

0000

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

ACC

10000/109/702  
(VOL. I)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

10000/109/702  
(VOL. I)

ITALIAN POLICE AGENCIES  
NOV. 1944 - JUNE 1945

89.

C.90

You asked me to B/Lu K's for E.C.'s return before with  
a follow up letter to B.S. for E.C.'s signature.

7/11/45

90

W's have put up a draft letter in  
this draft in two with letters.

Blank in.

8/8/46

96

Executive Commission

Ref 95 replying to 91 I would remind  
you that a letter to AFHQ on subject of  
responsibility for CERR is with C.S. for  
signature. The report referred to is page 8  
will be obtained

7/11/45

20/6/45

97

conference 29. June.

the third in  
Rank is. 17 8 4/6

96

~~Ref~~ Secretive Communication

Ref 95 replying to 91 I would remind  
you that a letter to AFHQ on subject of  
responsibility for CERR is with C.C. for  
signature. The report referred to is page 8  
will be obtained. *[Signature]*  
20/6/45 17 20/6

97:

See by EC and discussed in conference 29. June.  
Letter referred to in Nov 96 submitted to CC.

*[Signature]* 20/6. 17 20/6

86

Chap Commission

There is no record on the file that you have seen, discussed, agreed or disagreed with the report of the Commission which set in the CER R folder.

The committee arrived at some conclusions findings. After you have one month to reply please query.

Have you any views?

EC

27

7/5/14/10

Yes - draft letter for me, pointing out wherein their reply fails to meet the situation I request answer to our queries

15JWS  
CL29

MAY 16 1964

the committee arrived at some in future

findings. AFHQ has taken one month to reply  
none given.

Have you any views?

MS/14/10

EL

yes - draft letter for me, pointing out  
wherein their reply fails to meet  
The situation. I request answer to our

queries

JWS  
CC

13/5

39

MAY 16 1943  
CC 643

82

Chief, Comdisol, etc.

Attached is submitted for your information. 5/16/43

MS/16/5

APR 14 76  
CC OPS-269.Chief Commissioner:

Please see folio 68. General Browning takes issue with the Committee on the extent of the responsibility which should be placed upon Land Forces Subcommission with respect to the Caracineri. While his paragraph 2 (c) is administratively the right answer, it poses a rather serious political problem in that it might well have, ultimately, a considerable effect on the institutional question. Division of responsibility in the past has acted as a check. Perhaps you would wish to discuss this question informally with the Prime Minister before we commit ourselves to an aide memoir.

7

H. A. F.

Sec 70.

13/4/40

74

Affidavit

73 replace to 4 am letter

at 60

Si 17/4

75

24/4 word 7

NO. 76TO: The Office of the  
Executive Commissioner.

Action as suggested on Folio 77 is being taken. Delay due to the necessity of translating several documents.

A. H. BONTAM-SATTER.

Lt. Colonel.

2 May 45  
C A Section.

7

U. S. F.

Sec 7.

10/4/40

14

*A/Salmon*

73 replied to 4 am letter

at 60 8/17/4

75

24/4 Nov 8.7

NO. 76

TO: The Office of the  
Executive Commissioner.

Action as suggested on Folio 77 is being taken. Delay due to  
the necessity of translating several documents.

2 May 45  
C A Section.

*840p*

*A.B. BOWMAN-MASTER.*  
Lt. Colonel.

82

*noted*

Reply to 77 being sent today *83*  
*3/5*

*5501*

CSO

64

61-63 is the Report of the Committee set up to consider means for bringing about reorganization of the CERR. Terms of ref are at 56. See also folios 54, para 3.

Ehe

10 apr 46

65

V.P.  
Civil Affairs Section

The report of the Petitioner Committee in the reorganization of CERR is at 63. A/Executive is away today and CC has NOT seen it yet. See also but should support, at an early date. 5566

66

A/Executive Committee

Thank you for previous return for 10/11. 10/11.

V.A.

Civil Affairs Section

The report of the "White" Committee  
in the investigation of C.C.R. is  
at 63. A/Ex. Com. is away today  
and CC has NOT seen it yet  
Section but should support at an early  
date. 5385

5/14

66

A/Executive Committee

Thank you for provided - returned for  
Chis. Commission Birmingham for 5/14 5385

67

C.S.O. to L. Com.

I believe A/Ex. Com. has not yet seen.

C.C. has

THQ  
u.4

C.S.O.

52

Please see 48-50 Rapeseed equal treatment for 100  
P.S. with Guardia di Finanza as to cere are receiving a good  
list of equipment & accommodations required  
JLH 2/1/3

53

Mr. Llewellyn  
W. L. L. please follow up with CMC  
St. 2/1/3

55

447

To Ex. Commission  
Re 45, 46 & 47 V.P. C. has spoken and agreed  
terms of reference  
J. L. Llewellyn  
C.P.D.  
29 Nov. 45  
J. L. Llewellyn  
5565

57

Mr. Llewellyn

To Ex. Commission  
Re 45, 46 & 56 V.P. Cas. Lm. Sp. An. and agent

Letter of reference

Ed. Robinson

J.P. Hayes

4/10/56

CHS

5563 -

29/11/55

57.

Mr. Howdell

To see 4/10/56

2/1/56

59

C80

Please see 50

2/1/56

March 2/1/56

2/4

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

14U 21/3

MINUTE - LIO

8/10  
6/5/3

39

Ref Jolio 17, informed by C&Sae reorganization of C&R still being studied by 2d Jost. Subject was raised by Col Young with the first within the last two weeks + there should be results at end of Feb.

B/U 7/3  
~~Noted J.~~ *Elh*

13 Feb 45

40

E.C.

A report has come in on the question of reorganization and is being studied. The report is the subject of meetings between P.S.C. and the C&R. Plans and Reactions, by 1/1/45  
Co. Section.

~~Noted J.~~ B/U 2/3

43

All officers to be 44.

24/3 Nov 45

*Elh*  
~~Noted J.~~ B/U 2/3  
5501

7/Exec Comm.

44

Para 8 is approved, but Col. Paletti should be made Chairman. Exec. Comm. has

A report has come in on the question of reorganization and is being studied. The report is the duty of meetings between P.S.C. and the case is closed.

Plus at Rehearsal, May 11/3  
Co. Section.

Rehearsal 3/10 2/3

43

All officers to be 42.

1/13

24/3 moved 2

Sub B

2/13

3/10

H/Exec Comm.

with

Para 8 is approved, but Col. Poletti should be made Chairman. Exec Comm. has concurred with this change. EWS

27

See follows

45

V.P. C.A.S. (After C.A. Cripps)

At Sec C.A. Cripps store (US) and A/S. C.A. Cripps will go please take action including the dropping of the terms of reference.

2/24/3.

Bridgman

29

Heath + 28 is reasonable. Agree?

DS (27/1/45)

30

Certainly

24 Jan 45

WPH

32

cos

31 is MMIA advising P.S. (lit copy  
to Sandhu's) that AFSA appears  
the formation of a new Davis CCR  
Re P. Sandhu's and the loan  
of transport from Indian Army.  
The request was at 25 in "Jan"  
So it's been family for it took.

by 25/1

Con. 25/1

33

PA Please arrange meeting DS (30/1) 30/1

CAS. ~~25~~

Feeling lived in 1000 hrs 31/1

R 30/1

3. i. 174177 following P.S. (last copy  
to Sanden's) the AFSA appears  
the function' by a number of  
Ben to Sanden's and the lower  
of transport from the same  
The request was at 25 on 11 Jan  
So it's been fairly quiet work.

By 25/1

Cons M/20/1

33<sup>34</sup>

PA Please arrange meeting M/30/1 - 5063

CAS. ~~25~~

Meeting fixed 12 1000 hrs 3/1

R 30/1  
PA 25/1

Chief Commissioner.

1st January 45.

I discussed this with Brigadier Upjohn and Colonel Chapman. We did not get very far forward. As Colonel Chapman said we ought to have thought of it some months ago, for to organise such a scheme now would tend to disrupt the CC.RR. Just as we need them for the north. I am still convinced, however, that we must endeavour to do more for the CC.RR, and they have gone away to think the matter over.

cc 27/1  
M/30/1

M. V. L.  
Brigadier.  
Chief of Staff.

Noted

JWD

M/30/1

21/12

1/2

CC

22

(50)

I talked yesterday to Col Wilcox & Maj Wilson (PS SC) about forthcoming call up in Sardinia. They are aware of it & it is to take place in Feb but the date is not yet known. It is the intention to provide a mobile bn of CC RR by that time in Sardinia similar to Sicily. Folio 21 refers to this matter.

Sh

13 Jan 45

~~Major General~~

Please ensure that in planning in Sardinia there is not it will be as Sardinia - possibly by CAS

24

(50)

Re min 23, agree with Col Briggs of CAS who will see that a general note of caution is sent at once to Ind. Reg. Feb 15/46

25

COS

At 21 in letter from MARIA to

AFHQ asking action for approval of P. S. report for a mobile CC RR Bn to be used in Sardinia which is done

13 Jan 45

~~Major General~~

S. H.

Many lessons to be learned in future from this  
 I am to be. I believe, properly by CAS

24

Q30

Re min 23, spoke with Col Briggs of C.A.S. who will see  
 that a general note of caution is sent at once to Long. Reg.  
 Feb 15/6

25.

COS

At 21 is a letter from MIRA to  
 AFHQ asking asking for approval  
 of P. S. report for a mobile CCRR  
 Bu to be used in Sardines  
 during the call-up which is due  
 next week. CAS are willing  
 to recommend in forward terms  
 to R.C. Sardines Regim.

Stall  
 15/1.

C.S.O.

20 Dec 44

003

Please see <sup>24</sup> and <sup>26</sup> on tp movements to SICILY.  
Also <sup>24</sup> on formation of mobile line of Carabinieri for SICILY.

(Intd) ASM

x x x x x x x

(8)

<sup>6</sup> This is an old idea of Col Young's which he had at last put across. I think that it is a good idea.

(Intd) (AS) 20/12

00

<sup>6</sup> for reading

MSL 20/x11

(9)

003

Noted

(10)

MS 22/12

50

003 may wish to see 14

(15)

5 Jan 45

18

C.S.O. Col

16 & 17 is reply of PH to #3 & 4 on re-organization of the police force.

I do not recommend a reading of this except the last two paras. action being taken by

C.A.S. Col

6 Jan 45 Two or three paras

*Sh*

*Sh*

(Intd) OS 20/12

9

6  
For reading

12L 20/12/11

10

Noted

EMS 22/12

12

OS may wish to see 14

*Sh.*  
Ceylon

5 Jan 45

13

CSO Col

16 & 17 is reply of PH to #3 & 14 on reorganization of the police force.

I do not recommend a reading of this except the last two paras. action being taken by

CATCO. last

6 Jan 45 For on these papers

*Sh.*

20

CSO

5561

19 gives the latest information on the position of the MT of the Madras Bus of CCR for Sicily. Signal to HQ for Civilian Disturbances file wages for week despatch of 12 tanks mentioned here.

9 Jan 45

*Sh.* W.C.

3626  
Tel: 478427

30 June 1945  
JUL 2 1945

AO/14634/TS

SUBJECT : Reorganization of the CC.RR. and other Police Forces.

TO : Allied Forces Headquarters, APO 512,  
(Attention : G-5 Section.)

1. Reference is made to your G-5 C14.12 of 11 May, 1945, and to my 3626/EC of 19 May, 1945.

2. Since writing my letter of 19 May, I have had occasion to make further study of AFHQ letter AG 091.711/169 GCT-O of 16 November 1944, and I am now firmly convinced that under the provisions of that letter the responsibilities of Land Forces Sub-Commission (NMIA) in regard to the CC.RR. do parallel the responsibilities of the Italian Ministry of War insofar as control, supervision, administration and supply are concerned. I, therefore, request that a critical study be made in order to clarify the situation which has developed over the past several months in regard to responsibility for training, feeding, clothing and equipping the CC.RR.

3. In your letter G-5 C14.12 of 11 May, 1945, it stated that "NMIA responsibility for their (the CC.RR.) administration is specifically limited to seeing they are supplied with rations similar to the Italian Army." In this connection I invite your attention, first, to the fact that NMIA admit their responsibility for the feeding, clothing and equipping of the CC.RR., (letter A.O.18 of 11 April, 1945, copy sent to you as enclosure to our letter 3626/EC of 14 April, 1945), and, second, to para. 4b of AFHQ letter AG 091.711/169 GCT-O of 16 November, 1944, wherein it is stated that NMIA will be responsible for supervision of administration

and supply of the Italian Army. At this point may I say that there is no question about the CC.RR. being Italian Army units, inasmuch as they were specifically included under the CCS authority to re-establish the Italian Army and are specifically included in the list of Italian Army units maintained internationally as set out in the AFHQ letter above referred to.

