

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

ACC

10000/109/704
(VOL. III)

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10000/109/704
(VOL. III)

ITALIAN POLICE AGENCIES, ORGANIZATION
NOV. 1945 - JUNE 1946

Minute No. 297

To: Executive Commissioner.

1. The document at 293 is an improvement on the previous paper which has undergone some modification as a result of your letter of 287

Such a critical paper should have been a classified document. If it is considered confidential, I think it could be taken to be unobjectionable provided any re-organization of 293 or expansion of their activities is carried out with the full accord of the Italian Government.

2. As regards the criticisms of the forces of the questura and of the Guardia Metropolitana (para 16), I presume that MIA are fully aware that the 293 in areas where they alone operate, fail to take action against street trading in rationed goods, illegal use of motor vehicles etc.,

3. The Police operational matters, particularly such as the question of a 293 criminal records office (para 16) are outside the terms of reference of MIA and are the responsibility of the Public Safety Sub-Commission. This may be somewhat academic in view of the expected future of the Allied Commission and of the fact that a large number of Public Safety Sub-Commission officers have been transferred to MIA.

4. I suggest that no action is called for on the paper except to obtain from MIA an assurance that any revision of conditions of service of the 293 and any extension of their responsibility such as to criminal records, will be carried out only with the full accord of all interested Ministries in the Italian Government.

20th Nov 1946

M. B. Bigodier

M. CAIR, Brigadier.
V2. C.A. Section.

293

V.P. C.A.S.

Thank you. Will you obtain from Lord Force

The assurance I mentioned in para 4. 1/28/294.

carried out with the full accord of the Italian Government.

2. As regards the criticisms of the Forces of the Quersura and of the Guardia Metropolitana (para 16), I presume that MIA are fully aware that the CC.ER in areas where they alone operate, fail to take action against street trading in rationed goods, illegal use of motor vehicles etc.,
3. ~~The~~ Police operational matters, particularly such as the question of a CC.ER criminal records office (para 16), are outside the terms of reference of MIA and are the responsibility of the Public Safety Sub-Commission. This may be somewhat academic in view of the expected future of the Allied Commission and of the fact that a large number of Public Safety Sub-Commission Officers have been transferred to MIA.
4. I suggest that no action is called for on the paper except to obtain from MIA an assurance that any revision of conditions of service of the CC.ER and any extension of their responsibility such as to criminal records, will be carried out only with the full accord of ~~all~~ interested Ministries in the Italian Government.

20th May 1946

295

Major Bigden

M. CARR, Brigadier.
VR. CA. Section.

V.P. C.A.S.

Thank you. Will you obtain from Land Force

the assurance I mentioned in para 4. VR/22/46.

5719

I spoke to Gen Browning on line of 287.

He will have a further examination prepared.

DDG (2/15)

294

Ex Comm.

- (1) Ref folios 289-293. sorry I marked them up I thought it was a routine report, but on looking back I see it's not.
- (2) The report at 293 is almost word for word the same, as that at folio 280.
- (3) The Ex Comm suggested in his letter (folio 287) that paras 28, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 & 14, should be erased. I notice that paras 7 & 8 & parts of 20 & 21 are again included and the para re the Guardia Metropolitana remains unchanged.
- 29 m (2/15)

Ex Comm 295

Ref. m. 294 and folio 293. This report was not written in connection with Public Safety & C.

I thought it was a routine looking back I see it's not.

(2) The report at 293 is almost word for word the same as that at folio 250.

(3) The Ex Comm suggested in his letter (folios 287) that paras 28, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 & 14 should be erased. I notice that paras 29 & 8 & parts of 20 & 21 are again included and the para re the Guardia Metropolitana remains unchanged. Lgm (CM) 14/5.

Ex Comm 295.

See Ref. m. 294 and folio 293. This report was not written in cooperation with Public Safety (lots 978)

(3) I have attached the distribution (lots 978) at folio 284.

Lgm (CM) 16/5. H. 16/5

650

V.P. CAS.

May I hear your comments please? See also 1
287.

5712

262

Ex Comm.

Ref # 247, your m 249. comments
of P.S. 3/C, Ex.O.(B) are at # 261 and
258. I think that we should try to
avoid taking away a trained police officer
from Palmarde in view of our recent assurance
to G.O.C. & Dist. that we would keep this
group up to a strength of four police officers.

H.S. 2/13

263

C-SO Please summarize the position either

118/4/3

verbally or in writing.

264. Note. Ex Comm has now seen
m P.S. file protocols at # 264
, has agreed. 4 P.S. officers will
remain in Palmarde. H.S. 7/13.

266

A/C to H.S. 7/13

Ex C may wish to see 265, personnel
to him

H.S. 2/13

— CSD 4/3

268

H.S. 14/3

C-SO / folio 267 for info. please only 14/3

270-2/13

A/C.C. # 272 for info. H.S. 13/14

verbally + in writing.

MS/413

264 note: to learn has now seen
in P.S. file protocols at 4 264
has agreed. 4 P.S. officers will
remain in Piemonte. MS. 713.

266

A/C to MS. 713

to C. many with to see 265, personnel
to him

MS/263
C/D of 3

268

MS. 1413

C50 / folio 267 for info. please only 1413

272-273

A/P.C. + 272 for info. MS. 1314

274

V.P. C.A.S.

MS. 1413

Directa Public Safety had some

amendment for made to them. Council now seen

be done?

see 274

Done. MS/1314

MS/1314

MS. 1413

CSO Re see 239 for info. *DB 241*

240

Ex Comm.

241

In view of your discussions with Eric O's.
(B) and (B) this morning, I think you will wish
to see 239. *set 251*

W/ 261

A/CSO Ex Comm.

248

File 247 for info per *CSO 247 H. 1972*

CSO H. 1972

249

Please give me views of P.S. Duotom and *see 153*

Ex Off B.

W/ 2312

A/CSO H.L.

252

Re see 254 in reply to 247. P.S. say that
they have five boxes available at present -
ref para 1 of 247. *(B) 2512*

257

Capt-B.

W/ 2512 I have told Bureau Centre that

to Comm.

248

John 247 for info per [signature] JH. 1812

C50 JH. 1812

249

Please give me views of P.S. system and [signature] JH. 1813

Ex 87 B

JH. 23/12

A/C50 JH. 1812

251

Re see 254 in reply to 247. PS say that they have five boxes available at present - ref para 1 of 247 [signature] JH. 1812

252

Capt-B.

Re 254. I have told Messrs Centre that they must see that G-1 (A) (B) are in distribution of all cables to do with personnel in WE's. Please watch out for this. [signature] JH. 1812

259

Re see 258 in reply to your 253. in 249 refers

[signature] JH. 1813

1

~~Chg~~ 1 = x. (over)

Quack reply to 215 submitted 220 refers.

28/12

21/12

223

Issue 171/20

for law

2

Any action please on Public Ledger file
06/06/73/11/75 (attached) which you told me to add
up pending Col. Pisterly's report on the subject?

224

No action now. case = result of 2nd A.

182/29100

229

080
230
Pse see 228 - AFHQ's reply to 221. Has
the matter been discussed separately because
nothing on the file indicates that AFHQ
have reason to compare? AFHQ

055-01

233.

Cont. Free-charge.

215

Referenced your Memo 232 above.

Please see Folios 234, 229, 224 and 197 of Vol.2 (all flagged), all of which apparently relate to this subject. Some of these had been wrongly filed, hence the reason you had not seen them.

No action now as a result of 221A.

185/231a.

229 231

080 — ²²⁰ See the 238. AFHQ's reply to 221. Has
the matter been discussed separately because
nothing on the file indicates that AFHQ
have reason to confirm? *225/10/1*

233.

Capt. Braybrooke.

Sir,

Reference your minute 233 above.

Please see folios 231, 229, 224 and 197 of Vol.2 (all flagged), all
of which apparently relate to this subject. Some of these had been wrongly
filed, hence the reason you had not seen them.

May I suggest that G-1(B) be provided with copies of all this cor-
respondence as it concerns the posting of British officers; also that copy
of 229 be sent to Public Safety S/C and MIA.

Widdowson - 14/

235

Capt. Braybrooke

Sir. Ref minute 233, above. Letter at 234 submitted for
signature.

238

311

Exlon

233-232-235 for info - 231/10/1

211 212

PS Herring

CA. Sec.

Re sec 219: This was sent in error to Establishment Br. & received in this office only today. I have replied at 220 forwarding a copy of your letter at 210. May MCA be informed of further. If last para of letter 219.

~~219~~ ²¹² ~~Ex Com~~
Off. Ex Com.

13/2 0 K. q. d.

217

Ex Com

See, Please see ~~210~~ ²¹⁶ in reply to your letter at ~~210~~ ²¹⁵ copy has been sent to CA Section.

212

Ex Com

218

213 - 214 - 215 will discuss with Gen Browning
TCAS. Please arrange.

211

P.A. No luck with Gen. Browning. Ask CA.

Pidley to see me when he returns.

to Gen.

~~217~~ 217

See, Please see ~~217~~ ²¹⁸ in reply to your letter at ~~217~~ ²¹⁸ copy has been sent to CS Section

~~217~~ ²¹⁸

218

CSC

~~217~~ 218

P²¹⁶ ~~CSC~~ Will discuss with Gen. Browning
TCAS. Please arrange.

18/1

P.A. ²¹⁹ No luck with Gen. Browning. Act CD.

Pidley to see me when he returns.

17/1 18/1

En. Gen.

220

He has reports that Hain of Ireland Affairs has appointed a Project to coordinate and re-allocate work in Rome including Military. Has ten HQ. one Chicago reviewing the plans and are shall be informed of the proposals submitted by them to the Project. We have an outstanding demand on Rome Area for all Italian Air accommodation as per 11/14/44.

18/1

14/1A

Q. 27 Dec.

206

☞ Please take action on CSO's note on (201) which folio I have just seen. Include also to dist. copies of minutes 202, 203, 204.

EDS 19/11

gone

207.

CSO

Please see minutes 203 & 204 referring to 201

EDS 19/11

211

CSO

extension

Please see 210: further developments on the Police mission

EDS 8/12

2713

202

Please see 201.

H. H. H. H.

CAS
13 AUG 1962
X 522

CA Action:

203.

Re para 5 of 201, and para 2 of 191.

There will be no B. Col. available having the qualifications stated.

The two Majors (SOE) would be available after the hand-back of Northern Regions.

The availability of other officers is still in doubt. Our first commitments are to Vung Viem District and the B. Group. We have just started losing police officers under the B. released. off the continued on position will be most uncertain.

British police officers even given leave for the specific purpose of being commissioned for Civil Affairs. Their posting to M. 1919, may jeopardize their positions at home. This point should be cleared at once.

T. A. C. S. L.

17 Nov. 1945.

Chapman
Col. B. P. D.

204

EC. Sec

PS not formally stated that 10 officers would be

Head-back of Southern Regions.

The availability of other officers is still in doubt. Our first commitments are to Vengian Gindic and the Liaison Group. We have just started losing police officers under Class B releases. If this continues our position will be most uncertain.

British police officers were given leave for the specific purpose of being commissioned for Civil Affairs. Their posting to MMIA may jeopardize their positions at home. This point should be cleared at once.

T + CBL

17 Nov. 1948 -

Thompson
Capt. B. J. P. O.

2074.

EC. See

PS and previously stated that 10 officers would be available after providing for the specific Gindic but apparently officers upon whom we were counting are now being retained under class B release. If this continues, we may well be - may not have all our police officers. For class B is a release by groups of unemployment. It may be desirable to make representations to the Home Office ^{to arrange that} ~~the Home Office~~ ^{the Home Office} ~~should make~~ requests for class B releases should not be made in the case of police officers with AC.

If police officers are to be retained after AC comes to an end then the amount to their transfer will have to be ~~about 100~~ ^{about 100} and the safeguarding of their careers would be taken up at the same time. While AC continues these officers would still be on the strength of AC even if attached to MMIA and their positions vis-à-vis their careers would not be changed.

13 Nov 1948

Thompson

299

Ref: 3626/299/20.

8 June 1946.

SUBJECT: CC.RR Position in Italian Police System.

TO : Land Forces Sub-Commission (NSLA).

With reference to your notes on CC.RR position in the Italian Police system dated 4th May 1946.

The action proposed at sub-para 10(e) is a police operational matter, and that at 10(d) might affect the police forces as a whole. I presume that action will be taken, particularly with regard to the establishment of a CC.RR criminal records organization, only with the full accord of all interested Italian Ministries, in conjunction with the Public Safety Sub-Commission of this HQ. Finally, the Chief Commissioner will wish to be consulted.

M. S. Log W

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

Copy to: CA Section.

107-337 YH JE

in 11298

10/6
10/6
10/6

(100) 2

LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION.M. M. I. S.

