

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

ACC

10000/109/705
(VOL. IV)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

10003/109/705
(VOL. IV)

ITALIAN POLICE AGENCIES, ORGANIZATION
MAR. 1946 - JAN. 1947

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

378.

Ex Comm.

Aide memoire for P.M. at 4 377.

MS. 341

57911

0318

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made memoire for P.M. at 1377.
H.S. 3411

5390

03201

Ex Comm

To: CSE - Ex. Comm - Jpe 362

Attached Inter-Office Memorandum 358
for information of the Ex Comm member

Supp. Mem. att. 2/23/46
Jpe
WJL/46

2/23/46

361

P.A.

Bf. on Thursday AM 5/5

175/45

362

CAS will submit a new file memo

175/45

368.

Ex Comm.

4 367 for info. P.S. s/c taking

action.

J.H. 19/10

WJL/46

0321

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

P.A.

361

B. on Thursday A.M. 5/5

SS 3/5 44

362

CAS will submit a new idea memo

MS 6/5

368.

Ex Comm.

4 367 for info. P.S. 5/10 taking action.

MS 19/10 11/10 24/10

5/8/5

Minute No. 347.

20th July, 1946

To: Director of Public Safety Sub-Commission.

1. Reference 345. Will you initiate draft aide-memoire after discussion with me as early as possible.

We shall later have to discuss at a high level with MMIA.

2. As regards para 5 (b) of 345, I have discussed this matter with CC, and I feel that we might get off a letter now to AFHQ on this question of military organization of the P.S. Agents. Possibly you may have received some further information from the Chief of Police on this matter.

This letter would go on the file on which we write to AFHQ on the subject of over armament which was passed to MMIA but should now be back with your Sub-Commission.

McLaurin
M. CARR, Brigadier.
A/C Executive Commissioner.

351
Minute No. 349

To: Executive Commissioner.

10th August 1946.

At 345 is a draft of an Aide-Memoire for the CC on the subject of the re-organization of the Italian Police Forces.

This draft has not yet been discussed with MMIA and it is suggested that the matter should be discussed round a table.

As regards paragraph 7 of the draft, a recommendation was made to AFHQ in a letter dated 29th July 1946 that an opportunity should be found to recommend an Allied Police Mission to the Italian Government.

This would appear to be a suitable occasion on which to make such a recommendation, but we have not yet got clearance from AFHQ.

29th Aug

This letter would go on the file on which we write to AFHQ on the subject of over armament which was passed to NMIA but should now be back with your Sub-Commission.

McLan Bryader

M. CAPE, Brigadier.
A/C Executive Commissioner.

351
Minute No. 351

To: Executive Commissioner.

10th August 1946.

At 348 is a draft of an Aide-Memoire for the CC on the subject of the re-organization of the Italian Police Forces.

This draft has not yet been discussed with NMIA and it is suggested that the matter should be discussed round a table.

As regards paragraph 7 of the draft, a recommendation was made to AFHQ in a letter dated 29th July 1946 that an opportunity should be found to recommend an Allied Police Mission to the Italian Government.

This would appear to be a suitable occasion on which to make such a recommendation, but we have not yet got clearance from AFHQ.

V.P. CAS

McLan Bryader

M. CAPE, Brigadier.
VP. CA. Section.

351

I think this draft can very well be used as a basis for discussion after which no doubt it will emerge in a shatterer form. I think we might well abridge page 1 which is a little tedious. I have added a 4th in pencil. I should be glad to discuss some of the other points in the 19/8

333.

Sum
331-332

11/1/46

333.

Seen 300-331

11/1/46

339.

CSO. Ex Comm.

Please see folio 332 in ref to folio

229 of vol III

1476 MS. 1416

1476 MS.

338

CSO. Ex Comm.

Please see folio 337 for info. folio 299 info.

11/1/46

11/1/46

11/1/46

||

V.P. CHS.

343

||

Would you permit to then discuss?

with

178/1317

338

CSO. Ex Com.

Please see folio 337 for info. Folio 294 info.

18/1/7

18/1/7

18/1/7

343

V.P. CHS

Could you please discuss ?

with

178/1317

344

Chief Commissioner

518?

Could you read Brie Com comment

in Pen Brounange p342. I agree entirely. This is a very serious problem which I think we must face & which under the Armistice Terms we are entitled to take up with Action Gvt. Would you discuss with Brie Carr? ^{see my comments} ^{18/1/7} para 5(a), p 344

REDACTED ALIAS CERTIFICATION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
AND 7%

Ref. : 3636/375-70

31 January 1947

REDACTED Police Report.

TO : 1 AFHQ
6-3 Section.

1. Reference is made to your 5-31362.0 dated 13 Jan. 47.
2. I am enclosing two copies of the Report on the Italian Police Report together with copies of the side Machine under which it was located in the Prime Minister's office. Copies have been seen by Polads who reviewed the Report before its release.

377

REDACTED
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief Commissioner

Copies to: Polad A (with 3 copies of Report)
Polad B (with 3 copies of Report)
H.M.I.A. (with 1 copy of Report)
P. Safety Div. (loss Report)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

5 copies
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 794

377

AIDE MEMOIRE

REPORT ON ITALIAN POLICE FORCES

With reference to my Aide Memoire handed to you on 30th September 1946, herewith are six copies of a Report on the Italian Police Forces which has been compiled by the officers of the Public Safety Division of this Commission and is based on information acquired and experience gained during their tour of duty in this country.

It is hoped that this Report may be of value to the Italian Government in any study which may be made of the Italian police system.

/s/ E.W.S.

delivered 31 Jan. 47

578.207
1-21

785017

3626 4/

JAN 10 1947

3176

Ref: 10/1453/10

10 January 1947.

SUBJECT: Police Mission

TO : ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Attention: D-5 Section.

344

1. I refer to this Commission's letter 10/1453/10 of the 20 December 1946. In view of the desire to reduce as far as possible the functions of this Commission, your directions are requested as to whether the compilation of the report on the police forces in Italy should be completed.

2. The situation as regards the report remains as stated in the letter under reference, that is that a draft of the report should be ready about the end of this month. It is difficult to estimate what may be required for the editing of the draft and when the final report will be ready.

3. In connection with this matter, reference is made to your letter 10/1453/10 of 31 December 1946 addressed to AF on the subject of the efficiency of the Italian police and it would appear that the presentation of the report may be completed may be the only way in which some assistance and advice might be given to the Italian Government in this matter.

The Civil Safety Division (including the Security Branch), of this Commission is presently composed of only three officers so that the matter of a possible reduction in personnel hardly arises.

4. I recommend that the compilation of the report on the police forces in Italy should continue.

Major G. J. J. J.
Chief of Staff, AFHQ
Chief of Staff, AFHQ

Copy to: CC

EO

Polad (1)

Polad (3)

5187

Copy V 511/10/1

511/10/1

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

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JAN 3 1947

395

JAN 3 1947

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Public Safety Division
APO 794

AG/14634/PS

28 December 1946

SUBJECT : Police Mission.

TO : A.F.R.O., G-5.

314

1. I refer to letter from this Commission Ref. AG/14634/PS dated 20th December.
2. The number of signal referred to in para 1 of the letter should read F 73820 not F 73828.
3. Will you please amend.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER.

H. Green
for C. J. BYR, Colonel
Director.

FGG/aa

Copy to Ex. Comm.

Capt ✓ 3/1/47

678,708
4/1/47

785017

Secret
Confidential

DEC 28 1946

20 December 1946.

TO : ALLIED POWER HEAVY QUALITIES,

Attention: 0-5 Section.

1. Reference is made to your G-5: 940.00 of 25 August 1946 and to your signal P73027 of 12 December 1946.
2. On receipt of your letter under reference it was decided, after consultation with the American and British Embassies, that a direct approach to the Prime Minister on the subject of a police mission would be inadvisable, and that it would be better to seek the assistance of the Italian Government in the compilation of a report by the Public Safety Division of this Commission on the general efficiency of Police Forces in Italy.

The object of this report was to enable the question of a Police Mission to be re-opened and to afford the Italian Government an opportunity of asking for such a Mission.

Accordingly, on the 30 September 1946 I handed to the Prime Minister an Aide Memoire on this subject, copy of which is enclosed.

The re-action of the Prime Minister was that this was a very delicate matter and one that he did not propose to raise with the Council of Ministers. I concluded that the Prime Minister did not wish to give instructions for information to be provided to officers of the Public Safety Division for the report mentioned above, and still less to re-open the question of a Police Mission.

After further discussion with the American and British
Ambassadors it was considered that it would be unwise to make any further
request for information from the Italian Government and it was decided
to draw up the report on the Police Forces in Italy from such information
as was in the possession of this Commission. This procedure was acceptable
to the Prime Minister.

The position as outlined above was explained to Colonel Hamblen, G-5 Section of your Headquarters during one of his visits at that time.

Secret
Confidential

3. The report referred to above is now being compiled, but the matter has been delayed by the illness of the Director of Public Safety Division who is still in hospital. It is anticipated that a draft of the report may be available about the end of January 1947.

4. Since the above developments, I have received a copy of a note from the Charge d'Affaires of the British Embassy stating that the British Foreign Office have expressed the view that it would be politically a mistake if the Allied Commission or any other agent of the Supreme Allied Commander were to raise with the Italian Government the question of a Police Mission. The note further states that the Foreign Office believe that this might imply that the Mission was intended to be a kind of carry over from the Allied Commission and would very likely render the Italian Government strongly opposed to the whole idea of Allied assistance in this field.

I have informed the Charge d'Affaires of the British Embassy that I shall be glad to consult both the British and American Ambassadors before forwarding the report on the Civil Police of Italy to the Prime Minister. Since the report itself will not raise the question of a Police Mission, it is not believed that its submission would have any political significance.

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Encl: as above.

Copy to: CC.

EC.

Polad (A)

Polad (B)

Secret

AIDS PROGRAM

REORGANIZATION - ITALIAN POLICE FORCES

1. Officers of the Allied Commission have for the past three years worked in very close touch with the Italian Police Agencies, and it has been very evident to them that allowing for disorganization as the result of the war, the state of efficiency of the Italian Police Forces leaves much to be desired.

2. It is generally agreed that for a Police Force to be effective and efficient certain basic principles are necessary.

For example:

- (a) All Police Forces in a country should be co-ordinated and under the control of a central authority.
- (b) They must be adequately clothed, equipped and housed, efficient schools of instruction with a standard code of training should exist.
- (c) There should be reasonable pay and conditions of service.
- (d) The arming of Police should be kept at a minimum compatible with security.
- (e) Police forces should be divorced from the Armed (Defence) Forces of the country and they should, as far as possible be without any political bias.

3. At the present time there are in Italy three major Police Forces i.e. Carabinieri, Corps of Public Safety Agents and Finance Guards, together with other smaller forces, all of which work more or less independently of each other.

It is obvious that this must lead to overlapping, inefficiency and a waste of man power, furthermore the above mentioned basic principles are in general not applied.

Even allowing for the consequences of the war, housing and office conditions are to large degree inadequate.

Conditions of clothing and equipment, although improving are very poor.

-2-

Classes of instructions are in operation but there is little co-ordination between the Forces.

The pay and conditions of service are unsatisfactory.

Although it is appreciated that conditions at present are abnormal, the Police Forces are undoubtedly being overruled and a wrong mentality is thereby being fostered amongst both the Police and the Public.

Beyond doubt large sections of certain police bodies identify themselves with certain Political Parties.

4. The Allied Commission will be closing down in the near future, but before it does so, I propose that my Public Safety Officers submit a comprehensive report on the general efficiency of the Police Forces of Italy, together with their recommendations for improvement. To enable them to compile a detailed report, it will be necessary for them to seek information from Italian Police Officials and records. I am sure, that you will be only too pleased to give instructions for such information to be made available.

On completion, I shall submit the report to you. If you are in general agreement with the recommendations contained therein, you may then care to consider:

(a) whether the Italian Police Forces are able to implement the recommendations unaided or,

(b) whether you would wish to ask the service of an Anglo-American Police Mission to assist in their implementation.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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DEC 11 1946 370
Ex ham

CONFIDENTIAL

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DEK

H/8630
DEC 191000

IMPORTANT

AFHQ SIGNED SACRED CITY PHGEG

ALOOK ROMK FOR ADMIRAL STONE

BU

CONFIDENTIAL:

363

See letter subject police mission file G-5940 point 00 dated 25 August.
Have you taken action directed query. If so what was reaction query reply
urgently. Your AG/14634/PS of 29 July also refers.

350

AG DIST

ACTION - P SAFETY

INFO : CHIEF COMMISSIONER

EX COMER

FILE

SKELTON

CONFIDENTIAL

Capt V

3128



3626
THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

TOP SECRET

369
Confidential

MC 24/X
AMERICAN EMBASSY

Rome, October 18, 1946.

OCT 25 1946

My dear Admiral Stone:

I am informed that sometime ago you asked whether the United States Government's views on the question of an Allied Police Mission in Italy remain as communicated to you in September 1945. I have now received a message from the Department of State expressing its view that the decision on a Police Mission such as that contemplated lies entirely with the Italian Prime Minister. The Department does not believe that either the United States Embassy or the Allied Commission should press the matter with the Italian Government.

The Department also stated there is doubt whether the American Government could participate in a Police Mission at this time, but that no objection is seen to a British, as distinct from an Allied, Mission.

Sincerely yours,

David McK. Key
David McK. Key,
Charge d'Affaires ad interim.

Rear Admiral
Ellery W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner,
HQ Allied Commission,
R O M E.

EC DIST - 21/10/46

ACTION - EC
INFO - RS S/C.

(COPY 4)

3626

367

OCT 18 1946

TRANSLATION

THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

Rome, 15 October 1946.

Dear Admiral,

With reference to your letter of the 7th instant AC/14634 P.S.
I have the pleasure to inform you of the following:

It is true that the Corps of P.S. Guards has been organized and armed on military bases. The Chief of the Police has assured me that he has always informed of the steps taken to this purpose the Command of the Allied P.S. Sub-Commission.

The organization and the armament of a military type have appeared to be indispensable because of the well-known conditions of public order and especially because the disarmament of the population could not be carried out.

The Corps of P.S. Guards will soon have its new regulations and it will be without delay submitted to the Council of Ministers with a scheme of provisions of law determining its characteristics with regard to the constitution and armament in obedience to the clauses of the Peace Treaty draft.

Presently said Corps is considered part of the Armed Forces only according to the exceptional ruling of the decree 3.7.1943 No. 537, which for obvious disciplinary purposes imposed on it the treatment of the Military Corps.

The subdivision in Commands and Detachments in the national territory, though giving the impression of a military set up, is due only to the requirements of the distribution of forces.

In fact, the principle remains that in the territory of the provinces each Detachment is under direct orders of the Chief of the Police who thus disposes, through the commanding officer, of an organization and a discipline which the guards could never have if they depended from civilian functionaries.

As to the institution of group and division commands who have purely inspective functions, it must be noted that this is an experiment being made also in view of the administrative subdivision of the national territory in Regions and therefore of the necessity that each region may have a commander who is responsible for the Police forces.

As to the Mobile Detachments, these have been created in order to face special public order situations (Sicily, Puglia, Emilia, Veneto) and it is foreseen that they will be later again incorporated in the forces assigned to single Police stations - as soon as the conditions of public order will have become normal - in substitution of all the old elements who will be gradually eliminated until the present forces which are overstrength will be reduced to the authorized establishment number of 40,000 men.

See M 345.

PA 28
3826

As to the armored cars, it is obvious that according to the clauses contained in the Peace Treaty draft they will be handed over to the Military Authorities or anyhow destroyed unless the Allied Command would allow their use for some time considering the requirements of the struggle against bandits in Sicily and of the present and foreseeable future mass disorders. Therefore the request for the authorization to purchase armored cars as of letter of this Ministry to the Allied Commission dated 10 July 1946 is withdrawn.

