

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

ACC

10000/109/716
(VOL. I)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

10000/109/716
(VOL. I)

PUBLIC SECURITY
JULY-SEPT. 1945

Executive Commission

Please see photo 28, replying 5/17/28

about report of organization in Moscow. Bologna. Cezzo
who intended to take over dance bar.

If you suppose Devil has 38⁵
paraphrased to freedom ref letter.

22.
27.
210.

C80.

200 97.

See say that in receipt of X Army signal
we inform to AENO on the spot & this is his reply

775 (10/15)

C80.

400 105

Ref number 28, 1 34. Pub. Safety same already
signalled as 14th quarter 30 (not paraphrased). See

photo 42. 104

2. 11/9.

30

697

Yes say that in receipt of V Army signal
we infered to ACHO on the spot written a his reply

Ms. A. 9.2.15

43.05

6/5/9

830. /
 Rep number 28 + 36. 97
 Legalle & 17th quarter 33 95
 /plus 42 104

5/11

1000 444

2. Com.

Folio 39¹⁰⁷ for information ref 22. R/S
 See 42¹⁰⁴ sent by PS. They printed.
 a Topsec Signed linked paraphrase

1. Little stream

with steam
attention

1. ps.

Ensigned. 12/19/20

1984

2. Com. to 90
CSO Please see folio 89 Public Safety S/C is obtaining a report - 12/19
DASH 11/19

CSO Despatch 12/19
91
You will submit Com. letter instructing CC
to represent their transfer to P.D.
Mr. [unclear]

Adm. 893
Exlenc has main file
and prepared ~~report~~ action
on 89 Ref 892 para 1
Exlenc has told V.P. CAT
to consider a report. It is
not thought a P.S.O. would
do much good

630.

12/19.

Excluded
12/18/75
14 see 10 & 11

CHS (for P.S. 5/c) (14/19)

Let us find out whether it is true or not. The Region has been under A.D.C.

(see 84) 14/19

See how 84

CA election.

Ref. min 14. P.S.O. decision at Bologna has been requested to inquire and report. You will be advised on receipt of information.

18 Sept 1975

Chapman
Col. B.P.P.

Ex Com. Sec.

Please see 15 80.

6002
18 SEP 1975

12-82

Chapman

6382

108-511

See Page 84

L. A. Dickson.
 Ref. min 14. P50 Section at Bologna has been
 requested to inquire and report. You will be advised
 on receipt of information.
 Chapman
 11/2/21

18/10/1944

$$\frac{18}{1}$$

Ex. Com. 2

Please see pg. 80.

H. H. H.

2008

+2.82

~~Mar 18 1894~~

6384

1881

for 40 (A)
for 40 (B)

Person in file

24 Aug 45

357

Resident in file

Person - 7 houses - J. W. Miller Jones Pol Rd (Am) Aug 28/45

W. J. Miller Jones
28/10/45

J. W. Miller Jones

Pol. A. (B)

Aug 28

4.58

first for information

C.S.O.

Chief Commissioner.

1 P. 367

Attached is submitted for your information/initials/initials.

An. 28/10/45

28/10/41
H. A. (P.)

to the President
P.O.A. (S)
Aug 28

4. (S)
first for information 202203

C.S.O.

(S)

Chief Commissioner.

1 P. 67. Attached to submitted for your information/for approval.

An extremely good paper

775/2078

1570
Aug 20 1941

W. A. (P.)

W. A. (P.)

At Exec. Comm.

(51)

(52)

(53)

Report at file 12 and 1 for information please.

2/28/45

24/8 11/45 7

Polad (A)

Polad (B)

(54)

(55)

Folio 208 for info.

25 Aug 45

Mr. P. S. C. C.

This letter at every time, I have received about various provisions. May I have a copy for the Embassy files, please?

(56)

1/27/45

Noted - 7 Lankers - ~~W. L. Lankers~~
P. L. L. L. (Am) Sept 1/45

(16)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

Folio 208 for info.
25 Aug 45
This leaves out some things.
About Geneva provisions.
for the Embassy files, please?
I have heard
I have a copy

52 / 27

Noted - T. Hawks - Wichita Falls - Sept. 1/45
Col. H. L. (Am.)

6571

Ex. Affairs Let. - att. Big Bear. ¹¹⁶ ~~10~~

Reference is made to your letter at folio 2³⁷
 & the press release at folio 2³³ - This seems to answer
 your letter in part. Please see Ex. Comm's min 9¹⁵. When
 furnished please return file. Thanks. ^{28/8} ~~28/8~~

Ex. Comm's Office ¹¹⁷ ~~107~~

Noted thank you.

29/8

MP

Ex Comm

for your info plus see folios 38-39. This is response
to Security file containing ASAC's letter signed by Ellen Morgan.
You may wish to see this at your meeting this morning.

CAB 10/8

41

PRO for comment on folios 40-41.

20/8

2.

B 42

Ex Comm

Release was made on coal & in destroyed

imprisonment 21 Aug 45 - Ref. 102/408/PAB

Major Leonard PAB

(43)

10/8

Ex Comm

Reference to letter on folios 39-40 - please see folios 7-12.
"New Release of 21 Aug." Release the answers Big Bear's request.

CAB 20/8

(13)

Ex Comto us

Release was made on card & in dental
impression 21 Aug 45 - Rpt 102/408/PAB

Proj. Bureau PAB

(43)

not to

Ex Com

Refers to letter on form 10 - please see file 7 ⁴³
"From Release of 21 Aug." Below the answers Big Bear's request.

9-45
26/8

(17)

Yes - in fact. Tell VP CAS that I agree with
his suggestion, will follow it up and that PAB is
a partial answer.

Review of next Ex Com's meeting

10/27/8

Chief, Designation.

19

Attached is submitted for your ~~signature~~/approval/information.

Page 11 & 16

I am asking R.C.s for their comments.
/ E.C. Think we should
notify AFHQ & Paris. 115/418.
He may not want to take over 19. *Ellis*

ADD A 100

637657

21

Action on 20 was signal 3748 of 15 Aug 45 to
AFHQ at folio 335 of file 2605 JWC Vol IV.

22
Dr. E.C. Comment:

With reference to folio 55. In view of 109 in accompanying file
I thought you should see them both before an attempt was made to draft a
further letter to the Italian Government. *20/25/8*

37

Executive Commissioner.

Sir,

CA Section have submitted the letter opposite in acknowledgment
of AFHQ's letter at Folio 25 for your approval and signature.

See drawings comments on draft reply at folio 21 are given add 20.36

30 AUG. 45.

K
S.

13
C.S.O. — Ex-ten.
4 Feb 12 — Public Security in Northern Regions — for information.
I think para 3 is very fine.
RUSK 22/7



CSO BVPCAS

I return their report for clarification of the
last paragraph 8 (s) where police
refut stat. There is no evidence to show
then I expect something more than a negotiation.
I do not understand what is meant.

MS (38)7

16

20/7

Ex. Commissioner

Your Minute 14. I have seen the Security Office
and studied the original report & what is clearly
the intention has now been substituted for para 8(3).
I have add a new report which is interesting

last paragraph 8 (3) Shows Police
 report state. There is no evidence to show
 then I expect something more than a suggestion
 I do not understand what is meant.

MS (3817)

Mr. Commissioner

Your Minute 14. I have seen the Security Office
 and studied the original report to what is clearly
 the indication has and been substantiated for para 8(3).
 I now add a new report which is interesting
 and which connects up (folio 16)

G. B. B. Humphreys
 CAS

1 day

also, The entire Commission

minutes 17 and plus 16 for information
 Date 4/8

4/8

6384

MINUTES SHEET

La Commission

b (S)

Minutes of meeting with R.C. on Public Safety

17 July

D. B. Thompson
CA1 L61

(S)

E.C.

Very good report
Eud

178 (S)

18/7

cc P.A. Bf on my
return. D.S. (S)

9/

C80

(S)

This is the paper copy which should
go to G.C. - as we discussed yesterday.

178 (S)

158/7

Very good spot

End

cc P.A. B. for my
return. D.V. (cl)

178/121

2/

C80.

(5)

This is the paper copy of which should
go to G- as we discussed yesterday.

178/121

Dw m 9

178/121

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Lieutenant General W. D. Hays
Chief of Staff
CS, DSO, MC
A-114

785017

AFHQ GITE PHOEN

5062

Confidential

PRIORITY

TOP SECRET PD

PARA ONE PD REFERENCE FOR FOUR ONE ONE TWO SEVEN TOP SECRET DATED FIVE SEPTEMBER PD LAISON OFFICE BOLOGNA REPORTS PD PARAH TO AFHQ GITE PHOEN FROM ALCON GITE ACROSS PAREN PD QUOTE PD NOTHING KNOWN BY CHARLIE JOHN CHARLIE ON POLICE AGENCIES OF LAWLESS ELEMENTS COMMUNISTS OR OTHERWISE ORGANIZED IN MODENA DASH BOLOGNA DASH REGGIO AREA WITH POSSIBLE OBJECT OF TAKING OVER LOCAL GOVERNMENT AT OPPORTUNE MOMENT PD SCATTERED ATTACKS HAVE TAKEN PLACE AGAINST ISOLATED LANDOWNERS EVER SINCE OCCUPATION BY ALLIES PD WILL UNDOUBTEDLY CONTINUE PD STILL A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF ARMED INDIVIDUALS IN EMILIA REGION PD NO KNOWLEDGE OF ANY REPORT BY ABLE MINE GEORGE THAT PARTISAN FORMATIONS ARE HANDING IN ARMS SATISFACTORILY PD THERE ARE RUMOURS OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION CACHES BUT NO DEFINITE LOCATIONS PD AGREED BUT "RIOTS" NOT CORRECT TERM DEMONSTRATIONS SUCH AS WERE HELD UNDER ABLE MINE GEORGE CONTINUE PD NO SERIOUS DISORDER HAS OCCURRED TODAY PD NO EVIDENCE OF ANY CAUSE FOR ALARM OR PANIC PD AGREED CARABINIERI INSUFFICIENT AND POORLY EQUIPPED PD RECOMMENDATION FOR REINFORCEMENT GIVEN BETTER ARMS AND A DECENT TRANSPORT IS ENDORSED STRONGLY PD LACK OF POL A SERIOUS MATTER PD GRANDI ALBERTI NOT KNOWN BY THAT NAME PD GIANNI IS A COMMON NAME

SEE SECOND PAGE

6371

AFHQ CITE PAGES

5062

10 Sept 1945

Confidential PRIORITY

TOP SECRET ED

USED BY PARTISAN LEADERS AS A BATTLE NAME PD BINO FERRARI KNOWN
AS BROS WAS ARRESTED BY CHARLES ITEM CHARLES IN MODENA ON JULY TWO FIVE
RELEASED ON ONE TWO AUGUST OWING LACK OF EVIDENCE PD CONDITIONS
REMAIN SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME AS UNDER ALE MIKE GEORGE BUT THERE IS
AN INCREASE OF ARMED ROUGHRIES NOT NECESSARILY OF POLITICAL NATURE PD
POPULATION AND OFFICIALS CALM PD ONLY RECOMMENDATIONS WITH REGARD
TO CARABINIERI SEE ABOVE PD END QUOTE PD

Public Safety S/O

478427

E.J. BYN Lt Col.

NICHOLAS PIONEIRO 6370
CWO USA
Asst Adjutant

3636-40

Executive Commission

107

10:1 AMR 2788

1950

POWER 27 47

ADJUTANT

SECRET

Confide. 950

SEP - 8 1945

REPLY FOR JUNE ONE TWO TWO THREE FOUR FIVE SIX SEVEN EIGHT NINE

BASED TO ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE FROM JUNE ONE TWO THREE FOUR FIVE SIX SEVEN EIGHT NINE

PARA ONE TO DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY PAR TWO TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT PAR THREE TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT PAR FOUR TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT PAR FIVE TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT PAR SIX TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT PAR SEVEN TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT PAR EIGHT TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT PAR NINE TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

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From Public State 1/10

NICHOLAS ROMERO
LTC USA
Asst Adjutant

470421

JOHN W. CHAPMAN Col.

6266

(Not Known) 20 18

RESTRICTED

3636

PS 36
HMF 061000B

P/6739
REF 070840
ROUTINE

From: HQ MIERONTE
To: ALCON FOR PUBLIC SAFETY SO

SEP - 8 1945

RESTRICTED.