NOTES ON CC.RR. POSITION IN ITALIAN POLICE SYSTEM NOV 1948

1. MAJOR GENERAL L. BROWNING CB.OBE.MC. has directed that a description of the Italian Police System will be given by this Section to all Officers in Land Forces Sub Commission.AG.(RMIA).

2. TYPES OF POLICE.

There are six Police Forces in Italy, namely :

Carabinieri	Establishment: 75,000
Questura (including Railway and Traffic Police)	" 32,405
Guardia di Finanza	" 31,629
Forest Guards	" 5,579
Municipal Guards	According to local needs
Armed Watchmen	Specially authorised.

3. CARABINIERI (CC.RR.).

The CC.RR. are the largest single Police Unit ; they are the first and oldest Regiment in the Italian Army and have a splendid tradition of which they are intensely proud. An exceptionally high moral standard is required from volunteer recruits to the CC.RR. and enquiries concerning them and their families cover three generations. They are recruited and trained as soldiers. In their training, part is devoted entirely to instruction in Italian law and police powers and procedure, as every Carabinieri, in addition to being a soldier, is also an "Agente di Pubblica Sicurezza" (Policeman), with full police powers. The police duties of the CC.RR. are more comprehensive in those parts of Italy other than large cities and provincial seats as they (CC.RR.) are the only fully authorised police to be found in rural places. Therefore it is upon the CC.RR. that the chief responsibility for the maintenance of law and order rests. The general emphasis is that the CC.RR. are soldiers with, as a secondary duty, police functions.

4. For administration and discipline, CC.RR. are exclusively under the control of the War Ministry, operationally from the police aspect, however, they are under the direct control of the Ministry of the Interior.

Traffic Police)	"	32,405
Guardia di Finanza	"	31,629
Forest Guards	"	5,579
Municipal Guards)		
Armed Watchmen)		
	According to local needs	
	specially authorized.	

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4. For administration and discipline, CC.RR. are exclusively under the control of the War Ministry, operationally from the police aspect, however, they are under the direct control of the Minister of Interior who exercises that direction and control through the Civil Authorities (Prefetti and Sindaci).

5. The Prefect acts for the Ministry of Interior and in his Province he is the supreme authority for the Government, being responsible only to the Ministry of the Interior.

6. The second highest responsible Official in each Province is the Questore (the chief of all Police Agencies in the Province). The authority of the Questore includes the operational control of the Carabinieri, and all crimes coming to the notice of the CC.RR. have to be reported by them to the Questore, although CC.RR. are not bound to seek assistance in investigation. If, however, Carabinieri and Questore are jointly

(Capt K)

see M294-22544
Vol. 1, p. 799

- 2 -

engaged in police action, the Questura Agent of similar rank takes charge. Much jealousy exist between Questura and Carabinieri.

This local control of the Carabinieri by civil officials is not likely to be removed, as it is based on a well established principle applied in most countries.

7. In exceptional times, local civil control or single national control are dangerous as the Police Forces may be deliberately used to further the interests of one section of the community to the disadvantage of the others. When Police Agencies are not impartial, the public fail to receive that protection to which they are entitled, and which the laws of the land provide.

Civil authorities should therefore administer the Police under their operational control in such a manner that every citizen has confidence in the police to protect him.

8. In many parts of Italy to-day the civil authorities do not possess the essential qualifications and the political interests of the authorities concerned have undoubtedly had a considerable bearing on the correct or incorrect use of the Carabinieri and other Police Agencies. This is particularly true regarding the North of Italy.

9. The 12 "Mobile Battalions" of the Carabinieri (heavily armed with Armoured Cars etc.) have been created primarily to deal with public disorders of such gravity that Carabinieri personnel normally armed could not quell.

In the event of serious disturbances arising from political motives, instructions may be given by non-impartial civil authorities which will - by effecting dispersal - defeat the purpose for which the Mobile Battalions have been created. This fact should always be borne in mind so long as the operational control of the Carabinieri is vested in local civil authorities.

10. Although their standard of efficiency and administration still leaves much to be desired, the Carabinieri

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10. Although their standard of efficiency and administration still leaves much to be desired, the Carabinieri can be relied upon to perform their duties impartially, and their tradition and training of the past 133 years as soldiers and policemen is the most valuable asset in the Italian police system. Administrative enquiries have failed to reveal that the politics of any C.C.R.R. personnel affect the manner in which their duties are carried out. Therefore the policy of this HQ is not directed towards any fundamental change in the constitution of the Carabinieri, but to make it function as an efficient, independent Police Force.

It is intended to accomplish this by :

(a) Ensuring that all Carabinieri requirements are provided through army channels of supply.

(b) The supply to Carabinieri of sufficient transport, arms ammunition.

- 3 -
- (c) Provision of telephone and wireless communications.
 - (d) A revision of terms and conditions of service and intensive training in modern police methods.
 - (e) The establishment of a Criminal Records Office.
 - (f) Raising the morale & efficiency as a result of the above.

11. QUESTURA.

The Questura (Questura di Pubblica Sicurezza) is a national Police Force of civil character depending upon the Ministry of Interior. It is operated on a provincial basis largely in the towns only, the Questore being the Chief Police Officer for each Province. He is responsible to the Prefect only. He is also responsible in theory for co-ordinating all the Police service in his province, but in many instances no such co-ordination exist in practice. On a provincial level the Deputy Commander of Carabinieri should make daily reports to the Prefect and the Questore, but in practice this is not always carried out.

The Force under his command is divided into two smaller sections :

- (a) Regular Agents, who perform all duties in civilian clothes.
- (b) Auxiliary Agents, who wear uniform.

12. In large cities and provincial seats the main responsibility for policing the place is that of the Questura. Investigation of crime, control of fire-arms, licensing restrictions, control of prostitution, traffic control, etc., is almost entirely the work of the Agents of Public Security, who are in constant dealing with the

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13. On the liberation of the North, several Questura or senior officers were killed, many others imprisoned, and the remainder dismissed.

The Questura was taken over by partisan elements, very few, if any having any previous police experience. About 50% of the former Agents of inferior grade were re-instated, provided they were not politically unsatisfactory. Many of these locally appointed officers were conscientious, and law abiding

citizens, others were not, and the elements they commanded were incompetent. Since that time many of these locally appointed officers have been replaced by professional Questure Agents and the standard of efficiency raised, but many inefficient personnel remain. It will therefore be many years before the Questure's can possibly reach the standard of efficiency which they should possess.

14. There are other branches of "Agenti di Pubblica Sicurezza", who perform police duties of a minor character.

These are :

Railway Police.

Traffic Control Police.

Guardia Metropolitana.

the latter existing in Rome, Milan, Palermo and Naples.

15. The Railway Police and Traffic Control Police are energetic but untrained. Training of these men, however, is taking place, but it is unlikely they will ever be entirely satisfactory, owing to their low standard of education, and their recruitment (other than political ones) was at the time of their recruitment during the liberation required of them.

16. Guardia Metropolitana. The Guardia Metropolitana are concerned with local traffic control, conservation of byes laws, and control of markets. These men are ornamental rather than useful. Their continued existence in their present state, is however a nuisance, because they are incapable and/or unwilling to carry out their duties. The Carabinieri and Questure although empowered to act against offenders, ignore offences which should be dealt with by the Guardia Metropolitana e.g. street trading in rationed goods, etc.

17. Guardia di Pinnazo. The body has military status,

Railway Police.

Traffic Control Police.

Guardia Metropolitana.

the latter existing in Rome, Milan, Palermo and Naples.

15. The Railway Police and Traffic Control Police are energetic but untrained. Training of these men, however, is taking place, but it is unlikely they will ever be entirely satisfactory, owing to their low standard of education, as a qualification (other than political ones) was at the time of their recruitment during the liberation required of them.

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17. Guardia di Finanza. The body has military status, but is not a part of the Italian Army, being dependent on the Ministry of Finance for administration, and upon the Ministry of Interior operationally.

The Guardia di Finanza are, in their name implies, chiefly concerned with the enforcement of taxation laws and the collection of revenues. They work closely with the Carabinieri on frontier control. They are highly efficient.

18. Guardia Forestale. The Guardia Forestale are dependent upon the Ministry of Agriculture. They too have military status but are not a part of the Italian Army. They are specialists in afforestation and their work is extremely important for the preservation of forests and agricultural land value. They are efficient.

...../s

18. Guardie Municipali. The Guardia Municipale are organized on a municipal basis, under the control of the Sindaco. They are employed as municipal sergeants and are assigned to street patrol and shops. Usually speaking, they are employed in the situation they take towards the preservation of law and order.

19. Armed Guards. In order to save employing Carabinieri or Italian Army Units on guard duty at shops of captured enemy territories, AFHQ has given authority for the Italian War Ministry to use armed Italian civilians on guard duty. These men wear green arm bands when on duty and are employed by the Italian Army Territorial Commands. They are armed to a very light degree and can only carry arms when on duty. The number of armed civilian guards or employed varies according to local requirements.

20. Conclusion. The conditions in which the Carabinieri have been working in the past few years have been extremely difficult. They lost considerable "face" under the Fascists and after the armistice. Nevertheless the material is good, if properly organized and held. The CC.RR. have already made great strides, largely as a result of the policy inaugurated in June 16 above and partly owing to their enhanced prestige and the growing confidence of the public in them. There is no doubt that the general public are tired of disorder and welcome the increased CC.RR. efficiency and success in preserving order. Therefore the first and most hopeful step in Italian police re-organization must be to put the Carabinieri on their feet.

MS/ier

4 May 46.

Dist:

Executive Com. (2 copies)
A.C. for Public Safety (2 copies)
Sub Comm.

Lt. A.F.

H. MICHALL, Lt. Col.

CC. RR. Branch.

LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION. AG.

N. M. I. A.

H. M. Michall

289

have been during in the past few years have been extremely difficult. They lost considerable "feel" under the Phosolite and after the emulsion. Nevertheless the referred to B.M. if properly organized and held. The G.O.M. have already made great strides, largely as a result of the policy inaugurated in 1955 in 1956 and partly with the public in them. There is no and the growing confidence of the public in disorder and while in 1955 the Federal Publics are tired of disorder in preserving order. The increased G.O.M. efficiency and success in preserving order. Therefore the first and most painful step in Italian police re-organization must be to put the Carabinieri on their feet.

H. Maghalla

H. MAGHALL, Lt. Col.

AS. IS. Branch.

LAND PURCHASING COMMISSION, A.C.

M. M. I. A.

10/10/57

4 May 46.

Dist:

Executive Comm. (2 copies)

A.C. for Public Safety (2 copies)

Sub Comm.

List A.F.

List A - PA & GOC

Deputy Comdr. BGS.

Col. AG

GSP & Intelligence

G Training

A.

Quartermaster

RE

Signals

S. T.

Medical

Engineering

REME

CCRR Section

IPow Section

List B

1 to 12 B.L.V.

inclusive

5701

Ref: 3626/277/60

30. April, 1946.

SUBJECT: CC.RR Position in Italian Police System.

TO : COG, Land Forces S/C (ASIA).

1. I have read your notes and the proposed notes on the CC.RR position in the Italian police system. There is a good deal that I like in this study but I do not agree with all the points made and I certainly do not agree with the attitude which is taken on the ineffectiveness and lack of impartiality on the part of the Questura. Lt. Col. Mighall rightly says in para 6 that the local control of the CC.RR by civil officials is not likely to be removed as it is based on a well established principle. Although we can blind ourselves to the facts I think the document overstates the inefficiency of the Questura and in that respect I would cross paras. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14, and replace them by something far less destructive in the criticism of the Questura and the civil authorities. I think to say that the Police Agencies censured by the Questura form the strongest opposition to the return of the CC.RR. is quite untrue. Paras. 20 and 21 are also, in my opinion, overstatement and leave the unfortunate impression on the minds of the officers concerned with the CC.RR. who are very much part of the combined police forces in this country.

2. To issue such criticisms of the civil police authorities would engender contempt for them in the minds of the officers who have to assist in the CC.RR. and might tend to incite the same kind of contempt for them amongst the CC.RR. themselves.

3. I would prefer to see a far more objective paper, simply stating the facts and not recording the opinions of the writer as to the inefficiency or otherwise of the various police agencies. I entirely disagree with the remarks about the Guardia Metropolitana.

4. The whole of this matter is one which must be tackled by some such authority as the Police Mission and a paper such as this should not emanate from one of your officers who is concerned only with the CC.RR.

5. I would suggest that the paper be entirely redrafted with the assistance of the Public Safety Sub-Commission and a factual document produced which can be of the greatest value and of more value because it will be non-contentious.