As soon as the alterations requested by the clauses of the Peace Treaty draft with regard to armed forces will have been carried out, I shall send you without delay the project of law for the organization and the armament of the Corps of P.S. Guards.

Very truly yours,

/s/ De Gasperi

EC DIST - 18/10/46

ACTION - P S S/C

INFO - CC

EC

Admiral Ellery W. Stone
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
Rome.

3626

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSIC

Office of the Chief Commissioner

APO 394

EC 365

File

AC/4634/PS

7 October 1945.

OCT - 8 1945

My Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

Recently in accordance with the wishes of the Allied authorities that the Agents of Public Safety are being organized and armed on Military lines, parallel with the G.C.M.

It is understood that this Police Body is to be a thoroughly Military Corps comprising Mobile Battalions, Groups and Companies and that it is to be subject to Military Code and Discipline.

In regards the arming of the Force, a report submitted by the Ministry of Interior to the Allied Commission on 14th May last, revealed that an application for automatic arms by the Ministry of War had not been met, the Ministry of Interior had procured, without Allied authority, 4000 rifles, which, after repair had been issued to the Civil Police.

The report also disclosed that the Force possessed 5 Tanks, 21 Armoured Cars and 12 Armoured Tractors. Furthermore, in a letter from the Ministry of Interior to the Allied Commission dated 10th July 1945, it was stated that the Italian Society of General, and, on request of the Ministry, furnished to Rome, two new Armoured cars of the undermentioned types:-

- a. "Fiat" type (3 tons).
- b. "Type 45/53" type (7 tons).

The five Armoured cars were ordered within a short time, to supply 50 of each type fully equipped to the Ministry and authority of the Allied Commission to proceed with the armament was reported.

It is appreciated that the responsibility for law and order in Italian territory rests with the Italian Government and that the proposals to change the character of the Corps of Public Safety Agents were initiated before the elections and the institutional changes when outbreaks of disorder may have been considered by some as a possibility.

Further it is realized that many sections of the population are still in unlawful possession of arms.

Should the changes mentioned continue to be implemented, it will be necessary to give serious consideration to the question as to whether this re-organization and armament brings the Corps of Public Safety Agents within the category of the Armed (Defence) Forces, on a par with the G.C.M. for whom ceilings have been set under the Armistice

5174

(CAP 4)

RA 112
46

-2-

(Long or Revised) and by the Draft Peace Treaty, as it stands at present.

In view of all the circumstances, I would appreciate, my dear Mr. Prime Minister, if full details of the scheme for the re-organisation and re-equipping of the Corps of Public Safety Agents could be furnished to this Commission as early as possible. Meanwhile, pending the examination of the scheme, the Supreme Allied Commander is unable to give authority for the proposed manufacture of armoured cars for the Police.

Yours very truly,

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE,
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

5773

COPY

COPY

363

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

G-5: 940.00

25, August 1946.

SUBJECT: Police Missions

TO : Chief Commissioner,
Allied Commission,
APO 794.

Your letter AG/14634/PS of 29 July has received careful consideration and the proposals contained in the fifth paragraph thereof are approved.

Will you please take action accordingly and in due course inform the HQ of the reaction of the Italian Government to your advice.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN

/s/ A.L. RAMBLER
Colonel, G.S.C.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5.

*For further information see Public Safety
File AG/14634/PS.*

AG

AG

ALLIED [REDACTED] COMMISSION
INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

358

SUBJECT: Reorganization of the Italian
Police Forces.
TO: Executive Commissioner.

FILE NO. 3626/BC

3 September 1946

It is confirmed that the meeting to discuss the reorganization of the Italian Police Forces will be held on Thursday, September 9th at 1500 hours in the Executive Commissioner's office.

Copy of a draft aid-memoire is enclosed.

The draft is only a basis for discussion.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER.

Distribution:
M.H.I.A.
Public Safety.

W. Carr *Coff*
W. CARR, Brigadier,
VP CA Section.
3771

(EC)

See 17-360, 361, 362

DRAFT.

AIDE MEMOIRE.

REORGANIZATION OF THE ITALIAN POLICE FORCES.

1. It is believed that the Italian Government agree with the Allied opinion that the Italian Police Forces require considerable reorganization. The extent and type of reorganization required is, however, debatable and may present difficult and delicate problems.
2. If considered from an American or British angle, the primary object in the construction and ^{reconstruction} ~~reconstruction~~ of an efficient police force would be:-
 - (a) Prevention of crime.
 - (b) Arrest and detention of offenders if crime is committed.To these ends all efforts of the police would be directed. The absence of crime, the safety of life and property and the state of public tranquillity would alone prove whether the efforts of the police have been successful and the object in view attained.
3. In considering how to prevent crime, not only must ^{be considered} ~~be considered~~ supervision, patrolling, communications and transport be efficient,

1. It is believed that the Italian Government agree with the Allied opinion that the Italian Police Forces require considerable reorganization. The extent and type of reorganization required is, however, debatable and may present difficult and delicate problems.

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(a) Prevention of crime.

(b) Arrest and detention of offenders if crime is committed.

To these ends all efforts of the police would be directed. The absence of crime, the safety of life and property and the state of public tranquility would alone prove whether the efforts of the police have been successful and the object in view attained.

3. In considering how to prevent crime, not only must ^{be} ~~be~~ supervision, patrolling, communications and transport be efficient, but what is still more important, the Police must have the co-operation of the law-abiding sections of the community.

To ensure this they must have the confidence and respect of the public. This can only be attained by acting at all times with scrupulous fairness, impartiality and without political bias. When the public fully realise that the police have these attributes, then the public on their part will give their full support.

35b

The Police, in actual fact, should be the servants and friends and not the masters and enemies of the people.

4. For a Police Service to be thoroughly effective and efficient it is necessary for the following main principles to be applied.

(a) All the Police Forces, although they may be known by different names should be co-ordinated and under the control of a central authority.

(b) They should be adequately clothed, equipped and housed.

(c) Adequate schools of instruction with a standard code should exist.

(d) Pay and conditions of service should be such as to ensure the Force being contented and honest.

(e) Although armed when and where necessary, the Force should not, in general, be equipped, militarised and used in such a way as to constitute a continual threat to the community. X

(f) Information has been obtained from the Ministry of Defence, Italy, that the Italian Police are in possession of the Allied Commission, from the information in possession of the Allied Commission, the situation and state of efficiency of the Italian Police at present appears to be as follows:-

(a) There are three major Police Forces, i.e. Carabinieri (75,000), Guardia di Finanza (17,000), and Finance Guards

different names should be co-ordinated and under the control of a central authority.

- (b) They should be adequately clothed, equipped and housed
- (b) Adequate schools of instruction with a standard code should exist.
- (d) Pay and conditions of service should be such as to ensure the Force being contented and honest.
- (e) Although armed when and where necessary, the Force should not, in general, be equipped, militarised and used in such a way as to constitute a continual threat to the community.

5. From the information in possession of the Allied Commission, the situation and state of efficiency of the Italian Police at present appears to be as follows:-

- (a) There are three major Police Forces, i.e. Carabinieri (75,000), Corps of Public Safety Agents (47,000), and Finance Guards (30,000) each working more or less independently of the other.

The Finance Guards are in the nature of Revenue Agents and may require special consideration as regards inclusion in the Police Forces as such. In addition there are independent smaller Forces - i.e. Vigili Urbani (numbers not known) and Forest Guards (5,000) also under separate authorities.

- 3 -

355

In this connection it is understood that steps are now being taken to remove the Metropolitan which is a section of the Civil Police operating in Rome, Milan, Naples and Palermo from the control of the Director of Public Safety to that of the Comune.

all
However efficient these forces may be in themselves, overlapping and a waste of effort, manpower and money must inevitably occur when Police, under different organizations are covering the same areas and performing parallel duties. Each force becomes jealous of the other and co-operation is lacking.

- (b) As a result of the war and due to unavoidable causes, clothing, equipment and accommodation fell into a deplorable state. Many improvements have been effected but there is much still to be done.
- (c) Classes of instruction are in operation but there is little or no co-ordination between the Forces.
- (d) The pay of the Police, which is one of the most important essentials in police administration is inadequate and is such that corruption must inevitably creep in.
- (e) Originally the Civil Police Forces were normally armed with a musket and pistol, mainly for defensive purposes.

inevitably occur when Police, under different organizations are covering the same areas and performing parallel duties. Each force becomes jealous of the other and co-operation is lacking.

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- (e) Originally the Civil Police Forces were normally armed with a ~~ma~~ket and pistol, mainly for defensive purposes.

Immediately following the cessation of hostilities, ⁱⁿ successive areas of Italy, lawlessness became acute due to the aftermath of war. In some areas armed banditry was rife with the Police, on account of lack of transport and equipment, in no position to combat the situation effectively. Somewhat similar conditions still prevail in many centres. ^{Consequently} ~~Consequently~~ widespread unemployment is now causing disaffection in many places.

354

The Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission, with the assistance of Allied Police ^{Officer} ~~Personnel~~, concentrated on the re-clothing, re-equipment and re-arming of the Carabinieri with the result that to-day this Force has become reasonably efficient as a combatant force. They are now equipped with armoured cars and automatic weapons. The Carabinieri are military in character and are armed as such although performing civil police duties.

The Corps of Public Safety Agents has, for a long time been pressing for automatic arms on the grounds that such are necessary to combat criminals and a considerable percentage of the population who are similarly armed. Large numbers of automatic weapons have come into their possession ^{of the Public Safety Agents.} In addition they have a number of armoured cars and the authority of the Allied Commission has now been sought to purchase a considerable number of additional armoured cars.

It would seem that the Ministry of Interior are anxious to arm the Corps of Public Safety Agents on a scale equal to that of the Carabinieri.

Furthermore, in a directive issued by the Ministry of Interior to Prefects and Commanders of Police it is laid down that the Corps of Public Safety Guards is a thoroughly military Corps. It is being reorganized on military lines, i.e. in Divisions,

are armed as such although performing civil police duties.

The Corps of Public Safety Agents has, for a long time been pressing for automatic arms on the grounds that such are necessary to combat criminals and a considerable percentage of the population who are similarly armed. Large numbers of automatic weapons have come into their possession. In addition they have a number of armoured cars and the authority of the Allied Commission has now been sought to purchase a considerable number of additional armoured cars.

It would seem that the Ministry of Interior are anxious to arm the Corps of Public Safety Agents on a scale equal to that of the Carabinieri.

Furthermore, in a directive issued by the Ministry of Interior to Prefects and Commanders of Police it is laid down that the Corps of Public Safety Guards is a thoroughly military Corps. It is being reorganized on military lines, i.e. in Divisions, Groups, Companies etc., with Mobile Battalions.

6. In any organization re-organization many technical and detail matters would require study. Some of the main problems to be solved, together with recommendations for consideration are given in the following paragraph:

- (a) The merging of the main police forces under one central authority together with the elimination of over armament and of the duplication of effort may be an extremely difficult and delicate problem. The Carabinieri are an essentially military body, they are naturally very

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jealous of their traditions and might not view with favour their complete absorption into the Corps of Public Safety Agents.

On the other hand it would be equally inadvisable for the Public Safety Agents to be absorbed into the Carabinieri and for the whole force to become completely military in character. An efficient police force can never emerge from a force which is organized wholly on military lines and in which the human touch, so essential in successful police work, is completely lacking.

It is suggested for ~~your~~ consideration that in order to keep their identity as far as possible the Carabinieri might remain dependent on the Ministry of War for food, clothing and equipment, but for all other purposes control should be vested in the Director General of Public Safety Ministry of Interior. It would be essential, however, that political bias should be completely eliminated from both

Corps.,

(b)

Heavily armed Police may be required to meet serious emergencies as and when they arise in certain areas, but they are unnecessary for employment on normal police duties. It is agreed that a situation, such as exists in Italy to-day, where large Sections of the population are in possession

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Heavily armed Police may be required to meet serious emergencies as and when they arise in certain areas, but they are unnecessary for employment on normal police duties. It is agreed that a situation, such as exists in Italy to-day, where large Sections of the population are in possession of modern arms as a result of the passage of war is not in itself a normal condition.

The situation, however, in many areas, including some of the large cities tends, however, to be tranquil and normal. It is felt that every endeavour should be made to reduce steadily the number of armed police employed as such.

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(c) As regards the pay of the Police Forces, it is appreciated that this is a matter which is affected by the wage scales of statal and para-statal employees in general. In principle, however, it is essential that the Police Forces receive a scale of pay which should remove temptations of bribery and corruption.

7. In the past the question of ^{an} Allied Police Mission to advise on and assist in the re-organization of the Italian Police Forces has been discussed with various members of the Italian Government in power at the time.

It is suggested that re-consideration might be given at this stage to an invitation being extended to the Allied authorities for such a Mission.

Among other advantages which might accrue from ^{the higher} that such a step in the re-organization of the Police Forces would be considered in an atmosphere free from political bias and it is hoped might lead to the setting up of an impartial and efficient police organization.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 2.1/RND No.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Office of the Chief Commissioner

A.P.O. 794

SECRET

NY 1463/ML

11 July 1946

SUBJECT: Police Mission.

Confidential

JUL 27 1946

TO: G-5 Section, Allied Forces Headquarters.

1. I feel that the time has come when the whole question of an Allied or British Police Mission to the Italian Government should be reviewed, as there appears to be considerable confusion both as regards the prospect of such a Mission being set up in this country and as regards the personnel resources for a Police Mission.

2. From the Allied point of view, it seems to be agreed in principle with a view to the re-organization of the Italian police forces and their training in modern police methods and procedure that in accordance with the original proposal of this Commission made in June 1945, a Police Mission to the Italian Government would be highly desirable.

There now exists, however, no prospect of imposing such a Mission on the Italian Government under the revised Armistice terms or under the Peace Treaty under discussion so far as I am informed of it's terms.

There appears, moreover, to be no immediate prospect of the Italian Government extending an invitation to the Allies to provide a Police Mission. Quite apart from the present international political situation and the changes pending in the Italian Constitution, prestige as a sovereign power, in my opinion, precludes the possibility of the Italian Government asking for an Allied, still less an all-British Police Mission for which, incidentally, the Italian Government would presumably be mainly financially responsible. Some further observations are made in para. 4 below should, unexpectedly, the Italian Government extend an invitation.

3. From the purely Allied angle, the present position is as follows:-

Within the framework of L.F.R.G., A.C. (M.M.I.A.) there is a C.I.M. Section with a S.F. of 10 Police Officers (plus two military staff officers). The Police strength of this Section is now reduced to 6 Officers and under normal release procedure will gradually waste away.

Apart from the matter of a Police Mission, this C.I.M. Section has, in general completed it's immediate objective of re-equipping and rehabilitating the morale of the C.I.M. and the Section could, therefore, be allowed to waste.

See 363

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See 351 5167

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Declassified E.O. 13526 Section 3.2/NND No. 185017

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Apart from the matter of a Police Mission, this CC.RR. Section has, in general completed its immediate objective of re-equipping and rehabilitating the morale of the CC.RR and the Section could, therefore, be allowed to waste away.

PAL 661 of the 11th May 1946, however, has the following effect:

- (a) Approves an increase in the CC.RR Section (M.M.I.A.) from 10 Police Officers (plus 2 staff officers) to 15 Police Officers (plus 2 staff officers).
- (b) Constitutes the CC.RR Section (M.M.I.A.) as a foundation for a Police Mission which Section, in the meantime, is to endeavour to extend its influence over the Italian Police Forces as a whole.

As regards (a) above, there are no known sources in this Theatre from which personnel can be obtained to increase the strength of the CC.RR Section (M.M.I.A.) With regard to maintaining its existing strength, it would not be equitable to defer Police Officers as operationally vital unless there are fair prospects of the Italian Government requesting a Police Mission in the very near future, nor would it appear to be justified when there is such a shortage of Police Officers in U.K. and in Central Europe. In this connection it has become necessary to defer officers as operationally vital in order to maintain the Venezia Giulia Police Force.

