

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

ACC

10000/109/695
(VOL. I)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

10000/109/695
(VOL. I)

SECURITY MEASURES
NOV. 1944 - MAR. 1945

785017

977

My Spouse

with yr pleasure

69-10000

hence,

5.

 $\frac{2}{5}$ Establishment (Adj.:-)

Please sign attached stencil and publish.

AB.

Chief of Staff:

signed - will issue today.

Int. Sec
J. F. B.

1 Feb

157

So. 6 cc

3

95-

CC 676

1894

Report at 93 is in response to C.C.'s request at 80. You will note that further action is not recommended as regards the Order but C.C. may wish to reply to his informant.

Chief of Staff:

signed - will issue today.

Int. Sec.
5 Feb

Sec 51

95

CC
18 FEB 1960

So. to CC
EEO

Report at 93 is in response to CC's request at 80. you will note that further action is not recommended as regards the Order but C.C. may wish to reply to his informant.

(See 79)

to Her 45

Exec. Comm.

Noted - no action required
WD

He 3

97

VP. E.S. Sec.

18/3
vms 2

P 91. The C.C. will decide on distribution of letter to President. ~~what~~ 90 it received in AFHQ Drome. ~~for the P.M. is President of the A.C.?~~ MS (16/3)

18/3 Feb

Chief of Staff:(Att: Maj Stearns) *Run Memo 35*

Agreed with reservations as set forth below.

1. Para 3a: It is not considered practicable to confine the handling of TOPSEC material to officers above a specified rank. Occasions will undoubtedly arise on which it will be necessary for junior officers to handle such material, and rather than to draw an arbitrary line, below which TOPSEC material will not pass, the procedure set forth in Para 6, below, is considered preferable.
2. Para 4b: It is considered that, in the case of proposed downgrading of TOPSEC material originating in this Hq, such action should be taken by the officer originally responsible for the classification.
3. Para 4a: In this connection, reference is made to Para 7b, letter, AG 380.01/038 B-0, Hq, MATCUSA, 2 August 1944, Subject: Top Secret Control Procedure and Top Secret Control Channels, which states, "When a message has been classified and sent as TOP SECRET, any paraphrase of the whole or portions of the message, as well as all subsequent messages referring thereto, if any reference is made to the original message by subject or serial number, must bear the same classification."
4. Para 5a: There appears to be a certain inconsistency between this passage and Para 4(B), Office Memorandum No. 16, 25 August 1944.
5. It is suggested that a paragraph be inserted, specifying the grade of responsibility level of officers authorized to classify material as TOP SECRET.
6. It is suggested that, instead of an officer of specified rank, the head of each Sub-Commission and Section designate by name an officer of his activity to act as "Top Secret Control Officer". This officer would be responsible for the procedures laid down in Para 3 of the draft (folio 33-34), and would be, with the responsible head of the Sub-Commission or Section, the only individual to handle incoming TOP SECRET material. It is further suggested that the name of one clerk (preferably a senior WFO) be submitted as the individual charged with the typing of such material, on occasions when it is originated in a section or staff branch of this Headquarters. The names of the officer and EM/CR, as indicated above, should be kept on file by an officer designated to coordinate all Top Secret control measures. This procedure is in conformity with the directive cited in Para 3 of this minute.

Establishment Section
10 January 1944

Handwritten signature
for Col, DODG

11

Captain Morden - 0-602

5234

2. 10/050 B-0, Hq, MACVUSA, 2 August 1944, Subject: Top Secret Control Procedure and Top Secret Control Channels, which states, "When a message has been classified and sent as TOP SECRET, any paraphrase of the whole or portions of the message, as well as all subsequent messages referring thereto, if any reference is made to the original message by subject or serial number, must bear the same classification."

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6. It is suggested that, instead of an officer of specified rank, the head of each Sub-Commission and Section designate by name an officer of his activity to act as "Top Secret Control Officer". This officer would be responsible for the procedures laid down in Para 3 of the draft (folio 33-34), and would be, with the responsible head of the Sub-Commission or Section, the only individual to handle including TOP SECRET material. It is further suggested that the name of one clerk (preferably a senior NCO) be submitted as the individual charged with the typing of such material, on occasions when it is originated in a section or staff branch of this Headquarters. The names of the officer and SA/OR, as indicated above, should be kept on file by an officer designated to coordinate all Top Secret control measures. This procedure is in conformity with the directive cited in Para 3 of this minute.

Establishment Section
10 January 1944

for Col, DCOG

27

Captain Norden - O-C-S

Complete accord with minute 36, particularly para 6 thereof which is most important. I have thoroughly discussed this entire matter with Lt. Montant and further suggest that the file of names of individuals authorized to handle Top Secret documents be retained in the Office of the COS.

45

CSO Please draft office memo at 44, will issue on your approval.
11/1/45

WHITE PAPER II

(18)

To Cos.

First 17 refs.

All this 19 is submitted letter for signature which is
now in accordance with the draft

CAS

18 Jan 44
X 608

Issue 608 (19 Jan)

R. D. Kays
cl.

35

Latent Sec

Will you please say if you agree with draft
folios 31-34.

9 Jan 45

E. H. Jordan
Office of CAS.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

35

Estab Sec

Will you please say if you agree with draft

folios 31-34.

9 Jan 45

Thorden ^{att}
Office of C.S.

5232

785017

5

Book entry is 4 Feb at 13 hrs. 6-6 covered

CA -
JUL 1944

100

11/25/24
CBO

originally
The Franklin at 13 has been destroyed it appears from
PS for that AC comments on the memo when it first came
out for and was 10 is wrong in suggesting that the
only one to read immediately. The delay in dealing
request for comments is due to the fact that PS was meeting
requirements and collecting facts to ensure it is dealt appropriately
with the comments. The original action raised at 11
would no longer appear to be appropriate and what is required on the
is a full reply to the letter asking for comments based on the
submitted collected by PS. A new draft is therefore at 13A for
comment or approval.

0416



Double of suggested amount ~~100~~ 13 A. Please visitation at factory

CMS

15-00000

v.l. low / det. ally.

16 Dec 44.

25

You will see at 13 above the reason why the interview
 was not sent
 mentioned in min 11 was not sent
 HE 13A is draft of the proposed with a letter asking
 The draft was prepared in this office
 for the comments on 2.
 after consultation with PS and PS files. and has been approved

5231

is a full reply to the letter asking for comments from the
members of the staff. A new draft is therefore at 13A for
comment or approval.

CAS

12 DEC 1944

PS

Draft of suggested communication to the staff. Please continue to study it.

CAS

12 DEC 1944

Approved

W. L. J. (dtd. 16 Dec 44)

16 Dec 44

COS

You will see at 13 above the reason why the interim
reply mentioned in min 11 was not sent.
At 13A is a copy of the proposed reply to the letter asking
for ALC comments on 2. The draft was prepared in the office
after consultation with PS and PS files, and has been approved
by PS.

5231

This is a technical matter it is proposed that the
draft be signed by the COS.
Your comments on the draft are requested.
The draft is enclosed in case you wish to refer to the RAC report.

CAS

18 DEC 1944

M. L. J. (dtd. 16 Dec 44)

17

Issue as amended. Far too much has been
written about this and minutes 10, 13, to an too long. I
Shut, short, decisive minute as needed in the past and
Escape.

17 Dec 1944

7850, 7

52

You will see J-2 - a report by G-2 AFHQ dated 12/14/44 which is based on a report submitted by AFHQ received from RASC quarterly before that date. Will you please see G-2 RASC and obtain from them a copy of the report in question.

405
JUL 1964

4

0-0

Do not see second like first companions.

9. Qu. 44.

ad.

154

3

The reports regarding the two up to
 covered herein. The more relevant passages of the
^{present} brown leather with
 is provided.
 The author (at 2) 090 000

The similarities between the report and the letter (at 2) are too great to be merely chance. One is obviously the revision of the other for not only is the thought follows the same sequence as our revision but even to follow of the sequence of the thinking. But there is often a similarity of expression. Therefore there does not appear to any thought in a single originates outside the report. Every phrase can be accounted for in the report, there does not seem to be room for the idea that I was

[illegible][illegible]

Discussion

There are too many divisions & contrast to the following division especially
concerning E. Gt. K M because of the suggestion and how it happens
of the three communist movements in the reports one is outside
as pro ally - armed, but of decreasing activity. The second is inside in
said to be more strong to organization is as fully described that it
would be intelligible. The O.M. movement of its name if it is around. The
are maintained.

Chief Commission

P1. written in office, copy to CS was first brought
by your office at a meeting of PR. Secured. No copy
of the letter has ever been sent to AC from CS.

7. I think that we must get CS into the subject of
referring Nelson matter to the AC before taking
action, or allowing action to be taken. It is a general
business. This at the meeting without allowing
you to be properly briefed — and I do not think
that A.Q. & S. report is based on anything. Public
Safety Sub Com has been submitted. The whole
thing is cork-eyes.

Letter to CS submitted for signature

Not sent to CS

MS/207x1

reference Italian matter to the A.C. before taking
action, or allowing action to be taken. It is agreed
to discuss this at the meeting without allowing
you to be properly briefed — and I do not think
that A.Q. & S. report is based on anything. Public
Safety Sub Com has submitted. The whole
thing is cork-eye.

Letter to C.S. submitted for signature.

Not sent to C.S.

MS/28/21.

CO 1616
MAY 29 1968

(6)

Reference to C.2. R.A.A.C. on the villain of the

piece. We should insert a report from them.

MS/30/21

(Addition)

DCOS CAS.

(7)

Will you extract a copy of R.A.A.C. report
which formed the basis of C.2's memorandum & which
should have been sent to C.C. MS/31/21

CONFIDENTIAL

Date 1944	Ref No	File No	Subject	New Classifi- cation
12 Jul	B-2	310.22	Observers from Rq Combined Ops	Confidential
13 Jul	B-4	319.22 Ord-O	Priority for Issue of AA Material	Secret
17 Jul	B-26	310.22 - O	Directive	Restricted
17 Jul	B-34	319.22 SIG-O	Observers of Operation Anvil	Restricted
19 Jul	B-77	319.22 SIG-O	Reuse of Avalanche Signal Equip in Operation Anvil	Confidential
21 Jul	B-110		Amendment to Mounting Schedule, Operation Anvil	Confidential
26 Jul	B-305	123.7-5 E-O	Rates of Exchange for Anvil	Confidential
29 Jul	B-308	MSD/200	Amendment No 2 to "Troop List" for Anvil Type Ops	Confidential
27 Jul	B-336		Preparation and Appreciation for Submission to London	Confidential
27 Jul	B-345		Amendment No 2 to Mounting Schedule, Operation Anvil	Confidential
28 Jul	B-404	370.5-1 (French) OCT-O	Operational Use of French Anti- Aircraft Units	Confidential
28 Jul	B-405		Outline Plan of Anvil	Secret
28 Jul	B-425	425.05-1 OCT-O	Aircraft Markings and Use of Paras on Armored Fighting Vehicles	Confidential
31 Jul	B-555	370.5 OCT-O	Outline Plans - Anvil & Anvil- Overlord	Secret
31 Jul	B-590	400-4 SIG-O	Supplement 1 to Special Project NATUSA/9	Confidential

5229

Incl to Ltr AFHQ, AD 311.5/081 MAD-O,
dtd 16 Mar 45, subj: Downgrading of
Classified Documents

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3620
AL Com

R. G. G. 102
P 275
(51349-353)

349

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

2997

AG 311.5/D81/PAN-0

16 March 1945

MAR 10 1945

SUBJECT: Downgrading of Classified Documents

TO: All Concerned

1. Under the provisions of paragraph 15, AR 380-5, 15 March 1944, the documents listed in inclosure Number 1 are downgraded as indicated therein.

2. Necessary action will be taken by those concerned to regrade any and all listed documents that may be in their custody.

3. The documents listed in the inclosure do not constitute the final list of all documents to be downgraded by this headquarters. Other lists will be published at regular intervals. Requests for the downgrading of specific documents of this headquarters should be addressed to this headquarters, attention of Security Control Officer.

BY ORDER OF FIELD MARSHAL ALBERT:

G. W. CHRISTENBERRY
G. W. CHRISTENBERRY
Colonel, AG
Adjutant General

1 Incl
List of Documents

DISTRIBUTION:

AG
AGP

DIST
CHIEF COMMISSIONER
BY COMMISSIONER
CA SEC
ELN. SEC
EST. SEC

*del
R 11/3*

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Date	Ref No	File No	Subject	New Classif-ication
30 Jul 1944	B-539	511.8-1 D-0	1st Ind to SOS Nato ltr Asphalt requirement, Base and Air Force, M2, M3 Periods	Confidential
31 Jul 1944	B-584	614-1-1 PIN-0	Rates of Exchange for Anvil	Confidential
31 Jul 1944	B-587	000.7-9 A-0	"Yank" Correspondent Team to Accompany Anvil Operation	Restricted
31 Jul 1944	B-589	370-3 Surg-0	Theater Medical Evacuation Plan - Operation Anvil	Confidential

Incl to Ltr Hq MTO/SA, AG 311.5/142
M&D-0, dtd 16 Mar 45, subj:
Downgrading of Classified Documents

3228

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Date 1944	Ref No	File No	Subject	New Classif- ication
14 Jul	B-9	319.22 A-0	Personnel for Activation of 512th Airborne Signal Company	Confidential
18 Jul	B-47	319.22 Surg-0	Air Transport of Blood to 7th Army	Confidential
19 Jul	B-76	319.22 Sig-0	Extension of Loan of Equip for Operation Anvil	Confidential
20 Jul	B-86	319.22 A-0	Staff Officers to take Part in Operation Anvil	Restricted
20 Jul	B-89	319.22 Sig-0	Radio Frequencies for Anvil	Confidential
21 Jul	B-137	319.22 DO	Anvil Civil Supplies in NA	Confidential
22 Jul	B-171	319.22 C-0	Operation Memorandum	Confidential
23 Jul	B-202	319.22 C-0	BB Devices T-6 and T-7	Secret
24 Jul	B-235	319.22 I-0	Policy on P/ Matters in Connection w/Anvil	Confidential
24 Jul	B-236	319.22 D-0	Priorities for Supply	Confidential
25 Jul	B-257	091.721-1 (Italian) A-0	Employment of Italian Army Units	Confidential
27 Jul	B-331	419.44-2 Sig-0	FM Radios for 1st Gun Bns	Confidential
27 Jul	B-362	430-2 QM-0	Subsistence for WSA Ships	Confidential
28 Jul	B-436	400/565 D-0	Brazilian Expeditionary Force	Confidential
29 Jul	B-437	400.34-1 D-0	Equipment for Pet Sec (c) AFHQ	Confidential
28 Jul	B-438	319.1-5 D-0	1st Ind to 7th Army 1st Beach Operations Report	Confidential
29 Jul	B-476 B-478 B-479	400.312/602 D-0	Troop List for Operations and Supply	Confidential
29 Jul	B-497	320.2-3 D-0	3d Ind to Basic Activation of Diesel and Electric Sections, 759th Railway Operating Bn.	Confidential

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Date 1944	Ref No	File No	Subject	New Classif- ication
14 Jul	B-9	319.22 A-0	Personnel for Activation of 51st Airborne Signal Company	Confidential
16 Jul	B-47	319.22 Surg-0	Air Transport of Blood to 7th Army	Confidential
19 Jul	B-76	319.22 Sig-0	Extension of Loan of Equip for Operation Anvil	Confidential
20 Jul	B-86	319.22 A-0	Staff Officers to take Part in Operation Anvil	Restricted
20 Jul	B-89	319.22 Sig-0	Radio Frequencies for Anvil	Confidential
21 Jul	B-137	319.22 DO	Anvil Civil Supplies in NA	Confidential
22 Jul	B-171	319.22 C-0	Operation Memorandum	Confidential
23 Jul	B-202	319.22 C-0	BB Devices T-6 and T-7	Secret
24 Jul	B-235	319.22 A-0	Policy on I/W Matters in Connection w/Anvil	Confidential
24 Jul	B-236	319.22 D-0	Priorities for Supply	Confidential
25 Jul	B-287	091.711-1 (Italian) A-0	Employment of Italian Army Units	Confidential
27 Jul	B-331	413.44-2 Sig-0	FM Radios for AM Gun Bus	Confidential
27 Jul	B-362	430-2 QM-0	Subsistence for WSA Ships	Confidential
28 Jul	B-436	400/565 D-0	Brazilian Expeditionary Force	Confidential
29 Jul	B-437	400.34-1 D-0	Equipment for Pat Sec (e) AFHQ	Confidential
28 Jul	B-438	319.1-5 D-0	1st Ind to 7th Army ltr Beach Operations Report	Confidential
29 Jul	B-476 B-478 B-479	400.312/602 D-0	Troop List for Operations and Supply	Confidential
29 Jul	B-497	320.2-3 D-0	3d Ind to Basic "Activation of Diesel and Electric Sections, 759th Railway Operating Bn".	Confidential

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

CONFIDENTIAL

5225

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

288

AL COM
3620

For Commission
1st AF 276 2996
15(288-290)

102

HEADQUARTERS
MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 512

AG 311.5/142 W&D-0

16 March 1945

SUBJECT: Downgrading of Classified Documents

MAR 19 1945

TO: All Concerned

1. Under the provisions of paragraph 15, AR 380-5, 15 March 1944, the documents listed in inclosure Number 1 are downgraded as indicated therein.