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See 4/3

See memo 278

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6. I have been thinking about your proposal to set up a Criminal Record Centre for the CC.RR. alone. This is an innovation in the police system of the country and I do not think it should be undertaken without:

- (a) consultation at this HQ;
- (b) consultation with the Italian Government as a whole;
- (c) consultation with the Police Mission which we hope will be sent out.

It is all part and parcel of the re-organisation of the whole police system of the country and should not be made part of your particular terms of reference which are to re-organise the CC.RR. administratively.

M. S. LUSH

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

MEL/38.

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APO 394

29 April 1946

Dear *Bugadiv*.

I have read with interest the document you gave me this morning, in which is outlined the functions of the various Police Forces in this Country.

There is a good deal of wisdom and truth as depicted in this study but I do not agree with all the points made and particularly do I not agree with boosting ones own side up by damning the opposition completely when such is not really justified.

Dealing with the report in sections :-

In general I agree with the observations in paras 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 and 7.

The observation in para 6 i.e. "Much jealousy exists between Questura and CC.RR." is I think somewhat exaggerated. Some jealousy may exist, but I am of the opinion that a Questura Officer should take precedence over a CC.RR. Officer of equal rank as the Questura Officers are usually Doctors at Law and are all highly trained Police Officers. CC.RR. Officers are first and for most Army Officers and the Police side is a secondary consideration; therefore it automatically follows that the expert should take charge and any reasonable man would agree.

Paras 8 - 14 - 17 - 23. We all know the conditions which obtained in the north at the time of the collapse of the German Forces and how we could not put the imported CC.RR. on the streets at once. This was due, not only to the opposition of the C.L.N. and Partisans, but also to the fact that the CC.RR. were in such a deplorable state as regards clothing and equipment that no one could be expected to respect them.

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This was not the fault of Allied Commission (as many, including myself, thought at the time), but most of the responsibility rested with M.M.I.A. whom, I am informed, said NO to requests for clothing from Allied Commission almost before they were made.

To say that the Police Agencies commanded by the Questori formed the strongest opposition to the return of the CC.RR. is I think untrue and completely unfair. The Questore in every city was in a terrible position. The C.L.N. held the upper hand with - in places - the blessing of A.M.G. The Partisans - or Communists were all closely knit with the C.L.N. with the result that the Questori found themselves saddled with a few regular Agents and a lot of undesirables whom they could not get rid of however much they wished.

I agree crime and holdups were rampant but I do not agree it was always incompetence or reluctance on the part of the Questore. It was that he had not sufficient reliable personnel to deal with the cases. In fact - as for instance in Bologna - the CC.RR. were equally impotent due to lack of transport etc. but we did not say their Officers were incompetent.

To-day things have changed considerably. Of 91 Questori in Sicily, Sardinia and Italy 6 only are non career Officers and these will be shortly replaced by career men.

During the Fascist Regime, Questori were not appointed because they were good Fascists. They were all men with years of service behind them but of course they were not expected to be opponents of the authority in power. This applied equally to every other branch of public life. No doubt some were "good Fascists" whilst others were indifferent. The "Ufficio Politico" operated according to instructions and carried out decrees in force at that time.

During the past 9 months considerable weeding out has taken place in the ranks of the Questori and it is hoped that, providing they are given support, they

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will recover and become once more an efficient Force.

Improvement is already very noticeable and schools at Rome and Nettuno are functioning. Very careful screening of the Partisan elements, offering themselves for service, is taking place and a large number are being rejected as unsuitable.

Para 23. The Railway Police are being trained by Questura Agents; the traffic control Police have been completely absorbed into the Questura and the Metropolitan have always been a part of the Questura. I do not agree with the remarks regarding the Metropolitan. To suggest the Metropolitan should stop the sale of rationed goods viz "The Black Market" in Italy is farcical as, so far as I can see, the Black Market is almost one of the "pillars of the State".

Lastly, with regard to the intentions mentioned in Para 16.

A, B and C is agreed.

D and E, I do not agree with, unless a complete revision of the Police service is within the terms of reference of M.M.I.A.

A central record Office already exists in Rome under the Ministry of Interior and this functioned quite well before the war. I do not think the setting up of a second one by the CC.RR. would be to advantage.

Improvements could undoubtedly be effected, but I suggest there is only one way to thoroughly reorganize the Police Services of this Country and that is by the introduction of a Police Mission.


Such a Mission, to be successful, must be desired by and receive the full cooperation of the Italian Government, otherwise it is doomed to failure before it starts.

If the Police Section in M.M.I.A. can arrange for the necessary clothing, equipment and transport for the CC.RR., they will have done all that can be expected of them.

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As regards closer cooperation between the CC.RR. and Questura, that can, providing good will exists, be arranged between the Commanding General CC.RR. and the Director General of P.S., Ministry of Interior, similarly courses of instruction in crime detection for CC.RR. Officers and N.C.O.s. can be arranged to take place at the Ministries Superior School of Instruction in Rome.

It was intended to suggest to General Brunetti and Dr. Ferrari that such courses should be restarted. They were, I understand, held fairly regularly during the pre-war period.


E. J. BYE, Colonel
Acting Director.

EJB/ae

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10/2/50

CCRR

1. Ordered a résumé of position of CCRR in the police forces of 17AEC, so that all my officers would understand the background. Paper reviewed.
2. No hit at Pub. Safety S.C.
3. What distribution?

Matter of criminal records, fingerprints etc

- (a) with paper. The CCRR are the most prolific source to back in Hong Kong.
- (b) Every police force or part of a police force must be as efficient as possible at all angles.
- (c) CCRR cover the whole country whereas the Quetta only cover part.
- (d) Criminal records etc. are local general (central)

2. No hit at Sub. Safety v.c.
3. What distribution?
4. Matter of Criminal Records, Fingerprints etc
 - (a) risk paper. The CCR is the most important house to have in the police group.
 - (b) Every police force or part of a police force must be as efficient as possible at all angles
 - (c) CCR cover the whole country whereas the Westminster only cover part.
 - (d) Criminal records etc. are sent as well as general (central) at. Scotland road.
 - (e) waste of making CCR 1st priority over equipment etc. if we do not give them the max. opportunity to use this.
5. Thurston, propose to go ahead with planning for central criminal records etc. as responsibility of CCR.

6. This does not cut across any historical
-ibility of CCRP to the Minister of
Justice. It merely makes the
CCRP more efficient; creates
a solid base for the prevention
control of crime; & serves as
basis for binding up with the
reorgⁿ of the Quectuna in future.

A.B.
24-Apr-46.

- 3626 RB 280
- ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
- NOTES ON C.C.R. POSITION IN ITALIAN POLICE SYSTEM.
1. MAJOR GENERAL L. BROWNING CC, CR, NO, C.O.C. has directed that a description of the Italian Police system will be given by this Section to all Officers in the various Sub-Commission EC. (AMM).

2. TYPES OF POLICE

There are six Police Forces in Italy, namely:

Carabinieri	Establishment:	75,000
Quosdum (including Recluse and Traffic Police)	"	32,405
Gavardis di Piuma	"	31,629
Forast Guards	"	5,579
Municipal Guards	According to local needs	
Armed volunteers	Specialized authorized	

3. CARABINIERI (CC, CR.)

The CC, CR. are the largest single Police Unit; they are the first and oldest Regiment in the Italian Army and have a splendid tradition of which they are justly proud. An exceptionally high moral standard is required from volunteer recruits to the CC, CR. and inquiries concerning them and their families come from generations. They are recruited and trained as soldiers. In their training part is devoted entirely to instruction in Italian law and police powers and procedure, as every Carabinieri, in addition to being a soldier, is also an "Agente di Pubblica Sicurezza" (Police Officer), with full police powers. The police duties of the CC, CR. are more comprehensive in those parts of Italy other than large cities and provincial areas as they (CC, CR.) are the only fully authorized police to be found in rural places. Therefore it is upon the CC, CR. that the chief responsibility for the maintenance of law and order rests. The general emphasis is that the CC, CR. are soldiers with, as a secondary duty, police functions.

4. For administration and discipline, CC, CR. are exclusively under the control of the War Ministry - operationally from the police aspect, however, they are under the direct control of the Minister of Interior who exercises that direction and control through the Civil Authorities (Prefetti and Sindaci).

5. The Prefect acts for the Minister of Interior and in his province he is the supreme authority for the Government, being responsible only to the Ministry of Interior.

6. The second highest responsible official in each Province is the Questore (the chief of all Police agencies in the province). The authority of the Questore includes the operational control of the Carabinieri and all other combat

3. Carabinieri (C.A.R.)

The C.A.R. are the largest single police unit; they are the first and oldest Regiment in the Italian Army and have a splendid tradition of which they are intensely proud. An exceptionally high moral standard is required from volunteer recruits to the C.A.R. and emphasis concerning them and their families cover three generations. They are recruited and trained as soldiers. In their training part is devoted entirely to instruction in Italian law and police powers and procedure, as every Carabinieri, in addition to being a soldier, is also an "Agente di Pubblica Sicurezza" (Public Security), with full police powers. The police duties of the C.A.R. are more comprehensive in those parts of Italy other than large cities and provincial areas as they (C.A.R.) are the only fully authorized police to be found in rural districts. Therefore it is upon the C.A.R. that the chief responsibility for the maintenance of law and order rests. The general emphasis is that the C.A.R. are soldiers with, as a secondary duty, police functions.

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5. The Prefect acts for the Minister of Interior and in his province he is the supreme authority for the Government, being responsible only to the Ministry of Interior.

6. The second highest responsible official in each Province is the Questore (the chief of all Police agencies in the province). The authority of the Questore includes the operational control of the Carabinieri, and all crimes coming to the notice of the C.A.R. have to be reported by them to the Questore, although C.A.R. are not bound to seek assistance in investigation. If, however, Carabinieri and Questore are jointly engaged in police action, the Questore agent of similar rank takes charge. Much jealousy exists between Questore and Carabinieri.

This local control of the Carabinieri by civil officials is not likely to be removed, as it is based on a well established principle applied in most countries.

7. In exceptional times, local civil control or single national control are dangerous as the Police Force may be deliberately used to further the interests of one section of the community to the disadvantage of the others. When Police agencies are not impartial, the public fail to receive that protection to which they are entitled, and when the law of the land provide.

Civil authorities should therefore administer the Police under their operational control in such a manner that every citizen has confidence in the police to protect him.

...../.....

- 2 -

8. In many parts of Italy today the civil authorities do not possess the essential qualifications and the political interests of the authorities concerned have undoubtedly had a considerable bearing on the correct or incorrect use of the Carabinieri and other Police agencies. This is particularly true regarding the North of Italy.
9. Through the medium of the CLNA, the Left Wing of the Resistance movement in the recent past decided to form an autonomous Government in the North of Italy and to refuse to accept the authority of the Rome Central Government, notwithstanding the fact that they were well aware of the support given to that Government by the allies.
10. The North intended to accomplish its objective in two ways: first, by the appointment of their own nominees to all key positions in local government, and second, by the creation of an entirely new police force through whom they determined to enforce their policy on the community.
11. No plan did not include the existence of the Carabinieri. As far back as August 1944, instructions were given - believed by the Communist Headquarters in Rome - to certain of their members in the North that the formation of this new Police Force was to be pursued with the utmost vigor. At the date of the liberation the plan was in fact carried out and it is now well known that with regard to the appointment of their own nominees to these key positions in civil administration, the left elements succeeded, and although many former Prefects and Justices have since replaced locally appointed amateurs, many of these positions are still filled by persons who are not impartial.
12. The creation of the Police Force was accomplished in different districts in two ways: some regions created a force called the "Polizia del Popolo", others had no special name, but all installed themselves into the positions formerly occupied by the Carabinieri and Questura and assumed the authority of police.
13. Small numbers of CC.NR. were accompanied by the ASG Officers on their arrival in the North after the liberation. Elements of these newly formed Police were ejected by ASG from the CC.NR. Casertina and the CC.NR. put in. This was bitterly resented by the "Polizia del Popolo", 80% of whom were Socialists or Communists, and who obtained support in their resistance to the Carabinieri from Left Wing press and the CLNA. In a few weeks the CC.NR. in all their former Casertina. In very few instances did the Carabinieri re-occupy any Casertina without allied assistance.
14. It will thus be seen that the strongest opposition to the return of the Carabinieri came from another Police Agency commanded by the Questura, who operationally controls the CC.NR. The latter, who were gradually re-introduced to the performance of their normal duties.

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12. The creation of the Police Force was accomplished in different districts in two ways: some regions created a force called the "Polizia del Popolo", others had no special name, but all installed themselves into the Carabinieri formerly occupied by the Carabinieri and Quastari and assumed the authority of police.

