan. small length of rail on railway line was destroyed by explosives 1 km. south of railway station.

The report has been compiled jointly by Lt-Col. the Hon. H. A. C. Howard, Coldstream Guards (MIA) and by Major. I. Manley, Intelligence Corps (PWP).

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RAGUSA - Demonstration. Trouble began when CCHP arrested 28 persons in street after curfew and 9 men for ignoring call up.

1 Bn. (250 all ranks) from 139 Inf. Regt. PALERMO arrived of which 70 were sent to MODICA.

AVOLA - During night 3/4 Jan. small length of rail on railway line was destroyed by explosives 1 Km. south of railway station.

MODICA - Demonstration. 70 troops from 139 Inf. Regt. at RAGUSA arrived.

COMISO - Demonstration.

VITTORIA - Demonstration.

Thurs. 4 Jan.:- Demonstrations continue; situation in area tense.

RAGUSA:- Demonstrations. Shots exchanged between troops and rebels. One Italian Officer seized by crowd, but later liberated by Italian troops. Casualties, killed one civilian, wounded one CCHP, one commissario di Pubblica Sicurezza and one civilian. Another report states that the casualties were -

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Killed 0. CCRR and one Finance Guard and wounded one civilian.

AVOLA - Railway line repaired and train service resumed.

MODICA - Demonstrations continue.

VITTORIA - Demonstrations continue.

Situation in area unchanged.

Fri. 5 Jan:-

RAGUSA:- Situation more serious. Prefect ordered the Major Commanding the RAGUSA Garrison to get his troops out. These troops were fired on by well armed rebels in the area near the railway station of RAGUSA IBLEA on the outskirts of the town. Troops remained in this area for the night. Prefect asked for reinforcements of troops to be sent to his area to deal with situation. Prefect sent written report to O.C. Troops, SYRACUSE. Between RAGUSA and VITTORIA CCRR vehicle carrying rations held up and rifled by rebels armed with machine guns, rifles and hand grenades.

MODICA - Demonstrations continue no casualties or damage.

COMISO - Wanted demonstration. 200 to 300 armed rebels dispersed on escarpment above town by CCRR and troops sent from RAGUSA. Shots exchanged and CCRR wounded.

VITTORIA - Demonstrations continue no casualties or damage.

Sat. 6 Jan:- Situation in area takes a more serious and violent turn.

RAGUSA - In morning troops belonging to RAGUSA Garrison returned to town.

12:30 hrs 100 troops belonging to the 16th Arty. Regt. of the SASAUDA Division which had been sent from CALTANISSETTA as reinforcements were ambushed and after short action disarmed by rebels at road junction on outskirts of RAGUSA. Troops in accordance with orders did not have their weapons loaded. Rebels kept arms, troops proceeded to RAGUSA in disarmed condition. One officer and two other ranks killed during action.

In afternoon 70 CCRR arrived as reinforcements

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MODICA - Demonstrations continue no casualties or damage.

COMISO - Heated demonstration. 200 to 300 armed rebels dispersed on escarpment above town by CCRP and troops sent from RAGUSA. Shots exchanged one CCRP wounded.

VITTORIA - Demonstrations continue no casualties or damage.

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In afternoon 70 CCRP arrived as reinforcements from PALERMO. Skirmishes between troops and rebels in town. 1 off. 15 C.R.'s disarmed Military Det. H.Q.'s plus 5 CCRP. 16:00 hrs Demonstration outside prefecture. Prefect telephoned to SYRACUSE for reinforcements.

SYRACUSE - 21:15 hrs 225 troops under the Command of Lt. Col. TRAPANI left by road for RAGUSA of which 125 were from 145 Regt. SYRACUSE and 100 from 45 Regt. CATTANIA.

GIARRATANA - Troops on their way to RAGUSA from SYRACUSE fired on by rebels while passing through town at night. Slight injuries. Column then remained in area until later during 7 Jan., mopping up.

MODICA - Situation still tense.

SCICLI - Situation tense.

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CCRR - Demonstrations continue.

VITTORIA - Demonstrations and rebel activity, some shooting. CCRR barracks attacked and a few CCRR dispersed. Civil prison attacked and a few prisoners set free.

Mar. 7 Jan: - Situation in area unchanged. Telephone lines in area interrupted. Railway line RAGUSA to MODICA under rebel control.

RAGUSA - Shooting and skirmishes between troops and rebels in town. Prefect telephoned several times during day to SYRACUSE for reinforcements. Prefect and troops besieged (assaulted) in his own wards) by rebels in Prefettura. Several shots which were fired at the Prefettura entered the prefect's office.

During the day Prefect ordered Lt-Col. MANDANICI O.C. CCRR of RAGUSA to send sufficient men to the Prefettura to help disperse the rebels. A 2nd Lt. and about 60 men were despatched but on reaching the bridge at RAGUSA IBIZA they were fired upon by machine guns and rifle fire. The majority returned to their barracks and only the 2nd Lt. and 9 men arrived at the Prefettura. The Prefect again telephoned to Lt-Col. MANDANICI for reinforcements but the latter was unable and probably unwilling to lend his men in aid of the Prefect.

16:00 hrs Column, under Command of Lt-Col. TRAPANI, from SYRACUSE which had been held up in GIARRATANA area arrived.

17:00 hrs (approx) Col. LEONARDI Commanding Officer 16th Art. Regt., arrived from CALTANISSETTA with 25 men and one armoured car on tow.

17:30 hrs Gen. RONCO arrived with troops. Set up his H.Q. at the Prefettura and de facto took over from the Prefect.

19:00 hrs. Telephone line between RAGUSA and SYRACUSE interrupted.

During the night the situation quietened down as the majority of the rebels either left the town or went into hiding.

SYRACUSE - 12:30 hrs Gen. RONCO with 30 men (40 CCRR from CATANIA, 10 CCRR from SBAUDA Div. at MESSINA and 30 troops from 46th. Inf. Regt. at MESSINA) left for RAGUSA by road.

17:15 hrs. Lt-Col. HOWARD and Major. KANLEY arrived. Contacted Major. GRAY, O.C. Troops, and Capt. HUGHES A.C. Public safety in order to ascertain latest situation.

Lt. and about 60 men were dispatched but on reaching the bridge at RAGUSA IBLIA they were fired upon by machine guns and rifle fire. The majority returned to their barracks and only the 2nd Lt. and 9 men arrived at the Prefettura. The Prefect again telephoned to Lt-Col. MANDANICI for reinforcements but the latter was unable and probably unwilling to lead his men in aid of the Prefect.

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17:15 hrs. Lt-Col. HOWARD and Major. KALEY arrived. Contacted Major. GRAY, O.C. Troops, and Capt. HUGHES A.O. Public safety in order to ascertain latest situation. *0063*

CASERIBILE - Early in day small railway bridge on SYRACUSE-RAGUSA line destroyed by explosives. Workmen who were sent to repair the bridge were prevented from doing so by rebels who attacked them with hand grenades.

SOLARINO - In the evening rebels destroyed doors of grain and olive oil stores belonging to the Comune with hand grenades. Private house next to grain store damaged and one girl injured.

GIARRATANA - COOR dispatch rider on motor/cycle on way from SYRACUSE to RAGUSA forced to turn back by hostile attitude of crowd.

COMISIO - COOR disarmed at their barracks by rebels. Rebels use COOR barracks as P.W. cage for COOR and captured Italian Officer and other ranks. Comitato Provvisorio del popolo established.

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VITTORIA - Rebel activity and sporadic shooting occurred.

Mon. 3 Jan: - Situation still tense and serious in area. Telephone communication between SYRACUSE and RAGUSA still interrupted. Call up temporarily suspended. Lt-Col. HOWARD, Major. MAXLEY and Lt. JACOB, P. M. J. left SYRACUSE at 09:20 and are returning 17:35 hrs. During the day SOLARINO, MALAZZOLO, GIARRATANA, RAGUSA, NOTICIA, ISIRICA, NOTO, AVOLA and CASSIBILE visited. C.C. Troops, SYRACUSE informed early in morning that: -
 (a) Railway line between AVOLA and RAGUSA had been cut.
 (b) Damage had been done to grain and olive oil store at SOLARINO by rebels.
 (c) A bridge near CASSIBILE had been destroyed.

SOLARINO - Outwardly calm. In main square sulky and hostile looking inhabitants were standing about in small groups. Damage to store slight. C.C. guarding it.

MALAZZOLO - Looked outwardly calm in morning. Traffic normal on road SYRACUSE - PALAZZOLO.

GIARRATANA - At about 11:30 hrs. Very hostile looking crowd of men standing around cross roads in centre of town, no arms seen. Took road leading down valley to RAGUSA. Passed several small groups of peasants coming from the direction of RAGUSA.

RAGUSA - Troops in control, situation improved. Snapping operations in progress. Rebels in hiding or had left town.

On outskirts passed RAGUSA IBLEA railway station all shut up and deserted.

Shops and houses closed and streets deserted. Population peered from behind doors and windows. About 15 Italian troops encountered standing in large archway in main square of RAGUSA IBLEA. Troops had taken up positions with no cover. Troops appeared nervous. One of them acted as guide to main town of RAGUSA where the Prefettura is situated.

Courtyard of Prefettura full of troops and numbers and dilapidated Italian Army V.T.

Called immediately on Prefect DOTT. NALIA he appeared nervous. Prefect outlined events of previous days and considered that though order had been restored the situation was tense and that there was possibility of further trouble breaking out from one moment to another. He stressed the necessity for the systematic disarming of the civil population.

Gen. RONCO who was present concurred with the Prefect's statements and added that the rebels had not either

TALASSOLO - Looked outwardly calm in morning. Traffic normal on road SYRACUSE - TALASSOLO.

GIARATANA - At about 11:30 hrs. Very hostile looking crowd of men standing around cross roads in centre of town, no arms seen. Truck road leading down valley to RAGUSA, carried several small groups of persons coming from the direction of RAGUSA.

RAGUSA - Troops in control, situation improved. Mopping operations in progress. Rebels in hiding or had left town.

On outskirts passed RAGUSA IBLEA railway station all shut up and deserted.

Shops and houses closed and streets deserted.

Population peered from behind doors and windows.

About 13 Italian troops encountered standing in large archway in main square of RAGUSA IBLEA. Troops had taken up positions with no cover. Troops appeared nervous. One of them acted as guide to main town of RAGUSA where the Prefettura is situated.

Country of Prefettura full of troops and cumbersome and dilapidated Italian Army M.T.

Called immediately an Prefect DOTT NALTANA he appeared nervous. Prefect outlined events of previous days and considered that though order had been restored the situation was tense and that there was possibility of further trouble breaking out from one moment to another. He stressed the necessity for the systematic disarming of the civil population.

Gen. RONCO who was present concurred with the Prefect's statements and added that the rebels had now either gone into hiding or left the town, and that they were controlling the RAGUSA - MODICA road by means of a road block. Gen. asked Lt-Col. HOWARD to obtain further reinforcements, arms, ammunition and supplies on returning SYRACUSE.

Both Prefect and Quastore CIUFFRE considered that trouble in Province caused chiefly by Fascist elements aided by separatist who had used the call up as the pretext for creating the disturbances.

Interrogated 4 men who had been arrested as rebels only 2 of whom were liable for call up.

One said he had been given his weapon by Catanese Lt. while another said he had been given his weapon from a truck.

12/ total of rebels and suspects arrested up to 15:00 hrs.

During time spent in town there were sporadic bursts of firing and explosions of hand grenades caused by the mopping up operations.

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To: Mr. Murphy

Black is among the troops appear to be nervous.

Profect had had manifesto prepared to put up in town prohibiting meetings and assembling of crowds (for translation see Appendix 'B').

18:45 hrs. Left HAGUSA for SYRACUSE via MODICA and NOTO.

No sign of rebels or road blocks between HAGUSA and MODICA. Road deserted and all houses cleared.

MODICA - 15:15 hrs. Outwardly calm. Small groups of men in main street. Several slogans against call up on walls. COHR patrols in streets.

MODICA - 15:45 hrs. Outwardly calm apart from hostels looking groups of men in main square. Several fresh anti-call up and pro Fascist slogans on walls. No COHR visible.

AGROSELIMI - 24 passed town. Separatist slogans on station building.

NOTO - 16:45 hrs. Appeared normal. Two COHR patrols in main street.

AVOLA - During the day rebels armed with M.G. (1) throw six hand grenades against train carrying 200 conscripts from NOTO to SYRACUSE forcing it to stop. None of the conscripts used this as an opportunity for deserting. Troops sent from NOTO restored situation after an exchange of shots with rebels. Troops remained occupying positions near railway station and patrolling main street.

17:15 hrs. Passed through town, troops near railway station in open positions with no cover in street, outwardly calm, unfriendly looking groups of men in main square.

CASSIBILE - 17:30 hrs. Quiet.

COMISO - Concentration of rebels in occupation of town. Town under control of Comitato Provvisorio del Popolo with Commissario del Popolo at its head. During the morning Commissario del Popolo telephoned to HAGUSA to inquire about the situation there and to ascertain if the Profect was still in office.

VITTORIA - Situation tense, partial lull in rebel activity. Commissario Prefettizio in control. Local Committee of Liberation supported by all parties formed armed squads to help maintain public order and protect the town hall. The Communist leader is reported to have

station building.

NOIO - 16:45 hrs. Appeared normal. Two CORR patrols in main street.

AVOLA - During the day rebels armed with M.G.s (?) threw six hand grenades against train carrying 200 conscripts from NOIO to SYRACUSA forcing it to stop. None of the conscripts used this as an opportunity for deserting. Troops sent from NOIO restored situation after an exchange of shots with rebels. Troops remained occupying positions near railway station and patrolling main street.

17:15 hrs. Passed through town, troops near railway station in open positions with no cover in street, outwardly calm, unfriendly looking groups of men in main square.

CASSIBILE - 17:30 hrs. Quiet.

COMISO - Concentration of rebels in occupation of town. Town under control of Comitato Provvisorio del Popolo with Commissione del Popolo at its head. During the morning Commissione del Popolo telephoned to RAGUSA to inquire about the situation there and to ascertain if the Prefect was still in office.

VITTORIA - Situation tense, partial lull in rebel activity. Commissione Prefettile in control. Local Committee of Liberation supported by all parties formed armed squads to help maintain public order and protect the town hall. The Communist leader is reported to have been the principle organizer. Signor CURICONE, brother-in-law of Salvatore ALDISIO the High Commissioner for Sicily, was a member of one of the squads.

SRACIA - Situation tense and unsettled, rebels reported in area. Unconfirmed report stated that hand grenades were thrown in town.

Tues. 9 Jan. - Situation calmer and less tense. More traffic on road SYRACUSA to RAGUSA via NOIO and MOICA. Telephone line between SYRACUSA and RAGUSA still interrupted. Lt-Col. Howard, Major Manley and Sgt. Jacobs left SYRACUSA at 09:15 hrs. passing through CASSIBILE, AVOLA, NOIO, ISPIGA, MOICA twice during day, visiting RAGUSA and undertaking reconnaissance to within 2 kms. of COMISO. The same route was taken both ways on account of the reported mining of other road between SOLARINO and PALASOLO.

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RAGUSA - Gen. Ronco led by troops, situation calm, fresh slogans against the call up written on walls in center of town.

Meeting with Prefect and Gen. Ronco. They had received no news from either COMISO or VITTORIA and considered that the towns were in the hands of the rebels. They were of the opinion that Gen. BRISOTTO's column from AGRIGENTO had already arrived in the area and that order would soon be restored. The Prefect then sent for a telegram which he had received the day before from Salvatore ALVISE the High Commissioner for Sicily regarding Gen. BRISOTTO's column. On reading it again carefully he learned from it that the column was expected to arrive at VITTORIA at 12:00 hrs; this information had not been given by him to Gen. RONCO. Discussed the possibility of sending agents to COMISO and VITTORIA to ascertain what the situation was. This was an idea which they had not thought of before. They both stated that among the CCRR and Quentura Agents there was no one that they could trust and that if they sent one of these men it was possible that he would betray them to the rebels. Gen. RONCO said that none of the CCRR in RAGUSA were like his own Div. K.S. CCRR, 10 of which he had with him. Gen. RONCO said that he was going to place one of his platoons about 1 Km. outside RAGUSA astride the road leading to COMISO-Ronco of his troops had been as far as this point till then. Gen. RONCO asked for additional medical personnel to be sent to RAGUSA.

Visited prison to interrogate woman who had been acting as a nurse to the rebels and who was accused of having fired on the troops. Interrogation produced no results. Quentura plain clothes agent who acted as a guide to the prison was frightened to return to Proffetura on foot as he claimed that he was a marked man; he had to be escorted back in the jeep as a consequence. 14:30 hrs proceeded along road to COMISO - no traffic. Passed through the remains of several rudimentary stone road blocks erected by rebels outside RAGUSA. Countryside deserted and all houses closed up. Continued on winding road leading down escarpment above COMISO to within about 2 kms. of town. Excellent view of COMISO, VITTORIA and surrounding countryside from this point. Observed from 15:00 hrs to 15:30 hrs.

COMISO - Town in rebel hands. Two manifestos put up in town by Comitato Provvisorio del Popolo (for translation see Appendix C).

From observation point saw road block consisting of two rows of stones in position across the road entering the town from RAGUSA. From the town a few rifle shots

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there was no one that they could trust and that if they sent one of these men it was possible that he would betray them to the rebels. Gen. ROSCO said that none of the CORR in RAGUSA were like his own DIV. H.Q. CORR, 10 of which he had with him. Gen. ROSCO said that he was going to place one of his platoons about 1 Km. outside RAGUSA outside the road leading to COMISO-Rome of his troops had been as far as this point till then. Gen. ROSCO asked for additional medical personnel to be sent to RAGUSA.

Visited prison to interrogate woman who had been acting as a nurse to the rebels and who was accused of having fired on the troops. Interrogation produced no results. Queatura plain clothes agent who acted as a guide to the prison was frightened to return to Prefettura on foot as he claimed that he was a marked man; he had to be escorted back in the jeep as a consequence.

14:30 hrs proceeded along road to COMISO - no traffic. Passed through the remains of several rudimentary stone road blocks erected by rebels outside RAGUSA. Countrywide deserted and all houses closed up. Continued on winding road leading down escarpment above COMISO to within about 2 kms. of town. Excellent view of COMISO, VITTOLO and surrounding countryside from this point. Observed from 15:00 hrs to 15:30 hrs.

COMISO - Town in rebel hands. Two manifestos put up in town by Comitato Provvisorio del Popolo (for translation see Appendix C).

From observation point saw road block consisting of two rows of stones in position across the road entering the town from RAGUSA. From the town a few rifle shots were heard and two flares fired from a very pistol. People and carts were using the other roads leading to the town.

VITTOLO - Situation fairly quiet in morning, action squads on duty. Commissario Prefettizio telephones ALBISIO and reports situation in hand but reinforcements required.

13:30 hrs - strong force of rebels containing elements principally from COMISO attack town with intention of capturing town and ammunition depot.

Few shots exchanged with action squads who dispersed on arrival of rebels.

Rebels took up position in houses on outskirts of town from where they could obtain a field of fire on positions of the depot.

Rebels captured ten soldiers in town belonging to the depot garrison who were collecting rations.

The arms and ammunition depot garrison consisted of 40 troops under the command of a Maresciallo, ten of

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which had already been taken off shore by the rebels. Lt. Corrado MARIANI of the Divisione di Artiglieria Palermo who had been sent to VITTORIA on 5 Jan to salvage arms and ammunition from the area was in the depot when the attack was made and immediately took over command of the garrison, gave orders for its defense, and personally placed the troops in strategic positions inside the depot.