Ref year 4941. Subject is illegal possession of arms by civilians.

1. Daily operations here for past 5 weeks with success. See reports 20th and 26th August. Copies sent to 2 DISTRICT and AFHQ and monthly report. District contacted. Know of no other plans.

LIST

ACTION PUB SAFETY SO
INFO CHIEF COMMISSIONER
EX COMMISSIONER2
CA SEC
FILE 2
FLOAT

RESTRICTED



6368

(Mr. Kinnear)

WKA

3636 + 8273
TOP SECRET

Copy No 2

EX 40927
SEPT 4/1652B

F/6542
SEPT 5/1115B

PRIORITY
SEP - 5 1945

FREEDOM SIGNED ALEXANDER GITE MILOT

AMEMB FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF INFO: BRITISH WASHINGTON FOR US JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFF ALSO

Confidential

TOP SECRET.

this is MEDCOB 272. reference your COMSEC 236.

1. My views regarding the forces to be retained in ITALY were set out in HAFS 1013 and 1030. In these signals I recommended that:

A. An Allied corps of 2 divisions should be retained in VENETIA GEBLIA until the peace settlement.

B. One Infantry Division and 1 Armoured regiment should be retained in ITALY as a mobile reserve.

2. The above estimate was based on the assumptions that:

A. Almost the whole of ITALY would be returned to the Italian Government by about 30 September.

B. The Italian Government would be given sufficient armed forces to enable them to exercise a reasonable degree of control.

C. Owing to transport and other limitations there would in fact be considerable Allied forces available in ITALY during the period of handing over to the Italian Government and for some time thereafter.

3. My recommendation regarding the date for handing over of the whole of ITALY less certain special areas to the Italian Government were contained in HAF 1069.

4. My recommendations regarding the Armed forces required by the Italian Government to enable them to assume effective responsibility for territory returned to them were sent

TOP SECRET

PA 7/9

TOP SECRET

CONTINUATION PAGE 2

Confidential FX 10927

in NAPS 1051 and 1059 and provided for an "interim" Italian Army of 140000 which will include 10 internal security brigades 5 combat groups and 1 independent regiment.

5. As far as can be foreseen at present and apart from a corps of 2 divisions in VENETIA-GRULIA the following Allied formations will probably be available in ITALY for internal security:

1. until end October, 1 British division 1 N. Z. division 1 Indian division
2 Polish divisions. total 5 divisions.

3. until end December 1 British division 2 Polish divisions. total 3 divisions

6. There is no doubt that the morale of the Italian army is still low desertion high and discontent over question of pay and demobilization prevalent. All possible steps are being taken to improve this state of affairs but it will take time and if my recommendations regarding dates for handing over to Italian government are accepted the critical transitional period will take place while maximum number of Allied troops remain in the country.

7. Political complications connected with the use of Polish troops for internal security are fully appreciated but I consider if serious disorders take place we should be prepared to use Polish rather than keep further Allied troops in ITALY.

8. Serious internal disorder is not likely while forces shown in para 5 remain in ITALY. In any case these forces with those of Italian government should be adequate to deal with any situation likely to arise. From New Year onwards until final effective settlement I consider forces shown in para 1 together with a rehabilitated "interim" Italian Army should be adequate.

9. I would add that Admiral STONE's memorandum 001001 of 23 June was considered

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

CONTINUATION PAGE 3

EX 40927

on an Allied basis at this HQ and covering letter 27 July was signed by General MCNARNEY in his capacity acting as Supreme Allied Commander during my absence

DIST

COPY NO 1 & 2 INFO-ACTION : EX COMMISSIONER

3
4
5
6
7
8

INFO : CHIEF COMMISSION
POLAD (A)
POLAD (B)
CA SEC
LAND FORCES
FILE

ACTION COPY:- 8273/EC Allied Troops in Italy Policy.

TOP SECRET

6365

4/33

SEPT 8/15003

E/7023

SEPT 9/10003

ROUTINE

FROM: HQ ALCON LO BOLOGNA

TO: ACTION: HQ ALCON CITE ACCAS

SEP 10 1945

TOP SECRET.

Reference 4961 top secret. Nothing known by CIC or police agencies of lawless elements communists or otherwise organized in MEDENA-BOLOGNA-REGGIO area with possible object of taking over local government at opportune moment. Scattered attacks have taken place against isolated landowners ever since occupation by allies. Will undoubtedly continue. Still a considerable number of armed individuals in EMILIA region. No knowledge of any report by ASD that partisan formations are handing in arms satisfactorily. There are rumors of arms and ammunition caches but no definite locations.

Reference para 2. Agreed but riots not correct term demonstrations such as were held under ASD continue. No serious disorder has occurred to date. No evidence of any cause for alarm or panic. Agreed carabinieri insufficient and poorly equipped. Recommendation for reinforcement given better arms and adequate transport is endorsed strongly. Lack of pol a serious matter.

Reference para 3. GRASDI ALBERTI not known by that name. GIANNI is a command name used by partisan leaders as a battle name. DINO FERRARI known as UROB was arrested by CIC in MEDENA on July 25 released on 12 August owing lack of evidence.

Reference para 4. Conditions remain substantially the same as under ASD but there is an increase of armed robberies not necessarily of political nature. Population and

TOP SECRET

(C-04 N. 5 SPARE)

Lu M 33
96-97

TOP SECRET

CONTINUATION PAGE -

7/7023

Confidential

officials only. only recommendations with regard to carabinieri see above

DATA

COPY Number 1	ACTION :	CAS SSO
2	INFO :	CHIEF COMMISSION
3		EX COM (2) ER
5		FILE

6563

TOP SECRET

3636

92
8

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

Ref AG/14504/1/PS

12 Sep 45

SUBJECT : Liaison Office - Bari

SEP 13 1945

TO : Office of the Executive Commissioner

Exempt
On
Test/AC
Ed
Action

1 In view of adverse reports on the Public Safety situation in the Bari Area, the Director of Public Safety requests and I recommend the immediate increase of the staff of the Liaison Officer at Bari by one Public Safety Officer. The appointment may be temporary but should be made as a matter of urgency to assist the ACIO now and to keep him fully informed of developments.

2 The letter IB 65/A of 10 Sep from the ACIO Bari is only part of the story of disturbed conditions in this area as to which the Italian Govt is aware. PS has unconfirmed information that the Yugoslavs have been sending arms to communists in this area and recently when the police requested re-inforcements, the Government sent SCOGGIEMARO to the area who followed a policy of appeasement and ordered the release of prisoners and the cancellation of the order for the re-inforcements.

89

Handwritten signature

L. GARR, Brig,
VP CA Sec.

See 1193

Copy to : Establishment Sec.

6362

(C.S.O.)

Handwritten initials

3636

MOST SECRET AND URGENT

89

SWM/lc

ALLIED COMMISSION
LIAISON OFFICE
BAKI

Tel. 14152

Confidential

Ref : LB/65.a

10th September, 1945

SUBJECT : CC.RR. Report.

TO : V.P., Civil Affairs Section, (2 copies)
HQ, ALLIED COMMISSION,
C.M.F.

1. To-day I have received verbal reports from Officers of the CC.RR. in BAKI to the effect that information reaching them from many sources indicate that a general rising is being prepared, to take place later in September.
2. Communists, partisans and ex-soldiers are alleged to be secretly arming and holding meetings in out-of-the-way places.
3. There may be no truth in these rumours, but on the other hand if similar information has reached you from other parts of the country then the story received by me to-day might well marry up with other reports.

S.W. Miller
S. W. MILLER, Colonel,
Liaison Officer, A.C.,
BAKI.

Copy to : Executive Commissioner,
HQ, ALLIED COMMISSION,
C.M.F.

EXC.

P.S. is OBTAINING A Report

1st S.M. WHITE.
Lt. Col.

12 34145

6361

(att. to 34203 of 7 Sept)
from 2nd ch

CSC

File

File

This is up with CSC instructions
to represent lack of order to P. M.

Please see that the matter is

Coordinated &
Specified

17/9/12

Referred CPT (Or White)

that C.C. wants 6380627

to S. R. without comment

& to both Subscribers

17/5 PTH

E.C. —

Grateful if
you would
personally
follow through

Yus

cc

Translation

The President of the Council of Ministers
Minister of the Interior
n. 34203

INFO ONLY

Rome, 7 September 1945

SEP 11 1945

Dear Admiral,

as you know, my Government wishes to handle with the necessary firmness the problem of public order in Italy, fully to reestablish respect for the law.

The CC.RR. Corps, whose collaboration is able and trustworthy, is one of our best instruments to reach this aim.

However, considering the numerous duties entrusted to it, the organization of the Corps is still insufficient, so that I must draw your kind attention on the advisability of granting a further increase of the CC.RR. Corps, to reach 75 thousand units.

On this subject, I must inform you that from the present force of 62,000 units (besides the Trieste Legion, 1750 officers included must be deducted.

Of the remaining 61,450 men, we must not consider 17,700 enlisted men who are not available and cannot be made available, for part of them is on leave, part is attached to special services, part is being detained with the legions of the Veneto by the express wish of the Allied Authorities.

The result is that 42,950 men are available; this figure is inferior to the already insufficient number required for the 4809 CC.RR. stations, which ought to amount to 44,670 units. It seems obvious that the number of men of the stations cannot be further reduced, for it is sometimes of two elements only, while on the other hand we must form 12 mobile battalions, amounting as a whole to 7 thousand units.

I trust that this short report will show how urgent it is to increase the Corps in number; during the last few days, the War Department sent an official request to the Commission.

However, the wished-for reinforcement of the CC.RR. Corps depends not only on the increase of the number of the Carabinieri, but also on the improvement of their armament.

You already know, my dear Admiral, the particular importance of this problem. Unfortunately, the present armament of the Carabinieri is entirely inadequate considering the situation and the requirements. It is enough to say that personal equipment has remained what it was half a century ago, i.e. a rifle, mod. 1891, and a pistol which some of the men don't even have. Such a situation cannot but have a fatal effect on the morale and spirit of the Carabinieri who are often obliged to face, in conditions of obvious inferiority, gangs of delinquents more

Admiral Henry S. Stone
Chief Commissioner

(Seen on 3606/24)

6359

- 2 -

81

numerous than themselves, and equipped with portable weapons and bombs.

I therefore trust in your kind interest about this matter. In particular, I beg you to intervene personally, so that kind consideration may be given to the proposals made by the Comando Generale of the Corps, to obtain that the Carabinieri be allotted 14,000 automatic rifles 'Mitra' and 3000 pistols at present in the Garitta weapon factory, at Gardone val di Trompia; up to now, the Land Forces Sub-Commission hasn't granted this request for it stated that such arms must be considered as war booty.

I thank you, my dear Admiral, for taking this matter in consideration; considering its importance, it deserves to be dealt with without delay.

Yours sincerely,

s. Ferruccio Parri

trans. u/o

EC INT-11 SEP 45

ATTENTION: C. A. SEC 121

INFO: CHIEF CMOR

EXEC 6332

3636

Copy No 3

TOP SECRET

Ex Comm

1/31

SEP 8/11503

7/7067

SEP 9/15003

URGENT

FROM: ALGER LO BLOCH

TO: ACTION: HQ ALGER CITE AGED

SEP 10 1945

Confidential

TOP SECRET

Reference your 4913 top secret. para 2.

DEMO FERRARI arrested 28 July 1945. released 12 August 1945 the terms uprising around BLOCH in your original not understood

DEPT

Copy Number 1 ACTION : SECURITY DIV

"	"	2	INFO :	CHIEF COMMISSIONER
"	"	3-4		EX COMMISSIONER(2)
"	"	5		DA SEC
"	"	6		FILE

PA 11/9 TOP SECRET

6357

(Not Kuncen) OK

(Copy No 4 SPARE)

3636

TOP SECRET

25

10: AMO LO BOLOGNA FROM HQ ALCON CITE AGSSE

4913

6 SEP 45

Confidential

SEP 10 1945

TOP SECRET PD

SUBJECT IS UPRISINGS AROUND BOLOGNA PD

PARA ONE TO AMO LO BOLOGNA FROM HQ ALCON CITE AGSSE PARAN

PARA ONE PD THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF FIFTH ARMY GABLE TO AFHQ
CMA REPORTED TO THIS HQ FOR INFORMATION CMA READS COLAS REPORTED
LEADERS IN BOLOGNA AREA ARE GRANDI ALBERTI AND A CERTAIN GIANNI
PD LEADER IN MODENA AREA IS DILEMO FERRARI CMA WHOSE GANG IS
BELIEVED RESPONSIBLE FOR NUMEROUS ROBBERIES CMA KILLINGS AND
BLACKMAIL AND INTIMIDATIONS PD RECOMMEND FERRARI BE APPREHENDED
AS A THREAT TO SECURITY PD

PARA TWO WILL YOU ENQUIRE FROM DISTRICT CONCERNED IF FERRARI HAS
IN FACT BEEN ARRESTED AND REPLY URGENTLY PD

Security Division

489081 - 367

Major

6356

(NAG KENNEL Y)

PA 11/9

3636

(342)

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APO 394

Tel : 489081-365

17 September 1945

AO/14191/PS

SEP 18 1945

SUBJECT : Murder of Farm Owners in Emilia.