13. Small numbers of CC.RR. were accompanied by the AMG Officers on their arrival in the North after the liberation. Elements of these newly formed Police were absorbed by AMG from the CC.RR. Carabinieri and the CC.RR. put in. This was bitterly resented by the "Polizia del Popolo", 90% of whom were Socialists or Communists, and who obtained support in their resistance to the Carabinieri from Left Wing press and the CLM. In a few weeks AMG re-instated the CC.RR. in all their former Carabinieri. In very few instances did the Carabinieri re-occupy any Carabinieri without Allied assistance.

14. It will thus be seen that the strongest opposition to the return of the Carabinieri came from another Police Agency commanded by the Quastari, who operationally controls the CC.RR. The latter, who were gradually re-introduced to the performance of their normal duties, were welcomed by unbiased members of the public.

15. The 12 Mobile Battalions of the Carabinieri (heavily armed with Armour Cars etc.) have been created primarily to deal with public disorders of such gravity that Carabinieri personnel actually armed could not quell.

In the event of serious disturbances arising from political motives, instructions may be given by non-partisan civil authorities which will - by effecting dispersal - defeat the purpose for which the Mobile Battalions have been created. This fact should always be borne in mind as long as the operational control of the Carabinieri is vested in local civil authorities.

16. Although their standard of efficiency and administration still leaves much to be desired, the Carabinieri can be relied upon to perform their duties impartially, and their tradition and training of the past 125 years as soldiers and policemen is the most valuable asset in the Italian police system. Exhaustive

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agencies have failed to reveal that the policies of any O.G. or personnel affect the manner in which their duties are carried out. Therefore the policy of this HQ. is not directed towards any fundamental change in the constitution of the Carabinieri, but to make it function as an efficient, independent Police Force.

It is intended to accomplish this by:

- (a) Ensuring that all Carabinieri requirements are provided through any channels of supply.
- (b) The supply to Carabinieri of sufficient transport, arms & ammunition.
- (c) Provision of telephone and wireless communications.
- (d) A revision of terms and conditions of service and wages including all modern police methods.
- (e) The establishment of a Carabinieri Academy.
- (f) Training the Academy & all others as a result of the above.

QUESTURA

17. The Questura (Agenti di Pubblica Sicurezza) is a national Police Force of civil character depending upon the Ministry of Interior. It is operated as a provincial body largely in the towns only the Questore being the Chief Police Officer for each province. It is responsible to the Prefect only. It is also responsible in theory for co-ordinating all the Police services in his province, but in many instances no such co-ordination exists in practice. On a provincial level the Group Commander of Carabinieri should make daily reports to the Prefect and the Questore, but in practice this is not always carried out.

The force under his command is divided into two smaller sections:

- (a) Regular Agents, who perform all duties in civilian clothes,
- (b) Auxiliary Agents, who wear uniform.

18. In large cities and provincial seats the main responsibility for maintaining the peace is that of the Questura, investigation of crime, control of the press, licensing restrictions, control of prostitution, traffic control, etc., is almost entirely the work of the Agents of Public Security, but, as has been pointed out in the section dealing with the Carabinieri, where no Questura exists - i.e. below the provincial center all police duties are performed by the O.G. with the exception of certain specialist duties which will be detailed later.

- (c) The supply to Carabinieri of sufficient transport, arms and ammunition.
- (c) Provision of telephone and wireless communications.
- (d) Provision of terms and conditions of service and attendance including to uniform, police attitude.
- (e) The establishment of a Division, Records Office.
- (f) Supply the details of the delivery of the arms.

CONCLUSION.

17. The Questura (Agenti di Pubblica Sicurezza) is a national Police force of civil character depending upon the Ministry of Interior. It is organized on a provincial basis largely in the towns only the Questura being the Chief Police Officer for each province. It is responsible to the Prefect only. It is also responsible in theory for coordinating all the Police service in his province, but in any instance no such co-ordination exist in practice. On a provincial level the Group Commander of Carabinieri should make daily reports to the Prefect and the Questura, but in practice this is not always carried out.

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19. During the Fascist Regime, the Questura was the principal body through which the State enforced Fascism and it became - to a large extent - a political Police Force insofar that the majority of its Senior Officers were appointed because of their reliability as Fascists.

The activities of the "Ufficio Politico" (a department of the Questura) at that time were directed against non-Fascists, many of whom, during the period of hostilities, were in the partisan movement, particularly in the many experienced Questura Police Officers were dismissed or reassigned because their loyalty to the Fascist movement was in doubt, even though their efficiency was not. Thus, political considerations, rather than the efficiency of the Police Officers, were at that time more important.

20. On the liberation of the North, several Questura Senior Officers were killed, many others imprisoned, and the remainder dismissed.

The Questura was taken over by Partisan elements, very few, if any, having any previous police experience. About 50% of the former Agents of Superior grade were re-instated, provided they were not politically unsatisfactory. Many

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of these locally appointed officers were comradist, and law-abiding citizens, others were not; and the elements they commanded were hopelessly inefficient, many of them being of criminal tendencies.

Crime was rampant, armed bandits, armed robbers and murderers were alarming and the newly formed Questura's were both incompetent and reluctant to deal with the situation. It was, indeed, a period of political vengeance, and the instrument was the newly formed Questura.

At the same time, by the new "Ufficio Politico" of the Questura - which was directed in many cases by the Comandante proceeding in a course of vengeance - thousands of alleged fascists were arrested, many being merely non-left in their political views, but whose arrest was held as an excuse to rob their properties or occupy their homes, often with the connivance of the newly recruited police agents.

Although since that time many of these locally appointed officers have been replaced by professional Questura agents and the standard of efficiency raised, there still remains the "Ufficio Politico" and many other undesirable and hopelessly inefficient elements in the personnel.

24. It will therefore be many years before the Questura's can possibly reach the standard of efficiency which they should possess, because many of the personnel are untrained, incompetent, and partial in the execution of their duties and little or no confidence is placed in them by the public.

25. The foregoing remarks are chiefly concerning the Questura's in the North. In the South a less drastic appraisal took place, but the standard of efficiency is nevertheless unsatisfactory. It is not within the province of this Section to make any recommendation regarding the Questura, but it will be obvious that the value to the Italian public as a whole of the tradition and integrity of the Carabinieri cannot be over-estimated.

26. There are other branches of "Armati Pubblici Sicurezze", who perform police duties of minor character.

These are:

Railway Police.

Public General Police.

and directed in many cases by the "Camorristi" of the "Questura" which thousands of alleged fascists were arrested, many being merely non-left in their political views, but whose arrest was desired as an excuse to rob their possessions or occupy their homes, often with the connivance of the newly recruited Police agents.

Although since that time many of these locally appointed officers have been replaced by professional Questura agents and the standard of efficiency raised, there still remains the "Ufficio Politico" and many other undesirable and hopelessly inefficient elements in the personnel.

21. It will therefore be many years before the Questura's can possibly reach the standard of efficiency which they should possess. Because many of the personnel are untalented, inexperienced, not partial in the execution of their duties and little or no confidence is placed in them by the public.

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23. There are other branches of "Pubblica Sicurezza", who perform police duties of a minor character.

These are:

Railway Police.

Autistic Control Police.

Carabinieri Metropolitani.

the latter existing in Rome, Milan, Palermo and Naples.

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24. The Railway Police and Traffic Control Police are energetic but untrained. Training of these men, however, is taking place, but it is unlikely they will ever be entirely satisfactory, owing to their low standard of education, as no qualification (other than political ones) was at the time of their recruitment during the liberation required of them.

25. Guardia Metropolitana. The Guardia Metropolitana are concerned with local traffic control, conservation of bye laws, and control of markets. These men are ornamental rather than useful. Their continued existence in their present state, is however a nuisance, because they are incapable and/or unwilling to carry out their duties. The Carabinieri and Guardia, although empowered to act against offenders, ignore offences which should be dealt with by the Guardia Metropolitana e.g. street trading in rationed goods, etc.

26. Guardia di Finanza. The body has military status, but is not a part of the Italian Army, being dependent on the Ministry of Finance for administration, and upon the Ministry of Interior operationally.

The Guardia di Finanza are, on their home premises, closely concerned with the enforcement of taxation laws and the collection of revenues. They work closely with the Carabinieri on frontier control. They are highly efficient.

27. Guardia Forestale. The Guardia Forestale are dependent upon the Ministry of Agriculture. They too have military status but are not a part of the Italian Army. They are specialists in afforestation and their work is extremely important for the conservation of forests and agricultural land values. They are efficient.

28. Guardia Municipale. The Guardia Municipale are engaged on a communal basis, under the control of the Sindaco. They are employed as municipal messengers and are supposed to control markets and shops. Broadly speaking, they are completely incompetent in the contribution they make towards the preservation of law and order.

29. Armed Guards. In order to save employing Carabinieri or Italian Army units on guard duty at areas of captured enemy materials, ARMA has given authority for the Italian War Ministry to use armed Italian civilians on guard duty. These men wear green arm bands when on duty and are employed by the Italian Army Territorial Command. They are armed to a very light scale and can only carry arms when on duty. The number of armed civilian guards so employed varies according to local requirements.

30. Demobilisation. The conditions in which the Carabinieri have been working in the past few years have been extremely difficult. They lost considerable quantities of their equipment and often the ammunition. Nevertheless the material

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25. Guardia di Finanza. The body has military status, but is not a part of the Italian Army, being dependent on the Ministry of Finance for administration, and upon the Ministry of Interior operationally.

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28. Guardia Municipale. The Guardia Municipale are engaged in a communal basis, under the control of the Municipality. They are employed as municipal messengers and are supposed to control markets and shops. Broadly speaking, they are completely unimportant in the contribution they make towards the preservation of law and order.

29. Armed Guardia. In order to save employing Carabinieri or Italian Army units in garrisons at bases of captured enemy materials, AFHQ has given authority for the Italian War Ministry to use armed Italian divisions in guard duty. These men wear green uniforms when on duty and are employed by the Italian Army Territorial Commands. They are placed in a very light scale and can only carry arms when on duty. The number of armed civilian guards so employed varies according to local requirements.

30. Conclusion. The conditions in which the Carabinieri have been working in the past few years have been extremely difficult. They lost considerable "values" under the Fascists and after the armistice. Nevertheless the material is good, if properly organized and held. The G.I.R. have already made great strides, largely as a result of the policy inaugurated in para 16 above in early 1945, to their increased prestige and the growing confidence of the public in them. There is no doubt that the general public are tired of disorder and chaos and increased G.I.R. efficiency and success in preserving order. The situation is extremely unsatisfactory and therefore the first and most hopeful step in Italian police re-organization must be to put the Carabinieri on their feet.

Hq/for

21 APRIL 46

H. M. I. A.

CC. RR. Branch.

LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSIONER, AC.

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Ref: 3625/275/EC.

19 April 1946.

SUBJECT: Auxiliary Police in RSM.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
Attn: G-5 Section.

1. When he was recently in RSM the Supreme Allied Commander was informed by General DEWITT that there were 2000 auxiliary police, late partisans, functioning in RSM and that they were armed more adequately than the ordinary police. The report was subsequently reiterated in a slightly modified manner by HAAC.

2. At the Supreme Allied Commander's direction I have had investigations made and enclose the result. I should be glad if this could be brought to the personal notice of the Supreme Allied Commander who naturally evinced concern at the reports made to him.

M S CUSH

MEL/JG.

Brigadier,
Acting Chief Commissioner.

Copy to: Chief Commissioner
CA Section.

HS 20/4

509 20/4

3626 41
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission

APC 394

13 April 46.

APR 13 1946

SUBJECT : Allegation of Armed Auxiliary Police in Rome.

TO : Executive Commissioner, Allied Commission.

1. Acting on your telephonic request, investigation has been made into the report that there are approximately 2000 well armed auxiliary police in Rome. The report is categorically denied. The facts obtained are submitted.
2. Since about 1943 there have been auxiliaries in both the CC.NR. and the Agents of Public Security. This was necessary due to war conditions. For the most part these auxiliaries were drawn from former policemen who had retired from the forces. They should not be compared with the partisan police of the present day. There are approximately 300 of these auxiliary police still on duty in various stations in Rome. They are armed and equipt exactly the same as other Agents of P.S.

3. At present there are two schools for P.S. Agents in Rome - one, the Guido Rene School, which is the old established school, just opened this month in the Caserma Ferdinando di Savoia, received 240 recruits of whom 140 have already been dismissed as unsuitable. There is a third school operating at Nettuno which has an enrollment of approximately 1200 and which has been established for about four months.