Lt. MARIANI estimated the rebels to be about 500 strong and to be well armed. He stated that the rebels had four M.G.s. and that what appeared to be their leaders were armed with mitra Beretta automatic rifles.

During the afternoon the rebels made six attacks on the depot. During one attack a rebel car passing by the entrance to the depot was destroyed and set on fire by hand grenades thrown by the troops. Its occupants escaped though wounded. In another attack rebel elements tried to enter by the main gate. This attempt was repulsed by the troops with M.G. fire and hand grenades; one rebel, however, managed to get inside the perimeter defenses before he was wounded and captured, later he escaped from the civil hospital.

During the afternoon Lt. MARIANI ordered at 47 pm. German 88 guns in the depot to be used against the rebels, six rounds were fired.

The attack continued until dark when the rebels retired in the direction of COMISO, threatening to return early the next day.

About 6 soldiers were wounded, 4 rebels killed and an unascertained number wounded during the action.

The able and courageous defense of the arms and ammunition dump by Lt. MARIANI undoubtedly prevented its capture by the rebels and saved a dangerous situation in the Province from becoming critical.

Part of this attack was witnessed between 15:00 hrs and 15:30 hrs from the observation point above COMISO. At the time it was thought that it was Gen. BRIGOTTO's column that was engaged.

04:00 hrs - Gen. BRIGOTTO left AGRIGENTO by train with 100 troops from 10th Arty. Regt. from CALTANISSETTA, 100 troops from 139 Regt. Ft. Sec. from PALERMO and 100 troops from 22nd Arty. Regt. AGRIGENTO.

About 12:00 hrs train carrying troops arrived GELA. Here joined by troops and 4 guns that had come by road from CALTANISSETTA.

15:00 hrs - Train left GELA for VITTORIA. (came left by road)

19:00 hrs - Train arrived VITTORIA.

Quiet night at VITTORIA.

CHILBRAMONTE - Small groups of rebels reported in hills

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the rebel, however, managed to get inside the perimeter defenses before he was wounded and captured. Later he escaped from the civil hospital. During the afternoon Lt. MARINI ordered two 47 mm. German ATX guns in the depot to be used against the rebels, six rounds were fired. The attack continued until dark when the rebels retired in the direction of GCMISO, threatening to return early the next day.

About 6 soldiers were wounded, 4 rebels killed and an unascertained number wounded during the action. The able and courageous defense of the area and ammunition dump by Lt. MARINI undoubtedly prevented its capture by the rebels and saved a dangerous situation in the Province from becoming critical.

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About 12:00 hrs train carrying troops arrived GELA. Here joined by troops and 4 guns that had come by road from CALTANISSETTA.

15:00 hrs train left GELA for VITTORIA. *came left by road*

01:00 hrs train arrived VITTORIA.

Quiet night at VITTORIA.

CHILIRAMONTE - Small groups of rebels reported in hills above town.

SCIOLI - Small groups of rebels reported in district.

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COLARINO - PALAZZOLO road - 09:00 hrs - 763 SYRACUSE received report that road mined at one point, investigation later in the day showed that about one third of road had been ineptly demolished during the night by explosives. Damage repaired during day, traffic only held up temporarily.

Wed. 16 Jan: - Situation improved in all areas except GCMISO which remained in rebel hands. Mopping up operations at VITTORIA. Appearance all towns passed through outwardly calm. Telephone communication SYRACUSE-RAGUSA restored in morning.

Lt-Col. Howard, Major Manley and Sgt. Jacobs left SYRACUSE 08:25 hrs, returning 20:15 hrs. Passing through twice during the day, CASSIBILE, AVOLA, ISFICA, MODICA and visiting RAGUSA and VITTORIA.

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RAGUSA - Town rapidly returning normal life. Troops had not moved further than outskirts of the town. 100 rebels and suspects arrested to date. Called on Gen. ROMEO, Prefect and Questore, Lt. Giovanni LUPIS RAGUSA socialist leader at Prefecture. Gen. ROMEO received congratulations on operations and orders for the co-ordinated attack on COMISO for 12:00 hrs on Thursday Jan. from Gen. MARITTI. Gen. ROMEO had previous to this order planned to attack at dawn on Thursday Jan.

Prefect now in control and calm. Questore had sent no agents out to rural areas to observe rebels.

12:00 hrs - Left RAGUSA for VITTORIA via observation point above COMISO.

In afternoon Lt. Sabatini and other prisoners held by rebels at COMISO liberated and returned RAGUSA.

COMISO - No attempt to attack VITTORIA.

Early in the morning the parish priest of COMISO together with another priest went to RAGUSA as an intermediary of the rebels. At RAGUSA he told Gen. ROMEO that the rebels were prepared to cease fighting if the call up was abolished and that they would return the prisoners they held. Gen. ROMEO replied that his terms were :-

- (a) Immediate return of the prisoners held by the rebels.
- (b) All arms and ammunition in the hands of the rebels to be handed immediately to the Commissioner Profettizio in COMISO.

Priest then returned to COMISO. In afternoon rebels released SABATINI and other Italian army prisoners. It appears as if the rebels began to lose heart in evening and to disperse. At 12:15 hrs observed COMISO from road leading down escarpment. Town still in rebel hands but outwardly calm, no firing, road blocks in position on road entering town from RAGUSA. Civilian traffic on other roads leading from town. 12:30 hrs - Returned to top of escarpment and took secondary road to VITTORIA thereby avoiding passage through COMISO.

VITTORIA - Order restored, troops in control, sweeping up in progress. Few arrests made. Population calm and hostile looking, most of them standing in their doorways.

13:15 hrs - Arrived at entrance to arms and ammunition depot. Heard story of previous days attack from Lt.

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VITTORIA - Order restored, troops in control, mopping up in progress. Few arrests made. Population calm and hostile looking, most of them standing in their doorways.

13:15 hrs - Arrived at entrance to area and ammunition depot. Heard story of previous days attack from Lt. MARIANI and then proceeded to centre of town to visit Gen. BRISOTTO. The General was found lunching with his A.D.C. and the Commissario Prefettizio for VITTORIA former vice-sindaco of CATANIA at hotel. At another table the Communist leader was eating who had played a prominent part in organising the action squads. He gave the clenched fist salute on leaving room. Discussed situation with Gen. BRISOTTO, during this rifle fire and explosions from hand grenades was heard from the troops who were mopping up. Practically no rebel prisoners or suspects taken up to the time of leaving.

In town a number of pro-Fascist, anti-call up and anti-allied slogans had been written on the walls. One anti-allied slogan "A morte agli invasori", "to death with the invaders".

Called at arms and ammunition depot and were shown around by Lt. MARIANI. It has a very large perimeter and is a difficult place to defend without previously

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ated defences. Inspected rear ATK units that had been used for defence.
Left at 11:30 hrs returned to RAGUSA uneventful. Encountered people from COMISO but unable to extract any information.

CHIARAMONTE - Small groups of rebels reported in area.

SCICOLI - Small groups of rebels reported in area.

ROSCOLINI - A short distance after by passing town at about 16:30 hrs heard rifle shot near road.

CATANIA - In the evening supply column of vehicles on train left for RAGUSA with escort of 100 troops from 45th Regt.

Thur. 11 Jan: - Situation outwardly calm to normal in all areas except COMISO which was occupied by troops without incident. Appearance of towns passed through normal. Lt-Col. Howard, Major. Manley, Capt. Baker, Sgt. Harrison and Mr. Hooper U.S. Consul General Palermo left S. RAGUSA at 08:15 hrs returning at 17:30 hrs; passing through twice during the day the same towns as on the 10 Jan. except VITTORIA and in addition visiting COMISO.

RAGUSA - Situation calm, P.S. continue arresting suspects.
In early morning supply column and escort arrived by road from CATANIA, having detained at MODICA. Party arrived 11:00 hrs, called on Prefect and Gen. RANOC, latter having lunch with his officers, several telephone calls delayed Gen. from eating and it was not until 11:40 hrs that he left the Prefettura with a small column of troops to join his troops who were then deploying on escarpment above COMISO. Party followed in rear of column.

COMISO - Situation outwardly calm. No sign of rebels. Town occupied by Gen. BRISOTTO's troops without incident. No reaction of any sort to entry of troops by population.
Troops commence mopping up and post extending patrols at entrances to town.
12:15 hrs - Gen. RANOC's column followed by Allied party motored into town finding it already occupied by Gen. BRISOTTO's troops.
14:00 hrs - Party interviewed Parish Priest who acted as intermediary for rebels. Owing to his evasion of certain points that were raised failed to obtain satisfactory answers to all pertinent questions.

except COMISO which was occupied by troops without incident. Appearance of towns passed through normal. Lt-Col. Howard, Major Manley, Capt. Baker, Sgt. Harrison and Mr. Foster U.S. Consul General in Rome left STRACUSE 08:15 hrs returning at 17:30 hrs; passing through twice during the day the same towns as on the 10 Jan. except VITTORIA and in addition visiting COMISO.

STRACUSE - Situation calm, F.E. continue arresting suspects.

In early morning supply column and escort arrived by road from CATANIA, having detained at MODICA. Party arrived 11:00 hrs, called on Prefect and Gen. ROMEO, latter having lunch with his officers, several telephone calls delayed Gen. from eating and it was not until 11:40 hrs that he left the Prefettura with a small column of troops to join his troops who were then deploying on encampment above COMISO. Party followed in rear of column.

COMISO - Situation outwardly calm. No sign of rebels. Town occupied by Gen. ERISOTTO's troops with no incident. No reaction of any sort to entry of troops by population.

Troops commenced mopping up and post standing patrols at entrance to town.

12:15 hrs - Gen. ROMEO's column followed by Allied party motored into town finding it already occupied by Gen. ERISOTTO's troops.

14:00 hrs - Party interviewed Parish Priest who acted as intermediary for rebels. Owing to his evasion of certain points that were raised failed to obtain satisfactory answers to all pertinent questions.

14:30 hrs - Party visited CGRR barracks to interrogate only rebel arrested up to this time. He was a Venetian who stated that he had crossed on 11 Feb. 12 days before and had come to COMISO with his wife who formerly lived there. The Marisciallo of CGRR told party that rebels had said they were expecting a drop of arms and supplies from the Germans in the DONZAFUGATA area.

Up to this party left COMISO no arms had been found by troops.

14:45 hrs - Party left COMISO returning directly to STRACUSE.

NOTO - Few kms. south of town on return journey found two unexploded shells minus their fuzes standing up in road.

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NOTES:-

(A) On returning to SYRACUSE each evening a meeting was held at which Lt-Col. Howard and Major Manley informed all present what they had seen during the day and what their impressions had been. Those attending the meeting each evening were as follows:-

Major GRAY, O.C. Troops, SYRACUSE.
Capt. SAUER, 21 Feb (on 10 Jan. only).
Mr. WISTOR, U.S. Consul General, PALERMO (on 10 Jan. only).
General DE LORENZO, G.O.C. II Bde. "SABAUDA" Div.
Col. SALERNO, 145 Inf. Regt. (on 10 Jan. only).
Lt. Col. ROSSITTO, 145 Inf. Regt.
Major RE, O.C., CORR, SYRACUSE.
Capt. AZZOLINI, Liaison Officer to G.O. Troops, SYRACUSE.
Dr. COCUZZA, Prefect of SYRACUSE Province.
Pto. COHEN, took the minutes of the meeting.

(B) The only telephone line between SYRACUSE and RAGUSA is an A.S.F. meteorological one which continues to AGRIGENTO. This line was put at the disposal of the Prefect of RAGUSA during the period of the rebellion by O.C. Troops, SYRACUSE. This line was interrupted for two days during the rebellion.

(C) For translation of anti-call up leaflet circulated in RAGUSA in the month of Dec 44 see Appendix 'E'.

(D) Reference Lt. MARIANI's estimate that the rebels were about 500 strong on page 7, it is probable that many spectators were included and that the number of rebels were at least halved.

(B) The only telephone line between SYRACUSE and RAGUSA is an R.A.F. metropolitan one which continues to AGRIGENTO. This line was put at the disposal of the Prefect of RAGUSA during the period of the rebellion by O.C. Troops, SYRACUSE. This line was interrupted for two days during the rebellion.

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3. BACKGROUND AND CAUSES:-

(a) Background:-

Though Sicilians belong to the Italian race they differ in many respects from the Italians on the mainland; this can be largely accounted for by the influences left behind by the various races which have occupied the island in historical times, each of which has left its mark on the customs, language and character of the people.

Sicilians are very individualistic and selfish people who have little team or public spirit outside their own family, to which they are very closely tied, or Mafia circles, they are only loosely linked together and distrust for one another is common. They have, however, a deep individual pride in being Sicilian.

Their personal character is declared to few apart from relatives and intimate associates. Sicilian "omertà" is an impenetrable barrier to the outsider except when their interests are at stake.

Corruption and deceit are rife among all classes, particularly so among the rich and urban population. The contadini have the same weaknesses though they are generally hard working and industrious people.

A large proportion of the people are illiterate. From the end of the Great War until the advent of Fascism the few who were politically active had rightist tendencies, because they felt that right politics gave protection to their vested interest. In the towns there were small groups of Socialists, principally among professional classes, and a few Communists. The most popular party was the church party known as the "Partito Popolare" under the leadership of Dr. Luigi Sturzo. Cooperation as an organized movement was then unheard of. Fascism had some of its early cells in Sicily, made headway out of the prevailing unsettled conditions, the town of Racusa being notable for its activity.

The majority of the people remained politically immature or apolitical. Public demonstrations and disorders were infrequent, bribery and corruption was generally practiced. Organized brigandage and Mafia activities were common, especially in certain areas.

The Fascist Government, on the whole, neglected the welfare of the island, but in certain instances, efficiency was improved, notably with the railways. The Government managed to enforce its laws through its public administration, which later became corrupt and inefficient. The CORA were respected until recent years when they succumbed to corruption and began to lose the people's respect. An energetic campaign was carried on against the Mafia and brigandage, and crime reduced, and public safety largely restored.

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The majority of the people were either apathetic, disinterested or against the Fascist war of conquest and feared Italy's entry into the war against the Allies in 1940.

Though conditions to begin with remained fairly normal, apart from certain restrictions, in the island, the people rapidly became war weary, Allied air attacks, the arrival of German troops and finally the Axis defects in Africa, all added to this.

A reaction to Fascism began to set in and small individual Anti-Fascist groups began to form clandestinely.

The Allied landings in Sicily though Italy was still at war with the Allies were welcomed by the majority of the people even though they heralded the defeat of Italy. They saw in them what they imagined to be a speedy solution to their sufferings and problems, especially as Allied propaganda had led them to expect an improvement in their political and economic conditions.

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with the Allies came political freedom and the abolition of Fascism, political parties formed and public meetings were held. The separatist party came to light as soon as ITALIANO was occupied under the title of the Committee for the Independence of Sicily. Measures were taken to combat Fascism and remove prominent Fascist from official positions.

Quantities of Italian, German and some Allied war material was left everywhere after the speedy campaign and some time passed before its collection into dumps began. During this period certain elements, with an eye to the future, collected and hid arms and ammunition, the possession of which even in peace time is a source of pride to the Sicilian.

A.M.G. administration raised the peoples hopes to expect a new era of honest and efficient administration. They were soon dismayed to find that many former Italian officials were still in office and could not understand, firstly, why they had been retained and secondly, why many officials were still open to bribery and corruption.

The rise in the cost of living which followed and the scarcity of food encouraged both crime and black market activity. The police forces and public authorities were unable to stop its growth. The people began to become disillusioned.

During the winter 1943/44 crime and armed banditry were on the increase and there was a considerable lack of public safety in many areas.

In Feb. 44, A.M.G. relinquished its administration, Sicily being returned to the control of the Italian Government with A.C.O. in an advisory capacity. MUOTTO was appointed by the Government as first High Commissioner for Sicily.

The public administration without A.M.G. behind it began to lose the respect and confidence of the people and was the target for much criticism much of which was incorrect or unfair.

The separatist claimed at different times to have the support of either Great Britain or the U.S.A. and some a new intensive political campaign together with criticism of the Italian Government. Stormy scenes took place at separatist meetings.

The consignment of grain to the Granai del Trapani met with a poor response on account of the low price of 1000 lire per quintal for hard grain being fixed when it could be sold illicitly to the black market for more money. This resistance was encouraged by the separatist who had support of the large "latifundisti". Another factor which may have contributed to the failure to reach the quota for each province was that the latter may have been fixed too high. At the end of Dec 44, 43% of the total quota fixed had been consigned to the Granai del Trapani, RAGUSA province, however consigned 90% of its total quota during this period.

Crime and brigandage continued. Robbery was

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Crime and brigandage continued, robbery was encouraged by the rising prices and economic distress.

On the 19 Oct 44 in RAGUSA, while a large crowd was demonstrating against economic conditions a hand grenade was thrown and Italian troops opened fire, thereby wounding a number of the civilians. This incident brought forth a storm of protest and the feeling was very bitter against the troops who had taken part in the firing. Criticism against the Italian army was general, which, it was claimed, should be at the front and not firing on its own people. The separatist used this incident as a further pretext to attack the Italian Government and claimed that it had no authority as it had not been elected by the free will of the people.

The separatist continued with their opposition to the Italian Government and its representatives in Sicily and urged the people though not openly to adopt a form of civil disobedience

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An Official British Government statement was made during support of the Separatist, though officially disclaimed the Separatist leaders still tried to demonstrate to their less well informed followers that they were being supported by the British means of associating whenever possible with British officials in public places and by inviting them to their homes.

Early in 1946 the first phase of the call up of the 1945/46 and first quarter 1946 call up was begun.

This brought a storm of protest and an outbreak of public demonstration. In Palermo, Catania and Messina they lasted for several days, while at Messina it lasted for several days. Several demonstrators who objected to the call up held the town square demonstrators who objected to the call up held the town square demonstrators who objected to the call up held the town square

The Separatist together with a large number of public printers encouraged the men called up, especially students, not to present themselves, but to demonstrate instead. Further opposition to the call up was created by a rumor prevailing everywhere at the time that those called up were being sent to units which would go to Burma, China or Japan.

During 1946 the German counter offensive in Belgium and their small offensive in Italy gave impetus to the revival of Fascism, more of its exponents coming out into the open. Pro-Nazi elements also became active with the federation of movements. These elements together with the Separatist began using the pretext of the call up to create further unrest. Furthermore it is not unlikely that some Nazi subversive agents have been at work stirring up trouble, but there is no evidence to confirm this. Many agents recently dropped in Sicily and who were captured and quite different minds to accomplish.

The second phase of the call up began on 8 Jan 45 with the calling up of the 1945 to 1946 classes, this had already been postponed a few days at the request of Alcide De Gasperi that further demonstrations would take place.

Demonstrations began against the call up in the main towns of Palermo and parts of Syracuse provinces on 2 Jan 45. In the remainder of the island the call up proceeded according to plan. The series of events during the last few years combined with the Sicilian character have both contributed towards the present situation and the attitude of the population.

The people have lost confidence in themselves and in their government and are disillusioned. Furthermore they have had for some time now a completely post war outlook which makes it difficult for them to bear with the continued war conditions and to make any contributions now demanded of them to prosecute the war against the Nazis.

A growing lack of sympathy for the Allies has further added to this complex outlook.

(4) Groups:-

1. The Call Up of certain classes for military service. Reasons

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to BURMA, CHINA or JAPAN.