4. Also in your letter of 11 May, 1945, it is stated that "MMIA are not charged with responsibility for their (CC.RR.) organization, supervision or use". May I invite your attention to several paragraphs of AFHQ letter AG 091. 711/169 OCT-3 of 16 November, 1944, which would seem to be not in accord with the statement just quoted. Para. 3 of the letter provides that "Control of the Italian Army is exercised by the Supreme Allied Commander through the Land Forces Sub-Commission." Para. 4 specifically places a number of responsibilities on MMIA including supervision of administration and supply, supervision of appointments, promotions, dismissals, discipline, and liaison between the employing Allied formations and the MMIA and Ministry of War. Para. 8a provides that "in principle the Italian Military Authorities are responsible through MMIA for the Administration of all categories". Para 8b provides that "the general administration of the Italian Army is vested in the Ministry for War." Para. 24, in part, provides that "The Carabinieri (CC.RR.) are under the command of the Commanding General of the Carabinieri.". The Commanding General is a general of the Italian Army who is responsible to the Ministry for War. Thus is developed the chain of command, supervision, administration and control all exercised through the Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA). The only mention of any other responsibility is also in para. 24, wherein it is stated "The Carabinieri are a civil police organization directed by Public Safety Sub-Commission.". Thus the responsibility of Public Safety Sub-Commission is specifically limited to directing the operational use of the Carabinieri as police.

5. The failure to recognize and clarify the full responsibilities of MMIA in regard to Carabinieri within the existing provisions of the AFHQ letter has resulted in an unsatisfactory

level of supply of all kinds of equipment as compared with line troops of the Italian Army. Also this has caused the development of a fallacious opinion that, because Carabinieri are used as police, Public Safety Sub-Commission, which controls nothing in the way of supplies and equipment, is responsible for everything relating to Carabinieri. This situation has contributed materially to the ineffectiveness of the Carabinieri and the reports I am now receiving from my Public Safety officers in the north all testify to the very poor impression created in the minds of the public in all parts of the territory recently liberated by reason of the poor turn out of the Carabinieri sent North.

6. The internal security situation in Italy is far from satisfactory and threatens to become worse due in part to taking Carabinieri from the south to assist in the policing of the north. Now that combat operations have ceased, I feel that every aid and assistance possible should be given to strengthen, not only the Carabinieri, but also other Italian Police agencies. I see no reasons why Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMSIA) should not perform the same functions for Carabinieri that have been performed for other Italian Army units under the provisions of the AFHQ letter herein referred to.

7. For the reasons herein expressed and as a matter of urgency, I request that serious and prompt consideration be given to this matter.

Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE  
Rear Admiral, USNR  
Chief Commissioner

Copy to :  
Land Forces S/C (MMSIA).

3626 & 3627

95

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
Civil Affairs Section  
APO 394

Tel : 409081-365

18 June, 1945.

AC/14191/PS

SWSI NMF 6 I  
19 JUN 1945

SUBJECT : Public Security in N. Italy.

TO : Executive Commissioner

91

9 June

1. Reference 3626/EC dated 14 [redacted] 1945.

EC para 1(2)

2. (a) The primary responsibility for clothing and equipping CC.RR is one for MMIA (Land Forces Sub Commission) and Public Safety Sub Commission is in constant touch with them on it. The present directive is not satisfactory. MMIA's responsibility has, naturally, been primarily to the combat units and Public Safety Sub-Commission has not got the powers, organisation or personnel to look after their supplies. A letter on this is now approved and going forward to AFHQ over the Chief Commissioner's signature. The following items have been allotted to northern regions during the past few weeks

|      |                |
|------|----------------|
| 2500 | Boots          |
| 700  | Tunics         |
| 200  | Pairs Trousers |
| 400  | Caps           |
| 700  | Ties           |
| 700  | Puttees        |

In addition the Ministry of War is manufacturing 4000 pairs of trousers for issue to CC.RR. Further clothing will be manufactured as more cloth becomes available.

(b) It is agreed that equipment supplied to CC.RR. generally has been of inferior quality. The grey green type of uniform being made of shoddy soon wears out, and in many cases second hand repaired clothing has been the supply resulting in a very poor turn out of the men. Until cloth of a proper type is obtained and made up it would appear that the unsatisfactory dress will continue. Some good uniforms have been uncovered in the north and a supply of cloth has also been located near Como. It is expected this will soon be unblocked by MMIA.

MA 30/6

See MA 96

(Mr. Aorson)

- 2 -

The shoes issued are 2nd hand repaired goods and as such require changing at frequent intervals.

Firearms have been in short supply and in many cases rifles have been issued instead of muskets. The procedure is to secure a supply of muskets from dumps of surrendered arms in the north. This however is unsatisfactory as evidence goes to show that inferior arms are being turned in; the assumption being that the good ones are being concealed for nefarious use at a later stage.

EC para 1(b) 3. Reference Para 1(b). CC.RR. in the initial stages, as was expected from information received before the occupation, had a bad time as the C.L.N. would not recognise them. The situation is gradually changing for the better. The law abiding public are now weary of the banditry of so-called partisans and look to the CC.RR. to right matters. P.S. Officers are gradually getting the police accepted in their proper role and with increasing apprehensions of law breakers it is hoped that the interior rural districts will be on a par with the towns.

This can only be tackled by the P.P.S.O. and it is a slow but steady business.

EC para 1(c) 4. Questores for the most part have been appointees of C.L.N. Happily the demand for career officials is now increasing and a blend has been made of career assistants to guide the better of the C.L.N. Questores. The transient stage has been sticky and the uncertain political situation has militated against successful local government, but improvement is now apparent.

EC para 2 5. Transport has been a difficult matter. To date 48 3 ton trucks and 48 armoured cars have been allotted by AFHQ for CC.RR. mobile battalions (12 trucks and 12 armoured vehicles to each of the 4 Northern regions). 40 armoured cars proceeded to the North at the beginning of this week and are now in situation. These will be available to go to troubled spots. A further eight are undergoing repair. The 48 trucks were all Class 5 vehicles. 4 only were runners and these have been sent north. The other 44 are undergoing repair and will be sent north in small convoys as they are completed.

6. On 17 February the Executive Commissioner suggested to V.P. C.A. Sec. that extra vehicles for CC.RR. should be allotted from the 1700 vehicles being made available for the carrying of supplies. CC.RR. needs were made known to the Executive Commissioner on March 45, but it was then stated that the allotment of a number of trucks from the 1700 available would be wrong in principle.

555

- 3 -

93

A request for additional transport for carabinieri was then made to MMIA on 21 March 1945. A complete statement of the vehicle position throughout the entire force was supplied and on 26 April 1945 MMIA replied that no additional vehicles could be allotted.

The matter was then referred to AFHQ by G-4 (B) who were preparing a consolidated statement of the needs of all A.C. transport requirements. The bid was made for 50 trucks on 14 May 1945. AFHQ replied that the general shortage of load carrying vehicles in this theatre made it impossible to release additional vehicles to CC.RR.

7. 50 Italian Army Recce cars have been released to Carabinieri by MMIA. These carry 2 men each and at the present time Carabinieri are being taught to drive this rather unusual vehicle in the Italian Army driving school. These vehicles are only of use for short patrol in towns to show the flag and cannot be considered as any real assistance from a transportation point of view.

8. CC.RR. General Taddei has been in the north reorganising the force and his return and report should soon be available. In the light of his investigations coupled with the reports of R.P.S.O.'s much improvement should be effected.

9. Finally it must be reiterated that a general programme of refitting CC.RR. - a force of 65,000 - plus the acquisition of more transport must be faced by Higher Authority.

*G. R. Upjohn*  
G.R. UPJOHN, Brig. L/C  
VP CA Sec.

*Copy to Italian Police Agencies Supples 3627/EC.*

500

3626  
Ex Comm  
ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
G-5 Section  
APO 512

72  
TBJ/30  
3163

G-5: 014.12

14 June 1945

16 JUN 1945

SUBJECT: Reorganization of the CCN and  
other Police Forces of Italy.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission  
APO 394.

1. Reference is made to your 3626/SC of  
19 May.

2. G-3 this Headquarters state that it is  
necessary that the full attention of MIA should  
continue to be devoted for the time being to the  
military effectiveness of the Italian Army. G-3  
further state however, that it is possible that  
this requirement may be reduced in importance in  
a few months time, when consideration might be  
given to modification of the present policy.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5:

T. E. JACEMAN  
Lt. Colonel.

16 JUN 1945  
R.C. DIST - 18 June

Land Forces 3/C(1834)  
G.A. Section

5554

91

Ref: 3626/SC.

14 June 1945.

SUBJECT: Public Security in N. ITALY.

TO : Vice President,  
Civil Affairs Section.

1. Public security in Northern Italy is being affected adversely by the following facts.

- (a) The CC.RR are not properly equipped. Uniforms and shoes are lacking and in one instance I heard of an absence of firearms.
- (b) The CC.RR are performing their duties comparatively satisfactorily in the towns but when faced with a strong partisan feeling in rural districts are diffident and ineffectual.
- (c) The Questore, particularly those of Communist leanings, are very apt to obey the orders of the CLM and partisans and to effect the most illegal arrests. This has been reported both from GENOVA and VERCELLI.

2. May I know what is being done about this and whether you are satisfied that the CC.RR and other police agencies have sufficient transport to make them mobile.

MSL/JG.

MS Lush  
Brigadier,  
Executive Commissioner.

Copy to: 3627/SC.

see file 95 5352 10

WIS/hjp

88

Ref: 3626/RE

19 May 1945

SUBJECT: Reorganization of the CC.RR and other Police Forces of Italy

TO : Allied Force Headquarters, APO 512  
(Attention: G-5 Section)

85

1. Reference is made to your G-5 CLA.12 of 11 May 1945.

2. The point which you raise in your para 2 is noted--namely that MIA responsibility for the administration of the CC.RR is specifically limited to the supply of rations.

It is essential, however, to bear in mind that the CC.RR are Italian Army personnel more than historically; they are actually an integral part of the Italian Army, depending from the Ministry of War for their organization, supply, training, and discipline.

It was with the knowledge of this fact and with understanding of the Italian organization that the Committee which met to consider the reorganization of the CC.RR made their report.

70.

3. This Headquarters' letter 3626/RE of 14 April sought assurance that "placing corresponding responsibilities (i.e., corresponding to those of the Italian Ministry of War whose counterpart in this Commission MIA is) on the Public Safety Sub-Commission and Land Forces Sub-Commission (MIA) would not be inconsistent with any directives that have been issued to Land Forces Sub-Commission (MIA) and, in particular, AFHQ letter AG 001.711/169 OCT-C of 16 November 1944."

4. It is now my recommendation, should these proposed new responsibilities not be covered by existing directives to Land Forces Sub-Commission (MIA) or be in conflict with them, that it be considered whether these directives should not be changed.

cc: Exec Comm'r, AG  
Land Forces S/C (MIA), AG  
Civil Affairs Sec, AG

KILBY E. STONE  
Rear Admiral, USNR  
Chief Commissioner

11A 2/5

BU 289/5/1

1189-90

785017

3626A

Ex Compound Score 25

TBJ/irf

11 May 1945<sup>1</sup>

DATE \_\_\_\_\_

7c

- 70

Ap. l. m. m.

See Min. 8687

Feb. 27

5552

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

3626 Ex-Commissioner  
ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
G-5 Section  
APO 512

TRJ/ceb

G-5: 014.12

6 May 1945

SUBJECT: Reorganization of CC.RR.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission  
APO 394.

Reference your 3626/78/EC of 3 May. G-3  
this Headquarters to whom the matter was referred  
are being requested to expedite submission of their  
views.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5:

*T. B. Jackman*  
Lt. Colonel.

*Re*  
*(H. H. H. H. H.)*

*36*

BU 14/5  
555/14/5

785017

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
AND  
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

Ref: ACC/11012/PC

5 May 45

SUBJECT: Guardia di Finanza.

MAY 6 RECD

TO: Ministry of Finance.  
(Attn: General Oxilia.)

- 1 Very careful consideration has been given to your letter of 20 Apr 45 which was addressed to Major General Browning.
- 2 This Commission is sympathetic to many of the arguments which you put forward. It is felt, however, that the whole question is one which cannot usefully be discussed any further. The problem of the future organization of all Italian Police Agencies has very recently been referred to the Prime Minister for the consideration of the Italian Government, and the future status and organization of the Royal Finance Guards is a matter which should, it is thought, be included in any consequent deliberations.
- 3 This Commission has no doubt that any approach to AFHQ for an alteration of the present ruling can only meet with a refusal at this stage of the war and a recommendation on the same lines as that made above.

*J. R. Higgins*  
U.S. Army, Brig..  
VP CA Section,

Copy to: Executive Commissioner.  
~~Land Forces Sub-Commission (ad hoc).~~

5549

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

CONFIDENTIAL

Tel: 735

Ref: 3626/83/80.

5 May 1945.

SUBJECT: Guardia di Finanza.

TO : Civil Affairs Section.

Reference to 3626/83 dated 24 April 1945 enclosing letter from Land Forces Sub-Commission (LSCIA), attached hereto is a further communication from Land Forces Sub-Commission dated 3 May 1945 with its enclosure from the Ministry for Finance dated 27 Apr 1945. It is suggested that one reply to both letters can now be sent.