4. The recruits undergoing training at these schools are drawn from every section of Italy and some of them are ex-partisans enlisted in accordance with the government decree of last fall which offered a priority to qualified ex-partisans and war veterans. However, the percentage of ex-partisans in the schools

1. Acting on your telephonic request, investigation has been made into the report that there are approximately 2000 well armed auxiliary police in Rome. The report is categorically denied. The facts obtained are submitted.
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4. The recruits undergoing training at these schools are drawn from every section of Italy and some of them are ex-partisans enlisted in accordance with the government decree of last fall which offered a priority to qualified ex-partisans and war veterans. However, the percentage of ex-partisans in the schools is ~~very~~ small - ~~not exceeding 10 percent~~. Should any recruit present himself at a school armed, his arms are immediately withdrawn. No cadet is permitted to have arms of any kind except when and as issued for training purposes.
5. The 240 recruits who came in to the Ferdinando di Savoia School this month were mostly ex-partisans from North Italy wearing a type of partisan uniform. This may possibly have given rise to the rumour of partisan auxiliary police in Rome. There are no partisan auxiliary police in Rome.

See 10-27-44
4.27

E. J. Page Col.
JOHN W. CHAPMAN
Colonel J.A.G.D.
Director.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

271

28 March 1946

SUBJECT: Reorganization of CC.RR.

TO : G-5, AFHQ.

269

Forwarded herewith for information are five copies of the Land Forces Subcommittee, AG, paper subject "Reorganization of CC. RR.

For the Chief Commissioner:

signed:

L. W. STEARNS
Lt Col, AGD
Staff Officer to CC

5691

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

3626

2.70

TRANSLATION

INCOMING MESSAGE 400 46 27 1110

MELFI

APR 1 1946

27 MARCH, 1946.

IT IS URGENT THAT YOU SEND ENGLISH MILITIA HERE TO RESTORE PUBLIC ORDER WHICH HAS BEEN INTERRUPTED BY SOCIAL COMMUNISTS BACKED BY SOCIAL MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES: IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM TO RESIST ACTION TAKEN BY YOUR MILITIA. WE WISH TO REMIND YOU THAT MELFI IS FRANCESCO MITTI'S BIRTHPLACE, SUPPORTED BY US FOR THE GLORY OF ITALY.

PICCEGE CARLUCCI CARBONE

ADMIRAL KILBRY W. STONE
ALLIED COMMISSION
ROME.

(113)

*Director of Public Safety,
(Min of Interior) has been
informed by P. S. Sub Com.
Alth 30/3*

EC DIST - 1 Apr.

ACTION - CH Sec (PS 8/4)

CC

EC

5690

PA

(CHPT K)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

3626 RB

269

CC 3615

22 March 1946.

My dear

I read with much interest your report on the reorganization of the CC.MR dated 19 March and want to commend you and your staff for both the report and the excellent job you are doing.

Please forward me five additional copies for transmittal to AFHQ.

271 ~~right~~

Yours

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLEARY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Major General Langley Browning, CB, OBE, MC,
ODC, Land Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission, Rome.

AW
(CONFIDENTIAL)

AW
3655
RB

3646. 81
RESTRICTED

FZ 6261

MAR 12 1940 A

H/542

MAR 13 0845

PRIORITY

APHQ SIGNED SACRED CITE PHGEG
ALCON ROME
INFO: XIII CORPS

RESTRICTED.

You are directed to despatch the 6 Public Safety officers authorised to be added to W 3 of Venezia Giulia Police Force without delay by quickest possible means. (Ref our FX 61538 of 26 February 1946). If necessary they will be provided at expense of other Public Safety commitments. ACK and confirm despatch.

AC DIST.

ACTION: P. SAFETY

INFO: CHIEF COMMISSIONER

EX COMM

OAS

G-1 A

G-1 B

FILE

RESTRICTED

568.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

3626
TELEPHONE —
ROME 43.951.

265
BRITISH EMBASSY,
ROME.

4/16/46

4th March, 1946.

252
Dear Maurice

Before leaving for the North, the Ambassador asked us to acknowledge and thank you for your letter (AC/14601/72/15) of February 22nd. enclosing useful notes prepared by the Public Safety Sub-Commission about the Carabinieri.

Yours ever

Henry

H.L. d'A. Hopkinson.

Brigadier M.S. Lush, C.B.E., M.C.,
Executive Commissioner,
Allied Commission,
Rome.

105.713.
(105.713.)
Lee M. 266

56812 f.i.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APO 394

Tel : 475427

2 March 1946

SUBJECT : Transfer of P.S. Officers.

TO : Executive Commissioner,
thru C.A.S.

1. with reference to signal PX 61338 dated 26th February at 36A.

2. It is proposed that the undermentioned officers be transferred to Public Safety Venezia Giulia:-

Capt. V.V. Sans	
" J.R. Podridge	
" L.A.E. Addinge	(temporarily attached to Bologna Liaison Group)
" F.G. Gesch	(temporarily attached to Venezia Giulia)
" V.L. Willis	(temporarily attached to Lombardia Liaison Group).

3. The sixth Officer, Capt. T. Marsh, earmarked for V.G., is at present temporarily attached to M.E.I.A. pending the return of Major R.C. Limbert at present detained in hospital in England.

Capt. Marsh's transfer to V.G. would be effected on Major Limbert's return, or alternately, should Major Limbert not return to this Theatre, it is proposed to permanently post Capt. Marsh to M.E.I.A. and to transfer Capt. T. Sciffe, now with Piedmonte Liaison Group, to V.G.

Capt. Sciffe's position in Piedmonte could be filled by an untrained Police Officer, or if conditions warrant it the vacancy need not be filled.

PR
5687

4. With regard to the vacancy in Lombardis Liaison Group caused by the compassionate posting to the U.K. of Capt. Riley.

It is proposed to appoint Capt. J.B. Foster to the vacancy.

Capt. Foster although not a professional Police Officer has had a fair amount of experience in Public Safety work in Venezia Region and can beyond doubt adequately fill the position in Lombardis Liaison Group.

5. In making these proposals consideration has been given to the fact that Venezia Giulia is active A.R.G. territory and has always had priority on the acquisition of Police Officers, except as concerns the group of Police Officers posted to M.E.I.A. under direct A.R.G. authority.

6. When the above transfers are completed there will be no trained Police Officers available to fill vacancies which may subsequently occur.

KJB/ee

JOHN E. CHAPMAN
Colonel, JAGD
Director.

Copy to G-1 (2r).

3626 91

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APO 194

~~55~~
261

MAR 1 1946

Tel : 478427

AC/14004/1/PS

27 February 1946

SUBJECT : Police Officers - Venezia Giulia.

TO : VP Civil Affairs Section.

247
253

1. With reference to 51A and 54A.
2. This B/C is in complete agreement with the contents of paras 1 and 2 of 51A.
3. When the signal at 46A was forwarded to AFHQ there were seven trained British Police Officers, surplus to establishment, six of whom were available for attachment to the V.G. Police Force. Since that time however the undermentioned four public safety positions have become vacant through unforeseen circumstances which positions it has been necessary to fill from the seven Officers who were surplus.
 - a) M.M.I.A. Major Lambert while on leave in U.K. admitted to hospital for major internal operation. His return to this Theatre doubtful. His position temporarily filled by Capt. Marsh.
 - b) Capt. Biley. P.S. Liaison Officer Lombardie, granted compassionate 35 days leave to U.K. Now understood granted home posting. His position temporarily filled by Capt. Willis.
 - c & d) Major Moody & Capt. Hanbury, each granted compassionate leave 35 days U.K. Major Moody now granted compassionate posting (see 51A). Positions filled by Capts. Toes and Beach. Toes now permanently transferred to V.G.

260

4. It is considered essential that the Police Officers attached to WHIA should be of wide Police experience and all the positions should be kept filled, it is suggested that Capt. Marsh continue to temporarily fill the appointment until it is known whether or not Major Limbert will return.

5. In view of this and as Capt. Toes is now permanently posted to V.G. to fill Major Moody's position, only five Officers remain for permanent transfer should the proposal to augment the V.G. Force by 6 British Police Officers be approved. However this difficulty may be overcome by either the transfer to V.G. of Capt. Marsh, should Limbert return, or alternately by reducing the number of V.G. Officers in one of the Liaison Groups when local conditions become more normal.

6. For the reasons mentioned in para 5 it is considered that, if possible, the Public Safety Officers in V.G. should be retained on the strength of this Hq., also that should a sudden and urgent need arise other experienced Police Officers could be attached to V.G. from one of the Liaison Groups without unnecessary delay.

7. This S/C has no knowledge of proposals mentioned in para 3.

ZJB/ae

JOHN W. CHAPMAN
Colonel, JAGD
Director.

Copy:- 0-1 (Br).

Tel. Rpt. 510.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED OBSERVATION
INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM
EXECUTIVE OFFICER (9)

REFERENCE : XMB/111/A.

27 February, 1946.

SUBJECT : Police Officers - VENEZUELA.

FEB 28 1946

TO : Executive Commissioner.

Reference your 3626/253/23 dated 23 Feb 46.

I enclose a report from Public Safety Sub-Commission which sets out the present position.

The answer is to take three trained officers out of Liaison Groups and send them to VENEZUELA, together with the three who are presently spare, and fill up Liaison Groups with the best non-professional police officers we can find.

May I please have Col. RHE'S report returned to me.

Returned to
Lt. O. (B) J. H. B.

RHE/th.

Shutts

R. WILSON-JONES,
Lt. Colonel,
Executive Officer (Br).

See M 259

5682

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

3626

254

LT. Carter

PX 61538
FEB 26 1501 A

6/2895
FEB 27 0930
ROUTINE

ARMY FROM 8 (SD) JMY
MAIN 13 UMPF ALONE

RESTRICTED

247

RESTRICTED.

Subject. HQ VERMONT GIRLIA Police Force. Ref your
301/730 of 20 February 45. Your para 1. So 111 (CA)-6
have been INCL on we CM/266/3 to cover this commitment
meanwhile A. Your para 2. Second para and your para agreed.

HEADQUARTERS

27 FEB 1946

AS DIST

ACTION F SAFETY
INFO CHIEF COMMISSIONER
RI COMM
C A B
FILE

7 G-1 A+B

RESTRICTED

See M. 256

PA
158

5681

(copy of) 254

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

253

Ref: 3626/25300.

25 February 1946.

SUBJECT: Police Officers. VENEZIA GIULIA.

TO : VP, CA Section.
Executive Officer (B)

247

Reference signal SD/730 dated 20 February 46 from
XIII Corps to AFHQ, copy for information to you, will you
please forward as soon as possible, for the information of
the Executive Commissioner, your comments on this.

/s/ D. W. HIND-SMITH,
Maj.

Chief Staff Officer,
To the Executive Commissioner.

See A-258

5680

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

2626 25

252

Ref: AG/44601/72/13.

25 February 1946.

1946

244

A few days ago General Browning spoke to you from an Aide Memoire on the Carabinieri. He subsequently showed me his notes. I felt that he had, naturally, spoken only from the military aspect of their functions and organisation. I therefore instructed the Public Safety Sub-Commission to prepare some notes for you on the civil side of their work which is, of course, controlled, by the Ministry for Interior, and I am sending them herewith. I hope that they may be of value to you.

251

M. S. LUSH

H.E. Sir Noel Charles, K.C.M.G.,
British Ambassador,
British Embassy,
Rome.

MSL/10.

Copy to: Land Forces B/C.
Executive Commissioner.
6. Commissioner

see 265

5679 1A 26/2

(CARTO)

22nd February 1946.

AIDE MEMOIRE FOR H.E. THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR.

ORGANISATION - CARABINIERI.

1. Although the CC.RR. is a unit of the Italian Army and organized as such, it is primarily a Police force and its members are policemen charged with the duty of preserving the peace. It is for this reason that the CC.RR. is under the control of two Ministries, the Ministry of War and the Ministry of the Interior. The functions are as follows:

(a) Ministry of War. Administration, organization military training, discipline, recruiting, arms and equipment, transport (including horses). Military Police, action under mobilization orders, supervision of soldiers on leave and release, searching for deserters and those escaping from military prisons. The Ministry of War always works in agreement with the Ministry of Interior regarding the distribution and assignment of officers.

(b) Ministry of Interior. Maintenance of public order and security, billeting and barracks equipment. The Ministry can order concentration of forces whenever necessary. In matters concerning the strength of the CC.RR., or its disposition, the Commanding General, CC.RR. must obtain the previous authorization of the Ministry of Interior before interesting the Ministry of War in the matter.

2. The number of police in Italy today is less than the number employed before Italy's entry into the war, before its industrial, commercial and economic resources had been destroyed, and before its population was confronted with hunger, homelessness, unemployment and inflation. Before the war, the aggregate number of police engaged in maintaining law and order (excluding Royal Finance Guards) was approximately 207,000 officers and men. Of this number 150,000 were organized into specialized police agencies including:

- (a) Railway Police.
- (b) Port Police.

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- (a) Railway Police.
- (b) Port Police.
- (c) Highway or Road Police.
- (d) Post and Telegraph Police.
- (e) Frontier Police.
- (f) Coastal Police.
- (g) Forest Guards.
- (h) Anti-Aircraft Guards.