2. Necessary action will be taken by those concerned to regrade any and all listed documents that may be in their custody.

3. The documents listed in the inclosure do not constitute the final list of all documents to be downgraded by this headquarters. Other lists will be published at regular intervals. Requests for the downgrading of specific documents of this headquarters should be addressed to this headquarters, attention of Security Control Officer.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MCNARNEY:

1 Incl
List of Documents

substantive
C. W. CHRISTENSEN
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

"W"
"X"

Dist
CHIEF COMMISSIONER
By Commission
C. W. CHRISTENSEN
Recd. Sec
FST. Sec

Chad
2/2

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

SUP Supply Control (cont.)

13. Reports.

a. Reports will be submitted as per instructions of 1st Intercom-
ment, this Headquarters, to letter, Headquarters MTOUSA, file AG 400.73/
346-0, subject: "Supply Security Control", dated 24 February 1945.

C. M. Parkin

C. M. PARKIN
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

All units, this Regiment

Information copies to:

Regional Commissioners, Allied Commission
Directors, Sub-Commissions and Sections,
Headquarters, Allied Commission

5427

SOP Supply Control (cont'd)

103

- (3) Armed guard will travel on rear of the truck to prevent pilferage while in transit.
- (4) The consignee will check all loads received by him during the unloading and will report all shortages, overages and damages immediately to the consignor.

11. Showdown Inspection of Troops.

a. Inspection will not only be made physically, but whenever possible, the Enlisted Men's Form #32 will be used as a basis for determining unauthorized items of government property in the hands of troops. Disciplinary action will be taken upon the initiation of a Statement of Charges for loss of property.

12. Illegal Disposition of Government Property.

a. The following is extracted from Provost Marshal General Security Instructions for the information and guidance of all concerned:

"15. Illegal Disposition of Government Property.

a. Articles of War 64 and 94 prohibit the sale, wrongful disposition, misappropriation or diversion of United States government property to unauthorized persons. In this connection, particular attention is directed to the fact that abandonment, misappropriation or diversion in any way of Army rations, gasoline and oils, captured material, clothing and equipment and Army Exchange supplies of all types fall under the provisions of these articles and Army Regulations.

b. All military personnel who observe any act of abandonment, pilferage or illegal diversion of United States government property will, without delay, apprehend the offender, obtain the name, grade, organization and serial number of the offender. They will also obtain similar information concerning witnesses, if any, and submit a detailed report of the incident to the appropriate commander having courts-martial jurisdiction. If apprehension is not possible, all information available will be obtained, and a similar detailed report of the incident will be made. The information obtained from military offenders will be checked against their War Department Identification Cards and Logs. When there is no doubt as to the veracity of information given, the individual will be turned over to the Military Police.

c. Negligence on the part of any United States military personnel in reporting crimes of this nature will be considered dereliction of duty and will be punished accordingly.

d. All commanders having courts-martial jurisdiction will issue such additional instructions as may be necessary to enforce compliance with the foregoing and will take strict disciplinary action in all cases."

SGP Supply Security Control (cont'd)

c. In addition to General Orders, Special Orders will be issued from time to time depending upon the necessity, locality and situation.

5. Flood lights:

a. Flood lights will be utilized on all open car parks, entrances and exits which are in function during the night. Lights will be erected high enough so that the maximum exposed area will be illuminated.

6. Traffic Control:

a. In car parks, motor pools, supply installations and exposed supply dumps, a one way traffic will be maintained wherever practicable. This will be in coordination with the entrance and exit instructions, thereby prohibiting any vehicle from exiting without surveillance from the appointed guard.

7. Pass System:

a. Pass system will be initiated in any military installation where a group of more than 15 laborers is employed. Passes should bear the name printed and the signature of both the laborer and officer authorizing the bearer entrance to the installation.

8. Guards and Laborers:

a. Guards will be checked at frequent intervals to satisfy the responsible officer that guards are fully aware of their responsibilities. Laborers who physically handle U. S. supplies must be cautioned and checked for all possible means of pilferage. A physical search prior to daily departure of each laborer will be made by an officer or the commander of the guards. Vehicles will be checked for loads, and guards will be mounted on the rear of each truck whenever possible.

9. Checks and Tallies:

a. A simple debit and credit system will be maintained on all items stocked in warehouses and a daily or weekly running inventory should be made wherever practicable.

10. Vehicle Movement of Supplies:

a. Supplies will be moved in small convoys. When drawing rations or other supplies from a warehouse, the following will apply:

- (1) A checker will be posted at the tail gate of the vehicle in order to prevent loss while loading.
- (2) A checker within the depot will check off items prior to their loading and a signature will be obtained as an acknowledgment that the items listed thereon were received and were all in apparent good condition.

785017

3620
HEADQUARTERS
267TH REGIMENT
ALLIED COMMISSION (OVERHEAD)
APO 394

Encl. Comm.

104

CAF/CCC/tbv

19 March 1945

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE FOR SUPPLY SECURITY CONTROL

MAR 22 1945

1. Fencing:

a. Motor Parks not within a guarded building will be surrounded by barbed wire fencing with one entrance and one exit which will be guarded by military personnel. Special Orders preventing unauthorized persons from entering or leaving the park will be issued.

b. Ration Rooms whether they are within a mess hall or warehouse will be fenced with ordinary chicken wire wherever a probable means of entry other than a door is noticed. Door will be kept locked when room is not occupied by military personnel and only one key should be in the possession of the responsible military representative.

c. Supply Rooms (same as above)

2. Guard Towers:

a. Guard towers will be erected in the case of extremely large motor parks where lack of sufficient military guards prevails or where large quantities of supplies are stored under canvas.

3. Guards:

a. Motor parks or garages will have guards posted 24 hours per day. During the daylight hours dispatcher may be utilized as guard provided that the motor park has only one means of entrance.

b. Ration rooms and warehouses will be guarded constantly. Guard may be a Charge of Quarters who will make tours of the premises at irregular and frequent intervals during hours of darkness.

4. Entrances and Exits:

a. Entrances and exits of all installations will have guards posted whenever practicable. If not practicable due to lack of personnel, entrances and exits will be kept locked at all times and opened only after identification of authorized personnel.

b. Office furniture such as typewriters and adding machines will be placed under lock and key upon leaving the respective office where the item is in use. Guards at exits will be instructed to examine all parcels that appear large enough to cover equipment of this type.

3620
HQ HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION
Navy Sub-Commission APO 394

RESTRICTED

R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D:

NSC/1641
16 March 1945.

MAR 18 1945

From: Navy Sub-Commission, Hq. Allied Commission.
To : Chief of Staff, A.C.
Subject: Grading and Handling of Classified Material.
Reference: (a) Navy Sub-Com, AC restricted ltr. NSC/1629 of
6 February 1945.

1. In connection with reference (a), Lieutenant R.E. WOTHERSPON, USNR, is designated as Top Secret Control Officer for the Navy Sub-Commission, AC, vice Lieutenant R.C. CHAIR, USNR, detached.

H. W. ZROLL
Commander, U. S. Navy,

for REAR ADMIRAL
CHIEF, NAVY SUB-COMMISSION, AC.

Noted

322

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

3620 R
98
ALLIED ~~CONTROL~~ COMM.SSION
INTER OFFICE MEMO

From: Office of Chief Commissioner

SUBJECT: Top Secret Control Officer

FILE No.

TO: Chief of Staff Section

9 Feb 1945

The undersigned will be Top Secret Control Officer for this office.

J. A. Quayle
J. A. QUAYLE
Major, R. A.
Staff Officer to CC

5324

362-0
CONFIDENTIAL

94

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
A.P.O. 394
PUBLIC SAFETY SUB COMMISSION
SECURITY DIVISION

REF : SD/268-5

9 March 1945

SUBJECT : Order of German Descomases

TO : Executive Commissioner ALCON

MAR 10 1945

81

1. Reference your 3628/61/608 of 14 Feb. 1945.
2. A copy of a SIC report on the above named organization is attached for your consideration.

6

Hayes
JOHN W. CHAPMAN,
Colonel J.A.G.D.,
Director Public Safety,
Sub Commission.

CHH/nh

5323
See Ms 95.76
PA
5696.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TS/JF

HEADQUARTERS
426th C.I.C., Detachment,
APO #512, U.S. Army

Case No. R-1895

3 March 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE OFFICERS IN CHARGE:

SUBJECT: Order of German Deaconesses

RE: Report of Investigation.

1. On 22 February 1945, Lt. Col. Floyd C. Snowden, Chief, CIC, Rome Area MTGUSA, requested this agent to conduct an investigation of the Subject order. This investigation is predicated upon a letter, dated 19 Feb. 1945, from the A.C. of S., G-2, Rome Area MTGUSA, in which information was requested in regard to the Subject order.

2. The Subject order is located at Via Alessandro Farnese #18, Rome.

3. File of this office, and those of other Allied Intelligence agencies revealed nothing in regard to the Subject order.

4. On 27 February 1945, this agent questioned Dr. Carlo SOMMARUGA, a Swiss, Legal adviser and secretary to the Minister Plenipotentiary in Charge of Foreign Interests, Swiss Legation, Via Vitt. Veneto #121, Rome. Dr. SOMMARUGA told this agent that the Subject order was religious in character, having been founded by the German Evangelical Church more than sixty years ago. Branches of the Subject order are found all over the world, whose purpose it is to grant clinical and expert nursing aid to those in need. Persons of all nationalities and creeds are admitted. Upon the request of the Police Section, Allied Commission, Rome, the Subject order was placed under the protection of the Swiss government which is charged with the representation of German interests in Italy. Dr. SOMMARUGA stated that during the German occupation of Rome, German civilians, officers, and soldiers paid frequent visits to the Subject order. After the Allies entered Rome, Italian friends, sweethearts and mistresses of the departed Germans often visited the clinic of the Subject order to take advantage of medical treatment in cases of prenatal, childbirth and post-natal care. This agent was informed by Dr. SOMMARUGA that anyone may apply for medical treatment or lodging in the clinic or hospice of the Subject order, without asking permission of the Swiss Legation or Allied authorities, although all persons' names are filed with the Questura, in accordance with normal regulations governing hotels, hospitals, and sanitariums. The Subject order is in no way financed by the German government. It is self-supporting and flourishes in direct relation to its clients' ability to pay. Some persons receive medical care or lodging free of charge.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

92

while others pay what they can afford or are disposed to pay. The Subject order was quite prosperous before the war as it was practically the sole Protestant institution of its kind in Rome, and Protestants of all nationalities sought the Subject order's services. Dr. SOMMARUGA said the Subject order's staff is composed of eight nurses of German nationality who attend patients and maintain the Subject order's premises. These nurses are assisted by two Italian maid-servants. Special medical work is done by Italian doctors called in for the purpose as the case warrants. In many instances doctors advise their patients to go to Subject order for proper post-operation care. Dr. SOMMARUGA believes the Subject order does not present a threat to Allied security and affirms that nothing has occurred in the past which would substantiate suspicion of the Subject order's personnel. He added that he himself has on several occasions questioned the personnel in a routine manner and has given special instructions to the head nurse, Elisabeth SCHROEDER, to guard against admitting persons of doubtful purpose and to extend complete cooperation to Allied investigative authorities who might wish to inspect the personnel and the premises of the Subject order.

5. On 28 February 1945, this agent interviewed the head nurse, Elisabeth SCHROEDER, living at the Subject order, Via Alessandro Farnese #18, Rome. She has been with the order in Rome, since 1942. Her statements corroborated those made by Dr. SOMMARUGA. She added that the function of the Subject order is dictated, as it has always been, by Christian principles and not by Political pressure. Miss SCHROEDER stated that she and her staff of seven Evangelical sisters have always cooperated to the full with the requests of the Allies, reaching her through the Swiss Legation. She furnished this agent with the following list of sister-nurses living and worked at the clinic: Sister KRASHBORN, Margret; Sister MANIGIAN, Anna; Sister ROEMER, Ilse; Sister PACHSCHIES, Ruth; Sister DARRINGHAUS, Luise; Sister ARBAST, Lilli; and Sister KOLB, Johanna. The two Italian maid-servants are: DIGIAVANTOSIO, Giovanna and MAURONER, Giuseppina.

REMARKS : This agent does not consider the Subject order a threat to Allied security, since it is under an obligation of trust to the Swiss Government and because the continuing presence of Italian patients and Italian help would render hazardous, clandestine activity on the premises.

RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended that the case be closed in this office.

THADDEUS BATTIN,
Special Agent, CIC

CONFIDENTIAL

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R E S T R I C T E D

HEADQUARTERS
MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
APO 512

24 February 1945

AG 400.73/346-0

SUBJECT: Supply Security Control.

TO : President, Allied Commission, Rome.

1. Loss of supplies through pilferage, organized thefts, barter and the illegal diversion of government property, will continue to be an acute command problem so long as the present economic situation in Italy continues. It is an important command responsibility to reduce these losses to a minimum and this will require the continuing attention of all commanders to prevent any relaxation of strict supply-security control measures.

2. The principal contributing factors in the loss of supplies through illegal acts (the phrase 'pilferage' is generally used) are as follows:

- a. Carelessness and looseness of control measures.
- b. Pilferage by civilian population who are destitute.
- c. Dishonest personnel, including laborers, checkers, drivers, guards, etc., whom it is difficult to screen effectively.
- d. A most inviting Black-Market where huge profits prevail.
- e. Pilferage and organized thefts by military personnel and civilians.
- f. Improper loading of trucks and railway cars.

3. There is attached hereto for transmission to each command unit and installation, for the personal attention of commanding officers, a guide for the preparation of Standard Operating Procedures for the safeguarding of U.S. Government Property. This guide will be studied, a review of present control measures conducted, and then such changes will be effected as may be dictated by the resulting comparisons wherein present safeguard measures are not as adequate as those contained in the guide, or where changes are considered impossible or impracticable due to operational demands.

4. It is desired that you call to the attention of your principal subordinate commands the importance of continuing the command attention to the end that high standards may be maintained on supply-security control. A report will be made on 31 March 1945 to the Theater Commander on supply-security control measures to include the following:

R E S T R I C T E D

5220

R E S T R I C T E D

AICOM, 24 Feb 1945

- a. Action taken in compliance with this directive inclosing copies of directives issued.
- b. Explanation of circumstances which make it impracticable to adopt prescribed control measures with a statement of what substitute measures are in force.

/s/ Joseph T. McNarney
JOSEPH T. McNARNEY
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Commanding

1 Incl
Supply Security Guide

Reproduced by Hq 2675th Regt, Allied Commission,
(Ovhd), APO 394, 3 March 1945 flow.