During Dec 44 the German counter offensive in Belgium and their small offensive in Italy gave impetus to the revival of Fascism, more of its exponents coming out into the open. Pro-Nazi elements also became active with the fabrication of rumors. These elements together with the Separatist began using the pretext of the call up to create further unrest. Furthermore it is not unlikely that some Nazi subversive agents have been at work stirring up trouble, but there is no evidence to confirm this. Many contacts recently dropped in Sicily and who were captured had quite different attitudes to accomplish.

The second phase of the call up began on 5 Jan 45 with the calling up of the 1918 to 1921 classes; this had already been postponed a few days at the request of ALBISIO who feared that further demonstrations would take place.

Demonstrations began against the call up in the main towns of RAGUSA and parts of SYRACUSA provinces on 3 Jan 45. In the remainder of the island the call up proceeded according to plan.

The series of events during the last few years combined with the Sicilian character have both contributed towards the present situation and the attitude of the population.

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A growing lack of sympathy for the Allies has further added to this complex outlook.

(b) Causes:-

1. The Call Up of certain classes for military service. Reasons and presents were:-

- (1) General war weariness little or no desire to continue fighting in a war which Italy has lost, especially now that the war has moved away from Sicily.
- (2) Population has reached a post war state of thinking.
- (3) Low rates of pay and family allowances in the Italian army.
- (4) Unwilling to serve while many of their brothers and relatives are prisoners in Allied hands.
- (5) The dislike for Italians by Sicilians makes them unwilling to serve in the Italian army under Italian officers.
- (6) Fear because they do not know what they are being called upon for and how they will be treated.
- (7) Fear that they will be sent to BURMA, JAPAN or CHINA.
- (8) Fear of leaving those whom they support by their earnings when economic conditions are bad and the cost of living high.
- (9) Desire to be given good uniforms and boots, and to be given food and pay equal to Allied military standards.

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- (1) Short notice for call up.
- (2) Desire to obtain Allied status before they fight alongside Allies.
- (1) Desire to know the armistice terms

II. Political:-

- (1) Italian Government has little authority.
- (2) Opposition to and distrust of local Government authorities.
- (3) Desire to overthrow local authorities.
- (4) Separatist agitation.
- (5) Recent revival of Fascism and Fascist agitation.
- (6) Pro-Nazi agitation.
- (7) Anti-Allied feelings.
- (8) Desire to embrace the Allies.
- (1) Possible activity of enemy agents.

III. Failure of local authorities:-

- (a) Failure of local authorities to enforce the law and general inefficiency.
- (b) Failure of local authorities to foresee trouble, make plans accordingly, and take effective measures to nip trouble in the bud.
- (c) Questura and P.S. agents inefficient and fear to take strong action.
- (d) CCRR have lost much of their former prestige, were inefficient and were not prepared to put up a fight when attacked.
- (e) CCRR who have their wives and families in Sicily fear reprisals on them if they forcefully enforce the law.

IV. Economic Conditions:-

Economically the area affected by the rebellion is not nearly as badly off as other parts of Sicily. The majority of the population depend on agriculture for their livelihood and have not felt inflation and food shortages the same as those who live in the large towns. Rations of bread and pasta have been distributed regularly, however, if larger quantities were available at reasonable prices, it would do much to content the population. Unemployment is slight apart from 800 asphalt miners who are out of work.

Though economic conditions were not a direct cause of the rebellion, the population complain that:-

- (a) They fear that much of the grain they produce is exported to the mainland.
- (b) After Ragusa province had already consigned 90% of its grain quota to the granal, Aliscio's recent demand for

(1) Possible activity of enemy agents.

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- (a) Failure of local authorities to enforce the law and general inefficiency.
- (b) Failure of local authorities to foresee trouble, make plans accordingly, and take effective measures to nip trouble in the bud.
- (c) Quastura and P.S. agents inefficient and fear to take strong action.
- (d) CORR have lost much of their former prestige, were inefficient and were not prepared to put up a fight when attacked.
- (e) CORR who have their wives and families in Sicily fear reprisals on them if they forcefully enforce the law.

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Though economic conditions were not a direct cause of the rebellion, the population complain that:-

- (a) They fear that much of the grain they produce is exported to the mainland.
- (b) After Ragusa province had already consigned 90% of its grain quota to the arsenal, Aldisio's recent demand for a further 25 kgs of grain from the landowners and contadini's personal reserves created discontent.

V. Various:-

- (a) Availability of arms and ammunition in Sicily.

4. FAILURE OF CORR TO CONTROL THE SITUATION:-

- (a) One of the main reasons why the disorders in the Province of Ragusa took such a dangerous turn was that in many instances the CORR failed to carry out their duties and in certain others were considered by the Italian Military Authorities to be guilty of cowardice. The following are examples of the above:-

- (1) At Ragusa on the morning of 7 Jan 45 the Prefect asked for reinforcements from the CORR barracks at RAGUSA IERLA no

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he was then consigned in the Prefettura. Lt-Col. MANDRUCIO, 203 D.C., CORR, went out 2nd Lt. in charge of some 60 men. After a short examination at the Prefettura, most of them turned back and only the 2nd Lt. and 9 men remained in the Prefettura.

The Prefect again telephoned to Lt-Col. MANDRUCIO for more reinforcements but the latter remained in Palermo at the head of his men. His first appearance at the Prefettura was at 21:00 hrs after General ROMEO had arrived and some time after relative order had been restored by the troops. Both the Prefect and General ROMEO said plainly that they no longer considered the CORR Garrisoned in towns in the area affected to be trustworthy.

(iii) At COMISO on 7 Jan 45 some dozen CORR commanded by a Sardinian headed their arms over to the rebels without firing a shot.

(iiii) At VITICORIA a certain number of CORR were alerted without firing a shot on 6 Jan 45.

(iv) At RAGUSA 1500 CORR were alerted without firing a shot on 6 Jan 45.

(v) The previous behaviour of the CORR in the CATANIA riots of 15 Dec 44 (not referred to in this report) coupled with the general opinion about their conduct in the RAGUSA Province affair lead one to the following generic conclusion about the CORR in SICILY:-

(1) They have been incapable of showing the necessary determination to quell civil disorder in its initial stages and before it became dangerous.

(ii) They have lost their own self respect and the esteem of the people.

(iii) The officers are often very indifferent. The recent troubles at CATANIA and RAGUSA proved the two senior officers concerned to be at very rate inefficient and probably timid.

(iv) Both officers and men were often that not are married and have families in the towns where they are garrisoned.

(v) Since a considerable proportion of them are Sicilians this is a guarantee that they will not shoot, even in self defence, because they fear reprisals.

(vi) The rank and file seem to be very old or very young.

(vii) At COMISO the average age of the garrison appeared to be 40. They are inadequately armed to deal with (a) street riots, (b) armed rebellion, and are probably bewildered by the recent regulations issued after the CATANIA riots governing their use of arms in the case of civil disorder.

5. COMMENTS ON ACTION TAKEN BY ITALIAN MILITARY AUTHORITIES TO RESTORE ORDER.

(a) Command:-

(i) Military action against the rebels was directed at

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that on 5 Jan 45.

The previous behavior of the CCR in the CATANIA place of 15 Dec 44 (not referred to in this report) crumbled with the general opinion about their conduct in the RAGUSA Province affair lead me to the following general conclusions about the CCR in SICILY:-

- (1) They have been incapable of showing the necessary determination to quell civil disorder in its initial stages and before it became dangerous.
- (11) They have lost their own self respect and the esteem of the people.
- (111) The officers are often very indifferent. The recent treason at CATANIA and RAGUSA proved the two senior officers concerned to be at any rate inefficient and probably timid.
- (114) Both officers and men were often then not well armed and have failures in the towns where they are stationed. Since a considerable proportion of them are Sicilians this is a guarantee that they will not shoot, even in self defence, because they fear reprisals.
- (115) The rank and file seem to be very old or very young. As COM 140 the average age of the guerrillas appeared to be 40.
- (116) They are inadequately armed to deal with (11) street fights, (117) armed rebellion, and are greatly bewildered by the recent regulations issued after the FALLERMO place involving their use of arms in the case of civil disorder.

5. COMMENTS ON ACTION TAKEN BY ITALIAN MILITARY AUTHORITIES TO RESTORE ORDER.

(11) Command:-

- (1) Military action against the rebels was directed as far as possible by General MARIOTTI, C.O.C. Comando Territoriale della Sicilia from his H.Q. at FALLERMO. This was a mistake firstly because his communications by telephone with General BRISOTTO at AGRIGENTO/CELA/ VITTORIA and with General ROMEO at RAGUSA were slow, uncertain and controlled by civilian exchanges, and secondly because even had his communications been good he had not the necessary knowledge of local conditions to take his control effective at such a distance. It is surprising that a man of General MARIOTTI's experience should have failed to appreciate the necessity for complete control by the men on the spot (General ROMEO) and that he should have been guilty of issuing the operation order which is attached to this report as Appendix D without comment.
- (11) Efficient leadership amongst Italian Army Officers and C.O.s is hard to find, and when found their standards differ so widely from Allied standards that its value is hard to assess.

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Without any doubt however the energy and determination of General RONCO ensured the restoration of order in RASUBA whilst that of Lt. MARINI saved the arms and ammunition drop at VITTORIA from being captured by the rebels.

Generally speaking most of the operations carried out by Italian Army Units large and small violated all the known principles of war.

Organization was slow and clumsy, elementary battle drill such as ambushing, debussing, field fortifications, street patrols, the taking up of five positions etc., were carried out inefficiently.

No reconnaissance of any kind was made by either General or any of their officers prior to the occupation of COMISO.

The failure of General BRISOTTO to keep in touch by means of reconnaissance patrols, with the rebels retiring to COMISO, after his arrival at VITTORIA at 19:00 hrs on 9 Jan., and his inertia that night and the following day ensured the effective dispersal of the rebels and the hiding of their arms.

General RONCO and more especially General BRISOTTO appeared to have little idea of handling the particular guerrilla type of operation which they were required to perform. Though General RONCO, who is an able Commander, no doubt had his style cramped by General MARINOTTI's interference. He had in fact planned to surround and attack COMISO at dawn on 11 Jan. That this inability to adapt themselves to the circumstances was true of all ranks is shown by the fact that on 6 Jan., the reinforcement column of 100 men from CALTAGIRATA was ambushed by the rebels, 1 officer and 2 O.A.'s killed and the remainder not having their rifles loaded surrendered and were disarmed after a short action in which the rebels suffered no casualties.

(b) Staff:-

It was quite impossible to guess on visiting the H.Q.'s. of both the Generals concerned if there was any attempt being made to allocate staff duties even in accordance with normal Italian procedure. There was no sign of any kind whatsoever, and in the case of General RONCO "Q" appeared to be his own personal responsibility. General BRISOTTO apparently considered an ADC sufficient for all needs. Punctuality was noticeably absent from all operations. Reinforcement and supply columns never once arrived on time during the whole course of the operations.

(c) Transport:-

The striking power of the troops employed was crippled. The transport was inadequate. That there is a real lack

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(c) Transport:-

The striking power of the troops employed was crippled from lack of transport. Whether there is a road back M.T. throughout the island or whether what there is is uneconomically employed is not known, but there was a very definite shortage in the vital area.

General DE LAURENTIIS at SYRACUSE had no vehicles with which to send General RONCO urgently needed ammunition supplies on 9 Jan.

A vital M.T. supply column destined to leave CATANIA for SYRACUSE at 10:35 hrs on 10 Jan., by rail and to arrive at 12:47 hrs on the same day actually left by rail on the evening of the 10th and arrived at MODICA, where it detrained, late at night and finally reached SYRACUSE by road early on the morning of the 11th.

The tendency to send M.T. columns by rail was a notable feature of all operations and the excuse given was a shortage of fuel and the necessity for conserving tyres. The limitations imposed by time in carrying out this procedure and the risks run in adopting it are obvious.

(d) Communications:-

(1) All urgent communications between Italian H.Q.'s. were

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carried out by telephone. No R/T is available to the Italian Army I.S. Divisions and D.R.A. were not able to use radio either.

- (iii) All telephone communications were served by civilian exchanges.
- (iv) The line GELA/AGRIGENTO/PALERMO appeared to work fairly well for General BRISOTTO but General RONCO had to rely on the faulty R.A.P. line between RAGUSA and SYRACUSE - which was cut once - in order to keep in touch with his superior. All his messages had to be relayed on to PALERMO from SYRACUSE as there is no through communication.
- (v) General RONCO was working from the touring map of Italy 1/1,000,000 as issued by the R.A.C. d'Italia. No other maps were available to him or to his staff until supplied from Allied sources.

(d) Organization and Order of Battle:-

- (i) The organization of an Internal Security Division is shown in Appendix 'E'.
- The Italian Army Order of Battle for SICILY as at 5 Jan 45 is shown in Appendix 'F'.
- Given the present poor road and rail communications of the Island, the lack of military transport with which sudden operational moves can be made (civilian transport is untrustworthy in the case of civil disturbances) there would seem to be an unequal distribution of the armed forces throughout SICILY with too heavy a concentration of troops at PALERMO.
- (ii) As is usual in the Italian Army when units were required to produce bodies in a hurry they were found to be very much under strength. The battalion of the 139 Regiment which arrived at RAGUSA from PALERMO on 3 Jan was 250 strong.
- (iii) The fact that most of the troops employed were Sardinians from the SABAUDA Division made certain that there would be no disaffection on the part of the soldiery. The feelings between the Sicilian populace and the Sardinian troops of the SABAUDA and AOSTA Divisions have remained bitter throughout the Island since the PALERMO incidents of 19 Oct 44.

6. CONCLUSIONS:-

- (a) It is difficult to draw up a balance sheet showing the relative importance of the rebellion in the Province of RAGUSA. The people, however, who bore arms during the period 5/11 Jan 45 in the Province have been accorded the name of "rebels" and the disorders called "rebellion" for the following reasons:-
- (1) A definite attempt was made to besiege, attack and take over the Prefettura at RAGUSA.
- (2) At RAGUSA, COMISO and Vittoria, some of the 1000 and troops

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The Italian Army Order of Battle for SICILY as at

5 Jan 45 is shown in Appendix 'F'.

Given the present poor road and rail communications of the island, the lack of military transport with which sudden operational moves can be made (civilian transport is unsatisfactory in the case of civil disturbances) there would seem to be an unequal distribution of the armed forces throughout SICILY with too heavy a concentration of troops at PALERMO.

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6: CONCLUSIONS:-

- (c) It is difficult to draw up a balance sheet showing the relative importance of the rebellion in the Province of RAGUSA. The people, however, who bore arms during the period 5/11 Jan 45 in the Province have been accorded the name of "ribelloni" and the disorders called "rebellioni" for the following reasons:-
- (1) A definite attempt was made to besiege, attack and take over the Prefecture at RAGUSA.
- (11) At RAGUSA, COMISO and VITTORIA some of the GCR and troops were disarmed and in the case of COMISO imprisoned.
- (111) At COMISO a provisional committee of the people was set up which drew up its own laws, called upon all citizens to obey them, and prepared to defend the town against Government forces. It referred in a public manifesto (Appendix 'G') to the Government forces as "the enemy" and apparently directed all activities in the area which were carried out against them.
- (1v) The attack against the arms and ammunition dump at VITTORIA was a calculated attack by armed forces against Italian Army troops and organised with the object of placing at the disposal of the COMISO committee large stocks of weapons and munitions.
- In short the sum total of the disorders during the period mentioned were co-ordinated, if badly so, in such a way as to attempt to overthrow the representatives of the legal Italian Government of the Provincial Capital and to control a large part of the Province.

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It was not a case of spontaneous "disorders" or "riots", provoked by the call up, but of rebellion, planned to force the Government to abandon it.

On the credit side for the rebels the Government was forced to employ seven days and approximately 1000 troops and CCR in order to quell the rebellion, and of this total, 1240 had to be dispatched from other centres thus weakening the internal security at CATANIA, SYRACUSE and ARICENTO at an inopportune moment.

Furthermore in addition to many minor acts of sabotage some 150 soldiers or CCR were disarmed and their weapons taken off them, 1 officer and 6 other ranks were killed and about 26 wounded, and the Government was forced to suspend the call up for the Province of RAGUSA.

(b) The three danger periods during the rebellion were as follows:-

- (1) 6/7 Jan when RAGUSA town might have been taken and the rebel action been more determined and skillful. The taking over of the Prefettura at RAGUSA by the rebels would undoubtedly have spread and prolonged the rebellion.
- (11) 8 Jan when had it not been for the able and courageous defence of the arms and ammunition depot at VITTOGALIA the rebellion might have been given a dangerous impetus by the capture of large stocks of war material including at least three serviceable artillery pieces.
- (111) During the whole period 5/9 Jan the area GIARATANA, GIARAMONTE, COMISO, and VITTORIA was sufficiently under control of the rebels to enable enemy aircraft to land at the airfields at COMISO and VITTORIA or to drop supplies or agents unhindered and unreported anywhere in the area. The rebels at COMISO were reported by the CCR to have stated that they expected a drop by the Germans at DONNAFUGATA.

(c) The reason for the moderate success enjoyed by the rebels may be summarised as:-

- (1) The good breeding ground the Province of RAGUSA offered for discontent which was fostered by the unpopularity of the call up, by desperation and Fascism, by the circulation of a great number of arms and by the high cost of living.
- (11) The failure of the Civilian Authorities to enforce what form of violence the growing discontent would be likely to take and to suppress the rebellion in its initial stages.
- (111) The disgraceful and in some cases cowardly conduct of the CCR.

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 - The taking over of the prefettura at RAGUSA by the rebels would undoubtedly have spread and prolonged the rebellion.
 - (ii) 9 Jan when had it not been for the able and courageous defence of the arms and ammunition depot at VITTORIA the rebellion might have been given a dangerous impetus by the capture of large stocks of war material including at least three serviceable artillery pieces.
 - (iii) During the whole period 5/9 Jan the area GIARAFATA, CHIRAMONTE, COMISO, and VITTORIA was sufficiently under control of the rebels to enable enemy aircraft to land at the airfields at COMISO and VITTORIA or to drop supplies or agents unhindered and unreported anywhere in the area. The rebels at COMISO were reported by the GCRH to have stated that they expected a drop by the Germans at LONIAFUGATA.

(c) The reason for the moderate success enjoyed by the rebels may be summarised as:-

- (i) The good breeding ground the Province of RAGUSA offered for discontent which was fostered by the unpopularity of the call up, by nepotism and Fascism, by the circulation of a great number of arms and by the high cost of living.
- (ii) The failure of the Civilian Authority to force what form of violence the growing discontent would be likely to take and to suppress the rebellion in its initial stages.
- (iii) The disgraceful and in some cases cowardly conduct of the GCRH.
- (iv) The inefficiency of the Italian Army units employed.
- (v) The difficulties of transport and communications facing the Italian Army Authorities.

- (d) The Italian Army succeeded in its task of restoring law and order in the Province.
- It failed in its task of capturing the rebels their arms and ammunition.
- It is a safe assumption that the great majority of those who took part in the rebellion will not now be found.
- Whilst it is difficult to assess the numbers of rebels engaged there are probably still at large throughout the Province not less than 300 and not more than 800 well armed men who have at their disposal a few machine guns, a good number of light machine guns and sub-machine guns and considerable quantities of Italian rifles and hand grenades.

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There is no apparent lack of ammunition. Only very few of these hidden arms are likely to be recovered by either the Military or Civil Authorities. The majority of these men are now "wanted". They will go to ground either in the towns or the hills or try to join one of the brigand bands operating in Sicily. They will form a reserve of men ready for future disturbances should they occur. At the moment they are not organized and led, their danger is therefore only potential.