*Sh*  
Chief Staff Officer,  
To Executive Commissioner.

Incl:  
as above

Copy to: Economic Section.  
Land Forces Sub-Commission (LSCIA)

*copy of ASer with  
sent - see 77*  
*BUG*  
*554*  
*(Mrs Nelson)*

3026A

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: GGFF

LAND FORCES SUB COM, AC (WMIA)

SD/47

3 May 45

TO : HQ. AC (for Executive Commissioner)

MAY 4 REC'D

In continuation of my SD/47 of 23 Apr :-

1. Herewith copy of a further letter on the matter from the Minister of Finance.
2. Apart from what I have already said, as the war in Italy is to all intents and purposes over and as it would take some time to organize a GGFF "token force", it seems to me that this whole business is a nonsense.
3. Will you please take action.

*J. Browning*

Major-General  
MHIA

cgl.

*P.S. Since dictating the above,  
the surrender of the Germans in  
Italy removes the whole  
matter from discussion!*

See T1

5547

*(Plus STUS)*

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

COPY  
TRANSLATION

FROM: Finance Ministry

Ref: 2342

TO MMIA

DATE: 27 April 1945

SUBJECT: Participation of the R. Finance Guard in military operations.

The G.O.C. the R. Finance Guard has submitted to me the earnest desire and wish of the Corps to take active part at the present moment in the military operations on the Italian front by means of a representative contingent, by the side of the other State Armed Forces which are fighting heroically for the total liberation of the nation.

M.M.I.A. knows the military traditions of the R. Finance Guard which has taken praiseworthy part with the revolutionary armies for the liberation of Italy, as in all the military campaigns carried out by the nation for its independence and unity and because of which it's exclusion from the campaign against the Germans and Nazi-Fascists today places upon the Finance Guard an undesired inferiority as compared with the other Armed Forces of the State.

In view of the foregoing I should be very please if MMIA would kindly take into consideration the hopes of the "Yellow Flames" assuring you that in the event of the request meeting with the approval of the Allied Command the representative contingent would be prepared within a very few days.

I should be pleased of a kind note in reply on the matter.

Sgd. ILLEGIBLE

Minister

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

78

Tel : 473221

Ref/3626/78/80.

3 May 1948

SUBJECT : Reorganisation of O.S. and other  
police forces in Italy.

TO : C-5 Section, AMB.

70  
With reference to our letter 3626/80 dated 14 April  
45, a reply to para 2 would be appreciated.

For the Chief Commissioner :

*Sh*  
Brigadier,  
Executive Commissioner.

*see 84 x 85*  
*10/2/5*  
*[Signature]*

5545

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

Tel: 735

21 April 1945.

Ref: 5626/RO.

SUBJECT: Guardia di Finanza.

TO : Civil Affairs Section.

1. Attached hereto is letter from Land Forces Sub-Commission (MIA) enclosing letter from Ministry of Finance dated 25 April 1945 and an accompanying report.
2. This you will see is a plea for reconsideration of the status of the Finance Guards, so that they would become a part of the Italian armed forces.
3. Will you please take necessary action, sending a copy of your reply to this Office.

*[Signature]*  
Chief Staff Officer,  
To Executive Commissioner.

Incl:  
as above

Copy to: Economic Section  
Land Forces Sub-Comm (MIA)

8/4/29  
4

see 83

PA

15/4  
5544

*By Com* (78)  
CONFIDENTIAL

8227

SUBJECT: Guardia Finanza

LAND FORCES SUB-COM, AC (MMIA)

SD/47

23 Apr 45

TO : HQ. AC (for Executive Commissioner)

I have just received the attached from Gen OXILIA, head of the GGFF.

It seems to be a matter for you and connected with the somewhat analogous CORR status.

GGFF is specifically exempted by AFHQ from being part of the Italian Army.

twv

*2. Browning*  
Major General  
MMIA

5643

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
Civil Affairs Section  
APO 394

Tel : 489081 - 365

14 April, 1945

APR 17 1945

AC/14601/53/PS

SUBJECT : Appointment of CC.RR officers in the North.  
TO : Executive Commissioner.

1. Reference your 3626/52/EC dated 3 April 1945.
2. Attached is Appendix "A" showing the organization of Carabinieri Legions for the North, together with the names of the officers already appointed.
3. CC.RR officers are being transferred from the South to the North, but it is hoped to recover a large number of officers in North Italy. It has always been the policy of the Commanding General CC.RR to post the best type of officer to the North, and it is thought that a large number of good officers are still functioning or have joined patriot forces in occupied territory.
4. It is thought by the Public Safety Sub-Commission that the Divisional and Brigade establishment is not an essential part of the Carabinieri organization. Sufficient control is exercised at Legion level under the direction of the Commanding General, and accordingly every effort is being made to complete Legion officer strength before setting up full Brigade and Division Staffs which appear to serve very little practical purpose.
5. The officers being sent forward have all been subjected to Epuration by the Minister of War and found satisfactory. As other officers are recovered in the North they will be screened in the same way before becoming available to the Commanding General for appointment.
6. All postings of CC.RR officers to the North are first submitted to this Headquarters by the Commanding General. The matter is then cleared with Army AMG before the appointment is

- 2 -

confirmed. Any CC.RR officer found to be unsatisfactory after actually commencing duty can be removed from office by the Regional Public Safety officer in consultation with Public Safety Sub-Commission. Transfers are arranged with the Commanding General CC.RR who is co-operative. Recently a Legion Commander in AMG territory was removed in this way.

7. As the northern Regions become liberated, the present system will continue of informing Army AMG and Regional Commissioners (for R.P.S.O's) prior to the appointment of all CC.RR officers.

*J. S. Benham* 1/10/1

G.R. UPJOHN, Brig.  
VP CA Sec.

Copy to R.C. Emilia  
" Liguria  
" Piemonte  
" Lombardia  
" Venezia.

APPENDIX A



COMANDO GENERALE DELL'ARMA DEI CARABINIERI REALI  
Ufficio Ordinamento

-----0000-----

SPECCHIO: indicante la forza organica e presente degli  
ufficiali delle legioni dell'Italia occupata  
dei tedeschi.

MAPS AND CHARTS TOO LARGE TO FILM  
ON ONE EXPOSURE ARE FILMED CLOCKWISE  
BEGINNING IN THE UPPER LEFT CORNER,  
LEFT TO RIGHT, AND TOP TO BOTTOM.

SEE DIAGRAMS BELOW.



| COMANDO DI<br>DIVISIONE                                                                                                              | Comando di<br>Brigata.            | Regione   | Comando di<br>Legione. | ORGANICO UFFICIALE |                              |          |                         |        | Num<br>ro. |                                                  |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------|------------------------|--------------------|------------------------------|----------|-------------------------|--------|------------|--------------------------------------------------|
|                                                                                                                                      |                                   |           |                        | Colonnelli         | T. Colonn.<br>o<br>Maggiori. | Capitani | Tenenti e<br>S. Tenenti | Totale |            |                                                  |
| 2 <sup>a</sup> Divisione<br>"Podgera" Roma<br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br><br>1 <sup>a</sup> Divisione<br>"Pastrango"<br>Milano. | 3 <sup>a</sup> Brigata<br>Firenze | Emilia    | Bologna                | 1                  | 9                            | 19       | 29                      | 60     | 40         | 1 color<br>CHELI<br>BURI<br>tani<br>LI N<br>nand |
|                                                                                                                                      | 1 <sup>a</sup> Brigata<br>Torino  | Liguria   | Genova                 | 1                  | 9                            | 18       | 16                      | 44     | 20         | 1 Colo<br>ROSSO<br>FANT                          |
|                                                                                                                                      |                                   | Piemonte  | Alessandria            | 1                  | 6                            | 15       | 20                      | 42     | 9          | 1 T. Co<br>stin                                  |
|                                                                                                                                      |                                   |           | Torino                 | 1                  | 7                            | 14       | 17                      | 39     | 14         | 1 T. Co<br>lo);<br>Etto                          |
|                                                                                                                                      | 2 <sup>a</sup> Brigata<br>Milano  | Lombardia | Milano                 | 1                  | 9                            | 19       | 22                      | 51     | 26         | 1 Colo<br>DE M<br>MA S<br>do, P.                 |
|                                                                                                                                      |                                   | 3 Venetie | Verona                 | 1                  | 6                            | 12       | 11                      | 30     | 7          | 1 Colo<br>4 Su                                   |
|                                                                                                                                      |                                   |           | Bolzano                | 1                  | 6                            | 14       | 13                      | 34     | 1          | 1 T. Co                                          |
|                                                                                                                                      |                                   |           | Padova                 | 1                  | 7                            | 15       | 15                      | 38     | 14         | 1 Colo<br>DI D<br>balt                           |
|                                                                                                                                      |                                   |           | Trieste                | 1                  | 6                            | 15       | 22                      | 44     | 9          | 1 Colo<br>tani                                   |

| ITALI.     |        | UFFICIALI ASSEGNATI |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
|------------|--------|---------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| S. Tenenti | Totale | Numero.             | N O M I N A T I V I                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| 29         | 60     | 40                  | 1 colonnello(COZZO Andrea); 3 T.Colonnelli(VENTOSTA Attilio, GERONAZZO Luigi, FRANCHIELLA Edoardo); 7 Maggiori(CHRISTANELLI Giuseppe, STARA Michele, BOVE Antonio, BURIANI Alfonso, BARILE Vincenzo, MANGANARO Vincenzo, CHIESA Ferruccio); 12 capitani(GIACONI Ettore, BRUNELLI Alessandro, BIANCO Ettore, AMBROSI Max, PETRUZZELLI Nicola, MASSACCESI Amelio, GABRIELLI Vittorio, CAPELLI Aldo, VIVARELLI Ferdinando, ORLANDO Tindaro, D'ILARIO Raffaele, SALOMONE Eugenio); 17 subalterni. |
| 6          | 44     | 20                  | 1 Colonnello(ANDREOLI Mauro); 4 T.Colonnelli(PALLONI Eraldo, OLIVA Francesco, AMOROSO Luigi, ACCONGIAGIOCO Giuseppe); 6 capitani(TANCINI Oreste, ARIZIO Roberto, FANTINI Mario, PRETE Umberto, ELIA Francesco, LOCORI Lito); 9 subalterni.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| 20         | 42     | 9                   | 1 T.Colonnello(BONI Andrea); 1 maggiore(GIULIANO Domenico); 4 capitani(FIORI Agostino, NUZZO Oronzo, MAZZARELLI Francesco, RUGGERO Carlo); 3 subalterni.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| 7          | 39     | 14                  | 1 T.Colonnello(D'AGOSTINO Giuseppe); 2 maggiori(SALUCCI Francesco, D'AMATO Angelo); 5 capitani(CASTELLANI Sabatino, PELLECONIA Francesco, VANASCO Pericle, CURTI Ettore, COLELLA Franz, LAURO Massimo); 5 subalterni.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| 2          | 51     | 26                  | 1 Colonnello(NUZZOLO Italo); 3 T.Colonnelli(FORCELLI Arturo, ZUMAGLINI Alfredo, DE MATTEIS Carlo); 1 Maggiore(CALCAGNO Santo); 9 capitani(MARACCI Cesare, AURIEMI Salvatore, SPANO Giuseppe, MISTO Nicola, PULVIRENTI Francesco, MARANTONIO Aldo, PALCO Filippo, BONZANO Carlo, ARISTA Antonio); 12 subalterni.                                                                                                                                                                               |
| 1          | 30     | 7                   | 1 Colonnello(LUCA Ugo); 1 Maggiore(MAGGIORE Antonio); 1 capitano(SERNI Tommaso); 4 subalterni.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| 3          | 34     | 1                   | 1 T.Colonnello(SESTILLI Gualtiero).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| 2          | 38     | 14                  | 1 Colonnello(de VITA Giuseppe); 1 Maggiore(LASTRETTI Giuseppe); 4 capitani(CATALDI Domenico, TRIFILETTI Alessandro, RICCIOFFI Renzo, JAMICELLI Stanislao); 8 subalterni.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| 2          | 44     | 9                   | 1 Colonnello(DE SANCTIS Ernesto); 3 Maggiori(BELLA Carlo, MECONI Nazareno); 3 capitani(PEPE Nicola, OLIVIERI Antonio, CRISTINZIANI Davide); 3 subalterni.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Castrorengo  
Milano.

2<sup>a</sup> Brigata  
Milano

Lombardia

Milano

1

9

19

22

51

26

10; 5 ca  
Attore, O

1 Colonel  
DE MATTE  
MA Salva  
do, FALCO

3 Venetia

Verona

1

6

12

11

30

7

1 Colonel  
4 Subalt

Bolzano

1

6

14

13

34

1

1 T.Colonn

Padova

1

7

15

15

38

14

1 Colonel  
DI Domen  
balterni

Trieste

1

6

15

22

44

9

1 Colonel  
tani (FER

Totale.....

