

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

ACC

10000/109/703
(VOL. II)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

10000/109/703
(VOL. II)

ITALIAN POLICE AGENCIES, ORGANIZATION
MAY - NOV. 1945

Chief Commissioner

1. I would draw your attention to the message opposite which you will notice has been sent from the British GHQ and is not a SACRED message. No consultation has been made with this Commission. Our letter of 30 October is our last communication on the subject. (191)

2. I profoundly disagree with the thesis of having these police officers from one nation and I am sure that both British and American Ambassadors should have been consulted before the recommendation was sent forward that they should be British. The great virtue of an Allied Police Mission is that we do not wish to impose Anglo-Saxon ideas on this country and that the fusion of Allied police officers would tend to avoid that.

3. Brigadier Carr tells me that after the handover of the Northern Regions there will be 10 police officers surplus to AC requirements. These should surely be used.

4. I would warmly recommend that you discuss this signal with General Browning and Brigadier Carr in order that we can stop this grave tendency on the part of GHQ British of dealing unilaterally with matters that are essentially of Allied importance. Most respectfully proposed

5. Too many can be discussed with Sacred

MEL/EG.

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

5649

8/11/44. 2

12/12/44

785017

e/e.

191 'D'

7/12/2
Pass w/ing, to can see for action

ES 22/10

Capt Omybrooke

191 E

The Original passed to C.A. for ACTION.

Good 22/10

29 Oct.

Thompson 2/10

192.

Chief Commissioner.

OCT 30 1906

7 f6

Attached is submitted for your signature

(778/38A

signed see 191

193

191 B

is info.

She E. C. C. Angles it.

1/2

29 Oct. Good CAS 17/10 Thompson 17/10

Chief Commissioner.

192.

OCT 30 1944
17 36

attached is submitted for your attention

(MS/38) 2

signer see 191

193
1918 to 1940

the to be drafted it

180 1/11

196.

Copy to VP CAS
Land Forces

MS/ } Done, see 195. 1/12

5648

(188)

6-2-68

CS.O

Minute 185 is in reply to ~~CS.O~~ minute 184
see also 187 which refers.

26/10
26/10

(189)

We must now discuss 181 & with Lord
I frame a reply

27/10

(190)

Chief Commissioner

Approval
Attached is submitted for your signature
in confirmation

OCT 30 1968

0903

28/10
Very good
28/10

4 frame reply

Mr [unclear]

(196)

Chief Commissioner

OCT 30 1960

0003

Approved:
Attached is submitted for your signature
information

W. L. [unclear] Very good
cc

5647

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

② 174

ep Before submitting pre try to merge with original & cross ref the reference.

LRB 23/10

③ 177

E.S.O. Re see ④ for, I imagine, discussion with Dr C.

LRB 23/10

④ 183

Ex. Com. P. 180-182 I like you wished to discuss with Gen. Brown.

~ P. 178 & 179 for info

Fin

24/10.

V.P. CATS.

Will you please draft a letter in reply to ACED

161A in such a way as to point out the

the first

2003 23/10

183

Ex. Com. P. 180-182 2 d. h. you wished
to discuss with Gen. Browning

2 P. 178 a 179 for inf-

Final
24/10

V.P. CTS.

Will you please draft a letter in reply to ACRO
f. 181A in such a way as to point out the
extrajurisdictional demands and the proper
organization required. We can then use this as basis
for discussion with Ben Browning.

25/10 183/25/10

185

30/10

Ex. Comm.

be spoke. I have a copy of 16117 and am
dealing with this matter on a P/syde file with
than on the top secret file.
27/10.

McConkey
V.P. CTS.

Chief Commissioner.

1. I submit opposite a draft reply to p. 165. I regret that I did not take the point raised in their para 2 before. In this connection pending consultation with VP, CA Section and yourself we have sent no answer to 161A. Nevertheless p. 166 has since arrived, which hands over the administration and organization of the military training of the Carabinieri to the Land Forces Sub-Commission.

2. I have had preliminary discussions with VP, CA Section on this letter and we are disposed at the moment to leave it as such with the proviso that the last paragraph, which places the civil police training under MMIA, is left open to discussion and possible modification.

3 VP & AS agree with draft telegram

22 Oct. 45.

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

C&D

173.

Issue as amended

Done, see 174 1/2

85/22/1

F.C. (by mail) ¹⁶²
 Returned as per conversation
 you were to review Fan 487 to
 see how the PS S/C could accom-
 plish anything - The situation being
 quite different than our military
 rights

$\frac{14}{10}$

MS
 CC

Chief Commissioner. ¹⁶³

Fan 487 states that the report under the committee
 will be held in secret in the matter of day to day administration
 subject to domestic military needs.
 There is nothing else specified in Fan 487 affecting the
 Public Safety Sub Com.
 I think we could go ahead.

JS/4312

001 17 REU

0920

5044

• 3 •
 HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

164
 10 October 1945

Chief Commissioner

It is essential that the Police Forces of this country be reorganized; furthermore the Italian Government will require advice on training etc when reorganizing is complete.

We have asked for an Allied Police Mission. Farri feels it difficult to make the request for political reasons. We cannot let that interfere with prosecution of the matter.

ARMY are considering taking reorganizing and training of the Italian Police the responsibility of Land Forces Sub Commission and attaching Police Officers thereto. The proposal is ingenious; it gives ^{to} cover a Mission. But it meets less than half the problem. Well trained and reorganized O.I.R. will help but the other forces need reorganization. M.I.A. cannot undertake this; the addition of a handful of subordinate police officers would not meet the problem.

The only solution appears to be to adopt ARMQ principle and apply it to the Public Safety Sub Commission and using the cover of the Sub Commission place the Allied Police Mission therein and convert the Sub Commission into the Police Mission.

The Police Mission must be high powered. The quality and quantity of the P.S. Sub. Comm. would need considerable strengthening

we have asked for an Allied Police Mission. We cannot let that interfere with prosecution of the matter.

AFHQ are considering making reorganising and training of the Italian Police the responsibility of Land Forces Sub Commission and attaching Police Officers thereto. The proposal is ingenious; it gives cover ^{to} a Mission. But it meets less than half the problem. Well trained and reorganized CC.BB. will help but the other forces need reorganization. AFHQ cannot undertake this; the addition of a handful of subordinate police officers would not meet the problem.

The only solution appears to be to adopt AFHQ principle but apply it to the Public Safety Sub Commission and using the cover of the Sub Commission place the Allied Police Mission therein and convert the Sub Commission into the Police Mission.

The Police Mission must be high powered. The quality and quantity of the P.S. Sub. Comm. would need considerable strengthening throughout. Arrangements would have to be made to continue its functions possibly after the Peace Treaty and the disappearance of the Allied Commission. But once established under cover of the Commission this would present fewer difficulties than the creation of a new Mission.

Something must be done. AFHQ has given us a lead in slightly the wrong direction. I recommend most earnestly that we follow them in the right direction.

I submit D O letter from self to Deputy Sec to prepare the ground.

I will follow with an official letter after discussion with Brig. Carr. If

you agree in principle.

MSL
Brigadier
Executive Commissioner

5643

To: Chief Commissary

162 OCT 12 1945
3847

5th October, 1945

I am seriously concerned at the misapprehension regarding the object of the Allied Police Mission and the composition of the Police Forces in Italy which has appeared in para 3 of Freedom telegram on page 160. While I agree with para 4 in so far as it effects the Carabinieri only, I think we must point out to AFHQ that the object of the Allied Police Mission is to study and advise on the reorganisation of the Police Forces in Italy as a whole including the CCRR, the Guardia di Finanza and the Polizia Sicurissima. We must not allow CCS to labour under the misapprehension that the CCRR represent the only Police Force in Italy.

Draft Signal to AFHQ submitted.

(Handwritten initials)

(Handwritten signature)
BRIGADIER
Executive Commissioner

Explan.

18 for information.

2/24/5

(157)

Spoke to Ray Conn who will see them

Ex Conn machine

2/24/5

(158)

I should like to see him 2/25/5.

Noted. P. D. G. R. 2/24/5

161

Ex Conn 2/16/5 for info.
2/24/5

152

CSO

Howe written on 13/9. They did

not see it before 19/9. 18/9/2013

153

Exline

Delay between 17/9, a short day
150 A was received in Gen. Office,
and 15/9 was done by the fact-
that the file was with CC
and folder had not attached ^{red} 143
as stated and file clerk ^{had} ~~had~~
the file was available. The day
delay between 13/9, the day
in which Mr. Jones wrote the
letter, and 17/9 can only
be answered by Paul H. 18/9

18/9

Delay between 17/9, in which day
 150 A was received in Gen. Office,
 and 15/9 was done by the fact-
 that the file was with C.C.
 and posted had not attached ^{and} until
 as stated and file clerk had by
 the file was available. The day
 delay between 13/5, the day
 in which Mr. Jones wrote the
 letter, and 17/9 can only
 be answered by ^{13/5} ^{17/9}

W. J. 22/18

144
CSO Please see page 103. 10/20/53

Executive Commission

Please see at folio 143. CSO's copy
to our letters at 12/4/53 concerning an allied
Police mission to Italy. I will see that
Black - CTS Book files in show know.

27
CSO

7/9

MS (7/9)

E-5

The suggested reply to 143 is at 107

243
1953.19.5

149

Chief Commissioner

149A

Approved
Attached is submitted for your signature
information

SEP 15 1953
0 415

7/9

C80

MS 7/15

E25

The suggested reply to me is to let 107

24
17 SEP 1965

149

Chief Commissioner

129A

Approved
Attached is submitted for your signature
affirmation

SEP 15 1965
0-470

Reply to 143

MS 7/15

19/9

Note changes
ms cc

151

Exhibit Potal A's news on the Price.
Miner at 150^A are at Vancouver
was expressed at 150. He will have
seen 150 by now. 20/9.

Ex Com
280

125

Info for info

Monday AM G. dismisses these meetings police on the
handover of territory and the Italian Govt. messengers say that
it requires. P.S. Sub Com. think that as most of them in the North
are Partisans they are bringing the pressure to bear to get officially
taken on the strength before we leave.

20th 30/8

30/8

13th

When is the date of writing in the document? } See para 1
How has PT read them? } 1. take do.
2. take 30/8/50

40,337

Note

1st 1st 1st and from 1st 1st read.

Chs were withdrawn to take
action re Penitentiary at
Bellevue's meeting 30/8. See enclosure.

1/19

280

135

Can 9 be told what action has been taken

785017

272

45, 37

188 listed and for 600 read.

Chs were distributed to the
action' de Auxitania' not
Solomon's meeting 31/8. See butin's.

5/1/2

080

138

Can I see the what action has been taken.

4 what is drop ref by 6134

12/2/41

December Commission 140.

Def. minute 138 present sec at 139, reply to 134.

Quartz

4/5 K

129 Seen by ExCm-51141

2-9

785017

F.C. ¹³⁰ ⁽¹⁴⁴⁾

This letter,
as per car-
verbatim, is
to be modified

GD

130 (3624/EX 925 ang)

131
Attached is submitted for your signature
(please)

6700

AUG 20 1958



MS/218

132

988-1112
9 will see

Dms. 133

017
GWS

156
3626/EX 925 and

131
Approved
Attached is submitted for your signature
(2005)

6700
AUG 8 0 1980



012 MS 625/8
132
92800
9 will see
Dms, act
133

5639

785017

Ex. Comm.

125
#1
AT #18 is copy of reply sent to 112.
Also please see 119 which formed the
basis of the reply and also #17 which
was named through Polad (B) and
is of considerable interest as regards the
Coastal Guard Mission which might eventually
be agreed for Italy

MC. V.P. CAS.

2578/45

Executive Committee

126

Topics 119 to 124 are the results of your minute 117.

124 & 123 give information required by AF 110 in 112.

122, 121 & 120 contain the status & names of the Greek Police Mission.

Date 2/1/8

V.P. CAS

127

Deafman. You will, I understand, be asked

to state that a further letter is in preparation

Corresponding Mission which might eventually
be agreed for Italy
MC. V.P. CAS.
2578/45

Executive Committee

126

126 & 123 give information required by AFHQ in 112.

122, 121 & 23 contain the status & powers of the Greek Police Mission.

Doc 218

V.P. CAS

Deafman. You will, I understand, ~~be~~ send
AFHQ stating that a further letter is manifestation
of p 123 is being sent, and you will attach
a reply specifically answering the AFHQ letter.
Please show me drafts before drafting.

11/2/45

Ex. Comm

127

These are now sent at 128 ~~Att~~ Attached
is a suggested draft in amplification of no letter 3. ③
As you are aware, since we have no views from the Italian
govt on the subject, our somewhat offered at this stage to making
suggestions do to status and strength MC. 2578 V.P. CAS

114

C.S.D. 4010 113 and 112 forwarded for your attention, 114

114

116

Exline

112, 113 and 115 Dec.

V.P. CAT acts for action by CC

at 113 14/8

17

AUG 15 1960

Chief Commission.

Will you read 112 - I would you

consult the D. H. H. will you delegate that

D.V.P. CAT also is taking action of 112

You will see that in 115 AFPA an obtaining
information from Athens (at my suggestion) 9

have also asked Br. Embassy to send any

have them members

61113

8/14/58

117

118
119
120

Chief Commissioner.

Will you read p 112 - & would you
consult the P.M. & will you delegate that

D.V.P. C.A.S. who is taking action of 6.20

You will see that on p 118 A.F.H. & in obtaining
information from Athens (at my suggestion) &
then also asked Br. Embury to send any
papers they may have

118 (1418)

118

Ex. Com

The CC will take the problem up with
the P.M. - on or about 18th or 20th Aug.

18th Aug.

(See 119)

118
119
120

102

Excerpt

101 is for information

18/15

103

But Don't of the in their point. He
definitely any further evidence in CORA

18/15 - 18/15
18/15

105

Excerpt To info please compare 105

18/15

106

9 was necessary action in folio 106.