400.73
(24 Feb 45) 1st Ind. CMP/jtg
HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION, ESTABLISHMENT SECTION, APO 394, U. S. Army,
3 March 1945.

TO:

1. A copy of this letter will be forwarded to each sub-commission under your section.
2. Reports as required in par 4, basic communication, will be forwarded to this headquarters not later than 23 March 1945.

BY COMMAND OF REAR ADMIRAL STONE:

G. M. PARKIN
Colonel, Infantry
Executive Officer (US)

1 Incl:
Supply Security Control Guide.

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RHF/at

89

SUPPLY SECURITY
A Guide For the Preparation of Standard
Operating Procedures for Safeguarding
US Government Supplies

(Prepared under the direction of the Provost Marshal General)

INDEX TO SUPPLY SECURITY GUIDE

FORWARD (Page 1)

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>PARAGRAPH</u>	<u>AND</u>	<u>PAGE NUMBER</u>
Fencing	1		1
Guard Towers	2		1
Guards	3		1
Entrances and Exits	4		1
Flood Lights	5		1
Traffic Control	6		1 and 2
Pass System	7		2
Guards and Laborers	8		2 and 3
Checks and Tallies	9		3
Fort Areas and Associated Railway			
Marshalling Yards	10		3 and 4
Railways and Marshalling Yards	11		4 and 5
Vehicle Movement of Supplies	12		5
Showdown Inspections of Troops	13		5 and 6
Mobile Road Blocks	14		6
Illegal Disposition of Govt Property	15		6
Reports	16		6 and 7

SUPPLY SECURITY

Guide For the Preparation of Standard
Operating Procedures for Safeguarding
US Government Supplies

(Prepared under the direction of the Provost Marshal General)

Prevention of Loss by Pilferage - Prevention of loss by pilferage of United States government property is the purpose of these supply security measures. Commanders in all echelons must accept this responsibility. Recommendations gleaned from experiences in active theaters are submitted herewith as guides and assistance to supply security.

Sensitive Supply - Post exchange items, rations, gasoline, liquor, drugs, mail, clothing, personal baggage are the most common items which invite pilferage. Greater guard strength must be assigned to protect these items whether they are stored at docks, depots, dumps, railheads or in transit. Other supplies require constant guard but less personnel and modified general security measures can afford adequate protection.

GENERAL SECURITY MEASURES

1. Fencing - Barbed wire fencing will be erected at installations where its use will prohibit access to sensitive supplies or other pilferable material and equipment. The erection of such barricades for other storage areas and installations will be governed by judgment and the extent of losses experienced. The fence should be of sufficient height, durability, and center spacing, and be independent of buildings, damaged walls or rubble heaps. Open space on each side of fence, no obscured approaches permit sniping from one side. Serpentine rolls should only be used as a temporary expedient -- it has been proven that these can be crushed and an entrance made.

2. Guard Towers - Guard towers should be constructed of sufficient height and platform area to permit a free field of fire and observation.

3. Guards - Spacing of guards on perimeter fencing should be so planned that guards are either within sight or calling distance of each other at all times.

4. Entrances and Exits - Entrances, exits and fence perimeter should be under twenty-four (24) hour guard observation. Entrances and exits to any installation must be kept to a minimum consistent with the operation, size and design of the area, and the road net serving installation. Establishment of "in" and "out" gates is advisable for both vehicular and pedestrian traffic. The limiting of foot traffic, both in and out, to a single "pedestrian only" opening, provides a maximum in security and pass control. Reduction in the number of exits and entrances, for economy in guard personnel and localization of movement, can be accomplished by the use of double entrances or exits.

5. Flood Lights - All fencing and approach areas should be flood lighted at night where appropriate, except those areas in which black-out is in effect.

6. Traffic Control - Traffic control should consider the following:

- a. An uninterrupted in and out flow.
- b. Special exits for out loaded vehicles during heavy traffic periods, and the routing of outgoing supplies to these gates for checking. The use by any other traffic should be prohibited.

Supply Security (cont'd)

c. Designation of emergency gates for incoming and outgoing convoys of troop movements.

d. Army, Navy, Merchant Marine and civilian employees will use designated gates to insure effectiveness of pass system.

7. Pass System - A pass system to deny entrance to all unauthorized individuals should be adopted for all supply installations which prohibits entry, in general, to unauthorized persons. Passes should be issued and accounted for by the Security Officer.

a. A pass bureau should be located at the main "in gates" with trained personnel on twenty-four (24) hour service or on duty during all operational hours.

b. Lesser installations should control entrance to area by installation operational action through issuance of local passes or creation of a recognized identification system.

c. The issuance of photographic passes, due to temporary duration, reduction, and abandonment of installations, is not advocated, yet where practical the added security advantage warrants adoption.

d. Pass authority must be constantly on the person of the holder and be subjected to examination by proper authority at any time. Spot checks and roving inspections should be a continuous process. This procedure offers assurance that no unauthorized persons are in the area.

e. Revision of pass systems is necessary at periodic intervals, constant turnover of civilian employees, unreturned and lost passes, creates its own dangers. No system is wholly fool proof and its effectiveness is dependent on continued instruction, supervision, and checking.

(1) Permanent Passes - Issued for thirty (30), sixty (60) or ninety (90) day periods. Definite expiration dates and dates of renewal are most important. Records of issue, cancellation and expiration must be accurately kept.

(2) General Type Pass - Issued to authorized persons, reduces error and confusion and is good general identification. Distinguishing marks may be employed dependent on whether the installation is a temporary or lengthy operation. These markings may permit persons to enter further restricted areas and also show time of validity of pass.

(3) Photographs - Photographs will be attached to all drivers' licenses of all drivers other than American military personnel.

(4) Visitor's Passes - Must be immediately distinguishable from regular passes and must be surrendered by visitor on departure.

8. Guards and Laborers - A distraction of guards or military police, whose training has been in military police security work, by utilizing same as cargo checkers, tally clerks or inspectors is poor operation. Definite and complete orders must be given to guards. Instruction, constant briefing, and regular inspection by a commissioned officer is an absolute necessity. Italian military or

Ship Security (cont'd)

civilian guards do not afford the security offered by American personnel. Employment of this type personnel as guards, drivers, etc. may frequently open channels for loss of supplies. Increased American supervision must be provided in such instances. Loading and unloading operations performed by civilian labor or prisoners of war demand constant American supervision and guard. Intentional breakage of packaged goods for later pilferage is a common practice. Damaged and broken packages should be immediately collected and turned in to installation cooperation. All installations handling sensitive supplies must have civilians searched before leaving area.

9. Checks and Tallies.

a. Shortages and overages are often the result of error in count. Estimating tonnage or number of packages is forbidden. Responsibility for loss of supplies will be charged to the agency failing to provide sufficient and competent personnel to guard and account for supplies under their control.

b. Checking Errors - Comparison of totals of supplies received with totals shipped is a part of the mechanics of both the transfer of supplies themselves and the responsibility for them. Prompt exchange of data as to type and quantity of all supplies shipped and received must be arranged between shipper and consignee, and immediate action taken to account for all differences. Delay in compiling or exchanging this information may prevent tracing, recovering, or accounting for supplies involved.

10. Port Areas and Associated Railway Marshaling Yards.

a. Security of supply begins on arrival of a ship in port. Discharging and getting supplies out of ports is only a part of the port responsibility. Further responsibilities are accurate checks, tallies, records and guarding of supplies while in the port. Estimation of tonnage denies possibility of correct initial inventory which in turn prohibits accurate future receipts or consumption records. This must be done before opportunity for "shrinkage" occurs. Warehoused or back piles of supplies are a guard and security function of the agency concerned.

b. Joint utilization of a port by agencies not under the control of the Port Commander demands an amicable arrangement for easy identification of said agency employees, also instructive briefing of guard personnel with reference to privilege of said employees.

c. (1) All items arriving at ports in this theater in charge of Ship's Cargo Security Officers will be considered protected critical cargo.

(2) Base section and similar commanders will designate a Cargo Security Officer at each port. This officer, or his authorized representative, will contact the Ship's Cargo Security Officer immediately upon arrival in port and arrange to receive security cargo and deliver it to the consignee. If the consignee of any part of the security cargo is located elsewhere, arrangements with the Transportation Officer shall be made to ship it to destination as soon as practicable, consistent with military requirements.

Supply Security (cont'd)

(3) When a shipment of supplies or equipment from the United States is to be classified and shipped as Protected Critical Cargo, this will be indicated on all requisitions and cables to PEBARK. When shipments originate in this theater, the shipper will notify the Transportation Officer at the port of loading as to all cargo which is to be shipped in charge of the Cargo Security Officer.

(4) Protected Critical Cargo will be held to a minimum and will be requested only for valuable supplies such as dental gold, medical spirits, narcotics, currency, stamps, watches, medals, decorations and awards, pistols, binoculars and items normally exposed to pilferage because of their usefulness and value to the individual, or where prompt delivery to Supply Services of small packages is necessary.

11. Railways and Marshalling Yards.

a. Operation of railways hauling United States government supplies is often the problem of several agencies. The guarding and security of same has, as war progress expediency, been assigned to allied components. Operation of trains is turned back to civilians at the earliest opportunity and this creates further perplexities. Complete liaison, cooperation, and understanding must be had between American Army agencies, Allied or co-belligerent guards, and civilian railway operating agencies.

b. Inspection of Cars - Preloading inspection of all cars and a report of same is a must. Car load checker may do this in addition to his checking duty and an appropriate entry of car inspection made on tally sheet. Cars should not be accepted or loaded which have holes in the floor, roof or walls unless same are repaired. Emergency use of a damaged car demands assignment of a guard.

c. Improper Loading - Loose and careless loading causes waste space, breakage, loss of supply and is an invitation to pilferage. Load inspection of cars is as fixed a responsibility as the initial tally of contents.

d. Open Cars - No pilferable items will be shipped in open or gondola cars except in extreme emergencies, and in such cases a special guard will be placed on such cars.

e. Grouping of Cars - Grouping of cars containing pilferable merchandise is highly desirable. Wherever possible trains will be made up in such a way as to group together those cars carrying the most highly pilferable items in order to facilitate guarding. Economy of guard personnel is effected and this economy is further aided by planned posting of said guard. Guards riding the caboose or guard escort cars are completely inefficient and this practice is prohibited.

f. Tally Sheets - Tally sheets of car content must be affixed in prominent place on inside wall of car upon completion of loading. The accuracy of this tally is highly important in determining completeness of car content on arrival at its destination.

g. Sealing of Cars - All railroad boxcars will without exception have the doors closed, sealed and fastened securely with no less than 5mm wire or with a bolt the threads of which have been burred after the nut is fastened. When wire is used for sealing, a piece about fifteen (15) inches long should be passed through the eye of the lock. The ends will be drawn together and tightly

Supply Security (cont)

twisted three (3) or four (4) times with a tizzy bar. To avoid possibility of the seals being unwound, the ends of the wire will be cut short with a cropper so as to finish together.

h. Cars will be inspected enroute, whenever practicable, to determine if cars have been opened or pilferage has occurred. Appropriate reports will be made when cars are found unsealed or where theft is suspected. Cars will be resealed and relabeled when necessary.

i. Civilians - The carrying of unauthorized civilians on supply trains is prohibited. Where authorized civilians are permitted to ride on supply trains they will not be permitted to ride on cars carrying supplies.

j. Responsibility - Responsibility of supply proceeding movement is the absolute responsibility of the source or shipping agency concerned. Checking supplies and furnishing an accurate tally sheet of goods loaded is a part of this responsibility. Railway military police or other railway guards accept the responsibility after the cars are loaded, wired or belted and sealed. There is a continuing responsibility until the receiving agency physically accepts the car.

12. Vehicle Movement of Supplies.

a. Substantial amounts of truck cargo are lost within the zone of communications through pilferage, theft enroute, hi-jacking, illegal diversion, breakage, careless vehicle handling. Trucks from port installations, dumps, and depots will be moved in small convoys of from three (3) to six (6) vehicles at close interval, one individual being responsible for the movement. Guards will be supplied for these vehicles by the dispatching installation whenever possible and only in exceptional cases will individual vehicles be dispatched. Specific routes will be designated for truck drivers to follow, trucks found off the designated route will be impounded and drivers of same given immediate trial by courts-martial. All truck loads leaving an installation will be checked by count and not by estimation. Drivers will be responsible for loads on trucks and will inspect and sign for their load before departure. This responsibility remains even though guards are employed.

b. Trucks loaded with sensitive supply, stopped due to mechanical failure or for any reason will have a guard stand by. Frequent change of guards on trucks will be a procedure which discourages guard and driver collusions.

c. Unloading at destination will be accompanied by a check of truck content against load dispatch slip and any discrepancies will be reported immediately.

d. All precautions will be taken against alteration and forging of trip tickets, tallies and other records as well as collusion with hi-jacking gangs. Special and alert attention must be exercised on routes having steep grades, obstructions, one way defiles or heavy traffic to prevent loss of supply.

13. Showdown Inspections of Troops - Special emphasis will be placed upon frequent unannounced showdown inspections of all troops. When such inspections disclose illegal disposition of government property, strict disciplinary action will be taken. Statements of Charges cannot be relied upon as an effective

Supply Security (cont'd)

deterrent, and will not be used as a substitute for disciplinary action. Publicity programs will be instituted which will effect a wide dissemination to the troops of the results of such disciplinary action.

14. Mobile Road Blocks - To prevent the movement of illegally acquired supplies into black market channels by civilians or soldiers, all major commands will establish mobile road blocks to prevent the passage of pilfered material, AWOLs, stolen vehicles, and vehicles without proper trip tickets. Control points will also inspect all military personnel for passes, and military vehicles for illegal articles. Wherever possible, commanders will secure the cooperation of Italian authorities to have Carabinieri or other Italian police personnel utilized to make similar inspections of civilian vehicles and personnel at these same control points. Military Police patrols will frequently inspect small communities for AWOLs and supply trucks which may be found off the proscribed route to destination.

15. Illegal Disposition of Government Property.

a. Articles of War 84 and 94 prohibit the sale, wrongful disposition, misappropriation or diversion of United States government property to unauthorized persons. In this connection, particular attention is directed to the fact that abandonment, misappropriation or bartering in any way of Army rations, gasoline and oils, captured material, clothing and equipment and Army Exchange supplies of all types fall under the provisions of these articles and Army Regulations.

b. All military personnel who observe any act of abandonment, pilferage or illegal diversion of United States government property will, without delay, apprehend the offender, obtain the name, grade, organization and serial number of the offender. They will also obtain similar information concerning witnesses, if any, and submit a detailed report of the incident to the appropriate commander having courts-martial jurisdiction. If apprehension is not possible, all information available will be obtained, and a similar detailed report of the incident will be made. The information obtained from military offenders will be checked against their War Department Identification Cards and Tags. When there is no doubt as to the veracity of information given, the individual will be turned over to the Military Police.

c. Negligence on the part of any United States military personnel in reporting crimes of this nature will be considered dereliction of duty and will be punished accordingly.

d. All commanders having courts-martial jurisdiction will issue such additional instructions as may be necessary to enforce compliance with the foregoing and will take strict disciplinary action in all cases.

16. Reports.

a. Incidents of major pilferage will be immediately reported to the Provost Marshal General, this headquarters, by cable. Reports will contain the following: date, time, name or number of installation and location, type of supplies indicating the amount and value; brief resume surrounding loss; action instigated and date thereof and the results obtained as of the time report was rendered. Weekly letter reports on progress will also be rendered. These reports are required when supply loss is \$100.00 or more in value.

Supply Security (cont'd)

b. Further required is a letter report as of the 20th of each month, to arrive not later than the 28th, showing all other pilferage not reported by cable and containing the same type information as required in cable reports.