9

65

141

165

382

141

M.B. Non sono compresi gli ufficiali previsti per il comando della I<sup>a</sup> Divisione: n.5 (1 Generale  
licenza di convalida; 1 T.Colonnello: VENERANDI Luigi; -2 capitani: da assegnare) nè q  
li o Maggiori e 4 capitani, tutti da assegnare).

M.B. The Officers sent for the Command of the I<sup>a</sup> Division are not included: 1  
General License of Convalidation; 1 T. Colonel: VENERANDI Luigi; -2 Captains: to be assigned; 1  
Major or Maggiori and 4 Captains: all to be assigned.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

10); 6 capitani (CASTELLANI Sabatino, BELLECCHIA Francesco, VANASCO Pericle, CURTI Ettore, COLELLA Franz, LAURO Massimo); 5 subalterni.

2 51 26 1 Colonnello (NUZZOLO Italo); 3 T. Colonnelli (FORCELLI Arturo, ZUMAGLINI Alfredo, DE MATTEIS Carlo); 1 Maggiore (CALCAGNO Santo); 9 capitani (MARACCI Cesare, AURIEMMA Salvatore, SPANO' Giuseppe, MISTO Nicola, PULVIRENTI Francesco, MARANTONIO Aldo, PALCO Filippo, BONZANO Carlo, ARISTA Antonio); 12 subalterni.

30 7 1 Colonnello (LUCA Ugo); 1 Maggiore (MAGGIORE Antonio); 1 capitano (SERNI Toscano); 4 subalterni.

34 1 1 T. Colonnello (SESTILLI Gualtiero).

36 14 1 Colonnello (de VITA Giuseppe); 1 Maggiore (LASTRETTI Giuseppe); 4 capitani (CATALDI Domenico, TRIFILETTI Alessandro, RICCIOTTI Renzo, JAMICELLI Stanislao); 8 subalterni.

2 44 9 1 Colonnello (DE SANCTIS Ernesto); 2 Maggiori (BOLLA Carlo, MECCHI Nazzeno); 3 capitani (PEPE Nicola, OLIVIERI Antonio, CRISTINZIANI Davide); 3 subalterni.

382 141

5540

Divisione: n. 5 (1 Generale di Divisione: TADDEI Leonetto; -1 Colonnello: CONTADINI Giuseppe - in  
tani: da assegnare) n. 2 quelli per la 1<sup>a</sup> e 2<sup>a</sup> Brigata: n. 8 (2 Generali di Brigata, 2 T. Colonnelli

~~SECRET~~

3626/EC

SAF/ard  
14 April 1945

Subject: Reorganization of the Carabinieri and other  
Police Forces of Italy

To : G-5 Section, Allied Force Headquarters

1. The matter of the reorganization of the Italian Carabinieri is before the Commission. I enclose a report on this subject matter by a committee consisting of Colonel Poletti, Colonel Fidsley and Colonel Chapman, together with a letter of comment by General Browning.

2. The position of the Carabinieri in the Italian Governmental structure has been that its organization, supply, training and discipline have been a responsibility of the Ministry of War, whereas operationally they have been placed under the control of the Ministry of the Interior. Before proceeding to the discussion of this matter with the Prime Minister, I should welcome your assurance that placing corresponding responsibilities on the Public Safety Subcommittee and Land Forces Subcommittee (EMIA) would not be inconsistent with any directives that have been issued to Land Forces Subcommittee (EMIA) and in particular, AFHQ letter AG 091711/169 GCT-C of 16 Nov 44.

For the Chief Commissioner:

*Handwritten:* B/A 2/4  
*Handwritten:* See 76

*Handwritten:* N.E. Fiske

NORMAN R. FISKE  
Colonel

Acting Executive Commissioner

Encl.- R/0010, 7 April 45.  
A.018, 11 April 45.

Copy to: Civil Affairs Section (with encls R/0010 & A.018)  
Land Forces Sub-Comm (with encl R/0010)

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Report Reorganization of the Carabinieri  
and other Police Forces of Italy.

LAND FORCES SUB COM. A.C.  
(M.M.I.A.)

A.018

11 April 46

TO : Executive Commissioner, A.C.

1945

1. I have now had more time to "digest" the above report, which I had only time to read through quickly when the draft was shown to me.

2. Though undoubtedly some kind of reorganization of the Police Forces of Italy is indicated and there is much in the report that I agree with, I would like to make the following observations, which I feel I must make before this matter goes further :-

(a) The remarks on "Specific Recommendation (c)" are liable to be misunderstood. MIA is responsible only for the feeding, equipping and clothing of the CC.MA. This is specifically provided for in para 24 of AMIA letter AS 091.711/109 001-0 of 16 Nov 44, which states, "The Carabinieri, except those units within Army Formations in role of Military Police, are a civil Police organization under the Command of the Commanding General of the Carabinieri, and directed by the Public Safety Sub-Commission, A.C." The onus of responsibility is thus laid distinctly on the Public Safety Sub-Commission, with MIA as the supply agent. Any alteration in this subdivision of duties would have to be effected by AMIA altering the above paragraph of its directives.

(b) Though having certain advantages, the committee's proposals would in fact merely transfer some of the existing responsibilities from Public Safety to Land Forces Sub Commission with further divided control.

(c) The real answer would seem to be to have the whole command, training and administration of both the State (CC.MA.) and local police forces under one head. Otherwise the two police forces cannot be fully integrated. As in SWEDEN, I think the Police Forces should be separate from the Army and under the Minister of the Interior. This of course would mean a radical break with Italian tradition, though that is not necessarily a point against it. It however would correspond with the existing set-up, where Public Safety Sub-Commission (the counterpart of the Minister of the

file 825/2

63

CONFIDENTIAL

feel I must make before this matter goes further :-

(a) The remarks on "Specific Recommendation (a)" are liable to be misunderstood. MIA is responsible only for the feeding, equipping and clothing of the MIA. This is specifically provided for in para 24 of ARMA letter AD 001.713/189 OCT-0 of 15 Nov 44, which states, "The Carabinieri, except those units within Army Formations in role of Military Police, are a civil Police organization under the command of the Commanding General of the Carabinieri, and directed by the Public Safety Sub-Commission, A.O." The onus of responsibility is thus laid distinctly on the Public Safety Sub-Commission, with MIA as the supply agent. Any alteration in this subdivision of duties would have to be effected by ARMA altering the above paragraph of its directive.

(b) Though having certain advantages, the committee's proposals would in fact merely transfer some of the existing responsibilities from Public Safety to Land Forces Sub Commission with further divided control.

(c) The real answer would seem to be to have the whole command, training and administration of both the State (C.C.M.) and local police forces under one head. Otherwise the two police forces cannot be fully integrated. As in ENGLAND, I think the Police Forces should be separate from the Army and under the Minister of the Interior. This of course would mean a radical break with Italian tradition, though that is not necessarily a point against it. It however would correspond with the existing set-up, where Public Safety Sub-Commission (the counterpart of the Minister of the Interior) should do the job. MIA merely being the supply agent owing to the special supply conditions obtaining in this theatre in this time of war.

(d) My representative on the Committee stated before it that MIA had neither the time or the staff at present to take on any large extra commitment, particularly with the uncharted problems of NORTH ITALY before us. Nor do I think would ARMA agree of a similar situation "vis a vis" Prisoners of War.

Major General  
M.A.I.A.

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECRETREPORT ON REORGANIZATION OF THE CARABINIERI  
AND OTHER POLICE FORCES OF ITALY

R/0010

7 April 1945

APR 10 1945

INTRODUCTION

The Committee is sensitive to the realization that the most basic need for the achievement and maintenance of a sound democracy in Italy is law and order. During these months, even with the presence of thousands of Allied military personnel, law and order has been weak. Progress has been made in the moral and physical rehabilitation of the police forces, but the progress has been slow. Certainly, the progress has not kept pace with the economic and social forces which foment crimes of violence and political disorders.

The Committee believes that the United States and Great Britain are genuinely interested in helping Italy to establish itself as a sound democracy. Hence, our two nations must be vitally concerned with the improvement of the Carabinieri and other police forces in Italy. Only if our two nations are not interested in the internal peace of Italy at the cessation of military operations can the following recommendations be ignored.

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

- a. "Is it desirable and feasible, in the light of the "New Deal for Italy" and of the existing situation, for the Carabinieri to be reorganized at this time?"

The Committee answers that it is desirable and feasible. There is no explicit inhibition in the directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff (FAN L87). There is ample latitude in the directive to permit the Allied Commission to assume a live interest and to undertake concrete steps to assist in the reorganization of the Carabinieri and the other police forces. In paragraph one of the directive, a specific reservation of the powers contained in the Armistice and surrender instrument is made for any case in which military needs are involved. Inasmuch as the Carabinieri are inextricably linked with the Italian War Ministry, sound basis can be found for any action on the part of the Allied Commission. Paragraph 3(b) of the directive does not prevent the effectuation of any of the recommendations made by the Committee. The directive contemplates that law and order is fundamental that the police forces of Italy, both in Italian Government territory and AMG territory, are entrusted and that accordingly the Public Safety Sub-Commission has a wide scope of authority and responsibility. There is nothing in the directive which pares the authority and responsibility of the Land Forces Sub-Commission.

The Committee realizes that a heavy strain will be placed on all police forces as soon as Northern Italy is liberated. However, it is the judgment of the Committee that a substantial program of reorganization can be instituted and carried out even in the face of the situation that will develop in the North. The Committee feels that it is not too late for the Allied Commission to undertake the steps proposed in this report.

- b. "If such reorganization is made, what procedure should be adopted with respect to the Italian Government in bringing this about."

The Committee recommends that the Chief Commissioner confer with the Prime Minister

with the purpose of presenting to the Prime Minister the Allied Commission's appraisal of the weakness of the Carabinieri and of the other police forces and the great need of their revitalization. The Chief Commissioner should ask the Prime Minister to have the Italian Government, and not merely the Minister of War or the Minister of the Interior or the Head of the Carabinieri, prepare and submit to the Allied Commission a concrete plan for the reorganization of the Italian police forces. The concrete plan should be discussed, formulated, and approved by the entire cabinet, and be submitted to the Allied Commission as a cabinet paper. One reason for this is to obtain in advance the agreement of the various ministers representing different political attitudes. Once the cabinet plan is submitted, the Allied Commission can take appropriate action.

The Public Safety Sub-Commission has, of course, been having conferences with General Brunetti, the Commanding General of the Carabinieri, and he is at the moment engaged in the preparation of a plan for the reorganization of the Carabinieri. The General intends to submit his plan to the Public Safety Sub-Commission. The Committee feels that, as indicated above, any plan submitted should come to the Allied Commission as a cabinet paper.

The Chief Commissioner should also point out to the Prime Minister that the cabinet paper ought to set forth not merely proposals of structural changes of the police forces, which may well be the temptation since it is the simplest task, but the paper should contain definite recommendations for the recruiting of new personnel, replacement of ineffective personnel, training, administration and discipline, and also moral strengthening of the police. The cabinet paper should likewise contain definite recommendations on the demarcation of responsibility between the Ministry of War and the Ministry of Interior with respect to training, administration and discipline, and particularly operational direction of the police forces. The Committee believes that the basic weakness of practical police operation in Italy is the divided responsibility. Technically, the Questura has authority operationally over the Carabinieri, but practically it is most difficult to achieve. The Italian Cabinet ought to focus its attention on this basic weakness of Italian law enforcement.

*both as regards personnel and equipment,*  
The cabinet paper should also set forth specifically to what extent the Italian Government desires the assistance of the Allied Commission and, also, whether it believes that a special commission of Allied experts - Allied Police Mission - would be desired by the Italian Government.

- c. "If such reorganization is effected, should the organization, training, administration and discipline of the Carabinieri be made the responsibility in this Commission of the Land Forces Sub-Commission or the Public Safety Sub-Commission?"

The Committee believes that the respective responsibilities of the Land Forces Sub-Commission and the Public Safety Sub-Commission should correspond exactly with those of the War Ministry and Ministry of the Interior of the Italian Government. In the performance of the functions of these two Commissions, this line has not been followed in the past. As a result, many tasks which should have been performed have been totally ignored through no fault of either sub-commission.

The Chief Commissioner should issue a directive defining the responsibilities of the two sub-commissions in accordance with the recommendations made above. In other words, this directive would make the organization, training, administration and discipline of the Carabinieri a responsibility of the Land Forces Sub-Commission. The Public Safety Sub-Commission would be concerned only with the operational performance of the Carabinieri as a law enforcement agency. For instance, up to the present time there has not really been an effective job done by either sub-commission in following through and inspecting what occurs in the clothing, *food,* arming, and feeding of the Carabinieri. The Land Forces Sub-Commission has not undertaken the task as it does with regular units of the Army. On the other hand, the

Public Safety Sub-Commission has not assumed the task because it lacks the authority inasmuch as those matters come under the authority of the Italian Ministry of War. And with this Ministry, the Public Safety Sub-Commission does not deal.

Once the Italian Government submits its concrete plan for the reorganization of the Carabinieri and other police forces, and a new line of demarcation is proposed by the Italian Government between its Ministry of War and its Ministry of the Interior, the Allied Commission in its work can make corresponding changes with respect to the duties of the Land Forces Sub-Commission and the Public Sub-Commission.