Brig Drunk of the in their front

deficates any further reduction in EORR

11/2/2017 *[Signature]*

105

Ch To up plan on page 104

[Signature] 2/2/77

108

I will have necessary action on folio 106.

[Signature] July 20

106

ExCm: To see 107. On March 11,
 attention is being drawn to the
 information according to legend
 procedure "a" performed for Richmond
 State" *[Signature]* 11/2/2017

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

INCOMING MESSAGE

Originator's Reference : SERVICE X 2362
Date/Time origin : NOV 6/1950A

Message Centre No 3 2990
Date Time Rec'd NOV 7/1950
Precedence OF PRIORITY

FROM AFHQ SIGNED SAKMED

NOV 7 1945

TO ACTION: AOWAR CABINET OFFICES LONDON

INFO: ALCOM

SECRET.

Requard PX 51855 (HAF 1006) request you amend to read (signed SAKMED)

DIST

ACTION : EX COMMISSIONER (2)

INFO : CHIEF COMMISSIONER
POLAD (A)
POLAD (B)
CA SEC (1)
DTON SEC (2)
LAND FORCES
NAVY SO
FILE

ACTION

RECEIVED

FILE CLOSED

5635

203
10/11

0123

Exec Comm 197

INCOMING MESSAGE

Originator's Reference : EX 51855
Date/Time of Origin : NOV 5/1951A
Message Centre No: G 2964
Date Time Recd : NOV 5/1951A
Procedure : ROUTINE

FROM : CPO-MED-~~SECRET~~ SACMED

TO : ACTION: ADVISE FOR CHIEFS OF STAFF CABINET OFFICERS, LONDON
FOR BRITISH OFFICERS OF STAFF INFO: ALCOM MIA

Confidential

SECRET.

This is MAY 1085 and is further to MAY 1071 para 7 and 12E and MAY 1077.

1077-169

See 207

1. Since MIA will shortly become responsible for advice on and supervision of the Carabinieri except for matters of operational control it is considered that police officers holding temporary military rank should be included in the MIA establishment to handle Carabinieri affairs. In order to avoid any confusion arising to differing methods all these police officers should be either British or American not mixed and as the training and organization aspect of MIA is solely British it is recommended that they should be British. In order to avoid offending Italian susceptibilities it is essential that these officers hold temporary military rank and wear military uniforms.

2. Police officers will be required. (A) at HQ MIA. One Lt Col (Staff officer first grade) police college trained and with wide experience of police duties and personnel (B) as Major (Staff officer second grade) with experience of police duties from the operational and detailed organization aspect. One Major (Staff officer second grade) with experience of police duties from the administrative and legal aspect. These officers would act as technical advisors.

(B) at HQ MIA

considered that police officers holding temporary military rank should be included in the 10% establishment to handle carabinieri affairs. In order to avoid any confusion, owing to differing methods all these police officers should be either British or German and as the training and organization aspect of MMA is widely British, it is recommended that they should be British. In order to avoid affecting Italian susceptibility it is essential that these officers hold temporary military rank and wear military uniforms.

2. Police officers will be required. (A) at HQ MMA. One Lt Col (Staff Officer First Grade) police college trained and with wide experience of police duties and processes. (B) an Major (Staff Officer Second Grade) with experience of police duties from the operational and detailed organization aspect. One Major (Staff Officer Second Grade) with experience of police duties from the administrative and legal aspects. These officers would act as technical advisors. (B) At Italian Army territorial Regional HQ. One with each of 12 territorial Regions. (C) At Carabinieri regional HQs, 1 with each of 8 regions. (D) total 17 police officers. In addition the necessary clerical support and dr ptp will have to be provided.

INFO - ACTION

3. If these proposals are approved it is recommended that the senior police officer should be selected early and sent to ASHQ for consultation before final decision as to police representation is made.

DIST *Commissione*
INFO-ACTION: *Commissione* (2)
INFO: CHIEF COMMISSIONER

POL (4)
POL (2)
CA 9th

10th REG (2)
LAND FORCES HQ
NAVY HQ

6.13 on 11/46

QUARTERS
11/45

11/45

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Executive Commissioner

Confidential

5 November 1945.

Ref: 3626/195/30.

SUBJECT: Allied Police Mission.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
Attn: G-5 Section.

I enclose copy of letter addressed to the Italian Prime Minister
by the US Ambassador on the question of an Allied Police Mission.

For the Chief Commissioner:

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

1251/30.

Copy to: Polad (A)
Polad (B)
GA Sec (2)
Land Forces S/C

5637A

SECRET

Confidential

(194)

Rome, October 30, 1945.

My dear Mr. President,

I have the honor to commend you concerning the possibility of the establishment in Italy of an Allied Police Mission. I should like to inform you that my Government has now indicated that it believes that if the maximum benefit is to be derived from such a Mission, it should of course commence its operations at an early date. My Government is further of the opinion that the benefits that would accrue to all the democratic forces in Italy, through the strengthening of Italy's forces of internal security, might have been sufficiently apparent to the Italian Government that the Council of Ministers would have approved a request to the Allied Governments for the establishment of a Police Mission. In conclusion, my Government has pointed out that a fundamental factor in Italy's desire which she has expressed for the improvement of her international status would be her unequivocal assumption of the full responsibility of maintaining order, as well as giving to the Italian people a guarantee for the free exercise of democratic rights.

Believe me, my dear Mr. President,

Yours very sincerely,

(Sgd) ALAXANDER KIM.

Professor Ferruccio Parri,
President of the Council of Ministers,
R O M.

5632

2 918 41

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Office of the Chief Commissioner

APO 954

7 October 1945.

Ref: 3636/191/83.

SUBJECT: Transfer of responsibility for OCMR to NMIA.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
Attn: G-5 Section.

1. In your telegram 750363 of 25 Oct 45 you refer to your letter G-5, 104.12 of 7 Oct 45 to which I have not yet replied. I read your letter under reference in conjunction with your telegram 47521 of 6 Oct 45 on which I commented in my telegram 6822 of 10 Oct 45. I was studying the whole question of the transfer to NMIA of the responsibility for the OCMR in conjunction with your letter of 7 Oct 45 when your instructions of 14 Oct 45 arrived (your letter AG 014.12 (SR-0) 170 163.

2. I have received a letter from GOC, Land Forces S/C (NMIA) in which he states that he had previously informed you that in order to carry out his new duties he would require no less than 20 officers.

3. This matter is under discussion with GOC, Land Forces S/C (NMIA) and you will appreciate that in view of the divergence between the number quoted in your letter of 7 Oct 45 and the demands of GOC Land Forces S/C (NMIA) together with the grave shortage of personnel, a rapid decision is not possible.

4. My first impressions are that the numbers quoted in your letter and requested by GOC Land Forces S/C (NMIA) are extravagant but until Land Forces S/C (NMIA) and Public Safety S/C have worked out a modus operandi it would be premature of me to express a firm agreement. This will be forwarded in due course.

5. In this connection I forward you copy of a communication received from the US Ambassador in which you will note he has been instructed to communicate the State Department's instructions to the Prime Minister on the question of the despatch of an Allied Police Mission to this country.

6. I still hold that it would be better to prosecute the question of an Allied Police Mission as a whole rather than to adopt a plan which deals with only part of the question. I should therefore be glad if this point of view, together with a copy of the Ambassador's letter, could be submitted to SACMEX in support of my views which you note in para 3 of your telegram 750363 of 25 Oct.

ELBERT W. BYRNE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Copy to: Land Forces S/C (NMIA)
CA Section.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 324
Office of the Chief Commissioner

Ref: WMO/3R/175

29 October, 1945.

SUBJECT: Disposal of Captured Enemy Material in ITALY.

001 30 1945

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
Attn: Chief Administrative Officer.

1. Action is being taken on your CAO/214/6 of 20 Oct 45 but the Italian Government, in the person of the Prime Minister himself, has raised a point of great importance which is referred to in para 6, i.e., the guarding of the material.

2. The Prime Minister recognizes the immense value to the Italian Government of this material. He also recognizes that the police forces of the country are inadequate for the task before them and that in computing the strength of the interior army the Minister of War did not take into account the added responsibility of guarding the dumps and dumps of captured enemy material. I think that the Minister acted reasonably in this.

3. As you know, in previous communications the Prime Minister has asked for an overall increase in the strength of the OC.MR from 65,000 to 75,000. It has not yet been possible for this figure to be accepted. He now does make this specific request that the strength of the OC.MR shall be increased temporarily at any rate, by 4,000 men in order that this most valuable material can be properly guarded and that the responsibility of the Italian Government can be properly implemented. He proposes to effect the increase by deferring the discharge of time expired OC.MR up to the number proposed for a period of 4 - 6 months, during which time he hopes to dispose of the material.

4. I think that the Prime Minister's request is eminently reasonable. We cannot expect the Italian Government to fulfill their responsibility in keeping law and order and in guarding this immense amount of material if we do not allow them to maintain the force which they consider necessary. In this matter I fully concur with the Prime Minister that the extra OC.MR are necessary and that unless he receives them, either law and order will suffer or the material will not be properly guarded, the economy of Italy will suffer and additional materials will be demanded from the Allies.

5. I therefore strongly recommend that without prejudice to consideration for the overall increase of the OC.MR from 65,000 to 75,000 which will be

785017

3620 41

(4)

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 354
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

1913

Ref: AD/14634/15

29 Oct 45.

001 31 1945

SUBJECT: Reformation of Police Forces.

TO: AFHQ/5-5 Section.

170

With reference to your AD: OLA.12 080-0 of 14 Oct 45.

1. 1 Nov 45 has been agreed upon as the date of transfer of responsibilities, in matters connected with the Carabinieri, except their operational functions, from the Public Safety Sub-Commission to the Land Forces Sub-Commission (MFA).

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

M. Carr Brigadier

M. Carr, Brigadier.
Vice President,
Civil Affairs Section.

Copy to: Chief Commissioner,
Executive Commissioner,
MFA,
Establishment Section.

See 191

3629

(CAPT GRAYBROOK)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Aid to Civil Power

HQ 2 District CMF
2015 0(0)
23 October 45

Chief Commissioner Allied Commission
MILIA

Oct 27 1945

COPY: 217 Area

In view of ALHQ letter AG 014.12 CML-0 of 14 Oct which laid down that by 1 Nov the adm of the Carabinieri will have passed from AG to MILIA this letter is addressed to both.

1. Because the degree to which military help may be required in aid of Civil Power depends largely on the efficiency of the CCRA it has always been my policy to help them wherever possible. Such help has taken the form of instruction in driving, maintenance and use of weapons, and particularly the encouragement of their morale by strengthening their search parties with the loan of tpt and British tps.

2. Unfortunately, such help is becoming increasingly difficult to give owing to shortage of personnel and vehs, and the CCRA are having to rely on their own resources.

3. In 217 Area, these resources are meagre, and the morale of the CCRA is being seriously affected by three things -

- (a) Uniform
- (b) PCL
- (c) tpt

4. The uniform is poor and in short supply. Some men have no more than a hat and an armband and are not taken seriously by the public. The dark green battle dress which came from FLORENCE is old, badly worn in the seat, very roughly sewn together and torn. During dyeing it has shrunk and only the smallest men can be fitted. Normal sized men become objects of ridicule. The self respect of the CCRA is further reduced by the fact that the dye comes out on the skin. No overcoats have been received.

5. The CCRA get their PCL from civilian sources and apparently receive an inadequate allotment so that they are frequently immobilized although needed to move somewhere.

6. The tpt also seems inadequate. In each of the provinces of SAVONA and ALESSANDRIA, the CCRA have only a private veh and two m/cn, which means they are virtually immobile.

The new mobile bn has 400 men and 12 tanks, but no tank can be started or moved or any driving instruction given because there is no petrol. Only four tank drivers are trained and there are no other vehs in the bn.

7. The result is that the CCRA find themselves in that area ill-clothed and heavily handicapped when their duties require them to make a raid or go to the scene of a disturbance. Their morale naturally sinks and undoubtedly keen men are losing heart.

8. In view of the Italian's natural liking for display I would suggest that a smart

2. Unfortunately, such help is becoming increasingly difficult to give owing to shortage of personnel and vehs, and the GCRK are having to rely on their own resources.

3. In 217 Area, these resources are meagre, and the morale of the GCRK is being seriously affected by three things -

- (a) Uniform
- (b) PCL
- (c) Tpt

4. The uniform is poor and in short supply. Some men have no more than a hat and an armband and are not taken seriously by the public. The dark green battle dress which came from FLORENCE is old, badly worn in the seat, very roughly sewn together and torn. During dyeing it has shrunk and only the smallest men can be fitted. Normal sized men become objects of ridicule. The self respect of the GCRK is further reduced by the fact that the dye comes out on the skin. No overcoats have been received.

5. The GCRK get their PCL from civilian sources and apparently receive an inadequate allotment so that they are frequently immobilised although needed to move somewhere.

6. The tpt also seems inadequate. In each of the provinces of RAVENNA and ANCONA, the GCRK have only a private veh and two m/cs, which means they are virtually immobile.

The new mobile bn has 400 men and 12 tanks, but no tank can be started or moved or any driving instruction given because there is no petrol. Only four tank drivers are trained and there are no other vehs in the bn.

7. The result is that the GCRK find themselves in that area ill-clothed and heavily handicapped when their duties require them to make a raid or go to the scene of a disturbance. Their morale naturally sinks and undoubtedly keen men are losing heart.

8. In view of the Italian's natural liking for display I would suggest that a smart uniform would be of great encouragement, and that the sight of a well dressed body of men with obvious pride in themselves and adequately equipped would be a great deterrent to those of the public who at present treat them with contempt and challenge their authority.

CCLB/40

502
/s/ C. A. Heydeman
Major General
Commanding 2 District

Original passed to C.A. for action

MAJ D.E.