These agencies were named from M.V.S.H. (Black-Shirt Militia), they were fascist organizations, and were all abolished when the Allies occupied Italy. No replacement was made, and as a result, Carabinieri are being used for duty on railways, ports, roads, frontiers, etc., to the detriment of their primary function, the duty of preserving the peace. (The Italian Government has appreciated this situation and has issued Decrees creating Railway Police. Men are being enrolled as agents of Public Security under Quastore and will be trained as Port and Road Police).

3. The primary object of an efficient police is the prevention of crime. Next that of detection and punishment of offenders if crime in committee. These functions cannot be performed by police on static guard duty, nor by

-2-

those held in reserve bodies in readiness to put down riots or other disturbances beyond the capacity of the CC.BB. on patrol. The close contact with the public so necessary to the proper performance of police duty is secured by the naming of 4,500 stations throughout the country. The location and importance of the station determines the number of police to be assigned. The extraneous duties which must at present be performed by the CC.BB. militates against the effectiveness of their strength, with the result that the stations throughout the country are not armed to their proper strength. The minimum station allotment is usually 5 but this number has had to be reduced. The increase in mobility of a force increases efficiency. However, a reduction in strength in consequence, to be replaced by visiting CC.BB. in motor cars or trucks, will inevitably lead to a worsening of public safety conditions. The presence of the CC.BB. resident on the scene frequently prevents crime being committed. Flying squads can only deal with the trouble after it has occurred. Experience at home has shown that with all the many modern aids so valuable and necessary in police work today, the basis of the whole system is the "man on the beat". He cannot be replaced.

4. It is not generally appreciated that the CC.BB. is the only representative of law and order in the towns and countries below provincial level. He is not a village policeman. He is a member of a national police force and is transferred from a city or small town to a country in the mountains in accordance with the exigencies of his service. The CC.BB. in Rome is of the same type as the CC.BB. in a Sicilian village.

5. Agents of Public Security are concentrated in cities and provincial seats and are not distributed into countries to assist in the duty of preserving order. Guardia Finanze are revenue agents, not police in the generally accepted sense of the term. It is anticipated that an additional 6,000 agents will be trained by April and a further 6,000 by June. This increase in strength should enable a large number of CC.BB. to return to proper police duty. When this occurs, every effort should be made to build up the strength of the force at the station level.

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INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Originator's Reference: **ADG/73C**

Date/Time of Origin: **20 FEB 1945**

Message Centre No: **9/9593**

Date Time Rec'd: **21 FEB 0945**

Precedence: **IMPORTANT**

FROM: **MAIN 13 CORPS**

TO: **AFHQ INFO; ALSO HQ VENEZUELA GIULIA POLICE FORCE FOR GSD CHQ CHQ**

RESTRICTED.

RESTRICTED

REF. YOUR **YZ41096** OF 19 FEB.

1. CONSIDER RETENTION OF 6 PUBLIC SAFETY OFFERS BY VENEZUELA GIULIA POLICE FORCE ESSENTIAL UNTIL TRAINED AMERICAN POLICE OFFERS AVAILABLE TAKE THEIR PLACE.
2. PROPOSED HOWEVER TO ABOLISH HQ VENEZUELA GIULIA POLICE FORCE AS SEPARATE ENTITY ON OR ABOUT 01 APRIL AND TO ABSORB VARIOUS KEY PERSONNEL INTO AND EST. IN VIEW THIS FORTHCOMING HEDRG RECOMMEND THAT PUBLIC SAFETY OFFERS BE RETAINED TEMPORARILY ON WE OF AG ROME AND INCL IN PROPOSAL TO BE SUBMITTED BY THIS HQ FOR INCREASE IN AND EST CONSEQUENT UPON DISBANDMENT OF HQ VENEZUELA GIULIA POLICE FORCE.
3. ALSO RECOMMEND PROPOSAL SUBMITTED UNDER OUR **5371/SD2** OF 11 FEB BE DROPPED. THESE PERSONNEL CAN THEN ALSO BE INCL IN PROPOSAL TO AMEND AND EST.
4. REQUEST YOU CONFIRM AGREEMENT.

INFO - ACTION

AD DIST

INFO ACTN:

INFO:

CHIEF COMMISSIONER

ST. MARY'S EXCH.

G-1 B 2

G-1 A 2

FILE 2

RESTRICTED

5676

- RESTRICTED

LIST

DEFO ACTION:

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

WILLIAMSON COUNTY, ILL.
J. J. JAMES, JR.

Q-1 A 2

6712

251

FLORIS

HEADQUARTERS

21 FEB 1946

785017

FX 61096

FEB 19 1950A

3/9550

FEB 20 1950

ROUTINE

AFHQ W(3D) CMC
MAIN AIII CORPS
INFO ALCOM

RESTRICTED

Subject Public Safety Officers Venezia Giulia Police Force. ref
Alcom signal 978 of 6th Feb 40.

2.ii proposal to add British Public Safety Officers to HQ Venezia Giulia Police Force supported by you request you submit earliest proposal for AMDP to WE CM/1040/2.

2. request you arrange RHP attends Caserta PM 4 MAR for this and your proposals under AIII Corps 5306/SD1 dated 11 Feb.

AC DIST

ACTION: P SAFETY

INFO: CHIEF COMMISSIONER

01 A

01 B 2

PAGE 2

FLOAT

5675

245

Ref: 3626/245/SD.

16. February 1946.

SUBJECT: Organisation of the CC.RR.

TO : GOC, Land Forces
Sub-Commission (MHIA).

246

1. You were good enough to send me the aide memoire from which you spoke to the British Ambassador on the question of the CC.RR. in order to brief him for an interview on the subject with the Prime Minister.

2. If I may say so, it presents the military side of the CC.RR. and their organisation down to Legion level precisely. I think, however, if the British Ambassador is to speak to the Prime Minister on the subject he should also be briefed from the point of view of the functions of the Ministry of Interior with regard to the CC.RR. It is the Interior who deal with the CC.RR. as village policemen. It is this aspect of their work which is as vitally important as the organisation and equipment at the higher levels.

3. I have therefore instructed Colonel Bye, Public Safety Sub-Commission, to coordinate with Lt.Col. Sigal and produce a brief on the purely police aspect of the CC.RR.

Rec 252

M. S. LUSH

MSL/JG.

Brigadier,
Acting Chief Commissioner.

Copy to: CA Section (Attn: Public Safety S/O).

CLC
19/2

5671

Subject: CC.M

ALIM-REMOVAL FOR R.E. THE BRITISH ARMS ADOR.

The following are possible aspects of the CC.MR situation which might be discussed with the Prime Minister.

1. GENERAL.

The paramount importance of the CC.MR has been stressed to the Minister for War and he fully accepts the necessity of priority of supply of clothing, arms, equipment, etc. for the CC.MR. As the responsibility for the CC.MR has been handed over only comparatively recently to Lord Porcous Sub-Commission A.C. (M.M.I.A.) and police officers to form a CC.MR Section therein have only recently been made available, a comprehensive survey of the whole CC.MR situation has not been possible to date. However, certain aspects have been brought already and these are specified below.

2. RELIEF OF CC.MR FROM EXTRAMURUS DUTIES.

The authorized establishment of the CC.MR is 65,000 but at the urgent request of the P.M. Chief Commissioner on 9 Feb asked A.P.M.B. if a further 10,000 could be authorized. Meanwhile it is necessary to make the maximum use of the CC.MR available. One method of doing this is to relieve the CC.MR from extraneous duties. Examples of these are:-

Railway and Dock Police	No. Employed .. 1,506	Ministry of Transport.
RMC Road Transport		Ministry of Interior.
RMC Distribution of Aid to Italy	850	Ministry of Transport.
Prison Security	200	Ministry of Agriculture and Food.
		Ministry for Green and Justice.

Personnel Coordination A.C. (M.M.I.A.) and police officers to form a C.I.R.

Section therein have only recently been made available, a comprehensive survey of the whole C.I.R. situation has not been possible to date. However, certain aspects have come to light already and these are specified below.

2. RELIEF OF C.I.R. FROM EXTRANEOUS DUTIES.

The authorized establishment of the C.I.R. is 65,000 but at the urgent request of the P.M. Chief Commissioner on 9 Feb asked A.P.M.O. if a further 10,000 could be authorized. Meanwhile it is necessary to make the maximum use of the C.I.R. available. One method of doing this is to relieve the C.I.R. from extraneous duties. Examples of these are:-

Railway and Dock Police	No. Employed .. 1,306	Ministry of Transport.
ENAC Road Transport		Ministry of Interior.
ENAC Distribution of Aid to Italy	850	Ministry of Transport.
Prison Security	200	Ministry of Agriculture and Food.
		Ministry for Grass and Justice.
		Ministry of the Interior.

3. GUARDS.

Many C.I.R. are employed on guard duties, at the expense of their main function of preserving law and order. It is suggested that these guards could be provided from ex-C.I.R., ex-10, ex-soldiers etc. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) (47) (48) (49) (50) (51) (52) (53) (54) (55) (56) (57) (58) (59) (60) (61) (62) (63) (64) (65) (66) (67) (68) (69) (70) (71) (72) (73) (74) (75) (76) (77) (78) (79) (80) (81) (82) (83) (84) (85) (86) (87) (88) (89) (90) (91) (92) (93) (94) (95) (96) (97) (98) (99) (100) (101) (102) (103) (104) (105) (106) (107) (108) (109) (110) (111) (112) (113) (114) (115) (116) (117) (118) (119) (120) (121) (122) (123) (124) (125) (126) (127) (128) (129) (130) (131) (132) (133) (134) (135) (136) (137) (138) (139) (140) (141) (142) (143) (144) (145) (146) (147) (148) (149) (150) (151) (152) (153) (154) (155) (156) (157) (158) (159) (160) (161) (162) (163) (164) (165) (166) (167) (168) (169) 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reliability as the CC.M. would not be obtained and would be a certain linear
 variance in recruiting and organizing such groups. But the whole matter
 appears to be the balance between the use of CC.M. for the maintenance of
 law and order in the country as a whole as opposed to the local or particular
 needs of certain ministries.

4. RAIL TRANSPORT.

There is available sufficient stocks of uniforms, clothing, boots,
 arms etc. for the immediate requirement of the CC.M. In many cases however
 the stocks are located in stores far from the locations where they are needed and the
 State Railways require 15 days notice for the reserving of a box car and will
 not allocate cars unless it can be filled. It would seem that ~~the~~ ^{should} greater
 priority for movement of stores as above ~~would~~ be given to the CC.M.

5. DEFENSE ALLIED MATERIALS.

This is handed over to the Ministry of Supply to allocate and
 distribute through the A.S.A. organization. The Ministry of Supply could
 well be urged to ensure priority of allocation to the CC.M. The most
 notable case in point is the vessel matter of transport for the CC.M. After
 considerable pressure and discussion a compromise is being effected, it is
 hoped, whereby the Ministry of War will obtain the 10,000 army vehicles owed
 to it and now in the hands of civilians. Briefly the compromise will
 result in the Ministry of War getting a certain number of vehicles worth
 half a billion lire at once and a credit of 4 1/2 billion lire being made avail-
 able to the Ministry of War (within the Army budget) to enable the Ministry
 of War to buy non-civilian production. Transport funds is one of the vital

the stocks are located in stores far from the Legion where they are needed and the State Railways require 15 days notice for the reserving of a box car and will not allow to move unless it can be filled. It would seem that ~~less~~ ^{greater} priority for movement of stores as above ~~would~~ ^{should} be given to the CC.MR.

5. GENERAL ALLOCATIONS MINISTRIES.

This is handed over to the Ministry of Supply to allocate and distribute through the A.S.A.B. organization. The Ministry of Supply could well be urged to ensure priority of allocation to the CC.MR. The most notable case in point is the road motor of transport for the CC.MR. After considerable pressure and discussion a compromise is being effected, in the hope, whereby the Ministry of War will obtain the 15,000 army vehicles owed to it and new in the hands of civilians. Presently the compromise will result in the Ministry of War getting a certain number of vehicles worth half a million lire at once and a credit of 4½ million lire being made available to the Ministry of War (outside the Army budget) to enable the Ministry of War to buy new civilian production. Transport funds in one of the vital needs of the CC.MR and the Ministry of Supply and Transport, could help by agreeing to the compromise and making the vehicles and funds available quickly.