DISTRIBUTION:

250 - CG, AAF/MTO
325 - CG, Repl Comd
75 - DD, MRS I
75 - CG, MBS
110 - CG, Rome Area, MTOUSA
135 - CG, Adriatic Depot
75 - CG, MORBS
200 - CG, Hq Comd AFHQ
100 - CG, FRS
100 - ALCOM
100 - CG, Fifth Army
1 - D/TC, MTOUSA
1 - CG, MTOUSA
1 - G-1
1 - G-2
1 - G-3
1 - G-5
1 - AG
1 - JAG
1 - Fie Dir
1 - CIE
1 - PSS
5 - G-4
5 - ID
5 - OM
5 - Ordnance
5 - ALG
5 - Pol Sect
5 - Engineer
5 - Signals
5 - Surgeon
5 - CWS
5 - M&Th
50 - IAG

5620
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION
PATRIOTS BRANCH

Ref : 13:1/PAT.

23 February 1945.

Subject: Grading and Handling of
Classified Material.

FFR 24 1945

To : The Executive Commissioner

Ref our letter 13/PAT dated 8 Feb, 45.

The Top Secret Control Officer for
Patriots Branch is now J/Comd. M. PROBY A.T.S.

F. Craig

F. CRAIG,
Lt. Colonel,
Director,
Patriots Branch.

/mfg.

NOTED
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[Signature]

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File

Excerpt of Minutes of Executive Commissioner's Meeting held on 20 February 1945.

Italian Civilian Personnel for the North. VP CA Sec stressed the importance of proper screening for any Italian civilians whom it was proposed to take north. It was agreed that the screening should first be carried out by Security and then referred to the Italian authorities.

IPW Sub-Commission mentioned the case of a Dutchman who, they understood, was still working in one of the Regions, who was suspected and whose case was being investigated some months ago. Ex U directed CA Sec to enquire into this.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

3620
ALLIED COMMISSION
OFFICE OF THE HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT

SUBJECT: Office Memo No. 2.

FILE NO. HQC/3/2

TO Office of the Chief of Staff.

12 February 1945

FEB 13 1945

Reference above and para. 5, Daily Bulletin 42/45.

Major E. J. Bocchino has been appointed "Top Secret Control" Officer for this Section.


Colonel
R. H. ROBERTSON
Hq. Commandant.

3212 15/2

CONFIDENTIAL 81

Tel : 735

Ref/3620/31/008.

14 Feb 45

SUBJECT : Letter from Sig. ⁷⁹Amata Garibaldi.

TO : Civil Affairs Section.

1. Attached is a copy of a letter dated 2 Feb 45 from Signorina Amata Garibaldi addressed to the Chief Commissioner.
2. Many Italians feel that the Order of German Desecrations referred to in this enclosure may cover an organization for German espionage activities.
3. I require the Order investigated without delay by the appropriate authorities, including Italian if necessary, and a report submitted to me on the result.

[Signature]
Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

Lazio-Umbria Region.
Copy to : PS Sub Com.

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BU 21/2 2/2 5211
No let

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

3620
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 344

13 February 1945.

FEB 13 1945

TO : Chief of Staff.

1. The attached letter from Signora Annita Garibaldi refers to the activity of an order of German Deaconesses which many Italians feel may well be a cover organization for German espionage activities in this country.

2. Will you kindly have this entire question investigated by the appropriate Allied, and possibly Italian, intelligence authorities.

W
ELERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

See 81

5210

Rome February 2nd 1945

1 Via Tor. Jac. Maurino

FEB 2 1945

CC 285

Your Excellency,

The address you wished for is:
Casa delle Saceresse Germaniche Via Alessandrina
Torre 11 tel. 3433. This is how it appears
in the telephone book. But on the marble slab
outside their garden gate they have erased
"germaniche".

The German Saceresse is a wide spread
organization throughout all important Italian
cities. They maintain schools with excellent
pupils of the better class and clinics and
go themselves both by day and by night
for nursing purposes always for the best
paying people. They also own property
here in Rome.

I had sent a note to Colonel Pollock about them as they are talking about Rome on their German uniforms and I had also spoken about them at the Central Russian but there seems to be something that is protecting them, as otherwise how can they quietly exist in Rome at this present moment?

The villa is a three story one and if not for the Canadian nurses at present in the Cardale School, why not use it for the refugee families at present occupying the schools?

We are having a meeting to-day of the two Women's Associations along the lines you so kindly suggested yesterday to the two Presidents, and we are also working for the school.

Always with sincere gratitude
Yours sincerely

Annita Thelma Campbell

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78

HEADQUARTERS
PIEMONTE REGION
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
APO 394

JFF/jdm

10 February 1945

FEB 12 1945

File 312.3


SUBJECT: Top Secret Control Officer

TO : Office of Chief of Staff, Headquarters, Allied Commission

1. Pursuant to instructions contained in Office Memorandum No. 2, Hq AC, dated 3 February 1945, and par 2, Daily Bulletin No. 39, Hq AC, dated 8 February 1945, report is herewith submitted that J/Cmdr G. E. PHILLINGHAM, 257858, ATS, (B), has been appointed Top Secret Control Officer Piemonte Region.

For the Regional Commissioner:

Joseph M. Fournier
JOSEPH M. FOURNIER
Capt, Inf.
Adjutant



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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Public Health Sub-Commission

AG/3022/4/PH

11 February 1945

SUBJECT: - Grading and Handling of Classified Material.

FEB 11 1945

TO : - Office of Chief of Staff, All Allied Commission.

Reference 65/COS (Office Memorandum No. 2) dated 3 Feb 45.

1. In compliance with Para 3 (a) of the above-mentioned Memorandum and with Para 6 of Daily Bulletin No. 41 dated 10 February 1945, Major PAUL S. BAYNE, Executive Officer has been designated as "Top Secret Control Officer" for this Sub-Commission.

G. S. Parkinson
G. S. PARKINSON, Brigadier
Director,
Public Health Sub-Commission 5620

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

3620
In reply refer
to: ADM. 207.14.CS

HHS/rm

76

Subject: Top Secret Officer.

To: Chief of Staff. ✓

FEB 11 1945

Further to our memo of 9th February 1945
nominating Colonel J.L. Henderson as Top Secret Officer
for this Sub-Commission, a further nomination is made
of Major William M. BRUNNER as Top Secret Officer for
Civil Censorship Group.

Tel: 489081.
Ext: 333.
10th February 45.

J. L. Henderson
Colonel,
Director,
Communications Sub-Commission.

Copy to: Civil Censorship Group.

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394

Tel. 556

COMMERCE SUBCOMMISSION

JO/ec

Ref. AC/5020/Commerce

10 February 1945

FEB 11 1945

SUBJECT: Top Secret Control Officer

TO : Chief of Staff Allied Commission

1. Ref. para 2, Daily Bulletin No. 39, dated 8 Feb. 45 and para 3 of Office Memo No. 2 dated 3 Feb. 45.
2. The Top Secret Control Officer for this Subcommittee will be Maj. W. E. SCOTTEN.

for
W. P. EVANS

Colonel

Director

Commerce Subcommittee

Copy to Economic Section

(Ref. your ES/1.01 dated 9 Feb. 45)

3202

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Education Subcommission
ABO 394

EA/1C/1.3/AC

10 February 1945

SUBJECT: "Top Secret Control" Officer.

FEB 14 1945

TO : Office of the Chief of Staff.

Reference paragraph 3 (a), Office Memorandum No. 2, this Headquarters,
dated 3 February 1945.

1. The following Officer is hereby designated "Top Secret Control"
Officer:

Captain JOSEPH V. VELLA
Executive Officer
Education Subcommission

Joseph V. Vella Capt
for: CARLETON W. WASHBURN
Major, A.U.S.
A/Director of Education

5204

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 7250.7

3620
[Signature]

73

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

Ref 3/11/CA

11 Feb 45

SUBJECT : Handling of Classified Documents

FEB 11 1945

TO : COS

Reference Daily Bulletin No 39 dated 8 Feb 45.

Colonel R.B. CRIPPS is designated as "Top Secret Control" Officer
of CA Section.

[Signature]
G.R. UNION Brig,
VP CA Section
DOCS

5207

Tel. Ext. 467

MEMORANDUM

10 February 1945

REFERENCE : G-12/44/A

SUBJECT : Handling of Classified Material.

TO : Office of the Chief of Staff.

FEB 1 1945

Reference para 3 (a) Office Memorandum No. 2, dated 3 Feb 45 and
Daily Bulletin No. 40, dated 9 Feb 45.

The undermentioned Officers handle TOPSEC correspondence of this

Section:-

Colonel J.L. Jones - Executive Officer (B).
Lt.Col. Sir J.E.T. Ritchie, Bt. - G-1 (B).
Major A.S. Farrar - Asst. G-1 (B).

FOR VICE PRESIDENT, ESTABLISHMENTS SECTION.

Col Ritchie

— CONTROL OFFICER

/av.

James Ritchie
5242
Sir J.E.T. RITCHIE Bt.
Lt. Colonel,
G-1 (B).

3640
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

INTER OFFICE MEMO

From: WAR MATERIALS DISPOSAL AND ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR SUB COMMISSION

SUBJECT: Grading and handling of classified material
FILE No. WMD/10/2/25

TO: Office of the Chief of Staff

10 February 1945

Reference office Memorandum N.2 of 3 Feb. 1945
and Daily Bulletin N. 40 of 9 Feb. 1945.

Major C.S. Partridge, Executive officer of this
S/C has been designated "Top Secret Control" officer.

C. Partridge
J.A. CAMPBELL
Lieut.-Colonel
Director
WMD & IFCW Sub-Com.

5201

3620

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
AGRICULTURE SUB-COMMISSION

JMM/cim

Tel. 262
AGR/119.2

10 February 1945


FEB 10 1945

SUBJECT: Top Secret Control Officer

TO : Chief of Staff

1. In compliance with Office Memorandum No. 2 of 3 February 1945, paragraph 3e, the following officer is designated as "Top Secret Control Officer":

Major James M. Merritt


JAMES M. MERRITT
Major, Cavalry
Acting Director

Distribution:
Acting Deputy Chief
of Staff, Economic Section

5200

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
LABOUR SUB COMMISSION

69
WBY/ac

REF : LSC/111

10 February 1945

SUBJECT: Top-Secret Control - Labour Sub-Commission.

TO : Major Doe (Econ. Sec.)

FEB 10 1945

1. With reference to para 3 (a) Office Memorandum No. 2 of 3 February 1945, the "Top Secret Control" Officer suggested for the Labour Sub-Commission is:

Mr. David C. Sachs - American Civilian -
(Assimilated rank: Major)

W. H. Braine

W. H. BRAINE
Director,
Labour Sub-Commission

3620
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APC 394
Transportation Sub-Commission

(63)
WFS/lr

AC/100/34/Tn.1

9 February 1945

SUBJECT : Top secret Control Officer.

EEB 10 1945

TO : Office of the Chief of Staff.

1. Reference is made to paragraph 3(a) Office Memorandum No. 2, this Headquarters, dated 3 February 1945 and paragraph 2 of daily Bulletin Number 39, Headquarters Allied Commission, dated 8 February.

2. Lt. Col. Walter P. Scoggins has been appointed the "Top Secret Control" Officer for this Sub-Commission.

For the Director :

Walter P. Scoggins
WALTER P. SCOGGINS
Lt. Colonel, QMC,
Admin. Officer

3620
RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

CGR/gd'a

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
DISPLACED PERSONS AND REPATRIATION SUB-COMMISSION

DPR/71-6/Adm.

Tel. 489081 Ext. 576

9 February 1945

SUBJECT : Top Secret Control Officer.

FEB 10 1945

TO : C.A. Section *→ Chief of Staff.*

1. Reference 65/COS of 3 February 1945, Office Memorandum No. 2 para 3a and Daily Bulletin of 5 February 1945.

2. Lt. Col. C.F. FOTHERGILL is nominated TOP SECRET CONTROL OFFICER of this Sub-Commission.

C.B. Findlay
C.B. FINDLAY
Colonel,
Director.

5197

RESTRICTED

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

3620 *LM*
Tel. 489681 Ext. 589 66

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Public Works and Utilities Sub-Commission

APX/pan

126/PWU

9 February 1945

FEB 10 1945

SUBJECT: Officers Handling Top Secret Documents

TO : Office of the Chief of Staff ✓

1. Reference paragraph 2, Daily Bulletin No. 39 dated 8 February 1945.

2. The name of the Top Secret Control officer for Public Works & Utilities Sub-Commission is: -

J/Comd. A. K. King 287036 A.T.S.

G. E. Rhodes

G. E. RHODES
Lt. Col. R. E.
Deputy Director

5196

HP
C.O. Economic Section.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

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62

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
LEGAL SUB-COMMISSION

AC/4025/L.

/rlp.
9 February 1945.

SUBJECT : Grading and Handling of Classified Material.

TO : Office of the Chief of Staff, Hq AC.

FEB 10 1945

1. Reference Office Memo #2, Hq AC dated 3 Feb 45.
2. Lt. Col. I.G.H. CAMPBELL has been appointed "Top Secret Control" officer for the Legal Sub-Commission.

2
1 Campbell Lt Col
W. E. REINHENS,
Colonel,
Deputy Chief Legal Advisor.
(absent on duty)

785017

Ref. 396

1.01 RRE/RS

Ref. A1/5502/END.

9 February 45

SUBJECT : Top Secret Control Officer.

FEB 10 1945

TO : Chief of Staff ✓
Through Economic Section

FROM : Industry Sub-Commission

1. Ref. para 3 Office Memorandum No 2 dated 3rd February 1945

2. Major R.W. Reeve has been appointed "TOP SECRET CONTROL OFFICER" for this Sub-Commission.

W. S. Vaughan
W.S. VAUGHAN
Director
Industry Sub-Commission

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Phone 301

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Establishment Section

Ref/77/Est

LTM/mrd
9 February 1945

FEB 10 1945

SUBJECT: Top Secret Security Officer

TO : Chief of Staff, Allied Commission

1. Reference is made to Daily Bulletin Number 40,
Paragraph II, 9 February 1945.

2. Captain L. T. Montant, Jr. is appointed Top
Secret Security Officer for the office of the Deputy Chief
of Staff.

L. T. Montant, Jr.
NORMAN E. FISKE
Colonel
Deputy Chief of Staff

3620

62

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
A.F.M. 394
PUBLIC SAFETY SUB COMMISSION
SECURITY DIVISION

Original

REF : SD/102

7 February 1945

FEB 10 1945

SUBJECT : Top Secret Control Officer

TO : Office of Chief of Staff

1. With reference to office memorandum No. 2.
2. The officer designated to act as Top Secret Control Officer for Security Division is Major S.J. HARVEY.

St. Lawrence May
JOHN W. CHAPMAN,
Colonel J.A.S.D.,
Director Public Safety,
Sub Commission.

SJH/nt

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61

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394

Subcommission for Monuments Fine Arts and Archives
(Tel. 489081, ext. 442 & 664; 478480)

20230/MPAA

9 February 1945

Subject: Designation of "Top Secret Control"
Officer.

FEB 9 1945

To : Chief of Staff.

1. Ref. para. 2, Daily Bulletin No. 39, this
HQ., dated 8 Feb 45, the undersigned would report
that

Lt.Col. J.E. Ward Perkins, RA

has been designated as "Top Secret Control" Officer
for the Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives Sub-
commission.

Ernest T. De Wald
ERNEST T. DE WALD
Lt.Col., Spec. Res.
Director.

Copy to:
VP, CA Sec.

5192

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

3620
ALLIED [REDACTED] COMMISSION
INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT:

FILE NO. 1.01/ES

TO : Chief of Staff ✓

9 February 1945

FEB 9 1945

In accordance with instructions contained in Office Memorandum No. 2, dated 3 February, the officer designated as TOP SECRET Control Officer for Headquarters, Economic Section, is Major ROBERT E. DOY.

L. D. Densmore
L. D. DENSMORE
Colonel, FA
Acting Deputy Chief of Staff
Economic Section

5191

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HHS/epc *57*

In reply
refer to: ADM.207.13.CS

Subject : Top Secret Control Officer

To : Chief of Staff ✓

Feb 1945

is: Top Secret Control Officer for this Sub-Commission

Colonel J.L.Henderson R.Sigs.