As regards (b) above, I do not consider it practical for a CC.RR Section in Land Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission (M.M.I.A.) to extend its influence unobtrusively over the Police Forces as a whole. Land Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission (M.M.I.A.) only deals with the CC.RR in their capacity as an advisory body to the Italian Army of which the CC.RR form part.

4. Should, unexpectedly, the Italian Government extend an invitation to the Allies for a Police Mission, and agreement be reached on terms of reference and financial responsibility, we could, in my opinion, deal more appropriately at that stage with the question of personnel.

Police Officers who have had experience in this country would still be serving as Police Officers in U.K., U.S., or in Central Europe and doubtless arrangements could be made for some of them to be included in the Police Mission.

5. In the light of the foregoing, if it is accepted that the prospects of the Italian Government requesting a Police Mission are very faint or non-existent, my recommendations are as follows:-

- (a) That an opportunity should be found to advise the Italian Government that its Police Forces require re-organisation and to recommend an Allied Police Mission.

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- (b) That no endeavour should be made by the OC.RR Section, Land Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, (M.M.I.A.) to extend its influence over the Police Forces as a whole.
 - (c) That there should be no increase in the strength of the OC.RR Section, Land Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, (M.M.I.A.); that so long as there are sufficient duties to perform, the Section should continue with officers normally available or those who defer voluntarily, but that otherwise it should be permitted to waste to a minimum of 2 officers.

6. Will you please say if you concur.

ELIJAH W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner.

cc. Chief Commissioner.
Executive Commissioner.
Land Forces Sub-Commission, (M.M.I.A.)
Civil Affairs Section.
Public Safety Sub-Commission.
Polad (A)
Polad (B)

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION.

CONFIDENTIAL

18th July, 1946

To: Executive Commissioner.

1. I am not in general agreement with the views expressed. I consider they are biased. It is to be noted that the Commandant CC.RR is not and has never been a Police Officer.

2. I agree that the CC.RR are a much better force than the Corps of Public Safety Agents, but both have their defects.

3. As regards matters of detail, I have the following comments:

The incorporation of large numbers of partisans in the Questura Forces was the result of agreed policy of the Allied authorities and the Italian Government. The Allies presumably knew these partisans were mainly composed of left elements. I cannot see anything wrong in the desire of the Questura troops to parade on an equal footing with the CC.RR. Had it been appropriate to mix the two on parade - which, of course, it was not - I cannot see that much harm could have been done. They are all part of one force - the Police. In the field, on liberation of territory, rehabilitation of the Police services was furthered by Allied Police, CC.RR and partisan Police patrolling side by side.

It is a complete misconception to think that the CC.RR can take over the bulk of the present duties of the Questura organization and allow the Questura to reduce its strength to 8,000. The "Amasso" alone (para 5(c)) would require more than that number.

The proposal for this reduction takes no account of the Criminal Investigation and plain clothes duties carried out by the Questura. It would take years for the CC.RR to take over. They do not even recruit the appropriate type of personnel. A considerable rise would be necessary in the ceiling of the CC.RR

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I agree that there are many too many "shock troops". That is the result of divided control and probably a repatriation from the greater part of the police being a military organization. Armament and militarization fever is catching. There are strong indications that the Questura are going in for militarization and organizing Public Safety Agents in battalions, brigades etc., and forming mobile battalions.

I do not know how we can control these vicious tendencies. Incidentally I was strongly opposed (and recorded my opinion) at the outset to MMIA having anything to do with the Police except for provision of equipment to any part of the Force which remained under the War Ministry.

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I feel that in the field of our limited influence in this matter, we are now reaping the fruits of that initial error.

I agree that the present police set-up is unsound, uneconomical and there is much overlapping and duplication.

4. As regards the broad policy, GOC L.F.S.C.'s underlying recommendation is that the main police forces and functions should be incorporated in the CC.RR. This would bring the Police almost entirely under the Army - in my view a very grave error.

I consider, and the Director of Public Safety Sub-Commission agrees, that the CC.RR keeping as much of their identity as possible should be absorbed by the civilian police. There are indications that the Italian Government are thinking on these lines. I feel confident that any high expert Allied Police Officer who had studied the situation would be of the same opinion.

As regards the political angle, the aim should be to eliminate politics from the police and NOT to support unsound doctrines in order to avoid one political tendency or another.

5. As a Police Mission (with the necessary powers) seems out of the question, it is difficult to see what can be done to guide the Italian Government along the right lines.

My recommendations (which unfortunately include reservations) are:

- (a) That the QC, [redacted] should consider discussing the matter with the Prime Minister who is now also Minister of the Interior. But for this an agreed aide-memoire would be necessary, and if L.F.S.C. are going to take the standpoint contained in the documents under consideration and in some of their other papers, an agreed aide-memoire ~~will~~ seem to be well nigh impossible.

- (b) That we should follow up our letter to AFHQ on the subject of arms held by the civil police (which matter AFHQ say they have under consideration) with a further letter about "military" organization now taking place in the Corps of Public Security Agents.

The normal sequence should then be a Conference - AFHQ, MIA, Public Safety Sub-Commission - to decide what to do and to examine whether we can force the Italian Govern-

Not necessarily

(b) May this not depend on result of (a)?

Action taken

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The normal sequence should then be a Conference - AFHQ, MILIA, Public Safety Sub-Commission - to decide what to do and to examine whether we can force the Italian Government's hand by means of our control over the size and armament of the "Armed Forces" in Italy.

But AFHQ have no one who knows anything about Police organization and functions, and I fear that when it came to a question of police organization and responsibility, we should be swamped by the militarists.

6. One difficulty is that if we are going to do anything it should be done soon, and both the above lines of action are going to take time.

Alan Byades
M. LAR, Brigadier.
VP. CA. Section. *7/11*

Not necessary

(b) May this not depend on receipt of (a)? Action taken or file kept open for further action by AFHQ

TOP SECRET & PERSONAL.

SUBJECT: Italian Police Forces.

M. M. I. A.
M. M. I. A. COMMISSION, A.C.
ROME.

CCRR/c/12

12 July 1946.

Chief Commissioner, A.C.

JUL 15 1946

1. I feel it necessary to inform you of my views on the state of affairs as regards the Italian Police Forces as a whole. My views coincide to a great extent with those of General BRUNETTI, as I discovered in the course of a general final talk when he came to say good-bye to me on 1 July. I may say that General BRUNETTI spoke confidentially to me at that meeting and particularly does not want his name mentioned in this connection.

2. (a) The Allies have, at present, limited the Armed Forces of Italy to 140,000 for the Army and 75,000 for the CC.RR. These figures and the armament provided are rigidly controlled by my Sub-Commission.

(b) But the remaining police forces do not appear to be limited in numbers or controlled as regards armament at all.

(c) The latest figures I have as regards these "remaining police forces" are shown at Appendix "A". From this it can be seen that there are large armed forces outside the Army and CC.RR, which are not controlled by the Allies and which, it would seem, are contrary to the spirit of the Allies idea on the size and armament of the "armed forces" of Italy.

3. (a) One may sub-divide the general functions of the CC.RR into those of:-

- (i) judicial police.
- (ii) military police.
- (iii) public order.

(b) The inter-working of the CC.RR and Questura as regards (i) and (ii) is satisfactory. But as regards (iii) the Questura have encroached on the CC.RR functions by the forming of units of "shock-troops" ("celere", etc.). There are thus the two organizations both doing the same job in this respect. This leads to friction and jealousy, and even opposition, instead of co-operation. There have even been instances of clashes between the "celere" and the CC.RR. Moreover, this extra "shock troop" addition to the Questura has been recruited largely out of partigiani, many of unsuitable origin, owing their appointment to political backing, mainly of the Left. The Questura is being backed by the Parties of the Left, whereas the CC.RR naturally tend to be favoured by the Parties of the Right. I foresee a political struggle for control of the Police Forces as a whole at the expense of efficiency. The Left

(a) The Allies have, at present, limited the Armed Forces of Italy to 140,000 for the Army and 25,000 for the CC.RR. These figures and the armament provided are rigidly controlled by my Sub-Commission.

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Also General BRUNETTI has been ordered to replace General TAMBURI (Deputy Commander CC.RR and COC ROME Division) by General CARUSO - General TAMBURI to retain only his functions as Deputy Commander, which he must be, as senior General in the CC.RR, by Italian Law. CARUSO organised the partigiani at the armistice in ROME and is a cousin of the Communist Minister GIULIO.

These, and other straws, show the way the wind is blowing.

(c) The police forces of Italy are now theoretically as ITALIAN

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- 2 -

concern, but as the internal stability of ITALY depends largely on those forces, I suggest that it is also very much an Allied concern also. Control of those forces by the Left must be against Allied interests internationally. Apart from this, it seems that from the armament angle (see para 2 above) we have a right to be consulted and even dictate general policy. The only way we can do this (as I have said in other recent CC.MR/3/12 letters) is to have an advisory body in the shape of a Police Mission (i) to advise on the re-organisation of the whole of the Police Forces (ii) to examine the problem and present to the Italian Government an alternative solution divorced from party politics. This would cut the ground from under the machinations of the Left.

4. I realise that nothing can be done officially till the new Government in the saddle. But it seems to me that perhaps you might consider raising the whole question privately and unofficially now with DE GASPERI from the point of view of:-

- (a) the size of the "armed forces" ITALY has at this moment (see para 2)
- (b) the Allied interest in maintaining the CC.MR as the main element and bulwark in the maintenance of law and order, as opposed to the Questura. I have reason to believe that both DE GASPERI and RONALDI and the Vatican are sympathetic to this conception.

5. Though the whole subject is a vast one and would need considerable further study, my view in general is that:-

- (a) the Questura "shock troops" (see para 3(b) above) should be abolished as not in keeping with Allied orders.
- (b) the Questura should be reduced to an establishment of some 8,000. (I understand that the official ceiling is 52,000 but, see Appendix "A", actually the strength is far more).
- (c) the duties of the Questura should be confined to those of:-
 - (i) administrative police (passports, control of aliens, etc.)
 - (ii) political police (keeping the CC.MR out of politics)
 - (iii) general duties (control of cafes, brothels etc.)
 - (iv) railway, road, "amuseo" and road police.
- (d) the personnel of the Questura should be armed, but not be constituted as armed units.
- (e) the CC.MR should take over all "shock troop" functions, for the maintenance of law and order, as has until recently always been their responsibility.

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- (iii) general duties (control of cafes, brothels etc.)
- (iv) railway, road, "mazasso" and road police.

(d) the personnel of the Questura should be armed, but not be constituted as armed units.

(e) the CC.RR should take over all "shock troop" functions, for the maintenance of law and order, as has until recently always been their responsibility.

(f) there is an overwhelming case for the retention of the CC.RR as the basis for re-organization of the Italian Police Forces - see Appendix "B".

CH/cas.

A. Brown
Major General.
Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C.

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APPENDIX "A"

to COMSEC/12 dated 12 July 1946

AGENTI DI PUBBLICA SICUREZZA

1. The effective strength of this body is over 50,550, the present strength being approximately 42,900.
2. Ex partisans are being trained at the following schools to become "agenti":

(a) Nettuno	- - - 1033 men
(b) Rome	- - - 3484 men
3. The strength of the agenti in Rome is 7,500. The Rome Legion, CC.RR. has a strength of 4,500 men.
4. The "Celere" in Rome has 4 companies with a total strength of approximately 1,200 men. They are largely ex-partisans.
5. The other large cities have "Celere" companies, whose numbers are as followed:-

- Bari.....	N. 453
- Catania.....	" 248
- Paenza.....	" 179
- Livorno.....	" 87
- Messina.....	" 110
- Napoli.....	" 213
- Palermo.....	" 382

FINANCE GUARDS.

0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0

1. These number approximately 31,600.

MUNICIPAL GUARDS.

0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0

1. As many depend locally from communes, only a very rough estimate, 14,000, can be given.

FOREST GUARDS.

(b) Rome

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- Bari.....	453
- Catania.....	246
- Pienza.....	179
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- Palermo.....	382

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0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0

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MUNICIPAL GUARDS.
0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0

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FOREST GUARDS.
0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0

1. These number approximately 5,500

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APPENDIX "B"

to CC R/g/12 dated 12 July 1946.

Points in favour of retention of CC.RR as a basis for re-organisation of the Italian Police Forces:-

1. The pre-war prestige of CC.RR was very high. The Corps is rapidly regaining that prestige although it has a long way to go. The Public has little confidence in the Questura, a feeling which is shared by nearly every British Police Officer who has served in Italy.

2. CC.RR are the sole Police Agency in 90% (4836) of the Communes of Italy, where they are respected and regarded generally as are the Village Policemen in U.K.

3. The discipline and behaviour of CC.RR towards the people is in marked contrast to the indiscipline and corruption of the Questura.

4. The conduct of the Questura is very largely swayed by Political considerations. In performing their duties, Agents have to consider first of all how various Political influences will react, even in trivial cases.

The succession of Socialist Ministers of the Interior has led to the formation of heavily armed and semi-militarily disciplined "Celere" Shock Police, whose unnecessary recourse to force has received much unfavourable comment. The Italian people at least have no doubt as to the political leanings of the "Celere" and those responsible for its formation.

CC.RR are not subject to political influence to anything like the same degree. With some exceptions, matters of promotion, transfer and discipline of personnel are dealt with by the Corps itself, and not at the whim of some influential politician, all offences being Military offences.

5. CC.RR in peacetime are operationally completely under the control of the Ministry of the Interior, through the Prefects, in matters relating to public order in the respective provinces.

6. CC.RR are armed. This is, and always has been accepted, and expected, by the Public which from long experience knows that their arms are not used unnecessarily. In 1945, 46 Carabinieri were killed and 143 wounded in armed conflict with criminals. The figures are not too hard, but at least twice as many armed conflicts have taken place in which CC.RR have suffered no casualties. CC.RR action in dealing with civil disorders, even in the most trying situations, has received nothing but praise.

7. The work of CC.RR since the Armistice, has been commended by high Allied Authorities, including Field Marshall Alexander. In 1945, in conflict with 592 Carabinieri were

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5. CC.RR are not subject to political influence to anything like the same degree. With some exceptions, matters of promotion, transfer and discipline of personnel are dealt with by the Corps itself, and not at the whim of some influential politician, all offences being Military offences.

CC.RR in peacetime are operationally completely under the control of the Ministry of the Interior, through the Prefects, in matters relating to public order in the respective provinces.
6. CC.RR are armed. This is, and always has been accepted, and expected, by the Public which from long experience knows that their arms are not used unnecessarily. In 1945, 46 Carabinieri were killed and 143 wounded in armed conflict with criminals. The figures are not too hard, but at least twice as many armed conflicts have taken place in which CC.RR have suffered no casualties. CC.RR action in dealing with civil disorders, even in the most trying situations, has received nothing but praise.
7. The work of CC.RR since the Armistice, has been commended by high Allied Authorities, including Field Marshal Alexander. In 1945, in conflict with or owing to their opposition to, the Nazi-Fascist element, 592 Carabinieri were killed or executed and 31 wounded. The Questura has nothing to compare with this record.
8. The Ministry of War, controlling as it does, the manufacture and/or supply of arms, ammunition, equipment, transport and clothing, renders it essential that CC.RR should remain a part of the Armed Forces except in operational function.
9. The above few points can be greatly enlarged upon, with examples, to the benefit of the CC.RR and the detriment of the Questura. In this connection it must be pointed out that 85% of the 50,000 Questura Agents are redundant and perform no useful function.

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337

SUBJECT : CC.RR. Position in Italian Police System.

LAND FORCES SUB-COMMISSION.AC.
MBIA ROME.

CCRR/G/14

29 June 1946

Executive Commissioner.

1. Reference your letter 3626/299/EC dated 8 June 1946.
2. Sub paras 10 (d) and (e) should be regarded as "recommendations" rather than "intentions" and no action could be contemplated without direction from the highest authorities.