- (c) Discontent, arising at present mainly from the call up, Separatist agitation, latent Fascism, and in some cases economic distress, combined with brigandage will contribute to the continuation of isolated acts of violence throughout the Island. Such a semi permanent state of order is unlikely to crystallize into rebellion unless the pretext is a strong one, the moment for warlike and suitable leaders arrive. The two most likely pretexts in the near future may be the call up and shortage of food, but unless grave weakness is shown by the Civil and Military Authorities disorders are likely to remain localised.

- (f) Although most of the proceedings connected with the rebellion were carried out in an atmosphere of comic opera, and although the casualties on both sides were slight (see Appendix 'G') the danger which it constituted to the Allied war effort was that firstly a large tract of territory, including two airfields, was controlled by a movement hostile to the present Italian Government and possibly in a lesser degree to the Allies, and secondly that with a little more organization and impetus a state of affairs would have arisen necessitating Allied intervention.

Since the Allies are continually seeking opportunities to drop agents north of the line and to exploit just such circumstances as happened in Salento Province it is not unreasonable to suppose that where the Germans could retaliate economically they might well try to do so.

7. LESSONS BROUGHT OUT BY REBELLION:-

- (a) In order to discourage activities on a similar scale breaking out elsewhere in the Island a stern example must be made of men convicted of bearing arms and of killing or wounding any members of the armed forces. Sicily which is a troublesome area to administrators should have first class prefects and questors. Inefficient or weak administrators

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call up and shortage of food, but unless grave weakness is shown by the Civil and Military Authorities elsewhere are likely to remain localised.

- (f) Although most of the proceedings connected with the rebellion were carried out in an atmosphere of complete secrecy, and although the casualties on both sides were slight (see Appendix 'G') the danger which it constituted to the Allied war effort was that firstly a large tract of territory, including two airfields, was controlled by a movement hostile to the present Italian Government and possibly in a lesser degree to the Allies, and secondly that with a little more organisation and impetus a state of affairs would have arisen necessitating Allied intervention.

Since the Allies are continually seeking opportunities to drop agents north of the line and to exploit just such circumstances as happened in AGGUSA Province it is not unreasonable to suppose that where the Germans could retaliate economically they might well try to do so.

7. LESSONS BROUGHT OUT BY REBELLION:-

- (r) In order to discourage activities on a similar scale breaking out elsewhere in the Island a stern example must be made of men convicted of bearing arms and of killing or wounding any members of the armed forces. SICILY which is a troublesome area to administer should have first class prefects and gendarmes. Inefficient or weak administrators should be weeded out now, if they exist.
- (e) A complete report on the CCR in SICILY should be made with a view to punishing officers and men who have failed in their duty during the recent disorders at CATANIA, AGGUSA and elsewhere, and to reorganising and strengthening the Legion in order to cover once the defects mentioned in para 4 sub para (b).
- (a) The following points regarding the military organisation in the Island should be studied:-
- (1) In a grave emergency the need for a delegation of full powers to the military commander on the spot by the High Commissioner for SICILY and the Command/ Territorial Militia Siciliana, i.e. he must not be tied by advice from PALERMO military or civil or by regulations as to when he can open fire or upon what conditions he is allowed to use hand grenades etc.

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(ii)

The policy of strengthening garrisons by drawing off small numbers of men from units in other provinces is unecnomical.

A small mobile striking force should therefore be formed to be held as a reserve for immediate employment in cases of emergency.

(iii) Provincial Capitals must be adequately garrisoned, if necessary at the expense of other strategic centres. So long as the authority of the Prefect in his Prefecture is maintained disorders elsewhere are likely to remain localized.

(iv) The transport situation of the Comando Territoriale della Sicilia should be improved.

(v) Airplane communication should be restricted to the Italian Army in Sicily for essential headquarters in order to overcome the existing difficulties of communication.

(vi) A report should be made on the organization, equipment and efficiency of the ACSTA and SASADA Divisions with recommendations as to how their value for an internal security role could be increased.

(vii) An energetic press and radio campaign by the Italian Authorities preparing the people for the call up is essential. This was not in fact carried out in some of the Sicilian Provinces. In the Province of MESSINA where both the Civil and Military Authorities took great pains by means of posters, articles in the press, conferences, etc., to prepare the ground for the call up, well over the 1000 men expected, from the 1922/1923 and first quarter 1924 classes, were accepted for service with the columns.

Agency of the AGORA and SABABA Divisions with recommendations as to how their value for an internal security role could be increased.


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18 Jan 45.


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APPENDIX A



PROVINCE OF RAGUSA

1/500,000

MILES 10 5 0 10 MILES

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APPENDIX "A"

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MANIFESTO ISSUED BY DOTTORE MAITANA, PREFECT
of RAGUSA, on 8 Jan. 1945.

The Prefect of the Province of RAGUSA.

GIVEN the particular and exceptional needs of the moment
necessary to maintain normal public order at all costs throughout
the Province;

GIVEN the ordinance 16.12.1944 of the High Commissioner for
SICILY;

IN VIEW OF the necessity for prohibiting, until further
orders can be issued, all assemblies or public meetings in
public or private places;

GIVEN the ordinance 3 Jan. No. 019 Gab. di P.S.;

GIVEN the existing texts of the laws of I.S. (public order);

GIVEN article 19 of the existing urban and Provincial
byo-laws;

D I R E C T S

- 1) - From to-day and until rescinded participation in
assemblies or meetings inside or outside of houses is
prohibited throughout all Provincial communes.
- 2) - Whoever is found spoiling or destroying this manifesto
will be liable to severe punishment.
- 3) - The agents of Public law and order are entrusted with
the rigorous application of the present order.

GIVEN the particular and exceptional needs of the moment necessary to maintain normal public order at all times throughout the Province;

GIVEN the ordinance 16.12.1944 of the High Commissioner for SICILY;

IN VIEW OF the necessity for prohibiting, until further orders can be issued, all assemblies or public meetings in public or private places;

GIVEN the ordinance 3 Jan. No. 019 Gab. di P.S.;

GIVEN the existing texts of the laws of P.S. (public order);

GIVEN article 19 of the existing urban and Provincial by-laws;

D I R E C T S

- 1) - From to-day and until rescinded participation in assemblies or meetings inside or outside of houses is prohibited throughout all Provincial communes.
- 2) - Whoever is found spoiling or destroying this manifesto will be liable to severe punishment.
- 3) - The agents of Public law and order are entrusted with the rigorous application of the present order.

RAGUSA, 8 Jan. 1945.

The Prefect NAITANA.

APPENDIX "C"

(A) Notice and (B) Manifesto printed in COMISO,
issued by the Provisional Committee of the
People, 9 Jan. 1945 and posted all over the
town.

See page 6

(2)

NOTICE

All citizens are warned that whoever is found in the act of robbery or of any kind of violation to rights of private property will be immediately punished by sentence of death by means of shooting in the back.

THE PROVISIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE PEOPLE.(B) PEOPLE CITIZENS !

In order that the uncertainty of the times should be felt as little as possible and in order that public life should rapidly return to normal you are invited to remain calm, to return to your normal occupation and to collaborate with the Provisional Committee of the People.

With reference to the above the following is established :-

- 1) All legislative decrees, decree-laws, laws, instructions, bye-laws and municipal instructions which are not at variance with the new decrees issued by the Committee will be neither cancelled or altered.
- 2) Any citizen who has complaints or suggestions etc. to make may visit the Palazzo Comunale at any time where he will be heard and helped within the limits of the present conditions.
- 3) All public offices will resume their normal functions as from today.
- 4) Curfew is re-imposed from 2000 hrs. to 0500 hrs. 051
- 5) The roads entering the town are blocked and therefore those who have to leave it for essential reasons (work, sickness

(B) DEAR CITIZENS !

In order that the uncertainty of the times should be felt as little as possible and in order that public life should rapidly return to normal you are invited to remain calm, to return to your normal occupation and to collaborate with the Provisional Committee of the People.

With reference to the above the following is established :-

- 1) All legislative decrees, decree-laws, laws, instructions, bye-laws and municipal instructions which are not at variance with the new decrees issued by the Committee will be neither cancelled or altered.
- 2) Any citizen who has complaints or suggestions etc. to make may visit the Palazzo Comunale at any time where he will be heard and helped within the limits of the present conditions.
- 3) All public offices will resume their normal functions as from today.
- 4) Curfew is re-imposed from 2000 hrs. to 0500 hrs. *2031*
- 5) The roads entering the town are blocked and therefore those who have to leave it for essential reasons (work, sickness, etc.) are requested to obtain a pass which will be issued by the Comune.
- 6) The service of public order and of night watches is assigned to special patrols which will have the task of preventing any violation of person or property.
- 7) Anyone found circulating after curfew will be held when called upon to do so, will produce identity papers and justify his actions.
- 8) Violation of domicile, abuse of arms, robberies, treason, contact with the enemy at the present time and until further instructions are issued cancelling the present ones, will be punished by shooting: the execution to take place in the public square.

/...

9) Rations will be distributed normally.

10) In the case of enemy forces attacking the town the signal for "state of alarm" will be given by ringing the bells in pairs of three.

CC136, 9 January 1945.

THE PROVISIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE PEOPLE.

~~TOP SECRET~~

APPENDIX "D"

OPERATION ORDER from General MARIOTTI

to Generals RONCO and BRISOTTO

10 Jan 1945 1630 hrs.

From Comando Territoriale
To General RONCO Ercolo
To General BRISOTTO Silvio

TERMO
RAGUSA
VITTORIL

No. 282/01 di prot. I congratulate General RONCO and the troops under his command for their determined action during the last few days which resulted in the restoration of order at RAGUSA and I inform him that a supply column is on the way in accordance with his request escorted by 100 men of the 45 Inf Regt.

I also congratulate General BRISOTTO on the occupation of VITTORIL and I wish him too to express my warmest congratulations to the personnel of the arms and munitions depot for their determined and courageous action during the rebel attack on the depot itself.

CRISCO, still under control of the rebels, now remains to be liberated with the object of capturing the rebels themselves and bringing in their arms and munitions.

To this end:

General BRISOTTO will move from VITTORIL at about 0900 hrs tomorrow 11 Jan in such a way as to be able to attack the town of CRISCO at about 1200 hrs.

General RONCO will arrange to block the road RAGUSA CRISCO at 1200 hrs tomorrow 11 Jan with such troops as he has available, who will not push further west than the line VILLA ARZUFFO - CASCIOLA - PRASCA (reference map 1/100,000).

Signed General MARIOTTI

5050

inform him that a supply column is on the way in accordance with his request escorted by 100 men of the 45 Inf Regt.

I also congratulate General BRISOTTO on the occupation of VITTORELLA and I wish him too to express my warmest congratulations to the personnel of the arms and munitions depot for their determined and courageous action during the rebel attack on the depot itself.

COMISC, still under control of the rebels, now remains to be liberated with the object of capturing the rebels themselves and bringing in their arms and munitions.

To this end:

General BRISOTTO will move from VITTORELLA at about 0900 hrs tomorrow 11 Jan in such a way as to be able to attack the town of COMISO at about 1200 hrs.

General RONGO will arrange to block the road RAGUGLIA. COMISC at 1200 hrs tomorrow 11 Jan with such troops as he has available, who will not push further west than the line VILLA ARZIZIO - CASACINA. - PL.SCA. (reference map 1/100,000).

Signed General MARICOTTI

5050

page 18

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

1956

Internal Security Division

Div HQ
22 offrs 78 ORs

1 Sde 1 Engr Bn 1 Med Sec 1 Sup Sec 1 MT Sec 1 S

12 offrs 311 ORs 7 offrs 68 ORs 3 offrs 22 ORs 3 offrs 72 ORs

Rept 57 offrs 1031 ORs Rept

1 Bn Supt Coy 2 Bn

6 MC 12 MC

6 81 mm Mortars 16 LMC

Rifle Coy

Supt Coy

6 MC

6 81 mm Mortars

Rifle Coy

3 MC

8 LMC

12 Sub MC

BQ pl

MC pl

3 SA

Rifle pl

4 LMC

(A) inclusion Sde HQ

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

APPENDIX "E"

U.S. Internal Security Division

Div HQ
22 offrs 78 ORs

3049

1 Med Sec offrs 68 ORs	1 Sup Sec 3 offrs 22 ORs	1 MT Sec 3 offrs 72 ORs	1 Sec CCH 15 ORs	2 Bde 118 offrs 2083 ORs (A)
---------------------------	-----------------------------	----------------------------	---------------------	------------------------------------

Regt

2 Bn
12 MC
tars 16 LMC

Coy

Supt Coy 6 MC 6 81 mm Mortars	Rifle Coy 3 MC 8 LMC 12 Sub MC
-------------------------------------	---

HQ pl

MC pl
3 MC

Rifle pl
4 LMC

Rifle pl

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

APPENDIX "C"

Order of Battle Italian Army in SICILY asat 5 Jan 44.

TERRITORY

Territorial HQ SICILY

HQ 3d Div

3 Bde HQ (..)

5 Inf Regt (..)

6 Inf Regt (..)

139 Inf Regt (..) Less one Bn

28 Bn Engr (..)

MONTEBELLO Alpine Bn Less two Coys

MESSINA

HQ 3d Div

45 Inf Regt (S)

CATANIA

1 Bde HQ (S)

45 Inf Regt (S)

1 Coy Alpini

SYRACUSA

2 Bde HQ (S)

145 Inf Regt (S)

RAGUSA

1 Bn 139 Inf Regt (..)

2 Coys 145 Inf Regt (S)

CALTAGIRONE

1 Cp 16 Arty Regt (S)

CALTAQUISIA

16 Arty Regt less one GP (S)

ENNA

139 Bn Engr (S)

AGRIGENTO

4 Bde HQ (..)

MARTINI

22 Arty Regt (..)

Note A.

It is probable that owing to guard duties, sickness, leave, absence without leave etc. not more than 1/3 of the above units were available for special duty during the emergency.

Note B.

The following reinforcements were sent to the places indicated (early Bde figures refer to garrison troops).

3 Bde (3 Inf Regt
6 Inf Regt

1 Bde (45 Inf Regt
46 Inf Regt

2 Bde (145 Inf Regt
16 Arty Regt

4 Bde (22 Arty Regt
139 Inf Regt

3 Bde HQ (S)	1 Bde (45 Inf Regt
45 Inf Regt (S)	46 Inf Regt
1 Coy Alpini	
2 Bde HQ (S)	2 Bde (145 Inf Regt
145 Inf Regt (S)	16 Arty Regt
1 Bn - 139 Inf Regt (S)	
2 Coys 145 Inf Regt (S)	
1 Cp 16 Arty Regt (S)	
16 Arty Regt less one G2 (S)	
139 Bn Engr (S)	
4 Bde HQ (S)	4 Bde (22 Arty Regt
22 Arty Regt (S)	139 Inf Regt

Note A. It is probable that owing to guard duties, sickness, leave, absence without leave etc. not more than 1/3 of the above units were available for special duty during the emergency.

Note B. The following reinforcements were sent to the places indicated (early Dec figures refer to garrison troops).

Early December	110	60	30	From
End of December	90			
3 January	180	70		145 Regt SIRMUS.
6 "				" " "
7 "	225			139 Regt SIRMUS.
7 "	30			(125: 145 Regt SIRMUS.
7 "	25	50		(100: 45 Regt SIRMUS.
7 "	---	---		45 Regt SIRMUS.
Totals	660	120	330	16 Regt SIRMUS.
				(CC.RA : 175514 and
				CATANIA)

* This total does not include 100 men of the 16 Arty Regt sent from CATANIA to SIRMUS and 400 men of the 45 Arty Regt sent from CATANIA to SIRMUS on 2 Jan 45 or 100 men of the 45 Arty Regt sent from CATANIA to SIRMUS on 10 Jan.

TOP SECRET.

OSGUTH, S.

767

Reported during Retaliation:-	Italian Armed Forces		Rockets	
	Killed	Wounded	Killed	Wounded
Italian Government Official figures announced 16 Jan 45:-	1.	6.	15 to 26.	5 to 13.
	2(A)	16.	24.	19.
				65.

(A) Includes CCRA Lieutenant killed at HAO Province of AGRIGENTO on 15 Jan 45.

Robola and Suspects Arrested:-

- (14) The Italian Government has announced that 30 rebels have been arrested among whom are some of the leaders of the rebellion.
- (15) The Quotore of RAGUSA stated that 264 rebels and suspects had been arrested of which 22 had been released.

Government
Official
figures
announced
16 Jan 45:-

2(A) 16. 24. 19. 63.

(A) Includes OGR Lieutenant killed at MARO Province of
AGRIGENTO on 13 Jan 45.

Rebels and suspects arrested:-

- (i) The Italian Government has announced that 30 rebels have
been arrested among whom are some of the leaders of the
rebellion.
- (ii) The Quatero of RAGUSA stated that 264 rebels and
suspects had been arrested of which 22 had been released
in RAGUSA up to 17 Jan 45.

MINIATURED ITALIAN CIRCULAR IN PAGES

DEC. 1944.

An answer to "Italy at War" of

In the gazette of the 24th of this month a criminal
 modern writes "Italy at War" inviting all of us the youth
 (of Sicily) to take up arms once again in order to expel
 from our martyred land the leashed Nazi-fascists. To
 this man, a person certainly of great we answer
 we will not go. We will not go because our hearts tell us
 not to, because this is our sacred will, because our feelings
 in absolute opposition to any kind of militarism, can only
 register disgust and nausea for those who, after gambling at
 will with the unhappy fate of an Italy miserably and shameful-
 ly capitulated, try to gamble with the life so precious and
 so dear to us the youth (of Sicily), the life which is the
 dream and hope of our beloved ones. Shame! and above all
 contempt for those who discarding our history, forgetting
 how much we have suffered and our mothers wept, urge us to
 take up arms, to don our uniform caked with mud, and to fight
 under a flag not saturated with the pure blood of those who
 gave their lives on the battle field crying

" Land of my birth

the life which you gave me I hereby return to you"
 but saturated with the shame of a dynastic house whose continued
 existence is unjustified and hateful. To the mad criminal of
 "Italy at War" we must affirm that our land, today as never,
 is pregnant with resurrected Gariboldian heroes who fought
 and suffered and died for the liberation of the soil of Italy,
 and of heroes of the Risorgimento who to their thoughts and
 actions added the sacrifice for the independence and union of
 Italy. Like these and like worthy sons we are ready to give
 all, even our lives. We, the youth (of Sicily) who have
 already suffered too much from the frightful violence of this
 war are unable to consider sane he who defines it as our "sacred
 duty" to respond to the call to arms, we cannot but declare him
 criminal who exhibiting the most gross political ignorance
 thinks that such a contribution to the war will give Italians
 the possibility of preparing the future of the country/ *quà* of

register disgust and nausea for those who, after gambling at will with the unhappy fate of an Italy miserably and shamefully crippled, try to gamble with the life so precious and so dear to us the youth (of Sicily), the life which is the dream and hope of our beloved ones. Shame! and above all contempt for those who discarding our history, forgetting how much we have suffered and our mothers wept, urge us to take up arms, to don our uniform soaked with mud, and to fight under a flag not saturated with the pure blood of those who gave their lives on the battle field crying

" Land of my birth
the life which you gave me I hereby return to you"
but saturated with the shame of a dynastic house whose continued existence is unjustified and hateful. To the mad criminal of "Italy at War" we must affirm that our land, today as never, is pregnant with resurrected Gariboldian heroes who fought and suffered and died for the liberation of the soil of Italy, and of heroes of the Risorgimento who to their thoughts and actions added the sacrifice for the independence and union of Italy. Like these and like worthy sons we are ready to give all, even our lives. We, the youth (of Sicily) who have already suffered too much from the frightful violence of this war are unable to consider sane he who defines it as our "sacred duty" to respond to the call to arms, we cannot but declare him criminal who exhibiting the most gross political ignorance thinks that such a contribution to the war will give Italians the possibility of preparing the future of the country and of accelerating along the road to re-birth the fortunes of democratic and proletarian Italy. Such men are either deaf or pretend not to hear. A few days ago Anthony Eden publicly declared that Italy is a conquered country and as such has no right to expect any concessions at the peace table. We think that he could not have spoken more clearly.