TO : Liaison Officer, Bologna (att: E.S.O.)

1. The attached copy letter dated 14 September 45 and enclosure have been received by the Chief Commissioner.

2. Can it be stated please if this report of the death of 213 persons during 5 months is substantially true ?

John W. Chapman
JOHN W. CHAPMAN
Colonel, J.A.G.D.
Director.

23/9

Copy to Chief Commissioner
Exec. Comm. (Your 3636/EC refers) ✓
Economic Section.

(Hans Kerner)

PA
PAB 9/10

P. M.
63522
9
Hester

TOP SECRET

T 44447
EST 17/1911A

APPRO. REVIEWED SACRED CITE REVIEW
ACTION: ALCON

2/0056
EST 18/1100A
ROUTINE

Confidential

TOP SECRET.

1. Information has been received by this Headquarters that the Italian government propose reductions in the pay of the army and that discontent is likely to result.
2. In view of the important role of the Italian army in maintaining internal security during the coming winter SACRED views with concern any measure which may lead to a reduction in its efficiency during so critical a period.
3. Information is desired as to the extent of the proposed reductions together with your views as to the necessity for them and their effect on the efficiency of the army.
4. If you consider such a step appropriate you should inform the Italian government of SACRED's views as set forth in para 2 above

DLR

Copy number 1 ACTION: LAMP FINGER 80

:	:	2	INFO :	CHIEF COMMISSIONER
:	:	344		IN COMMISSIONER (2)
:	:	5		FOLOD (A)
:	:	6		FOLOD (B)
:	:	7		CA REC
:	:	8		FILE

(SEEN ON 8251/EC 6354 -

3636 d

77 (12)

11 September 1945

My dear Mr. Ambassador:

SEP 13 1945

Thank you for your letter of September 10, 1945 which forwarded a memorandum concerning the murder of farmers in Emilia Province over a five-month period.

Sincerely yours,

ELLEN W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

The Honorable Alexander Kirk
American Ambassador
119 Via Vittorio Veneto
Rome

Ex Comm:

cc file

COPY TO: CA Sec (P. S. M. Y. S. C.)

78-82
6303-414
6

3636 46

(76) (S) (H)

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, September 12, 1945

SEP 12 1945

My Dear Admiral,

9
The following is a copy of a memorandum to the Director of the Agricultural Section of the Embassy concerning the murder of a substantial number of farmers in Chile Province over a five-month period. If this information has not come to your attention from another source it will be of interest to the appropriate authorities of the Commission.

Sincerely yours,

A. Kirk

Enclosure

Rear Admiral Henry W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner,
Allied Commission,
Rome.

cc-EX 100

ACTING S.A. for sub
Safety S/C for ACTION

EXC INT-12 SEP 45

Action: C. A. Sec
(Rear Admiral)

MR. G. W. C. C. C.

EXC 100

COPI

September 6, 1945

TO : Ambassador Kirk
Mr. Livingston
Mr. Riker

FROM : James Herbert Kilgore

SUBJECT : Murders of farm owners in the Province of Bologna.

I regret to report that during the five-month period ending August 31, 1945, a total of 113 farm owners were murdered in the Province of Bologna according to information supplied to this officer on the occasion of a recent visit to the headquarters of the Farmers' Association of Bologna located at Bologna.

As I have pointed out in conversations with you since my return, this is a most heinous crime, and is believed largely to be of a terroristic nature designed to force farm owners to comply with certain political and social aims allegedly for the benefit of farm workers.

Before presenting this statement I have consulted with Captain Koeller, U.S. Agricultural Officer assigned to Bologna. Presently on duty at headquarters in Rome, and he states the information is substantially the same as that which he has been receiving.

6351

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Chief, Commission.

Attached is submitted for your ~~approval~~ signature information

W. C. S.

SEP 9 1950
D-130

23

C.S.O. / take care for information per 207659

24.Excerpt

At Dec 22. City are asking
 HPTAR as to who is asking re
 arrest of FERRARI at X
 would you like the signed copy
 to Col W. L. at Bologna?

C.S.O.

6/4

See Reports A.C.O. Bologna deal for confirmation
 or otherwise.

11/1/65

C.S.O. CAS26.

For action please in accordance
 with Mr. 20 at Mr. Please see cc's
 letter attached to

Would you tell me?

Ad. Walker

6/9

CSO

See Report to ACHO Bogue & ask for confirmation

or other wise.

11/1/65

28.

CSO CAS

For action please in accordance

with Mr. 28 at Mr. Moore's office

7/1/7

22 (63330)

28.2.9

Ex. C.

- 1/ Ret 28.2.28 action is at 27/2
- 2/ 28. report. Person already under arrest for murder confirmation as to this is being sought

21 8/7

1 SEP 1965

13

3636

28

ALCOA LIAISON OFFICER BOLGONA

1961

7 Sep 65

PRIORITY

Confidential

TOP SECRET 10

PARA ONE PD DO YOU CONSIDER FOLLOWING FROM FIVE AM CABLE TO AFM AS DESCRIPTION
SECURITY SITUATION BOLGONA COLOR QUOTE REPORT OF ARMY FIVE DIVISION SUBSTANTIALLY
CORRECT PD LARGELY ELEMENTS NOT HIGHERLY ORGANIZED IN THE
BOLGONA DASH BOLGONA DASH BARRIO AREA WITH POSSIBLE CHANCE OF TAKING OVER LOCAL
GOVERNMENT AT ONCE PD SCATTERED ATTACKS HAVE OCCURRED AGAINST
RELATED LOCATIONS PD THERE ARE CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF ARMED INDIVIDUALS
IN BOLGONA AREA ALTHOUGH ARMED MILITARY GOVERNMENT REPORTS POSITIVE POSSESSION
IN BOLGONA BOLGONA AND BOLGONA ARE HAVING IN AREA SATISFACTORILY PD REMOVAL OF
ARMS AND AMMUNITION CACHED BUT NO DEFINITE LOCATIONS PD
PARA TWO PD SMALL LOCAL RISKS AND ACTS OF BANDITRY MAY BE EXPECTED BUT NO
EVIDENCE OF LARGE SCALE UPRISINGS IN SEPTEMBER PD CARABINIERI CONSIDERED
EFFICIENT AND POORLY EQUIPPED PD RECOMMEND THEY BE REINFORCED ORA GIVEN
BETTER ARMS AND PROBABLY REFORCED PD

73H-95

See 6343

(20)

207 9

785017

TOP SECRET

(27)

4961

7 Sep 61

- 2

CONFIDENTIAL
Confidential

PAGE THREE PD REPORTED LEADERS IN BOLOGNA AREA ARE GRASPI ALBERTI AND A
CERTAIN QUOTE GILBERT UNQUOTE PD LEADER IN MEDINA AREA IS DIDDO FENHAI WHOSE
NAME IS BELIEVED RESPONSIBLE FOR NUMEROUS ASSAULTS AND KILLINGS AND BLACKMAIL
AND EXTORTIONS PD UNQUOTE

PAGE TWO ALSO LEADS OFFICE BOLOGNA FROM ALCO DETE AGAS PAREN

PAGE FOUR PD HAVE YOU ANY RECOMMENDATIONS ON COURSE THEREIN

Internal Distribution: Chief Commissioner.
Executive Commissioner.

Civil Affairs Section

505

6348

E.C. ^{3.36} Personal

Paras 2 & 3
are obviously
passed to us
not only for
"Info."

Please follow
up vigorously
1/9 JWS cc

3636
TOP SECRET

Ex Comm

COPY NO 3

CONFIDENTIAL

2/5623

SEP 06 1945

PRIORITY

SEP - 6 1945

From: VERONA AIRMAIL BOMBED SITE 5/10/45

To: AID OF ROSE

TOP SECRET.

Paraphrase of 3TH ARMY cable 5029 in reply to our EX 38345 is reproduced for information. Paraphrase begins.

1. Report of 22 DIVISION substantially correct. Lawless elements not necessarily organized in the VERONA - BOLOGNA - REGGIO Area with possible object of taking over local government at opportune moment. Scattered attacks have occurred against isolated landowners. There a considerable number of armed individuals in VERONA Area although AMR reports Partisan formations in areas BOLOGNA and VERONA are heading in areas satisfactorily. Numbers of arms and ammunition caches but no definite locations.

2. Small local riots and acts of banditry may be expected but no evidence of large scale uprising in September. Carabinieri considered insufficient and poorly equipped. Recommend they be reinforced, given better arms, and partially motorized.

3. Reported leaders in BOLOGNA Area are GRANDI ALBERTI and a certain "GIANNI". Leader in VERONA Area is DIDIMO FERRARI whose gang is believed responsible for numerous robberies killings blackmail and intimidations. Recommend FERRARI be apprehended as a threat to security.

4. VERONA Area is relatively quiet and stable. End of paraphrase.

DIST

COPY NO 1

ACTION

CA SEC

2

INFO

CHIEF COMMISSIONER

3

EX COMMISSIONER 2

POLAD (A)

POLAD (B)

POLAD (C)

L GOVT

FILE

6347

(1 Spec copy)

75R
 1123-224
 Final

(Flat Knives)

3686

75E

P 160
SEPT 3/1600p

7/6505
SEPT 5/0900p
routine

FROM: AMB PIERMONT REGION

TO: ALCON CTR ACPSF

SEP - 1945

75

UNCLASSIFIED.

1. Reference your 4541.
2. Message not understood.
3. please furnish details of subject matter

DIST

ACTION : PUBLIC SAFETY E

INFO : CHIEF COMMISSIONER
EX COMMISSIONER (2)
CA SEC
FILE (2)
FLOAT



6846

Ref: 3636/49/20.

S. Singh, L.S.

Subject: Illegal Retention of Arms.

To: G-5,
AFHQ.

34

I enclose a copy of a memorandum prepared by my Executive Commissioner on the above subject, with which I entirely agree.

I would draw your particular attention to para: 9 with the suggestion that the action therein indicated should be taken as soon as possible.

1st Floor, 10th Street

ELIJAH W. STONE,
Rear Admiral, USNR,
Chief Commissioner.

Encl.

115
M. G. Stone
(M. G. Stone)

To: *4-3,*
AFSC.

34 (Minute)

I enclose a copy of a memorandum prepared by my Executive Commissioner on the above subject, with which I entirely agree.

I would draw your particular attention to para: 9 with the suggestion that the action therein indicated should be taken as soon as possible.

1/1 (Minute)

ELMER E. SCOTT,
Rear Admiral, USNR,
Chief Commissioner.

115 (Minute)
referred
(M. J. Scott)

End.

File 12-1-1
for

AND LIGORIA REGION CIA AND FIDELITY REGION CIA AND LOMBARDIA
REGION CIA AND VENUEIA REGION ATTENTION INFO AND VENUEIA STUDIA
REGION ATTENTION INFO

4541

3 September 49

ROUTINE

SECRET ID

SUBJECT IS ISLAND FORMATION OF AREA OF CIVILIANS ID

PARA TWO AND LIGORIA REGION CIA AND FIDELITY REGION CIA AND

LOMBARDIA REGION CIA AND VENUEIA REGION ATTENTION INFO AND VENUEIA

REGION ATTENTION INFO FROM ALICE AREA APPENDIX

PARA ONE ID. PARA HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED AND INFORMATION ISSUED

ON THE SUBJECT ID

PARA TWO ID. SET IN TOUCH THE FIDELITY CIA AREA OF THE AREA

CONSIDER FOR DETAILS ID

Copies to :

~~Chief of Station~~
Executive Comm.
~~...~~

Public Safety 8/8

175217

NICHOLAS FIDELITY
CIA USA
Asst Adjutant.