- d. "What steps, if any, should be taken to coordinate the reorganization of other police forces, specifically the Metropolitan and Public Security Guard, with the reorganization of the Carabinieri."

The Committee is of the opinion that the reorganization of the members of the Guardia Nazionale, formerly the Agents of Public Security, is more urgent and vital even than that of the Carabinieri. The Guardia Nazionale has proven in practical operation to be a weak and ineffective force. The Committee recommends that the Chief Commissioner ask the Italian Government to include in a cabinet paper a plan for the reorganization of the Guardia Nazionale. The Committee sees no reason why a reorganization of both the Carabinieri and Guardia Nazionale cannot proceed simultaneously. The Committee makes no recommendation in respect to the Royal Guardia di Finanza or the Guardia Forestale.

Charles P. Latta, Col.  
W. P. Parley, Colonel.  
John W. Chapman, Col.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

60

Ref: 3626/52/KO.

HEF/ard  
3 April 1945

Subject: Appointment of Heads of Carabinieri in the North  
To : Vice President, Civil Affairs Section

At a recent meeting of the Prime Minister with the Regional Commissioners of Northern Regions, the question was raised as to the appointment of Heads of the Carabinieri in the North. It is presumed that the organization of the Carabinieri in the North will follow the former Italian pattern of territorial legions. Will you let me know what this territorial organization is and how it is proposed that the leaders be selected and appointed. Also, to what extent individuals have already been designated.

NORMAN E. FISKE  
NORMAN E. FISKE  
Colonel  
Acting Executive Commissioner

sub 73

BU 9/12  
4  
noted  
8/23/45

RESTRICTED

FX 52445  
MARCH 30/1945

3626.

D/6471  
MARCH 31/0910  
PRIORITY

AFHQ SIGNED ALEXANDER CITE FREEO

MAR 31 1945

ACTION: TROOPERS LONDON INFO: ALCON ROME

RESTRICTED.

Reur 79195 CA 28 of 23 March.

Noted with satisfaction you agree to receive Italian Police experts but request the visit be not delayed until June and that it be authorized for earliest possible date before then.

Reasons are:

(A) Some 8000 sets fingerprints already collected and numbers likely to increase rapidly. The longer the visit to ENGLAND is delayed the greater will be numbers of prints which will have to be reclassified if 'HENRY' system is ultimately adopted and process of transition will become progressively more difficult.

(B) Formation of modern criminal record system much easier if undertaken immediately rather than when large number of files have been accumulated. Moreover plans for general reorganization Italian Central Criminal Record Office and provincial offices must remain in suspense pending the result of visit.

Request in light of above you state soonest date on which you can receive the mission

DIST

INFO-ACTION : P SAFETY  
INFO : A/PRESIDENT  
CHIEF COMMISSIONER-  
EX-00000000  
CA SEC  
FILE (2)  
FLOAT

RESTRICTED

~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref: 3626/43/KC

30 March 1945

Memorandum:

1. A committee is appointed consisting of the following officers, to meet at the call of the Chairman thereof, for the purpose of examining the question of reorganization of the Carabinieri and other police forces.

Colonel Charles Poletti - Chairman  
Colonel John W. Chapman  
Colonel W. G. Fideley

2. The committee, in reporting its recommendations, will consider the following:

a. Is it desirable and feasible, in the light of the "New Deal for Italy" and of the existing situation, for the Carabinieri to be reorganized at this time?

b. If such reorganization is made, what procedure should be adopted with respect to the Italian Government in bringing this about.

c. If such reorganization is effected, should the organization, training, administration and discipline of the Carabinieri be made the responsibility in this Commission of the Land Forces Subcommittee or the Public Safety Subcommittee.

d. What steps, if any, should be taken to coordinate the reorganization of other police forces, specifically the Metropolitan and Public Security Guard, with the reorganization of the Carabinieri.

3. The committee will consider this matter as highly confidential and urgent. A report by 3 April is desired.

By command of Rear Admiral STONE:

*Norman E. Fiske*  
NORMAN E. FISKE  
Colonel  
Acting Executive Commissioner

~~SECRET~~

56

6/9/4  
M 57  
PA 332  
8/3

RECEIVED

NOV 1964

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

DETAINMENT:

Colonel Charles Colletti, LAMIA-REMA Region.

" John W. Chapman, Public Safety Sub-Commission.

" W.C. Pridley, Land Forces Sub-Commission (REMA)

Civil Affairs Section.

Public Safety Sub-Commission.

3627

JAG/hjp

54

29 March 1945

MAR 29 1945

51

MEMO TO: Civil Affairs Section, Hq A.C.  
(Attention: Col. Cripps)

1. A letter from Sig. Bonomi to the Chief Commissioner, No. 258 (Presidency of the Council of Ministers) of 26 March 1945, on the subject of improvements in the Police Force, was passed for action to Civil Affairs Section on the 27th of March.
2. This letter begins "In accordance with your kind request," and it should be explained that these words refer to a personal conversation between the Prime Minister and Admiral Stone.
3. The Chief Commissioner suggests that if the Polatti Committee on CC.RR. has been appointed then Bonomi's letter and its attachment might be included for consideration by the Committee under its terms of reference.

*J. A. Quayle*  
J. A. QUAYLE  
Major, R. A.  
Staff Officer to CC

*B/L/TH*  
*note g*  
*3/4*

Copy to Ex. Com. ✓

5531

*(this is a copy)*

785017

translation

3627

EXEC COMMR

(51)

The President of the Council of Ministers  
2/8

Rome, 26 March 1945

MARK 28 1945

18-50

Dear Admiral,

In accordance with your kind request, I enclose a note showing the action and means required to reinforce without delay the police force; this is more than ever urgent nowadays, since the Allied force left the greater part of the administration of the liberated provinces to the responsibility of the Italian Government, and also because public order will be faced with difficult times when North Italy will be liberated.

see 5H.

Trusting in the kind interest of the Allied Commission, I thank you and remain,

Yours truly,

G. I. Bonomi

Admiral Ellery W. Stone  
Chief of the Allied Commission  
R O M E

see M 5253

PA 31, 1/2

G.O.

1 C DIST - 27 Mar.

ACTION: CA SEC

INFO: CHIEF COMMR

: EXEC COMMR

5530

PA

Translation

50

SANITARY SUPPLIES AND RELIEF

The fact of treating differently the RR. CC. Corps and the P.S. Guardia Corps (and the Royal Guardia di Finanza) is a cause of trouble and dissatisfaction which is prejudicial to the collaboration between the Police Forces.

In fact, because of the regulation putting these last Forces on civilian rations, P.S. Guards (and the Guardia di Finanza) get a food ration which is considerably inferior in quantity as well as in quality to that which is allotted to the RR. CC.

The same rule established that the P.S. Guardia are not admitted (in opposition to what was formerly done) in military nursing homes nor are they entitled to the medicines supplied by the military authorities, which means that they have got to go to civilian hospitals which do not always have free beds, and which, as it is well known, dispose of very few means; civilian patients can make up for these deficiencies with what they get from their families, but the Guardia, especially the unmarried ones, find themselves in a state of inferiority. As for medicines, they have to buy them on the market, where they are expensive.

It is clear that all that this difference of treatment has as influence on the moral of the Guardia, and hurts their pride for they know they are exposed to the same dangers and to the same responsibilities.

It must also be noted that the oats and fodder rations of the horses of the horse guards have been greatly reduced and are now quite insufficient, so that it was necessary to take special action to prevent their loss.

BARRACKS

It is indispensable that the P.C. units should get barracks, this for discipline as well as for their employment. Not only in Rome, but everywhere else, the Guards live isolatedly outside the barracks, without the necessary surveillance and military discipline, and in an emergency, it is difficult to collect the forces which are to be employed. These inconveniences are greater in Rome. It is therefore most important that in Rome, large barracks should be put at the disposal of the P.S. Guardia; these barracks ought to have at least two thousand beds, and constitute the nucleus of the police forces and the Guardia ought to be able to get trained and militarized there.

It is also necessary that one at least of the vicinale buildings, which are at present occupied by the Allies, should be given back, to be turned into barracks again for the unit which is on duty in the Interior Department. It is also necessary that the Caserta Police School premises, (at present occupied by the British Navy), should be given back; they are indispensable for the re-aperture of the school for non commissioned officers for which we have no premises.

5329

they have to buy them on the market, where they are expensive.

It is clear that all that this difference of treatment has an influence on the moral of the Guardia, and hurts their pride for they know they are exposed to the same dangers and to the same responsibilities.

It must also be noted that the oats and fodder rations of the horses of the Guardia have been greatly reduced and are now quite insufficient, so that it was necessary to take special action to prevent their loss.

#### BARRACKS

It is indispensable that the P.S. units should get barracks, this for discipline as well as for their employment. Not only in Rome, but everywhere else, the Guards live isolated outside the barracks, without the necessary surveillance and military discipline, and in an emergency, it is difficult to collect the forces which are to be employed. These inconveniences are greater in Rome. It is therefore most important that in Rome, large barracks should be put at the disposal of the P.S. Guardia; these barracks ought to have at least two thousand beds, and constitute the nucleus of the police forces and the Guardia ought to be able to get trained and militarized there.

It is also necessary that one at least of the Viminale buildings, which are at present occupied by the Allies, should be given back, to be turned into barracks again for the unit which is on duty in the Interior Department. It is also necessary that the Caserta Police School premises, at present occupied by the British Navy, should be given back; they are indispensable for the re-aperture of the School for non commissioned officers for which we have no premises.

5329

#### BARRACKS & EQUIPMENT

The construction of camp beds presents great difficulties; we require at least two thousand of them for Rome only.

#### WEAPONS

At present, the P.S. Guardia's armament is not complete. For a force of about 24,000 men between the present effective and those who will be enrolled in the railroad police which is being formed, to obtain an equipment which will enable to employ all the units, in such a way that they would all be armed at the same time, the following items are required:

|                                       |             |
|---------------------------------------|-------------|
| Guns, mod. 91, with bayonet, cal. 6,5 | a. 11,000 - |
| Automatic Beretta guns cal. 9         | 9,000 -     |
| Automatic Beretta pistols, cal. 9     | 11,000 -    |
| Hand grenades                         | 5,000 -     |
| Cartridges for mod. 91 guns, cal 6,5  | 100,000 -   |

785017

Cartridges for Beretta pistol cal. 9 n. 250,000 -  
 Cartridges for Grede automatic gun n. 37, cal. 8 100,000 -  
 C " " " n. 30, cal. 6.50 200,000 -

Also indispensable:

Lapromators 10,000 -  
 'Sfolaganti' 15,000 -

The equipment problem is urgent for nothing is more demoralizing for police agents than knowing that the citizens are better armed than they are.

### CLOTHING

To dress in uniform ten thousand Guardia only, the clothing requirement would be the following:

|                                                                       |          |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|
| Cloth uniforms (material, lining, sewing material, buttons) n.        | 12,000 - |
| Coats (with material, etc)                                            | 6,000 -  |
| Waterproofs                                                           | 10,000 - |
| Short waterproof coats (material, etc) for cyclists                   | 700 -    |
| Waterproof uniforms for motorcycle drivers                            | 600 -    |
| Leather jackets for drivers and motorcycle drivers                    | 8,000 -  |
| Spolverini (material)                                                 | 600 -    |
| Coats for riding agents (material, etc.)                              | 300 -    |
| Cloth caps                                                            | 8,000 -  |
| Cloth hats                                                            | 8,000 -  |
| linen hats                                                            | 10,000 - |
| Pairs of shoes (plus top boots and leggings in the proportion of 1/3) | 15,000 - |
| Leggings (bands)                                                      | 8,000 -  |
| Gray-green shirts                                                     | 25,000 - |
| linen shorts                                                          | 25,000 - |
| Woolen sweaters                                                       | 25,000 - |
| Sweaters and shorts for gpm.                                          | 25,000 - |
| Belts                                                                 | 25,000 - |
| Stockings                                                             | 20,000 - |
| Handkerchiefs                                                         | 20,000 - |
| Thick sweaters for cyclists and motorcycle drivers                    | 700 -    |
| Black leather belts                                                   | 10,000 - |
| Trousers belts                                                        | 10,000 - |
| Sheets (pairs)                                                        | 20,000 - |

The material, lining, buttons, sewing material, leather, etc. required to make the above mentioned pieces of clothing should therefore be supplied.