For when must we fight? For when must we say goodbye to our dearly loved ones? For when are we to shed our blood? Our questions can be epitomised in a single reply for those who have conquered us with shame and with betrayal, who have affirmed their imperialistic theories in every age, conquering a vast empire at the cost of the blood and sacrifice of others, and also for those opportunists who in order to maintain themselves in the saddle try the most desperate remedies.

We do not wish to go and we must not go.

The unknown author of "Italy at War" had also better realize that the future and guarantee for the liberty of our people will not be a gift of others which we do not want or aspire to, but the fruit of our titanic sufferings, of our assiduous labours and of our thirst for peace which burns within us.

YOUTH (OF SICILY) MEN AND WOMEN THOU ART OBVIOUS THREAT IS ATTEMPTING TO BLIND, MOTHERS WHO HAVE CONCEIVED THE BEST DAYS OF YOUR LIFE IN PAIN AND TEARS, WIDOWS WHO HAVE BEEN SNATCHED FROM THE AFFECTIONS OF YOUR BELOVED HUSBANDS BY THE BLOWS OF A DEVILISH WAR, WAR WOUNDED TOWN AND MARTYRED IN FLESH AND BODY, UNITE WITH US, AND STEAR WITH US, HATE, ETERNAL HATE, IMPERISHABLE HATE AGAINST ANYONE WHO TRIES TO GAMBLE ONCE AGAIN WITH OUR TOO OFT TORTURED LIVES.

Appendix 'II'.

1. Land Forces Sub Commission A.C. (MIA).	20 Copies.
2. Mr. C.R. Radford, Chief of Intelligence P.W.B.	2 "
3. Lt. Col. H.A.C. Howard, MIA.	1 Copy.
4. Major. J. Manley, P.W.B.	1 "
5. MIA, 10, Sicily.	1 "

785017

ALCOM SICILIA REGION RPTD DISTURBS

541

25 JAN

ROUTINE

JAN 26 1945

RESTRICTED PD

PARA ONE PD SUBJECT IS HOLD UP OF SERGEANT KING ON TWO ONE JANUARY PD

PARA TWO ALCOM SICILIA REGION RPTD DISTURBS FROM HQ ALCOM PAREN

PARA TWO PD CONFIRMING TELEPHONE CONVERSATION UPON WHICH I AM CASH REQUEST YOU
PROTEST IN THE MOST FORMAL AND STRONGEST TERMS TO HIGH COMMISSIONER AT THIS
OUTRAGE BY SICILIAN BRIGADES ON AN ALLIED SOLDIER COM AND DEMAND THAT THE
MOST ENERGETIC MEASURES BE TAKEN TO APPREHEND AND PUNISH THE OFFENDERS COM
AND TO PREVENT A REOCCURRENCE OF SUCH AN INCIDENT

THE DISTRIBUTION:

CCS ✓
Pub Safety S/C

CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

437

NICHOLAS PIONBINO
CWO, USA
Asst Adjutant

5040

[Handwritten signature]

3618A

CONFIDENTIAL

189

ALLIED COMMISSION
SICILIA REGION HEADQUARTERS
APO 394

OFFICE: REGIONAL COMMISSIONER
PHONE: 15555 EXT 1

PC

FILE:RC/301

22 Jan 1945
JAN 26 1945

My dear Lush,

173

With reference to your 3618/173/003 of 16 JAN 45, I was aware that quite possibly you were receiving reports through military channels more quickly than those despatched from this Headquarters over the civil wires. I agree to your suggestion and have already instructed the Provincial Commissioner Eastern Sicily at Catania that in future copies of any telegraphic situation reports made by him will be sent direct to your Headquarters.

I think the matter is one mainly of communications as I understand that there is a teleprinter service direct from sub-area Headquarters Catania to No.3 District Naples and AFHQ. We, on the other hand, have to use the civil telegram system and have to be more careful about security. Moreover, the situation as regards reports from the recently disturbed area was somewhat abnormal because P/3 happened to have an officer in the area who was carrying out daily visits rather to the concern of the sub-area commander and myself, as we feared there was always a risk that some incident might be provoked.

However I have taken the steps you suggested and trust that should similar circumstances arise information will reach your Headquarters more rapidly.

Yours sincerely
M. Carr

M. CARR
Brigadier
Regional Commissioner

5045

Brigadier M.S. Durr C.B.E. M.C.
Chief of Staff
Allied Commission Headquarters
ROME

~~SECRET~~ 3678

188
C/8810

Jan 21 0700A
ROUTINE

218/87
ALCOM SICILY REGION PALERMO (CARR)
HQ ALCOM RPT P SAFETY SC ROME

JAN 21 1945

~~SECRET~~ PD

1. Beginning 21 January energetic action will be taken Italian
Govt collect men failing answer call up.

Further disorders may occur.

AC DIST.

Action Pub Safety

Info A/ President
Chief Commissioner
C o S
C.A. Section
Land Forces
File (2)
Float.

Action copy on file 8270/015

3044

3618

187

HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394

WSC/1516

17 January 1945.

142 JAN 18 1945

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Referring to your letter No. 809 of 11 January, the necessary arrangements have been made to implement the proposal to send 2 Italian cruisers to Palermo and Catania as a precautionary measure. The Minister of Marine is in possession of all details of the arrangements made.

Yours very truly,

Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral
Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi,
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government,
Rome.

5043

3618
Translation

The President of the Council of
Ministers
Minister of the Interior

n. 1223

Rome, 16 January 1945

Dear Admiral,

I received your letter 11/607/2/PS in reference
with the incidents which took place in Catania.

As I have already informed the P.S. Subcommission, having felt
that the intervention of the armed force had been neither efficacious,
nor timely to repress the trouble in Catania, I gave orders for the
immediate substitution of the Prefect and of the Questore.

Later on, a P.S. General Inspector was sent there to find out
about the technical responsibility of the various persons who were
to maintain order.

As regards a definite use of the public force in case of new
trouble in Sicily, orders have been given, through the High Commission-
er for Sicily, to all competent organs; these regulations have already
been enforced with good results in Ragusa and in Naro.

Sincerely yours,

M. I. Bonomi

Rear-Admiral Ellery W. Stone
Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission
Rome

e.e.

PA 186

COS Hist - 17 Jan 45

Action: C A SEC

INFO: 5042- C.A.S.

COPY ON FILE 3606/COS

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394

AG/14607/2/PS

31 December, 1945

My dear Mr. Prime Minister :

I am writing to you in your capacity of Minister of the Interior to bring to your notice complaints which have been made about the inefficiency of the Italian police during recent disturbances which have taken place in Italy, and in particular in regard to those at Catania.

So far as these last disorders are concerned, it has been alleged, inter alia, that the police allowed the situation to get completely out of hand and took no measures whatever to deal with the comparatively small number of persons who were causing the trouble. For example, it is said that, during the disturbances, no policemen were to be seen in the streets; indeed, in at least one barracks, the Carabinieri had locked themselves in; the lieutenant in charge explaining to an Allied Officer that because he had been ordered not to fire on the crowd he was unable to take any action. The Municipio was fired by not more than six persons, and the resulting conflagrations were not attended by the Fire Services, who were apparently afraid to venture from their Stations.

These complaints, serious in themselves, are also indicative of the general criticism which have been levelled against the police in recent months. They have been brought to the attention of your Ministry and of the General Commanding Carabinieri, by my Public Safety Sub-Commission, who have asked for a full investigation to be made and for measures to be taken to prevent such complaints in future.

I am of opinion, however, that your various police commands are in need of the support of your Government in dealing with this problem, and I would suggest that consideration is given to the publication of an official announcement, made by you, on behalf of the Italian Government, as to the need for the preservation of law and order, of your Government's firm intention to insist on this being enforced by every means in your power and by force if necessary.

May I take this opportunity to remind you that I have not yet had a reply to my letter to you on the subject of the possible reorganisation of the Italian Police, dated 26th November 1944, since I believe that any measures contemplated to deal with the present difficulty ought to be regarded as part of a large plan to effect an improvement in Italian Public Security

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

(184)

Services as a whole.

Yours very truly,

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivano Bonomi
The Minister for the Interior,
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government,
Rome.

3040

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

3618
ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
INFORMATION AND CENSORSHIP SECTION
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH
ITALIAN THEATRE HEADQUARTERS
P.W.B. UNIT No. 12 U.S.A.P.O. 512

CC-137
1837

To : Rear-Admiral Stone
Major L. Fielden.

From : Mr. L. Titchener

16th January 1945
JAN 17 1945

The following is Masley's cable No. 14 received
16th January.

"Prefect Hagusa has issued manifests ordering that all arms
in Prov must be consigned to authorities by 18th January.
No action will be taken against those who hand them in.
Severe measures will be taken against those found in
possession arms after 18th January. SHS officer killed
Dard was killed."

W. J. Titchener
Chief, Policy and Propaganda.

COS Diet 18 Jan 45

C.A. Sec.
P.S. Sp.
Legal Sp.

5039

PA 1/1

3618
RESTRICTED

CITE RRG-376
JAN 17 1950A

182
C/S
4/8305
JAN 17 1945A
ROUTINE

FROM ALONG TIGLIA REGION (GARR)

TO: HQ ALONG FOR VICE PRESIDENT ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION

JAN 18 1945

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

RESTRICTED.

1. Subject is recent disorders.
2. Regional Commissioner has made personal tour of district affected and information will be included in general report now being compiled.

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

Dist

Action - CA Sec
Info - A/President
Chief Commissioner
C o S
Pol Sec
R Safety
Navy
Land Forces
Air
PRO
File

PA 41
RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
10 JAN 45
A. C.

5038

227

3618

117

From: Manley

Date received: Jan. 15, 1945.

To: JEB Rose,

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Frank Palermo,

No. 13.

Gerbutt Catania.

JAN 17 1945

Palermo Catania Syracuse Ragusa outwardly calm yesterday.

At Piazza Armerina on Jan. 7 British soldier in charge column
mules dragged off mule by unknown assailants. Face slashed
motive unknown. At Naro 08356 (corrupt group) Agrigento on 11 Jan.
crowd disarmed CCHR and held town for 48 hrs. CCHR entered town
on 13 Jan. at 1030 hrs. Casualties, CCHR killed 1 officer, wounded 4.
Civilians wounded 4. Damage inside Naro was confined CCHR barracks
which were set on fire. Situation now under control. Minor unrest
Canticatti 03662 and Campobello Liante 09051. Belmonte and Di Martino
and prominent Separatists are expected to go Ispica 08299 15 Jan.
This may fit in with Finocchiaro proposed visit on same day to area.
Unconfirmed report states Finocchiaro expected 16 Jan. Catania.
Ref. my No. 12 dated 13 Jan. letters written on walls in Catania
Syracuse were put up by Separatists to commemorate anniversary
revolution in Sicily on 12 Jan. 1848 and an sign Separatist solidarity.

cc: Hon. Alexander Kirk
Cof 5
A. Liles

see 1804018

3618
RESTRICTED

REF 85
JAN 16/1703A

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

3/8165
JAN 17/1300
RETIRE

From: ALGER SICILY REGION (CARE)

JAN 17 1945

To: HQ ADVANCE AND PUBLIC SAFETY OUR COMMISSIONS REPORT FOR INFO: HQ
204 SUB AREA AND UNION PALMORO

RESTRICTED.

1. Special sitrep.
2. Present situation in SICILY remains delicate they are no disorders reported in progress at present.
3. Searching operations continue in the Provinces of AGRIENTO and NACURA
4. Daily sitrep will not be continued but any changes in the situation will be reported.

DIST

Action: P. Safety
Info: A/President
Chief Commissioner
As Sec
Navy
Land F.
Air
C o S
Political
File

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
17 JAN 1945
5036
A. C.

3618
RESTRICTED

CHE RPS-84
JAN 16 1985

Q/B145
JAN 16 1985
PRIORITY

FROM: ALCON GRILLIA REGION (CARE)

JAN 12 1985

RE: ALCON RPT TO PUBLIC SAFETY SUB COMMISSION AND HQ 204 SUB AREA AND USMC PALERMO

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

RECAP: PAGES.

Special sitrep.

Para 1. Disorder reported at ^EDLIA, CALTANISSETTA Province on 14 January. Order restored on morning of 15 January by Carabinieri.

Para 2. Position at CALTANISSETTA and SOMERINO described as uneasy.

Para 3. Reminder of island mtr

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

LIST

ACTION	P SAFETY
INFO	A/INCIDENT
	CHIEF COMMISSIONER
	SOB
	C A SEC
	NAVY
	1 FORCES
	ALN
	PRO
	ISIE

RESTRICTED

2037

174

Ref: 3618/174/000.

17th January 1945.

174

Thank you for your letter RC/201 of 9th January which reached me on the 15th.

I entirely understand your arguments against Allied officers getting implicated in Italian disturbances. All that I intended to convey to you through Gripps was that you should go down to Catania or wherever the Headquarters of the Area Commander was, so that you could be with him for advice and information.

We found that reports about the disturbances were arriving from the Area Commander, from PWS and the Italian Government a good many hours before your own.

I hope that this lot of disturbances is now over.

M. S. RUSH

Brigadier H. Carr, CBE, MC,
Regional Commissioner,
Allied Control Commission,
SICILIA REGION.

5034

(173)

Ref: 3618/173/COS.

16th January 1945.

During the recent troubles I very much appreciated the Mitreps which you sent in. We were also getting Mitreps from other sources, from No. 3 District, through Italian channels and through PNB. I notice that very often the others, especially PNB, got their reports through to us first. I know that you are handicapped by not having your HQ at the same place as the local Military Commander, and I would like to suggest, if you have not already done so, that you delegate to your officer in CATANIA the authority to wire reports on the situation direct to this HQ with a copy to you. This is in the event of any future troubles which, of course, I hope will not happen.

M. S. LUSH

Brigadier M. Carr, CBE, MC,
Regional Commissioner,
Allied Control Commission,
SICILIA REGION.

Sec 189

Copy to: File 212/COS.

5032

ALCOM SARDINIA REGION FOR REGIONAL COMMISSIONER

9865

15

PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~ PD

JAN 16 1015

PARA ONE PD CALL UP FOR ITALIAN ARMY WILL PROBABLY TAKE PLACE IN SARDINIA
ON FIRST FEBRUARY FOUR FIVE AND CONTINUE FOR TWO MONTHS PD ONE NINE ONE
FOUR DASH ONE NINE TWO FOUR AIR GROUPS AFFECTED PD YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO
INFORM HIGH COMMISSIONER PD

PAREN TO ALOOM SARDINIA REGION FROM HQ ALOOM PAREN

PARA TWO PD TEN THOUSAND MEN ARE REQUIRED IN EACH MONTH PD

PARA THREE PD CHARLES CHARLES ROGER ROGER MOBILE BATTALION BEING FORMED WITH
TWELVE THREE TON TRUCKS AND TWELVE ARMORED VEHICLES TO BE ALLOTTED BY LAND
FORCES SUB COMMISSION

Distribution:

CC COS
PUB SAFETY
LAND FORCES S/C

CA SRC

437

R. R. CRIPPS, COL.

NICHOLAS PIOMBINO
CWO, USA, ASST ADJUTANT

ACTION off Bond Jones Info 8252/COS
INFO Og Police General 3626/COS

File

Extract of Minutes of Chief of Staff's Meeting held on 12 January 1945.

JAN 15 1945

Situation in Sicily. Cernigliani was Sub-Commissioner and
communications were on the way but they were not. C.S.
considered this point, saying that what was meant in the
former discussion was that lines of communication had been
broken by insurgents. He considered that news from RC
urgently reached us last, the first information being
from the Italian Government, then from the Army, and
finally from the Navy. This was not the fault of the
military service and the remedy was that RC must designate
someone to be representative on the spot to communicate
direct with headquarters. L.S. & S.H. to take it up with
RC.
C.S. then gave a brief résumé of the present situation,
again stressing that the Italian Government must handle
the matter themselves and Allied Forces would not partici-
pate in any way. C.I. Henderson raised the question
of breaking communication in Ragusa. C.S. considered this
would be Allied intervention and the best thing was for
the Italian Government to continue the communication they
already opened in Palermo and Syracuse. The matter,
however, would be put up to RC.

3031

ALLIED COMMISSION
SICILIAN REGION HEADQUARTERS
APO 394

OFFICE: REGIONAL COMMISSIONER
PHONE: 13353 EXT 1

FILE:RC/201

2 Jan 1945

JAN 15 1945

My dear Luch,

About 1230 hours today, 9th January, I received a telephone call from Colonel Cripps speaking on behalf of Brigadier Upjohn. There were three points in Colonel Cripps's message. The first two points referred to Italian Airforce reinforcements in connection with the current disturbances but it is on the third point on which I am writing to you.

The third point in Colonel Cripps's conversation was a message from the Chief Commissioner that, if I felt that the present disturbances were going to be confined to the eastern part of the Island, the Chief Commissioner considered that a personal visit by me to the area affected would be a good thing.

I had already made arrangements to go to Catania on Thursday, 11th January, and I propose to carry out that program if the situation is quiet at Palermo. But I have always worked on the principle and instructed my officers to the same effect that Allied Commission officers in Italian Government territory should, generally speaking, avoid going into areas where there are disorders and where the responsibility for quelling such disorders rests with the Italian authorities.

I base these rules on the following:-

(a) The presence of an Allied officer might provoke an unnecessary and untoward incident.

(b) The presence of Allied officers where the Italian military are endeavouring to restore order or have just restored order may be undesirable.

(c) If Allied officers visit the civil authorities such as Prefects under these circumstances it must give the impression that Allied officers are available to come and give them advice and support when trouble occurs and must militate against such officials learning to stand on their own feet.

I take it that the intention of Colonel Cripps's message was that I should personally visit the affected

~~SECRET~~

169

6

area, that is Ragusa, but I shall use my own discretion after my arrival at Catania as to whether a visit to Ragusa will serve any good purpose.

When I tried to put my point of view to Colonel Cripps over the telephone he apparently could not hear what I was saying so matters were left rather in the air.

I know there may be, even in this island, a type of demonstration where the presence of an Allied officer might be advisable and beneficial but, as a general principle, my view is that Allied Commission personnel under circumstances such as exist here should not take special steps to visit demonstrations or areas where disturbances are being quelled. In view of the Chief Commissioner's message could you let me know if I am right?

Yours sincerely
M Carr

M. CARR
Brigadier
Regional Commissioner

Brigadier M.S. Iush C.B.E. M.C.
Chief of Staff
Allied Commission Headquarters

R O M E

3618
RESTRICTED

SO 102
JAN 15 1210A

6/8010
JAN 15 1347A
ROUTINE

From: DI THREE

JAN

To: AFHQ (CI OPS) INFO: AFHQ (CI -CI), AFHQ, DIA, NIA LO

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

RESTRICTED.

Ref this Hq SO94 dated 13.