6344/9

3636

754

BOSTON, WEDNESDAY

Allied Officials Concerned By Unrest in Italy

By Joseph G. Harrison

The Christian Science Monitor

MILAN, Italy, July 15—Allied officials are becoming increasingly anxious over the situation in northern Italy. During the three months which have elapsed since the liberation of this part of Italy, conditions for the average individual have grown steadily worse, with the result that many observers believe only radical improvement can prevent serious trouble.

The greatest popular unrest centers around the lack of work for northern Italy's big industrial population, and around the worsening food situation. Not only is unemployment the rule but workless men and women are now faced with a steady rise in the prices of food.

Milan and some other main industrial centers have already seen large popular demonstrations against the rising cost of living and are likely to see more in the near future.

Economic Breakdown

Both Allied and Italian officials are fully aware of the explosive nature of the present situation but none are able to offer much hope for improvement within any foreseeable period.

Qualified regarding the situation, officials admit its seriousness, but point out the difficulties in the way of any quick improvement.

They declare Italy is caught in the same economic breakdown which is sweeping or has swept all Europe and that any betterment in Italy's position depends in a large degree upon economic improvement elsewhere in the world.

Black Markets in Rome

In Rome one sees it in the extraordinary numbers of persons who make their living dealing in black marketed Allied military supplies, particularly cigarettes, clothing, and bolt rifles.

Entering Milan from the east one drives through the big industrial district of Sesto San Giovanni which is one long line of factories. Today one must look long and hard for any sign of industrial activity.

In fact, these plants seem as deserted today in the middle of July as they were when a first wave of them at the end of April when the city was being freed from the Germans.

Persons in closest touch with conditions here see little chance for any quick or radical improvement. Indeed it is the general opinion that the situation will show little if any change before next spring.

Work and Food Scarce

This means that in all likelihood Italy's big industrial centers face a winter in which both work and food will be scarce—actually a grievous combination.

Of course, everybody knows what Italian industry needs. It must have coal, raw materials, and markets. The difficulty comes when one attempts to find any of all these three requisites.

Coal and raw materials must either come from the United States and Britain which need their shipping for other purposes, or from European countries which need these products as desperately as does Italy.

Markets would be easier to find but then there is the problem of transportation since Europe's rail and road system has virtually collapsed under the war and fear of nearly six years of warfare.

War Out Possible

Present conditions are naturally causing great concern among persons of all political shades in Italy. I have met a considerable number of upper and middle class persons who are convinced that Italy is headed for serious trouble and eventual Communist or Socialist dictatorship.

Spoken for workers, on the other hand, express apprehension over a possible British coup.

Concerned by
Unrest in Italy

By Joseph G. Harrison
The Christian Science Monitor

ATLANT, Italy, July 12.—Allied officials are becoming increasingly anxious over the situation in northern Italy. During the three months which have elapsed since the liberation of this part of Italy, conditions for the average individual have grown steadily worse, with the result that many observers believe only radical improvement can prevent serious trouble.

The greatest popular unrest centers around the lack of work for northern Italy's big industrial population, and around the worsening food situation. Not only is unemployment the rule but wageless men and women are now faced with a steady rise in the price of food.

Milan and some other main industrial centers have already seen large popular demonstrations against the rising cost of living and are likely to see more in the near future.

Economic Breakdown

Both Allied and Italian officials are fully aware of the explosive nature of the present situation but none are able to offer much hope for improvement within any foreseeable period.

Questions regarding the situation, officials admit its seriousness, but point out the difficulties in the way of any quick improvement.

They declare Italy is caught in the same economic breakdown which is sweeping or has swept all Europe and that any betterment in Italy's position depends on a large degree upon economic improvement elsewhere in the world.

Everywhere one goes in Italy one sees clear and stark evidence of national poverty. In Naples one sees it in long rows of ragged men and boys who line up with empty cans in their hands to receive the refuse from American Army kitchens.

Florence, Milan from the east drive through the big industrial district of Sesto San Giovanni which is one long line of factories. Today one must look long and hard for any sign of industrial activity.

In fact, there plenty seem as departed today in the middle of July as they were when I last saw them at the end of April when the city was being freed from the Germans.

Persons in closest touch with conditions here see little chance for any quick or radical improvement. Indeed, it is the general opinion that the situation will show little if any change before next spring.

Work and Food Scarce

This means that in all big cities Italy a big industrial belt faces a winter in which both work and food will be scarce—undoubtedly a grave condition.

Of course, one should know what Italian industry needs. It must have coal, raw metals, and machines. The difficulty comes when one attempts to find any of all of these three requisites.

Coal and raw materials must either come from the United States and Britain which need their shipping for other purposes, or from European countries which send these products as desperately as does Italy.

Markets would be easier to find but there is the question of transportation since Europe's rail and road system has virtually collapsed under the wear and tear of nearly six years of warfare.

Was Out Possible

Present conditions are naturally causing great concern among persons of all political shades in Italy. I have met a considerable number of upper and middle class persons who are convinced that Italy is headed for serious trouble and eventual Communist or Socialist dictatorship.

Spokesmen for workers on the other hand, express depression over a possible Right-Wing coup d'etat, supported, they say, by conservative British and American officials.

Neither event is inevitable, but the situation is serious enough so that it warrants a much harder and more intelligent study than it has received either in Washington or London.

6343

TOP SECRET

EX COMMISSIONER 14

Copy No 3

3835
AUGUST 31/1711B

7/6109
SEPT 1/1109B

ROUTINE

SEP - 1 1945

From: FIFTH ARMY

To: ACTION: AHIQ INFO: DISTWO ALCOM

Confidential

RS

TOP SECRET.

1. All intelligence agencies have been instructed to increase activity to determine location of arms, arms dumps and ammunition in army area with particular attention directed to VERONA-MODENA Area. Ref AFHQ EX 38435 of 25 August cite FRICT. Separate report follows on result of investigation in this area as directed by AFHQ EX 38436 of 25 August cite FRICT.

2. DISTWO has issued instructions to 217 Area reference search for arms in army area. In view of turn-over of FIFTH ARMY Area to DISTWO at 310001B this action considered desirable to insure continuity of policy.

3. Since provinces of BOLOGNA, MODENA and REGGIO have been released to control of Italian govern as of 4 August 1945 assume by para 3 of AFHQ radio EX 38435 that Italian government will take necessary action other than investigation directed in EX 38436 in these areas

LIST

Copy Number 1 INFO-ACTION : PUBLIC SAFETY SC

•	•	2	INFO : CHIEF COMMISSIONER
•	•	3 2 4	EX COMMISSIONER (2)
•	•	5	POLAD (A)
•	•	6	POLAD (B) 342
•	•	7	CAS
•	•	8	FILE

TOP SECRET (1 5842 Copy)

Ref: 5636/EC.

1 Sept 1945.

SUBJECT: Arms - CC.RR.

TO : CA Section.

Executive Commissioner wishes you to provide him by 3 Sept 45 with a memorandum setting out the requests made (a) by the Italian Government, and (b) by the Allied Commission, to modernise the arms or to re-arm the CC.RR.

B. Talbot

Lt.Col.,
Chief Staff Officer,
to the Executive Commissioner.

/JC.

See 47
Blu file
S-4 3/9

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Executive Commission

at photo 91 is Bugader Dunlop
up to your letter at 80 regarding Bellum dump.

5/9

Si
cto

3636 2000
 HEADQUARTERS
 VENEZIE REGION
 Allied Military Government
 APO 394

4 SEP 1945

1 September, 1945

SEP - 4 1945

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission
 Office of the Executive Commissioner

SUBJECT : Ammunition Dumps Belluno Area.

FILE NO : RXII/386.834 (CEV)

Reference your letters, 9006/EC of 9th August,
 and 9006/82/EC of 28th August.

It is regretted that a formal reply to your letter of the 9th August has not been sent earlier though, in fact, this matter was fully discussed with the Executive Commissioner in the course of his drive through Belluno Province.

In order to gain an appreciation of the problem it is necessary to remember that not only is Belluno exceedingly mountainous and sparsely populated, but that it also was a frontier province and the scene of much fighting in the War of 1915-1918 between Italy and Austria. As a result, the whole area is honeycombed with battle positions of the last war. Dugouts, ammunition positions, command posts- all hewn out of the solid rock. The general effect is to make the area an ideal hiding place for ammunition and war-like stores. My personal view is that there is not much present activity in the direction of the creation of new dumps. On the other hand I am perfectly prepared to believe that there are considerable quantities of arms and ammunition still hidden in the mountainous districts. To search for them without some previous knowledge would require a division of troops and even then might be only partially successful. The most satisfactory method of finding out the position of these dumps of ammunition is to get information through some disaffected member of the band.

It is regretted that a formal reply to your letter of the 9th August has not been sent earlier. Though, in fact, this matter was fully discussed with the Executive Commissioner in the course of his drive through Belluno Province.

In order to gain an appreciation of the problem it is necessary to remember that not only is Belluno exceedingly mountainous and sparsely populated, but that it also was a frontier province and the scene of much fighting in the War of 1915-1918 between Italy and Austria. As a result, the whole area is honeycombed with battle positions of the last war. Dugouts, ammunition positions, command posts - all hewn out of the solid rock. The general effect is to make the area an ideal hiding place for ammunition and war-like stores. My personal view is that there is not much present activity in the direction of the creation of new dumps. On the other hand I am perfectly prepared to believe that there are considerable quantities of arms and ammunition still hidden in the mountainous districts. To search for them without some previous knowledge would require a division of troops and even then might be only partially successful. The most satisfactory method of finding out the position of these dumps of ammunition is to get information through some disgruntled member of the band. This method, however, demands time and time has been our difficulty to date. We have already carried out drives and searches for ammunition but only with moderate success. We can pick up the odd cache of ammunition hidden in houses and these are at least sufficient to give us evidence for a conviction on a charge of possession of arms. The big dumps are, however, still well hidden and we will not get these until we can give some assurance of protection to the informers.

[Signature]
Regional Commissioner

JKD/160

(2 True copies)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/RND No. 785017

Ref: 9006/32/BJ.

Tel : 478603
28 August 1945

SUBJECT: Assassination Dumps Belluno area.

TO : Regional Commissioner, Venezia Region.

It is requested that an answer may now be given to this
HQ letter No. 9006/BJ dated 9 August 1945.

R. W. KEMLEY
Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

6539

3636

19
80

Ref: 9006/EC

9 August 1945.

SUBJECT: Reports of Ammunition Dumps
in BELLUNO area.

TO : Regional Commissioner,
VENETIAN REGION.

I am rather concerned at the reports which have reached me of ammunition dumps presumably formed by the partisans in the BELLUNO area. I understand these have been reported to your Provincial Officers from time to time but no action has been taken. I would be glad to hear from you on this subject.

For the Chief Commissioner.

M. S. LUSH

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

80 on Fr. Com. action

10/8

See Memo 11/52

CV

17/8

633

BU

27/8

Noted

3636
TOP SECRET

29 AUG 1945

Confidential

28 August 1945

SUBJECT: Current Situation in ITALY.

TO : The Secretaries,
Combined Chiefs of Staff,
1901 Constitution Avenue,
Washington, D.C.

1. By direction of the Supreme Allied Commander, the attached copies of an appreciation on the current situation in ITALY are forwarded for information.

2. The Supreme Allied Commander has approved the recommendations of this paper and, in so far as is in his power, has instituted action in accordance with them.

[Signature]
J. L. GASTON, JR.,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander.

Incls:
6 copies of above.

Copy to:
The Secretary to the British Chiefs of Staff.

Copy to:
Chief Commission, ALCOM (one copy of incl)

TOP SECRET

S E C R E T

3636

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED COMMISSION
PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION
Milan

① Polad B
② Polad B
③ Return to
4 August 1945 D/E/L

PS/5075/M
tel. 12670 ext 250

AUG 27 1945

SUBJECT : Report on Situation in Piemonte Region

TO : Colonel N. E. PISKE,
Acting Executive Commissioner,
Hq Allied Commission, APO 394

1. There is no immediate danger of a revolution or any Communist movement that might end in bloodshed as the result of withdrawal of AMG from Piemonte. This was the opinion voiced by Lt-Col Turner-Coles, DRC Piemonte Region and Major Mighall, RPSO.