19/10

785017

3626
RESTRICTED

Exp. Comm. 187

F50363
OCT 251825A

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OCT 261000A
ROUTINE

AFHQ SIGNED BACKED CITE PHGEG
ALCOM HOMB

OCT 26 1945

160
1290
RESTRICTED

1. Para 5 of NAF1077 stated that no action was required by CCS on para 12(D) of NAF1031 for the time being. It is intended to finalise the examination of the proposal to attach a small increment of police officers to MMIA as indicated in para 4 of NAF1077. Your view of this proposal were requested by letter reference G-5. 014.12 of 7th October to which no reply has yet been received. 160

2. When your reply has been received and a decision made by AFHQ with regard to attachment of police officers to MMIA the whole question of the establishment of a separate police mission will again be reviewed.

3. Your views in the action of SACMED are noted.

Dist

Action - P Safety SC
Info - Chief Commissioner
Exec Comm 2
CA Sect
File 2 Float

HEADQUARTERS

26 OCT 1945

MAJ. C.

na 191

RESTRICTED

5621

(CAPT. BAYBERRY)

3626

0

146

NAMES SUGGESTED FOR PROPOSED POLICE MISSION

BRITISH OFFICERS:

Colonel	DONNETT	now in U.S.
Lt. Col.	FRANCIS	" " "
Lt. Col.	ROHLERSON	" " "
Lt. Col.	WALSH	
Lt. Col.	WILSON	
Lt. Col.	WILCOX	? Now in Austria.
Lt. Col.	REIDHART	
Major	MARSH	

AMERICAN OFFICERS:

Colonel	SMOCK	now in Austria
Colonel	SILVER	now in Germany
Major	SCOTT	
Major	SMITH	
Major	WILSON	
Capt.	ZEPPEL	
Capt.	MILLER	

PA 20
5626

CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

100-4732 PER

TO: Executive Commissioner. ✓

1 Reference attached memo is forwarded.

2 As regards transferring any Public Safety Sub-Commission officers to MIA, the situation is as follows:

3 Public Safety Officers ~~will~~ deal with matters which are not to be transferred to MIA. But they did not deal only with Carabinieri but with all other police agencies as well. ~~will~~ *These officers will be fully employed.*

4 As you will remember, it was proposed to assign one or more officers with "Q" experience to the Public Safety Sub-Commission as, very soon after my arrival here, I formed the opinion that Public Safety Sub-Commission had neither adequate or qualified staff to deal with this subject. Owing to shortage of suitable personnel no immediate action was taken. The matter was then dropped when it was known that full responsibility for the security and administration was to be passed to the Ministry for War.

5 Public Safety Sub-Commission etc., therefore, were no officers for transfer to MIA. Presumably you will take up with Establishment Section whether or not any W/S vacancies which could be taken up by MIA.

6 I do not know whether you intend to comment on this report, in my opinion, extravagant staff. The proposed staff follows the lines of a letter received from AFM which was asked to you, I believe, for action. I do not think that any reply has been sent to AFM yet. The AFM proposals were, however, limited with the question of the police mission and the officers were to be in the main police officers.

7 As regards the 10 officers proposed in the attached letter, the majority of these officers would not necessarily require police experience, providing that MIA are not going to be responsible for training in police duties.

8 Now that responsibility for administration and equipment of the CC.FM. has been handed over to the Ministry for War I cannot imagine what an Lt. Col. and 5 Majors are going to do at this Headquarters.

9 As regards the police colleges where MIA representatives will be responsible only for ~~basic~~ military training, I cannot imagine what responsibilities I shall assign at the police colleges in Rome which is so near to the Headquarters. The other two police colleges are at Bari and Cagliari and I should have considered the necessary officer for all 3 colleges able to deal with basic military training.

Handwritten notes:
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Handwritten: m183

- 2 -

As regards MIA representatives at territorial headquarters, I understand that territorial headquarters will eventually correspond to a command headquarters in the U.S. and will deal with all sides of military activity such as provision of stores, maintenance of vehicles, etc. At present, MIA have no representatives there but I understand that it is proposed that, instead of having Allied Liaison Officers with British Liaison Officers should be concentrated at territorial headquarters and I heard it mentioned that this could mean about 3 or 4 Allied representatives at each territorial headquarters. I should have thought that these representatives could quite easily have handled the Burmese as well, noting that they will have no duties in connection with police training or operational work. My information on this proposed change in organization is unofficial.

4 I think we shall have to come to a clear understanding as to what MIA's responsibilities are to be. *McCarrie Brigadier*

Tel. 2nd. 5th.
25 Oct 45.

Brigadier,
Vice President,
Civil Affairs Section.

Subject: Transfer of Responsibility for the Carabinieri to
M.M.I.A.

22 OCT 1945

20 OCT 1945
Land Forces Sub-Comm A.C.,
(M.M.I.A.) H D W S

A 018

19 Oct. 1945.

To : Executive Commissioner,
Allied Commission.

70

Reference: AHC Letter AG 014.12 025-0, subject re
above, dated 14 Oct 45.

1. When matters affecting 31 M (except their operational
functions) came to my Sub-Commission, it would seem that the
Public Safety Sub-Commission will have a certain number of
officers surplus.

2. I had previously informed AHC that to carry out the
new duties I should require the undermentioned staff.

1 Lt. Colonel
1 Major
1 Major
3 Majors for the staff (one
each for 'A', 'B' and 'C').

3 Majors (One for each Police College)

14 Majors or Capt. (One for each Terr. HQ)

3. Will you please say:

(a) which of the above 14 positions can be relinquished
by you from HQ, Allied Commission.

Referenced Army letter AG OIG-12 000-0, subject as above, dated 14 Oct 45.

1. When matters affecting III AF (except their operational functions) pass to my Sub-Commission, it would seem that the Public Safety Sub-Commission will have a certain number of officers surplus.

2. I had previously informed AFH that to carry out the new duties I should require the undersigned staff.

- Lt. Colonel
- Major
- Major
- 3 Majors for the staff (one each for G, A, and C).

3 Majors (One for each College College)

11 Majors or Capt. (One for each Terr. HQ)

3. Will you please say:

(a) which of the above positions can be relinquished by you from HQ, Allied Commission.

(b) which of the above officers are available for transferring.

L. Browning

Major General,
H.M.I.A.

Copy to: Civil Archive Section, A.C.
Public Safety Sub Comm A.C.
SB for SB/47

5194

/cc.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

3626 AT

179

22 October 1945

OCT 23 1945

178

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of 18 October 1945, advising me of the state Department's view that it is preferable not to impose a Police Mission on the Italians under the Supreme Allied Commander's present authority.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE,
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

The Hon. Alexander Kirk,
American Ambassador,
Via Vittorio Veneto 119,
Rome.

cc-EX COMM.

see 191

5622

(APT 0494R00R)

3626 (X)

170

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMERICAN EMBASSY

Rome, October 18, 1945

OCT 23 1945

Rear Admiral E. W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner,
Allied Commission,
Rome.

Dear Admiral Stone:

With reference to your letter of September 19, 1945 (File No 3626/149 /EC) to G-5 Section, AFHQ, regarding an Allied Police Mission, I have received the views of the Department of State. The Department agrees with you that it is preferable not to impose a Police Mission on the Italians under the Supreme Allied Commander's present authority. It is even reluctant to insist upon its establishment as part of the peace treaty. The Department had hoped that the President of the Council of Ministers would be sufficiently aware of the advantages to democratic government in Italy, through strengthening internal security forces, to accept the responsibility of obtaining the Cabinet's approval of a plan to request the Allied Governments to send such a Mission. The Mission should begin work at once, of course, if the greatest good is to be accomplished.

The Department has instructed me, at my discretion, to inform the President of the Council of Ministers of the position of the United States Government as outlined above. The Department is of the opinion that factors governing the Italian Government's expressed desire for an improved international status are the assurance of free exercise of democratic rights to the Italian people and a clear assumption of responsibility for the maintenance of order.

I intend to communicate the substance of the Department's instructions to Professor Parri at an appropriate opportunity.

Sincerely yours,

La 201

/s/ A. Kirk.

Alexander Kirk.

EE DIST - 230d

ACTION - EX-1000K

5621

INFO: CASRE

CHIEF COMINT

Original retained by CC.

(NOT RECORDED)

Subject: Transfer of Responsibility for the Carabinieri to
M.M.I.A.

Land Forces Sub-Comm A.C.,
(M.M.I.A.) R O M E

A O 18

19 Oct. '45.

OCT 22 1945

To : Executive Commissioner,
Allied Commission.

Reference APHQ letter AG OI4.I2 GEG-O, subject as
above, dated 14 Oct 45.

1. When matters affecting CC RH (except their operational
functions) pass to my Sub-Commission, it would seem that the
Public Safety Sub-Commission will have a certain number of
officers surplus.

2. I had previously informed APHQ that to carry out the
new duties I should require the undermentioned staff.

Lt. Colonel

Major

Major

3 Majors (One for each Police College).

11 Majors or Capts. (One for each Terr. HQ)

3 Majs. for the Staff (one
each for 'G', 'A' and 'Q').

3. Will you please say :-

(a) which of the above WE positions can be relinquished
by you from HQ, Allied Commission.

Reference AFHQ letter AG 014.12 GEG-C, subject as above, dated 14 Oct 45.

When matters affecting CC RR (except their operational functions) pass to my Sub-Commission, it would seem that the Public Safety Sub-Commission will have a certain number of officers surplus.

I had previously informed AFHQ that to carry out the new duties I should require the undermentioned staff.

- 1. Lt. Colonel
Major
Major
3 Majors (One for each Police College).
11 Majors or Capts. (One for each Terr. HQ)
- 2. 3 Majors for the Staff (one each for 'G', 'A' and 'Q').

Will you please say :-
(a) which of the above WE positions can be relinquished by you from HQ, Allied Commission.
(b) which of the above officers are available "in body" for transferring.

A. Browning
Major General,
M.M.I.A.

Copy to: Civil Affairs Section, A.C.
Public Safety Sub Comm A.C.
SD for SD/47

McC (ecc. *RR* *RR* *RR*) *11/10*

30.10.45

AFHQ For C-5

ROUTINE

7546 Confidential 123 Oct 1

SECRET PD

YOUR FAX FOUR EIGHT SIX FOUR EIGHT OF ONE FOUR OCTOBER HAS JUST BEEN BROUGHT TO MY
NOTICE PD I HAVE FOLLOWING COMMENTS PD
FAKED TO APPE FOR GEORGE DASH FIVE EIGHT SIX FOUR GENERAL HAMILTON FROM HQ ALCOA CITY
AGENCY SIGNED STONE PAPER

I DO NOT UNDERSTAND WHY CHARLIE CHARLIE SUGAR HAVE BEEN ASKED TO TAKE NO FURTHER ACTION
REGARDING PROVISION OF POLICE MISSION PD I HAVE NEVER OFFERED ANY OBJECTION TO A
POLICE MISSION AS SUCH PD I ORIGINALLY RECOMMENDED IT IN MY MEMORANDUM OF TWO THREE
JUNE CMA IN PARA EIGHT OF MY LETTER OF THREE ONE AUGUST AND IN MY LETTER OF ONE NINE
SEPTEMBER PD I SUBMIT THAT YOU HAVE CONFUSED THE ISSUE OF PRINCIPLE WITH THAT OF
TIMING PD I RECOMMENDED ON ONE ^{ONE} SEPTEMBER THAT THE MISSION SHOULD NOT BE SET UP UNDER
SACROSANCT PRESENT AUTHORITY UNDER THE ARMISTICE BUT THAT IT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED WITH THE
PEACE TREATY AND THAT STEPS SHOULD BE TAKEN NOT TO ASSEMBLE THE MISSION PD IN VIEW OF
INDEFINITE DELAY REGARDING PEACE TREATY I SUGGEST PROVISIONAL NOMINATION OF HEAD OF
MISSION WHO COULD THEN VISIT ITALY AND WORK OUT HIS TERMS OF REFERENCE PD IN MEANTIME
I WISH TO LEAVE YOU IN NO DOUBT PAPER AME PAPER THAT I REGARD THE SETTING UP OF A
POLICE MISSION AS ESSENTIAL PROVIDED IT CAN BE DONE TACTFULLY AND SO HAVE ^{Some} CHANCE OF
SUCCESS CMA PAPER HAKEN PAPER THAT I REGARD YOUR AME GEORGE PD ZERO ONE FOUR HYPER
ONE TWO GEORGE EAST GEORGE PD ZERO OF ONE FOUR OCTOBER AS A PARTIAL REQUEST ONLY AND
POSSIBLY SOMEWHAT PROMPT

Copy to: CA Section
Land Forces S/C

5619

Office of Ex. Commissioner

MAJ

L. P. C. 123

Brigadier

Executive Commissioner

INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Ex Camp

Originator's Reference: F 48648
Date/Time of Origin: OCT 131815

Message Centre No: G/959
Date Time Rec'd: OCT 140930
Precedence: ROUTINE

FROM: AFHQ SIGNED SACMED SITE FHGEG
TO: ALCOM ROME

~~Confidential~~ ACTION

SECRET.

1. It has for some time been the view of this Hq that all Italian Police Forces require radical reorganisation and training. (Ref your 5884 of 10th October). It was with this object in view that introduction of an Allied Police Mission was recommended in NAF1051. As a result of your representations combined Chiefs of Staff were asked in NAF1077 to take no further action regarding provision of a Police Mission.

2. It is fully appreciated that MMIA can only undertake responsibility for basic military training and administration of Carabinieri. In view of this and your objections to a Police Mission it is difficult to see what Allied assistance could be offered to reorganise and train Guardia Di Finanza Polizia Sicurezza Municipale Police and other forces of civil security. Unless you can forward recommendations no further action in this matter will be taken by this Hq.

DIST

ACTION EX COMMISSIONER 2
INFO CHIEF COMMISSIONER
CA SEC
L FORCES SC
FILE

~~SECRET~~

5615

A. C.

REF ATDALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 312

14 October 1945

AG 014.12 (GEG-0)

SUBJECT: Transfer of Responsibility for the Carabinieri to MMIA

TO: Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, APO 394
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission,
FOR: MMIA

1. Reference is made to paragraph 24 of letter, this headquarters, AG 001.711/169 GCF-C, dated 16 November 1944, subject, "Command and Administration of Italian Army" and to letter, this headquarters, G-5 014.12, dated 20 July 1945, subject, "Reorganization of Carabinieri and Other Police Forces of Italy".