1. GUSPOMILLA DI LICATA and CANICATTI now quiet.
2. Remainder of Island Htr.
3. No further Sitreps being issued.

Dist

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

Info-Action - P Safety

" DIA

Info - A/President

Chief Commissioner

C o S

GA Sec

Navy

Air

IRS

Political

File

RESTRICTED

3618
~~SECRET~~

FX 84812
JAN 14 1445

(47)
C/8006
JAN 130500
PRIORITY

From: AFHQ, BOMBED BACKED CITE FIRM, PROCT

JAN 15 1945

To: HQF LO 204 SUB AREA INFO INFO SKILL, 204 SUB AREA, AREA, ALCOM BICITY FOR AREA,
ALCOM, AREA LO SARDINIA, MOVIT

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

~~SECRET.~~

Reference our FX 81335 of 8 January and AREA SD 2058 of 7 January. LO SARDINIA 7
ALCOM 7 For Public Safety Commission. 12th Italian light tank are being loaded in
vessel BRIGHON Etc. 21 January. Agreed

FOR INFORMATION



Info: 1. Safety
2. Person
Info: 1. President
Chief Commissioner
O. O. S.
O. A. Sec.
Navy
Air
Col. Sec.
S. R. C.
File

~~SECRET~~

785017

3618
RESTRICTED

C/2011

E.O.S. 165

CITE

RFS 53

JAN 141205A

JAN 151230A

PRIORITY

From: ARCOM SICILIA REGION (GARR)

To: HQ ARCOM ROMM (R) P SAFETY SC rpt for INFO: HQ 204 SUB AREA AND
USCIB PALERMO

RESTRICTED.

Special Sitrep.

1. Situation MAFUSA Province remains tranquil.
2. Disorder at SARO AGRIGENTO Province now quelled and situation in hand.
3. Unrest reported at CAMPOBELLO DI LICATA and CANICATTI AGRIGENTO Province.
4. Reminder of Island NTR.

Dist

Action - P Safety
Info - A/President
Chief Commissioner
C o S
GA Sec
Pol Sec
PRO
Navy
I Forces
Air
File



RESTRICTED

5026

3618
107

163

APR 6-5

9846

14 January 1945

PRIORITY

JAN 1945

~~SECRET~~ PD

PAGE ONE PD SPECIAL BUREAU SICILE ONE PD JANUARY PD

PAGE TWO PD BATTLE OF MARSANO AT EL FORTA IN CALABRIAN PROVINCE PD NO DETAILS PD

REPORT TO APR 6-5 FROM EL ALONE PAPER PD

PAGE THREE PD BRIDGE BLOWN ON HOLDING PATRONS ROAD AGRIGENTO PROVINCE PD

PAGE FOUR PD BRITISH TROOPS RELIEVING ITALIAN TROOPS ^{center} GUARD INSTALLATION OF GATE

REMARKS PD ?

← To read and
check. *th*

PAGE FIVE PD AT MARSANO IN AGRIGENTO PROVINCE ON ONE ONE JANUARY POLICE AND GUARDIAN

WERE FIGHTING BY AIRBORNE TROOPS AND HELICOPTERS PD REINFORCEMENTS WITH MORTAR

SECTION STATIONS AT MARSANO FIRE FROM MORTARS PD NO FURTHER DETAILS PD

PAGE SIX PD ITALIAN GOVERNMENT SENDING TWO DIVISIONS ONE TO PALERMO AND ONE TO CATANIA

TO PROTECT HARBOR INSTALLATIONS PD

PAGE SEVEN PD REMINDER OF ISLAND WAR PD

DISTRIBUTION:

CC ✓ CAC
CCE CRO

PUBLIC SAFETY 4/0

221 436

JOHN W. CRAWFORD, Colonel.

5025

785017

RESTRICTED

3018

CofS

(161)

SC 94
JAN 14 1945

77950
JAN 14 1945
ROUTINE
JAN 15 1945

From: BIRTHDAY

To: AFHQ (93 OPS) INFO: AFHQ (93-01) ALCOH, MIA, DATA LO

153

RESTRICTED.

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

Ref our 9079 of 13 January.


1. Reported minor unrest at COMPOBILLA DI LICATA and GANTICATTI C 8662. Details awaited.
2. Remainder Island NTR.

Dist

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

Info-Action - F Safety
MIA

Info - A/President
Chief Commissioner
C o S
CA Sec
Navy
Air
PAC
Pol
File



RESTRICTED

3024

785017

3618
RESTRICTED

Cof (159)

SITE
HPS 82
JAN 121500A

6/7505
JAN 141530A
PRIORITY

FROM ALCOB SIGINTA REGION (GARR)

JAN 14 1945

TO HQ ALCOB RPT TO P SAFETY SC HQ 204 SUB AREA AND TO USROB PALERMO

FOR INFORMATION

RESTRICTED.

1. Special Sitrep. Magusa province reported returning to normal but operations in progress against rioters who have taken to country.
2. Order given by military commander to surrender arms but none recovered.
3. CATANIA quiet.
4. Disorders reported at RARA and CASIGATTE both in AGNISTO Province. Reinforcements sent to both places. Communications difficult owing to heavy snowfall and damage to telephone lines.
5. Report received of attack on British soldier now in hospital suffering from knife wounds but not serious. Motive of attack unknown. Enquiries in hand.
6. Remainder of Island RM.

FOR INFORMATION
RECEIVED

14 JAN 1945

1. C.

RESTRICTED

Dist

Action - P Safety
Info - A/President
Chief Commissioner
C & S
CA Sec
Navy SC
Land Forces
Air
P R Br
Political Sec
File

5023

3618 X

150

To - AFHQ 0-5

9810

13 January 1945

PRIORITY

JAN 14 1945

IN VIEW OF ANY DEATH PD
PARA ONE PD SPECIAL SITING BEING PD
PARA TWO AFHQ 0-5 FROM HQ ALSCA PAREN PD
PARA TWO PD RAGUA PROVINCE QUIET PD
PARA THREE PD NO DETAILS ON RAGO DISTURBANCE PD
PARA FOUR PD REMAINING ISLAND WITH PD
PARA FIVE PD SPECIAL SITING WILL BE DISCONTINUED IN ABSENCE OF NEW OUTBREAK PD

DISTRIBUTION:

OC / CAS
COI / PBO

PUBLIC SAFETY S/O

EXT 606

ccy c50

3022

JOHN E. CHAPMAN, Colonel

NICHOLAS PIERRE
CWO, USA
Asst Adjutant

RESTRICTED

CITE REF-50
ZAS 1216504

FROM ALON SIGILLA BRIGADE (CARR)

TO HEADQUARTERS ALON AND PUBLIC SAFETY SUBCOMMISSION REPORT TO 204 ONE AREA
AND VANCE FALINDO

JAN 14 1945

RECAPITULATED.

1. Special sitrep RUCUSA Province 12 January.
2. Italian tps entered COMUSO on 11 January without resistance.
3. Some rioters have taken to open country. Operations now in progress to restore order throughout RUCUSA Province.
4. Disorder reported evening of 11 January at BABA, AUDIOBRO.
5. Carabinieri reinforcements sent.
6. Garment also reported at GATALLA but no disorder there at present.

HEADQUARTERS
11 JAN 1945
A. C.


ATTN: Safety
INFO: A/President
Chief Commissioner
G.O.B.
G.I. Sec
Navy
Land Forces
Air Force
TWO
TOL
FILE 3021

FOR INFORMATION ONLY
C-5
157
9/7056
JAN 14 1945
BOUTIER

JAN 14 1945

REMARKS.

1. Special atrey SUGUA Province 12 January.
2. Italian tps entered GADISO on 11 January without resistance.
3. Some rioters have taken to open country. Operations now in progress to restore order throughout SUGUA Province.
4. Disorder reported evening of 11 January at LANA, AGRIENNO.
5. Carabinieri reinforcements sent.
6. Arrest also reported at CATANIA, but no disorder there at present.



BLZ

ACTION: P. Safety
INFO: A/President
Chief Commissioner
G.O.B.
C.A. Sec
Navy
Land Forces
Air C/O
Eng
Tel
File 5021

RESTRICTED

run by C50

~~SECRET~~

CITE 1082/10
JAN NET

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

8/7890
JAN 141340A
HOPTINE

FROM: ALGERIA REGIONAL PALERMO, AREA 20 SICILIA
TO: ALGERIA, TO AREA 20

JAN 11 1945

~~SECRET.~~

Report for 10 January. PALERMO reported 178 accepted 99. MESSINA reported 160 accepted 45. CATANIA reported 161 accepted 53. TRAPANI reported 42 accepted 22. MARSALA reported 35 accepted 14. GASTANISSETTA reported 41 accepted 41.

New subject.

100 troops from ABRIGENTS entered VITTORIA early 1st time (?) January. Casualties reported troops wounded 1 civilians wounded 20 killed 3. COMING here by rioters. Italian troops grouping on VITTORIA COMING road for operations.

Dist

Action - Land Forces (2)
Info - A/President
Chief Commissioner
P Safety
G & S
CA Sec
NAVY
AIR SC
PRG
Pol Sec
File

~~SECRET~~

run by CSO20

CTM 1082/9

FROM DEPUTY REGIONAL COMMISSIONER

TO EL ZAGHARA BOX

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

URGENT

JAN 11 1945

077784
JAN 12 1945

IN CLIP

Following report by districts for 8 and 9 January. LAMAR reported 260 accepted
185. MASHIM reported 167 accepted 117. LAMAR reported 327 accepted 167 accepted
reported 135 accepted 135. LAMAR reported 61 accepted 28. LAMAR reported 53 accepted
53. LAMAR reported 81 accepted 74. Figures include 190 volunteers. Disturbances
prevent earlier and more complete reports from all districts.

RE: SUBJECT

Battle in progress at LAMAR. Bridge blown 1 mile south of LAMAR on road to
LAMAR. British troops relieving Italian troops on 10 installations on Ceta Island
and LAMAR reported quiet. CIPANICA?

PAGE

ACTION LAND FORCES (2)

5019

TH CILIA,

Following report by districts for 6 and 7 January. VALERO reported 260 accepted
105, ALBINO reported 167 accepted 117. LUCILLA reported 327 accepted 167 accepted
135 accepted 125. ALBINO reported 62 accepted 29. LUNA reported 53 accepted
33. CALABRIGLIA reported 81 accepted 74. Figures include 190 volunteers. Disturbances
prevent earlier and more complete reports from all districts.

NEW SUBJECT


Battle in progress at ILLINOIS. Bridge blown 1 mile south of SCLERIN on road to
SALABO. British troops relieving Italian troops on VD installations on Costa Isomide of
and MACOMA reported quiet. *SPANAVICA?*

DIST

ACTION LAND FORCES (2)
INFO A/STAFF
CHIEF COMMISSIONER
PUB SAFETY
COB
CA SEC
NAVY
AIR
P R DR
POL SEC
FILE

5019

see Serial 155



36/2
RESTRICTED

80 79
JAN 13/1035A

C 875153
C/7739
JAN 13/1710
ROUTINE

FROM: DISTRICT

TO: AFHQ (83 GPH), INFO: AFHQ (83-GI), AIDON, MIA, MIA 50.

JAN 14 1945

151
RESTRICTED.

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

Ref our 80 74 of 12 January.

1. Situation throughout MAGUSA Province returning to normal.
2. Stand down state swallow in CATANIA ordered wef 1700 hrs 12 January.
3. Remainder of island ntr.

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

DIST

Info-Action: 1. Forces (2)
2. Safety
Info: A/President
Chief Commissioner
G o G
GA Sec
Pol Sec
Navy
Air
Ar Br
File



RESTRICTED

5018

RESTRICTED

00 74
210 1217300

070655
ZAM 130000Z
ROUTINE

FROM: DISTRICT

TO: AFHQ (03 0005) INFO AFHQ (02 01). ALGER, MALA, MILA, LO

JAN 13 1945

FBI INFORMATION UNIT

RESTRICTED.

Reference our 02 61 of 12.

1. ALGERIA Province all quiet. Yps entered 00130 1200 hrs 11 January meeting no resistance. Situation CALIXO calls with no reaction to entry type.
2. MALA and ALGER reys in SLALIX concerned that total number rioters so far arrested small.
3. GUTHERIA no incidents. Disturbances HARS 0 8005 11 January. Details omitted. Remainder Inland HTH.
4. Unconfirmed reports state head of separatist movement FIMXALH NO ANNILZ intends visit towns MALMUA Province starting 15 January.

END

INFORMATION: P. Safety
Land Forces 2
INFO: A/President
Chief of Communications
C.O.D.
C.A.A. Sea
Navy
Air
185


RESTRICTED.

Reference our CG 61 of 12.

1. KADUNA Province all quiet. The entered COMUS 1200 hrs 11 January meeting no resistance. Situation COMUSO calm with no reaction to entry the.
 2. AGILA and ALONA rope in SIGHTLY concerned that total number rioters so far arrested small.
 3. C.TABLA no incidents. Disturbance RANG 8 8255 11 January. Details attached.
- Remainder Island 1978.
4. Unconfirmed reports state head of separatist movement MINOCCHI 250 AMMILS intends visit town KADUNA Province starting 15 January.

NOTE

INFORMATION: P. Safety
Land Forces 2
INFO: A/President
Chief Commissioner
C.O.D.
C.A. Sec
Navy
Air
INFO
File



RESTRICTED

ALONG SICILIA REGION

9780

13 January 49

PRIORITY

~~SECRET PD~~

SUBJECT IS SICILIAN DISTURBANCES PD

PARM TO ALONG SICILIA REGION FOR EMERGENCY COMMISSIOER FROM HQ ALONG PARM

ITALIAN GOVERNMENT ARE SENDING TWO CRUISERS TO SICILIAN WATERS ONE TO

PARM AND ONE TO CATANIA PD. THEIR ROLE IS TO PROTECT VAMPOUR

INSTALLATIONS PD. APART FROM THAT THEIR PRESENCE IS IN THE NATURE OF A

DEMONSTRATION OF FORCE AND THEIR ROLE NOT REFRAT NOT AN ACTIVE ONE EXCEPT

IN EXTREME NEED

Int. Dist.

Navy S/C
Land Forces S/C (1371A)
Air Forces S/C
C.A. Sec.
Pol. Sec.
Public Safety S/C
P.B.C.

Office of the Chief of Staff

300

Lt. Col.

5016

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

DRAFT CABLE

149
13 January 1945.

TO REGIONAL COMMISSIONER SICILY

~~SECRET~~
PRIORITY

ITALIAN GOVERNMENT ARE SENDING TWO CRUISERS TO SICILIAN WATERS ONE TO
PALERMO AND ONE TO CATANIA PD THEIR ROLE IS TO PROTECT HARBOUR
INSTALLATIONS ^{OF FORCE - ITALIAN} APART FROM THAT THEIR PRESENCE IS IN THE NATURE OF
A DEMONSTRATION AND NOT REPEAT NOT AN ACTIVE ONE EXCEPT
IN EMERGENCES

Copy to: Navy Sub Commission
Political Section.
C. A. Section
F. R. C.

Air Forces Sub Commission
Land Forces Sub Commission
Public Safety.

Commodore Nelson

With you please say if you agree if this
Signal - King's order is to be RC. informed

see 150
L. King

3618
RESTRICTED

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

(148)

DD FORM 1
JAN 17/1023ADD FORM 1
JAN 17/1023A

FROM: DISTRICT

To: AFHQ (21-75), JMWG: AFHQ (21-75), AFHQ: AFHQ, AFHQ: AFHQ.

132

RESTRICTED.

Ref our 20 43 of 11 January.

1. **RAGUSA Province.** Tension between SYRACUSE and RAGUSA outwardly calm. Situation RAGUSA soon returning to normal. Italian troops entered VITTORIA morning 10 January. Final elimination of resistance continues. Unconfirmed reports say ops against GEMINI postponed. Info difficult owing breakdown communications SYRACUSE - RAGUSA.

2. **State swallow ordered in CATANIA** owing repeated rumors disorders likely between 11/14 January. Leaflets attributed to separatists distributed but no incidents reported.

3. **Remainder island** ntr but further disorders thought likely owing resentful feelings population.

4. **CATANIA military dist** report that out of 1910 persons due to be called up in 1934/4 classes 1784 reported.

LIST

Info-action: L. Forces (2)
Info: L. Safety
A/President
Chief Commissioner
C. G. H.
CA. Sec
Navy
Air
Pro
File

RESTRICTED

3014
RECEIVED
JAN 17 1945
C

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

~~Chief of Mission~~

Attached is submitted for your information/signature/approval

→

NS/1411

3

5013

146

NAVAL MESSAGE.

5 1320L
(ESTABLISHED, OCTOBER, 1933)

TO: VAN PUGHAN SQUAD P-1412 BOMB (R) ON 6-11 P-1412
FROM: CDR U.S. NAVAL (RETIRED) BOMB P-1412, (RETIRED)
TOP SECRET. DEPARTMENT.

O. IS C. AND.

1. ALLIAN CRUISE P-1412 BOMB P-1412 SHOULD BE SAILED AS SOON AS READY
TO QUINIA AND RETURN AFTER FORTNIGHT HOURS IN THE PORT TO P-1412.

2. ON COMPLETION OF DEPARTURE FROM P-1412 A HULL SHOULD BE SAILED TO P-1412
OR CATANIA AS REQUIRED. (PART ONE T.O.C. 121832)

3. P.O.T.A.L.I. BOMB IS RE-ARMED TO INDICATE IN WHICH PORT PRESENCE OF
CRUISE IS MOST DESIRABLE.

4. ITALIAN CRUISE ALLOCATED V.A.M. FOR MOVEMENTS OF PERSONNEL SHOULD NOT
OPERATION NOT BE DIVIDED FROM THIS IS PLANT.

5. DEPARTURE/CRUISE VISIT SHOULD BE LIMITED AS FAR AS POSSIBLE.
TOTAL BOMB 141153 NOT TO HOLD MAPLES P-1412.

6. AND BOMB BOMB TO RE-ARMED ADDRESS.

121847A.

DIRT. 3469.

OTHER T.P.

T.O.R. 0708

DATE 13-1-45.

1. TO GAZANIA AND TUNIS AFTER FURNISHING INFO IN THE PORT TO PALERMO.
2. ON COMPLETION OF DEFENSE DATA IEL A HUEL SHOULD BE SAILED TO PALERMO OR CATANIA AS REQUIRED. (PART COM T.O.O. 121832)
3. F.O.T.A.L.L. I. NAME IS REQUESTED TO INDICATE IN WHICH PORT PRESENCE OF OFFICER IS MOST DESIRABLE.
4. ITALIAN CRUISE ALLOCATED V.A.N. FOR MOVEMENTS OF PERSONNEL SHOULD NOT EXPECTATION NOT BE DIVIDED FROM THIS IS PLANNED.
5. DURATION/CRUISE VISIT SHOULD BE LIMITED AS FAR AS POSSIBLE. TOTAL TIME 141153 NOT TO EXCEED 141153 PERIODS.
6. AND MORE ZAPUS TO EXHIBIT ADDRESSES.

ed 21847A.

DATE. 3/4/59.

OTHER T.P.

T.O.R. 0708

DATE 13-1-55.

3012

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

1145

NAVAL MESSAGE

To: C. INO. SEA (R) VAN POTALI PUNAM PUNEST
COM 6TH FLEET COMMAND PALERMO.

FROM: POTALI ROME.

9. 1320d.
Declassified by: 1988
Excluded from: 1988

RESTRICTED.

YOUR 12747 PARA 5 CANTINA.

#131056A.