2. While it is true that AMG posted numerous proclamations and orders practically none of them were enforced. The Partisans turned in very few arms. The substantial citizens did not react to the order to surrender arms because young hoodlums were going about entering homes, committing robbery, rape etc. These people apparently felt justified to keep arms in order to protect their families. It was discussed in some towns where more serious crimes have been committed to make a house to house search for arms. This plan was dropped because it was felt that would only find a few arms in possession of reliable citizens and the trouble makers and young gangsters had their arms hidden in the mountains. AMG is now gradually bringing in small numbers of arms from alledged Partisans that are getting exceptionally bold. It is believed that there are large caches of arms hidden, whether or not these arms will be used to cause serious trouble in Northern Italy depends largely on whether or not the Italian Government takes a firm hand in dealing with the first signs of an outbreak. It is believed that one way the Allied Forces can aid the Italian Government is to see that police agencies, particularly the Carabinieri, are immediately screened and that new equipment, with a strong stress on transportation, be allotted. If the Italian population is given evidence that the Allied Forces respect the Italian police agencies and aid them in securing necessary equipment, this in itself will do much toward aiding in the security of this country.

Clarence L. Farber
CLARENCE L. FARBER,
Captain, Ordnance
Public Safety Officer

6338

See M6

Spoke Copy

SECRET

Confidential

Tel: 735

Ref: 3636/BO.

5 September 1945.

SUBJECT: Political Situation - Novara Province.

TO : Political Adviser (B).

The attached copy of memorandum No. PR/NO/58 dated 18 AUG 45, on the above subject, received from the Provincial Commissioner Novara Province, is forwarded as requested.

R. W. KEMSLEY

Chief Staff Officer,
To Executive Commissioner.

Incl:
as above

Copy to: Polad (A)

6330

785017

8327

Ex. Comm.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
FIDELITY REGION
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
APO 394

20 August 1945

AUG 24 1945

REFERENCE : PR/ISO/111.1

SUBJECT : Political Situation,
Novara Province.

TO : As Under

1. Herewith copy of communication PR/NO/38 dated 18 August '45, received by the Regional Commissioner from the Provincial Commissioner, Novara Province.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL MARSHALL

A. W. MICHLEBERRY
Capt. R.A.
Exec. S. G. (D)

TO : G. S. I. H. Q., 2 District
Assoc. Commissioner, H. Q., A. G.
Public Safety Div., H. Q., A. G.
R. P. S. G. Pleurade

(Not Known)

6334

HEADQUARTERS
NOVARA PROVINCE
ARMED FORCES GOVT.
MILITARY REGION
NOV 1945

REFERENCE: PR/MO/58

SUBJECT: POLITICAL SITUATION IN NOVARA.

TO : H. AND MILITARY REGION
(Attention Region Commissioner)

AUG 2, 1945

1. The published early withdrawal of AMG has been hailed with delight for some weeks past by the would be hammer and sickle imitators in Novara. Threats have been made to individuals based always on the assumption that AMG would pull out on the 1st August 45. This in itself is perhaps no more than a minor menace, and falls into line with the personal vengeance mentality of these people AMG are trying to help and control.
2. What is much more grave is the certainty that some form of revelation will occur, which, if not rapidly suppressed may lead to civil war. It will not be one of those bloodless victories, in that the Monarchist - gun - Reactionary people are also arming themselves for the coming conflict. The Provincial Commissioner has been personally approached by a local individual of standing for permission to form depots of arms and ammunition. In this instance the intention was to disclose the full facts to AMG. Nevertheless it automatically follows that if one group is in a position to request permission; others must have similar facilities. The potential menace of the whole set-up admits of no contradiction. The whole of this paragraph refers to the resistance which will be offered to the Communists.

3. The intentions of the Communists are at best half-veiled. Moscatelli is a known quantity who under considerable charms of manner cloaks murderous intentions. The hidden arms run into colossal figures. All of this has been reported on, and military co-operation has already resulted in the uprooting of some of the arms referred to. Nevertheless many of the raids have been abortive. Moscatelli is much too well informed. It is reliably stated that when one of the Partisan groups was searching on Novara shortly before the day of liberation it was surprised by Moscatelli's outfit who confiscated as the result 44 armoured vehicles. These are all stated to be hidden in small farms on the outskirts of the town of Novara. The informer in this instance is the Colonel on the active list who is in charge of this District.

of revolution will occur, which, if not rapidly suppressed may lead to civil war. It will not be one of those bloodless victories, in that the monarchist - our - reactionary people are also arming themselves for the coming conflict. The provincial Commander has been personally approached by a local individual of standing for permission to form depots of arms and ammunition. In this instance the intention was to disclose the full facts to AMG. Nevertheless it automatically follows that if one group is in a position to request permission; others must have similar facilities. The potential menace of the whole set-up admits of no contradiction. The whole of this paragraph refers to the resistance which will be offered to the Communists.

3. The intentions of the Communists are at best half-veiled. Montecelli is a known quantity who under considerable charges of manner cloaks murderous intentions. The hidden arms run into colossal figures. All of this has been reported on, and military co-operation has already resulted in the destruction of some of the arms referred to. Nevertheless many of the raids have been abortive. Montecelli is much too well informed. It is reliably stated that when one of the Partisan groups was searching on Novara shortly before the day of liberation it was surprised by Montecelli's outfit who confiscated as the result it secured vehicles. These are all stated to be hidden in small farms on the outskirts of the town of Novara. The informer in this instance is the Colonel on the active list who is in charge of this District.

4. It is the considered opinion of the writer that the retention of Allied troops, unless concentrated in the district, will not act as a deterrent. It will be necessary to retain Allied troops on the spot.

5. The withdrawal of AMG will precipitate a crisis, and this fact is now placed on record. AMG on the spot may appear to accomplish little in a military sense, but its moral effect on the civilian population is enormous.

6. If the above opinions carry any weight at all, it is strongly urged that the following methods be applied:-
(a) That AMG should remain until the bulk of the known and hidden arms have been collected. Military co-operation should

See First

Confidential

42-12

Continue to be made available to the public. Should withdraw when the figure show that a parade of organized armed force will be impossible.

(b) Moscatelli, Sindaco of Novara, in his capacity as such, should be called upon to use the medium of the press to urge his satellites to hand in their arms and renounce all ideas of military prowess. This would call for the re-institution of military censorship. Moscatelli's own paper - "La Stella Alpina" - should be put back into circulation with this end in view.

(c) When this has been done Moscatelli should be transferred to one of these Hostelties for which Italy is so justly famous. Finding the occasion for doing so should be a simple matter.

7. Whilst it is known that the other Northern Provinces have each their peculiar problems it is firmly believed here that Novara will initiate revolution unless provision is made on the lines indicated above.

8. The above report is submitted with a view to onward transmission. It is essentially not an effort to prolong a life of luxury and ease.

18 AUGUST 1945

/s/ C.P. MURCHIE
/s/ C.P. MURCHIE
Major

Provincial Commissioner
Novara Province.

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16 AUGUST 1945

/s/ C.F. MURCHIE

/s/ C.F. MURCHIE

Major

Provincial Commissioner

Novara Province.

6332

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

(437)

Folios 677 transferred to file 9258/52
Press Release Ref/102/401/Sec of 21 Aug 45

cc - #7
See M ~~25~~ 11

of Middleton
6381
PA 31/6 Cpl

3636
3/25
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

4/6.3/CA

23 Aug 45

SUBJECT : RCs' Meeting.

AUG 23 1945

TO : Executive Commissioner.

- 1 May I refer to the Minutes of the Regional Commissioners' Meeting of 12 Aug 45 issued under 511/EC of 14 Aug 45 and to para 1, 3rd sub-para on page 2. This sub-para refers to the use of economic sanctions and to the matter of publicity in regard to the import of Allied supplies.
- 2 I consider that a well-directed publicity campaign in regard to the importation of coal and raw materials might prove invaluable and be equivalent to several units of internal security troops. The effect of increased imported supplies on the existing widespread unemployment and the necessity for peaceful conditions to enable their rapid distribution should be constantly kept before the public. Similar remarks apply to another main "industry" - resumption of tourist traffic.
- 3 I should be strongly opposed to economic sanctions but serious disorders would prevent the importation and distribution of raw materials and the Italians thereby would impose upon themselves economic sanctions.
- 4 I am unaware to what extent publicity may be possible and I only draw attention to the matter because it seemed to me that the matter was left rather in the air at the Conference and may get lost sight of.

M. Carr By.
M. CARR, Brig.
VP CA Section.

6330

(CARR Admin) (B)

EXTRACT FROM MINUTES OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONER'S MEETING
- 13 AUG 45.

Page 2 sub para 3

Brigadier Anderson suggested the use of economic sanctions, i.e. the cutting off of supplies, in the event of serious disorder, but Executive Commissioner did not consider this to be practicable. He agreed, however, that the matter could be publicised.

See P. 139/40

29 August 1945

36

Dear

Maurice

31

Here are our views on the points in your paper on which you want my comment:-

1. With reference to paragraph marked in pencil 'X', the use of Italian troops for enforcement of law where no disturbances are taking place would be for the decision of the Italian Government, and it appears that a state of martial law would have to be declared in order to permit search of private property and seizure of these weapons. This sort of enforcement of law is usually done by the local prefects with the assistance of the carabinieri and not the Army.
2. With reference to paragraph marked 'XX', I suggest that the words "Moreover, the Italian Army is under the control of your Headquarters and the" be deleted. Italian troops under War Ministry control, that is the security brigades and others in the ITI-III category are not for the purpose of local defense under control of AFHQ. The system set up in the AFHQ letter referred to in this paragraph provides that the local Italian civil authorities enforce the law with the carabinieri, and if the carabinieri are unable to deal with the situation they then appeal to the nearest Italian military headquarters for assistance of such Italian troops as are available. I believe that AFHQ does not intend that Italian troops of any category be used as aid to the civil power except in the event of riot or disorder and then as called out by the local Italian civil authorities. However if the Italian Government declared a state of siege for the purpose of getting its arms, then Italian troops could be used for that purpose.

Yours *Em*
Langley Browning
Major General, USA.

Brig. M.S. LUSH,
CB, CBE, MC,
Executive Commissioner, A.C.

6528

DRAFT

SECRET

READING

Confidential

Ref:

27 AUG 45

SUBJECT: Illegal Stocks of Arms and Civil Disturbances
in Italian Government Territory.

TO: AFHQ, Chief of Staff.

- 1 With reference to your unnumbered Secret letter of 21 Aug 45 on the subject of illegal stocks of arms and civil disturbances in Italian Government territory I am approaching the Italian Government as directed in your letter under reference and will report on its reactions as early as possible.

There are, however, certain aspects affecting this urgent and important matter to which I feel I should draw your attention at this stage.
- 2 Your letter refers to the use of the Italian Army in the collection of arms illegally held by civilians.

Civilians who are illegally in possession of arms in Italian Government territory are committing an offence against the civil law. The Italian civil population pay no regard whatever, as in the case of many other laws to the laws relating to the possession of firearms, etc.

1 With reference to your unnumbered Secret letter of 21 Aug 45 on the subject of illegal stocks of arms and civil disturbances in Italian Government territory I am approaching the Italian Government as directed in your letter under reference and will report on its reactions as early as possible.

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Civilians who are illegally in possession of arms in Italian Government territory are committing an offense against the civil law. The Italian civil regulation pay no regard whatever, as in the case of many other laws to the laws relating to the possession of firearms, etc. Normally no offense is disclosed because the arms remain hidden ^{6.2.45} and appear only in times of riot or disturbance.

The use of Italian troops in the enforcement of the law in circumstances where no disturbances are taking place, or no state of martial law exists, would be ~~new~~ exceptional.

Moreover, the Italian Army is under the control of your Headquarters and the instructions contained in your ^{13/370.6/205} CTRG of 6 Jan 45 envisage the use of Italian troops in aid of the civil power only in the event of riot or disorder.

~~Confidential~~

3 I presume it will be agreed that the collection of large quantities of hidden arms in the possession of individuals is a most difficult task. It can only be effected if areas are sealed off and thoroughly combed, involving hours to house search in many instances. Such operations entail the use of considerable numbers of police and/or troops which also require to have the necessary degree of mobility. From past experience, co-ordinated action between Prefects, the Carabinieri and other police forces and the Italian Army has hitherto proved very difficult to achieve, especially as Italian military districts do not agree with Provincial boundaries.