C Hayes

C. HAYES, Major
for Major General,
M. M. I. A.

CH/lmr

see M 338

5755

PA
5/3

Police Mission

3626-41 336

- (1) Dec. 14 Telegram from Foreign Office
Consider the success with the Italian Gov. Most is more likely if we proceed to ask for a small police mission to be attached to existing military mission.
- (2) Jan. 12 Telegram from Foreign Office
Refers to Savinard above. Possible to recruit good candidate for head of police mission and to recruit officers from those now in Italy, Germany etc. They must wear uniforms - this should be discussed with General Morgan.
- (3) Jan. 15 From General Browning (MIA)
Memorandum for discussion with COS on Police officers for the CMB.
- (4) Jan. 19 Telegram to Foreign Office
Refers to 2 above. Matter to be discussed on January 21st with CMB to AGO and Gen-Browning. Notes that AGO has already provisionally appointed 12 former Public Safety Officers of Allied Commission for training of CMB.
- (5) Jan. 20 Telegram from Foreign Office
Refers to 2 above. Request early reply.
- (6) Jan. 22 From Major Page-Looker, CMB, CTF
Copy of telegram to War Office reporting views of MIA and Ambassador that police officers should wear military uniform and suggesting how they should be organized.
- (7) Jan. 24 Telegram to Foreign Office
Refers to 5 above. Draws attention to 6 above. Psychological advantages of wearing police uniform are offset by disadvantages of publicity drawing attention to fact that police mission has been sent.
- (8) Jan. 25 Telegram to Foreign Office
Refers to 7 above. Suggestion that O'Keefe be appointed as head of police mission and that it be an Allied mission.
- (9) Feb. 1 AG telegram to Foreign Office
Refers to 8 above. From Brigadier Hope regarding information held at AFHQ about Italian Coastal, Frontier and AA defences.

- (5) Jan. 20 Telegram from Foreign Office
Refers to 2 above. Means to early re-ly.
- (6) Jan. 22 From Major Tugot-Cochin, Apr. 1947
Copy of telegram to War Office regarding views of CIA and Ambassador for Police officers should wear military uniform and suggesting how they should be organized.
- (7) Jan. 24 Telegram to Foreign Office
Refers to 5 above. Draws attention to 6 above. Psychological advantages of wearing police uniform are offset by disadvantages of publicity drawing attention to fact that police mission has been sent.
- (8) Jan. 25 Telegram to Foreign Office
Refers to 7 above. Suggestion that O'Garra be appointed as head of police mission and that it be an Allied mission.
- (9) Feb. 1 AC telegram to Snelching memo. from Commander Hope regarding information held at AFHQ about Italian Coastal, Frontier and AA defences.
- (10) Feb. 11 Telegram from Foreign Office
Refers to 8 above. All members of mission should wear military uniform; strength reduced. In favour of all-British mission.
- (11) Feb. 20 Telegram to Foreign Office
Refers to 10 above. General Browning (MIA) has pointed out that U.S. interest will be secured by presence of his deputy, a U.S. Colonel with whom he works in closest cooperation.
- (12) Feb. 19 Telegram from Washington
Refers to 10 above. State Dept. now confirms that they have no objection to police mission being exclusively British.
- (13) Feb. 26 Telegram from Cairo
Refers to 12 above. Formal enforcement of C/S view required should make it clear that it is a Police mission but increase in staff of military mission to Italian army.

- 2 -

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- (14) Feb. 25 Telegram from Foreign Office
Refers to 11 above. Foreign Office spoke to Admiral Stone before his departure from London, on lines of 10 above. He will support our proposals. Mission must be treated as military affair.
- (15) Mar. 14 Telegram from Washington
Refers to 12 above. ON suggest reply to Garsed on lines of 13 above.
- (16) Mar. 27 Telegram from Washington
Refers to 15 above. Instructions requested as to wording of reply, should that in 13 above be used?
- (17) Mar. 29 Telegram from Foreign Office
Refers to 16 and 15 above. Administrative hitch prevents despatch of immediate instructions to 134.
- (18) Mar. 9 Telegram from Foreign Office
Refers to 12 above. Have been unable to secure Colonel O'Rourke or substitute. Arrival of full Colonel in Italy would attract much attention. Comments required. Does named want 3 subordinate police officers?
- (19) May 13 Telegram from Caserta
Refers to 16 above. 134 Telegram PIN 661 to SAC informs him that proposals in NIP 1086 are approved. Given extract of Tel. SAN 661. British Police officers should be attached to MIA to supervise Carabinieri affairs but they should not be regarded as Police Mission.
- (20) May 14 From General Browning (MIA)
Letter enclosing list of police officer staff of "group" giving demob. dates. Discusses recruitment of men in time for the elections.
- (21) May 17, 11 From Foreign Office
Encloses copy Tel. 134 Washington to London No. 224 and copy of PIN 661. British Police officers should be attached to MIA to supervise Carabinieri - they should be regarded as part of MIA.
- (22) May 22 Telegram to Foreign Office
Refers to 18 above. Agreed generally that officer of Colonel O'Rourke's calibre should be found instead of Lieut. Colonel Highall. Existing officers are anxious to be relieved soon.

- (18) May 9 Telegram from Foreign Office
Refers to 12 above. Have been unable to secure Colonel O'Herke or substitute. Arrival of full Colonel in Italy would attract much attention. Comments required. Does need want 3 subordinate police officers?
- (19) May 13 Telegram from Caserta
Refers to 16 above. See Telegram PAN 661 to SAC inform him that proposal in PAN 1026 are approved. Given extract of Tel. PAN 661. British police officers should be attached to MIA to supervise Carabinieri affairs but they should not be regarded as Police Mission.
- (20) May 18 Telegram from Browning (MIA)
Letter enclosing list of police officer staff of "Vige" giving demob. dates. Discusses recruitment of MIA in time for the elections.
- (21) May 17 Telegram from Foreign Office
Enclosure copy Tel. PAN Washington to London No. 22, and copy of PAN 661. British police officers should be attached to MIA to supervise Carabinieri - they should be regarded as part of MIA.
- (22) May 22 Telegram from Foreign Office
Refers to 15 above. Agreed generally that officer of Colonel O'Herke's calibre should be found instead of Lieut. Colonel Michall. Existing officers are anxious to be relieved soon.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

3626 91

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SUBJECT : CC.RR. Position in Italian Police System.

LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION, A.C.
E. M. I. A. ROME.

CCRR/G/14

12 June 1946

H.Q. A.C. (for Executive Commissioner).

JUN 13 1946

24
M.D. - ?

Ref. your 3626/299 EC, of 8 June: -

1. Yes. No executive action has yet been taken as regards paras 10 (d) and (e) because our proposals are still in course of preparation. These will, of course, as hitherto, be dealt with in conjunction with Public Safety Sub-Commission A.C. and the Italian Ministries concerned.
2. Early next week I hope to send you the "complete report" referred to in my CCRR/G/12 of 1 June. This will include the proposals referred to in para 1 above.

331

L. Brown

Major General,
E. M. I. A.

LB/am

See M 334

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(CART K)

785017

SUBJECT :- Reorganisation of Carabinieri

CONFIDENTIAL
33

LAND FORCES SUB COM, A.O. (MELA)

CCRR/ G /12

1 Jun 46
JUN 3 1946

TO :- Chief Commissioner, A.O.

23

In continuation of my CCRR/G/12 of 19 Mar 46:-

1. Herewith progress report to date.
2. (a) It will be seen that the "immediate objective" (referred to in para 2(d)(i) of covering letter to CCRR/G/12 of 19 Mar) may be considered to have been reached.
(b) There is no doubt that with the issue of the clothing, arms and equipment since Mar; the formation of the Mobile Battalions; the increase in ceiling to 75,000; and the steps taken in connection with administration and training - the efficiency and morale of the CCRR has increased noticeably over the last three months. This progress, in my opinion, will continue, particularly as the populace are showing an increasing tendency to welcome and respect the activities of the CCRR as a main bulwark against disorder.
3. The "complete report" referred to in para 17 of attached will deal with the major reorganisation considered necessary to attain the "ultimate objective" (see para 2(d)(ii) of covering letter to CCRR/G/12 of 19 Mar) for CCRR.
4. As before, I am supplying copies of this to the British and American Embassies.

A. Brown

Major General
Land Forces Sub Commissioner AO (MELA)

Copy to : British Embassy Rome
American Embassy Rome

5751

18/05

SUBJECT : Reorganization of Carabinieri - Progress Report.

Confidential

S. B. C. I.

LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION, A.C.
R. L. I. I.

CONF/5/52

50 May 45

1. POLICE OFFICERS STAFF OF C.A.R. SECTION.

GSO I
GSO II (Admin)
GSO II (Ops)
Squad and Training

LIAISON OFFICERS

TUNIS
MILAN
FLORENCE
ROME
NAPLES
PALERMO

Lt. Col. H. NIGHALL
Major B. POWELL
Major D.P. FIELDS
Major T. WALSH

Major A.C. HILLS
Major W. GREENHOUGH
Major C. HAYES
Major E. LIDBERT
Major W. LACEY

2. POLICY.

(a) To complete the immediate requirements of C.A.R. for transport, arms, ammunition, clothing and equipment, and report present situation.
(b) To prepare draft report embodying final recommendations for suggested improvement in C.A.R. organization.

3. GENERAL ORGANIZATION.

This is the subject of a comprehensive report, the draft of which has been prepared and is under discussion. The recommendations made do not affect the immediate objective.

4. PERSONALITIES.

Reports are conflicting. A policy of diplomacy is being pursued by Senior Carabinieri Officers and it is not possible to give an exact assessment of their competence in prevailing conditions. Apprehension as to the future of the Carabinieri will not be resolved until the result of the

3626 14 330

GSO I
 GSO II (Admin)
 GSO II (Ops)
 Schools and Training

Lt. Col. H. MIDDLE
 Major R. POWELL
 Major R.F. FIELDING
 Major T. LAMSH

MAISON OFFICERS

TUDIN
 MURRAY
 FLORENCE
 ROSE
 S. PLUS
 PALARNO

Major A.G. HILLS
 Major W. GREENHUGH
 Major C. HAYES
 Major E. LINDROCK
 Major W. LACEY

2. POLICY.

(a) To complete the immediate requirements of CC.M. for transport, arms, ammunition, clothing and equipment, and report present situation.
 (b) To prepare draft report embodying final recommendations for suggested improvement in CC.M. organisation.

3. GENERAL ORGANISATION.

This is the subject of a comprehensive report, the draft of which has been prepared and is under discussion. The recommendations made do not affect the immediate objective.

4. PERSONNEL.

Reports are conflicting. A policy of diplomacy is being pursued by Senior Carabinieri Officers and it is not possible to give an exact assessment of their competence in prevailing conditions. Apprehension as to the future of the Carabinieri will not be dispelled until the result of the forthcoming elections is known. It will then be possible to determine the efficiency or otherwise of individuals. No immediate action is recommended.

5. GRANDES OF SUPPLY.

Following recommendations by this H.Q., the War Ministry have agreed that administration of CC.M. should be through existing Army Channels (i.e. Territorial Command). CC.M. G.H.Q. and the War Ministry are at present working out the details. The result will be greatly to the advantage of the Carabinieri in every direction. The consequent relief to CC.M. transport will be extremely valuable.

6. FINANCIAL.

(a) Authority was given (vide A.F.H.Q. signal of 21/3/46) for an increase in CC.M. ceiling from 65,000 to 75,000. The recommendations of this

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Confidential

- 2 -

H.N. are being closely followed regarding location of these additional personnel.

- (b) Every Carabinieri station will have not less than 7 CC.M. (1 N.C.O. and 6 men).
- (c) Distribution of the additional 10,000 men (when available) is shown on attached Appendix "A".

7. ACCOMMODATION.

- (a) Slowly improving but lack of money for essential repairs and renewals is a great handicap, and no appreciable improvement can be expected in the near future. Local authorities are offering minor repairs to some Caserme, but financial considerations are a limiting factor.
- (b) The provision of accommodation ordered by the War Ministry has been requested.

8. UNIFORM AND CLOTHING.

- (a) Considerable improvement has been effected in the provision of uniform and clothing, which is now reaching the men on the ground. War Ministry and CC.M. G.N. are agreeing on a new scale and type of CC.M. uniform and clothing, which will be provided through army channels.
- (b) Legions vary in their uniform and clothing standard, but these variations are rapidly disappearing.
- (c) The morale of Carabinieri, particularly in the North, has risen immensely, as a result of improvement in their clothing and equipment.
- (d) Distribution of clothing: see Appendix "B" attached hereto.

9. AMMUNITION.

- (a) 10,000 Beretta automatic carbines have been distributed to Legions. A further consignment of 10,000 Beretta automatic carbines are expected from the factory during the months of June and July.
- (b) 1,599,205 rounds of 9 m.m. ammunition for the Beretta carbines and 250,000 rounds of 9 m.m. pistol ammunition are being distributed today at the present time.
- (c) The 37 m.m. ammunition for the Staghound armour cars is not yet available for release to the Carabinieri. However the 300 Browning ammunition for the machine guns in the Staghounds has already been delivered to the Mobile Battalions.

10. TRANSPORT.

- (a) Deliveries of vehicles between 1st January and March 1941 are shown on appendix "C" attached. The appendix discloses that in 1940 carrying vehicles have not been delivered in the anticipated numbers. The War Ministry have endeavoured to make up the deficiency by allocation of more vehicles from Italian army workshops, but the provision of the vehicles from the Italian motor industry is still required.
- (b) CC.M. transport situation has improved immensely, and the vehicles

...but financial considerations are a limiting factor.
(b) The provision of accommodation status by the War Ministry has been requested.

5. UNIFORM AND CLOTHING.

(a) Considerable improvement has been effected in the provision of uniform and clothing, which is now reaching the men on the ground. War Ministry and CC.M. G.O. are agreeing on a new make and type of C.C.M. uniform and clothing, which will be provided through army channels.

(b) Legions vary in their uniform and clothing standards, but these variations are rapidly disappearing.

(c) The morale of Carabinieri, particularly in the North, has risen immensely, as a result of improvement in their clothing and equipment.

(d) Distribution of clothing: see Appendix III attached hereto.

9. ARMS AND AMMUNITION.

(a) 10,000 Beretta automatic carbines have been distributed to Legions. A further consignment of 10,000 Beretta automatic carbines are expected from the factory during the months of June and July.

(b) 1,599,209 rounds of 9 m.m. ammunition for the Beretta carbines and 250,000 rounds of 9 m.m. pistol ammunition are being distributed to Legions at the present time.

(c) The 37 m.m. ammunition for the Staguard armour d cars is not yet available for release to the Carabinieri. However the 300 Browning ammunition for the machine guns in the Staguarda has already been delivered to the mobile battalions.

10. TRANSPORT.

(a) Deliveries of vehicles between 1st January and May 1944 are shown on appendix IV attached. The appendix discloses that over 1000 carrying vehicles have not been delivered in the anticipated numbers. The War Ministry have endeavoured to make up the deficiency by allocation of more vehicles from Italian army workshops, but the provision of the vehicles from the Italian motor industry is still required.

(b) CC.M. transport situation has improved immensely, and the vehicles are being used to the utmost advantage. The present situation is as follows:

Legions:

Passenger Vehicles	Jeeps	LOD CARBINES			TOTAL
		Heavy	Medium	Light	
1st	982	NIL	925	67	1974
2nd	740	185	320	81	1326
					3300

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Confidential

MOBILE ESTABLISHMENTS

T.S.	Passenger Vehicles	Jeeps	LOAD-CARRIERS		Motor- Cycles	TOTAL
			Medium	Heavy		
24		411	264	96	780	1144
10		19	213	93	384	719

123 New lorries from the SPA and Alfa Romeo factories have so far been received out of a total of 315 new lorries expected from the War Ministry before the end of May 1946.

500 New motor-cycles have been promised to the Carabinieri, but delivery is not likely to commence before July according to the War Ministry.