BICYCLES AND MOTORBICYCLES

|                                                                      |          |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|
| Coats (with material, etc)                                           | 12,000 - |
| Waterproofs                                                          | 6,000 -  |
| Short waterproof coats (material, etc) for cyclists                  | 10,000 - |
| Waterproof uniforms for motorbicycle drivers                         | 700 -    |
| Leather jackets for drivers and motorbicycle drivers                 | 600 -    |
| Spolverini (material)                                                | 8,000 -  |
| Coats for riding agents (material, etc.)                             | 600 -    |
| Cloth caps                                                           | 300 -    |
| Cloth hats                                                           | 8,000 -  |
| Linen hats                                                           | 8,000 -  |
| Pairs of shoes (plus top boots and leggings in the proportion of 1%) | 10,000 - |
| Leggings (bands)                                                     | 15,000 - |
| Grey-green shirts                                                    | 8,000 -  |
| Linen shorts                                                         | 25,000 - |
| Woolen sweaters                                                      | 25,000 - |
| Sweaters and shorts for gym.                                         | 25,000 - |
| Belts                                                                | 25,000 - |
| Stockings                                                            | 25,000 - |
| Bandkerchiefs                                                        | 50,000 - |
| Thick sweaters for cyclists and motorbicycle drivers                 | 50,000 - |
| Black leather belts                                                  | 700 -    |
| Trousers belts                                                       | 10,000 - |
| Shirts (pairs)                                                       | 10,000 - |
|                                                                      | 20,000 - |

The material, lining, buttons, sewing material, leather, etc. required to make the above mentioned pieces of clothing should therefore be supplied.

#### BICYCLES AND MOTORBICYCLES

As the bicycles and motorbicycles were damaged or requisitioned by the Nazi-fascists, and as the manufactures which made them are closed, the P.S. Guardia or hasn't got these vehicles which are indispensable for police operations. A hundred motorbicycles and a thousand bicycles are therefore required as well as an adequate number of tyres.

#### VEHICLES

The problem of vehicles is most serious and urgent, the more so as the Allies go on requisitioning. From all the questions, especially from those of Sicily and Sardinia, we hear that the necessary vehicles are almost entirely lacking for police operations, as well as for the requirements of the various units.

To supply vehicles and accessories, tyres especially, is now impossible for they cannot be bought on the market. The police units cannot therefore perform the necessary operations, especially in Sicily, Sardinia, and Calabria, where it is obviously necessary to curb dangerous manifestations of banditism which require rapid movements of forces.

48. long  
To avoid all police activity coming to an end/outside small inhabited centres and even inside large inhabited centres, it is therefore necessary for three trucks for troop transport, and a car for functionaries to be allotted to every questura of small importance. As for the more important questura, like those of Catania, Palermo, Messina, Reggio Calabria, Naples, Bari, Rome, Cagliari, Ancona, Florence, the allotment should be much greater, in accordance with the relative populations.

In Rome, it is also necessary that the Allied Authorities should hand over the Via Tuscolana Campanella pool, which is the only organization for the custody, maintenance and repairing of vehicles.

This is all the more necessary because of the fact that numerous armed cars are being repaired and put at the disposal of the police; these cars require a special maintenance.

An adequate allotment of tyres, which are now impossible to find on the market, is required for the functioning of the numerous vehicles in the provinces as well as in the Capital.

We point out that the immediate requirements would be covered, should the Allies derequisition the vehicles requisitioned from the Italian Government, as long as these vehicles are in good conditions.

#### FUEL AND LUBRICATOR

At present, the Rome police gets a monthly allotment of a hundred liters oil for each of its vehicles: this is quite inadequate for the requirements of the units and offices. A stock of oil and lubricators ought to be constituted to enable to face the unforeseen requirements of police operations. -

(45)

From -

Ce wants Col Pelette  
as chairman - I don't know  
Pat day & hand person  
nominate an officer and  
drop term of reference for  
the Committee -

24/2

↓

see M.H.

3528

MAR 19 1945  
CC 724

## ADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

A P O 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref: 3636/12/100.

Chief Commissioner.

13th March 1945.

1. Some weeks ago I addressed you on the subject of the inefficiency of the CC.M. and gave as my opinion that we, the Allies, might perhaps have helped more in the past and might yet do so in the future in the way of training the CC.M. and other police agencies in their duties. Discussions with VP, CA Section and the Director of the Public Safety Sub-Commission led us to some and the matter dropped. (The paragraphs below are not intended to level criticism at the Public Safety Sub-Commission).

2. The contents of the whole of this file (ROAFCA case) compel me to bring the matter to your notice again. As the VP, CA Section comments on the report on the Vindale incident "the inefficiency is appalling". This has been proved repeatedly and in my opinion the time has come when, at the expense of going outside the terms of the directive, we must take action.

3. In the first place the CC.M. need much improvement (it is true they were not concerned in the Vindale case). The Italian Army has reconstituted itself, and to a certain extent redeemed itself by efficient work in the rear areas and adequate conduct in battle. There are many weaknesses but the former is a going concern.

4. The CC.M., part of the Army, have not achieved the same success. True their task has been more difficult: their priority in receiving equipment, etc., lower; their training more complex. But we should, I think, ask ourselves whether our treatment of the force has been successful: whether we have infused it with the degree of efficiency and enthusiasm which is apparent in the Italian Army. If we find that our treatment has been at fault we should find a new method.

5. I believe we have been at fault: that we have fallen between two stools: that we have not handled the CC.M. vigorously enough in AMC and have dropped the reins too hastily. Some of these emblems may be laid at the door of Allied policy. But the result is what we read in such files as the ROAFCA case.

6. I submit two alternative remedies:

785017

7. The contents of the whole of this file (ROMITA case) compel me to bring the matter to your notice again. As the VP, SA Section comments on the report on the Visinale incident "the inconsistency is appalling". This has been proved repeatedly and in my opinion the time has come when, at the expense of going outside the terms of the directive, we must take action.

3. In the first place the CC.MR need such improvement (it is true they were not concerned in the Visinale case). The Italian Army has reconstituted itself, and to a certain extent redeemed itself by efficient work in the rear areas and adequate conduct in battle. There are many weaknesses but the force is a going concern.

4. The CC.MR, part of the Army, have not achieved the same success. True their task has been more difficult: their priority in receiving equipment, etc., lower; their training more complex. But we should, I think, ask ourselves whether our treatment of the force has been successful: whether we have imbued it with the degree of efficiency and enthusiasm which is apparent in the Italian Army. If we find that our treatment has been at fault we should find a new method.

5. I believe we have been at fault: that we have fallen between two stools: that we have not handled the CC.MR vigorously enough in AMC and have dropped the reins too hastily. Some of these omissions may be laid at the door of Allied policy. But the result is what we read in such files as the ROMITA case.

6. I admit two alternative remedies:

(a) We could hand over the training, equipping and general reconstitution of the CC.MR to the Ministry of War and Land Forces Sub-Commission (to whom one or two officers of the Public Safety Sub-Commission might be attached). In this way they would be secured equal treatment with the rest of the Italian Army: would enjoy the same regard from the Land Forces Sub-Commission and would greatly benefit therefrom. Moreover, the Land Forces Sub-Commission in its capacity as ALIA transmits ALLIED'S ORDERS to the Italian Army, in no uncertain terms, and sees that they are carried out. They are in fact (in this sense) a Military Mission.

The Public Safety Sub-Commission would then concern itself with (i) the other police agencies; (ii) the location of the CC.MR in accordance with general public safety requirements.

(b) We could persuade the Italian Government to accept and set up an Allied Police Mission for the immediate reorganisation of the Police Forces of the country including the CC.MR. This Mission would have the authority to operate in an executive manner in Italian

-2-

(41)

Government as well as AMI territory, insofar as the organization and functions of the Police Forces were concerned. (A Police Mission has recently been set up in GREECE, we might well follow the same lines).

7. Without complacency I am satisfied with much of our work in AG but I feel that we must share with the Italian Government the onus of the existing inefficiency of the Police Forces and it is our duty to remedy the situation without fail.

8. I suggest a sub-committee under the chairmanship of Brigadier GARR with members from Public Safety and Land Forces sub-Commissions should be set up to review the matter and make recommendations.

MSL/JG.

MSL 5521  
Brigadier,  
Executive Commissioner.

3625 *for* COS. 9361  
SUBJECT: Mobile CC. 4 Battalion for SARDINIA ~~SECRET~~ (35)

Land Forces Sub Com, A.C.  
(M.E.I.A.)

SD/28

2 Feb. 1945.

To : Public Safety Sub Com, A.C.

Copy to: Chief of Staff Section, A.C. ←  
MMIA IO SARDINIA  
Regional Commissioner, SARDINIA.

(31) FEB 4 1945

Further to MMIA SD/28 of 24 Jan 45.

1. It is now learned verbally from A.F.H.Q. that, in approx 2 or 3 months, when the need for a Mobile Coln CC.BR in SARDINIA has died, the ~~the~~ will be withdrawn and shipping arranged to the Mainland for employment of *of* in any N.W. ITALY.

trc.SMT.

*S. M. Fyfe*  
Major General.  
M.E.I.A.

Int: AQ.  
ST  
War Diary (2)  
CIRC.  
B/S.

3625

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Chief of Staff

Ref: 3626/CCS.

27 January 1945.

Chief Commissioner.

1. I have been concerned for some time as to the relations of the Public Safety Sub-Com and the Public Safety officers with the CC.RR. The CC.RR have a pretty bad name in this country, sometimes deservedly, as I think in Sicily, sometimes quite undeservedly. But whatever their ceremonial and parade ground training may be like, they are obviously woefully lacking in the more general police training particularly in dealing with disturbances, etc.

2. The CC.RR are part of the Italian Army. The Allied authorities, in their wisdom, have attached to Italian formations Allied training officers who help considerably with the training of personnel and are present in the combat groups and are very much part of the Italian Army units themselves. Is it not our duty through our Public Safety Sub-Commission to take the same role ~~and~~ rather than that Public Safety officers should be advisers to the Regional and Provincial Commissioners they should be definitely part of the CC.RR units, acting as training officers to the legions and the smaller formations of the CC.RR. The presence of such officers in such a capacity could in no wise be taken as re-assuming control but would, in my opinion, do much to help the CC.RR and fill a gap for which I for one feel a certain responsibility. In other words, I think our Public Safety Sub-Commission both at HQ and in the field want to concentrate far more on the training as well as the equipment of the CC.RR and so by this means effect a better security organisation throughout the country.

3. I think this might be discussed with CA Section and Public Safety Sub-Commission.

I agree. Pls do

MSL/JG.

Copy to: DCCS, CA Sec.

MSL  
Brigadier,  
Chief of Staff.

PA 5022  
2/2

3626  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
**SECRET**

(31)

SUBJECT: Mobile CoAR Battalion for SARDINIA.

LAND FORCES SUB-COM. A.C.  
(M.E.I.A.)

24 JAN 45

JAN 23 1945

TO : Public Safety Sub-Com. A.C.

Copy to: Chief of Staff Section, A.C.  
MIA LO SARDINIA Regional Commissioner SARDINIA

Ref MIA SB/28 of 11 Jan 45.

1. AFHQ has authorized the formation of a mobile CARABINIERI Bn for use in SARDINIA on the same lines as the two Bns now operating in SICILY (AGC 12/051 OCT-9 of 19 Jan).
2. The unit is to be formed within the existing CC.RR. ceiling, and authority has been given for the issue of 12 A.P.V.'s, and of 12 x 3 ton vehicles or loan from Italian Army resources in the island, until such time as CC.RR. obtain their own vehicles. A provisional time limit of one month is hereby agreed.
3. It is requested that A.C. Commissioner SARDINIA contact the MIA BC in island to arrange the transfer of suitable vehicles.

*[Signature]*  
Major General  
M.E.I.A.

INTERNAL:

A/1

ST

War Diary (2)

*see Miale 32*  
5521

785017

3626

28

Land Forces  
Sub Commission, AG (MMIA)  
Rome  
SD/28

17 January 1945

26

My dear: Lush

JAN 16 1945

Your 3626/26/COS of 15 Jan 45.

1. I'm afraid I don't agree.
2. You decided to have a mobile CC.RR unit in SARDINIA.

Your Public Safety Sub Commission wanted certain equipment. MMIA (not Land Forces Sub Commission) is the channel for provision of equipment, so your P.S.S.C. came to us and said, "Can we have it?" We said, "Yes - provided that AFHQ agree. We'll ask AFHQ" - which we did.

When we get the reply, we'll go <sup>direct</sup> ~~about~~ to your P.S.S.C. and arrange details.

3. Coordination is thus fully effective this end.

As MMIA is the supply executive directly under AFHQ, by MMIA going ~~direct~~ (as we did) direct to the appropriate section of AFHQ, we all save TIME.

Otherwise, if MMIA did not write, your P.S.S.C. would have to go to G-5, who would have to go to another section of AFHQ to authorize supply, i.e. the coordination would be done at AFHQ instead of, as it has been, here.

4. I honestly think that MMIA SD/28 of 11 Jan showed that we had coordinated this end, and that MMIA was merely asking for a supply authorization so that the whole thing could be tied up swiftly this end.

Yours, Sir

Langley Browning

Brig M. S. LUSH, CB, CBE, M.C.