2. It is believed that the time has now come when the supervisory functions of MMIA should parallel the executive functions of the Italian Ministry of War. It is therefore desired that you cause all matters connected with the training and administration of the Carabinieri which have heretofore been handled by the Public Safety Sub-Commission to be transferred to the Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA). This will result in all matters connected with the Carabinieri except their operational functions, which should remain as at present, being placed under the supervision of MMIA.

3. The date of transfer of responsibilities will be mutually agreed between Public Safety Sub-Commission and MMIA and will be reported by you to this headquarters. In any event this date will not be later than 1 November 1945.

4. In matters affecting the instruction of the Carabinieri in purely civil police duties, as distinct from normal military training, MMIA will consult the Public Safety Sub-Commission which will afford such advice and assistance as may be required.

BY COMMAND OF THE ACTING SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

C. W. CHRISTENSEN
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

5 - LA Advance
2 - No 2 District
2 - No 3 District
2 - PPS
2 - CG MTOUSA
2 - Rome Area, MTOUSA
2 - "A"
2 - G-1 (MTOUSA)
2 - G-2
1 - G-3 (AFHQ)
1 - G-3 (MTOUSA)

1 - G(SD)
2 - G-4 (MTOUSA)
1 - G(AN)
1 - G(Mfst)
1 - G-2
1 - Fin Adviser(Br)
1 - Fin Dir MTOUSA
2 - JA
1 - Dir of Labor
1 - D Prov M Sec
1 - Medical (Br)

1 - G1
1 - MTR
1 - S & T
3 - G-4 (MTOUSA)
1 - Dep Mil Sec
1 - DPTG
1 - CAO
2 - AG Records
10 - Spares (to G-5)

RESTRICTED

785017

SECRET 3426

SECRET

AFHQ FOR G-5

6966

12 OCT 45

Confidential

PRIORITY

OCT 12 1945

SECRET PD

IN MY SIX EIGHT EIGHT FOUR OF TEN OCTOBER

FAREN TO AFHQ FOR GEORGE FIVE FROM HQ ALCOM CITE ACNCG SIGNED STONE FAREN

CORRECT QUOTE CHIEF OF STAFF UNQUOTE TO READ QUOTE ACTING DEPUTY

SACMED UNQUOTE

DISTRIBUTION:

CA Section

Land Forces S/C (1801A)

Exec Comm

Chief Commr

Chief Commissioner

222

ELLEN W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

SECRET

SECRET

(CSO)

Draft Letter to General Morgan

by Army General :

Draft only

The Chief Commissioner has asked me to write to you on the question of the Allied Police Mission and the alternative proposed in NAF 1077 to which the Admiral has made telegraphic reply.

One of the troubles about the Italian Police Organisation lies in the multiplicity of police forces all of whom are under different authorities. The GCR under the Ministry for War represent only ^{1/4} the total force. It may be said that they are the most important half but the others are by no means unimportant. There are the Guardia di Finanza under the Ministry of Finance, the Polizia Siciliana under the Ministry of Interior, the Municipal Police under the Provincial Gov'ts, the Railway Police under Ministry of Transportation, and Forest Guards under the Min of Agriculture.

Until all these bodies are reorganized and until there is some co-ordination in the direction of matters of public security it seems to me that we cannot look forward to a stable Italy.

It is to examine this comprehensive problem and to advise in a solution thereof that we have recommended the sending of an Allied Police Mission to Italy. Its mission would be to study the whole question of public order, the forces now employed to maintain it and then to advise on re-organization, training and administration.

The ingenious, if I may use the word, device of infiltrating a small number of officers into the Land Forces Sub-Commission (MLIA) in order to reorganize and train the GCR meets only part of the problem. It has the advantage of speed and the use of the machinery of MLIA but this group could not take the place of an Allied Mission and they could not deal with the other police forces. Nor in my opinion could MLIA be

see Memo 104

expected to tackle the greater problems. It needs for them to continue
their work in some form or other even after the Peace Treaty when the
Allied Commission will disappear. This at any rate might be included
in the Peace Treaty and perhaps the bulk of the work could be done
before the USSR insisted in participation.

I am writing this officially.

2

expected to tackle the greater problems. It needs the whole time work of a highly technical Police group.

In that aspect we deprecate the proposal to make the reorganization and training of the Italian Police the responsibility of Land Forces Sub-Commission as stated in para 4 of HAF 1077 though the C.C. would consider the possibility of putting the responsibility of training and organizing the CCRR ^{only} on to that Sub-Commission. We have as ^{in CCRR} you know, advocated the assumption of administrative responsibility by ALLIA without success for some months.

It seems to us that the best and most immediate solution to the difficulty is to strengthen the Public Safety Sub-Commission both in quality and in strength, to convert them in fact into the high levelled Police Mission which we have been attempting to obtain and to arrange for them to continue their work in some form or other even after the Peace Treaty when the Allied Commission will disappear. This at any rate might be included in the Peace Treaty and perhaps the bulk of the work could be done before the USSR insisted in participation.

I am writing this ^{on} officially.

166A
10 October 1945Chief Commissioner

It is essential that the Police Forces of this country be reorganised; furthermore the Italian Government will require advice on training etc when reorganising is complete.

We have asked for an Allied Police Mission. Parri finds it difficult to make the request for political reasons. We cannot let that interfere with prosecution of the matter.

APHQ are considering making reorganising and training of the Italian Police the responsibility of Land Forces Sub Commission and attaching Police Officers thereto. The proposal is ingenious; it gives cover a Mission. But it meets less than half the problem. Well trained and reorganised CC.RR. will help but the other forces need reorganisation. MACA cannot undertake this; the addition of a handful of subordinate police officers would not meet the problem.

The only solution appears to be to adopt APHQ principle but apply it to the Public Safety Sub Commission and using the cover of the Sub Commission place the Allied Police Mission therein and convert the Sub Commission into the Police Mission.

The Police Mission must be high powered. The quality and quantity of the P.S. Sub. Com. would need considerable strengthening

We have asked for an Allied Police Mission. Parri finds it

difficult to make the request for political reasons. We cannot let that interfere with prosecution of the matter.

APHQ are considering making reorganising and training of the Italian Police the responsibility of Lami Forces Sub Commission and attaching Police Officers thereto. The proposal is ingenious; it gives cover ^{to} a Mission. But it meets less than half the problem. Well trained and reorganised O.G.R. will help but the other forces need reorganisation. MEIA cannot undertake this; the addition of a handful of subordinate police officers would not meet the problem.

The only solution appears to be to adopt APHQ principle but apply it to the Public Safety Sub Commission and using the cover of the Sub Commission place the Allied Police Mission therein and convert the Sub Commission into the Police Mission.

The Police Mission must be high powered. The quality and quantity of the P.S. Sub. Comm. would need considerable strengthening throughout. Arrangements would have to be made to continue its functions possibly after the Peace Treaty and the disappearance of the Allied Commission. But once established under cover of the Commission this would present fewer difficulties than the creation of a new Mission.

Something must be done. APH has given us a lead in slightly the wrong direction. I recommend most earnestly that we follow them in the right direction.

I submit D O letter from self to Deputy Sec to prepare the ground. I will follow with an official letter after discussion with Brig. Carr if you agree in principle.

MSL

Brigadier
Executive Commissioner

Draft Letter to General Morgan

166 B

My dear General :

The Chief Commissioner has asked me to write to you on the question of the Allied Police Mission and the alternative proposed in NAF 1077 to which the Admiral has made telegraphic reply.

One of the troubles about the Italian Police Organization lies in the multiplicity of police forces all of whom are under different authorities. The OCER under the Ministry for War represent only half the total force. It may be said that they are the most important half but the others are by no means unimportant. There are the Guardia di Finanza under the Ministry of Finance, the Polizia Siciliana under the Ministry of Interior, the Municipal Police under the Provincial Gov'ts, the Railway Police under Ministry of Transportation, and Forest Guards under the Min of Agriculture.

Until all these bodies are reorganized and until there is some co-ordination in the direction of matters of public security it seems to us that we cannot look forward to a stable Italy.

See 205

It is to examine this comprehensive problem and to advise in a solution thereof that we have recommended the sending of an Allied Police Mission to Italy. Its mission would be to study the whole question of public order, the forces now employed to maintain it and then to advise on re-organization, training and administration.

The ingenious, if I may use the word, device of infiltrating a small number of officers into the Land Forces Sub-Commission (MLIA) in order to reorganise and train the OCER meets only part of the problem. It has the advantage of speed and the use of the machinery of MLIA but this group could not take the place of an Allied Mission and they could not deal with the other police forces. Nor in my opinion could MLIA be

expected to tackle the greater problems. It needs the whole time work of a highly technical Police group.

In that aspect we deprecate the proposal to make the reorganization and training of the Italian Police the responsibility of Land Forces Sub-Commission as stated in para 4 of MAP 1077 though the C.C. would consider the possibility of putting the responsibility of training and organising the CQRR on to that Sub-Commission. We have as you know, advocated the assumption of administrative responsibility by MIA without success for some months.

It seems to us that the best and most immediate solution to the difficulty is to strengthen the Public Safety Sub-Commission both in quality and in strength, to convert them in fact into the high levelled Police Mission which we have been attempting to obtain and to arrange for them to continue their work in some form or other even after the Peace Treaty when the Allied Commission will disappear. This at any rate might be included in the Peace Treaty and perhaps the bulk of the work could be done before the USSR insisted in participation.

I am writing this officially.

Draft letter to General Morgan

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X am writing this officially.

163

AMHQ

6884

10 October 45

PRIORITY

SECRET PD

Confidential

Sec 201

REFERENCE PARA THREE OF YOUR MAILABLE FOX ONE ZERO SEVEN SEVEN DATED SIX OCTOBER ONE NINE FOUR FIVE PD

PAREN AFHQ FOR GEORGE DASH FIVE FROM HQ. ALSO ON THE AGENT STONE DASH FIVE I WOULD POINT OUT THAT THE OBJECT OF THE ALLIED POLICE MISSION IS TO EXAMINE AND ADVISE ON THE REORGANISATION OF ALL POLICE FORCES IN ITALY OF WHICH CC.RR. REPRESENT ONLY ONE HALF PD GUARDIA DI FINANZA OMA POLIZIA SICUREZZA OMA MUNICIPAL POLICES AND OTHER FORCES OF CIVIL SECURITY WHOSE REORGANISATION IS ACTUALLY IMPORTANT ARE ESSENTIALLY CIVILIAN POLICE AND DO NOT COME UNDER THE ITALIAN MINISTRY FOR WAR PD THEIR REORGANISATION THEREFORE COULD NOT BE HANDLED BY MMIA PD WHILE AGREEING WITH PARA FOUR AS AN INTERIM AND PARTIAL REMEDY AFFECTING THE CC.RR. ONLY AND PROVIDED NECESSARY COORDINATION WITH PUBLIC SAFETY SUB COMMISSION IS MAINTAINED AS AGREED WITH ME BY CHIEF OF STAFF I WISH TO LEAVE YOU IN NO DOUBT AS TO THE NECESSITY FOR A COMPLETE REORGANISATION OF ALL POLICE FORCES IN THIS COUNTRY A TASK WHICH I SUBMIT COULD NOT BE UNDERTAKEN BY LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION

Office of the Exec Commr.

343

10/ M.S. Losh.

162
167
171
3610

SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

161A

G-5: 014.12

Confidential October 1945

SUBJECT: Attachment of Police Officers to Carabinieri.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission, APO 394

1. The transfer to MMIA of responsibility for the supervision of the administration and training of the Carabinieri is under consideration at this Headquarters.

2. If this transfer is approved, it is proposed that, in view of the fact that the projected Police Mission is now unlikely to materialize for some time at any rate, a small number of trained police officers should be attached to MMIA for duty with the Carabinieri. It is appreciated that, in view of the unwillingness of the Italian Government to accept the Police Mission, the numbers of these officers would have to be kept to a minimum and their purpose disguised as far as possible.

3. The following is an estimate of the number of officers who would be required:-

HQ MMIA	1 (Lt. Col.)
Three Police Colleges	3
Eleven D.L.U.s. (one per Territorial region)	11
Total	15

4. Your views are requested on the proposal outlined in para 2 above. At the same time, will you please say how many of the appointments listed in para 3 above could be filled by trained police officers now serving under the Allied Commission, who could be made available after the proposed hand back to Italian control of the Northern Regions (less UDINE and possibly BOLZANO) has been completed.

A. L. RAMBLER,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5.

Copy to: G-3 (AFHQ).

5603

SECRET

785017

3426 1

160

INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Originator's Reference: FX 47521

Date/Time of Origin: OCT 061024A

Message Centre No: G 289

Date/Time Rec'd: OCT 071115A

Precedence: PRIORITY

FROM: AFHQ SIGNED SACMED CITE FHGEG

8 OCT 1945

TO: ACTION: AGWAR FOR CCS, CABINET OFFICE WHITEHALL FOR BR CHIEFS
OF STAFF. INFO: ALCOM**SECRET****SECRET****Confidential** (189B)

See 201

1. In NAF 1051 it was recommended that you approve an Allied police mission to overhaul and increase the efficiency of the Italian Carabinieri and stated that details would be forwarded. This is NAF 1077.

INFO - ACTION

2. The present situation with relation to the Italian Govt is this. PARRI personnel appears to agree the desirability of such a mission. He officially states however:

- A) That it would be inexpedient to invite a Mission because the communists would probably demand Russian participation.
- B) That if the Allies imposed a mission it would be contrary to present Allied policy and would be resented by the Italians.
- C) That, after elections when presumably the communists would be an opposition party, the Govt might request a mission.
- D) That a mission might be agreed as part of a supplementary agreement to the Peace Treaty or even imposed as part of the Treaty.