5011

785017

3613

112

Translation

The President of the Council of
Ministers
Minister of the Interior

n. 809

Rome, 11 January 1945

Dear Admiral,

In agreement with the Ministers of
War and Navy, I think it advisable to send two cruisers
in the waters of Sicily; this action would have a pre-
dential and precautional character because of the situa-
tion of the island.

The two cruisers that might be the 'Duca d'Aosta'
and the 'Montecucoli', should cruise in the waters of the
harbours of Palermo and Catania; their presence should
be mostly a demonstration, to give the impression that
the Italian Government will not stand public order being
troubled; it would therefore warn the agitators that
they had better not make trouble.

In cases of extreme need, they might be used in co-
operation with the Army force to maintain order.

S. I. Bonomi

Admiral Ellery W. Stone
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
R o m e

e.o.

COS DISTRIBUTION 12 Jan 45

ACTION: NAVY SC.

INFO: CHIEF COMMR

see Memo 143 0911

RESTRICTED

CITE: RUS 79
JAN 11/1708

FROM: ALCON SIGMA HELLON (CASS)

TO: HQ ALCON AND TO PUBLIC SAFETY SUB COMMISSION

INFO: HQ 204 343 AREA, USMB

RELEAS

17ND NOVEMBER 1979

C/7569
JAN 12/1359
ROUTINE

RECEIVED.

1. Special sitrep.
2. Situation RAGUSA province morning 11 January.
3. RAGUSA city and VITRUBIA reported returning to normal.
4. Action in progress today against 1000 armed rioters controlling COMISO.
5. Anticipated this action will terminate disturbances RAGUSA province but further disorders area likely to occur.
6. Remainder of island not

FOR INFORMATION

PER

INFO-ACTION: FOR SAFETY

INFO: / PRESIDENT
CHIEF COMMISSION
COC
CA SEC
LP
NAVY
AIR
IN BR
YLLS

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

RESTRICTED.

1. Special atrop.
2. Situation NAGUUA province morning 11 January.
3. NAGUUA city and VITTHULA reported returning to normal.
4. Action in progress today against 1000 armed rioters controlling COMBUD.
5. Anticipated this action will terminate disturbances NAGUUA province but further disorders are likely to occur.
6. Remainder of island for

FOR INFORMATION

RECE

INFO-ACTION : FUB SAFETY

INFO : ✓ PRESIDENT
CHIEF COMMISSIONER
COS
CA SEC
LP
NAVY
AIR
IN BR
FILA

RESTRICTED

see Nindale 30443

3618 B.

CP 5 (139)

CITA: 1082/B
JAN 11/NPT

C/7497
JAN 12/0305
ROUTINE

FROM: ITALIA TO SICILY PALERMO

JAN 12 1945

TO: ITALIA HOME HQ ALLIED COMMISSION IN ROME

IN CLEAR.

Reference my 1082/7 of 66 January. Following for 6 and 7 January completing first phase. PALERMO reported 26 accepted 22. MESSINA reported 58 accepted 43. CATANIA reported 90 accepted 35. AGRIGENTO reported 133 accepted 136. TRAPANI reported 43 accepted 31. SIRACUSA reported 123 accepted 104. AGRA reported 7 accepted 7. CALTANISSETTA reported 10 accepted 10.

NEW SUBJECT

Serious disorders reported from MESSINA VITTORIA Area. Cause believed to be opposition to call up. CCM and troops disarmed for reconfor(?) for events(?) dispatched by MARICOTTI. General BRIDGEMAN sent to BITTOLA to assume charge of troops. Four General BRIDGEMAN sent to MESSINA to take

CITE: 1082/8
JAN 11/1945

FROM: DATA LO SICILY RELAYED

TO: DATA ROOM HQ ALLIED COMUSMACV H HONOLULU

9/7097
JAN 12/1945
HONOLULU

JAN 12 1945

IN CLEAR.

Reference by 1082/7 of 66 January. Following for 6 and 7 January completing first phase. PALERMO reported 26 accepted 22. MESSINA reported 53 accepted 43. CATANIA reported 93 accepted 35. AGRIENTO reported 138 accepted 138. TRAPANI reported 43 accepted 31. SIRACUSA reported 123 accepted 104. MESA reported 7 accepted 7. CALTANISSETTA reported 10 accepted 10.

NEW SUBJECT

Serious disorders reported from RAGUSA VITTELLIA Area. Cause believed to be opposition to call up. CCM and troops disarmed for retransfer(?) for events(?) despatched by MARZOTTI. General BELLICCI sent to BITTURA to assume charge of troops. Four soldiers and 3 CCM reported killed RAGUSA. General BELLICCI sent to RAGUSA to take charge. Railway line embargoed IN of MEDICA. Rioters armed with machine guns small arms and grenades.

5007

ACTION : DATA

INFO : /PRESIDENT
CHIEF COMUSMACV
COS
CA SEC
F SAFETY
NAVY
AIR, HON, FILE

785017

3618

138

TO - AFHQ G-5

9684

11/1/45

PRIORITY

JAN 12 1945

RESTRICTED PD

PARA ONE PD SPECIAL SETREP BICILY AS OF ONE ONE JANUARY PD

PARA TWO PD RAGUSA QUIET PD

PARA TO AFHQ G-5 FROM HQ ALGOM ENEN PD

PARA THREE PD ITALIAN TROOPS ENTERED VITTORIA ONE ZERO JAN

CASUALTIES ITALIAN ARMY WOUNDED THREE CIVILIANS KILLED THREE WOUNDED

TWO ZERO PD SITUATION REPORTED QUIET PD

PARA FOUR PD COMISO STILL HELD BY RIOTERS REPORTED TO BE ABOUT ONE

ZERO ZERO ZERO PD ROAD BLOCKS SHOT BY RIOTERS AND ROADS LEADING

TO COMISO MINED PD OPS AGAINST COMISO SCHEDULED TO BEGIN ONE ONE

JANUARY PD

PARA FIVE PD INCIDENTS REPORTED AT SOLARINO AND CASSIBILE SYRACUSA

PROVINCE PD NO DETAILS PD

PARA SIX PD ITALIAN SOURCES CONFIRM COMISO AS BEING STRONGHOLD OF

REBELS WHERE STRONG RESISTANCE IS EXPECTED AND ITALIAN FORCES WERE MOVING

AGAINST COMISO ONE ONE JANUARY PD

PARA SEVEN PD REMAINDER OF ISLAND NTR PD

Distribution

CC/ CSS
OOS PRO

Public Safety S/C

Ext 686

JOHN E. CHAPMAN, Colonel.

5007

File 121

Extract of Minutes of Chief of Staff's Meeting held on 9 January 1945.

JAN 11 1945

Situation in Sicily. COS raised this question and was told by CDS that Public Safety Sub-Commission had all the relevant information on this security matter. COS outlined the main facts and stated the situation in Ragusa was under control. He explained the measures that had been taken as a result of CS meeting yesterday. COS mentioned the Italian Government were extremely worried over the affair, the more so as we had drawn attention to weakness of troops and Carabinieri and lack of coordination between Italian ministries. C. Sec pointed out the difficult task RC encountered, and how he was hampered by lack of personnel. COS agreed but stated that lack of communications was the main handicap, and this should be partially removed when Italian military communications were set up. It had been stressed that Allied intervention was not contemplated. If it became necessary CC would have to be consulted in the first instance.

see M 140

5006

SECRET

NA 13

JAN 101645A

07455

JAN 111645A

INFOC JMT

FROM: AIR FORCE SUBCOMMISSION ALLIED COMMISSION NAME

TO: HQ MAY 250, HQ ALLIED COMMISSION (BY HMB), AFHQ, HQ 3 DISTRICT, ALLIED

COMMISSION SICILY REGION, HQ BALKAN AIR FORCE

JAN 11 1945

~~SECRET~~

Your immediate signal 386/176 of January 9th no time of origin delivered this SubCommission 1625 hours January 10th.

Presume it was written prior to discussion with Deputy A.O.C.-in-C. by telephone but not certain of this as no time of origin.

Agree channels proposed by you are essential to avoid untoward incidents and misuse of aircraft.

1 S.79 transport aircraft moved to CATANIA under orders of Chief of Staff Air Ministry without reference to Allies 1 other S.79 has returned HOME and a further one has proceeded CATANIA but only as transport for government officials.

These aircraft now under orders of Italian Air Force commander SICILY Colonel ~~SECRET~~.

Orders were issued 1630 hours 9th January to Italian Air Ministry that no fighter aircraft were to be used in SICILY but that SM.79 aircraft could be used for the purpose of gaining information or supply dropping if required. Would point out A.O.C. BALKAN Air Force has not operational control of SM.79 squadron which comes under Italian Air Ministry through this SubCommission.

5005

SECRET.

Your immediate signal DUC/176 of January 9th no time of origin delivered this SubCommission 1635 hours January 10th.

Presume it was written prior to discussion with Deputy A.O.C.-in-C. by telephone but not certain of this as no time of origin.

Agree channels proposed by you are essential to avoid untoward incidents and misuse of aircraft.

1 S.79 transport aircraft moved to CATANIA under orders of Chief of Staff Air Ministry without reference to Allies 1 other S.79 has returned ROME and a further one has proceeded CATANIA but only as transport for government officials.

These aircraft now under orders of Italian Air Force commander SICILY Colonel SPEDINI.

Orders were issued 1630 hours 9th January to Italian Air Ministry that no fighter aircraft were to be used in SICILY but that SM.79 aircraft could be used for the purpose of gaining information or supply dropping if required. Would point out A.O.C. Italian Air Force has not operational control of SM.79 squadron which comes under Italian Air Ministry through this SubCommission.

5005
EAC

INFO: ACTION: P. Safety B/C

INFO: A/President

Chief Commissioner

C.O.F.

C.A. Sec

Navy

Land Forces,

1st Br. File

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

3648

GO 22
JAN 10/1945

07393
JAN 11/1945
PRIORITY

Re: DISTURB

To: AFHQ AFHQ MOIA, HQ AFHQ.

JAN 11 1945

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

URGENT.

Your VI 21052 of 8th.

Confirmed battalion M. STROGANOFF battalion.

DIST

Info-Action:	L. Forces (2)
"	P. Safety
Info:	A/President
	Chief Commissioner
	C o H
	GA Sec
	Ta S/C
	File

~~SECRET~~

5004
HEADQUARTERS
11 JAN 1945

RESTRICTED

DATE REC-78
JAN 10 1350A

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

JAN 11 1345
ROUTINE

FROM: ALONG AICILLA REMIGN (GARR)

TO: HQ ALONG AND PUBLIC SAFETY HQ HOME HPT INFO HQ 204 SUB AREA AND
USMOS PALMRO

RESTRICTED.

1. Special Sitrep situation RAJUNA Province morning 10 January.
2. Available information indicates RAJUNA and VITTOBIA quiet,
COSMO controlled about 1000 rioters.

Dist

Action - Pub Safety
Info - A/President
Chief Commissioner
S O S
CA Sec
Secm Sec
Lead Forces
P H Dr
AIR SC
NAVY SC
File

RESTRICTED.

1. Special Sitrep situation RAJURA PROVINCE morning 10 January.
2. Available information indicates RAJURA and VICTORIA quiet, GOVISO controlled about 1000 fighters.

List

Action - Pub Safety
Info - A/President
Chief Commissioner
C O S
CA Sec
Recd Sec
Land Forces
P R Br
Air SC
Navy SC
File

RESTRICTED

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

3618
RESTRICTED

SR 43

JAN 11/1139A

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

0/7403

11/1400

ROUTINE

JAN 11 1945

FROM: DISTANCE

TO: AFHQ (93 - 218) INFO: AFHQ (93 - 31) ALBON, MAIA, MAIA 20

129

RESTRICTED.

Ref our 80 31 of 10 January.

1. Some 500 Italian troops from CHILICHO entered VITTORIA 10 January. Casualties Italian Army wounded 3. Civilians killed 3 wounded 20.

2. COMISO still held by rioters. Understood ops against COMISO scheduled start today.

3. RAVUSA and remainder island str.

4. US school PALESTRA visiting SYRACUSE with 80 31 153.

INFO

Info-Action: Land Forces
" Public Safety
Info: A/President
Chief Commissioner
C o S
CA Sec
Air Force
Navy
Fr Br
File

HEADQUARTERS

11 JAN 1945

A. C.

RESTRICTED

5002

131

3

CSO

from Region

128

Sitrep at 1 dated 10 Jan. still reports RACUSA
have. For the first time incidents are reported
SIRACUSA Pres.

129

Signal from 3 Dist at 2. Same date as above
sitrep from the Region + turned 35 mins later,
reports firing ceased in RACUSA on 9 Jan. both
to report remainder of Island.

11 Jan 45

4

Col

No drops from N 3 Dist and Big Can. The latter is
a little glowing but I do not think there is any particular
cause for anxiety yet.

MS/111

11/11

Specie about from 10-15 Jan 45

subnets from the Region + timed 35 mins later,
reports firing ceased in RATTUSA on 9 Jan. looking
to report remainder of Ireland.

11 Jan 45

Col

Two Edsps from N° 6 Dist and Big Can. The latter is
a little gloomy but I do not think there is any particular
cause for anxiety yet.

MS/mt.

L. H. H.

Speculate about from temporary for det.

2001

3618

6130

AFSA G-5

9614

10/1/45

PRIORITY

JAN 11 1945

IN CLEAR PD

PARA ONE PD SITREP PD R C SICILY REPORTS RAGUSA CITY UNDER CONTROL AND QUIET PD
VITTORIA AND COMISO UNCERTAIN PD

PARA TWO PD PWB SOURCES REPORT NINE JANUARY GEN RONCO HAS RESTORED ORDER RAGUSA PD
REBELS WELL ARMED WITH SUFFICIENT AUTOMATIC WEAPONS PD COMISO AND VITTORIA IN HANDS OF
REBELS PD ITALIAN TROOPS LEFT AGRIGENTO FOR VITTORIA NINE JANUARY PD SIX HAND
GRENADES THROWN AGAINST TRAIN AVOLA NO CASUALTIES OR DAMAGE PD RIOTERS WITH MACHINE GUNS
STOPPED TRAIN FROM PROCEEDING SYRACUSE PD

PARA TO AFSA G-5 FROM HQ ALCOM PAREN PD

PARA THREE PD FURTHER FROM PWB PREFECT AND QUESTORE RAGUSA CLAIM THAT TROUBLE AGITATED
PRINCIPALLY BY FASCISTS AIDED BY SEPARATISTS PD LEADERS OF REBELS REPORTED TO BE
INTELLECTUALS AND PROBABLY SOME ITALIAN ARMY OFFICERS PD CALL UP IN RAGUSA HAS BEEN
POSTPONED UNTIL ORDER IS RESTORED PD

PARA FOUR PD GEN RONCO IS REPORTED TO HAVE FIVE ZERO ZERO TROOPS AND TWO ZERO ZERO
CC RR IN RAGUSA PROVINCE PD

PARA FIVE PD SITUATION IN PALERMO AND CATANIA REPORTED QUIET PD

DISTRIBUTION:

CC
CCs

CAS
PMJ

PUBLIC SAFETY S/C

Ext 502

5000

See by CSC & Capt. [illegible]

CO 31

JAN 10 1620A

DISPATCH

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

AFM (03-000) INFO AND CT-CI) - ALOCH - MIA - MIA 10

JAN 11 1945

C/721

JAN 10 1930A

NOTES

ENTERS

3R

15 JAN 15

A.

DISPATCH.

Reference our CO 21 of 10 January.

1. Firing RANGE, ceased 1500 hrs 5 January. Arrests now total 127.

Preliminary interrogation reports indicate many ex fascists included.

2. VICTORIA and OCEANO still held by rioters. 10 blocks erected by rioters and rds leading to OCEANO mined. Italian typ case in area.

3. Remainder of Island N F R.

NAVY

INFORMATION: Land Forces

Public Safety

INFO: J/President

Chief Commissioner

C.O.S.

C.I. Sec

Air Force

WH Mr

File

NAVY

RECEIVED

Reference our GO 21 of 19 January.

1. Firing ceased 1500 hrs 9 January. Arrests now total 127.

Preliminary interrogation reports indicate many ex fascists included.

2. VIVENDIA and COMINO still held by rioters. 34 blocks erected by rioters and rds leading to COMINO mined. Italian tps come in area.

3. Remainder of Island N Y R.

END

INFO ACTION: Land Forces &
Public Safety
INFO: President
Chief Commissioner
C.O.A.
C.A. Soc
Air Force
PW Tr
File
NAVY

see inside 314

4989

~~SECRET~~

CITE RPS 75
JAN

FOR INFORMATION ONLY C/7322
JAN 101855A
PRIORITY

FROM: FLORENCE SICILY REGION CARR

RE: ALONG AND P SAFETY SO BIRD TO USNOZ PALERMO AND 104 SUB AREA

JAN 11 1945

~~SECRET~~

1. Special Sitrep.
2. Situation MAGNA Province grave but there is no definite indication that it is out of control.
3. Complete facts not available conflicting reports being received.
4. General MAGNA sent to take command reported reached MAGNA 7 January.

5. Report 1600 hrs from Commander 13 Corps as follows: Conflicts had taken place GIARANTANA and MAGNA casualties Army 1 officer 1 POC killed 35 wounded Carabinieri 1 killed Guardia di Finanza 1 killed civilians 4 dead many wounded.

6. Incidents also reported SOLARINO and CASIMIRIA SIRACUSA Province.

List

Action - P Safety (2)
Info - A/President
Chief Commissioner
C O B
CA Sec
Econ Sec
Lead Forces

HEADQUARTERS
JAN 11 1945

A.

1. Special Sitrep.

2. Situation NASUNA Province grave but there is no definite indication that it is out of control.

3. Complete facts not available conflicting reports being received.

4. General ROMON sent to take command reported reached NASUNA 7

January.

5. Report 1500 hrs from Commander 12 Corps as follows: Conflicts had taken place PLAKATANA and NASUNA casualties Army 1 officer 1 RCO killed 35 wounded Carabinieri 1 killed Guardia di Finanza 1 killed civilians 4 dead many wounded.

6. Incidents also reported MOLARINO and CASHIBILE SIRACUSA Trovines.

Dist

Action - P Safety (2)
Info - A/President
Chief Commissioner

C O S

CA Sec

Recn Sec

Land Forces

File

AIR

NAVY

PRC

~~SECRET~~

4998

SECRET

JCS/176
JAN 09 1947

C/
JAN 10 1947
IMMEDIATE
JAN 10 1947

FROM: HQ MAJF 8300

TO: AIR FORCES SUBCOMMISSION RELATED HQ ALLIED COMMISSION, AFHQ, 3 DISTRICT

F.O. SICILY REGION, HQ BALKAN AIR FORCE

FULL INFORMATION UNL105 Vol I

SECRET

Last sentence of second addressee signal 9484 January 8th is not repeat not understood. This HQ has not been consulted or given approval for the employment of any repeat any Italian aircraft in connection with Sicilian disturbances. If the Italian authorities wish to make a case for the use of Italian aircraft for such purposes as reconnaissance or supply dropping that case should be put up by Air Ministry through AVN BISCARLET. It will be considered here and, if approved in consultation with AFHQ, AOC BALKAN Air Force, under whose operational control the IAF squadrons are, will be authorized to make appropriate arrangements through you to release the aircraft required, for employment under Italian Command and on Italian responsibility in SICILY. In no circumstances are any orders or requests to be accepted except through this channel and no repeat no aircraft are to move without approval as above. It is most unlikely that the use of fighter aircraft will be authorized in connection with present disturbances for which on present information they appear to be entirely unsuited.