3,000 New bicycles have already been delivered to the Carabinieri Legions and a further 4,000 new bicycles are awaited from the factories in Northern Italy.

(c) Army Territorial Canteen Workshops have been instructed by the War Ministry to give priority to CC.M. vehicles requiring repairs. Many vehicles are off the road due to lack of tyres and efforts are being made to obtain supplies from Italian factories.

11. P.O.L.

(a) The Ministry of Industry and Commerce have been requested by CC.M. G.H.Q. to instruct provincial authorities of the Ministry to supply CC.M. petrol requirements for legions and lesser units in full.

(b) The system of units drawing supplies of petrol by coupon exchange at C.I.P. points has been adapted.

12. TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS.

(a) A survey of existing telephone system in CC.M. organization is progressing.

(b) Installation of private line communication is favoured by the Carabinieri and information as to the materials required and operational difficulties are being obtained from all stations.

13. WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS.

(a) Wireless sets requested have now been provided in fullness from this H.Q. The sets will be used in accordance with the manual recommended by this H.Q. Sufficient personnel are being trained as operators, and in maintenance.

500 New motor-cycles have been promised to the Carabinieri, but delivery is not likely to commence before July according to the War Ministry.

2,000 New bicycles have already been delivered to the Carabinieri Legions and a further 4,000 new bicycles are awaited from the factories in Northern Italy.

(a) Army Territorial Command Workshops have been instructed by the War Ministry to give priority to CC.MB. vehicles requiring repairs.

Many vehicles are off the road due to lack of tyres and efforts are being made to obtain supplies from Italian factories.

11. 2.0.1.

(a) The Ministry of Industry and Commerce have been requested by CC.MB. G.H.Q. to instruct provincial authorities of the Ministry to supply CC.MB. patrol reinforcements for Legion and lesser units in Italy.

(b) The system of units drawing supplies of petrol by coupons exchange at C.I.P. points has been adopted.

12. TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS.

(a) A survey of existing telephone system in CC.MB. organization is progressing.

(b) Installation of private line communication is favoured by the Carabinieri and information as to the materials required and operational difficulties are being obtained from all stations.

13. WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS.

Wireless sets requested have now been provided on release from A.F.H.Q. The sets will be used in accordance with the scheme recommended by this H.Q. Sufficient personnel are being trained as operators, and in maintenance.

14. MOBILE BATTALIONS.

(a) These are up to their authorized establishment with the exception of motor-cycles, which cannot be obtained, except from Italian factories. Difficulty is not serious as sufficient lorries are available to transport all personnel of the Battalions at any time.

(b) Training of personnel of Mobile Battalions is progressing satisfactorily.

(c) Carabinieri are highly satisfied with the equipment provided.

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15. SCHOOLS AND TRAINING.

- (a) The training curriculum has been under constant supervision of Major Mann, who noticeable improvement effected.
- (b) Full report on C.I.M. Schools and Training is prepared and will shortly be submitted.
- (c) Lack of accommodation and equipment (due to lack of funds) are serious handicaps. These difficulties will be fully detailed in the separate report on findings.

16. GENERAL EFFICIENCY.

Reports received show a marked improvement in the efficiency and morale of the Carabinieri and the foregoing details show that the immediate objective has to a large extent been accomplished.

17. CONCLUSIONS.

A complete report abiding full recommendations as regards the wider and more drastic reorganization which is considered necessary in respect of the C.I.M. is being prepared. Meanwhile, the progress in raising efficiency and morale continues satisfactorily.

HA/am

H. MICHAEL, Lt. Col.,
USC I, C.I.M. Section.

Distribution:

- ... (for Exec. Comm.) (2)
- ... (Public Safety Sub-comm.) (2)
- ... (2)
- ... (2)
- ... (2)

will properly be submitted.

(c) Lack of accommodation and equipment (due to lack of funds) are serious handicaps. These difficulties will be fully detailed in the separate report on findings.

16. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS.

Reports received show a marked improvement in the efficiency and morale of the Organization and the foregoing details show that the immediate objective has to a large extent been accomplished.

17. CONCLUSIONS.

A complete report embodying full recommendations as regards the wider and more drastic reorganization which is considered necessary in respect of the O.C.M. is being prepared. Meanwhile, the progress in raising efficiency and morale continues satisfactorily.

W. H. H. H. H.

H. H. H. H. H. H. H.
USO I. CC. H. H. H. H. H.

H. H. H.

Distribution:

H. H. H. (for Exec. Comm.) (2)
H. H. H. (Public Safety Sub-Comm.) (2)

Lists: "A" (2)
"B"

CC. H. H. L. O. H.
Library.

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APPROVED BY

DATE 2008/7/13

dated 30- May-1968

For CC.BP. ESTABLISHMENT (C.B.P.) DIVISIONS, Brigades, Legions, School
Legions, Mobile Battalions Headquarters and
Mobile Battalions.

UNIT

ORGANIZATIONAL STRENGTH

Officers

C.B.P.

Parliamentary G.H.Q.	26	268
Central School - Florence	28	170
Cadets Legion - Rome	81	4,100
2nd Div. Headquarters - Rome	5	40
4th Brigade - Rome	3	33
Group of Mob. Bns - Rome	7	40
Rome Legion	45	4,019
Rome Mobile Battalion	25	525
Latin Legion	55	3,336
Latin Mobile Battalion	25	525
Abruzzi Legion	42	2,600
Chieti Legion	43	2,733
Castellari Mobile Battalion	25	525
1st Brigade - Florence	3	33
Group of Mobile Battalions - Florence	7	40
Florence Legion	38	2,000
Florence Mobile Battalion	25	525
Monte Legion	39	2,015
Bellegna Legion	35	3,730
Bellegna Mobile Battalion	25	525
Livorno Legion	43	2,547
1st Division Naples	3	40
1st Brigade Naples	3	33
Group of Mob. Bns - Naples	7	40
Naples Legion	58	4,280
Naples Mobile Battalion	25	525
1st Legion	45	2,985
1st Mobile Battalion	25	525
Castellan Legion	52	3,543
5th Brigade - Palermo	3	33
Palermo Legion	49	3,959
Palermo Mobile Battalion	25	525

Terzianieri S.M.C.	202	33	202
Central School - Florence	170	33	170
Cadets Legion - Rome	4100	33	4100
2nd Div. "Mediterranean" - Rome	40	33	40
4th Brigade - Rome	33	33	33
Group of Mob. Bns - Rome	40	33	40
Rome Legion	4030	33	4030
Rome Mobile Battalion	525	33	525
Local Legion	3300	33	3300
Local Mobile Battalion	525	33	525
Abruzzi Legion	2000	33	2000
Cagliari Legion	2000	33	2000
Cagliari Mobile Battalion	525	33	525
3rd Brigade - Florence	33	33	33
Group of Mobile Battalions - Florence	40	33	40
Florence Legion	2300	33	2300
Florence Mobile Battalion	525	33	525
Genoa Legion	2415	33	2415
Genoa Mobile Battalion	3730	33	3730
Livorno Legion	525	33	525
1st Division Naples	2517	33	2517
4th Brigade - Naples	40	33	40
Group of Mob. Bns - Naples	33	33	33
Naples Legion	40	33	40
Naples Mobile Battalion	4280	33	4280
Port Legion	535	33	535
Port Mobile Battalion	2983	33	2983
Catania Legion	525	33	525
6th Brigade - Palermo	3543	33	3543
Palermo Legion	3739	33	3739
Palermo Mobile Battalion	525	33	525
Buscetta Legion	3243	33	3243
1st Div. "Mediterranean" - Milan	40	33	40
2nd Brigade - Milan	33	33	33
Group of Mob. Bns - Milan	40	33	40
Milan Legion	3882	33	3882
Milan Mobile Battalion	525	33	525
Verona Legion	2852	33	2852
Verona Mobile Battalion	2395	33	2395
Verona Legion	525	33	525
Verona Mobile Battalion	2325	33	2325

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UNIT	ORGANIC STRENGTH	
	Officers	A.R.F.
1st Brigade - Turin	3	33
Turin Legion	43	3982
Turin Mobile Battalion	25	525
Administrative Legion	49	2556
Gen. Legion	48	3083
Gen. Mobil. Battalion	25	525
TOTALS :	1127	73573
GENERAL TOTAL:		75,000

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1st Brigade - Turin	31		
Turin Legion	1862		
Turin Mobile Battalion	525		
Alghero Legion	3083		
Genoa Legion	525		
Genoa Mobile Battalion			
TOTAL	3427	73573	
TOTAL			75,000

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EP/NOEL 757
to GCHQ/13/12, dated 30 May 46

CLOTHING received by GCHQ/13/12 between 1st March 1946 and 23 April 1946

	Received	Issued to Legions	Stored
Cups	29,442	25,397	4,245
Collars, linen	80,000	80,000	-
Cloth, asbestos	13,520	13,520	-
Boots	9,171	9,171	-
Shoes, mountain	4,000	4,000	-
Half-boles	17,000	17,000	-
Leather, Kgs.	1,000	1,000	-
Latexes	852	852	-
Pillows	2,021	2,021	-
Socks	20,345	15,345	5,000
Timels	65,000	65,000	-
Shirts	25,000	20,000	5,000
Trunks or Drawers	16,500	16,500	-
Blankets	20,000	18,404	-
Blankets, quilted filled	3,400	3,400	-
Uniforms, e.g. new (jackets, trousers, & SS cap)	10,000	10,000	-
Jackets	3,407	3,407	-
Trousers e.g.	450	450	-

Caps	29,642	28,197	1,245
Collars, inner	80,000	80,000	-
Cloths, various	13,920	13,620	-
Coats	29,171	9,121	-
Shirts, button-down	4,000	4,000	-
Half-suits	17,000	17,000	-
Leather, K&N.	1,000	1,000	-
Patrons	851	852	-
Pillows	2,021	2,021	-
Socks	20,345	15,345	5,000
Towels	65,000	65,000	-
Shirts	25,000	20,000	5,000
Pants or Drawers	16,500	16,500	-
Blankets	20,000	18,404	-
Blankets, quilted (lited)	3,400	3,400	-
Uniforms, E.G. new (jackets, trousers, & FS cap)	10,000	10,000	-
Jackets	3,407	3,407	-
Trousers E.G.	450	450	-
Footies or Anklets	8,460	8,460	-
Overalls	100	100	-
Gaiters E.G.	1,425	1,425	-
Fullers	2,000	2,000	-

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APPENDIX "C"

Vehicles received by the Carabinieri between 1st January 1944 and 31st May 1944

	Passenger Vehicles	Buses	Load- Carriers	Motor Cycles
REGIONS	7	125	210	10
ARMED BATTALIONS	1	10	120	5
TOTAL	8	135	330	15

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Lead Forces Sub-Com. Meeting, A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)

W.D.R. / 12
19 March 1946

JUN 1 1948

Chief Commissioner, L.C. (2)

1. In October 1945, on responsibility for investigation of the C.C. and was transferred to the Sub-Com. Section, but no extra staff was provided until 14 Jan 1946.

2. I decided to tackle the problem as follows:-

(a) Organization and initiation of a special staff

to coordinate British Police Officers who transferred to us from Public Safety Sub-Commission. These had already had considerable experience in the field in Italy. A "day course" was held at the officers' headquarters, L.C. (M.M.I.A.) to explain to them the situation in the U.S. and to get them up to speed on the work of the Sub-Commission. A "day course" was also held at the headquarters of the Sub-Commission, L.C. (M.M.I.A.) to explain to them the situation in the U.S. and to get them up to speed on the work of the Sub-Commission. A "day course" was also held at the headquarters of the Sub-Commission, L.C. (M.M.I.A.) to explain to them the situation in the U.S. and to get them up to speed on the work of the Sub-Commission.

(b) Collection of information.

The U.S. Section applied itself to gaining information on all C.C. matters from the U.S. (C.C.), while the U.S. did the same in connection with the U.S. (C.C.). Simultaneously a U.S. Section and the U.S. Section, the C.C. in day-to-day procedure and a U.S. Section to oversee the U.S. which was all too apparent throughout the C.C.

(c) Assessment of information gained.

Having allowed 2 months to gain full information and consider future developments, a conference was held at the U.S. Lead Forces Sub-Commission, L.C. (M.M.I.A.) Room on 13 and 14 March 1946, at which all U.S. Section's together with a representative of Public Safety Sub-Commission, A.C.

(d) Planning for the future.

In addition to the considerable "building-up" which has been done

10. Substitution and initiation of a tactical staff.

10. Operational British Police Officers were transferred to the Public Safety Sub-Commission. These had already had considerable experience in the field in ITALY. A tactical "source" was held by B.G. Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.G. (M.I.I.A.) to explain to these officers as General M.I.I.A. setting up procedures on the tank before M. In G. Section in 1948, under Lt. Col. Marshall, was organized as a "Combined Section" of B.G. Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.G. (M.I.I.A.) and the remaining police officers were distributed as L.O. to the G.B. Divisional and Regional H.Q.s.

(b) Collection of information.

The B.G. Section applied itself to gaining information on all G.B. sections from G.B. G.B., while the L.O. did the same in substitution of G.B. G.B. Simultaneously the B.G. Section and the L.O. made the G.B. in day-to-day operations and a skilled finger to overcome the inertia which was all too apparent throughout the G.B.

(c) Assessment of information gained.

Having allowed 2 months to gain full information and consider future developments, a conference was held at G.B. Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.G. (M.I.I.A.) HQ on 13 and 14 March 1948, at which all L.O. attended together with a representative of Public Safety Sub-Commission, A.G.

(d) Planning for the future.

In addition to the considerable "tidying-up" which has been done since Jan 1948, it is now possible to plan more accurately for the future. I directed to this planning about two forms:-

- (1) the 1948-49 objectives - I have laid down that our immediate objective is to transform the G.B. into a properly armed and equipped force capable of doing its job, before the elections take place next June. Such limited reorganization as is possible will also take place, without any major change which might upset the equilibrium functioning of the G.B. 540. However, arms and equipment, however, the morale and prestige of the G.B. should be considerably enhanced. In fact, from all reports this movement is already well under way.

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(1) the ultimate objective - to put the O.S. in a completely modern feet. This will be a development out of 2(d) (1). It will involve many major matters as larger term policy, such as: reorganization and change of staff and superior personnel; standardization of organization; revision of terms and conditions of service; accommodation generally; reorganization of the complete training system; organization of initial or original reserve and scientific staff to crime detection on modern lines; etc. - this inevitably will take time.

3. (a) The time we have reached now is set out in the attached interim report for me by Lt. Col. Marshall.

(b) The report shows:-

(1) that we have made considerable progress towards our immediate objective, but that the time and inertia that existed in the O.S. has hitherto.

(2) the time we are in achieving our ultimate objective and the lines on which we are thinking and acting.

4. The advantages of continuity as regards retention of personnel connected with the O.S. business is obvious. I would urge that at this critical stage an order removal of officers should take place. The value of the work done by these few officers is out of all proportion to their numbers. Moreover, their ability, enthusiasm and energy has been beyond praise. I think that we can achieve success if, and only if, continuity is maintained.

5. Finally, I would mention that I have placed the O.S. as "first priority" agreeing with what I know in your view in the matter viz. that the first line of defence for law and order is the O.S., the Army being merely secondary and in reserve for this purpose.

6. I am sending a copy of this letter and the interim report to the British and American Embassies, as they have to see and are taking considerable interest in this vital matter.

d. B. Manning

Major General,

(1) that we have made considerable progress towards our immediate objective, now, on the change and morale that existed in the CC.RB. hitherto.

(11) the task "There is in achieving our ultimate objective and the lines on which we are thinking and acting.

4. The advantages of COMBATANT as a means of retention of personnel connected with the CC.RB. business are obvious. I would urge that at this critical stage no major removal of officers should take place. The value of the work done by these few officers in the CC.RB. is all proportion to their numbers. Moreover, their ability, enthusiasm and energy has been beyond praise. I think that we can achieve success if, and only if, continuity is maintained.