Chief of Staff

Allied Commission

Bv 72/1 5520  
Hobbs

785017

3626

27

ALCOM SARDINIA REGION FOR REGIONAL COMMISSIONER

9865

13

PRIORITY

JAN 16 1945

SECRET PD

CONFIDENTIAL  
PARA ONE PD CALL UP FOR ITALIAN ARMY WILL PROBABLY TAKE PLACE IN SARDINIA  
ON FIRST FEBRUARY PARA FIVE AND CONTINUE FOR TWO MONTHS PD ONE NINE ONE  
FOUR DASH ONE NINE TWO FOUR AGE GROUPS AFFECTED PD YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO  
INFORM HIGH COMMISSIONER PD

PARA TEN ALCOM SARDINIA REGION FROM HQ ALCOM PAREN

PARA TWO PD TEN THOUSAND MEN ARE REQUIRED IN EACH MONTH PD

PARA THREE PD CHARLIE CHARLIE ROGER ROGER MOBILE BATTALION BEING FORMED WITH  
TWELVE THREE TON TRUCKS AND TWELVE ARMORED VEHICLES TO BE ALLOTTED BY LAND  
FORCES SUB COMMISSION

21-fer

Distribution:

CC GCS  
FED SAFETY  
LAND FORCES 3/C

CA HBC

437

R. R. CHIFFS, COL.

NICHOLAS PICCOLINO  
CEO, USA, ASST ADJUTANT

ACTION copy *Land Forces* 525/40  
INFO *Earlier Distribution* 36/8/45

5519

*PA*

*Seen by [unclear]*

*17*

CONFIDENTIAL (20)

Ref: 3626/25/008.

15th January 1945.

You will have received my memorandum on the necessity of coordination between Sub-Commissions on various subjects which are cognate with two or more Sub-Commissions. (51)

My attention has been drawn to your letter SD/28 of 11th January regarding mobile Carabinieri.

In this case it would, I think, have helped AFM if the letter had gone from the Chief Commissioner on the lines that:

- (a) it had been decided to form a mobile Carabinieri battalion (para 1);
- (b) the total commitments would be as stated;
- (c) if agreement was given to the proposal, Land Forces Sub-Commission could make the necessary arrangements (para 3);
- (d) asking for approval.

I think we are in danger of giving AFM the impression that coordination here is lacking and thereby giving them the responsibility of deciding priorities which should be done here in the Commission.

Do you agree?

M S 1945

see 28

Major General L. Browning, CB, CBE, MC,  
General Officer Commanding,  
Land Forces Sub-Commission (SMIA).

SH/X.

Seen by H. Tallant  
5518

3626  
SUBJECT: Mobile CC.BR. Bn for SARDINIA.

~~SECRET~~  
CONFIDENTIAL  
LAND FORCES SUB-COR. A.C.  
(S.F.L.A.)

SD/28

11 JAN 45

JAN 13 1945

TO : AFHQ.

Copy to: Public Safety Sub Cor. A.C.,  
Chief of Staff Section A.C.  
-----

see 31

Ref this HQ letter SD/28 of 19 Dec 44 and your  
AG 614.12/253 GGT-C of 26 Dec 44.

1. A request has now been received from Public Safety Sub Cor. A.C. for a mobile CAMOUFLAGE Bn to be formed, for use in SARDINIA, on the same lines as the two Bns in SICILY.
2. The total commitment for this Bn would be 12 Italian Arm'd Veba or light tanks and 12 Italian 3-ton Veba (excl 1 car).
3. Will you please state if you agree to this proposal, when arrangements will be made by this HQ for 12 Arm'd Veba to be made immediately available from SARDINIA and for 12 3-ton veba to be loaned from Italian Army sources until CC.BR. obtain their own veba.
4. In view of the fact that a call-up is due to take place in SARDINIA next month, will you please forward your reply as soon as possible.

*L.M. Ingleson*  
Major General  
S.F.L.A.

INTERNAL: A/C  
BT  
War Diary (2)

see number 22 to 24 9 25

5517

ALCON SICILY REGION ATTENTION REBU

9504

8/1/45

PRIORITY

JAN - 9 1945

MEMORANDUM TO

FROM ONE TO TWO FOUR TRUCKS FOR MORTAR BATTALIONS QUARTER SUPPLY ROGER ROGER  
HAVE BEEN SENT FROM NALES TO SICILY TO

FROM TO ALCON SICILY REGION ATTENTION REBU FROM HQ ALCON TARKER TO

FROM TWO TO SIX TRUCKS LEFT ON SIX JANUARY FORTY FIVE ON SIX OR SEVEN  
JANUARY FORTY FIVE FOR PALERMO TO

FROM THREE TO ONE TWO TRUCKS LEFT ON EIGHT JANUARY FORTY FIVE FOR CATANIA TO

FROM FOUR TO ONE TWO ARMORED VEHICLES WILL BE SENT FROM SANDINIA AND

ONE TWO FROM LEGGE TO DATE NOT YET FIXED TO

FROM FIVE TO SIX ARMORED VEHICLES LEFT HOME ON FIVE JANUARY FORTY FIVE  
BY RAIL FOR PALERMO TO THESE WILL BE RETURNED WHEN OTHER VEHICLES ARRIVE  
FROM SANDINIA AND LEGGE. TO

Internal C.C.

C.O.S. ✓

C.A.

Public Safety Sub-Commission

Ext 502

F.J. WILSON Maj.

5518

cc Minute 20

PA 10/1

Translation

The President of the Council of Ministers  
Minister of the Interior

Paris, October 20th 1944

Dear Admiral,

Thank you for the interest you so kindly took in the  
activity and functioning of the French police, to the reorganization  
of which I had been thinking for a long time.

It is understood that the police too should have felt the need and im-  
portant effects of the deep changes that the nation has lately been sub-  
mitted to, and which have disorganized it and diminished its prestige,  
and above all attacked its material and disciplinary frame; it has no-  
tably reduced the means that it has used of, with which it had surrounded on  
its activity. On the other hand, it must be observed that though the  
police is less efficient, the need for it has greatly increased, this be-  
cause of the state of war and because of the economic crisis that the na-  
tion has to cope with, so that its activity is now diminished in the  
absolute sense of the word than relatively to its necessary power or its  
needs, therefore, more extremely than formerly.

To obtain that, in the changed political situation, the police should  
get a maximum of power and adequately fulfill all the requirements of its  
various services, a complete reform is necessary. This reform would re-  
organize the police according to new criteria adapted to the present  
time; as you acknowledged, as an organization would require a long and  
careful study, for it would have to deal not only with the chief traits of  
its functioning, but also with the smallest particulars. Obviously, it  
is necessary that the police should be put in a position which will enable  
it to cope with the present difficult situation of public safety, which  
is getting more and more insistent.

As you are well aware, there are several police corps, but it is quite  
certain that there are prejudicial interferences and superposition of power among  
them, for every one of them, according to its constitutive law and the relative  
regulations, has specific and well defined duties. If there are some de-  
ficiencies in their relations, and therefore, in the activity of the police  
as a whole, this is to be ascribed, as I have already said, principally to the  
present situation which has had repercussions on the functioning of this  
delicate organ.

Among these Corps, the P.S. Agents Corps, with its 250,000 functionaries,  
depends directly from the Interior Department, for all services of public  
order, judicial police, and administrative police; the G.C.M. are de-  
pendent of the same Ministry, for the same services, except for those of admin-  
istrative police which require a special bureaucratic organization. The War

...incident, the need for it has greatly increased, this because of the stress of war and because of the economic crisis that the nation has to cope with, so that its activity is more diminished in the above sense of the word than relatively to its necessary power or its needs, therefore, more extremely than normally.

To obtain that, in the changed political situation, the police should get a minimum of power and adequately fulfill all the requirements of its various services, a complete reform is necessary. This reform would re-organize the police according to new criteria adapted to the present time; as you know, a police organization would require a long and careful study, for it would have to deal not only with the chief traits of its functioning, but also with the smallest particulars. Obviously, it is necessary that the police should be put in a position which will enable it to cope with the present difficult situation of public safety, which is getting more intense of better.

As you are well aware, there are several police corps, but it is quite untrue that there are prejudicial interferences and superposition of power among them, for every one of them, according to its constitutive law and the relative regulations, has specific and well defined duties. If there are some deficiencies in their relations, and therefore, in the activity of the police as a whole, this is to be ascribed, as I have already said, principally to the present situation which has had repercussions on the functioning of this delicate organ.

Among these Corps, the P.S. Agents Corps, with its various functions, depends directly from the Minister of the Interior, for all services of public order, judicial police, and administrative police; the M.R. Arm extends also of the same Ministry, for the same services, except for those of administrative police which require a special bureaucratic organization. The War Department has jurisdiction over the G.S. Arm only for services of a military character and for discipline, for the corps is part of the army. These two corps constitute the police in all its various aspects, and their interrelation has been conserved by a long tradition. The P.S. Agents Corps, directed by P.S. Investigators, functions mainly in the towns, or municipalities, of the province and of the nation P.S. offices, stationed in their centers of some importance; in the country, the G.S. Arm, functions mainly in rural centers, where numerous small garrisons are stationed; these are grouped under hierarchical commands under a General Directorate. Their singularity of action is regulated by the Chief of the Police, who has the general direction of all public safety services. As for the G. Guardia di Finanza, it depends from the Ministry of Finance, is in charge of customs practices and sees that that the various tributary laws, which are of the specific competence of this Ministry, are observed; under the competent military authorities, it contributes together with the other Army corps, to the military service of the frontiers.

The Guardia Forestale depends from the Ministry of Agriculture and Forests; its chief function is to see that the laws relative to the preservation of the forests which are a national patrimony should be observed; naturally it is only sent in forest zones. Nevertheless, in case of need, these two corps can also be employed in the services depending from the Ministry of the Interior, on the request, under orders and responsibility of their own Chief, the Carabinieri. Besides, the various corps do not exercise own activities. On the other hand, to see that the laws are respected, moreover they are, and they simply advise their chief, specializing in determining engineering, with better results for the services. In an emergency, they may use another, also by initiative of the minor commands. The result is that they fulfill their tasks separately in normal cases, and act under one direction only when special circumstances make it necessary.

I haven't completely seen the military police and of minor police, for they are independent of the Chief, and, anyway, if constituted, they would exercise their activity in a well determined field of action and under the direction of the Chief, offices which depend from the Interior Department.

In spite of all, it has gone through, the fact, of the police taken as a whole is still scarce, and doesn't lack very good elements among the agents and their respective commands, and must, making the functionaries, many of them own over-zealous not be used either because they are then transferred north, or because they are still submitted to a judgement of operation. If there are faults, they must be attributed to the general state of disorder in which the whole country finds itself; these faults come therefore from the difficulty the country has to get settled, and will therefore disappear, in great part, at the end of this crisis.

As I have already said, the Government exclude the need of a reform of the police on a large scale; the competent offices are making the necessary studies for its realization, while we have tried, naturally, to make all the possible modifications which could eliminate the more serious inconveniences and better the services, with responsibility with the lack of men and efficient means.

As soon as the crisis of 1940 will have reached a moderate phase, which will take a certain time - I will gladly follow your suggestion and entrust a commission with the task of examining them thoroughly and in detail; I shall be most glad if technical members of the Armed Forces will participate in it.

I remain,

Truly yours,

I haven't considered before the military police and other minor police, for they are laxest. I at present, and, anyway, if reestablished, they would exercise their activity in a well determined field of action and under the direction of the F.B.I. offices which depend from the Interior Department.

In spite of all it has gone through, the idea of the police takes as a whole is still sound, and doesn't lack very good elements among the agents and their respective commands, and finally, among the functionaries, many of whom are nevertheless not be used either because they have been transferred north, or because they are still submitted to a judgment of separation. If there are faults, they must be ascribed to the general state of disorder in which the whole country finds itself: these faults come therefore from the difficulty the country has to get settled, and will therefore disappear, in great part, at the end of this year.

As I have already said, this doesn't exclude the need of a reform of the police in large basis; the competent offices are making the necessary studies for its realization, while we have tried, meanwhile, to make all the possible modifications which could diminish the more serious inconveniences and better the services, with compatibility with the lack of men and sufficient means.

As soon as the first studies will have reached a concrete phase, which will take a certain time - I will gladly follow your suggestion and entrust a commission with the task of examining them thoroughly and in detail; I shall be most glad if technical members of the Allied Commission will participate in it.

I remain,

Truly yours,

A. J. Bonomi

S.S.

5011

B/V ~~Handwritten signature~~  
CofS II  
Action: C A Sec  
INFO: Chief Comm  
C of S

~~SECRET~~

2 30/28  
347.6

JAN - 4 1945

Copy to: AFHQ  
OCS SMC A.C.

1. AFHQ has approved the formation of two mobile OGRB Bns in SICILY as presented in NSIA letter SD/28 of 19 Dec 44.
2. The units will be formed within the existing OGRB authorized ceiling and equipped with Italian transport.
3. Twenty-four Italian Army three ton trucks are now being made ready in NAPLES for transfer, on a loan basis for a period of one month, by Mil Bq CAMPANIA to Hq OGRB, NAPLES. Trucks are to be requisitioned from civilian sources in SICILY for the mobile Bns. The Italian Army has bid for transportation for

12 light tanks from MESAGNE - SICILY  
6 road cars ROMA - SICILY\*  
12 light tanks ex SARDINIA

\*on loan pending arrival of tanks ex SANDWICH. Move by rail subject special authority being granted.