Tel: 489081
Ext: 333

9th February, 1945

97.13.15.16
J.L.HENDERSON

Colonel,

Director,

Communications Sub-Commission

5190

362011
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION
PATRIOT BRANCH

Ref: 13/Pat
Subject: Grading and Handling of
Classified Material.
To: Office of the Chief of Staff.

Ext. 374
8th Feb, 45.

FEB 1945

Reference para. 3.(a) Office Memorandum No. 2.,
this HQ, dated 3rd February, 1945.

Top Secret Control Officer for Patriot Branch

is:

Miss LUTMAN-JONES.

Kraig

P. CRAIG.
Lt. Colonel.
Director
Patriot Branch.

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 594
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION
PATRIOT BRANCH

Ref: 13/Pat

Subject: Grading and Handling of
Classified Material.

Ext. 374

To: Office of the Chief of Staff.

8th Feb, 45.

FEB 9 1945

Reference para. 3.(a) Office Memorandum No. 2.,
this HQ, dated 3rd February, 1945.

is: Top Secret Control Officer for Patriot Branch

Miss LUTTMAN-JOHNSON.

Kraig

P. CRAIG.
Lt. Colonel.
Director
Patriots Branch.

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(664)

36209
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
FINANCE SUB-COMMISSION

13003/F

8 February 1945
FEB 1 1945

SUBJECT: Grading and Handling of Classified Material.

TO : Chief of Staff. ✓

1. Reference Office Memorandum No. 2 dated
3 February 1945, para 3 (a).

2. "Top Secret Control" officer for this
Sub-Commission is Major B.E.L. Timmons.

B.E.L. Timmons
Joint Director,
Finance Sub-Commission.

5187

36201
INTER OFFICE MEMO

EGE/au
1.01

Tel : 584

8 February 1945

Ref : 10-13/28/FOOD

SUBJECT : Office Memo N° 2

FEB 1945

FROM : FOOD SUB-COMMISSION

TO : Office of the Chief of Staff
(Thru Economic Section)

1. Ref is your 65/COS dated 3 February para 3 A.
2. Major E.G. LUSH, R.A.S.C., has been designated 'Top Secret Control Officer' for the Food Sub-Commission.

E. G. Lush
W. J. A. 35
Colonel

5187

Director, Food Sub-Commission

36204

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APO 394

AG/14034/PS

6 February 1945

SUBJECT : "Top Secret Control Officer"

FFR 1945

TO : Office of the Chief of Staff.

Having regards for paragraph 3 (a) Office Memorandum No. 2 dated 3 February, 1945. Colonel John W. Chapman will be the Top Secret Control Officer for Public Safety Sub Commission.

John W. Chapman

JOHN W. CHAPMAN
Colonel, J.A.G.D.
Director Public Safety
Sub-Commission

LJP/t.

785017

3620 (10) (32)
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
LOCAL GOVERNMENT SUB COMMISSION

AC/10/32/LG.

Tel: 478107

SUBJECT : Grading and handling of Classified Material.

TO : COS.

FEB 1945

1. Reference Daily Bulletin Number 39, and Office Memorandum No. 2 - para 3 (a);

2. The name of the "Top Secret Control" officer is :-

Captain T. C. SHANKS.

R.G.B. Spicer Colonel.

R.G.B. SPICER,
Colonel,
Director,
Local Government Sub Commission.

5185

3413

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HRC/1c

INTER OFFICE MEMO
OFFICE OF G-4 (B)

Ext: 436

G-4/ICC/22.

8 February 1945

SUBJECT : Grading and Handling of Classified Material. FEB 8 1945

TO : Office of the Chief of Staff.

1. Reference para 3 (a) of Office Memorandum No.2
this H.Q. dated 3 February 1945.

2. Major D.H. HASLAM, R.A. is appointed "Top Secret
Control Officer" for this Branch.

S. W. Miller

S. W. MILLER
Lieut. Colonel,
G-4 (B).

Copies to : D.C.O.S. - Establishment Section.
Major D.H. HASLAM.

5184 -5

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3620
HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION
Navy Sub-Commission APC 394

RESTRICTED

R-X-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

880/1629

6 February 1945

FEB 9 1945

From: Navy Sub-Commission, W. Allied Commission.
To : Chief of Staff, A.C.

Subject: Grading and Handling of Classified Material.

1. In accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3 of Hq. A.C. Office Memorandum No. 2 of 3 February 1945, Lieutenant P.C. CRAIG, USNR., is designated as TOP SECRET Control Officer for the Navy Sub-Commission, A.C.

A.C. Craig
Commander, U. S. Navy,
For Chief, Navy Sub-Commission, A.C.

File 99

5183

RECEIVED

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

AIC 33.

Office of the Chief of Staff

Ref: 65/COS

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

NUMBER

2)

3 February 1945

THE GRADING AND HANDLING OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL1. INTRODUCTION

As it appears that the correct grading and handling of material having a security classification are not fully understood the following notes are set down for compliance by all concerned at this HQ.

2. CLASSIFICATION

The overclassification of documents in this HQ is prevalent. By classifying documents and films correctly and down grading them as early as possible the danger of a breach of security will be reduced considerably and handling facilitated.

The following classification definitions and examples will be of assistance:

A. TOP SECRET

(a) Definition: Certain secret documents information, or material the security aspect of which is paramount and whose unauthorized disclosure would cause exceptionally grave damage to the allies.

Examples:

- (1) Plans or particulars of future major or special operations.
- (11) Particulars of important dispositions or impending moves of forces or convoys in connection with (1) above.
- (111) Very important political documents dealing with such matters as negotiations for alliances and the like.

As it appears that the correct grading and handling of material having a security classification are not fully understood the following notes are set down for compliance by all concerned at this time.

2. CLASSIFICATION

The classification of documents in this is prevalent. By classifying documents and files correctly and down grading them as early as possible the danger of a breach of security will be reduced considerably and handling facilitated.

The following classification definitions and examples will be of assistance:

A. TOP SECRET

(a) Definition: Certain secret documents information, or material the security aspect of which is paramount and whose unauthorized disclosure would cause exceptionally grave damage to the nation.

Examples:

- (i) Plans or particulars of future major or special operations.
- (ii) Particulars of important dispositions or impending moves of forces or convoys in connection with (i) above.
- (iii) Very important political documents dealing with such matters as negotiations for alliances and the like.
- (iv) Information of the methods used or success obtained by Intelligence Services and Counter-Intelligence Services on which would imperil secret agents.

(b) Establishment of Classification: It will be the general policy of this is that the responsibility level of officers authorized to classify material as TOP SECRET will be as follows:

- (i) The Chief Commissioner
- (ii) Deputy Chief Commissioner
- (iii) Chief of Staff
- (iv) Vice Presidents of Sections
- (v) Subcommissioners
- (vi) Regional Commissioners
- (vii) Provincial Commissioners
- (viii) Senior executive staff officers of the officials mentioned in (i) to (vii) inclusive.

RECEIVED

RESTRICTEDB. SECRET

Definition: Documents, information, or material the unauthorized disclosure of which would endanger Allied security, cause serious injury to the interests or prestige of the Allies or any governmental activity thereof.

Examples:

- (i) Particulars of operations in progress.
- (ii) Plans or particulars of operations not included under TOP SECRET.
- (iii) Certain reports of operations containing information of vital interest to the enemy.
- (iv) Adverse reports on general morale affecting major operations.
- (v) Certain development projects.

C. CONFIDENTIAL

Definition: Documents, information or material the unauthorized disclosure of which, while not endangering the Allied security, would be prejudicial to the interests or prestige of the Allies, any governmental activity, or an individual, or would cause administrative embarrassment or difficulty.

Examples:

- (i) Matters, investigations, and documents of a personal and disciplinary nature, the knowledge of which it is desirable to safeguard for administrative reasons.
- (ii) Routine intelligence reports.
- (iii) Unit movement of non-operational significance in areas within or adjacent to operational theaters.

HANDLING OF TOP SECRET DOCUMENTS AND FILES

(a) The head of each subdivision and section will designate an officer of his activity who will act as "Top Secret Control Officer" and be responsible for carrying out the procedures laid down in the following sections of this paragraph. Together with the head of the subdivision or section, he will be the only individual to handle incoming TOP SECRET material. The only

those to whom work is

(iv) Advice reports on general morale affecting major operations.

(v) Certain development projects.

C. CONFIDENTIAL

Definition. Documents, information or material the unauthorized disclosure of which, while not endangering the Allied security, would be prejudicial to the interests or prestige of the Allies, any governmental activity, or an individual, or would cause administrative embarrassment or difficulty.

Examples:

(i) Matters, investigations, and documents of a personal and disciplinary nature, the knowledge of which it is desirable to safeguard for administrative reasons.

(ii) Routine intelligence reports.

(iii) Unit movement of non-operational significance in areas within or adjacent to operational theatres.

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(a) The head of each subdivision and section will designate an officer of his activity who will act as "Top Secret Control Officer" and be responsible for carrying out the procedures laid down in the following sections of this paragraph. Together with the head of the subdivision or section, he will be the only individual to handle incoming TOP SECRET material. The only officers who will be informed of TOP SECRET matters are those to whom work the knowledge is essential and they should only be informed of so much as may affect their work. The name of the officer, as indicated above, will be kept on file in the Office of the Chief of Staff who will co-ordinate all TOP SECRET control measures.

(b) Clerks, excluding CONFIDENTIAL clerks (see sub-para (a) below), will not handle TOP SECRET papers. Incoming letters will be registered by the officer responsible for custody of the file in a special register kept by him for that purpose.

RECEIVED

SECRET

(c) TOP SECRET matter will be typed only by a special confidential clerk who will, while so engaged, not work in a room in which are persons not entitled to see TOP SECRET papers.

(d) The responsible officer will satisfy himself that all carbon copies (including spoils) are received by him and properly disposed of. Short-hand notes (which should be taken in a loose leaf book) will be destroyed as soon as the typescript is passed. New carbon papers should not be used but if of necessity they have to be used they will be destroyed. Stencil copies will be run off under supervision of the confidential clerk and all copies (including spoils) collected and properly disposed of. The stencil will be destroyed or locked up by the officer responsible. The clerk typing the letter will also prepare the inner envelope which will be addressed, marked and numbered in accordance with para 4 of Office Memorandum No. 13.

(e) The responsible officer will place all TOP SECRET material in an envelope and after sealing, it will be registered out by him.

(f) A receipt will be obtained from the addressee or message centre as may be appropriate. The register for TOP SECRET material will contain a space which will be dated when the acknowledgment of the addressee is received.

(g) Where more than one copy is made, each copy will be consecutively numbered and a separate line in the register will show the disposal of each copy. Receipts will be filed in the same order as they appear in the register; as vouchers for the register they will not be filed on the TOP SECRET file.

4. GRADING AND DOWN GRADING OF DOCUMENTS AND FILES

(a) Grading. A file will be graded according to the most highly classified document on that file. Individual letters or other documents will be graded according to their own content and not in accordance with their relation to any other document or file. Extracts or quotations from classified documents other than TOP SECRET which in themselves contain nothing to entitle them to receive the same classification will be issued in a lower category. In the case of TOP SECRET material, the following will govern: when a message has been classified and sent as TOP SECRET, any paraphrase of the whole or portions thereof as well as all subsequent messages referring thereto, if any reference is made to the original message by subject or serial number, must bear the same classification.

(b) Down Grading. When a document or file is down graded a note of the new classification allotted to it will be made on the document or file. This note will be signed and dated by the officer or official authorizing such down grading, who will, in all cases where practical, be the officer originally responsible for the classification.

(c) The responsible officer will place all TOP SECRET material in an envelope and after sealing, it will be registered out by him.

(f) A receipt will be obtained from the addressee or message centre as may be appropriate. The register for TOP SECRET material will contain a space which will be dated when the acknowledgment of the addressee is received.

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(b) Down Grading. When a document or file is down graded a note of the new classification allotted to it will be made on the document or file. This note will be signed and dated by the officer or official authorizing such down grading, who will, in all cases where practical, be the officer originally responsible for the classification.

5. GENERAL

(a) Attention is drawn to Office Memorandum No. 13 dated 24 July 1944, "Official Mail Services" and No. 16 dated 25 August 1944, "Handling of Classified Documents by Civilians."

DECLASSIFIED

(b) Nothing in this memorandum supercedes the official pamphlet issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff entitled "Classification and Handling of Protected Documents 1944."

By command of Rear Admiral STONE:

M. W. Braggett

M. W. BRAGGETT
Lt. Col., AGO
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:

1A

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

DISTRIBUTION:

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- 4 -

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IN RE: [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]

RESTRICTED

WAR DEPARTMENT
The Adjutant General's Office
Washington 25, D. C.

3620
Chief of Staff
/am

AG 380.01(15 Jan 45)01-S-F-1

CJ/mc 23-939 Pentagon

18 January 1945

SUBJECT: Unauthorized Disclosures by Personnel
of Armed Forces.

TO : * * * * *
Commanding Generals,
Theater of Operations
* * * * *

FEB 1945

1. The safeguarding of classified military information is the responsibility of all military personnel and civilian employees of the War Department and of the management and employees of all commercial firms engaged in classified work or projects for the armed forces.
2. Publication or communication to any unauthorized persons of experiences of escape or evasion from enemy-occupied territory, internment in a neutral country or release from internment not only furnishes useful information to the enemy but jeopardizes future escapes, evasions and releases. Such information is classified "Secret".
3. Notwithstanding the provisions of letter AG 383.6 (31 Jul 43) 01-S-3-M, 6 August 1943, subject: Amended Instructions Concerning Publicity in Connection with Escaped Prisoners of War, to Include Evaders of Capture in Enemy or Enemy-Occupied Territory and Internees in Neutral Countries, military and civilian personnel under the War Department are releasing classified information which is being published in the news and editorial columns of the press, as well as on the radio.
4. All concerned are again warned that information coming from military and civilian personnel of the War Department must be cleared by the appropriate military agency before it is released to anyone. A statement of assurance by a newspaper or radio representative seeking such information (story) that it will be properly cleared prior to publication is no authority for any disclosure.
5. Commanding officers will be responsible for instructing all personnel under their commands as to the provisions of the directives issued on this subject, warning them that violations will subject them to severe disciplinary action. In addition, all commanding officers concerned will make every reasonable effort to investigate thoroughly all violations of the directives on this subject and where the degree of the offense justifies it, bring such offenders to trial and in all lesser violations impose severe disciplinary action under the 104th Article of War.
6. The commanding generals, domestic service commands, will bring the contents of this letter to the attention of all Class I, II, III and IV installations within the territorial limits of their service commands.

By order of the Secretary of War:

REPRODUCED By 2675th Regt, Allied
Commission, (Ovhd), 2 Feb 45 *scw*

/s/ Robert H. Dyer
/t/ ROBERT H. DYER
Brigadier General
Acting The Adjutant General.

RESTRICTED (over)

785017

RESTRICTED

360.01

(18 Jan 45)

1st Ind.

H D/Jtg

HEADQUARTERS, 2675TH REGIMENT, ALLIED COMMISSION, (OVERSEAS), APO 394, U. S.
Army, 2 February 1945.

TO: All Concerned.

For compliance.

By order of Colonel PARKIN:

N. R. Drachoff
N. R. DRACHOFF
Lt Col, AGD
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:

- 1 - Units this Regiment.
- 1 - Sub-Commission / Sections Allied Commission.

RESTRICTED

44

DRAFT

SUBJECT: The Grading and Handling of Classified Material

Office Memorandum No.

1. INTRODUCTION

As it appears that the correct grading and handling of material having a security classification are not fully understood the following notes are set down for compliance by all concerned at this HQ.

2. CLASSIFICATION

The overclassification of documents in this HQ is prevalent. By classifying documents and files correctly and down grading them as early as possible the danger of a breach of security will be reduced considerably and handling facilitated.

The following classification definitions and examples will be of assistance:

A. TOP SECRET

(a) Definition: Certain secret documents information, or material the security aspect of which is paramount and whose unauthorized disclosure would cause exceptionally grave damage to the Allies.