5. Finally, I would mention that I have placed the CC.RB. as "first priority" according with what I know in your view in the matter viz. that the first line of defence for law and order is the CC.RB., the army proper being merely secondary and in reserve for this purpose.

6. I am sending a copy of this letter and the interim report to the British and American Embassies, so they have taken and are taking a considerable interest in this vital matter.

LB/c

Copy to:- British Embassy
American Embassy

d Banning

Major General,
M.H.F.A.

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SUBJECT: Reorganization of DUEA - Interim Report.

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LAND DEFENSE SUB COMMISSION, AS
(H.A.F.A.)

0305/6/12

12 March 1945

1. PROPOSED DUEA STAFF OF DUEA SECTION

0305 I
0305 II (Admin)
0305 III (Ops)
Subsidiary and AVE
Division Officers
JONES
MILAN
HICKMAN
ROSE
WILLIAMS
PALANCO

1st Col H. MICHALL 3
Major B. SMITH 2
" H.P. FENDERS 1
Capt A. MURPHY 3
Major A.G. HILLS
" P. OGDEN
" W. GIBSON
" W. L. LUTZ
" C. H. GIB
" E. COOPER

On extended duty as of Jan 1945.

2. COMMENTS

(a) (1) To determine the extent to which the efficiency of the DUEA may be rapidly improved herein, report to the commandant that they will undoubtedly have to face in the immediate future, particularly with reference to the forthcoming elections and the present serious crisis now.

(11) To implement all possible improvements forthwith, and

(12) To submit recommendations regarding organization, training and administration which are further to (1) and (11) above as a long-term policy.

(b) To (1) with 2(a) DUEA was required to make a comprehensive study of survey of existing conditions in Division, Brigade and lower formations. This HQ Section simultaneously conducted a survey of the DUEA. This preliminary survey has been made and it is

CNO I

CNO II (ADMIN)

CNO III (Ops)

Schedules of

Training Officers

LUNN

MILAN

TOMLIN

WOLFE

WILSON

PULASKI

Lt Col H. MURRAY

W. J. B. JONES

W. J. B. JONES

W. J. B. JONES

W. J. B. JONES

W. J. B. JONES

W. J. B. JONES

W. J. B. JONES

W. J. B. JONES

W. J. B. JONES

W. J. B. JONES

W. J. B. JONES

Continued duty on 14 Jan 1946.

2. PURPOSE

(a) (1) To determine the extent to which the efficiency of the O. M. will be readily improved by the regular initiation of the will undoubtedly have to pass in the immediate future, particularly with reference to the mechanical elements and the present status of the work.

(11) To determine all possible improvements forthwith, and

(11) To submit recommendations regarding organization, training and administration which are further to (i) and (ii) above as a longer term plan.

(b) To determine with 2(a) O. M. was required to make a comprehensive preliminary survey of existing conditions in Division, Brigade and lower formations. This preliminary survey has been made and it is at O. M., H. O. T. This preliminary survey has been made and it is now possible to assess the information obtained in a completed form, state what has been done already, and what will be done in the immediate future to complete 2(a) (ii) above.

(c) A conference of O. M. Officers was held at these HQs on 15th and 16th March 46 to discuss fully and amplify the facts now known, to make that the programme under 2(a) (i) and (ii) above is carried out to the best advantage and to gain further information upon which to base final recommendations for permanent improvement in O. M. organization as in 2 (a) (ii) above.

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(c) the immediate objective at this stage is to provide the OMR with the necessary facilities to perform efficiently the action required of them. Conferences and personal contact through necessary and important for keeping up morale, are secondary considerations.

(d) Despite changes in the nature of the OMR as a police agency are not envisaged, as it is unlikely they would be acceptable to the public. The peculiar positive occupied by the OMR in relation to other police agencies, chiefly the Montagu, also prevents any possible through desirable changes.

(e) As this Section is limited in its activities to the OMR, it is intended with at once attention in the character of the OMR to make that force more efficient in itself. However, the OMR is much in being kept with Public Safety Sub-Commission AD in respect of the police and C.

2. CHIEF OF POLICE

The OMR is organized into:

(a) Chief of Police - the OMR in 1900 (see Annex '1')

The staff officers are responsible to them and efficient, but completely lacking in force.

There is no centralization in respect of decisions and staff work, however, the 13 "offices" being the responsibility to feel through the Chief or Vice-Chief of Staff. For the present however it is inevitable to alter this unbalanced organization and pressure. What can now later when the formation and under are more on their feet.

(b) Divisional Chief of Police (see Annex '2')

These can only serve a policy of in action. It is true that the staff members are small, but they are at present apparently quite useless. They should accept and have concentrated to them a much wider responsibility and power of supervision and control. This must be done as soon as they are in that they are very little left. Under existing conditions, for instance, Divisional Commissioners are extremely isolated from their OMR Stations of their lower formations.

Recommendation for a revision of their titles and responsibilities will be made.

(c) 1st June (see Annex '3')

Reports from 1st June show that more energy and determination is shown by the Chief of Police.

The staff is organized into:

(a) General - the GNS in GNS (see Appx '1')

The staff officers are receptive to ideas and efficient, but completely lacking in drive.

There is over-centralization in respect of decisions and staff work generally, the "decision" being the top-down to deal through the Chief or Vice-Chief of Staff. For the present however it is impossible to alter this unbalanced organization of procedure. This can come later when the functions and units are more on their feet.

(b) Division of Work - (see Appx '2')

These committees pursue a policy of inactivity. It is true that the staff concerned are small, but they are at present apparently quite useless. They should accept and have responsibility to them a much greater responsibility and power of supervision and control. The most that can be said of them is that they do very little work. Under existing conditions, for instance, Divisional Committees are expressly forbidden from visiting. CSM Sections of their lower formations.

Recommendations for a revision of their duties and responsibilities will be made.

(c) Is-isms (see Appx '3')

Is-isms from idea show that more energy and determination is shown by the staff concerned.

Is-isms from HALLS Is-ism, which has been the subject of numerous reports, no immediate changes are necessary.

(d) Division and Companies (see Appx '4')

On the whole, no satisfactory as can be expected under the circumstances. The personnel are good but require equipment and leadership.

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(c) Mobile Battalion (See Annex 13)

A comprehensive report is being submitted. This powerful, hard hitting mobile force should help both directly and indirectly in the maintenance of law and order. See also page 14.

CONCLUSIONS

Confidential reports will be submitted on the important command and control officers. In general, while many of these are good (and would be better), even proper powers and support, there are some whose capabilities in any form would be limited. The matter of changes will have to be agreed in full view of the political implications involved, particularly at this time. The answer will have to be a full order of 1 for, unless, without proper direction, no force can become efficient.

RECOMMENDATIONS

(a) There is no doubt that lack of clothing and boots for the ODR has already been due to faulty distribution procedure within the ODR; the present system in the Legion Command is to issue direct to the ODR which is no longer a monthly report showing requirements and stocks held. There is no action at ODR for checking these returns and legions are permitted to issue items at their own discretion.

(b) Each Legion is a store of clothing, equipment, arms and ammunition which is maintained by a sub-unit with stock and can under his command maintain reserve stocks, and in an effort to ensure easy distribution (which has not been successful), certain supplies are held in the form of a stockpile, and, under the control of the Legion Commander, are authorized by him only. The stockpile is not released to the ODR, consolidated Legion Command to the Air Ministry, who release the stockpile to the ODR. The latter will also be liable to the Legion in need of supplies the Legion command.

Up to this point the supplies still lie in the ODR or ODR main depot however they may be in the Legion store to collect them from the depot.

(c) Little, if anything, is ever done by the Air Ministry or ODR to ensure the physical delivery of the supplies to the Legion who are often not in a position to collect, having insufficient or unreliable transport to their depot. The Legion are left to their own devices in the emergency shown by the Air Ministry and ODR regarding this is largely responsible for the frequent delays in getting supplies out to the ODR. One is surprised to find that the Air Ministry is not aware of how much equipment has been lost when he is not.

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(e) In an effort to effect an immediate remedy a recommendation has been made by this Section (and concurred with by all, COMZ) for Army channels of supply to be used at once for all COMZ supplies (excepting accommodation stores). This would ensure the physical delivery of supplies to all locations through the Army Territorial Commands, and would fix the responsibility of maintaining the COMZ upon the War Ministry. It would also ensure simplification of procedure and economy and prevent serious delay in distribution.

A scheme has been drawn up, which, it is confidently anticipated, will have the desired effect. For details see Appendix 'G'.

Released for the period October 1945 to 25 February 1946 as Appendix 'G'.

6. SUMMARY

(a) Extraneous duties performed by the COMZ have, according to COMZ, become necessary owing to the absence and unavailability of other police agencies.

Resources have been affected and more than 500 personnel have been returned to normal duties. Allied Military demands for Services of COMZ have been exacting and this is being dealt with by Public Safety Sub Commission, AC.

(b) Disposition of resources are being closely observed by IAC and representations made to Brigade Commanders, in order to obtain maximum value from the forces available.

Establishments Authorized	Present with units
65,000	36,322

The difference between these two totals is accounted for by sick, men on leave etc.

It is quite clear that no proper order of battle is being observed, COMZ being moved about from pillar to post or kept in reserve as special Companies for eventual guard duties. Steps have been taken to remedy this. The use of these Companies is under review now and representations have been made for their return to normal duties.

(c) COMZ, COMZ, IAC and Public Safety Sub Commission AC are strongly opposed to the closing of any permanently manned COMZ Station. As a result, there are 4,106 of these stations all staffed by 10 men or

(a) Extraneous duties performed by the OCHS have, according to the OCHS, become necessary owing to the absence and unreliability of other police agencies.

Extraneous have been effected and more than 500 personnel have been returned to normal duties. Killed military demands for the OCHS have been unmet and this is being dealt with by Public Safety Sub Commission, AF.

(b) Dissolution of arrangements are being closely observed by the OCHS and representations made to Brigada Comandante, in order to obtain maximum value from the forces available.

Establishment	Present
Authorized	with units
65,000	30,322

The difference between these two totals is accounted for by also, men on leave etc.

It is quite clear that no proper order of battle is being observed, OCHS being moved about from pillar to post, or kept in reserve as special Companies for eventual guard duties. Attempts have been taken to remedy this. The use of these Companies is under review now and representations have been made for their return to normal action.

(c) OCHS, OCHS, IGA and Public Safety Sub Commission AF are strongly opposed to the closing of any permanently manned OCHS Station. In consequence, there are 4,106 of these stations all staffed by 10 men or more. Each of these detachments is responsible for representing the Government and maintaining law and order in numbers (varying between 3 and 21) of ex-armies throughout Italy. The withdrawal of the OCHS from any of these stations would deprive the population of any police protection whatever and of any visible sign of the power of the law. Therefore the closing of such stations will not be recommended, but an improved standard of efficiency demanded.

ACCOMMODATION

(c) The satisfactory "Campanello" system, whereby OCHS barracks stores are provided by civilian contractors, has completely broken down and the condition of most of the 5,000 OCHS concerned is bad. The contractors are obliged to maintain the buildings, providing furniture and bedding and kitchen equipment. They are at present unable to do this.

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(b) It would be difficult to overcome the many legal and other difficulties in order to change the present accommodation situation, and, short of compulsory acquisition of all Caserma's controlled by GMR which would mean lengthy legislation, no immediate remedy can be suggested. GMR GEL do not favour state ownership of the buildings concerned, as local interest (which GMR value) in the housing of the GMR would no longer be taken.

(c) The provision of accommodation alone is another matter. Here again the War Ministry should step into the breach. GMR GEL have supplied to War Ministry, on our recommendation, for the loan of accommodation stores to improve existing conditions. The question of accounting is one for the Ministries and contractors concerned.

(d) Similarly regarding repairs to caserma's, the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of War should co-operate in this vital matter. Civilian and Genie Military must provide the necessary material, and there is no difficulty in obtaining civilian labour.

(e) More detailed recommendations regarding accommodation for GMR will be submitted.

REPAIRS AND MAINTENANCE

(a) This is being supplied piecemeal and conditions vary greatly in different Localities. Since October 1941, the War Ministry have released to GMR among other items 72,000 jackets, 70,000 pairs of trousers, 12,000 overcoats, 90,000 pairs of boots, 40,000 pullovers, 70,000 blankets, 74,000 shirts, etc.

(b) The normal scale of clothing for GMR is generous (too generous for Immediate Fulfilment, as supplies are not available) but Ministry of War are now allocating more to GMR and the general situation is improving.

(c) The necessary uniforms, boots and clothing, minimum immediate requirements have now been ascertained and a consolidated indent made to War Ministry. It is now for the War Ministry to state if the supplies are available, and, if so, we intend to see they are delivered at once.

(d) GMR uniforms and requirements (according to scale) from 1st May 1942 to 30 April 1947 will shortly be known. The winter scale will be available this year.

ARMED AND AMMUNITION

(a) GMR suggested a scale for arming GMR (less Mobile Battalions). Subject to certain amendments, this HQ recommended the immediate adoption of the scale, and the arms and ammunition are now being distributed.

(a) More detailed recommendations regarding accommodation for OMA will be submitted.

UNIFORM AND CLOTHING

(a) This is being supplied plentiful and conditions very greatly in different to last. Since October 1945 the War Ministry have released to OMA among other items 72,000 jackets, 70,000 pairs of trousers, 32,000 overcoats, 90,000 pairs of boots, 40,000 pull-overs, 70,000 blankets, 71,000 shirts, etc.

(b) The normal scale of clothing for OMA is generous (see comments for immediate fulfilment, as supplies are not available) but industry or War are now allotting more to OMA and the general situation is improving.

(c) The necessary uniform, boots and clothing minimum immediate requirements have now been ascertained and a consolidated indent made to War Ministry. It is now for the War Ministry to state if the supplies are available, and, if so, we intend to see they are delivered at once.

(d) OMA uniform requirements (according to scale) from 1st May 1945 to 30 April 1947 will shortly be known. The winter scale will be available this year.

3. ARM AND AMMUNITION

(a) GIC suggested a scale for arming OMA (less Mobile Battalions). Subject to certain amendments, this HQ recommended the immediate adoption of the scale, and the arms and ammunition are now being distributed.

(b) 16,110 Beretta automatic rifles with abundant supply of ammunition are already on their way to OMA.

A further 26,000 Beretta automatic rifles are being assembled, 1,000,000 rounds of ammunition is available, and will be supplied to the OMA collectively.

In addition, each OMA Station is now receiving a Bren machine-gun and a minimum of 20 handgrenades for station defence. Many have already been delivered.

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(c) The carrying of automatic rifles by GMR in patrol day-patrols in cities should be discouraged for obvious reasons. However, the GMR must have available at all times weapons equal to those in possession of the "enemy", who have acquired considerable numbers of powerful weapons illegally as a result of the war. Therefore, present and future distribution will ensure 50,000 automatic rifles for GMR use on dangerous duty, or when strong opposition may be met.

(d) Authority has been given for the manufacture of sufficient 9 mm pistols (and M) to arm the GMR on the scale of 1 per man.

(e) On provision of the above GMR armament will be standardized, sufficient, and no further recommendations regarding arms will be necessary.

(f) GMR have expressed great satisfaction and morale and discipline has been raised as a result.

(g) For scale of arms: see Appendix 'B'.

10. Transport

(a) An establishment for GMR Transport (Less Mobile Battalions) has been agreed and it is attached as appendix 'B'.

(b) Distribution has been recommended by this HQ on the basis of each GMR Station having the use of a light load carrying vehicle - one vehicle servicing a varying number of stations. Thus all supplies will be distributed by GMR themselves from stations to the smallest unit, at present method of distribution by locally hired transport (as a rule) caused by bullock carts will be abolished.

(c) The provision of the required transport in an efficient mode is the most vital need of the GMR. The general situation regarding lack of vehicles is well known but re-distribution of existing holdings is, under our supervision, taking place.