3. I still hold to the view that, unless the reorganization and training of the Carabinieri is placed under a qualified Allied Police Mission, it will remain an inefficient and undependable force in which the Govt cannot depend in any crisis. I am hesitant however about insisting that a Mission be accepted until it is clear that such

(See 143)

(Com. 144/145)

Confidential **SECRET**

- 2 -

159

action conforms to your policy.

4. A detailed examination is therefore being made of the feasibility of making the reorganization and training of the Italian police the responsibility of the Military Mission to Italian Army. As the training of the Carabinieri is a function of the Italian Ministry of War this would not be illogical. In this event the provision of a small increment of police officers on the staff of the Military Mission would be required and it might be necessary for these officers to be given army rank.

5. Meanwhile, no action by you in regard to para 12 (D) of NAP 1051 is at present required.

Dist

Info-Action - Exec Commr 2
Info - Chief Commissioner
POLAD A
POLAD B
CA Section
Econ Sec 2
Navy SC
Land Forces SC
File

INFO - ACTION

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
ACTION

5607

COPY

Major-General A.D. WARD, C.F., C.B.E., D.S.O.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff

DO. Italy

Confidential

SECRET AND
PERSONAL

6 Oct. 1945

My dear Lush,

Your DO letter 3636/DC of 1 October 1945 to General Morgan has been passed to me for action.

You may have found that the G-5 letter to which you refer was perhaps not very clear, the policy involved, however, was fully agreed on an Allied basis. It most certainly is intended that the Italians themselves should do the bulk of the work in the collection of arms. One cannot lay down hard and fast rules as the precise methods must be left to the direction of local commanders. However, roughly speaking, the first step in the collection of arms should normally be the employment of Carabinieri, the next should be employment of units of the Italian Army and only in the last resort should Allied troops be used. In those parts of ITALY which are handed back to Italian Government control no Allied troops have been so far employed.

last

When I was in Rome you discussed with me the proposal that British troops should mother the Carabinieri in the business of collecting arms. This proposal was, I know, coloured by what Graham had been doing in Turin. The conditions under which Graham was working do not really obtain in other parts of ITALY and when we examined the proposal it was decided that no general directive in such terms was practicable. What we have got to do is to ginger up the Carabinieri as a whole. As I expect you know, we are examining the possibility of doing this through the Military Mission, giving them policemen disguised as soldiers to help them in their task.

Yours ever

(sgd) A. D. Ward

Brigadier M.S. Lush, C.B.E., M.C.
Executive Commissioner
Allied Commission

Orig am 3636/DC

5606

TOP SECRET

Confidential

1598

EXTRACT from signal FX 31519 dated 3 August 45 from "Signed Alexander Cite PHDSC" to Agvar for COS and AMSSO for British Chiefs of Staff Info Alcom and NMIA classified TOP SECRET.

TOP SECRET

(This is RAF 1051)

7. The present establishment of the Carabinieri is 65000. This force is inefficient by Allied standards. It is not however considered that any overall alteration to its establishment is necessary. The remedy lies in increasing its efficiency rather than its numbers. For the purpose an Allied Police Commission should be provided urgently to reorganize and train the Carabinieri.

12. I urgently request that you approve:

d. The provision of an Allied Police Mission as indicated in para 7 and details in regard to which will be the subject of separate signal.

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: Taking over of CC.ER. by MIA.

LAND FORCES SUB COM. A.C.
(M.M.I.A.) R.O.M.E.

A 013

2 Oct 45

1. (a) Para 24 of AFHQ AG.021.711/169 OCT-20 of 18 Nov 44 states that "The Carabinieri (CC.ER.), except those units within army formations in the role of Military Police, are a civil police organization under the command of the Commanding General of the Carabinieri and directed by Public Safety Sub-Commission."

(b) At present, therefore, MIA are merely the supply agency as regards clothing, boots and equipment.

(c) Operationally and for their police functions the CC.ER. are under the Italian Minister of the Interior.

(d) For their organization, accommodation, pay etc (i.e. from the S.D. and Administrative point of view) the CC.ER. are under the Italian Minister of War and are the senior corps in the Army.

(e) The CC.ER. are only part of the police forces of ITALY and work in with municipal or local police - "metropolitani", questura, etc.

2. (a) The problem of the possible reorganization of all the Italian police forces is thus a vast one, with a considerable civilian and political aspect.

(b) It is therefore necessary to be quite clear what exactly MIA are to take over.

(c) MIA could perhaps take over the CC.ER. as regards the functions in para 1(d) provided certain additions (see para 3 below) were made to MIA staff, in order to compete with the extra work involved by adding 60,000 CC.ER. to MIA responsibilities. The directive as in para 1(a) would have to be changed accordingly.

(d) To compete with a possible reorganization of all the Italian police forces as in para 2(a) would be beyond the power of MIA and would necessitate a special "Police Mission" to investigate the whole question and produce a complete project. Such a Mission should be either British or American, so that the final project is not a compromise between the differing British and American systems.

It could and probably should work independently, consulting MIA

(e) Operationally and for their police functions the CC.M. are under the Italian Minister of the Interior.

(d) For their organization, accommodation, pay etc (i.e. from the S.D. and Administrative point of view) the CC.M. are under the Italian Minister of War and are the senior corps in the Army.

(e) The CC.M. are only part of the police forces of Italy and work in with municipal or local police - "metropolitani", Carabinieri, etc.

(a) The problem of the possible reorganization of all the Italian police forces is thus a vast one, with a considerable civilian and political aspect.

(b) It is therefore necessary to be quite clear what exactly MIA are to take over.

(c) MIA could perhaps take over the CC.M. as regards the functions in para (d) provided certain additions (see para 3 below) were made to MIA staff, in order to compete with the extra work involved by adding 65,000 CC.M. to MIA responsibilities. The directive as in para 1(a) would have to be changed accordingly.

(d) To compete with a possible reorganization of all the Italian police forces as in para 2(a) would be beyond the power of MIA and would necessitate a special "Police Mission" to investigate the whole question and produce a complete project. Such a mission should be either British or American, so that the final project is not a compromise between the differing British and American systems.

It could and probably should work independently, consulting MIA where necessary.

The question as to whom this Mission should be directly responsible to is one for decision by higher authority. The choice appears to be between A.C., A.F.H.Q. or M.I.A. If M.I.A., the Police Mission and the Military Mission would have to be incorporated under one Commander. This would throw a considerable extra burden on that Commander, who would have to deal with the Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Grace and Justice, as well as the Minister of War.

5. (a) As regards the extra staff required by MIA to take over the functions in connection with CC.M. as per para 1(d), this should consist of three main elements:-

- (i) Technical police service officers.
- (ii) Extra military staff officers in MIA
- (iii) Liaison officers with CC.M. formations, as may be necessary.

- 2 -

3. (cont'd)

(b) For 3(a)(i) the following are considered the minimum:-

One Lt. Col. (staff officer 1st grade) - police college trained and with wide experience of police duties and procedure.

One Major (staff officer 2nd grade) - with experience of police duties from the operational and more detailed organizational aspect.

One Major (staff officer 2nd grade) - with experience of police duties from the administrative and legal aspect.

These 3 officers would act as "Technical advisors and inspectors" in the same way as e.g. A.D.S.I. in the MIA H.E. proposed under my SO/101 of 18 Sept. Appx "A".

(c) For 3(a)(ii) Three additional majors (Staff officers 2nd grade) would be necessary, one each for O, A and Q.

(d) For 3(a)(iii) This would have to be the subject of examination with Public Safety Sub-Commission.

Of course, the requisite additional batmen, clerks and transport would also have to be added.

4. If it is decided that MIA are to take over functions as in para 1(d), it is essential that all the personnel and transport specified in para 3 should be present with MIA before the hand-over takes place.

5. The above is MIA's initial reaction to this matter. It has not been discussed with Public Safety Sub-Commission. Such discussion would be necessary in order to examine all facets of the problem, before the transfer of responsibility was accepted by MIA.

2 Banning

One Major (staff officer 2nd grade) - with experience of police duties from the administrative and legal aspect.

These 3 officers would act as "Technical advisors and inspectors" in the same way as e.g. A.D.S.T. in the MIA H.S. proposed under my 85/101 of 18 Sept. Appx "A".

(c) Per 3(a)(ii)

Three additional majors (staff officers 2nd grade) would be necessary, one each for J, A and Q.

(d) For 3(e)(iii)

This would have to be the subject of examination with Public Safety Sub-Commission.

Of course, the requisite additional between, clerks and transport would also have to be added.

4. If it is decided that MIA are to take over functions as in para 1(d), it is essential that all the personnel and transport specified in para 3 should be present with MIA before the hand-over takes place.

5. The above is MIA's initial reaction to this matter. It has not been discussed with Public Safety Sub-Commission. Such discussion would be necessary in order to examine all facets of the problem, before the transfer of responsibility was accepted by MIA.

L. Browning

Major General
H.S.I.A.

sk

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8624

Ex-Owner

155

INFO

YCP/9/50
SEP 231045A

P/8773
SEP 231515A
IMPORTANT

From: CHIEF OF POLICE VANERIA GIULIA POLICE FORCE 13 CO PS.
To: P SAFETY SC HQ ALCOM

SEP 1945

UNCLASSIFIED

Col THORNE Chief of Police VANERIA GIULIA Police Force
proceeding to Hq ALCOM respecting police matters. Eto at ROME
airfield 1220 hrs Tuesday 25 September. Will you please arrange
for him to be met at airfield.

List

Action - P Safety
Info - Chief Commissioner
Exec Commr 2
CA Sect
File

26/9

See M 156

HEADQUARTERS
24 SEP 1945
A C.

26/9

560

(Copy destroyed)

3626 - 3626 D
ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

G-5: 000.5

SUBJECT: Illegal Retention of Arms

21 September 1945

TO : Chief Commissioner,
HQ, Allied Commission, APO 394

SEP 24 1945

1. Reference is made to your letter, subject as above, ref 3636/49/EC dated 5 September, which enclosed a staff memorandum.

2. The following represents the present views of the responsible Sections at AFHQ:-

"In view of the overall reduction of Allied Forces in Italy, and the resultant increase in the commitment of the remaining forces, it is not considered advisable to place the additional burden of responsibility for advising and training Carabinieri and local police agencies on the District and/or Base Section Commanders.

The AFHQ signal (FX 38435 of 25 August) directs all concerned to take all possible steps to collect illegal arms, and this directive has the additional value of permitting commanders to fit the methods employed to the local conditions encountered.

In view of the above it is considered that no further action should be taken on the matter at this time.

|| That there should be this demand for assistance to the Carabinieri from ALCOM, seems to be an added reason for the early acceptance of the Allied Police Mission by the Italian Government. ||

A. L. HAMBLEY,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5.

Copy to: G-3.

(ORIGINAL ON FILE 3636/EC)

560

Ref: ~~1686/249/33~~

Confidential

SECRET12th September 1945.

SUBJECT: Allied Police Mission.

TO: 1 C-5 Section, A.P.H.Q.

I refer to your C-5 CLA. 12 of 5 September 45.

1. I much regret that my two letters under reference, which were not consistent, should have caused confusion. It would have been better if I had indicated that part of the first letter was cancelled by the second.
2. The question of the establishment of a Police Mission being made one of the conditions of the Peace Treaty is a matter on which I do not feel competent to judge. I am, however, convinced that the matter should be raised in the discussions on the Peace Treaty and that it should either be one of the conditions of the Treaty itself or that the Italians should be invited as a condition of the signing of the Peace Treaty to request and accept such a Mission in an exchange of letters between the Italian and the Allied Governments.
3. As I stated in my letter dated 25 August 45 the Prime Minister believes that such an arrangement would be acceptable to the Italians and went so far as to say that it might be made a condition of the Peace Treaty itself. Some politicians would resent it and try to make capital out of it, but there is little doubt that the officials in authority would welcome a Mission and the mass of the people would favour it.

4. I do not recommend that opening of a Mission under Secord's present authority. You will notice from my letter of 25 August that the Prime Minister stated that it would not be well received as such and I agree that an imposition in these circumstances would be resented as an complete opposition to the principles of PAN 457 and would give the Mission itself a bad start. I do not think the Prime Minister would be able, even if induced, to play down any tendency on the part of the Italians to say that Secord is going against his policy on tendency toward Italy, as stated in your letter of 5 September.

5. I think it would be quite proper if I were instructed to inform the Prime Minister that the establishment of a Police Mission would be imposed in some form or other as a result of the Peace Treaty and if steps were taken at once to assemble this Mission and discuss its terms of reference. It might even be possible if some news of this were to leak out from London currently in order that we could test Italian reaction.

I refer to your 2-5 CM, 12 of 5 September 45.

1. I must regret that my two letters under reference, which were not consistent, should have caused confusion. It would have been better if I had indicated that part of the first letter was cancelled by the second.
2. The question of the establishment of a Police Mission being made one of the conditions of the Peace Treaty is a matter on which I do not feel competent to judge. I am, however, convinced that the matter should be raised in the discussions on the Peace Treaty and that it should either be one of the conditions of the Treaty itself or that the Italians should be invited as a condition of the signing of the peace Treaty to request and accept such a Mission in an exchange of letters between the Italian and the Allied Governments.
3. As I stated in my letter dated 25 August 45 the Prime Minister believes that such an arrangement would be acceptable to the Italians and went so far as to say that it might be made a condition of the Peace Treaty itself. Some politicians would resent it and try to make capital out of it, but there is little doubt that the officials in authority would welcome a Mission and the mass of the people would favour it.
4. I do not recommend that opening of a Mission under Secord's present authority. You will notice from my letter of 25 August that the Prime Minister stated that it would not be well received as such and I agree that an imposition in these circumstances would be resented as an complete opposition to the principles of PM 437 and would give the Mission itself a bad start. I do not think the Prime Minister would be able, even if induced, to play down any tendency on the part of the Italians to say that Secord is going against his policy of leniency towards Italy, as stated in your letter of 5 September.
5. I think it would be quite proper if I were instructed to inform the Prime Minister that the establishment of a Police Mission would be imposed in some form or other as a result of the Peace Treaty and if steps were taken at once to assemble this Mission and discuss its terms of reference. It might even be politic if some news of this were to leak out from London currently in order that we could test Italian reactions.