Examples

- (i) Plans or particulars of future major or special operations.
- (ii) Particulars of important dispositions or impending moves of forces or convoys in connection with (i) above.
- (iii) Very important political documents dealing with such matters as negotiations for alliances and the like.
- (iv) Information of the methods used or success obtained by Intelligence Services and Counter-Intelligence Services or which would imperil secret agents.

(b) Establishment of Classification: It will be the general policy of this HQ that the "responsibility level" of officers authorized to classify material as TOP SECRET will be as follows:

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- (ii) Particulars of important dispositions or impending moves of forces or convoys in connection with (i) above.
- (iii) Very important political documents dealing with such matters as negotiations for alliances and the like.
- (iv) Information of the methods used or sources obtained by Intelligence Services and Counter-Intelligence Services or which would imperil secret agents.
- (b) Establishment of Classification: It will be the general policy of this HQ that the "responsibility level" of officers authorized to classify material as TOP SECRET will be as follows:
 - (i) The Chief Commissioner
 - (ii) Deputy Chief Commissioner
 - (iii) Chief of Staff
 - (iv) Vice Presidents of Sections
 - (v) Subcommission Directors
 - (vi) Regional Commissioners
 - (vii) Provincial Commissioners
 - (viii) Senior executive staff officers of the officials mentioned in (i) to (vii) inclusive.

B. SECRET

Definition: Documents, information, or material the unauthorized disclosure of which would endanger Allied security, cause serious

749

43

injury to the interest or prestige of the Allies or of governmental activity thereof.

Examples:

- (i) Particulars of operations in progress.
- (ii) Plans or particulars of operations not included under TOP SECRET.
- (iii) Certain reports of operations containing information of vital interest to the enemy.
- (iv) Adverse reports on general morale affecting major operations.
- (v) Certain development projects.

C. CONFIDENTIAL

Definition: Documents, information or material the unauthorized disclosure of which, while not endangering the Allied security, would be prejudicial to the interests or prestige of the Allies, any governmental activity, or an individual, or would cause administrative embarrassment or difficulty.

Examples:

- (i) Matters, investigations, and documents of a personal and disciplinary nature, the knowledge of which it is desirable to safeguard for administrative reasons.
- (ii) Routine intelligence reports.
- (iii) Unit movement of non-operational significance in areas within or adjacent to operational theatres.

3. HANDLING OF TOP SECRET DOCUMENTS AND FILMS

(a) The head of each subcommission and section will designate an officer of his activity who will act as "Top Secret Control Officer" and be responsible for carrying out the procedures laid down in the following sections of this paragraph. Together with the head of the subcommission or section, he will be the only individual to handle incoming TOP SECRET material. The only officers who will be informed of TOP SECRET matters are those to whose work the knowledge is essential and they should only be informed of so much as may affect their work. The name of the officer, as indicated above, will be kept on file in the Office of the Chief of Staff who will coordinate all TOP SECRET control measures.

(b) All documents and information containing CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET data (see sub-part (c) below).

Definition: Documents, information or material the unauthorized disclosure of which, while not endangering the Allied security, would be prejudicial to the interests or prestige of the Allies, any Governmental activity, or an individual, or would cause administrative embarrassment or difficulty.

Examples:

- (1) Matters, investigations, and documents of a personal and disciplinary nature, the knowledge of which it is desirable to safeguard for administrative reasons.
- (11) Routine intelligence reports.
- (111) Unit movement of non-operational significance in areas within or adjacent to operational theatres.

HANDLING OF TOP SECRET DOCUMENTS AND FILES

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(b) Clerks, excluding CONFIDENTIAL clerks (see sub-para (c) below), will not handle TOP SECRET papers. Incoming letters will be registered by the officer responsible for custody of the file in a special register kept by him for that purpose.

(c) TOP SECRET matter will be typed only by a special confidential clerk who will, while so engaged, not work in a room in which any persons not entitled to see TOP SECRET papers.

(d) The responsible officer will satisfy himself that all carbon copies (including spoils) are received by him and properly disposed of. Shorthand notes (which should be taken in a loose leaf book) will be destroyed as soon as the typescript is passed. New carbon papers should not be used but if of necessity they have to be used they will be destroyed. Stencil copies will be run off under supervision of the CONFIDENTIAL clerk and all copies (including spoils) collected and properly disposed of. The stencil will be destroyed or locked up by the officer responsible. The clerk typing the letter will also prepare the inner envelope which will be addressed, marked

and numbered in accordance with para 4 of Office Memo No. 13.

(e) The responsible officer will place all TOP SECRET material in an envelope and after sealing, it will be registered out by him.

(f) A receipt will be obtained from the addressee or message centre as may be appropriate. The register for TOP SECRET material will contain a space which will be dated when the acknowledgment of the addressee is received.

(g) Where more than one copy is made, each copy will be consecutively numbered and a separate line in the register will show the disposal of each copy. Receipts will be filed in the same order as they appear in the register; as vouchers for the register they will not be filed on the TOP SECRET file.

4. GRADING AND DOWN GRADING OF DOCUMENTS AND FILES

(a) Grading. A file will be graded according to the most highly classified document on that file. Individual letters or other documents will be graded according to their own content and not in accordance with their relation to any other document or file. Extracts or quotations from classified documents other than TOP SECRET which in themselves contain nothing to entitle them to receive the same classification will be issued in a lower category. In the case of TOP SECRET material, the following will govern: when a message has been classified and sent as TOP SECRET, any phrase of the whole or portions thereof as well as all subsequent messages referring thereto, if any reference is made to the original message by subject or serial number, must bear the same classification.

(b) Down Grading. When a document or file is down graded a note of the new classification allotted to it will be made on the document or file. This note will be signed and dated by the officer or official authorizing such down grading, who will, in all cases where practical, be the officer originally responsible for the classification.

5. GENERAL

(a) Attention is drawn to Office Memorandum No. 13 dated 24 July 44, "Official Mail Services" and No. 16 dated 25 August 44, "Handling of Classified Documents by Civilians."

(b) Nothing in this Memorandum supersedes the official pamphlet issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff entitled "Classification and Handling of Protected Documents 1944."

4. GRADING AND DOWN GRADING OF DOCUMENTS AND FILES

(a) Grading. A file will be graded according to the most highly classified document on that file. Individual letters or other documents will be graded according to their own content and not in accordance with their relation to any other document or file. Extracts or quotations with their classified documents other than TOP SECRET which in themselves contain nothing to entitle them to receive the same classification will be issued in a lower category. In the case of TOP SECRET material, the following will govern: when a message has been classified and sent as TOP SECRET, any phrase of the whole or portions thereof as well as all subsequent messages referring thereto, if any reference is made to the original message by subject or serial number, must bear the same classification.

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(b) Nothing in this Memorandum supercedes the official pamphlet issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff entitled "Classification and Handling of Protected Documents 1944."

(41)

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
AND
Office of the Chief of Staff

Ref: 3607/LI/001.

15 January 1948.

Subject: Security Conference.

To: VP Records Section
VP Civil Affairs Section
VP Establishment Section.

MAC are holding a Security Conference on Saturday 17 January at 1030 hours at Teatro delle Arti, Via Sicilia 59, Rome.

The object of this Conference, which is more in the nature of a lecture on security rather than a conference, is to draw the attention of all military units in this area to the vital importance of good security.

MAC have allotted 20 places in this Conference to AF, AG, and I am directed by the Chief of Staff to request you to arrange for a number of officers from your Section to attend. Details can be arranged with Major BOWEN, Security Division, who bears this letter.

(Signed) E. Talbot
Colonel,
Chief Staff Officer.

5176

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

C O P Y

(40)

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

G-5 : 389.7-15

6 Jan 1945

SUBJECT : Security Situation in Rome

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission, APO 394

(24)

Reference is made to your 3620/COS of 18 December. This has been forwarded to Major General Airey, Assistant Chief of Staff this HQ's who has taken note of its contents.

(Signed) D.S. Jackling, Lt. Col.
for

T.R. HENN
Colonel

Acting Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5.

Original passed to CA Section 26/1/45

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CONFIDENTIAL
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AF532

320

AG 311.5/434 M&D

HEADQUARTERS
MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 512

3620

COS

7261
JC/at

SUBJECT: Downgrading of Classified Documents
TO : All Concerned

31 December 1944
JAN - 7 1945

1. Under the provisions of paragraph 15, AR 380-5, 15 March 1944, the documents listed in inclosure number 1 are downgraded as indicated therein.
2. Necessary action will be taken by those concerned to regrade any and all listed documents that may be in their custody.
3. The documents listed in the inclosure do not constitute the final list of all documents to be downgraded by this headquarters. Other lists will be published at regular intervals. Requests for the downgrading of specific documents of this headquarters should be addressed to this headquarters, attention of Security Control Officer.

By command of Lieutenant General McNABBY:

1 Incl
List of Documents

DISTRIBUTION:
"A" & "B"



[Signature]
Colonel, AGD,
Acting Adjutant General.

3174

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CONFIDENTIAL

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323

HEADQUARTERS
MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 512

3620

COS

7261

JC/at

AG 311.5/434 M&D

31 December 1944

JAN - 7 1945

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By command of Lieutenant General McNABNEY:



1 Incl
List of Documents

[Signature]
Colonel, AGD,
Acting Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION:
"1" & "B"

5174

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONFIDENTIAL

Date	Ref No	File No	Subject	New Classi- fication
2 Apr 1944	T-97	210.3/483 A-0	1st ind to Force 163 ltr, 27 March 1944, "Transportation Personnel"	Confidential
10 Apr	T-237	400.703/493D-0	Report of Theater of Operations Section, 'D Manpower Board	Secret
20 Apr	T-362	400.34-2 D-0	Supplies & Equipment for 2672d Bq Co, Allied Liaison Service (Prov)	Confidential
22 Apr	T-382	400.703/493D-0	1st ind to 'D Manpower Board ltr, "Report of Theater of Operation Section 'D Manpower Board", 10 Apr	Secret
6 May	T-503	420/527 Q4-0	Protective Clothing for French Army	Confidential
15 May	T-574	461.92/312 Ord-0	Status of DUKWS in Mediterranean Theater of Operations	Secret
19 May	T-604	319.22 G-0	Combined Operations Headquarter Bulletins	Confidential
27 May	T-677	370.28/566 Engr-0	Pneumatic Water Targets	Confidential
1 Jun	T-691	322/413 G-0	Attachment of Personnel from 31st AAA Brigade to Force 255	Confidential
5 Jun	T-732 T-754	400/565 D-0	Equipment Being Taken Overseas by Brazilian Expeditionary Force	Confidential
8 Jun	B-21	319.1/418 A-0	J.D.M.B. Report on Staff & Staff Organizations, SATODSA	Secret
8 Jun	B-24	400/565 D-0	1st ind to Hq, ASF, Wash, ltr, SPILLD 091.711 (31 May 44), "First Contingent, Brazilian Expeditionary Force"	Confidential
9 Jun	B-31	370.5/344 AA&CD-0	Preparation for Overseas Movement of 113th AAA Gun Bn	Confidential
10 Jun	B-38	412.41-2 Eng-0	Tower Equipment for Anvil	Confidential
11 Jun	B-47	470.6-1 CVS-0	2d ind to Force 163 ltr, 21 May 1944, "Smoke Munitions for Navy, Operation Anvil"	Secret
19 Jun	B-173	212/460 JHC-0	US Advisors in Brazil to Accompany Brazilian Units	Confidential

CONFIDENTIAL

Date	Ref No	File No	Subject	Sec Classi- fication	
19 Jun 1944	B-181	400.34-1 D-0	Equipment for Naval Shore Fire Control Parties (Spec)	Confidential	N/R
20 Jun	B-200	400/565 D-0	Brazilian Expeditionary Force	Confidential	N/R
22 Jun	B-231	370.5-5 Sig-0	Movement of 1st Type C Platoon, Signal Photo Mail Company	Confidential	N/R
25 Jun	B-307	400-1 (French) D-0	1st ind to SOS NATOSUSA ltr, "Equipping French Units for Operation Anvil", 19 June 1944	Secret	N/R
26 Jun	B-328	451.94-1 D-0	1st ind to Force 163 ltr, 451-94- D, "Allocation of DUKES", 12 June 1944	Confidential	N/R
25 Jun	B-333	400-2 (AMGOT) D-0	Civil Supply Requisition	Confidential	N/R
27 Jun	B-346	400.34-2 D-0	1st ind to Force 163 ltr, 413. 44-2, "Equipment of Air Corps Units, Operation Anvil", 17 June 1944	Confidential	N/R
27 Jun	B-359	400.34-1 Eng-0	1st ind to Force 163 ltr, 22 June 1944, "Equipment in excess of T/C"	Confidential	N/R
29 Jun	B-373	400/565 D-0	1st ind to TAG, WD, ltr, 400 (21 Jun 44) OB-3-SIDOL, 21 June 1944, "Supply of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force in North African Theater of Operations"	Confidential	N/R
29 Jun	B-386	470.6-2 D-0	1st ind to Force 163 ltr, 470.6- C, "Request for Smoke Generators for navy use in Operation Anvil"	Confidential	N/R
30 Jun	B-401	210.1-1 A-0	Assignment of Grades for Combat Appointments.	Confidential	N/R
1 Jul	B-430	370-3 QM-0	Administrative Policies for Operation Anvil	Confidential	N/R
5 Jul	B-519	339.22 Q-0	Foreign Requirements	Confidential	N/R
9 Jul	B-588	422.3 QM-0	Protective Clothing	Confidential	N/R
11 Jan	B-2062	322-1 (Replacement) A-0	Replacement Situation, North African Theater, as of 1 Jan 1944	Confidential	N/R

CONFIDENTIALCONFIDENTIAL

Date	Ref No	File No	Subject	New Classi- fication	
20 Jan 1944	B-82	400-4	Sig-O Special Project S 11-44 (Wire)-- Operation "Anvil"	Confidential	NIR
3 Feb	B-311	463.7-6	Pet-O Cased Petroleum Products	Confidential	NIR
29 Feb	B-843	400.34-3	D-O Temporary Retention of Special Type AA Vehicles	Confidential	NIR
11 Mar	B-1152	453-2	D-O Railway Supplies, Operation Anvil	Confidential	NIR
17 Mar	B-1279	400.34-1	D-O Equipment for Operation of Mobile Unit (Operation Anvil)	Confidential	NIR
4 Apr	B-1708	400.34-1	D-O Equipment for Special AFHQ Units for Operation "Anvil"	Secret	NIR
6 Apr	B-1743	400-3 (ANCOOT) D-O	Requisitions for Civil Supplies	Confidential	NIR
12 Apr	B-1879	370.5-5	C-O Movement of GM Truck Units	Confidential	NIR
14 May	B-2550	370.5-5	C-O Threat of Amphibious Operation	Confidential	NIR
14 May	B-2551	370-3	D-O Surplus Service Units	Confidential	NIR
23 May	B-2723	400-1 (French) JRG-O	Training Films for French Units	Restricted	NIR
29 May	B-3832	412.41-2	Eng-O Power Equipment for Anvil	Confidential	NIR
31 May	B-3878	400-5	D-O Supply Status, Operation Anvil	Confidential	NIR

5172

CONFIDENTIAL**CONFIDENTIAL**

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

MTOUSA

Suspense AG 311.5/434Date 31 DEC 1944

DIST

TO	TO
Chief Commissioner ✓	Political Section ✓
Chief of Staff ✓	Establishment Section ✓
Liaison Div.	Executive Officer (A)
Message Centre	Executive Officer (B)
Civil Affairs Section ✓	G-1 (A)
DP & Rep.	G-1 (A) Civilian Emp.
Local Govt.	G-1 (B)
Patrols Branch	G-2 (A)
Public Safety	G-2 (B)
Security Division	267th Regt. ✓
Public Health	H.S. Comm.
Local	Adjutant ✓
Education	Army
Monuments & Fine Arts	Land Forces (1944) ✓
Economic Section ✓	Air
Requisition Division	Communications
Agriculture	Civil Censorship Group
Commerce	R.M.D. & E.M.E.
Finance	Public Relations Branch
Property Control Div.	Information Division ✓
Food	Archives
Industry	I.C.C.R.
Mining Division	
Labor	
Public Works & Utilities	
Shipping	
Transportation	

Signature

Remarks & Recommendation

Information

Approval/Disposal

Appropriate Action

Investigation & Report

Dispatch

5171

Remarks

SECRET

34

SUBJECT: The Grading and Handling of Classified Material.