(d) The required number of load carriers could be supplied immediately by:

- (i) Re-allocation of army transport,
- (ii) Release to GMR of the next 500 vehicles from Indian Army workshops,
- (iii) Release to GMR of new vehicles by War Ministry, out of those becoming available by War Ministry's agreement with ALM and the Treasury.

(e) As it is inadvisable to deplete army transport which is still very short, the solution (d) (iii) has been decided on. The War Ministry has given a verbal undertaking (for which confirmation is

- (a) an establishment for OER Transport (Long Mobile Battalions) has been agreed and it is attached as appendix 'F'.
- (b) Distribution has been recommended by this HQ on the basis of each OER Station having the use of a light load carrying vehicle - one vehicle servicing a varying number of stations. Thus all supplies will be distributed by OER themselves from stations to the smallest unit, at present method of distribution by locally hired transport (as may occur by bullock cart) will be abandoned.
- (c) The provision of the required transport in an efficient mode is the most vital need of the OER. The general situation regarding lack of vehicles is well known but re-distribution of existing holdings is, under our supervision, taking place.
- (d) The required number of load carriers could be supplied immediately by:
- (i) Re-allocation of Army transport,
 - (ii) Release to OER of the next 500 vehicles from Indian Army workshops,
 - (iii) Release to OER of new vehicles by War Ministry, out of those becoming available by War Ministry's agreement with OER and the Treasury.
- (e) As it is inadvisable to deplete Army transport which is still very short, the solution (d) (iii) has been decided on. The War Ministry has given a verbal undertaking (for which confirmation in writing is being requested) to provide OER with:
- (i) 250 Jeeps - delivery to commence in next 5 weeks.
 - (ii) 945 heavy and medium lorries - new, from Indian Motor Industry - 500 to be delivered by the end of June 46.
 - (iii) 24 light lorries - new, from Indian Motor Industry - delivery soon.
 - (iv) 500 motor cycles - new, from OER factory - delivery soon.
 - (v) 2000 bicycles - new, from BIRCH factory - delivery soon.

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CGR have made arrangements for collection of the above, as they become available.

(c) The establishment of CGR transport (less Mobile Battalions) compared with present holdings is

	Medium				Heavy		Total
	Passenger Vehicles	Load Carriers	Load Carriers	Light Lorries and Jeeps	Lorries	Cycles	
Establishment :	912	915	67	897	1951		3712
ICLA :	744		344		4634		2429

Recent census shows over 70% of holdings are inefficient. Most passenger vehicles are requisitioned and no facilities exist for their repair, it being the intention of CGR to de-requisition as a matter of policy.

(d) The establishment is thus extremely modest and possible quickly to implement, but it will provide all immediate CGR transport requirements for maintenance and high operational efficiency.

11. ICL

(a) ICL for Legions is supplied by Ministry of Industry and Commerce on a provisional basis through Prefects. This is unsatisfactory because the supplies are liable to fluctuation and at the moment in some cases of a biased political person.

Full investigation is being made so that supplies to Legions may be certain through Army channels.

(b) At present POL for Legions is imported by UNHRA as part of oil-lion needs and no financial difficulties arise. For the Army to supply POL to Legions will mean the Army having to increase its purchases or reduce consumption in units to supply CGR. Therefore it is recommended that the petrol now supplied through UNHRA should be allotted by Ministry of Industry and Commerce to CGR who would then allot to Legions, the channels of supply being through Army Territorial Commands.

(c) A system whereby coupons may be exchanged by CGR at "Comitato Italiani Petroli" points is being considered. This has much to commend it, as the drawing of petrol from Legions by small units often exhausts most of their allotment. There is, however, the danger that C.I.L. points may not function, but this could be overcome by reserves in sufficient quantities to be available at Army Territorial Commands for use in emergency.

(d) Full recommendations will be made regarding POL supplies and

(x) The establishment is thus extremely modest and possibly quickly is in liquidation, but it will provide all immediate OGR transport requirements for maintenance and high operational efficiency.

11. POL

(a) POL for Legions is supplied by Ministry of Industry and Commerce on a privileged basis through Prefects. This is unsatisfactory because the supplies are liable to fluctuation and at the moment in some cases of a biased political person.

Full investigation is being made so that supplies to Legions may be certain through Army channels.

(b) At present POL for Legions is imported by MIMA as part of civilian needs and no financial difficulties arise. For the Army to supply POL to Legions will mean the Army having to increase its purchases or reduce consumption in units to supply OGR. Therefore it is recommended that the petrol now supplied through MIMA should be allotted by Ministry of Industry and Commerce to HQ OGR who would then allot to Legions, the channels of supply being through Army Territorial Commands.

(c) A system whereby coupons may be exchanged by OGR at "Comitato Italiano Petroli" points is being considered. This has much to commend it, as the drawing of petrol from Legions by small units often exhausts most of their allotment. There is, however, the danger that C.I.P. points may not function, but this could be overcome by reserving in sufficient quantities to be available at Army Territorial Commands for use in emergency.

(d) Full recommendations will be made regarding POL supplies and distributions.

12. TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS

(a) More than 2,000 stations are without telephones. It is not yet known how many of these stations formerly had telephone communications. Where telephones are installed, the majority are available for part time service only. (Civilian exchange system).

(b) It is recommended that private lines be installed throughout. Much detailed information is being collected, but it is apparent that no appreciable improvement can be expected in telephone communications in the immediate future.

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15. WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS

(a) A scheme for wireless communications down to group level has been recommended and the nets will, it is hoped, be provided immediately by ARHQ. Spare nets (5) will be kept at Legion HQ, available for transport use at any station - i.e. below Group level - in emergency.

Copy of wireless scheme recommended is attached as Appendix 'G'. This is essential in view of the lack of telephone communications.

(b) The provision of motor-cycles according to scale in the next section remedy for the poor state of GCR communications.

16. INFANTRY BATTALIONS

(a) Agreement on minor points has not yet been reached between ARHQ and War Ministry as to the establishment of three battalions, but it is reasonably certain that the battalions will be up to establishment by the end of May 1944.

(b) We have obtained from ARHQ the release of 125 "Stragglers" (some of them and their issue is expected in the near future. 45 are already at the Army Training School, GCR HQ. A further 45 "Stragglers" will later be provided to replace the 45 Husbands at present held in the South of Italy, i.e. PUMA, MILAN, TULIN, and GELA. Efforts are being made to obtain spares for both Husbands and "Stragglers" and request has been made to ARHQ for supplies of ammunition for combat.

(c) On the 1st April a course of training for a minimum of 60 drivers will commence at GCR HQ. Instructors in gunnery and wireless are at present being trained. These instructors will then impart their knowledge to the crews in the battalions at the latter's HQ, thus cutting out delay in training.

(d) It is considered that the battalions should be formed of 3 companies each, and operationally never used in less than company strength. This will prevent undesirable dispersal and unnecessary use of the Battalion, and will ensure the unit being kept absolutely concentrated as an essential striking force.

Instructions have been given by GCR HQ accordingly, and immediate despatches will be recalled to BN HQ.

12a have been asked to see that the instruction of GCR is fully complied with and report.

(e) The variety of equipment, lack of training and transport, latent the purposes for which the Mobile Battalions were formed and the above is being pressed, so that the battalions may be a really efficient striking and reserve force before the forthcoming operations. See also

(c) Agreement on other points has not yet been reached between GMR and our Ministry as to the establishment of these battalions, but it is reasonably certain that the battalions will be up to establishment by the end of May 1946.

(b) We have obtained from GMR the release of 100 "St. James" armor cars and their issue is expected in the near future. 10 are already at the Army Training School, GCMG. A further 45 "St. James" will later be provided to replace the 45 others at present held in the North of Italy, i.e. PAVIA, MILAN, VERDI, and SONIA. Efforts are being made to obtain armor for both "St. James" and "St. James" and request has been made to GMR for supply of armor for armor.

(c) On the 1st April a course of training for a minimum of 60 drivers will commence at GCMG. Instructors in gunnery and vehicles are at present being trained. These instructors will then impart their knowledge to the crew in the battalions at the latter's HQ, thus cutting out delay in training.

(d) It is considered that the battalions should be formed of 3 companies each, and operationally never used in less than Company strength. This will prevent undesirable dispersal and unnecessary use of the battalions, and will ensure the unit being kept adequately concentrated as an essential striking force.

Instructions have been given by GMR GMR accordingly, and in late developments will be recalled to HQ HQ.

LtC have been asked to see that the instruction of GMR is fully complied with and report.

(e) The variety of equipment, lack of training and transport, the purpose for which the Mobile Battalions were formed and the above is being pressed, so that the battalions may be a really efficient striking and reserve force before the forthcoming elections. See also para 3 (e).

15. SCHOOLS AND TRAINING

(a) Apart from specialist training at Army Schools at USALD, elementary training is being given as in (b).

Presently, all elementary training was given at ROME and TRENTO.

Owing to lack of equipment and accommodation, schools are not working to the maximum capacity.

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(b)

Location
actually
under training
Max Capacity
per room

(i) Locazione Allievi OZRE Cas. San Vittoria Emanuele, Via Lagone, 3 ROMA	1250	5000
(ii) Battaglione Allievi OZRE Torino, Castello Reale, TORINO	300	800
(iii) Battaglione Allievi OZRE 44 Reg. Casematte pro- cedura, Bari	300	500
(iv) Battaglione Allievi OZRE 41 Reg. Carabinieri (Sardinia)	100	500
(v) Scuola Centrale OZRE di Firenze, Via della Scala 26, FIRENZE (4000)	700	700

OZRE occupies 1 of accommodation at the Central School in Rome for its offices.

(c) The present method of instruction is formal and concentration and equipment are totally inadequate. The system of selection for OZRE sources leaves much to be desired, and no Officer's training course is taking place at the moment. The nature of the training, terms and conditions of service are all under review and a final report will be made shortly.

16. CRIMINAL EXPLOITATION OF OZRE

(a) Any success achieved by the OZRE in maintaining law and order in existing conditions is remarkable, considering the chaotic state of affairs in OZRE.

OZRE have no system of criminal records, or the recording of cri-

Scientific aids in detection of crime are almost unknown to them. This important section of police work has always been regarded as the responsibility of the Quersura.

This HQ will have no difficulty in gradually remedying these defects and full recommendations will later be made.

1000, Comandante ro-
-mulo, RMI

(iv) Battaglione Allievi OGR
di Allievi, OGR
(Sottile)

(v) Scuola Centrale OGR
di Firenze, Via della Scala 20,
Firenze (JACO)

OGR occupies 1 of accommodation at the Central School in Rome
for its offices.

(a) The present method of instruction is theoretical and over-education
and equipment are totally inadequate. The system of selection for
OGR courses leaves much to be desired, and no Officer's training
course is taking place at the moment. The system of instruction,
training, tests and conditions of service are all under review and a
final report will be made shortly.

16. GENERAL EFFICIENCY OF OGR

(a) Any success achieved by the OGR in maintaining law and order in
existing conditions is remarkable, considering the chaotic state of
affairs in OGR.

OGR have no system of criminal records, or the recording of ori-

Scientific aids in detection of crime are almost unknown to them.
This important section of police work has always been regarded as the
responsibility of the Quattro.

This HQ will have no difficulty in gradually remedying these
defects and full recommendations will later be made.

(b) With the immediate application of the remedial suggested regard-
-ing transport, arms and ammunition, Mobile Battalions, re-education
stores, and, in particular, channels of supply through Territorial
Command and the adoption of the plan for detailed improvement through
-out the OGR organization, this HQ is satisfied that the following
results will be achieved:-

- (1) The OGR will progressively be more and more successful in
maintaining law and order in the immediate future, and
- (44) OGR will improve in its functioning as an efficient,
independent police force, without altering the special
character and tradition of this branch of the Italian Army,
particularly as and when the reorganization gathers force.

2732
W. Mitchell

H. MITCHELL, Lt Col C80
OGR Section, M.M.I.

SECRET

COMANDO GENERALE

Appendix (A) to Order 12
 Dated 19 March 1946

The "HQ CCE" comprises the undermentioned staff:

FRANCESCO ARNONE, Generale, Comandante.

Chief of Staff: Col SACCINI Mario

Vice-Chief of Staff: Lt Col BIANCO Marco.

Ufficio Segreteria e Ricerche (Secretary's Office - Confidential Matters).

CC : Lt Col BIANCO Marco - matters regarding personnel (Officers); recruiting of Officers, and transfers to Officers and NCOs.).

Ufficio Situazioni ("Situation" Office)

CC : Major MICHELE Ruggiero - Reports on crimes, arrests, accidents, local and general political matters.

Ufficio Servizio ("Service" Office)

CC : Major PIGNONI Guido - Duty matters, records for ordinary works, reinforcement

Ufficio Ordinamento (Organisation Office)

CC : Major SACCINI Cesare - Division into smaller Commands, strength, lists of personnel, and all the general matters in connection with the strength and the regulations of CCE.

Ufficio Personale Sottufficiali e Truppe (Personnel Office - GRS)

CC : Major EUGENIO Emilio - Movement, marriages, discipline, instruction and training of NCOs and soldiers of CCE.

Ufficio Mobilitazione (Mobilisation Office)

CC : Capt CALABO Mario - Assignments of the personnel returning from imprisonment or internment, confidential correspondence, mobilisation of Officers.

Ufficio Stampa e Propaganda (Press and Propaganda Office)

CC : Major BIANCO Domenico - Publication of the "Bollettino d'Ordine", of the official bulletin of CCE, and the paper "CARBONIERE DELLA NOVA ITALIA".
 printing of CCE regulations, ceremonies, historical museum, and the "Associazione Carbonieri".

Uffici Situazione ("Situation" Office)

CC : Major MIGUEL PUGLIERO - Reports on crimes, arrests, accidents, looting and general political matters.

Ufficio Servizio ("Service" Office)

CC : Major FLECHER GILLES - Duty matters, rewards for ordinary works, reinforcement.

Ufficio Ordinamento (Organization Office)

CC : Major RIGGIO Cesare - Division into smaller Commands, strength, lists of personnel, and all the general matters in connection with the strength and the regulations of OGR.

Ufficio Rumore e Sottufficiali e Truppe (Personnel Office - OGR)

CC : Major SIMONINI Emilio - Movement, marriages, discipline, instruction and training of NCOs and soldiers of OGR.

Ufficio Mobilitazione (Mobilisation Office)

CC : Capt GILLES Mario - Assignments of the personnel returning from imprisonment or internment, confidential correspondence, demobilization of Officers.

Ufficio Stampa e Propaganda (Press and Propaganda Office)

CC : Major NERATO Domenico - Publication of the "Foglio d'Ordine", of the official bulletin of OGR, and the paper "CARABINIERI NELLA MOV. ITAL." - printing of OGR regulations, ceremonies, historical museum, and the "Associazione dei Carabinieri in Congo" (Organization for ex-Carabinieri).

Ufficio Assistenza (Welfare)

CC : Major NERATO Domenico - Welfare of personnel.

Ufficio Amministrazioni (Administrative Office)

CC : Col. MOTTOLA Giovanni - Administration.

Ufficio di Consegna (Supplies)

CC : Col. La ZARZA Angelo - Rationing and outfit of the OGR personnel.

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Appendix 'A' to OADR/6/12
dated 19 March 1946

Ufficio Collocamento e Motorizzazione (Communications and Motorization)

OO : Col GALLI Roberto - Arms, motorization and communications of OADR.

Intesaione Igiene e Veterinaria (Riding Establishment and Mounted Section)

OO : Col MARCONI Francesco - Horses, mules, etc, of OADR.

Ufficio Inchieste (Inquiries and Screening)

OO : General FERRARI Alfredo (Generale di Divisione) - Screening of Officers and NCOs, in connection with their political background, and with their duty distribution in the armistice.

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
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and HUIE, in connection with their political background, and with his
may did after the irradiation.