For the Chief Commissioner:

Copy to: Palace A & B
Civil Affairs Section
Public Safety Sub-Com.

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

3626
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Political Adviser (A)

Subject: Allied Police Mission
To : Executive Commissioner

SEP 17 1945

I favor the third suggestion (sub paragraph c) of paragraph 3 of G-5's letter attached, that an Allied Police Mission be appointed under SAC's present authority to increase the efficiency and possibly completely reorganize the present Italian police system.

I feel that the various suggestions made by the Prime Minister regarding the appointment of such a Mission in the future are conflicting and infeasible. There is no assurance that the Communist Party will be out of the Government after the holding of national elections. Nor would it be any more feasible to provide for an Anglo-American Police Mission under the terms of the peace treaty, in which the Soviet Union will be a full participant, than to obtain agreement on this question in the present coalition Government of Italy. Furthermore, the need for reorganization and increased efficiency in the Italian police force is immediate and precious time, undoubtedly running into months, would be lost if the proposed Mission had to wait for the conclusion of peace before it could even begin work.

I am not convinced that the sending of an Allied Police Mission to Italy under SAC's present authority is contrary to the spirit of FAN 487. Certainly internal security during the coming months is a question which vitally affects the military interests of the Allied powers, who are forced to keep Allied troops in this country to implement our pledge to the Italian people of a free choice of government and to protect the Allied lines of communication with the northern military theaters. While it is probably correct that the present Italian Government, because of its political complexion, will be unable to invite an Anglo-American Police Mission to Italy, I doubt that the Italian Government could or would refuse to accept it if SAC took the decision and had the Italian Government informed that such a Mission was being sent to Italy for the purposes specified.

Consequently I suggest that the Chief Commissioner, in reply to AFHQ, recommend that SAC proceed with the appoint-

2048

(Enclosure)

-2-

ment of an Allied Police Mission under his present authority and authorize the Chief Commissioner to so inform the Italian Government, expressing the belief that the Italian Government will share the views of SAC in regard to the urgency and importance of this problem and that the Italian Government will cooperate to make the Mission effective.

J. Wesley Jones

J. Wesley Jones

Rome, September 13, 1945

Copy to:
Office of Political Adviser (B)

2. The question of the establishment of a Police Mission being made one of the conditions of the Peace Treaty is a matter on which I do not feel competent to judge. I am, however, convinced that the matter should be raised in the discussions on the Peace Treaty and that it should either be one of the conditions of the Treaty itself or that the Italians should be induced as a condition of the signing of the Peace Treaty to request and ~~have~~ accept such a Mission in an exchange of letters between the Italian and the Allied Governments.

785017

SECRET

ConfidentialHEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 594
Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref: 1626/EC.

September 1945.

SUBJECT: Allied Police Mission.

TO : G-5 Section, AFHQ.

I refer to your G-5 014.12 of 5 September 45.

1. I much regret that my two letters under reference, which were not consistent, should have caused confusion. It would have been better if I had indicated that part of the first letter was cancelled by the second.

2. I do not recommend the imposition of a Police Mission by including such a provision in the Peace Treaty itself. I am, however, convinced that the matter should be raised with the Italians at the same time as the discussions with the Peace Treaty and that they should be induced as a condition of the signing of the Peace Treaty to request and have accepted in an exchange of letters between the Italian and the Allied

~~to examine such a mission.~~

3. As I stated in my letter dated 25 August 45 the Prime Minister believes that such an arrangement would be acceptable to the Italians and went so far as to say that it might be made a condition of the Peace Treaty itself. Some politicians could resent it and try to make card out of it, but there is little doubt that the officials in authority would welcome a Mission and the mass of the people would favour it. ⁴ I do not recommend the

149A

not consistent, should have caused confusion. It would have been better if I had indicated that part of the first letter was cancelled by the second.

2. I do not recommend the appointment of a Police Mission by including such a provision in the Peace Treaty itself. I am, however, convinced that the ~~mission~~ ^{mission} should be ~~included~~ ^{included} with the Italians at the time as the discussions with the Peace Treaty and that they should be included as a condition of the signing of the Peace Treaty to request and have accepted in an exchange of letters between the Italian and the Allied

~~Government and the Italian Government.~~

3. As I stated in my letter dated 25 August 45 the Prime Minister believes that such an arrangement would be acceptable to the Italians and must so far as to say that it might be made a condition of the Peace Treaty itself. Some politicians would resent it and try to take it out of it, but there is little doubt that the officials in authority would welcome a Mission and the name of the people would favor it. ⁴ I do not recommend the opening of a Mission under Scapellato's present authority. You will notice from my letter of 25 August that the Prime Minister stated that it would not be well received as such and I agree that an objection in these circumstances would be resented as in complete opposition to the principles of 25 August and would give the Mission itself a bad start. *Do not think the Prime*

5. I think it would be quite proper if I were instructed to inform the Prime Minister that the establishment of a Police Mission would be approved in some form or other as a result of the Peace Treaty and if steps were taken at once to ~~rescind~~ ^{rescind} this Mission and discuss its terms of reference. It might

Minister would be able even if intended to play down any tendency and the fact of the Italian Government to suggest that it should be in the letter of 25 August.

Confidential

149b

even be possible if some news of this were to leak out in order that
we could test Italian reactions.

For the Chief Commissioner:

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

Copy to: AD/14650/23.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Principles,
Executive Commission.

Copy to: AD/14650/28.

5595

785017

146

Confidential

Ref: 3626/EO.

7 Sept. 45.

Subject: Allied Police Mission.

To: Pol. Ad. (A) VP, Civil Affairs Section.
Pol. Ad. (B)

143

Attached for your information and comment is a copy of a letter received from Chief of Staff, G-5, on the above subject.

Would you please let this office have your recommendations as to how we should reply to the queries in para. 3.

For Chief Commissioner.

✓ E. TATBOT
Brigadier, Lt Col
Executive Commissioner.

Encl.

Copy to Public Safety Sub-Commission.

B/P SEE F
13/9

SECRET

Noted.
5597
H. J. 9/9

3626
~~SECRET~~
Confidential
ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

3448
EX Commission

442
143

G-5: 014.12

5 September 1945

SEP - 5 1945

SUBJECT: Allied Police Mission.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission, APO 394.

124

Reference is made to your 3626/EC of 25 August and your 3626/133/EC of 31 August.

1. The following facts and considerations now emerge in connection with the provision of an Allied Police Mission to Italy:

a. Military Aspect

(1) A Police Mission would help to increase the efficiency of the CCRR and this in turn would assist the Italian Government in maintaining law and order.

(2) If (1) above was successful, then fewer Allied troops would be required in Italy.

b. Italian Government aspect as indicated by Prime Minister Parri

(1) He would personally welcome the Police Mission.

(2) He feels that the present government couldn't invite a purely Anglo-American Police Mission, and that the communist element of the present government would insist on Russian representation.

(3) He believes that after the elections, when the Communist party will probably be in opposition, it may be possible for the Government to ask for an Anglo-American Police Mission.

(4) Presumably as an alternative to (3), he considers that such a Mission could be offered by the Allies and accepted by the Italians as a condition of the Peace Treaty or as a separate arrangement in connection with the Peace Treaty.

(5) He feels that should an Allied Police Mission be imposed upon the Italian Government under the Armistice terms, it would not be well received, since this step would be in conflict with the general policy of holding the Armistice terms in reserve.

SECRET

(1 SPARE COPY)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

c. Allied Commission's Aspect

(1) In your letter 3626/EC of 25 August, you state that it is presumed that no action should be taken at this stage in regard to the organization of such a Mission.

(2) In your letter 3626/133/EC of 31 August you state that the matter should not be allowed to rest and suggest that the acceptance of a Police Mission may have to be included as one of the clauses of the Peace Treaty.

2. It appears that if the CORR is to be depended upon for internal security, increased efficiency and possibly complete reorganization is necessary. No other solution than a Police Mission has been offered.

3. In view of the fact that it is difficult to reconcile your two letters referred to above it is requested that you restate your views to cover the following specific points:

a. Do you recommend the imposition of a Police Mission on the Italians by including such a provision in the peace treaty?

b. What would be the reaction of the Italian Government to such an imposed mission?

c. Do you recommend the appointment of a mission under SACMED's present authority?

4. If you agree the desirability of a police mission, please consider the practicability of approaching Professor Parri with the viewpoint that both he and SACMED realize that the appointment of such a mission is in the best interests of Italy; that in your view the most desirable line of action would be for SACMED to appoint such a mission and for him (Parri) to play down any tendency on the part of the Italians to say that SACMED is going against his policy of leniency toward Italy.

5. No future action will be taken at AFHQ pending the results of your talk with Professor Parri, or if it does not take place, pending your further remarks and recommendations.

A. L. Hamblen

A. L. HAMBLÉN,
Brigadier General, GSC,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5.

Copy to: G-3

5592

SECRET

3626
X

139

DATE
AND VERBALLY REGION

4542

21 August 1945

ROUTINE

UNCLASSIFIED TO

SUBJECT IS AUXILIARY POLICE TO

SEP - 5 1945

UNDER TO AND VERBALLY REGION FROM ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE WAGEN

134

PAGE ONE OF REFERENCE TO THE ABOVE THAT ONE ONE SLANT FIVE THREE
THAT AT 304 ONE TWO THREE TWO THREE THREE ONE THREE FOUR FIVE SIX
FOUR TWO TWO THREE OF AUXILIARY POLICE TWO ARE EXHIBITED
MAINTAINED SHOULD BE PLACED AS AN ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE WAGEN
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STRENGTHENED IN THIS IN IN ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE WAGEN THE ABOVE WHICH HAS
BEEN ADOPTED IN ALL OTHER AREAS IN THE ABOVE

Internal List : Chief Commissioner SA Sec First
Ex Commissioner (?) Finance Sec File
POLICE (A)
POLICE (F)

2014 1945 1/2

385

JOHN W. CHAPMAN COL.

NICHOLAS J. JORDAN
3591
Asst Adjutant

9 Sgt Thompson.

Sgt. Hoot

EX. 104125

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171404141

EXED COMM

3626

134

RXII/PS/6.12
ADG 2816308

F/5791
ADG 2920108
ROUTINE

From: HQ VENEZIA REGION
To: ALCON

AUG 30 1945

UNCLASSIFIED.

Confirming discussion on OCCASION visit Brigadier LUSH. Matter requiring urgent decision before transfer of territory is legalisation and financial provision for auxiliary police. At present they are maintained by AMO authority. Approximate numbers BELLUNO 70 BOLZANO 28 PADOVA 315 ROVIGO 155 TRENTO 80 UDINE 825 VERONA 535 VENEZIA 420 VIGENZA 100.

DIST

ACTION: P. Safety SC
INFO: Chief Commissioner
Ex Commissioner 2
POLAD (A)
POLAD (B)
CA Sec
Finance SO
Float
File

HEADQUARTERS
30 AUG 1945
A. E.

See M/135.6-117

135.6-117

Runner)

TOP SECRET.

Confidential

133

Ref: 3626/133/EC.

31 August 1945.

SUBJECT: Allied Police Mission to ITALY.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
Attn: G-5 Section.

With reference to this HQ letter 3626/EC of 25 Aug 45.

1. On further consideration being given to this matter the following additional views are forwarded in amplification of paras 1(b) and (c) and in reply to your specific question.

2. The object of the Mission would be in the first place to review the whole of the machinery for maintaining law and order now existing in ITALY and to advise the Italian Government in respect of any reforms or changes deemed necessary for the establishment of an adequate police system in the country.

3. The secondary duty would be to furnish advice and supervision on the organisation, administration and training of the police formation adopted. It would probably not be necessary or politic to give the Mission such extensive authority as has been proposed for the Police Mission to GREECE. With advisory functions only the Mission should without difficulty be able to attain its object.

4. Similarly, whereas the Mission to GREECE will contain some 40 officers I consider between 10 and 30 should suffice for ITALY, but I should prefer to leave this to the decision of the Chief of the Mission.

5. Doubt has been expressed as to the desirability or even possibility of forming an Allied Police Mission for the reason that methods in various countries differ widely. I see no difficulty in this. Our object is not to impose any specifically national form of police system on ITALY, but to evolve a system best suited to this country and the Italian population. Combined study by experts with possibly a different approach would seem an excellent way to achieve this. I would recommend parity between US and UK officers.

6. The staff must be police experts with long experience and if possible it would be helpful if their experience of police systems were not limited to American or English systems. On the British side I would welcome an officer with experience in the Dominions or Colonies. The principals must be very highly qualified.

7. Until more is known of the future of Allied commitments in ITALY it is ~~now~~ difficult to make recommendations as to how the personnel of the Mission should be held. In my letter of 23 June I recommended an Allied Mission, one of whose duties would be to care for the Police Mission. If this does not eventuate, the Police Mission could remain independent and on the same lines as the Military, Naval and Air Force Missions or Mission.

(See also C 50)

BU 12125-488/11
SEP F 43

-2-

Confidential

(133A)

8. In spite of Signor PARRI's first reactions, I feel that we cannot let the matter rest. The future of ITALY will depend largely on the adequacy of her police force. The Allies have a responsibility in this respect. It may well be that the acceptance of a Police Mission will have to be included as one of the clauses of the Treaty or be a matter for an agreed exchange of letters concomitant with the Treaty.

For the Chief Commissioner:

M. B. LUSH

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

Copy to: US Ambassador
Br Ambassador
Chief Commissioner
Polad (US)
Polad (Br)
C2 Section
Public Safety Sub-Com

548x

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

3626
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394

18 August 1945.

805 20 1945

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Addressing of Signals.

To : Executive Commissioner.

1. Your letter, reference 3025/107/E of 2 August, on the above subject addressed to Regional Commissioner, Piemonte Region, and signed by Lieutenant Colonel Talbot was not in order and should not have been sent.