An instance of the difficulties of achieving results is to be found in SILEX where, despite the fact that the Island was occupied over two years ago and underwent a long period of Allied Military Government and notwithstanding all efforts made since to improve the situation, little or no progress has been made in reducing the large number of arms illegally held by individuals and communities throughout the Island.

4 Your letter refers in general to territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government and in particular to the area covered by No. 3 District.

I feel, however, that I should point out that according to my information the situation in the areas of the North, (excluding, possibly, UDINE and VERCELLA GIULIA which still contain considerable numbers of Allied Troops) which are under AMG and covered by No. 2 District,

Italian Army has hitherto proved very difficult to achieve, especially as Italian military districts do not agree with provincial boundaries.

An instance of the difficulties in achieving results is to be found in SICILY where, despite the fact that the Island was occupied over two years ago and underwent a long period of Allied Military Government and notwithstanding all efforts made since to improve the situation, little or no progress has been made in reducing the large number of arms illegally held by individuals and communities throughout the Island.

Your letter refers in general to territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government and in particular to the area covered by No. 3 District.

I feel, however, that I should point out that according to my information the situation in the areas of the North, (excluding, possibly, UMBRIA and MARCHE) which still contain considerable numbers of Allied troops) which are under AMG and covered by No. 2 District is similar, if not considerably worse.

I have already recommended to your Headquarters that North Italy (with the exception of VALLE D'AOSTA and the Province of UMBRIA) should be handed over to the jurisdiction of the Italian Government with effect from September 15th of some near date. In making this recommendation the unsatisfactory situation prevailing as regards law and order and arms illegally in possession of the civilian population was put as clearly as possible. Whatever date is eventually decided upon, it would appear that Northern Italian territory as given above may pass under Italian jurisdiction in the near future.

Confidential

Allied forces have been or are being withdrawn from the Regions of the North, leaving large quantities of arms in the hands of the civilian population and mainly in those of the worse elements. During the operational phase partisans are estimated to have handed in one weapon per capita which was not, probably, their best weapon but at the same time to have retained one or more good weapons.

My Regional Commissioners in ALL territory of LOMBARDIA, PIEMONTE, LIGURIA and VALLE D'AOSTA report that virtually no progress is being made in the collection of large quantities of arms held illegally by the civil population. This is due to the strength of the Italian police agencies being totally inadequate for the task and to the non-availability of Allied troops for the purpose. Raids are made from time to time on suspected arms dumps but so far results have been insignificant.

The Italian Government might well draw attention to a state of affairs in which, with the very limited resources at their disposal, they are called upon to rectify in Italian Government territory, a situation which the Allied authorities in conjunction with the Italian administration with much greater means at their disposal have failed to control in the North.

5 In my view the Italian Government and its forces of law and order, despite any assurances which may be given, have neither the capacity nor the task of collecting or once the illegal arms

632

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By Regional Commissioners in ALL territory of LOMBARDIA, PIEMONTE, LIGURIA and VENETIA all report that virtually no progress is being made in the collection of large quantities of arms held illegally by the civil population. This is due to the strength of the Italian police agencies being totally inadequate for the task and to the non-availability of Allied troops for the purpose. Raids are made from time to time on suspected arms dumps but so far results have been insignificant.

The Italian Government might well draw attention to a state of affairs in which, with the very limited resources at their disposal, they are called upon to rectify in Italian Government territory, a situation which the Allied authorities in conjunction with the Italian administration with much greater means at their disposal have failed to control in the North.

In my view the Italian Government and its forces of law and order, despite any assurances which may be given, have neither the capacity nor the means to carry out the task of collecting at once the illegal arms held by civilians in Italian Government territory thereby affecting what the Allied authorities and AMB, together with the Italian administration, failed to achieve in the past in areas of the South such as SICILY and so far in existing circumstances have failed to achieve in Northern Italy.

Copy

~~Confidential~~ ~~SECRET~~

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Chief of Staff

35B

21 Aug 45

SUBJECT: Illegal Stocks of Arms and Civil Disturbances in
Italian Government Territory.

TO: Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, APC 394.

- 1 The large quantities of illegal arms held by civilians in Italian Government territory and the failure of the Italian authorities to take adequate steps for their collection has been brought to the notice of this Headquarters by Commander, 3 District. The latter, moreover, has been officially informed by the Commander of the Naples Division of the Carabinieri that in present circumstances he is of the opinion that the forces under his command are insufficient and inadequately equipped to maintain order should any emergency arise.
- 2 The suggestion that the Carabinieri are inadequately armed emphasizes the necessity for their receiving proper support from the Italian Army and the local Italian authorities, notably the Prefects, and also points to the vital importance of collecting at once all illegal arms held by civilians.
- 3 You are directed to approach the Italian Government and place the following before them:
 - (a) It is and has been the policy of the Supreme Allied Commander to recommend that the Italian Government take the strongest possible steps to deal with civil disturbances within their own territory. It appears, however, that the Carabinieri cannot take effective action in dealing with disturbances of any magnitude unless they receive proper guidance and support from the local Prefects, who must be prepared to call for military assistance, if they consider such a course necessary. To this end, the Prefects themselves should receive from the Italian Government clear and definite directions as to their duties and responsibilities.
 - (b) The collection of illegal stocks of arms held by civilians is considered as one of prime importance and as a matter which can only be brought about by properly planned and co-ordinated action between the Prefects, the Carabinieri and the Italian Army.
 - (c) The present situation is viewed with gravity as it is considered

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Confidential

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that any further deterioration in it is likely to have the most serious consequences. In this connection the Italian Government must realize that their ability to maintain law and order must inevitably be an important factor affecting any decision of the Allied Government in regard to the return of further territory to Italian control.

At the same time you should point out that, despite repeated requests, specific information as to the action taken by the Italian Government, following on the disturbances in the ANTERA and RINERVINO areas in June last, is still awaited. In this connection, it should also be stated to the Italian Government that, whatever these measures were, it is apparent that they were inadequate as they did not prevent renewed incidents occurring in the RAM area on 2 August. You should reiterate the serious view which the Supreme Allied Commander takes of these disturbances.

A report is required on the reactions of the Italian Government to your approach in accordance with the foregoing instructions.

By command of Field Marshal ALEXANDER:

(Sgd) W.D. Morgan
(S) W.D. MORGAN
Lieutenant General,
Chief of Staff.

6327

35

Ref: 3686/35/82.

30 August 1945.

SUBJECT: Illegal Stocks of Arms and Civil Disturbances
in Italian Government Territory.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
Attn: Office of Chief of Staff.

25

Receipt is acknowledged of the letter dated 21 August
1945 instructing the Chief Commissioner to approach the Italian
Government in regard to measures to be taken for dealing with civil
disturbances and for the collection of illegal stores of arms.

For the Chief Commissioner:

M B LUSH

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

Copy to: CA Section.

6322

SECRET

34

Ref: 3626/EC.

Confidential 29th August 1945.

Chief Commissioner.

MEMORANDUM ON THE ILLUSORY RETENTION OF ARMS.

1. The state of a country which has been beset by war and civil war in which all parties have deliberately or through defeat allowed enormous quantities of arms and munitions to pass into the hands of individuals presents a difficult problem of public security.
2. Italy has suffered war and civil war. Every party has poured arms and munitions into the countryside or has left enormous depots ripe for spoliation by the civilian population. The people have been ruled by force for a generation and have seen that only victory by force of arms has defeated the tyrannical form of government to which they have been subjected. Moreover, they have no confidence as yet in the government which has taken its place nor the machinery which that government uses to enforce law and order. The protection of the individual has become a matter for the individual, for they distrust the competency and honesty of purpose of their rulers. Individuals therefore become their own armed policemen.
3. Until confidence in the government and its organs of law and order is restored, this will continue. Laws and decrees forbidding retention of arms will be ignored: for a civil population will respect not law which does not itself give the individual protection. Purges and witch hunts for arms will have little effect for where a population remains armed and lacks confidence, no information will be given leading to the seizure of arms from any particular individual or group.
4. Of course there are those who take advantage of this state of affairs and with anarchical ideas maintain hidden arsenals and depots which in due time they use or hope to use either for political or criminal purposes. Even against these little or no information will be laid unless and until confidence in the forces of law and order, in the government, and in the future, has returned to the population. Such being the case, purges and raids for arms are not likely to achieve success - rather may they add to general dislocation and lack of confidence which is natural after battle.

6321/6 34A

-2-

5. For the success of any action taken by the forces of law and order against illegal retention of arms - whether these forces be indigenous or occupational - depends on the information supplied as to where arms and munitions are to be found. Even if a specific area, e.g., Route 9, West of MODENA, be suspected to contain arms, a successful raid for arms depends on local information as to their whereabouts. A house to house, and field to field search is unthinkable, however large the force employed. Unless information is forthcoming, raids will be generally unsuccessful. Lack of success will increase the boldness of the anarchists and reduce the confidence of the general public and of the local forces of law and order.

6. What then is the solution? I submit that the harvesting of illegally retained arms is a long term process which, unless success is achieved in the first few days and weeks of occupation, must be treated, notwithstanding the distaste for lawbreaking and the risk of disorder, as a long term policy. Where information is forthcoming a short sharp raid should follow and, if successful, immediate and vigorous justice should be applied. But generally the policy should be not to institute general arms-hunts which are wasteful of men and barren of result, but to use the same Allied military organisations to assist, train and supplement the local indigenous forces of law and order and by giving them confidence in themselves, provoke mutual confidence from the public who will not be slow to realise real assistance given to the Italian police forces and to add their individual assistance.

7. A great example of such assistance is shown in the efforts being made by Brigadier Graham, OC, AGRA, FURIN, to assist, re-equip, train and rehabilitate the OC.RR in the area under his command. He is already achieving success and is content to limit his efforts to the first objective of creating an efficient police force before enforcing the law which it must protect, realising that this must be a prerequisite to the recovery of illegally possessed arms and munitions.

8. There are sufficient Allied troops in Northern Italy to make it possible to repeat throughout the territory this attempt of Brigadier Graham to make the OC.RR a confident, dependable and efficient force. Without it, no orders to recover arms can be expected to succeed.

9. It is therefore suggested that AFHQ signal FX 38435 of 25 Aug 45 be followed by an instruction to the addressees that as a preliminary step they do everything in their power, in consultation with AMG, to assist the OC.RR and local police agencies and help them materially and by advice and training to become a force respected by themselves and the public, and effective. Without them, Allied troops will be useless: so trained and encouraged the OC.RR and police forces could so establish confidence that they could do more than Allied troops themselves to restore stability and order in the matter of illegal retention of arms.

10. I have written the above in the light of experiences of precisely the same sort in three other countries liberated by Allied troops in which arms have been previously freely distributed by Allies and enemy alike.

DISTRIBUTION

FOUR (7)
FOUR (6)
FOUR (5) AGRA
FOUR (4) N. (AGRA)
FOUR (3) AGRA

REL/JG.

M 8320/1002
Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

SECRET

32

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
AFHQ
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

Confidential

Ref: AE/12602/P3.

27 Aug 45

SUBJECT: Illegal Stocks of Arms and Civil Disturbances
in Italian Government Territory.

TO: Executive Commissioner.

- 24/8
- 1 With reference to your 3635/27/23 of 23 Aug 45 attached, and the discussions we had on the question of collection of illegal arms. Am agreed I attach two copies of a draft letter to AFHQ.
 - 2 I have not discussed this matter with MMIA who failed to send a representative to our meeting and it will be necessary for this to be done as regards the two major points in respect of control of the Italian Army by the Italian Government and its employment on collection of hidden arms.
 - 3 Since our meeting, the situation has changed somewhat in that AFHQ have sent a telegram to 5 Army, XIII Corps, and 2 District ordering methodical searching operations to commence immediately in the North. You have a copy of this telegram - EX 36435 of 26 Aug 45.
 - 4 In view of the foregoing I suggest that the first step is for MMIA to be consulted as regards the use of the Italian Army for the purpose envisaged, especially as, so far as I am aware, the Italian Army is not under the control of the Italian Government.
 - 5 When this point has been cleared, the Chief Commissioner could then approach the Italian Government.
 - 6 A letter on the lines of the attached draft could be sent, if the Chief Commissioner so desires; in any case it may be necessary to take up with AFHQ the question of the Italian Army still being under AFHQ control.