2). It is understood that some 579 may already have moved to CATANIA. If

this is so

issued, and

~~SECRET~~

Full information until 105 Vol I

Last sentence of second addressee signal 9434 January 8th is not repeat not understood. This HQ has not been consulted or given approval for the employment of any repeat any Italian aircraft in connection with Sicilian disturbances. If the Italian authorities wish to make a case for the use of Italian aircraft for such purposes as reconnaissance or supply dropping that case should be put up by Air Ministry through AFM BUSCALET. It will be considered here and, if approved in consultation with AFHQ, AOC BAIXAN Air Force, under whose operational control the IAF squadrons are, will be authorized to make appropriate arrangements through you to release the aircraft required, for employment under Italian Command and on Italian responsibility in SICILY. In no circumstances are any orders or requests to be accepted except through this channel and no repeat no aircraft are to move without approval as above. It is most unlikely that the use of fighter aircraft will be authorized in connection with present disturbances for which on present information they appear to be entirely unsuited.

2). It is understood that some 573 may already have moved to CATANIA. If this is so

(a) You are to report by whom and to whom was this order issued, and



~~SECRET~~

see Memo 127

4997

(JCS/176 - 9 Jan continued)

~~SECRET~~

under whose orders they are now, and

(b) Immediate instructions should be issued that they are in no repeat no circumstances to be employed on anything but reconnaissance, supply dropping or transportation.

(Note: This message received from PACAF decyphering.)

DIST

ACTION: Air Forces S/C
INFO: A/President
Chief Commissioner
C.O.S.
G.A. Sec
Land Forces
PR Br
P-Safety
Political Sec
Local Govt
File

...to be employed on anything but reconnaissance, supply dropping or transportation.

(Note: This message received from RAAC & cyphering.)

DIST

- ACTION: Air Forces S/C
- INFO: A/President
- Chief Commissioner
- C.O.S.
- C.A. Sec
- Land Forces
- IR Br
- P. Safety
- Political Sec
- Local Govt
- File

HEADQUARTERS
10 JAN 1945

~~SECRET~~

4996

RESTRICTED

00 21

00 100945

6/1050

00 100515

00 100515

From: 00 100515

10: 00 100515 (00-015) INFO AFTER (00-011) ALCON, 001A, 001A 10 (BY HAND)

JAN 10 1945

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

RECEIVED

Ref our 00 14 of 9 January.

1st. Col BRONCO (0000) returned last night from visit to various dissoners and reported
000000 and 000000 quiet. Battle reported in progress 000000. Details omitted.

2nd. British troops relieving Italian troops on 00 installations and deposits in 000000.
Understood demonstrations likely 000000 area shortly.

3rd. Reported release of news to press authorized and that High Commissioner will
issue statement.

4th. Remainder of Island War

00 1

INFO-ACTION 1 PAGES (2)

INFO 2 SAFETY

00 100515

CHIEF COMMISSIONER

00 1

00 100515

00 100515

00 100515

HEADQUARTERS

00 100515

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

RESTRICTED.

Ref car 00 14 of 9 January.

1st. Col REYNOLD (MORRIS) returned last night from visit to some disorders and reported
MORRIS and MORRIS quiet. Battle reported in progress VINDICIA. Details awaited.

2nd. British troops relieving Italian troops on VC installations and depots in CUBANIA.
Understood demonstrations likely CUBANIA area shortly.

3rd. Reported release of news to press authorized and that High Commissioner will
issue statement.

4th. Remainder of Island MAY

LIST

DEF-AC-101 1. FORMER (2)
INFO 2. SAFETY
A/2000 IDENTITY
CHIEF COMMISSIONER
COS
G A SAC
A-BI FORCES
F R BR
FILE

HEADQUARTERS

17 JAN 1945

C

Handwritten: 127

4995

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

CITE H.A.S.-77

JAN

6/7259

JAN 10 11 22

PRIORITY

ALCOA SICHIA REGION (CASE)

HA ALCOA NOT TO PUBLIC SAFETY SUB COMMISSION BIT FOR INFO TO HA 204 SUB ALCOA
AND DESKIN PALERMO

JAN 10 1945

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

RESTRICTED.

Para 1. Special sitrep further to secret sitrep EPR-75 of 8th January.

Para 2. General situation NACUSA Province.

Para 3. BAKUDA city under control and quiet.

Para 4. VITICOLA and COMINO uncertain.

DISC

ACTION P SAFETY

INFO A/ PROSECUT

CHIEF COMMISSIONER

COB

C A SEC

P R BR

FILE

AND OTHERS SALES

JAN 10 1945

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

RECEIVED

- Para 1. Special attep further to secret attep ERS-75 of 8th January.
- Para 2. General situation MOUNTAIN PROVINCE.
- Para 3. RAJAHMUNDRY city under control and quiet.
- Para 4. VITTIKOLA and GUMING uncertain.

DATA

ACTION P SAFETY
IN TO A / INCHMENT
CHIEF COMMISSIONER
COS
C A SMO
P R DE
FILE



see 123

RESTRICTED

4994

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Ref: 3616/708

10 Jan 1945.

SUBJECT: Sicily Disturbances.

TO : DMB, CA Section.

119-120

1. Enclosed are two reports from PSC on the situation in SICILY. They come from an office in which I have confidence and, I think, can be treated as accurate.

2. If the DMB representative can send through an excellent report such as this, I cannot see why the Public Safety Officer or the Regional Commissioner or his representative, cannot do the same. The obvious thing seems to me is for the Regional Commissioner to instruct his representative at Area HQ to send objective reports direct to this Commission with copies to him. But it is essential that we should get early information.

MBL/SS.

M. S. / 1002
Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Precedence: IMMEDIATE.

Time received: 9th Jan. 1945.

No. 5

For information only. Situation tense province Ragusa and part province Siracuse. Have visited Solarino Palazzolo Giarratana Ragusa Modici Noto Avola today. Road clear but unfriendly groups in towns who might have taken hostile action had we been Italian troops. General Ronco has restored order Ragusa. Streets deserted everything closed and spasmodic firing while there. Rebels well armed with sufficient automatic weapons. Rebels reported to have several intellectuals and probably Italian army officers leading them. Comiso and Vittoria in hands of rebels. No action being taken against them by General Ronco as he has not sufficient troops to send there though column of 300 troops with 4 field guns left Agrigento for Vittoria today. Prefect and Questore Ragusa claim that trouble agitated principally by Fascists aided by separatists. Today 6 hand grenades thrown against train at Avola. No casualties or damage. Rioters with MGs stopped train from proceeding Siracuse. Italian troops from Noto later dispersed rioters. Ref signal number 4 only (doors?) of depot at Solarino destroyed by hand grenades. Explosives not used. Try to visit Vittoria and Comiso tomorrow if can get through.

The above cable received from the FWB observer in Sicily is forwarded by Mr. Titchener, elaborating telephone message given verbally this morning.

Rear Admiral Stone (1)
Major Fielden (2) for Public Security Sub-Commission.

Classification: S ~~SECRET~~

Time received: 9th Jan. 1945.

Precedence: IMMEDIATE

No. 6

Frantz and Garbutt told me last night situation quiet their areas. The call up in Ragusa has been postponed until order is restored. Prefect of Ragusa stated yesterday that town had appearance of being quiet but that trouble could break out from one moment to another as large number of rebels were still hiding in town. General Ronco has 500 troops and 200 CCR at his disposal in prov. Ragusa. Reinforcements ammo and supplies have been asked for. Woman wearing nurses uniform arrested at Ragusa for shooting at Italian troops. Rebels taking their prisoners to Comiso. In Ispica saw Viva Il Duce freshly written on walls together with anti-call up slogans. Telephone to Ragusa interrupted this morning.

Above telegram just received 16.30 hrs. Frantz is PWB representative in Palermo and Garbutt is stationed in Catania.

~~SECRET~~

EX 51862

JAN 05 1945

FROM: AREA OFFICE SACRED CITY FRONT
TO: DIRECTOR INFO BUREAU, HQ, ALCOR

9/7232

JAN 10 1945
F. B. I.

JAN 10 1945

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

~~SECRET~~

Your 5 03 of 8th. Confirm 1 An AMPIN in your para 2 refers to MEMORANDUM IN

HOW IN AREA II

Dist

INF ACT: L. Form (2)

" " : P. Safety

INF : A/P. Air
Commissioner

C.O.S.

C.A.S.

T.N. 5/2

File

HEADQUARTERS

10 JAN 1945

~~SECRET~~

JAN 10 1945

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

~~SECRET.~~

Your 003 of 8th. Confirm 1 in AMPING in your para 2 refers to SECRETARY'S NO
now in 32111

Dist
INF ACT: L. Form (2)
" " : P. Safety
INF : A/P. Pres
Commissioner
C. A. S.
T. N. S. H.
File

HEADQUARTERS
10 JAN 1945
C

~~SECRET~~

118
ser

4990

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

~~SECRET~~ 3618

FX 81361
JAN 9/1700

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

47228
JAN 9/2359
IMMEDIATE
JAN 10 1945

FROM: AFHQ SIGNED SAC CITE FIDCT

TO: ACTION: H, ALCON INFO DISTREE, NMIA, ALCON SICILY REGION

~~SECRET.~~

Ref ALCON 9503 of 8 January. DISTREE have arranged immediate dispatch officer to
REDDO CALABRIA to expedite relief AMMA and SARUDA bus and are making additional
transport available for move. Active steps have been taken to ensure earliest possible
shipment 12 light tanks to PALERMO

Dist
ACT: Land Forces (2)
INF: A/Pres
Commissioner
COS L
Pub. Safety - H
P.R. Br.
CA Sec.
File

HEADQUARTERS

10 JAN 1945

A. C.

~~SECRET~~

see 118

~~SECRET~~

3618
FOR INFORMATION ONLY

EX 81807
NO DATE

JAN 9/2359
IMMEDIATE

FROM: AFM, STEREO SACRED CITY FIDDM FIDOT

JAN 10 1945

TO: ACTION: ALCON SARGINE INFO: MIA, MIA LS PES, ALCON FOR PUBLIC SAFETY COMMISS-
SION, MIAIT, MIA LS SIGLY

~~SECRET~~

Ref MIA IN 2058 of 7 January.

1. Situation SIGLY now demands tanks must arrive REINFOR soonest possible.
2. Essential you load them REINFOR via COLIARI 10th January as CALTON not arriving COLIARI before 14 January. Agreed REINFOR.
3. Reply requested as in out EX 8133 of 7 January.
4. For MIA. Request you endeavour transmit this signal by 1/1

HEADQUARTERS
10 JAN 1945

Direct
AIR INF ALT: LAND (4)
" " : Pub. Safety
INF : A/Pers
Commissioner
COS
P.R. Br.

File

CA

~~SECRET~~

RESTRICTED

SC 14

JAN 091315A FOR INFORMATION ONLY

0/71119

JAN 091404A

ROUTINE

FROM: DIRECTOR

JAN - 9 1945

To: AFHQ 33 ONE BAIT INFO AFHQ (32- 61), ALCON, MEIA, MIA 10 (BY HAND)

RESTRICTED.

Ref this Hq CO 3 of 8 January.

1. RAGUSA. Gen MONRO reports situation in hand. Approx 100

rioters and suspects arrested in RAGUSA.

2. VITTORIA and COMINO still controlled by rioters. After Italian troops ordered to VITTORIA object opening Comm with RAGUSA. Report awaited.

3. Casualties RAGUSA Province disturbances up to 2100 hrs 8 January Italian Army killed 4 wounded 15 missing 13. GARR killed 3 wounded 3. Civilians killed 5 wounded 5.

4. Remained Island M T R.

Dist

Info-Action - Land Forces (2)

" " P Safety

Info - A/President
Chief Commissioner

C O S

CA Sec

P H Br

File (2)

Flot

HEADQUARTERS

9 JAN 1945

A. C.

RESTRICTED.

Ref this Hq CO J of 8 January.

1. RAGUNA. Gen CONGO reports situation in hand. Approx 100 rioters and suspects arrested in RAGUNA.
2. VITTONIA and CONISO still controlled by rioters. After Italian troops ordered to VITTONIA object opening Gens with RAGUNA. Report awaited.
3. Casualties RAGUNA Province disturbances up to 2100 hrs 8 January Italian Army killed 4 wounded 15 missing 13. Gens killed 3 wounded 3. Civilians killed 5 wounded 9.
4. Remained Island N T R.

Dist

Info-Action - Land Forces (2)
" P Safety
Info - A/President
Chief Commissioner
C O S
CA Sec
P R Br
File (2)
Flont

HEADQUARTERS

9 JAN 1945

A. C.

RESTRICTED

see Serial 113

4987

785017

3618

112

DISTRESS FOR ACTION D AFHQ HC SICILY REGION

9557

9 Jan

OPS PRIORITY

JAN - 1945

105

~~SECRET PD~~

PARA ONE PD CANCEL LAST SENTENCE THIS HQ SIGNAL NINE FOUR EIGHT FOUR EIGHT
JANUARY PD

PAREN TO DISTRESS FOR ACTION RPTD AFHQ HC SICILY REGION FROM HQ ALCOM FROM
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION PAREN

PARA TWO PD AFTER CONSULTATION WITH AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION ITALIAN RESCUE
AIRCRAFT ARE NOW TO OPERATE IN AFFECTED AREA

AC DISTRIBUTION:

Chief of Staff.
Political Sec.
Pub Safety S/o.
Loc Govt S/o.
Hon Alexander Kirk.
Sir Noel Charles.

CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

437

NICHOLAS PIOMRINO,
CWO, USA,
Ass Adjutant.

see Memo 113

4986

RESTRICTED

CO 3

JAN 05 1945

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

JAN 05 07 004

JAN - C 1945

UNIT DISCHARGE

AFHQ (G 3 CMO MR) INFO: AFHQ (G 3-01), ALGER, MEDA, MILA LO

RESTRICTED.

Ref our CO 382 of 7 January.

1. 204 Sub Area report situation quieter HADUSA. Night 7/8 January grain and oil stores blown up SOLARINO H9934. Railway Br blown up CASIMIR 30620 - AVOLA H0112 Grease thrown at labourers repairing rly. CORM and Italian tps are protecting labourers.
2. Gen ROMEO now in comd. Has requested despatch 1 Ba Alpini tps. Reinforcements 200 tps arrived HADUSA from SYRACUSE casualties killed 1, injured 18 missing 8. Rioters casualties killed 3.
3. Italian comd 16 Arty Regt proceeding to HADUSA attacked GOMISO H 5416.
4. MEDUSA H 6808 quiet VITTORIA H 4817 and GOMISO not controlled by tps. Rest of Island N T R.
5. HQ ALGER have requested no Allied intervention in present disturbances without prior consultation and agreement Chief Commissioner ALGER.

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Info-Action - Land Forces (2)

" " " Safety (2)

Info - A/President

Chief Commissioner

HEADQUARTERS

RESTRICTED.

Ref our SO 582 of 7 January.

1. 204 Sub Area report situation quieter RACUSA. Night 7/8 January grain and oil stores blown up SOLARINO H9934. Railway Br blown up CASALINLE JO620 - AVOLA HO112 Gress thrown at labourers repairing rly. GGR and Italian tps are protesting labourers.
2. Gen KONGO now in comd. Has requested despatch 1 Bn Alpini tps. Reinforcements 200 tps arrived RACUSA from SYRACUSE casualties

killed 1; injured 18 missing 8. Rioters casualties killed 3.

3. Italian comd 16 Arty Regt proceeding to RACUSA attacked

COMINO H 5416.

4. MONTUA H 6908 quiet VITTORIA H 4817 and COMINO not controlled by tps. Rest of Island N T R.

5. HQ ALCOM have requested no Allied intervention in present disturbances without prior consultation and agreement Chief Commissioner ALCOM.

Dist

Info-Action - Land Forces (2)
" " P Safety (2)

Info - A/President
Chief Commissioner

C O S

GA Sec

Tn SG

File



RESTRICTED

~~SECRET~~

3/18

109

RPS 7A
JAN 07/1735A

2/7059
JAN 09/0930
PRIORITY

Flori ALCON VICILY BERNI (CARR)

JAN - 9 1945

TO: HQ ALCON WTD PUBLIC SAFETY SUB COMMISSION WORK, UNION PARLIAM
JO4 SUB AREA.

~~SECRET~~

1. Special sitrep. Information received that serious disorders have broken out in SIRACUSA ^{Comiso} Erba.
2. Cause believed to be opposition to call up.
3. Present reports indicate that trouble started 6 January when armed crowd disarmed carabinieri and later troops sent in support.
4. During night 6/7 reinforcements were attacked en route between SIRACUSA and affected area and casualties reported are 8 carabinieri and 4 soldiers killed.



DIST P. Safety (2)
Action: J o S (4)
Info: A/Premier
Chief Commissioner
CA Sec
Seco Sec
Land Forces
P Safety
Mile

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

CITE: NPT 73
JAN 7/1125

6/7023
JAN 24/1990 0822030
NAUTINE

JAN 24/1990

NICILIA ROTHEN (GARR) PALERMO

TO: H. ALLEN INFO PUBLIC SAFETY SUB COMMISSION 206 SUB AREA. SENIOR PALERMO

~~SECRET~~

1. Referring to previous reports contemplating disorders as result of fall up.
2. Incidents have been reported at MOLLINI (MIRACIA) 28 December 1944 when 200 people protested a gainst arrest of 3 persons failing to answer call up.
3. Shooting took place but immediately ceased when Carabinieri released prisoners.
4. At SAN C. (CANTINA) on 27 December 1944 population assaulted trucks carrying grain and grain warehouse sacked. 1000 bombs were thrown and shots fired.
5. At SAN VIGILIO DI GABRIELLA CANTINA on 30 December 3 Carabinieri fired at by unknown persons. One Carabinieri killed and 1 seriously wounded.
6. At MOLLINI on 6 January 45, rioters assaulted Italian soldiers and police throwing hand grenades following a rest of 9 persons not answering call up. One civilian killed, 1 civilian wounded, 1 carabinieri wounded, 6 persons arrested

SECRET

ACTION: P SAFETY SE (2)

INFO: A/SECURITY

ROUTINE

JAN - 9 1945

SICILIA RIDI N (CAGN) PALERMO

1. H. AICH. INFO PUBLIC SAFETY SUB COMMISSION 206 BUS AREA, UNION PALERMO

~~SECRET.~~

1. Referring to previous reports contemplating disorders as result of dull up.
2. Incidents have been reported at MONTIN (SIRACUSA) 28 December 1944 when 200 people protested a saint's arrest of 3 persons failing to answer call up.
3. Shooting took place but immediately ceased when Carabinieri released prisoners.
4. At SAN G. GNO (CATANIA) on 29 December 1944 population assaulted trucks carrying grain and grain warehouses seized. Hand bombs were thrown and shots fired.
5. At SAN VINCENZO DI GARIBOLDI CATANIA on 30 December 3 Carabinieri fired at by unknown persons. One Carabinieri killed and 1 seriously wounded.
6. At MONTANA on 6 January 45, rioters assaulted Italian soldiers and police throwing hand grenades following a rrest of 9 persons not answering call up. One civilian killed, 1 civilian wounded, 1 carabinieri wounded, 6 persons arrested.

DEET

ACTION: H. SAFETY SC (2)

INFO: A/RESIDENT
CHIEF COMMISSION
COS
CA. SEC
FOOD SC (2)
TECH SEC
FILE

HEADQUARTERS
7 JAN 1945
A. C.

~~SECRET~~

see. Antelli
44X1