4. Please inform this HQ when civilian transportation has been requisitioned in SICILY to replace the twenty-four trucks on loan to CCR from Italian Army.

Major General  
U. S. I. A.

3606

13

AG/14507/2/18

31 Dec 44

My dear Mr Prime Minister,

I am writing to you in your capacity of Minister of the Interior to bring to your notice complaints which have been made about the inefficiency of the Italian police during recent disturbances which have taken place in Italy, and in particular in regard to those at Catania.

So far as these last disorders are concerned, it has been alleged, inter alia, that the police allowed the situation to get completely out of hand and took no measures whatever to deal with the comparatively small number of persons who were causing the trouble. For example, it is said that, during the disturbances, no policemen were to be seen in the streets; indeed, in at least one barracks, the Carabinieri had locked themselves in; the Lieutenant in charge explaining to an Allied Officer that because he had been ordered not to fire on the crowd he was unable to take any action. The Municipio was fired by not more than six persons, and the resulting conflagrations were not attended by the Fire Services, who were apparently afraid to venture from their Stations.

These complaints, serious in themselves, are also indicative of the general criticisms which have been levelled against the police in recent months. They have been brought to the attention of your Ministry and of the General Commanding Carabinieri, by my Public Safety Sub-Commission, who have asked for a full investigation to be made and for measures to be taken to prevent such complaints in future.

I am of opinion, however, that your various police commands are in need of the support of your Government in dealing with this problem, and I would suggest that consideration is given to the publication of an official announcement, made by you, on behalf of the Italian Government, as to the need for the preservation of law and order and of your Government's firm intention to insist on this being enforced by every means in your power and by force if necessary.

May I take this opportunity to remind you that I have not yet had a

12

reply to my letter to you on the subject of the possible reorganization of the Italian police, dated 26th November, 1944, since I believe that any measures contemplated to deal with the present difficulty ought to be regarded as part of a larger plan to effect an improvement in Italian Public Security Services as a whole.

Yours very truly,

*15/6.11.44 W. Stone*

HILARY W. STONE  
Rear Admiral, USNR  
Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe BONOMI  
The Minister for the Interior,  
President of the Council of Ministers,  
Italian Government  
ROME

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

3606

(11)

WELA

AFHQ

22 1700 A  
28 DEC 1944

Public Safety Sub Com  
Chief of Staff Sec AC

SD 1291

(6)

CONFIDENTIAL

Further to our SD/2B of 19 Dec 44 (.) Correction (.)  
in para 2 read twenty-four Ital and 3 ton vans (.)  
In appx A of a/a let ar under transport at bottom  
of page read twelve 3 ton trucks

(5) Amended 24.2.51

AG  
ST

ROUTINE

JOJO

By E. Pinkley 17/50

SUBJECT: Fin of two mob CC.RR. Bus in SICILY.

LAND FORCES SUB-COM. A.C.  
(M.N.I.A.)

SD/28  
Dec 14

TO : A.P.H.Q.

Copy to: Public Safety Sub Com. A.C.  
Chief of Staff Sec A.C.

20 DEC 1944

1. Public Safety Sub Com. A.C. has recommended that mobile bus of Carabinieri be formed, from within the present CC.RR. ceiling and with personnel now serving in the CC.RR., in order expeditiously to suppress riots. It is felt that the very presence of such a column would serve as a deterrent to aggression. It is desired to form two bus in SICILY as a start. Column HQ would be at PALEMO with one Mobile Bus at PALEMO and one at MESSINA. Details are at Appendix "A".

2. It will be seen that the total request for the two bus in SICILY amounts to 24 Italian armoured vhs or light trucks and 18 Italian 3 ton vhs (excl two cars). *PAK 5 - Amended to all*

3. The scheme is thoroughly supported by this HQ and it is requested

(a) that you agree in principle,

(b) that you authorize this HQ to issue Italian Armoured vhs mentioned in para 2 above as and when available. Majority of vhs are still in SARDINIA.

4. If it is conclusively shown that it is not possible to requisition 3 ton vhs, or for those to be supplied from A.C. sources, it is recommended that up to a total of 12 vhs be issued from Army sources.

5  
1. Public Safety Sub Com. A.C. has recommended that mobile bus of Carabinieri be formed, from within the present CC.RR. calling and with personnel now serving in the CC.RR., in order expeditiously to suppress riots. It is felt that the very presence of such a column would serve as a deterrent to aggression. It is desired to form two bus in SICILY as a start. Column HQ would be at PALERMO with one Mobile Bus at PALERMO and one at MESSINA. Details are at Appendix "A".

2. It will be seen that the total request for the two bus in SICILY amounts to 24 Italian ~~armored~~ <sup>armored</sup> vohs or light <sup>trucks</sup> and 18 Italian <sup>trucks</sup> 3 ton vohs (excl two cars). <sup>... 61-81</sup> <sup>1944-5 - On - do to the</sup>

3. The echelon is thoroughly supported by this HQ and it is requested

(a) that you agree in principle,

(b) that you authorize this HQ to issue Italian Armored vohs mentioned in para 2 above as and when available. Majority of vohs are still in SARDINIA.

4. If it is conclusively shown that it is not possible to requisition 3 ton vohs, or for those to be supplied from A.C. sources, it is recommended that up to a total of 12 vohs be issued from Army sources.

INTERNAL:

A/C

ST

War Diary (2)

Major General  
M.M.I.A.

5509

24

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

5508

SICILYBRIGADE COMMANDER

PALESTINE REGION  
COLONEL

MOBILE BATTALION (305 All Ranks)  
MAJOR

A COMPANY  
Captain

B COMPANY  
Captain  
(101 All Ranks)

C COMPANY  
Captain

1st Platoon  
1 Lieut  
1 M.C.O.  
23 CC.RR.  
1 3-ton truck  
1 Armoured Vehicle

2nd Platoon  
1 Lieut  
1 M.C.O.  
23 CC.RR.  
1 3-ton truck  
1 Armoured Vehicle

3rd Platoon  
1 Marasciallo  
1 M.C.O.  
23 CC.RR.  
1 3-ton truck  
1 Armoured Vehicle

4th Platoon  
1 Marasciallo  
1 M.C.O.  
23 CC.RR.  
1 3-ton truck  
1 Armoured Vehicle

## Strength of each Mobile Battalion

PERSONNEL

1 Major  
3 Captains  
6 Lieutenants  
6 Marascialli  
12 M.C.Os  
277 CC.RR.

TRANSPORT

1 Motor car  
9 3-ton trucks (to be secured by requisitions in  
12 ~~Armoured Vehicles~~ (to be moved from SARDINIA)  
(Note: above will carry 305 CC.RR.)

*See Index 81*

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

SECRET

APPX "A" to MMIA SD/28 of 19 Dec 44

SICILY

BRIGADE COMMANDER

ERMIC LEGION  
COLONEL

MESSINA LEGION  
COLONEL

1st BATTALION (305 All Ranks)  
MAJOR

B COMPANY  
Captain  
(101 All Ranks)

C COMPANY  
Captain

1st Platoon  
Lieut  
N.C.O.  
23 CC.RR.  
3-ton truck  
Armoured Vehicle

3rd Platoon  
1 Maresciallo  
1 N.C.O.  
23 CC.RR.  
1 3-ton truck  
1 Armoured Vehicle

4th Platoon  
1 Maresciallo  
1 N.C.O.  
23 CC.RR.  
1 3-ton truck  
1 Armoured Vehicle

TRANSPORT

1 Motor car  
9 3-ton trucks (to be secured by requisitions in SICILY)  
12 ~~Armoured Vehicles~~ (to be moved from SARDINIA)  
(Note: above will carry 305 CC.RR.)

*See Table 21*

3606

4

AG/14607/2/PE

26 Nov 44

25 NOV Reed

My dear Prime Minister,

I know that in recent months your Government has given some attention to the question of the desirability for some reorganization of the Italian Police. In my view the time has now arrived when this matter ought to be most carefully considered on the basis of both a long and short term policy.

Any constitutional change, which should be the subject of long term reform, will of course, be for you to consider, but nevertheless, even on a short term basis, which would more directly concern this Commission, I feel that there is a great deal which could be accomplished.

For your present consideration let me bring to your attention two points affecting the Italian Police Services, which I suggest should be the subject of careful review.

Firstly, the existing ambiguity of police command and responsibility, both on the administrative and executive levels. In the first instance, not only the Ministry of the Interior, but also the Ministries of War, Finance, Justice, Agriculture and Communications are all concerned with public safety matters, and in the second, the Royal Carabinieri, the National Police Guard, the Finance Guards, the Forest Guards and the Railway Police have by no means clearly defined spheres of responsibility, which are, in addition, superimposed one upon another.

Secondly, I believe there is much opportunity for the display of greater leadership by the officers of the various police services. I feel that this could be much improved by training the right type of officer in a much fuller and more comprehensive technical sense than has hitherto been the practice.

I am sure you will agree with me that any constitutional change of the Italian Police system will be a complicated matter, requiring a great deal of thought and attention from all the authorities who would be concerned, thus it is by no means easy, or indeed proper, to suggest in advance exactly what ought to be done. I would like to make the

5507

(Enclosure)

- 2 -

3

suggestion therefore, that an advisory Committee of administrative and executive Police officials be constituted to give this matter full consideration and report to you their conclusions and recommendations.

I have in mind that your Government might wish to set up a full Committee, representative of the Ministries concerned and presided over by a Minister without portfolio, and that they would examine this subject by means of sub-committees upon which your technical experts could serve.

As I think you will agree the matter is urgent and the setting up of some such Committee as I have suggested is not only an expeditious and efficient way of handling the problems I have outlined above but will go far to restore much needed public confidence in the Police Forces of the country.

If you decide to initiate such a step, I would, of course, be very happy to provide one or more technical advisers from this Commission to assist your Committee in its work.

Yours very truly,

ERLENE E. STONE,  
Comodore, USNR  
Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe BONOMI  
The President of the Council of Ministers,  
Italian Government  
R. O. M. E.

Sh PA

785017

3606 97.

605 (2)

Ref: 100/14601/20/13

25 November 1944

2nd NOV Recd

Dear Colonel Munro:

I shall be obliged if you will communicate the gist of the following to the Editors of the Italian Press at one of your weekly meetings:

"The Supreme Allied Commander has noticed with grave concern the continued vicious and unfair criticisms of the Italian Police Forces, and in particular the Carabinieri, which appears in a section of the Press. Such criticism has in one case extended so far as to incite the Police Force to disobey orders.

The Supreme Allied Commander does not for one moment desire to curb or stifle fair and just comments and criticisms on the actions of the Police Forces, but it is considered that the criticisms to which reference has been made goes far beyond any such fair or just criticism.

The Allied Forces rely on the Italian Police Forces to maintain law and order in the rear of the fighting line. The continuance of these criticisms will, in the opinion of the Supreme Allied Commander, severely prejudice our military security in Italy by encouraging the populace to believe that the Carabinieri and other police agents are incapable of carrying out their duties. Such is emphatically not the case, and the Supreme Allied Commander will have no hesitation in taking repressive measures against the newspapers concerned and their editors, in the interests solely of the military security of the Allied Forces, if such criticisms continue.

Attention is also drawn to the deplorable effect on public opinion, both in the United States and in England, that these criticisms will have just at the time when Italy desires to resume to the greatest possible extent friendly relationships with those nations."

Thanking you for your co-operation in this matter.

Yours sincerely,

WILLIAM W. STONE  
Commodore, USNR  
Chief Commissioner

Lieut. Colonel I. S. Munro,  
Executive Secretary,  
Allied Publications Board.

5406

785017

~~The Legal Sub-Commission has considered the possibility of~~

REF: ASD/11601/20/13

18 November 1944

21 Nov Read

SUBJECT: Press Comments and Criticisms of the Royal Carabinieri.

TO: Acting President.

1. For some time now certain sections of the Press have been carrying on a campaign of adverse criticism of the Police agencies in this country, in particular of the Carabinieri. Much of this criticism is grossly unfair and, at times, unfounded. There is no doubt it is having its effect upon public opinion, and has affected the morale of the Carabinieri and other police forces which this Commission is at pains to build up.

2. Steps have been taken with various Ministers concerned, and with the Press in particular, to cause this criticism to cease; in fact Colonel A. E. Torg of the Public Safety Sub-Commission recently addressed the editors of the Italian Press on the question of this particular adverse publicity. Within a very short period after this address two articles appeared in the papers "Unita" and "Avanti" which deliberately went out of their way to undermine the authority and prestige of the Carabinieri, and to incite them to disobedience.

3. The Legal Sub-Commission has considered the possibility of prosecution of both these papers but, in the opinion of the Chief Legal Advisor, as the cases will have to be heard in Italian courts, not only may there will be some delay, but also the possibilities of success are somewhat meagre.

4. I therefore submit for your approval the draft of a letter which I propose to address to the Prime Minister, and as you will see from the last paragraph I also propose to have its contents communicated to the Press editors.

500  
HVS  
HARRY W. STONE  
Commander USGI  
Chief Carabinieri

0093