ME
L. CAG,
Brigadier.
VF SA Section.
6319

PLAIN

SECRET

READING

Confidential

Ref:

27 Aug 45

SUBJECT: Illegal Stocks of Arms and Civil Disturbances
in Italian Government Territory.

TO: AFHQ, Chief of Staff.

- 1 With reference to your unnumbered Secret letter of 21 Aug 45 on the subject of illegal stocks of arms and civil disturbances in Italian Government territory I am approaching the Italian Government as directed in your letter under reference and will report on its reactions as early as possible.

There are, however, certain aspects affect this urgent and important matter to which I feel I should draw your attention at this stage.

- 2 Your letter refers to the use of the Italian Army in the collection of arms illegally held by civilians.

Civilians who are illegally in possession of arms in Italian Government territory are committing an offense against the civil law. The Italian civil population pay no regard whatever, as in the case of any other laws, to the laws relating to the possession of firearms, etc.

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The use of Italian troops in the enforcement of the law in circumstances where no disturbances are taking place, or no state of martial law exists, would be ~~an~~ exceptional.

Moreover, the Italian Army is under the control of your Headquarters and the instructions contained in your AF/370.6/005 CDTG of 6 Jan 45 envisage the use of Italian troops in aid of the civil power only in the event of riot or disorder.

- 2 -

Confidential

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3 I presume it will be agreed that the collection of large quantities of hidden arms in the possession of individuals is a most difficult task. It can only be effected if areas are sealed off and thoroughly combed, involving house to house search in many instances. Such operations entail the use of considerable numbers of police and/or troops which also require to have the necessary degree of mobility. From past experience, co-ordinated action between Prefects, the Carabinieri and other police forces and the Italian Army has hitherto proved very difficult to achieve, especially as Italian military districts do not agree with Provincial boundaries.

An instance of the difficulties of achieving results is to be found in SICILY where, despite the fact that the Island was occupied over two years ago and underwent a long period of Allied Military Government and notwithstanding all efforts made since to improve the situation, little or no progress has been made in reducing the large number of arms illegally held by individuals and communities throughout the Island.

4 Your letter refers in general to territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government and in particular to the area covered by No. 3 District.

I feel, however, that I should point out that according to my information the situation in the areas of the North, (excluding, possibly, UMBRIA and VENETIA GIULIA which still contain considerable numbers of Allied troops) which are under AMG and covered by Nos. 1 and 2 Districts

to have the necessary degree of mobility. From past experience, co-ordinated action between Prefects, the Carabinieri and other police forces and the Italian Army has hitherto proved very difficult to achieve, especially as Italian military districts do not agree with Provincial boundaries.

An instance of the difficulties of achieving results is to be found in UDINE where, despite the fact that the island was occupied over two years ago and underwent a long period of Allied Military Government and notwithstanding all efforts made since to improve the situation, little or no progress has been made in reducing the large number of arms illegally held by individuals and communities throughout the Island.

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I have already recommended to your Headquarters that North Italy (with the exception of VERCELLA GIULIA and the Province of UDINE) should be handed over to the jurisdiction of the Italian Government with effect from September 15th or some near date. In making this recommendation the unsatisfactory situation prevailing as regards law and order and arms illegally in possession of the civilian population was put as clearly as possible. Whatever date is eventually decided upon, it would appear that Northern Italian territory as given above may pass under Italian jurisdiction in the near future.

- 3 -

Allied forces have been or are being withdrawn from the Regions of the North, leaving large quantities of arms in the hands of the civilian population and mainly in those of the worse elements. During the operational phase partisans are estimated to have handed in one weapon per capita which was not, probably, their best weapon but at the same time to have retained one or more good weapons.

My Regional Commissioners in ASG territory of LOMBARDIA, PIEMONTE, LIGURIA and VENETIA all report that virtually no progress is being made in the collection of large quantities of arms held illegally by the civil population. This is due to the strength of the Italian police agencies being totally inadequate for the task and to the non-availability of Allied troops for the purpose. Raids are made from time to time on suspected arms dumps but so far results have been insignificant.

The Italian Government might well draw attention to a state of affairs in which, with the very limited resources at their disposal, they are called upon to rectify in Italian Government territory, a situation which the Allied authorities in conjunction with the Italian administration with such greater means at their disposal have failed to control in the North.

- 5 In my view the Italian Government and its forces of law and order, despite any assurances which may be given, have neither the capacity nor the means to carry out the task of collecting at once the illegal arms

by National Commission

LICURIA and VENEZIA all report that virtually no progress is being made in the collection of large quantities of arms held illegally by the civil population. This is due to the strength of the Italian police agencies being totally inadequate for the task and to the non-availability of Allied troops for the purpose. Raids are made from time to time on suspected arms dumps but so far results have been insignificant.

The Italian Government might well draw attention to a state of affairs in which, with the very limited resources at their disposal, they are called upon to rectify in Italian Government territory, a situation which the Allied authorities in conjunction with the Italian administration with much greater means at their disposal have failed to control in the North.

5 In my view the Italian Government and its forces of law and order, despite any assurances which may be given, have neither the capacity nor the means to carry out the task of collecting at once the illegal arms held by civilians in Italian Government territory thereby effecting what the Allied authorities and AMG. together with the Italian administration, failed to achieve in the past in areas of the South such as SICILY and so far in existing circumstances have failed to achieve in Northern Italy.

TOP SECRET

78

FX 38435
AUG 252007B

P 5403
AUG 261700B
ROUTINE

From: FREEDOM SIGNED SIGNED

To: 5 ARMY 13 CORPS DISTWO INFO DISTONE DISTHREE PENBASE RAAC 26 AUG 1945

TOP SECRET

1. Numerous reports have been received of considerable quantities of arms and ammunition in illegal possession of civilians all over ITALY. Attempts may be made by extremist elements to take advantage of withdrawal of Allied Forces and grave economic position of ITALY to seize power by force.

2. 5 ARMY 13 CORPS DISTWO will immediately institute methodical searching operations with the objects of seizing all illegally held arms and bringing their owners to justice using such troops as are available for this purpose.

3. ALCON have already been instructed by this Hq to press Italian Govt to take energetic measures to collect illegally held arms in territory under their control.

(Message routed to ALCON although ALCON not in addressee in view of contents considered advisable to deliver for info. British Military Ciphers ALCON.)

Dist

No 1 Copy Info-Action - P Safety SC
2 Info & Chief Commissioner
3 Exec Commr
4 CA Section
5 File 634

TOP SECRET

Secret

Confidential *2*

47
Ref: 3636/27/73

23 August 45

SUBJECT: Illegal Stocks of Arms and Civil Disturbances in Italian Government Territory

TO : Civil Affairs Section

1. Enclosed is copy of a letter received from AFHQ, Office of the Chief of Staff, with reference to the above subject.

2. The Executive Commissioner directs that a letter be drafted for the Chief Commissioner's signature to the Italian Government embodying the terms outlined by Lt. Gen. Morgan; also that a letter be drafted acknowledging General Morgan's letter.

1 Incl.
as above

[Signature]
4/Chief Staff Officer
To Executive Commissioner.

See 32

6344

Secret

SECRET

Ex Commission

824

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Chief of Staff

Confidential

21 August 1945

Aug 22 1945

SUBJECT: Illegal Stocks of Arms and Civil Disturbances in Italian Government Territory.

TO : Chief Commissioner,
Allied Commission, APO 394.

1. The large quantities of illegal arms held by civilians in Italian Government territory and the failure of the Italian authorities to take adequate steps for their collection has been brought to the notice of this Headquarters by Commander, 3 District. The latter, moreover, has been officially informed by the Commander of the Naples Division of the Carabinieri that in present circumstances he is of the opinion that the forces under his command are insufficient and inadequately equipped to maintain order should any emergency arise.

2. The suggestion that the Carabinieri are inadequately armed emphasises the necessity for their receiving proper support from the Italian Army and the local Italian authorities, notably the Prefects, and also points to the vital importance of collecting at once all illegal arms held by civilians.

3. You are directed to approach the Italian Government and place the following before them :

a. It is and has been the policy of the Supreme Allied Commander to recommend that the Italian Government take the strongest possible steps to deal with civil disturbances within their own territory. It appears, however, that the Carabinieri cannot take effective action in dealing with disturbances of any magnitude unless they receive proper guidance and support from the local Prefects, who must be prepared to call for military assistance, if they consider such a course necessary. To this end, the Prefects themselves should receive from the Italian Government clear and definite directions as to their duties and responsibilities.

b. The collection of illegal stores of arms held by civilians is considered as one of prime importance and as a matter which can only be brought about by properly planned and coordinated action between the Prefects, the Carabinieri and the Italian Army.

SECRET

See 85

24
Confidential

c. The present situation is viewed with gravity as it is considered that any further deterioration in it is likely to have the most serious consequences. In this connection, the Italian Government must realize that their ability to maintain law and order must inevitably be an important factor affecting any decision of the Allied Governments in regard to the return of further territory to Italian control.

At the same time you should point out that, despite repeated requests, specific information as to the action taken by the Italian Government, following on the disturbances in the Andrea and Minervino areas in June last, is still awaited. In this connection, it should also be stated to the Italian Government that, whatever these measures were, it is apparent that they were inadequate as they did not prevent renewed incidents occurring in the Bari area on 2 August. You should reiterate the serious view which the Supreme Allied Commander takes of these disturbances.

4. A report is required on the reactions of the Italian Government to your approach in accordance with the foregoing instructions.

By Command of Field Marshal ALEXANDER :

107/1000/27
W. D. MORGAN,
Lieutenant General,
Chief of Staff.

SECRET

23

RAUQUAGGIO ALLEGATO COMMISSIONE
APG 584
Office of the Executive Commissioner

Confidential

Ref: 514/SC.

14 August 1945.

MINUTES OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONERS' MEETING - 13 AUGUST 1945.

1. Hand Over of the Northern Provinces to the Italian Government.

Executive Commissioner reminded the meeting that at the Regional Commissioners' meeting held approximately two months ago Chief Commissioner proposed 1 September 1945 as a possible date for the hand over of Northern Italy to the Italian Government. This date had since been given a considerable amount of publicity. It was not a firm date, but a target fixed by the Chief Commissioner.

All the Provinces of the four Regions would be handed back, with the exception of the Province of MILAN. In this case the recommendations of the Commander XIII Corps and the Regional Commissioner had been followed and the Chief Commissioner had recommended to AMR, for submission to CSC, that AMR should continue in this Province until 1 November 1945.

The future of NARVAL was still uncertain, but AMR would be kept there for the time being. BOLANO would be handed back with the other Provinces of Northern Italy subject to approval of CSC.

Even the economic and local government point of view there was everything to be said for a speedy handback. There was one disturbing question - that of public safety. Although there was a period of tranquility at present, public safety was far from satisfactory, and Executive Commissioner said that we could not recommend to AMR that the North, from a public safety point of view, was administratively in a fit state to be handed back.

Executive Commissioner said he understood that the general consensus of opinion of Regional Commissioners was that either the handback should take place quickly in spite of the unsatisfactory state of public safety or that AMR should be retained for at least six months. Regional Commissioners were asked for their views and all stressed the amount of publicity that had been given to the date of 1 September. Regional Commissioners PIZZOLI and LIGUZZA considered that we should either hand over on that date or remain until after the elections.

Regional Commissioner VILLAZZI said he was in favour of handing over in September and of keeping strong teams of Liaison Officers who, he believed, could do very useful work. Deputy Regional Commissioner LIGUZZA was also in favour of handing back in September.

hand over of Northern ITALY to the Italian Government. This date had also been given a considerable amount of publicity. It was not a firm date, but a target fixed by the Chief Commissioner.

All the Provinces of the four Regions would be handed back, with the exception of the Province of UMBRIA. In this case the recommendations of the Commander XIII Corps and the Regional Commissioner had been followed and the Chief Commissioner had recommended to AMB, for submission to COS, that AMB should continue in this Province until 1 December 1945.

The future of UMBRIA was still uncertain, but AMB would be kept there for the time being. BELLINO would be handed back with the other Provinces of Northern ITALY subject to approval of COS.