Office Memorandum No.

INTRODUCTION

1. As it appears that the correct grading and handling of material having a security classification are not fully understood the following notes are set down for compliance by all concerned at this HQ.

2. Classification.

The over classification of documents in this HQ is prevalent. By classifying documents and ~~files~~ correctly and ~~down~~ grading them as early as possible will ^{considerably} reduce the danger of a breach of security and ^{facilitate} handling.

The following classification definitions and examples will be of assistance:-

A. TOP SECRET. →

1. Definition: Certain secret documents, information, or material of the security aspect of which is paramount and whose unauthorized disclosure would cause exceptionally grave damage to the nation.

Allies

Examples:

- (i) Plans or particulars of future major or special operations.
- (ii) Particulars of important dispositions or impending movements of forces or convoys in connection with (i) above.
- (iii) Very important political documents dealing with such matters as negotiations for alliances and the like.

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By classifying documents and ~~files~~ correctly and ~~down~~ grading them as early as possible will ⁱⁿ reduce ^{considerably} the danger of a breach of security and facilitate handling.

The following classification definitions and examples will be of assistance:-

A. THE SECRET →

3. Definition: Certain secret documents, information, or material of the security aspect of which is paramount, and whose unauthorized disclosure would cause exceptionally grave damage to the nation. ^{Allied}

Examples:

- (1) Plans or particulars of future major or special operations.
- (11) Particulars of important dispositions or movements of forces or convoys in connection with (1) above.
- (111) Very important political documents dealing with such matters as negotiations for alliances and the like.
- (1v) Information of the methods used or success obtained by Intelligence Services and Counter-Intelligence Services or which would impair secret agents.

→ (b) ↗
B. SPECIAL →

Definition: Documents, information, or material the unauthorized disclosure of which would endanger national security, cause serious injury to the interests or prestige of the nation, or any governmental activity thereof or would be of great advantage to a foreign nation. ^{Allied}

Examples:

- (1) Particulars of operations in progress.

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- (iii) Plans or particulars of operations not included under TCM SECRET.
- (iii) Certain reports of operations containing information of vital interest to the enemy.
- (iv) Adverse reports on general morale affecting major operations.
- (v) Certain development projects.

2. CONFIDENTIAL.

Definition: Documents, information or ~~materials~~ ^{related} the unauthorized disclosure of which, while not endangering the ~~national~~ ^{allied} security, would be prejudicial to the interests or prestige of the ~~nation~~ ^{allies}, any governmental activity, or an individual, or would cause administrative embarrassment or difficulty or be of advantage to a foreign nation.

Exemptions

- (i) Matters, investigations, and documents of a personal and disciplinary nature, the knowledge of which it is desirable to safeguard for administrative reasons.
- (ii) Routine intelligence reports.
- (iii) Unit movement of non-operational significance in areas within or adjacent to operational theaters.

3169

5. Handling of TOP SECRET documents and files.

- (a) TOP SECRET files will be kept in the custody of an officer of equivalent rank ~~to that of the officer who is normally responsible to the TOP SECRET file.~~ The only officers who shall be informed of TOP SECRET matters are those to whom work the knowledge is essential and they should only be informed of as much as

would be prejudicial to the interests of ^{allied} prestige of the nation, any governmental activity, or an individual, or would cause administrative embarrassment or difficulty or be of advantage to a foreign nation.

Examples:

- (i) Matters, investigations, and documents of a personal and disciplinary nature, the knowledge of which it is desirable to safeguard for administrative reasons.
- (ii) Routine intelligence reports.
- (iii) Unit movement or non-operational significance in areas within or adjacent to operational theaters.

2169

3. Handling of TOP SECRET documents and files.

(a) TOP SECRET files will be kept in the custody of an officer of rank not lower than ~~lieut. colonel~~ ^{officers of rank above} ~~not normally have access to any TOP SECRET files.~~ The only officers who shall be informed of TOP SECRET matters are those to whose work the knowledge is essential and they should only be informed of so much as may affect their work.

(b) Clerks, excluding Confidential Clerks ^{Sub (c)} (see para 4) ~~(b)~~ ^(c) ~~(b)~~

will not handle TOP SECRET papers. Incoming letters will be registered by the officer responsible for custody of the file in a special register kept by him for that purpose.

(c) TOP SECRET matter will be typed only by a special confidential clerk who will, while so engaged, not work in a room in which are persons not entitled to see TOP SECRET papers.

(d) The responsible officer will satisfy himself that all

carbon copies (including aforesaid) are received by him and properly disposed of. Shorthand notes (which should be taken in a loose leafbook) will be destroyed as soon as the typewritten is passed. New carbon papers should not be used out of of necessity they have to be used they will be destroyed. Stencil copies will be run off under supervision of the confidential clerk and all copies (including aforesaid) collected and properly disposed of. The stencil will be destroyed or locked up by the officer responsible. The clerk typing the letter will also prepare the inner envelope which will be addressed, marked and numbered in accordance with para 4 of office memo No 13.

(e) The responsible officer will place all TOP SECRET material in an envelope and after sealing, it will be registered out by him.

(f) A receipt will be obtained from the addressee or message centre as may be appropriate. The register for TOP SECRET material will contain a space which will be dated when the acknowledgment of the addressee is received.

(g) Where more than one copy is made, each copy will be consecutively numbered and a separate line in the register will show the disposal of each copy. Receipts will be filed in the same order as they appear in the register; as vouchers for the register they will not be filed on the TOP SECRET file.

4. Grading and Loss Grades of Documents and Files.

(a) Grading. A file will be graded according to the most highly classified document on that file. Individual letters or other documents

in the case of TOP SECRET material, the following will govern: When a message has been classified and sent as TOP SECRET, any paraphrase of its contents or anything else as well as all subsequent messages relating to any message to make a TOP SECRET message by subject or serial number must be in the same classification.

be addressed, sorted and numbered in accordance with para 4 of Section here

no 13.

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(g) Where more than one copy is made, each copy will be consecutively numbered and a separate line in the register will show the disposal of each copy. Receipts will be filed in the same order as they appear in the register; as vouchers for the register they will not be filed on the TOP SECRET file.

4. Grading and Down Grading of Documents and Files.

(a) Grading. A file will be graded according to the most highly classified document on that file. Individual letters or other documents will be graded according to their own content and not in accordance with their relation to any other document or file. Extracts or quotations from classified documents in themselves contain nothing to entitle them to receive the same classification will be issued in a lower category.

(b) Down Grading. When a document or file is down graded a note of the new classification allotted to it will be made on the document or file.

This note will be signed and dated by the officer or official authorising such down grading, who will in all cases where practicable be the officer originally responsible for the classification.

in the case of Top Secret material, the following message has been classified and sent as Top Secret, and is being sent as well as all subsequent messages, by the following message centre:

31
2-5. General.

(a) It is emphasized that it is a serious breach of security for anyone other than an allied officer, or allied civilian of appropriate rank, to have access to or to handle any classified material.

(b) Attention is drawn to Office Memoranda, No 13 dated 23 July 44, "Official Mail Services" and No 16 dated 25 August 44, "Handling of Classified Documents by Civilians".

(c) Nothing in this memorandum supersedes the official pamphlet issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff entitled "Classification and Handling of Protected Documents 1941."

"Official Mail Services" and 10 16 dated 23 August 44, "Handling of
Classified Documents by Civilians".

(b) Nothing in this Memorandum supersedes the official pamphlet
issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff entitled "Classification and
Handling of Protected Documents 1944."

5168 -
2016

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

Ref 4/4.3/CA

28 Dec 44

SUBJECT : Instructions for the Handling of Top Secret Documents.

TO : All CA Sub-Commissions.

- 1 Top Secret files will be kept in the custody of an officer of rank not lower than Lt Col. Officers of rank lower than Lt Col will not normally have access to any Top Secret files. The only officers who shall be informed of Top Secret matters are those to whose work the knowledge is essential and they should only be informed of so much as may affect their work.
- 2 The file itself will be graded according to the most highly classified document. But letters or other documents will be graded according to their own content and not in accordance with their relation to any other document or file. Extracts or quotations from Top Secret documents which in themselves contain nothing to entitle them to receive the same classification will be issued in a lower category.
- 3 Clerks including Chief Clerks will not handle Top Secret papers. Incoming letters will ~~either~~ be registered by the officer responsible for custody of the file in a special register kept by him for that purpose.
- 4 Top Secret matter will be typed only by a special confidential clerk who will while so engaged not work in a room in which are persons not entitled to see Top Secret papers. The responsible officer will satisfy himself that all carbon copies (including spoils) are received by him and properly disposed of. Short-hand notes (which should be taken in a loose leafbook) will be destroyed as soon as the typescript is passed. New Carbon papers should not be used but if of necessity have to be used they will be destroyed. Stencil copies will be run off under supervision of the confidential typist and all copies (including spoils) collected and properly disposed of. The stencil will be destroyed or locked up by the officer responsible. The Clerk typing the letter will also prepare the inner envelope which will be addressed ~~marked and numbered~~ ^{marked and numbered in accordance with para 4 of Office Memo 43} in accordance with para 4 of Office Memo 43 will be registered out by him.
- 5 The responsible officer will place the top secret letter in the prepared envelope and after sealing the same the letter marked and numbered in accordance with para 4 of Office Memo 43 will be registered out by him.
- 6 A receipt will be obtained from the addressee or message centre as may be appropriate. The register for secret documents will contain a space which will be dated when the addressee's acknowledgment of the addressee is received.
- 7 Where more than one copy is made, each copy will be consecutively numbered and a separate line in the register will show the disposal of each copy.

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- 5 The responsible officer will place the top secret letter in the prepared envelope and after sealing the same the letter marked and numbered in accordance with para 4 of Office Memo 13 will be registered out by him.
- 6 A receipt will be obtained from the addressee or message centre as may be appropriate. The register for secret documents will contain a space which will be dated when the addressee acknowledges the addressee is received.
- 7 Where more than one copy is made, each copy will be consecutively numbered and a separate line in the register will show the disposal of each copy. Receipts will be filed in the same order as they appear in the register; as vouchers for the Register they will not be filed on the Top Secret file.
- 8 This instruction is issued as a matter of convenience, it does not supersede the official pamphlet issued by the combined Chiefs of Staff entitled "Classification and Handling of Protected Documents 1944" with which all officers should be familiar and to which they are referred as the authority on this subject and ignorance of which will not be accepted as an excuse for failure to carry out the instructions therein contained.

R.R. CRIPPS Col.,
CSO CA Section

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1 272

WAR DEPARTMENT
The Adjutant General's Office
Washington 25, D. C.

AP376

(30)

AG 350.05 (30 Nov 44)OB-S-S-H

PH/er 2B-939 Pentagon

4 December 1944

28 DEC 1944

SUBJECT: Disclosure of Technical Information to Foreign Governments.

TO : * * * * *
The Commanding Generals, Theaters of Operations.
* * * * *

COM
Hb
(272-276)

Inclosed for your information and guidance is a copy of Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum of Policy No 5, 28 November 1944, subject: Basic Policy Governing the Disclosure of Technical Information to Foreign Governments.

By order of the Secretary of War:

s/ Edward F. Witsell
t/ EDWARD F. WITSELL,
Brigadier General,
Acting The Adjutant General.

1 Incl
As listed above.

DISTRIBUTION:

"X" plus
2 - Ea Corps
2 - Ea Division

Reproduced, Hq MTQUSA, 16 December 1944.

R.H.F.
R. H. F.

AC 21-5r

EST SEC
ELON SEC
LA SEC
POLITICAL SEC

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CONFIDENTIAL

J.C.S. Policy Memo 5
28 November 1944

(29)

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

MEMORANDUM OF POLICY NO. 5

BASIC POLICY GOVERNING THE DISCLOSURE OF TECHNICAL
INFORMATION TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS

References: a. J.C.S. 927/2
b. J.C.S. 527/2
c. C.C.S. 432/1
d. C.C.S. 671

Note by the Secretaries

1. By informal action the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 27 November 1944 approved in J.C.S. 927/2 the policy circulated in Enclosure "A" hereto. This supplements the policy on release of equipment and disclosure of technical information to the U.S.S.R. in J.C.S. 527/2 which the Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff, acting for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, approved on 23 December 1943 and which is attached as Enclosure "B".

2. Policies on disclosure of information have also been approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the specific subjects of "Disclosure of Military Information to the Chinese" (C.C.S. 432/1) and "Policy on Release of Radar Equipment and Information" (C.C.S. 671).

A. J. McFARLAND

E. D. GRAVES, JR.,

Joint Secretariat.

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ENCLOSURE "A"

1

**BASIC PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE DISCLOSURE OF TECHNICAL
INFORMATION TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS**

1. Principles. The following principles shall apply in the disclosure of technical information to foreign governments:

- a. The military security of the United States shall be safeguarded.
- b. Classified technical information shall be disclosed only when such information can be effectively used by the recipient nation in the prosecution of the present war.
- c. Technical information should be disclosed to foreign governments within the limitations above as is necessary for the prosecution of the present war, and especially as may be necessary in operational use.

2. Definition of Technical Information. "Technical Information" shall be deemed to include information on weapons and equipment, including instructions on maintenance and operation and any descriptive matter on components. It further includes means of manufacture, techniques and processes of weapons and equipment, together with information pertaining to the various sciences relating to weapons and equipment and to direct and indirect measures which may be employed in warfare. Information of a strategic or tactical nature ("military information") is specifically excluded from the meaning of this term.

3. Definition of Disclosure. "Disclosure of Technical Information" shall be deemed to include the furnishing of full or partial information and descriptions on weapons and equipment. The term "disclosure" includes attendance at, liaison with, or visits to demonstrations, maneuvers, schools, laboratories, proving grounds, works, yards, plants, factories, arsenals or any other like facility, or means of imparting information. All foreign nationals as individuals are subject to the restrictions of disclosure as applied to their governments.

4. When Item is "Restricted". When an item of technical information is classified as "Restricted", the War and Navy Departments should determine, within the limitations established by Joint Chiefs of Staff or Combined Chiefs of Staff decisions, what information should be released.

5. When Item is "Confidential" or Higher. When an item of technical information is classified as "Confidential" or higher, the Joint Intelligence Committee shall be the agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to determine, within the limitations established by Joint Chiefs of Staff and Combined Chiefs of Staff decisions, what information should be released.

6. Classification of Highest Component. The governing classification of a unit involving more than one component should be that of the most highly classified component which is necessary for the employment of the weapon or equipment. This should not change the security classification of other components of lower classification. Authorization for the disclosure of technical information as to a whole unit, such as a ship, tank, plane, or vehicle, should not in itself authorize the disclosure of auxiliary items bearing higher classifications.

5164

Enclosure "A"

CONFIDENTIAL

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7. Reciprocal Security. Disclosure of technical information should in all cases be contingent upon the agreement of the recipient nation to effect the same security of the information as is effected by the United States.

8. No Commitment as to Supply. Disclosure of technical information does not imply that the actual equipment and materiel is available to the recipient of the technical information in supply quantities. Disclosure merely implies that there is no objection from a security point of view to the release of the information.

9. Information Not Releasable. Except by specific authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, technical information involving research and development projects, the applications of which are incapable of being introduced in the present war, shall not be released. Information specifically restricted by an agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including cryptographic devices, is not to be released.