6. CHANNELS OF SUPPLY, CC.MR.

At present, through the CC.MR is part of the Army, its channels of supply run parallel to those of the Army. It seems to us that in order to have co-ordinated and continuous supply, the whole supply of the CC.MR should be done by the Ministry of War. A start has been made on this by the provision of PCL to the CC.MR Mobile Bus through Army channels instead of through the prefects. But it would seem that such greater efficiency would result if the whole of the PCL and other supplies were controlled and distributed

/through

242

through Army channels. If this were so, it would fit in well with the Army Territorial Organization. The Ministry of War would deal in RUMS with the head of the CC.RR while out in Army Territorial Regions the father and mother of the CC.RR would be the Territorial Regional Commander. This, it is suggested would not cut across the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior or the Ministry of Grace and Justice as regards the purely police duties aspect of the CC.RR. The big point of this should be that the CC.RR should not consider themselves as a separate organization running parallel to the Army but as part of the Army, working in very close touch and under the Ministry of War as regards administration, maintenance, and discipline generally.

7. Press.

The prestige and morale of the CC.RR has undoubtedly risen. Anything that can be done to increase this is all to the good. It is suggested that more use should be made of the Press and better propaganda put out to show the Nation that the CC.RR are busily getting on their feet and are doing a good job.

L.P.
Major General,
Iand Porosa Sub Committee, A.C. (M.M.I.A.)

as part of the CC,IR. The big point of this would be that the CC,IR

should not consider themselves as a separate organization running parallel to the Army but as part of the Army, working in very close touch and under the Ministry of War as regards administration, maintenance, and discipline generally.

7. Proposed.

The prestige and morale of the CC,IR has undoubtedly risen. Anything that can be done to increase this is all to the good. It is suggested that more use should be made of the Press and better propaganda put out to show the Nation that the CC,IR are properly getting on their feet and are doing a good

job.

L. B.

Major General,
Land Forces Sub Committee, A.C. (M.E.I.A.)

13 Feb. 46.

5671

3626
E.C. COMM R 239

ALLIED FORCES HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

FOAP/jrc

G-5: 014.12 VET

22 January 1945

JAN 24 1945

SUBJECT: Officer Personnel

1. Headquarters, Allied Commission,
A.P.O. 394

1. Steps have now been taken to ensure that the British Element of the Venezia Giulia Police Force is complete in War Establishment strength. The American element is, however, still not complete.

2. You are therefore requested to take appropriate steps to have vacancies in Tables of Organization filled by suitable American officers.

3. In the event you do not have suitable American officers for this assignment, requisition should be submitted to G-1, AFUSA, for same. Every effort will then be made to secure them from within the Theatre. If not available here, they will be requisitioned from the Zone of the Interior.

4. It is no longer considered expedient to hold British officers against American vacancies in the Police Force and no further British officers will be despatched for this purpose.

BY ORDER OF ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF:

[Signature]

F. O. A. FARMER,
Brigadier,

Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

Copy to:

Headquarters 13 Corps
G-1 AFUSA

AC	DIST
ACTION	G-1 (A)
	FOR SAFETY etc
IMP	CH COMM R
	EX COMM R
	C A SEC
	G-1 (B)

PAF
5070

See M-240 & 241

(1017 B)

INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Originator's Reference: 94147 (CAS)

Date/Time of Origin: JAN 19 1210 Z

Message Centre No: G/7611

Date Time Rec'd: JAN 22 1400AA

Precedence: ROUTINE

FROM: TROOPERS

TO: CHQ CMF

INFO: ALCON MILITARY MISSION ITALIAN ARMY

JAN 22 1946

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED.

Your PX 58552 14 January. After consultation with foreign and home offices can trace no evidence that 12 police effrs being obtained in U kingdom.

HEADQUARTERS

22 JAN 1946

AC DIST.

INFO ACTION: EX COMMR 2

INFO: CHIEF COMMISSIONER

L FORCES

O.A. SEC

P. SAFETY

G-1 B 2

FILE

SKELETON

RESTRICTED

CIPHER TELEGRAM

As a security measure, this message should be distributed outside the British or Allied Government Departments or Headquarters and should be transmitted over a cipher without (9) being marked (Messages marked AT.P. need not be paraphrased).

INFO - ACTION

RESTRICTED

236

RESTRICTED.

Your PX 58552 14 January. After consultation with foreign and home offices can trace no evidence that 12 police officers being obtained in U Kingdom.

RECEIVED

72 JAN 14 1946

A. C.

AC DIST.

INFO ACTION: EX COMMR 2

INFO: CHIEF COMMISSIONER

L FORCES

C.A. SEC

P. SAFETY

G-1 B 2

FILE

SKELTON

RESTRICTED

CIPHER TELEGRAM

This message must not be distributed outside British or U.S. Government Departments or Agencies and must not be transmitted even in Cipher without being properly phrased. (Messages marked C.T.P. used not be paraphrased).

See No 230

INFO - ACTION

2569

1/22/46

8/10

367b 58 By Command. 236

I.JCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Originator's Reference: FI50552

Date/Time of Origin: 141540A

Message Centre No: G/7351

Date Time Rec'd: JAN 150900A

Precedence: IMPORTANT

FROM: G (SD) GHQ CWP

TO: TROOPERS FOR SD INFO ALGOM MMIA

JAN 15 1945

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Further to troopers cable 90408 (GAS) of 21 Dec and our C 12022 of 9 Jan. Have received unofficial INFM that 12 police offrs have been obtained by you in US for MMIA. Grateful for confirmation and for ranks of officers.

AC DIST

INFC ACTION: EX COMMISSIONER 2

INFO: CHIEF COMMISSIONER

L FORCES

C A S

FILE

PS

61(13)

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Further to troopers cable 90405 (CAG) of 21 Dec and our O 12022 of 9 Jan. Have received unofficial INFM that 12 police officers have been obtained by you in UK for MIA. Grateful for confirmation and for ranks of officers.

AC DIST

INFO ACTION: EX COMMISSIONER 2

INFO: CHIEF COMMISSIONER

L FORCES

C A S

FILE

PS
G.1(13)

RESTRICTED

CAPITAL TELEGRAM

This message will be distributed outside British or U.S. Government Departments or Headquarters of any consular or other without being processed (describing method O.T.P. need not be processed).

Handwritten signature

5667

Handwritten note:
1.
(not of) OLB

Ref: 3626/82

11 January 1946

SUBJECT: Provision of Police Officers for SASH

TO : C-1, (B)

Reference signal 012845 of 11 January 1946. (Action copy C-1 (B)).

Enclosed to complete your file on this subject are copies of:

- (a) SASH signal to C-1 - FA 51855 of 5 Nov. 1945.
- (b) TROOPERS signal to C-1, C-2 - 90408 of 9 of 21 Dec 45.
- (c) C-1, C-2 letter to War Office - C-5, 210, 5-1 of 8 Jan 45.
- (d) C-1, C-2 signal to TROOPERS - C 12022 of 9 Jan 1945.

(Sgd) Capt. [Signature]

Lt. Colonel
Chief Staff Officer
to Executive Commissioner

Copy to:

Land Forces S/C (endorsing copy of (a) above)
Public Safety S/C (endorsing copy of (c) above)

See in 235

566

INCOMING MESSAGE HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Originator's Reference: G 12842

Date/Time of Origin: JAN 11 1834 A

Message Centre No: G/1225

Date Time Rec'd: JAN 12 1015

Precedence: ROUTINE

FROM: AFHQ GHQ CMF FROM CIVIL AFFAIRS

TO: TROOPERS LONDON

INFO: ALCON ROME

UNCLASSIFIED.

After fresh consideration requirements this theatre, can now offer following 8 Police officers for back from AMR/AD: (for GA 9 AMR 34061 GA 9 of 11 December 4) and further to our 210.3-1 of 8 January 46) A/Capt R Bellamy (291035) Gen list: A/Capt S Keen (291034) Gen list: T/Capt De Braddock (291037) Gen list: T/Capt K Cocks (279403) Gen list: A/Capt LV Gale (295371) Gen list: A/Capt WNO Liddle (291049) Gen list: T/Capt Tompkins (291715) Gen list: A/Capt Lu Wymen (281121) Gen list.

AC DIST.

61(0).

INFO ACTION: EX COMMISSIONER 2

INFO: CHIEF COMMISSIONER

EX COM

CA 20

5/12/46

FILE 2

FLOAT

UNCLASSIFIED.

After fresh consideration requirements this theatre,
can now offer following 8 Police officers for MAON from AMB/AD:
(for GA 9 KZOK 34061 GA 9 of 11 December 42 and further to our
210.3-1 of 8 January 46) A/ Capt T Bellamy (291035) Gen list:
A/Capt S Bean (291034) Gen list: T/Capt De Bradberry (291036)
Gen list: T/Capt Kr Cocks (279403) Gen list: A/Capt LV Gale
(219371) Gen list: A/Capt GHO Liddle (291049) Gen list: T/Capt
Tompkins (291115) Gen list: A/Capt LG Whymman (287121) Gen list.

AC DIST.

61(0).

INFO ACTION : EX COMMISSIONER 2

INFO : CHIEF COMMISSIONER

EX COM

CD Dec

17/12/46
FILE 2

FLOAT

See 234.

INFO - ACTION

5668

9/ (part n)

3626 90

INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Originator's Reference: C 12022

Date/Time of Origin 091255 A

Message Centre No: 0/7048

Date/Time Rec'd 091615

Precedence: ROUTINE

FROM: AFHQ GHA, GAF

TO: TROOPERS LONDON INFO ALCON MELA

JAN 10 1946

UNCLASSIFIED:

REF YOUR 90408 (C49) OF 21 DECEMBER 45. CONTINUED

AC DIST

INFO ACTION: EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER (2)

INFO: CHIEF COMMISSIONER

LAND FORCES

CAS

FILE

INFO ACTION

2023.
See M. 2024
F. 24

10.246

REF YOUR 90408 (CAG) OF 21DEC68 AS. CONFIRMED

AG DIST

INFO ACTION: ELECTIVE COMMISSIONER (2)

INFO: CHIEF COMMISSIONER

LAW FORCES

5713

STUDY

INFO ACTION

See M. 1009

5665

10/1/07

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

7850, 7

2221
SUBJECT: Public Safety Officers

442 97
364
Civil Affairs
General Headquarters
GAF

G-5: 210.3-1

8 January 1946

TO : The War Office (GA.9)
Whitehall
London, E.C.1.

Copy to: HQ Allied Commission
Dep Mil Sec GHO GAF
'A' Branch GHO GAF

4/2
Reference your 34661 GA.9 of 11 Dec 45 and further to our
G-44736 of 7 Dec 45.

221 refuse
1. It is regretted that no Public Safety Officers can be made immediately available from this theatre for NAOM. It is also impossible at the moment to forecast definite dates at which any such officers would become available in the future.

2. There are in Allied Commission Italy 65 Public Safety Officers who are, with the exception of 7, earmarked to fill vacancies in authorized War Establishments as follows:

(a). To fill vacancies in the proposed War Establishment of the Allied Commission which is now being prepared based upon AFPO signal TAN 965:

- (i) 5 for the HQ in Rome
- (ii) 20 for Liaison Teams, remaining in regions which are being handed over to Italian Control.
- (iii) 5 for GHOHQ

The proposed strength of Liaison Teams are now under examination. The names of any Public Safety Officers who are found to be surplus as a result of this examination will be reported.

(b). To be posted to fill vacancies in the War Establishment of the VENEZIA GIULIA Police Force (GA/1046/2) - 11.

(c). To be posted to fill vacancies in the War Establishment of the Military Mission to the Italian Army (GA/241/5) in connection with the training of the Carabinieri - 17.

3. The 7 Public Safety Officers who are not earmarked to fill vacancies as set out above are urgently required, for the time being at least, to replace American Public Safety Officers who have lately been released from the Service and whose replacements have not yet arrived. The American Table of Organization (equivalent to W.E.) allows 15 Public Safety Officers, but only 4 of the vacancies are in fact filled. There is no immediate prospect

5464

828
228

of replacements being provided and a serious situation will arise if the British officers who are performing the duties are withdrawn before this occurs.

4. There has recently been a number of releases under Class "B" of the Release Regulations of Police Officers serving with Allied Commission. It would be appreciated if this GHQ could be given an indication of the future policy with regard to such releases, which constitute an unexpected drain on a type of officer already in short supply.

5. In view of the situation as set out above, it is urgently requested that this theatre be not required to provide Public Safety Officers for BACH.

F. G. A. Parsons

F. G. A. PARSONS
Brigadier, GS
Director of Civil Affairs

5662

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
AND 594
Office of the Executive Commissioner

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ *file*
3271

Ref: ~~3626/83~~

31 December 1945

SUBJECT: Conditions within the G.I.H.R. at Naples.

TO : Land Forces Subcommission.

1. Reference Public Safety report 42/44/507/10/28 of 19 December 1945, copy to you. Your attention is drawn to para 7 and 8(e) of the report. It is considered that in the interests of Public Safety Major Rocorella should be posted away from Naples forthwith.