2. Colonel Marshall was entirely correct in sending me a personal message in response to my personal message to him.

3. I should be grateful if in the future I am consulted before instructions are sent to others affecting personal communications from me.

W
ELIOT W. HANE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Copy to: Colonel Robert F. Marshall
Regional Commissioner, Piemonte Region.

(H.I. 2.4)

785017

128A

TO: AFTR GEORGE FIVE SECTION

4328

28 AUG 45

PRIORITY

Confidential

TOP SECRET PD

PAGE ONE PD REFERENCE THIS INFORMATIONAL LETTER THREE SIX TWO SIX SEVEN EIGHT
CHARLES OF TWO FIVE AUGUST FOUR FIVE PD

REFERENCE AFTR GEORGE FIVE SECTION FROM ALDORE ONE AGAS PAREN

PAGE TWO PD A MENTION LETTER IS BEING DISPATCHED IN AMPLIFICATION OF PAGES ONE
PAREN HARRY PAREN AND PAREN CHARLES PAREN

Internal Distribution:

Chief Commissioner,
Executive Commissioner,
U.S. Ambassador,
British Ambassador,
Political Advisor (A),
Political Advisor (B),
Public Safety Sub-Commission.

Civil Affairs Section

437

NICHOLAS PICHIERO,
CHD ISA,
Asst. Adjutant.

5586

~~TOP SECRET~~ (24)

Copy No. 10

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

27 AUG 1945

Confidential

Ref:

9624/33

25 AUG 45

SUBJECT: Allied Police Mission.

TO: AFM, G-5 Section.

112

With reference to your G-5: OIA.12 of 11 Aug 45.

1. The following reply is sent in regard to the points raised in para 2 of your letter under reference;

- (a) The Chief Commissioner discussed with the Italian Prime Minister on 21 Aug 45, the question of the Italian reaction to an Allied Police Mission.

In brief, the Prime Minister's position was that while he would welcome an Anglo-American Police Mission for the purpose of reorganizing the Public Security Forces of Italy, including the Carabinieri, he did not feel that the Italian Government as at present constituted from the six parties of the UN would be able to invite such a Mission to be sent by the U.S. and British Governments. He stated that the Communist Party would certainly be opposed to inviting such a Mission unless it included Russian members - a proposal which he would not favour.

He believed that after elections were held the resulting Government would not comprise as many parties as the present Government, that it would probably have the Communist Party in opposition and that with a more closely knit Government such an invitation for an Anglo-American Police Mission could then be made by the Government.

He felt that if such a Mission were instituted now by the Supreme Allied Commander or by the Allied Commission it would not be well received and it would be considered as constituting an employment by the Allies of their powers under the Armistice in conflict with the present policy of holding the Armistice powers in reserve.

He did feel that the furnishing of an Allied Police Mission could be offered by the Allies and accepted by the Italians either as a condition of the peace treaty or as a separate arrangement made in connection therewith.

See File 1235
F-42

~~TOP SECRET~~

Confidential

123

From the foregoing it will appear that the Prime Minister has political objection to the furnishing of an Anglo-American Police Mission forthwith but is disposed to accept such a mission at the time of the execution of a peace treaty. He assures that the peace treaty will be concluded before there is a new government as a result of national elections.

- (b) In view of the foregoing it is presumed that no action should be taken at this stage in regard to the organization of the mission or to its composition by nationalities.
- (c) Your Headquarters, under your telegram EX 34913 of 12 August 45, was endeavouring to obtain particulars of composition and terms of reference of the Special Police Mission to Greece. No information has yet been received from your Headquarters but since this matter was raised, this Headquarters has seen copies of correspondence which passed between the British Ambassador in Greece and the Greek Prime Minister. In this correspondence the status, the powers and composition of the mission to be sent to Greece are outlined.
- 3 In view of the foregoing no action has been taken at this stage as regards the attachment of a Senior Police Officer to your Headquarters as suggested in paras 3 and 4 of your letter under reference.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

ML

H. GALT,
Brigadier,
VP CA Section.

Copy to: Chief Commissioner,
Executive Commissioner,
U.S. Ambassador,
British Ambassador,
Political Advisor (A)
Political Advisor (B)
Public Safety Sub-Commission.

5084

0189

BEST COPY POSSIBLE

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BALEKAR HATATE

May 28, 1945.

CONFIDENTIAL
Section 2.
Confidential

(U/193/1918/19)

Copy No. 130

Sir R. Loeper to Mr. Eden. - (Received 28th May.)

(No. 290.)

Sir,

With reference to paragraph 1 of my telegram No. 1167 of the 12th May on the subject of the police, gendarmerie and prison services mission, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of my letter of the 5th May to the President of the Council, together with copies of the latter's reply (see paragraph 3 of my telegram under reference).

Athens, 16th May 1945

I have, etc.

H. L. LESTER.

ENCLOSURE 1.

Letter dated 5th May from His Majesty's Ambassador to the Greek Prime Minister about the Police, Gendarmerie and Prison Service mission.

THE Greek Government requested His Majesty's Government to send a mission to Greece to reorganise the gendarmerie, police and prison services. As has already been made known to the Greek Government, His Majesty's Government is anxious to afford every assistance towards the re-establishment of the Greek State services in general and the forces of law and order in particular. In consequence Sir Charles Wickham, the present Inspector-General of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, visited Greece in March to enquire into the position and to give his views to His Britannic Majesty's Government to the status and powers of such a mission. His Majesty's Government has given full consideration to the request and are willing to make available

10-19-1

This reference to paragraph 1 of my telegram No. 1167 of the 12th May on the subject of the police, gendarmerie and prison services mission, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of my letter of the 5th May to His President of the Council, together with copies of the latter's reply (see paragraph 3 of my telegram under reference).

I have, etc.,

W. M. LAMONT.

ENCLOSURE 1.

Letter dated 12th May from His Majesty's Ambassador to the Greek Prime Minister about the Police, Gendarmerie and Prison Services Mission.

The Greek Government requested His Majesty's Government to send a mission to Greece to reorganise the gendarmerie, police and prison services. It has already been made known to the Greek Government, His Majesty's Government is anxious to afford every assistance towards the re-establishment of the Greek State services in general and the forces of law and order in particular. In consequence Sir Charles Widdowson, the present Inspector-General of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, visited Greece in March to enquire into the position and to give his views to His Britannic Majesty's Government to the status and powers of such a mission. His Majesty's Government has given full consideration to the request and are willing to make available services of Sir Charles Widdowson as head of a mission to carry out the request by the Greek Government. It would seem, however, to be desirable before this mission is finally constituted that its status and powers be defined, some broad principles of the lines of reorganisation and the extent of the financial liability of the Greek Government for same agreed.

2. In the past there have been two missions to this type in Frederick Halliday and Colonel Potts which covered a continuous period of ten years and an investigation into the organisation and maintenance of the gendarmerie by Mr. Bagg of the Royal Irish Constabulary. As a result of these missions as well as of further consideration by Sir Charles Widdowson His Majesty's Government suggest that the head of the mission and his staff should have full powers of organisation, administration and control in the police, gendarmerie and prison services which would include the maintenance, practical, and training, but that they should act in a advisory capacity only on police and gendarmerie action and on the normal daily routine of duties. It is considered by Sir Charles Widdowson that

Confidential

(21)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

although an armed force, should be essentially a police force. It is wholly incompatible with this condition that it should have any connection with the army or that the army should exercise any control over it, direct or indirect. The ministerial authority for its organization, administration and operation should rest solely with the department of Government charged with the maintenance of law and order, namely the Ministry of the Interior, which already controls the police. (This essential reform was strongly urged by Mr. Rizis.) His Majesty's Government would urge that this centralization of the authority of the Ministry of Interior over the gendarmerie should be accepted and confirmed by any legislation or decree necessary to implement it.

3. As the number of officers in each rank or grade in the gendarmerie and police should not be in excess of the actual numbers required or of the approved establishments, it is suggested that no further appointments to the active lists of the two forces should be made either from officers on the retired list, the unemployed list or from any other source until the mission is established and in a position to review the number of officers necessary to undertake the duties of the various ranks and grades.

4. The full cost of the proposed mission can not be met by the Greek Government. His Majesty's Government would not propose that a mission of forty officers and eight other ranks should be constituted to re-organize the three services, gendarmerie, police and prisons. In order that this task may be satisfactorily completed it is appreciated that the financial liability will be heavy. His Majesty's Government are willing to contribute towards the cost. I am therefore instructed to suggest the following division of the financial liability:-

- (1) Financial Liability accepted by the British Government.
 - (a) Basic salaries involving an annual charge of about £17,000.
 - (b) War bonus which might involve a further £3,000.
 - (c) Any pensions contributions and any liability to pay injury or death compensation.
 - (d) An allowance, free of tax, to cover entertainment expenses.
- (2) Financial Liability to be undertaken by the Greek Government.
 - (a) An expatriation allowance of 25 per cent. basic salary for married men and 12 per cent. for single men. This might involve £12,000 a year.
 - (b) A foreign service allowance of £90 for married men and £25 for single, which might cost £4,000 per annum.
 - (c) An outfit allowance totalling, say, £2,000 initially and £1,200 in the second year.
 - (d) For furnished office and living accommodation for mission and wives of officers.

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should not be in excess of the actual numbers required or of the approved establishments. It is suggested that no further appointments to the active list of the two forces should be made either from officers in the retired list, the unemployed list or from any other source until the mission is established and in a position to review the number of officers necessary to undertake the duties of the various ranks and grades.

4. The full cost of the previous mission was met by the Greek Government. His Majesty's Government could not propose that a mission of forty officers and eight other ranks should be constituted to re-organise the three services,endarse, police and prisons. In order that this task may be satisfactorily completed it is suggested that the financial liability will be heavy. His Majesty's Government are willing to contribute towards the cost. I am therefore instructed to suggest the following division of the financial liability:-

- (1) Financial liability accepted by the British Government.
 - (a) Basic salaries involving an annual charge of about £47,000.
 - (b) War bonus which might involve a further £3,000.
 - (c) Any pensions contributions and any liability to pay injury or death compensation.
 - (d) An allowance, free of tax, to cover entertainment expenses.
- (2) Financial liability to be undertaken by the Greek Government.
 - (a) An expatriation allowance of 25 per cent. basic salary for married men and 12 per cent. for single men. This might involve £12,000 a year.
 - (b) A foreign service allowance of £30 for married men and £25 for single, which might cost £4,000 per annum.
 - (c) An outfit allowance to selling, say, £2,000 initially and £1,200 in the second year.
 - (d) For furnished office and living accommodation for mission and wives of officers and other ranks who may wish to bring them to Greece; also a suitable furnished house or flat for the head of the mission.
 - (e) Housing allowance which would involve a total of £2,000 a year.
 - (f) The cost of care, including the maintenance and the provision of drivers, realising the difficulty in providing suitable cars His Majesty's Government would have available from British army services sufficient vehicles on repayment.
 - (g) For passages to and from United Kingdom or elsewhere on joining and/or relinquishing appointments, and once a year when proceeding on leave.
 - (h) The sea passages for families of officers who desire to join them in Greece and also the cost of return passages for such families when the officer relinquishes his appointment in the mission.
 - (i) For medical and hospital expenses with choice of hospital and doctor.
 - (j) A subsistence allowance to cover out-of-pocket expenses for officers travelling in duty. It is suggested that this should be on the same scale as subsistence allowances payable to foreign service officers.
 - (k) Provision of an adequate number of interpreters.

785017

- 3 -
Confidential 120

It is not possible for His Majesty's Government to indicate the cost of the above items against which no estimate has been placed, but it is clear that both Governments would be paying considerable and something like equal shares towards the cost of the mission.

5. It is suggested that, for administrative convenience, the British authorities should in the first place pay cash benefits set out above under the liabilities to be undertaken by the Greek Government, and then be reimbursed by the Greek Government. The benefits in kind would be provided by the Greek Government direct.

6. Finally it is suggested that contracts for service should be for two years and would be grateful to hear from your Excellency as soon as possible whether the Greek Government agree to the above proposals.

R.A. LEECH.

ENCLOSURE 2.

H. Voulgaris to Sir R. Leeper.

12th May, 1945

My dear Ambassador,

I HAVE received your letter of the 8th May on the subject of the mission which the previous Greek Government requested His Majesty's Government to provide to reorganise the gendarmerie, police and prison services. Your letter has been considered by my Government, who are fully aware of the importance of this question to the future of Greece, and they are happy to learn that they can assist upon the assistance of His Majesty's Government in this matter.

The Greek Government approve the financial proposals and other suggestions for the status and powers of the mission, as set out in your Excellency's letter. On one point, however, they desire to make their own position clear. They readily agree that the chief of the mission should have those full powers mentioned in paragraph 2 for the organisation, administration and training of the services concerned. For this purpose they recognise that his powers must cover the question of appointments, promotions and transfers. At the same time, it is the understanding of the Greek Government that in operational matters, outside daily routine, as in other matters, including appointments, promotions and transfers, he will conform to the general policy laid down by the Greek Government, whose final responsibility in these matters must remain.

As the reorganisation of these services is a matter of urgency, the Greek Government will be glad if His Majesty's Government will expedite the arrival of the mission.

218

R. A. LAMPERT.

MEMORANDUM R.

R. Voulgaris to Sir R. Langer.

12th May, 1945

My dear Ambassador,

I HAVE received your letter of the 8th May on the subject of the mission which the previous Greek Government requested His Majesty's Government to provide to reorganise the gendarmerie, police and prison services. Your letter has been considered by my Government, who are fully aware of the importance of this question to the future of Greece, and they are happy to learn that they can count upon the assistance of His Majesty's Government in this matter.

The Greek Government approve the financial proposals and other suggestions for the status and powers of the mission, as set out in your Excellency's letter. On one point, however, they desire to make their own position clear. They readily agree that the chief of the mission should have those full powers mentioned in paragraph 2 for the organisation, administration and training of the services concerned. For this purpose they recognise that his Government must cover the question of appointments, promotions and transfers. At the same time, it is the understanding of the Greek Government that in operational matters, outside daily routine, as in other matters, including appointments, promotions and transfers, he will conform to the general policy laid down by the Greek Government, whose final responsibility in these matters must remain.