10. Operational Necessity Within a Theater. When operational necessity within a theater requires the immediate disclosure of technical information classified as "Confidential" or higher, the theater commander of U.S. forces may at his discretion make such disclosure. Whenever such disclosure is made it shall be immediately reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

11. Release for Political or Economic Purposes. The necessity of the release of certain items of technical information for political or economic purposes to forward the war effort is recognized. Such releases will be confined to items classified not higher than "Restricted", decision being made in each case by the cognizant armed service (War or Navy Department). When necessity is believed to exist for the disclosure of items classified higher than "Restricted", for political or economic purposes, the question shall be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

12. Items Under Consideration for Lend-Lease. Items under consideration for lend-lease which involve technical information shall be cleared in accordance with the procedure described in preceding paragraphs.

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ENCLOSURE "B"

27

DISCLOSURE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION TO THE U.S.S.R.

Subject to reciprocity on the part of the U.S.S.R., the following policies shall serve as a general guide in the preparation and revision of lists of items of equipment, devices, and weapons, and of manufacturing processes and designs regarding which technical information may be disclosed to the U.S.S.R. to aid in the prosecution of the common war.

a. Technical information which may be released. The U.S.S.R. may be furnished with information falling within the categories listed below:

- (1) Technical information which is unclassified or carrying a classification equivalent to U.S. "Restricted".
- (2) Technical information concerning equipment, weapons, devices, manufacturing processes or designs intended for use by or from the U.S.S.R. which are in production, field test or are standard authorized equipment.
- (3) Technical information pertaining to the improvement and maintenance of weapons, equipment, and devices which are already in use by the U.S.S.R.

b. Technical information which may not be released -- The U.S.S.R. will not be furnished with technical information regarding items of equipment, devices, weapons, projects, processes or designs which fall in the following categories:

- (1) Items in the experimental, developmental, or laboratory stage.
- (2) Items in fields of scientific research which have not yet reached the stage at which their applicability to specific military or naval uses can yet be reasonably determined.
- (3) Items and processes the disclosure of which may be specifically restricted by an established agency of either the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Enclosure "B"

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
ECONOMIC SECTION

CWA/hs

(26)
23/12
PA

Ref. 1.10/ES

22 Dec 1944

SUBJECT: Security Regulations.

25
23 DEC 1944

TO : Chief of Staff.

1. Ref. your 3620/COS dated 20 December 1944.

2. The mishandling of the document in question has been investigated and found to be due to the Chief Clerk of the Sub-Commission concerned being called away at the moment he was about to place it in an envelope. In his absence it was picked up in error by another clerk and sent to the message center.

3. Security regulations have again been impressed upon the staff in question.

L. D. Densmore
L. D. DENSMORE
Colonel, F.A.
Acting Vice President
Economic Section

PA

5162

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

~~SECRET~~

Tel: 289

20 December 1944.

Ref: 3620/003

SUBJECT: Security Regulations.

TO : Economic Section.

1. Attached copy this office signal to AFHQ No. 6214 dated 14 Dec 44, being Weekly Sitrep No. 17 classified ~~SECRET~~, which was copied to you for info, was intercepted in the Message Centre this afternoon, not enclosed under cover of an envelope.
2. Please investigate this violation of Security Instructions and submit report to this office not later than 22 Dec 44.

see 26
✓ 13/12
Noted
Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.
2/12

785017

3620/038

15 Dec 44

SUBJECT: Security situation in Rome

TO: AFHQ G-5

CONFIDENTIAL

1. Your OOO, 1 of 10 Nov asked for comments on GHI/SEC/3000 of 17 Nov from AOS G-2 to AOS G-3. The document is obviously based on the G-2 report of MAAC covering the month of October which, on the whole gives a fairly sound overall picture of the conditions in Rome. Although this Commission does not agree with all the views expressed therein, it is recognized that the intention of the Memorandum is to initiate measures to ameliorate matters and any action which will assist in improving the position is welcome. The Memorandum however expressed opinions far stronger than anything contained in the report and this Commission is not in agreement with the conclusions reached. It is quite astounding that it should have been submitted to SACRED's Political meeting without consultation with this Commission and the Public Safety Sub-Commission who have considerable knowledge about Civil Security in Rome and the rest of Italy.

2. First it is desired to contrast a few phrases taken from the MAAC report with the analogous phrases in the G-2 Memorandum.

Memorandum

- a) It is considered that there may be incidents in Rome of an even more serious nature than that of Palermo.
- b) It is believed that public utilities employees will strike and that crowds will demonstrate and riot.
- c) There are three active organization which.....are more extremist than even the Rus-sians may desire.
- d) These groups vary in size but each is believed to be around 4000 or possibly more. They are well armed with weapons ammunition and sabotage material. The members are well trained, very active and believe strongly

Report

It is felt to be not unlikely that incidents of varying degrees of seriousness may before long occur.

There have been threats of loose strikes by employees of the public utilities and a feeling of tension and exasperation is widespread. No parallel.

Inconsistent with statements in the report.

(23)

in the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. So far they have not advocated violence but are leaning that way.

- e) Peasants are being urged openly to seize land of large landowners. To some extent this is tacitly approved by the Government.

A number of cases occurred of forcible occupation by peasants of uncultivated land belonging to large landowners. This action is almost certainly communist inspired and has to some extent been legitimized by a Government instruction.

- f) Civilian morale is spiralling down at an increasing rate.
g) There is some decrease in pro- allied sentiments.

There is little change in the downward trend of civilian morale.
No parallel.

3 The drafter in G-2 perhaps had a more vivid imagination than HAD. To use the words "adding fuel to the flame of discontent" is a gross abuse of metaphors in describing tempers in Rome in a wet winter.

- a) Some of the criticisms are made without sufficient knowledge of the administrative or economic position (which are matters not within the province of G-2 HAD) he may be competent to say that the orders restricting the movement of food are "ineffective" but not that they are "inept".
b) With regard to the entry on to uncultivated land, the Italian Government has passed a decree authorizing the occupation of uncultivated lands for the purpose of cultivating the same and prescribes the method of doing so and as to the rights of the landlords. Far legislation of this nature has also been passed in England, where not only can uncultivated lands be taken, but a farmer actually cultivating his land can be dispossessed entirely, if it can be shown that he is farming in an uneconomic or unhusbandlike manner. It is not appropriate to comment on incidents related to this policy as if they were entirely unauthorized. Incidentally I know of no such incursion in the city of Rome where land is mostly vegetable plots or built over.
c) These points are not mentioned in any cavilling spirit but as examples merely to show the necessity of distinguishing between comment which the reporting officer is qualified to make and that which is outside his function and as to which he has not the inside knowledge or the technical experience to justify his criticisms.

4 It is agreed that the political and morale position is not satisfactory and that corrective action is desirable. Before this can usefully be discussed, there has to be determined first what is wrong and secondly its cause. One can then consider steps to be taken to remove the cause and decide what other action to improve the position may be desirable.

5 This particular question on examination can be divided immediately into two entirely distinct but not entirely unrelated problems

- a) the state of civil morale;
b) the discipline, efficiency and reliability of the office.

5153

There are several factors which affect civil morale

- a) Political manoeuvre and intrigue is an inevitable consequence of the position after 20 years of fascism. No political parties were permitted; on the removal of the restrictions there is inevitably a struggle for position among those who have ideas as to how Italy should be governed. A condition of stability will take time to evolve naturally; meanwhile the mixture is to some extent explosive. At the same time it should be noted that a weak government has just been replaced by, we hope, a stronger government and that the interregnum of 12 days between the two was marked in Rome not by a bloody revolution nor coups d'etat nor disturbances but by the most exasperating apathy on the part of the Romans.
- b) Propaganda. The object is primarily political, a part of the struggle for position and secondarily and this is elementary psychology, to flatter the damaged self-esteem of the Italian people, which psychologically is commonly achieved by adverse criticism of others; the more respected the criticised, the better the psychological need is served. This propaganda is not confined to the truth, to honest conviction, the good of the country or even false innuendo. It does not boggle at the deliberate lie nor does it hesitate to inflame opinion or incite to opposition. It is in fact delightfully Latin. The promised freedom of the press makes the writer difficult to deal with. But what is freedom of the press? It is also difficult to draw the line between fair and unfair comment especially where a different nationality with different ethical and political standards is concerned. Possibly short periods of suspension may be a remedy especially for the deliberate untruth. If so it will have to be decided whether it is not better for the Allies to deal with this on military grounds rather than to launch the Italian Govt on control of the press.
- c) The depression of devastation and defeat emphasized by insufficient food, heat, light, water, clothes, transport, overcrowded or inadequate shelter and unemployment are without any doubt whatever, the biggest factors in the morale situation. The Italian people had hoped that the Allies would bring with them peace, freedom and if not plenty at least a sufficiency; they have possibly counted on more than they were promised, they are cold, hungry, idle, they are disillusioned; according to their temperament, they sink to apathy or reach after a new ideology which promises them a better world. The effect of this natural reaction has been very greatly magnified by the fact that specific promises have been made and broken, the trusted saviour cannot be trusted.

The principal elements as to the morale and effectiveness of the police are fourfold:

- a) Probably of first importance is the esteem in which they hold themselves; a man with a good conceit of himself and his service has the confidence to do what he should; it does not occur to him to wonder what others may think of him. When he is spurned, disarmed, flouted or his post forced by Allied forces it does far more than discredit him in the eyes of the people. It destroys his self confidence. Mixed patrols of US AR and MP have greatly helped to restore this spirit. Ceremonial Parades such as that projected to be held by Field Marshal Alexander are valuable.

Wherever the CC RR have been called upon to help at the front, they have been excellent. It has been said that in the early days in Sicily AMBT could not have functioned but for the CC RR. Police who have shown initiative in dealing with trouble should receive prompt recognition, (especially if attacked in the press though their action has not been unreasonable) not as recently occurred be suspended pending enquiry. The best medicine to improve morale is recognition of good work and employment on work which is definitely of service; it does not matter if it is trying; it is when a man feels he is of use and doing something worth while which others cannot do as well that his opinion of himself goes up.

- b) The next most powerful factor is the economic one, food, heat, clothing, transport. The Force cannot be efficient unless it has the necessities of life and movement, this needs no argument. Nor can it be incorruptible if its dependants are starving.
- c) The third factor is public opinion. If the Allies do not treat the CC RR with respect they cannot expect the people to do so. From the deliberate propaganda in the press it would appear that certain parties do not desire a strong police. So far as the public is concerned, the police has also to live down some of its recent past, the public associates it with the enforcement of fascism. If it does its duty it is called fascist or monarchist. If it does not, it is incompetent, corrupt and venal. In any case it generally gets a bad word from U.S. The public has no concept of the police as a guardian of public rights and of good order.
- d) The last factor is the trouble brought by defeat, the change of sides, part fighting on one side, part on the other, disorganization by dispersal, by flight, by desertion. The situation adds its quota; until this last is settled there is still no assurance of stability. It is no use barking the effect of this disorganization or any feeling that the right minded are with us and only the wrong minded have fled. It is most demoralizing to have once organization and once beliefs shattered. It takes time to build up again.

- 8 No attempt has been made to go at all deeply into the factors which have to be considered but only to define the problem and to indicate the nature of the matters which have to be dealt with. It is submitted that the problem can not be usefully discussed without the advice of officers who have not only intimate knowledge of the CC RR and the problems which they face but also considerable police experience and it is strongly recommended that before Ge2 produce a memorandum affecting the public order in any place in Italy that they consult the authority who should have the technical and comprehensive knowledge thereof.

M. S. LUSH

Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

File

(20)

Tel: 239

13 December 1944.

Ref: 3620/003.

SUBJECT: Security Regulations.

TO : Civil Affairs Section.

1. At 1155 hrs today, 13 Dec 44, TOP SECRET file 2606/003 subject "Powers and Rights in Italian Government Territory" was returned to this office by hand of an Italian civilian employee of Public Safety Sub-Commission. The file was not even enclosed in an envelope.
2. This is a most serious violation of security regulations and I direct that you instruct Public Safety Sub-Commission to overhaul their office organization so that a repetition will not be possible.

Disciplinary action will be taken against the person responsible

Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

5150

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH

Unit No. 13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

To: PWB Rome - attention Mr. Titchener
PWB, AFHQ - attention Mr. Barnes and Mr. Norton
British Resident Minister
U.S. Political Advisor
Political Commission, AS - attention Mr. Hopkins
From: Mr. Bedford
Date: 18th November 1944

B.V. Lush
Has been seen
the annex memo
by few army?

1. I attach copy of a memo which has been received from A.C. of G., G-3, AFHQ.
2. I consider that the information presented and the conclusions drawn are fully justified by the information at our disposal.
3. In my opinion the situation, as outlined in the memorandum, is grave, and PWB, along with other Allied organizations should seriously consider any recommendation for corrective action which may be considered necessary.
4. It is not within the province of the Intelligence Section of PWB to take positive action in this field, but in the view of the undersigned, preventive action can only be based on a positive encouragement of those forces of order in the communes and provinces which are attempting, against great discouragement, to ~~and~~ carry out the reconstruction of Italy.
5. This section has been endeavouring to obtain information about local initiative in the cause of reconstruction, and will endeavour to go on obtaining such information. But information is not sufficient, and it is suggested that the widest possible encouragement be given by PWB to all local initiative towards reconstruction, irrespective of what political elements are favouring the particular project of reconstruction.
6. All instances of locally sponsored reconstruction which are brought to the notice of PWB will be fully reported upon, and recommendations will be made as to the suitable propaganda treatment of individual instances. It is recommended that the fullest publicity be given to all instances of reconstruction sponsored by local initiative irrespective of the political forces which may be behind it.

C. N. Bedford
Chief of Intelligence
PWB, ITALY.

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~~SECRET~~

SECRET

COPT.

GBI/SEC/3000

17th November 1944

Memorandum for: A.G. of S., G-2.

SUBJECT: Security situation in Rome.

1. It is believed that the security situation in Rome is serious enough to be brought to the attention of the proper authorities so that corrective measures may be taken.
2. It should be understood that any activities detrimental to the military efforts are not caused by anti-Allied sentiments. The underlying causes are lack of food, clothing and heat. These are aggravated by a weak government and a venal police force. They are furthered by a lack of political and social unity in the population as a whole. Inaccurate and biased newspapers only add fuel to the flame of discontent.
3. It is considered that there may be incidents in Rome of an even more serious nature than that of Palermo. It is believed that public utilities employees will strike and that crowds will demonstrate and riot. It is doubtful that the police will be able to handle the situation as they form an ineffective force due to poor pay, lack of ability, discontent, reputation and other causes.
4. There are three active organizations which, although communist inspired, are much more extremist than even the Russians may desire. They constitute a potential danger. They are (1) Communist Youth Group, (2) Movimento Comunista d'Italia, and (3) Movimento Partigiano. These groups vary in size but each is believed to be around 4000 or possibly more. They are well armed with weapons, ammunition and sabotage material secured either from the Allies prior to the fall of Rome, from the Axis area, or from German stocks. The members are well trained, very active and believe strongly in the theory of "The Dictatorship of the Proletariat". So far they have not advocated violence but are leaning that way.
5. Leftist propaganda is becoming more and more outspoken in its criticism of the Allies, and the Benoni Government. Conditions in Italy are contrasted to those in Bulgaria and Roumania, to Russia's benefit.
6. Peasants are being urged openly to seize the land of large landowners. To some extent this is tacitly approved by the Government.
7. There are cases of armed robbery of individuals, 'hi-jacking' of Allied military trucks, and thefts from Allied supply dumps. These acts are committed by hands of Allied deserters, both American and British, by Italian deserters, and by civilians.
8. Civilian morale is spiralling down at an increasing rate. This is due to the lack of essentials for the coming winter, and the extremely high cost of goods on the black market. There is some decrease in pro-Allied sentiments. This is caused

~~SECRET~~

2.

by communist propaganda. Mr. Eden's latest speech regarding Italian colonies, and the Allies failure to fulfill FWB promises of adequate food.

9. It is not within the province of this Section to make recommendations for ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ corrective action but it is believed that the situation is serious enough to be brought to the attention of G-3, G-4, G-5 and FWB for the purpose of considering precautionary steps and plans.

Sgd. T.S. AIRBY
Major General, G.S.,
A.C. of S., G-2.

Copies to: G-4
G-5
POLAD.
FWB

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