2. Will you please therefore take this matter up with AFM and the Ministry of War with a view to orders being issued for Major Rocorella's removal from Naples. Will you please treat this matter as urgent.

For the Chief Commissioner.

Pro
Brigadier
Executive Commissioner

Copy to: SA Section.

5662

FROM: Chief Staff Officer.

TO : Capt. Braybrooke.

DEC 14 1945

Will you obtain for me for the information of the C.C. the file, or files, containing the latest on OC.RR strength, disposition, clothing and weapons situation.

13 Dec 45.

TO : Chief Staff Officer

Ref. minute above.

1. The latent information (detailed) regarding strength and disposition of OCRR is contained at pp 63-65 (flagged) of att'd. C of B.
2. MMIA are at present working with CA Sec to provide details of weapon strength: this should be available shortly.
3. Col. Pidsley MMIA reported at Ex Comr's meeting of 4 Dec as below:

"OC.RR. Clothing. Col Pidsley reported that the OC.RR clothing situation had been considerably improved, and that by the end of December the clothing of the OC.RR should be completed."

5661

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Ref: 3626/225/SC.

31 December 1945.

216
Thank you for your letter DG/10 of 12th December. I
am sorry we are causing so much trouble over the Caserma
Ferdinando di Savoia, and that they are becoming such a big
headache for you.

The War Ministry have now informed MMIA that the
Ministry of Internal Affairs has appointed a Prefect to coordinate
and reallocate accommodation in Rome, including military barracks.
Rome Territorial HQ are therefore revising their plans and we shall
be informed of the proposals submitted by them to the Prefect.
Perhaps in this reshuffle something useful will come to light.

M. S. LUSH

Brigadier Alban Lee, CBE, MC,
Deputy Commander,
Headquarters,
Rome Area Allied Command.

Copy to: Land Forces S/C (MMIA)
CA Section.

221/20.

5660

3626 x 104

I ICOMING MESSAGE
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Ex. Com.

Originator's Reference: 90408 CA9
Date/Time of Origin: DEC. 21 1000Z

Message Centre No: G/6274
Date Time Rec'd: DEC. 23 1115
Precedence: ROUTINE

FROM: TROOPERS

TO : ACTION : GHQ CTF INFO: ALCOM NMLA

DEC 21 1945

194 Vol II

RESTRICTED.

Reference NAF 1086 5 NOVEMBER. CONFIRM EARLIEST YOU WILL BE ABLE FIND ALL 17 POLICE OFFRS REQUIRED FROM YOUR RESOURCES IN VIEW RUN DOWN OF AMG AND ALCON.

AC DIST

INFO ACTION : EX COM 2
INFO : CHIEF COMMISSIONER
I. FORCES 2
C A S
FILE

*Seen by Ex. Com.
Spoke also with Big Can who
says 10 not 17 Salice often required
to AFGO Sec. know.
Question on this until we hear*

RESTRICTED.

Reference MAP 1006 5 NOVEMBER. CONFIRM EARLIEST YOU WILL BE
ABLE FIND ALL 17 POLICE OFFERS ACQUIRED FROM YOUR RESOURCES IN
VIEW RUN DOWN OF ANG AND ALCON.

1946 Vol II

AC DIST

INFO ACTION : EX COM 2
INFO : CHIEF COMMISSIONER
L FORCES 2
C A S 1
FILE

Seen by Ex. Com.

Spoke also with Big Can who

says 10 and 17 Salva offer required
to A. H. O. Lee knows.

No action on this until we hear
from A. H. O.; then ensure C. S. are
consulted.

T-102

26/12.

5659

By

(40)

Headquarters.

Rome Area Allied Command.

12th December 1945.

DC/10.

Dear Maurice

In reference to your AC/14613/11/PS of the 10th.

It is quite extraordinary how many guns from many different directions have opened up on me in regard to the Caserma Ferdinando di Savoia, known to us as the Artillery Barracks, in the last week or two, and to what a multiplicity of purposes the Italian Government proposes to devote them. A few weeks ago Admiral Stone particularly asked for them as a home for refugees. It really begins to seem that the retention of these barracks is the outstanding obstacle which the Allies obstruct in the way of a re-birth of Italy.

At the present moment we have no discretion in the matter, for whatever may be the interest which the SAC takes in the Police, his Headquarters has instructed us not to release without his authority, which has not been given. I have asked that they may be removed from GHQ reserve and left to us for disposal at our discretion, but no favourable reply has yet been received. As a matter of fact I am not at all sure that, even if we were allowed discretion in the matter, we should be able to release them for they are of considerable importance to us, and though I must confess that at the moment we are not fully utilising them, I had in mind a scheme by which we should concentrate there a lot of smaller holdings we have elsewhere in the City. However, I will see what we can do without them.

From another aspect I am bound to say that, according to our ideas, they are by no means ideally situated either as a Police training barracks or as quarters for an internal security reserve. As you know as well as I, it has generally been the idea of the British Army in many parts of the world to have their schools and barracks in cantonments within reach of a city, rather than in its heart.

I am not at all convinced that full use is being made of the barrack accommodation which is already at the disposal of the Ministry of War in and around Rome, though of course I have to confess that we

...bottoms have opened up on to in regard to the Caserma Ferdinando di Savoia, known to us as the Artillery Barracks, in the last week or two, and to what a multiplicity of purposes the Italian Government proposes to devote them. A few weeks ago Admiral Stone particularly asked for them as a home for refugees. It really begins to seem that the retention of these barracks is the outstanding obstacle which the Allies obstruct in the way of a re-birth of Italy.

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I am not at all convinced that full use is being made of the barrack accommodation which is already at the disposal of the Ministry of War in and around Rome, though of course I have to confess that we hold a good deal of it.

In the course of the next week or two the greater part of the barrack area in Cecenignola will be restored to the Ministry of War and this should provide particularly good and extensive accommodation, besides being in an area eminently suitable for training. This, I have discussed at some length with Wilfred Pidsley.

I am not really being obstructive, and will help if I can.

See him 20.2.19.224

F 225

Brigadier K.S. Lush, C.B., C.B.E., M.C.,
Executive Commissioner,
HQ Allied Commission.

Copy to Art Sec

AL/ML

Copy retained by OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

Ref. AG/14613/11PS.

10 December 1945

205.
The Italian Government are most anxious to have the Ferdinando di Savoia barracks for either a Police Training School or the C.C.R.R. in ROME. You know what a personal interest SACMED take in the Police situation and how important it is to us as Allies. There have, I know, been made several requests by this Commission for the barracks.

Is there any possibility of you being able to release them as a special case?

M.S. LUSH

Brigadier A. Low, MC
Headquarters,
Rome Area Allied Command,

MHL/JG.

Copy to : Chief Commissioner
Exec. Commissioner

See 4.22²¹⁶

6657

785017

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Executive Commissioner

~~250~~

213

Ref: 3626/220/37

December 1945

SUBJECT: Police Mission to Italy

TO : Land Forces Subcommittee, AG, (MIA)

17

1. References your G/3/1 of 27 November 1945.
2. It is very much regretted (a) that your letter has been overlooked (b) that you were not included on the original distribution of the reply to AFHQ.
3. A copy of that reply is herewith forwarded and the information requested in your letter will be supplied to you as early as possible.

(Signature)
Brigadier
Executive Commissioner

5650

785017

3626 ~~91~~

6/20/21

212

५३

Ref AFHQ letter (no ref) dated 10 Nov, subject as above,
addressed to you, copy to this HQ.

May this HQ please have a copy of your answer to AFHQ, and may I please be informed, ref para 5 of the a/q letter how many officers will be transferred to MOCIA from AC, and when they may be expected to report for duty.

J. B. Lawrence

67

See 220 213.
M. 22 11214

Received from Esch Inc
DEC 13 1945

565.

王林 13/12

(250)

785017

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

AD/14650/TS

1 Dec 45

DEC 3 1945

SUBJECT: Provision of a Police Mission to Italy.

TO: Allied Force Headquarters,
Chief of Staff, APO 512, US Army.

Reference is made to para 5 of your letter dated 10 Nov 45, subject as above.

1 It is estimated that on the completion of the proposed hand-back to Italian control of the Northern Regions (less Udine), there would be available 2 Lieutenant Colonels and 9 Majors, all of whom are British police officers. Neither of the Lieutenant Colonels has the qualifications specified in MAY 1086 of 5 Nov 45.

2 The first commitment for surplus police officers is to complete the Public Safety staff for Venezia Giulia. When that has been done it is possible that there may be a few captains available. The requirements for Venezia Giulia are not yet clarified.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

S. B. WHITE Lt Col,
A/VE CA Section.

Distribution: G-5, AFHQ
Chief Commissioner
Exec. Commissioner ✓

(CAPT B) 3/12

PA 5/12

785017

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
AFD 394
Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref: 3626/209/50

24 November 1945

SUBJECT: Provision of a Police Mission to Italy

TO : CA Section

Copy of the attached letter, which you have seen, is forwarded with copies of your minutes on it. May a draft reply please be prepared.

C. R. BRAYBROOKE

Chief Staff Officer
to Executive Commissioner

5658
Noted
2/12

785017

3620

208

Ref: AG/14634/PS

19 November 45

SUBJECT : Reformation of Police Forces.

TO : AFHQ, G-5 Section.

161A

NOV 20 1945

With reference to your G-5: Oth. 12 of 7 Oct 45 and in continuation of my letter 1656/191/AG of 30 Oct 45.

1. Owing to the recent continuous changes in regard to the numbers and categories of officers remaining with or leaving the Allied Commission it has not been possible to form earlier an estimate of the number of police officers available for duty with MHA.

2. No officers will be available for assignment to MHA before the hand-over of the Northern Regions. After the hand-back to Italian control of the Northern Regions, it is estimated that 10 Police Officers can be made available for assignment outside the Public Safety Sub-Commission and ASG territory. At least one of these would be of the rank of Lt. Colonel. Owing to the requirements of Venezia Giulia, all officers available will probably be British. If the mission is to be Allied, as recommended, arrangements for the provision of US personnel will have to be made.

3. In connection with this matter I must be satisfied on behalf of the British Home Office that any British Officers assigned to MHA are employed on purely police duty, for which purpose they have been provided to the British Army from the Home Office.

/s/ Henry W. Stone

HENRY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR,
Chief Commissioner.

Copy to: Land Forces G/5 (MHA)

565 PA

(LFT OKAYBOOK)

Translation

The President of the Council of Ministers
Minister of the Interior

10350

Rome, 10 November 1945

NOV 16 1945

Dear Admiral,

you are aware that the Interior Department, which is doing everything to render the police forces more efficient, gives great importance to the functioning of the Police School in Rome, which it is trying to reorganize in the best possible way.

However, this school can only be efficient if it has sufficient and adequate premises, for it is advisable to have the largest possible number of people attending it.

To face such requirements, it would be most useful to allocate the Ferdinando di Savoia barracks, which according to our information, should soon be available.

Trusting in your interest for all that concerns the reinforcement of the Italian police, I bring this matter to your personal attention, and shall be most grateful if you kindly issue orders to have the said building handed over without delay.

Truly yours,

B. Ferruccio Parri

Admiral Ellery S. Stone
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
Rome

trans. e/s

EC DIST. 16 NOV

ACTION - CASRE (2)

INFO - CHIEF COMM

- EX COMM

30/11/45
BU 23/11

5051

785017

~~SECRET~~ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Chief of Staff~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

10 November 1945

SUBJECT: Provision of a Police Mission to Italy.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission, APO 394.

1. Reference is made to your letter No. 3626/191/10 of 31 October 1945.

2. The Supreme Allied Commander has taken note of the contents of the U.S. Ambassador's letter of 18 October 45 and of the views expressed in your signal No. 6884 of 10 October 45.

3. This Headquarters fully appreciates the need for a thorough reorganization of the Italian Police Forces and agrees that this can best be achieved by means of an Allied Police Mission. This view has, however, been made clear to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Paragraph 3 of this Headquarters Signal NAF 1077.

160 It is not, therefore, proposed to take further action in the matter unless, either directions on the subject are received from the Combined Chiefs of Staff or the Italian Government decide, as suggested in the U.S. Ambassador's letter, to invite the Allies to provide a mission.

4. In the meantime preliminary arrangements will proceed for the execution of the alternative plan, whereby officers with police experience are to be attached to MIA for duty with the Carabinieri.

5. You will by now have seen this Headquarters signal NAF 1086 of 5 Nov 45, in which a firm proposal is submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the attachment of 17 British police officers to MIA. Information is requested as to how many, if any, of the appointments set forth in para 2 of NAF 1086 you consider could be filled by officers now serving under the Allied Commission, who could be made available on the completion of the proposed hand-back to Italian control of the Northern regions (less UDINE and possibly BOLZANO).

BY COMMAND OF ADJUTANT GENERAL MORGAN:

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