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SECRET

GENERAL LAYOUT - CANADIAN



NOTE : In addition, there are 12 Mobile Bns which are attached to certain legions


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GENERAL LAYOUT - ORGANIZATION

Appendix 'B' to GCM/C/12
dated 12 March 1946




In addition, there are 12 Mobile Bns which are attached to certain legions.

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DETAILED ORGANISATION OF CARABINIERICHIEF

SUMMARY :- 3 Divs
6 Bdes
4 HQ Mob Bn Gps


21 Legions
111 Groups
12 Mob Bns

-2-

Appendix 'B' to OCRR/C/12
dated 19 March 46

DETAILED ORGANISATION OF CARABINIERI

CHIEF



SUMMARY :- 3 Divs
6 Bdes
4 HQ Mob Bn Gps

21 Legions
141 Groups
12 Mob Bns

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Appendix to MHA Letter
CC.117/3/12 dated 19 March 1946

1. Attached is a diagrammatic key to proposed channel of supply to CC.117 Legions.
2. The system intended to be implemented, is briefly as follows:-
 - (a) Legions submit demands to Army Territorial Command.
 - (b) War Ministry release items available and notify the appropriate Territorial Commander, who is responsible for collection from Army Depots unless delivery to Territorial Command has been arranged by Ministry of War.
 - (c) Legions will collect from Territorial Command and be responsible for "break-down" and delivery to sub-units.
3. The following supplies and equipment are involved:-

Clothing and equipment
Ammos and ammunition
Rations
Patrol
Vehicles

(c) Persons will collect from Territorial Commands and be responsible for "track-down" and delivery to sub-units,

5. The following supplies and equipment are involved:-

Clothing and equipment
Arms and Ammunition
Rations
Petrol
Vehicles

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
SECRET

PROPOSED SYSTEM OF SUPPLY TO LEGIONS OF ARMY

Page
of 1

MINISTRY OF WAR

ARMY TERRITORIAL COMMANDS



Note 1 : HQ, Div and Bde Hqs are to be maintained by the nearest Legion

Note 2 : Legions will be responsible for collecting from Army Territorial Commands, and distribution to own Sub-Units.

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Appendix 'C' to COMZ/C/12
of 19 March 1946

LIST OF SUPPLY TO LEGIONS OF COMZ

MINISTRY OF WAR

ARMY TERRITORIAL COMMANDS

	BOLOGNA	FLORENCE	ROME	BARCE	NAPLES	PALERMO
		LEGIONS				
	BOLOGNA	CENTRAL SCHOOL	BARCE	NAPLES	PALERMO	
	ANTONI	FLORENCE	ROME	CATANZARO	MESSINA	
		LEGNORI	LEGIONS ALLEVI			
			LAZIO			
			ABRUZZI			
			CALABRIA			

to be maintained by the nearest Legion

able for collecting from Army Territorial Commands,
Sub-Units.

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Appendix 1 to MDA letter
 88.001/5/12 dated 19 March 1946.

TABLES OF EQUIPMENT FOR THE CC.FBI

from October 1945 to 25 February 1946.

ITEMS	Received by W. M.	Received by CC.FBI	R R C S : V M D	
			Expense (a)	Short
Caps	30,000	24,650	-	5,350
Jackets	25,057	28,157	10,150	-
Cloth for Jackets	34,050	-	-	24,250 in course of manufacture
Hosiery	10,000	-	-	10,000 - do -
Trunks	32,401	39,450	7,639	-
Cloth for Trunks	37,600	-	-	37,600 - do -
Grenade tin	29,600	30,350	1,350	-
Cloth for Grenade tin	3,000	-	-	3,000 - do -
Shirts	2,116	1,716	-	400
Pants	25,200	45,700	20,400	-
Stockings	4,500	-	-	4,500
Leggings	2,443	2,000	-	443
Boots	66,600	90,500	23,900	-
Shirts	99,292	71,400	-	28,052 - do -
Drawers	62,000	71,310	-	10,090
Socks	64,632	73,013	9,211	-
Underclothes	1,674	1,674	-	-
Pullovers	40,000	40,000	-	-

	10,000	-	-	10,000	- 30 -
Trousers	32,404	38,150	7,000	-	-
Cloth for Shirts	37,600	-	-	37,600	- 40 -
Green trousers	20,600	20,970	1,350	-	-
Cloth for Overalls	3,000	-	-	3,000	- 30 -
Knickerbockers	2,116	1,716	-	400	-
Pants	25,700	45,700	20,400	-	-
Shirts	4,500	-	-	4,500	-
Leggings	2,443	2,000	-	443	-
Boots	66,000	50,500	25,500	-	-
Shirts	99,252	71,200	-	28,052	- 40 -
Drawers	82,000	71,310	-	10,690	-
Socks	64,602	73,943	9,211	-	-
Undergarments	1,672	1,674	-	-	-
Undergarments	40,000	40,000	-	-	-
Towels	21,200	20,000	-	1,200	-
Blankets Comforters	66,000 } 22,000 }	70,000	-	17,200	-
Overalls	3,212	2,192	-	1,020	-
Gloves	3,064	1,954	-	1,110	-
Boots	2,254	1,954	-	600	-
Overalls with fur	600	-	-	600	-
Overalls	898	258	-	660	-

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S. J. C. A. 2. F

Sheet No. 2.

CONFIDENTIAL

I & H M S

Released
by
% M.Received
by
CC. RR.R E C E I V E D
Expense Short

Capas in waterproof 510 - - 510

Canteens (Flasks) 10,000 10,000 - -

Oym Tent Bousers 1,672 1,672 - -

Bandage materials 130,000 130,000 - -

Shoes - - 15,300 15,300 - -

Speculums - - 1,954 1,954 - -

Complete allied uniforms with buttons and green

Complete grey-green uniforms (Jackets and trousers)

10,000 10,000 - -

10,650 10,650 - -

The following materials released to CC. RR. on 20 February 1946 are still to be withdrawn by them :-

Overalls 6,000 - -

Spectacles 12,436 - -

Hoods (woollen) 3,000 - -

Gloves 6,200 - -

Socks (cotton) 24,972 - -

The following materials will be released shortly :-

Capas 10,000

Uniforms 10,000

Boots 10,000

Complete blind
uniform with
sleeves and green

10,000 10,000 -

Complete grey-green
uniform (jackets
and trousers)

10,650 10,650 -

The following materials released to CGA on 20 February 1946
are still to be returned by them :-

Overalls 6,000 -

Spec. shoes
for drivers 12,446 -

Knives (wooden) 3,000 -

Gloves 6,200 -

Shoes (cotton) 24,972 -

The following materials will be released shortly :-

Caps 10,000

Uniforms 10,000

Boots 10,000

(a) Reason is due to special releases from
other sources such as HQ 2 District direct.

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SECRETC. G. R. R.Append
of 19TABLE OF EQUIPMENT - ARMS AND AMMUNITIONA. AUTOMATIC PISTOLS BERETTA MOD. 34

One for each man (officers excluded, as they provide their own). The revolvers mod. 89 which are now held will be substituted by automatic pistols mod. 34.

B. RIFLES MOD 91.

One for each man who is not in possession of a Beretta automatic rifle.

C. AUTOMATIC RIFLES BERETTA MOD 38 Cal. 9

One for each man in Mobile Battalion (12 Battalions);
4 for each 5 men of the total strength of ROOs
and nonexcluded men of Mobile Battalions (56,929 men)
Four for the 4 Comando Raggruppamento Mobile Bns -
Total 16.

D. LIGHT MACHINE GUNS BREDA MOD 30 Cal. 6.5.

- 5 for each Comando Generale (General HQ)
- 2 for each Division HQ (3 Divisions)
- 2 for each Brigade HQ (6 Brigades)
- 4 for each "Comando Raggruppamento Battaglioni Mobili" (4 for four Raggruppamento)
- 21 for each Mobile Bn (12 Bns)
- 72 for CCR School "Logione Allievi"
- 16 for the Central School
- 5 for the Squadron Group, Legion of Rome
- One for stations with less than 10 men; total 4,106
- 2 for stations with not more than 25 men
- 3 for stations with not more than 50 men
- 4 for stations with more than 50 men

E. HAND GRENADES

- 50 for each Comando Generale (General)
- 10 for each Division HQ (3 Divisions)
- 10 for each Brigade HQ (6 Brigades)
- 100 for each Raggruppamento Battaglio (4 Raggruppamenti)
- 100 for each Mobile Bn (12 Bns)
- 100 for Cadets Legion (Logione Allievi)
- 100 for Central School
- 100 for Squadron Group of Rome
- 100 for each Company Legion HQ (21)
- 20 for each station with less than
- 20 for each station with not more than
- 30 for each station with not more than
- 50 for each station with more than

F. AMMUNITION.

As follows for each weapon :

- automatic pistol Beretta Cal. 9

Total

- Rifle mod. 1891

Total

- Automatic rifle Beretta

Total

Light Machine Guns Breda

Total

1
2
5
4
2

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C.C.R.R.

Appendix 'B' to COMV/G/12
of 19 March 1946.

OF EQUIPMENT - ARMS AND AMMUNITION

E. HAND GROWLERS

ed, as they provide
which are now held
pistols mod.34.

- 50 for each Comando Generale (General HQ)
- 10 for each Division HQ (3 Divisions)
- 10 for each Brigade HQ (6 Brigades)
- 100 for each Raggruppamento Battaglioni Mobili
(4 Raggruppamenti)
- 100 for each Mobile Bn (12 Bns)
- 100 for Cadets Legion (Legione Allievi)
- 100 for Central School
- 100 for Squadron Group of Rome
- 100 for each Company Legion HQ (21)
- 20 for each station with less than 10 men
- 20 for each station with not more than 25 men
- 30 for each station with not more than 50 men
- 50 for each station with more than 50 men

session of a

1.9

on (12 Battalions);
length of HQs
Battalions (56,929 men)
Battaglioni Mobili -

F. AMMUNITION.

1.6.5.

As follows for each weapon :

General HQ)

Coma)

en)

to Battaglioni

mento)

vi"

of Rome

0 men; total 4,106

25 men

50 men

100

- automatic pistol Beretta Cal. 9	Total	21 rds handed to each man
		<u>7</u> " reserve
- Rifle mod. 1891	Total	72 rds handed to each man
		<u>28</u> " reserve
- Automatic rifle Beretta	Total	80 rds handed to each man
		<u>170</u> " reserve
Light Machine Guns Broda	Total	300 rds handed to man
		<u>422</u> " reserve

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ESTABLISHMENT FOR CARABINIERI TRANSPORT - DIVISIONS, BRIGADES, LEGIONS AND

	Motor Cars	TRUCKS		Light Trucks	Motor Cycles	Aired Cars	Workshops
		30 cwt 3 ton	Over 3 ton				
General Command	14	1	1	2	3	1	1
Division Command	2	1	1	1	2	1	1
Brigade Command	2	1	1	1	1	1	1
Legion Command	3	2	3	1	6	1	1
Group Command	1	1	1	1	2	1	1
Company Command	1	1	1	1	2	1	1
Sec Command and stations Commanded by LTs	1	1	1	1	2	1	1
Stations with personnel up to 10 men	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
" " " " 25 "	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
" " " " 50 "	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
" " " over 50 "	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Squadrons' Group	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Royal Guards - OCRR Squadron	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Cadets Legion	2	2	2	2	60	6	1
Control School	2	1	1	1	20	2	1
" Raggruppamento " Command (each)	2	1	1	1	2	1	1
" Raggruppamento included 4 Mob Bn	2	1	1	1	2	1	1
Total vehicles required for all Carabinieri units, except the 12 Mobile Battalions	982	915	67	697	1951	8	23

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785017

of 19 March 1946

ST FOR CANADIAN TRANSPORT - DIVISIONS, BRIGADES, BATTALIONS AND LESSEER UNITS

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Appendix to 61011. Letter
CC. 12/12 dated 19 March 1946

Carabinieri Wireless Communications

The following are the proposed Carabinieri requirements for wireless communications:-

1. MOBILE BATTALIONS

No. 19 Sets
No. 9 Sets
No. 38 Sets

For each Battalion Total for 12 Bns.

9 108
9 24
12 144

2. Carabinieri HQ's in Rome and 18 Legions outside Rome.

Twelve powerful sets are required to enable communication to be set up between Rome and Legions in the following cities:-

ROME, MESSINA, GENOA, MILAN, PAVIA, BOLOGNA, VERONA, BOLOGNA, PAVIA, ANCONA, LECORNI, CHIESI, NAPLES, BARI, CALABRIZZO, MESSINA, PAVIA.

3. Two Legion HQ's in Rome.

Three No. 9 Sets are requested for communication between Carabinieri HQ in Rome and the two Legions in Rome. It is not necessary to have high powered sets for these two Legions to communicate with Carabinieri HQ.

4. Twenty Legion HQ's.

There are 20 Legions in ITALY, SICILY and SARDINIA and they are divided into 111 Groups. 131 No. 9 Sets are required for communication between Legions and Groups.

5. Station HQ's

It is impossible to equip every Carabinieri station with wireless, but in order that radio communication may be possible, in times of trouble and disorder, it is proposed that three No. 9 Sets be kept at Legion HQ's, together with trained operators. Total required fifty No. 9 Sets.

6. Emergency Sets.

If trouble is expected, or is occurring in a town or village, a No. 9 Set could be taken out by car to the nearest Carabinieri station, and kept there until trouble lasts. This would enable the Legion Commander to keep in touch by radio with the situation, whilst remaining in Legion HQ in some large town. The set would return to Legion HQ when the situation became normal.

7. Mobile Stations.

Radio Sets

3. Two Legion HQ's in ROE.

Three No. 9 Sets are requested for communication between Carabinieri HQ in ROE and the two Legions in ROE. It is not necessary to have high powered sets for these two Legions to communicate with Carabinieri HQ.

4. Twenty Legion HQ's.

There are 20 Legions in ITALY, SICILY and SARDINIA and they are divided into 141 Groups. 134 No. 9 Sets are required for communication between Legions and Groups.

5. Station HQ's

It is impossible to equip every Carabinieri station with wireless, but in order that radio communication may be possible, in times of trouble and disorder, it is proposed that three No. 9 Sets be kept at Legion HQ's, together with trained operators. Total required sixty No. 9 Sets.

6. Emergency Sets.

If trouble is expected, or is occurring in a town or village, a No. 9 Set could be taken out by car to the nearest Carabinieri station, and kept there until trouble lasts. This would enable the Legion Commander to keep in touch by radio with the situation, whilst remaining in Legion HQ in some large town. The Set would return to Legion HQ when the situation became normal.

7. Mobile Battalions.

Radio Sets	
No. 9.	No. 19.

Legion HQ's	1	1
Mobile Battalion HQ's in field	1	1
Mobile Battalion HQ's to 3 Coy HQ's	-	4
3 Coy HQ's to Armoured Cars	-	3
3 Coy HQ's to 3 Platoons	-	-
	2	12
Total for 12 Mobile Battalions	24	106
		130

5521

8. Summary of Sets Required.

FOR THE HQ'S.

Carabinieri HQ, ROE	1
18 Legions Outside ROE	18
	19

SECRET

Sheet No. 2.

Confidential

Appendix "C" to MILA letter
CG. 02/G/12 dated 19 March 1964

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8. SUMMARY OF SER'S EQUIPMENT (Cont'd)

No. 3 SER'S.

CHL, 101st	1
2 101st Legions	2
Legions	20
Graded	111
Shore units at Legions	60
Mobile Battalions	24
	<u>218</u>

No. 19 SER'S.

Mobile Battalions	<u>141</u>
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No. 36 SER'S.

Mobile Battalions	<u>144</u>
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0 2 3 8

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2 4000 Legions 2
Legions 20
Group 1 111
Specs sent to Legions 60
Mobile Battalions 21
210

No. 19 SW.3.
Mobile Battalions 1-1
No. 18 SW.3.
Mobile Battalions 1-1

0432