As the reorganisation of these services is a matter of urgency, the Greek Government will be glad if His Majesty's Government will expedite the arrival of the mission in Greece at the earliest possible moment.

Believe me, Sir,

P. VOULGARIS.

2581

785017

SECRET
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
 Office of the Chief Commissioner

APO 394

Confidential
 22 August 1945.

119

MEMORANDUM TO: Executive Commissioner.

For your information in preparing a reply to the attached secret letter, file 4-5:01A.12 of 13 August, and with particular reference to para 2(a) thereof, I discussed with Prime Minister Parri yesterday the question of the Italian reaction to an Allied Police Mission.

In brief, Parri's position is that, while he would welcome an Anglo-American Police Mission for the purpose of reorganizing the public security forces of Italy, including the Carabinieri, he does not feel that the Italian Government, as at present constituted from the six parties of the Dc, would be able to invite such a Mission to be sent by the U.S. and British Governments. He stated that the Communist Party would certainly be opposed to inviting such a Mission unless it included mission members -- a proposal which he would not favor. He believed that after elections are held, the resulting Government will not comprise as many parties as the present Government, that it would probably have the Communist Party in opposition, and that with a more closely knit Government, such an invitation for an Anglo-American Police Mission could then be made by the Government.

He felt that if such a Mission were instituted now by and for the Supreme Allied Command, it would not be well received and would be considered as constituting an employment by the allies of their powers under the armistice in conflict with the present policy of holding the armistice powers in reserve.

He did feel that the furnishing of an Allied Police Mission could be offered by the allies and accepted by the Italians either as a condition of the peace treaty or as a separate arrangement made in connection therewith.

From the foregoing it will appear that the Prime Minister sees political objection to the furnishing of an Anglo-American Police Mission forthwith but is disposed to accept such a Mission at the time of execution of a peace treaty. He assures that the peace treaty will be concluded before there is a new Government as a result of national elections.

W. H. T. A. 5580
 W. H. T. A.
 Rear Admiral, USN
 Chief Commissioner

Copy to: US Ambassador
 US Ambassador
 FORAD (A) and (B)

SECRET

158
 124-125

785017

3626
TOP SECRET

A. E. Commissioner

Copy No 4

FX 34913
AUGUST 12/1309B

7/3810
AUGUST 14/0845E

PRIORITY

AUG 14 1945

FROM: AMIR, SIGNED SACHS CITE EMBRO

TO: ACTION: GREECECIL INFO: ALCON ROMER

Confidential

TOP SECRET.

Establishment of Allied police mission for ITALY under consideration here. grateful for particulars of composition and terms of reference of special police mission to GREECE and any other information you think may be useful to us

REPT

COPY NO 1 & 2 INFO -ACTION : OA SEC (2)

: : 3
: : 4 & 5
: : 6

INFO : CHIEF COMMISSIONER
EX COMMISSIONER (2)
FILE

TOP SECRET

See it to it.

3879

(1945 Kinsley)

(1 copy of file)

0 3626 ~~SECRET~~ 113
ALLIED [REDACTED] COMMISSION
INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT:

TO

EC

11 Aug 1945

AUG 13 1945

Ref attached.

Will you please ask CC. to take up para
2(a) with Signor Pami.

I am taking action on 2(b) + (c) as
instructed by you on the telephone.

G. Pami

5528

see M. H. R. H.

17 115

TOP SECRET BY AUTHORITY OF SAC

SEC.

421

~~SECRET~~

1165

112

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

Confidential

11 August 1945

AUG 13 1945

~~SECRET~~

FILE : G-5:GLA.12

SUBJECT: Allied Police Mission to reorganize the Carabinieri.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission, APO 394.

1. Paragraph 7 of MAP 1051 (of which you have an information copy) informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff that it was considered that an Allied Police Mission should be provided urgently to reorganize and train the Carabinieri. Paragraph 12(a) of the same signal stated that details in regard to the suggested Mission would be made the subject of a separate signal.

2. It is now necessary, as a preliminary to the further signal envisaged, to determine at least the following points:

- a. The Italian reaction to the suggested Mission.
- b. The suggested composition of the Mission by nationalities (including staff, transport etc) and the organization on which its personnel should be held.
- c. The suggested terms of reference of the Mission and its duration.

3. It is felt that the most expeditious way to arrive at conclusions on the above would be for a Senior Police Officer from your Headquarters, briefed by you and knowing the Italian viewpoint, to be attached to this Hq on temporary duty for a few days during which the staff work in connection with the proposed Mission could be worked out with all concerned.

4. It is requested that you will state the soonest date by which such an officer as above could be briefed and be made available. It is necessary that the supplementary signal to CCS should be sent with the least possible delay.

For the Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5:

[Signature]

F. G. A. PARSONS
Colonel, G.S.

cc: U.S. Ambassador
British Ambassador
Ad. Asst. (A)
Ad. Asst. (B)
Chief Comm.

~~TOP SECRET~~

SEC F 113
5
119, 124, 2125
2027

HEADQUARTERS
PIEMONTE REGION
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
APO 394

Office of the Regional Commissioner

6th August, 1945.

AUG 10 1945

REFERENCE: PR/RPW/311.2

SUBJECT : Addressing of Signals.

TO : Headquarters,
Allied Commission. ✓

1. Your 3626/109/TC dated 2 Aug 45 refers.
2. Our Signal P 127 of 26 July 45, as indicated therein, was in response to signal received at this Headquarters from Chief Commissioner (No. 2406 of 23 July 45) addressed "Personal. For Colonel Marshall".
3. In the absence of instructions to the contrary, your above mentioned communication will be construed as prohibiting personal responses to personal messages received from Chief Commissioner.
4. It is the understanding of this Headquarters that signal traffic between Regional Special Divisions and appropriate A.C. Sub Commissions, may be handled directly on routine and technical matters only. If this is not the case, your further instructions on this point are requested.

Robert P. Marshall

ROBERT P. MARSHALL.
Colonel P.A.,
REGIONAL COMMISSIONER.

Copy to: Chief Commissioner.

8
(c.30)

P 11
3626

116

44

OPTIMIZATION PROBLEMS

(ACTION COPIES ON 2604/ELT 9254/EL)

Ch. 5: *Generalization*

5575

5575

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Ref: 3626/109/EC.

2 August 1945.

SUBJECT: Addressing of Signals.

TO : Regional Commissioner,
PISCATE Region.

1. Reference your signal P.127 of 26 July 45. Your attention is drawn to Office Memorandum No. 17 of 13 October 44, para 4, which states:-

"Correspondence from Regions will be addressed to "Headquarters Allied Commission" and will in all cases issue in the name of the Regional Commissioner."

2. Please ensure that the above is drawn to the attention of all originators of signal traffic from your Region.

E. Talbot

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

Copy to 212/EC -

65 (hand)
file 36

Am 110

PA
53715/5

3626 21 2
RESTRICTED

P127
JULY 26 09008

P/1330
JULY 26 1045
ROUTINE

From: HQ PIERMONT SIGNED MARSHALL
To: ALSO: PERSONAL FOR ADMIRAL STONE

JUL 26 1945

RESTRICTED.

1. Pursuant to your personal message advantage was taken of recent gathering in TORINO. Conferred at length with PABRI and MORANDI and discussed particular points with others.
2. Complete accord and understanding in all matters of police with all questions satisfactorily resolved.
3. Agreed that matter of Prefect of Alessandria should be reviewed by me. Expect to conclude review and make final decision in immediate future. Will report result.

DIST
ACTION CHIEF COMMISSIONER 2
INFO EXEC COMMISSIONER 2
FILE

RESTRICTED

see M.108 Feb 10/45
see 120
HEADQUARTERS
JUL 27 1945
A.I.C.

(Has Review)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

3626 A
HEAD ARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

cc 1433
106
JUL 27 1945
17th July 1945.

JUL 25 1945

Chief Commissioner.

This is exactly what we want for the police mission in ITALY. If you agree I suggest that I ask Mr. Hopkinson to wire to this effect. I understand that a telegram has been received from LONDON saying that the question of the police mission for ITALY is still under discussion.

→ M.S.L.

see M.108

MSL/JL.

COPY No 100 of R 9193/1912/19
dated 28 May returned
Per Hov (3) on 24 Jun 45

Noted

Inv

End cc

5583

File
H 7

3626 EXECUTIVE COMMISSION

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 594

ECONOMIC SECTION

HMS/ab

Phone 489081

10/46/1/Tn 5

July 19/45

JUL 24 1945

SUBJECT: Transfer of Control of the Polizia Controllo Economico

TO : Geo distribution

1. At a meeting between the Transportation Sub-Commission and the Public Safety Sub-Commission it was decided that the control of the "Polizia Controllo Economico" be handed over by the Transportation Sub-Commission to the Public Safety Sub-Commission.

2. The Force was organized by the Transportation Sub-Commission for work under the jurisdiction of the Regional Transportation Officers in the four Northern Regions. Initially it was essential that the Force be immediately available for specialized work under these Regional Transportation Officers on assuring their functions in the North; now it is considered that the control of the Polizia Controllo Economico should be under the Public Safety Sub-Commission; therefore, the control of the Force will pass over to the Public Safety Sub-Commission as soon as possible.

3. Major H.A. Symons, Intelligence Corps, attached to AG, Liaison Officer to the Force, will be responsible for seeing that the various Italian Regional Commanders of the Polizia Controllo Economico commence immediately to make all necessary arrangements for the transfer. They will prepare lists showing:

- a. Officials, Sottufficiali and Agenti on the strength;
- b. Distribution of a throughout the respective Regions;
- c. Where and how accommodated;
- d. Vehicles in use by the Force;
- e. Particulars of stores, arms, etc., on charge.

4. Major H.A. Symons will make arrangements for the handing over of all Automezzi taken over by the Force; and also for the handing over of the Police Academy at Busto Arsizio, which was requisitioned for use by the Force; and all other buildings, etc., so requisitioned. He will insure that the Italian Regional Commanders of the Polizia close their accounts and lodge same with the appropriate Quarters. Further, he will be responsible that arrangements are made for the collection and disposal of all goods, etc., sequestered but not yet handed over to the appropriate authorities.

Initially it was essential that the Force be immediately available for specialized work under these Regional Transportation Officers on assuming their functions in the North; now it is considered that the control of the Polizia Controlla Economico should be under the Public Safety Sub-Commission; therefore, the control of the Force will pass over to the Public Safety Sub-Commission as soon as possible.

3. Major H.A. Symons, Intelligence Corps, attached to AS, Liaison Officer to the Force, will be responsible for seeing that the various Italian Regional Commanders of the Polizia Controlla Economico commence immediately to make all necessary arrangements for the transfer. They will prepare lists showing:

- a. Officials, Sottufficiali and Agenti on the strength;
- b. Distribution of a throughout the respective Regions;
- c. Where and how accommodated;
- d. Vehicles in use by the Force;
- e. Particulars of stores, arms, etc., in charge.

4. Major H.A. Symons will make arrangements for the handing over of all Autocentri taken over by the Force; and also for the handing over of the Polizia headquarter at Busto Arsizio, which was requisitioned for use by the Force; and all other buildings, etc., as requisitioned. He will insure that the Italian Regional Commanders of the Polizia close their accounts and lodge same with the appropriate Quarters. Further, he will be responsible that arrangements are made for the collection and disposal of all goods, etc., sequestered but not yet handed over to the appropriate authorities.

5. The handing over of the personnel of the Force should be completed by 4 August 1945, but all orders with regard to the working of the Force will, as from 1 August 1945, inclusive, be given by the Public Safety Sub-Commission. It will not, of course, be possible to arrange for the transfer in all the four Regions at the same time, as it will be necessary for Major H.A. Symons to supervise it; but as the hand-over is made in each Region, Transportation Sub-Commission will be notified. Regional Transportation Officers are responsible that all records, etc., with regard to the work of the Force be handed over to the Regional Public Safety Officers; they must also contact Regional Public Safety Officers at the earliest possible moment and give them all the necessary information as to work of the Force.

6. After the hand-over, which should be completed by 10 August 1945, Major Symons will close down his office in Milan and report to Transportation Sub-Commission, this Headquarters, by telegram for orders.

(Dist. Adviser)
(Dist. Adviser) 9.12

-2-

7. HQ 43 letter 155/W/7n 2 of 4/5/45 and A/E AC latter 160/W/7n 2/ADW of 25/5/45 are cancelled.

By Command of Rear Admiral STONE:


E. B. MCKINLEY
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
Acting Vice President

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HEADQUARTERS
VENEZIE REGION
Allied Military Government
APO 394

TO : HQ. A.C.,
Attention: Executive Commissioner.

17 July 1945

SUBJECT: Public Security - Carabinieri.

FILE No: RXII/024.13

Since my return from Rome and from your conference on Saturday morning the 14th I have been in discussion with my R.P.S.O. on the various measures which we can take during the forth-coming six weeks to support every possible way the efficiency of the Carabinieri.

In this connection I have been fortunate to have a visit this morning from General Brunetto, the Chief of all the Carabinieri of Italy. We have discussed fully the various steps which may be taken; provision of clothing, provision of arms, support and recognition by allied authorities, assistance of transport, etc. I have decided to call a conference for 1600 hours on Tuesday next, the 24th July, to go further into this matter and I have invited 13th Corps and No 1 District to send representatives. I believe that with care we can take steps, even in the short time available, to leave the Carabinieri in a better condition than they now are. Naturally an increase in numbers would be a help and this must be a matter to be taken up on your level. However, as General Brunetto says very wisely, numbers are no substitute for quality.

Linked in with this question is the whole matter of public morale and public security and on that I am writing a separate letter to you describing my conversation with the Prefects.

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(Folio 154)
(File 3604/EC)


Regional Commissioner

see M102-103


(1) Spade C-44

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