From the committee and local government point of view there was everything to be said for a speedy handback. There was one disturbing question - that of public safety. Although there was a period of tranquility at present, public safety was far from satisfactory, and Executive Commissioner said that we could not recommend to AMB that the North, from a public safety point of view, was administratively in a fit state to be handed back.

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Regional Commissioner VALL-ZLA said he was in favour of handing over in September and of keeping strong teams of Liaison Officers who, he believed, could do very useful work. Deputy Regional Commissioner LORREAU was also in favour of handing back in September.

It was agreed by all that it was useless retaining AMB without having sufficient Allied troops to back it up. At present Military Government was being operated with the backing of the Italian Army, and COLIN PLECO, pointed out, was an undesirable situation.

AC Liaison Officer BARR said that in the MINEVIA and MARESA incidents the Italian Government had handled the situations very feebly. They had "suggested" that arms should be handed in but few results had been obtained and the ring leaders still had their arms. Troops had not been used.

Brigadier UFFELI stated that all our experience was that the Italian Government had not tackled and were not tackling the public safety problem energetically. Reorganisation of the Carabinieri was desirable but this was not a short term policy, and would take months. As regards the date of the handover, he pointed out that unless approval could be obtained from AMB by 16 August 45 it would be administratively impossible to effect the handover on 1 September 45.

- 2 -

Poland (B) agreed that unless sufficient troops are made available, it was useless trying to run this, and stressed that we should state the position very bluntly to the American and British Governments. Executive Commissioner concurred and said we must also have clearly laid down the exact responsibility of the Allied troops who would remain in regard to quelling of civil disturbances. Col. Hamilton said GOC No. 2 District required a directive from AFHQ to define his responsibility, and Executive Commissioner promised to take this up at AFHQ.

Col. Pisko said if it was not practicable to remain until after the elections we should hand over in September. He made the point that the transfer of the Italian Army should be concurrent with the transfer of Italian territory, and if it was not possible to hand over control of the Italian Army until 30 September it was desirable to postpone the hand back of territory until that date. Executive Commissioner stated that the date of 30 September had already gone forward as the date for the Italian Army to be handed over to the Italian Government and in the event of approval for the transfer being obtained he felt sure that General could be persuaded to give the Italian Government control of their army before that date.

Brigadier Anderson suggested the use of commandant positions, i.e. the cutting off of supplies, in the event of serious disorder, but Executive Commissioner did not consider this to be practicable. He agreed, however, that the matter could be publicized.

Executive Commissioner stated we must also obtain a ruling from AFHQ on the French and Sino-Frontier problems, and the powers of GIC and PIS must be defined.

With the Chief Commissioner's approval Executive Commissioner suggested 10 September as the hand over date and Executive Commissioner asked Regional Commissioners for their views on this. They said they could be ready by this date.

2. Proposed Liaison Groups in the North.

Establishment Section had prepared a draft summary of personnel and vehicles, which was distributed to members of the meeting. Executive Commissioner read a note put up to the Chief Commissioner, which formed a basis for discussion.

The Establishment Section summary was discussed group by group. Several amendments were requested by Regional Commissioners, and these were noted by Establishment Section, who would make the necessary adjustments.

Public Safety Officers. There was discussion on whether the Public Safety Liaison Officers should be called Public Safety Officers or Security Intelligence Officers. A decision was reached and the following

being obtained he felt sure that Sacconi could be persuaded to give the Italian Government control of their army before that date.

Brigadier AMBROSON suggested the use of economic sanctions, i.e. the cutting off of supplies, in the event of serious disorder, but Executive Commissioner did not consider this to be practicable. He agreed, however, that the matter could be publicized.

Executive Commissioner stated we must also obtain a ruling from ASHQ on the French and Swiss frontier problems, and the powers of CIC and FNS must be defined.

With the Chief Commissioner's approval Executive Commissioner suggested 16 September as the hard over date and Executive Commissioner asked Regional Commissioners for their views on this. They said they could be ready by this date.

2. Proposed Liaison Groups in the North.

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The Establishment Section summary was discussed group by group. Several comments were requested by Regional Commissioners, and these were noted by Establishment Section, who would make the necessary adjustments.

Public Safety Officers. There was discussion on whether the Public Safety Liaison Officers should be called Public Safety Officers or Security Intelligence Officers. Opinion was divided and Executive Commissioner ruled that they should be called Public Safety Liaison Officers.

Col. Pike stated that 200 No. 2 District said that he was short of Security Officers and would welcome the presence of Public Safety Officers in his area. Executive Commissioner mentioned an important suggestion that the Chief Commissioner had made, namely, that Public Safety Officers should be withdrawn from their present location to another area when the hard over took place, so as to avoid changing their hats in the place they were now working.

Location of Liaison Groups. It was agreed that Liaison Groups should be stationed in the following towns.

MILAN,
TRENTO (to include representation at AOSMA)
CARNOI,
VALICA,
BOLZANO, and perhaps ANCOALA.

/It me ...

- 3 -

Confidential

It was also agreed that BOLLEANO should meet with the present Liaison Officer PIR should be made two AG Liaison Officers at LUYKMO.

Executive Commissioner ruled that for the purposes of discipline and administration the Central Lombard Liaison Group should be under Lombard Liaison Group in MILAN.

Local Government Officers. There was considerable discussion on the functions of local government officers and Local Government Sub-Commission did not want any in the field. The Regional Commissioners were in agreement with this, stating that it would be impossible for the local government officers to perform any useful function.

Brigadier WATSON said that the general consensus of opinion of the meeting was that special local government officers were not necessary.

IP & Medical Officers. It was agreed that medical officers were not necessary in the Liaison Groups and it was stressed that we public health officers in the IP & R teams were only to be used for IP & R work. Civil Affairs Section were told to put up a recommendation to Establishment Section at an early date for an increase in Displaced Persons staff.

Vehicle. Establishment Section had put in for a number of WD vehicles, and had allowed for soldier drivers for them in their survey. There was discussion on the supply and maintenance of vehicles. Executive Commissioner said that the question of the maintenance of WD and US vehicles for the North should be taken up with AFHQ at a high level.

3. RAF Team for MILAN.

The list proposed by Establishment Section was studied and some alterations were made. Executive Commissioner stressed that the officers chosen must be good experienced men, and the team must be large enough to provide a pool for reimpairment of AG in other areas.

Brigadier WATSON wanted 40 officers for this Province as against 34 suggested by Establishment Section, the extra nine officers to be all Provincial Officers. After discussion this was agreed. Executive Commissioner stressed the importance of not duplicating officers as between MILAN and VARENNI GILIA.

4. Ration Scales.

Col. Long spoke of the endeavours of the Food Sub-Commission to formulate a uniform system of rationing throughout the whole of ITALY. A new scale had been planned and the views of the Regional Commissioners were invited.

necessary in the future. It was stressed that the Public Health Officers in the DP & H teams were only to be used for DP & H work. Civil Affairs Section were told to put up a representation to Establishment Section at an early date for an increase in Displaced Persons staff.

Violations. Establishment Section had put in for a number of WD vehicles, and had allowed for soldier drivers for these in their numbers. There was discussion on the supply and maintenance of vehicles. Executive Commissioner said that the question of the maintenance of WD and US vehicles for the North should be taken up with AFHQ at a high level.

3. War Team for UDING.

The list proposed by Establishment Section was studied and some alterations were made. Executive Commissioner stressed that the officers chosen must be good experienced men, and the team must be large enough to provide a pool for repositioning of AM in other areas.

Brigadier MILLER wanted 40 officers for this Province as against 34 suggested by Establishment Section, the extra nine officers to be all Provincial Officers. After discussion this was agreed. Executive Commissioner stressed the importance of not duplicating officers as between UDING and V-44221A GILLIA.

4. Ration Section.

Col. Legg spoke of the endeavours of the Food Sub-Commission to inaugurate a uniform system of rationing throughout the whole of INDIA. A new scale had been planned and the views of the Regional Commissioners were invited.

From a political and administrative point of view it was desirable that uniformity be achieved at the earliest possible date. A meeting with the Indian Government at which all interests were represented took place recently. LC put forward recommendations, together with the lay out of the proposed new ration scale, and agreement was obtained.

The ration scale provided that the workers of the North received the same treatment as the workers in the South for a comparable job.

Regional Commissioners were in complete agreement with the proposed new ration scale. Executive Commissioner said it should be got through as quickly as possible. Col. Legg stated that he had still to clear it with Labour.

637

5. Archives.

Executive Commissioner emphasized the responsibility of Allied Commission to see that its Archives were handled over in good order, and this responsibility began with Regional Commissioners in the field. One officer was to be appointed at each Region to deal with Archives, and this officer would spend two or three days at Headquarters, Allied Commission with Capt. Collins. Uniformity was essential and the instructions issued by Archives must be followed.

A paper prepared by Capt. Collins was distributed to members of the meeting. Capt. Collins said the object in view was to prepare all files so that they would mean something to people looking at them for the first time, perhaps twenty years hence.

Executive Commissioner stressed the importance of this subject, which he said had not always had the attention it deserved.

Paul H. Usher

Chief Staff Officer,
To the Executive Commission.

DISTRIBUTION:

"B"

Group I Less Serials 4 and 37 to 48
Group II
Group III

3636 + 6214
CONFIDENTIALHEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
A.F.O. 324
PUBLIC SAFETY SUB COMMISSION
SECURITY DIVISION

Ref : SD/645.12

1 August 1945

Subject : Arms in Northern Italy

AUG 2 1945

To : V.F. Civil Affairs Section

1. From a reliable source I have received the following information respecting subversive activities in Northern Italy.

2. A few days ago two truck loads of arms were found at a village in Milan Province. The local Communist leader in the village and his deputy have been arrested. Their explanation is that they were keeping the arms for the Revolution.

3. In Milan one of the armouries (or storehouses) of one of the Garibaldi Brigades in Milan has been raided and AMG police have taken possession of three or four truck loads of arms, mostly light and heavy machine guns, very many Tommy guns, and a few 20 mm. cannon; also large quantities of hand grenades. Every weapon was in perfect condition, oiled, greased, and carefully packed away. Six arrests, all Communists and one the secretary of this particular Garibaldi Brigade, have been made. This is the largest case of finding arms which has arisen in Lombardia Region.

4. During the last few weeks we have had information from many different sources that the Communists were going to rise and seize power. The dates have varied from 15th August to 15th October, but early in September seems to be the most popular time. Other sources have said that the Communists have planned to seize power as soon as A.M.G. has gone.

5. The information above seems to be borne out by the finding of these two arms dumps. The Communists are now referring to A.M.G. as the third occupation. The first was Fascism, the second the German and now A.M.G.

6. It is hoped to forward full reports soon on these arms cases, but I think it advisable to bring to notice that arms are apparently being collected openly in the North. The Communists are well organized, and should

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6. It is hoped to forward full reports soon on these arms cases, but I think it advisable to bring to notice that arms are apparently being collected openly in the North. The Communists are well organized, and should they decide to take power it will either be unopposed by reason of their armed strength, or it will precipitate civil war into which the Allies may be drawn.

S. J. HARVEY,

Major,

Security Division

SPH/bd

(Copy to GSIH/EC)

CONFIDENTIAL

(2 SPARE COPIES)

19-21
17/11/18
19-21
17/11/18

3636,
CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

Ref: W/BC/CA

27 Jul 45

SUBJECT: Security in Northern Regions.

JUL 2 1945

TO : Executive Commissioner.

The attached is a summary of reports from Security Officers in
Regions.

It is forwarded for information.

A. D. Bingham

A.D. BINGHAM-CARRER Lt Col,
CSO CA Section

COPY 16 : Field (A)
Field (B)

(Asst. Secretary) R-1

See M 13-4-5
630
Filed 16-11-17
19-21 2125

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
A.P.C. 304
PUBLIC SAFETY AND COMMISSION
SECURITY DIVISION

REF : 3D/45.12

26 JULY 1945

SUBJECT : Forest in Northern Region.

TO : V.P. Civil Affairs Section.

1. After the liberation of Northern Italy and the capitulation of the German armies, killings on a large scale were reported, particularly from industrial centres, such as Milan. In the early days the greater proportion of those killed were well known fascists and it can be said that in most cases the action taken was inspired by patriotic motives, and the number of murders for gain was proportionately small.

2. After the first month, the number of "executions" decreased very considerably, but continued throughout the month on this diminished scale. These murders were usually accompanied by robbery and looting.

3. It is the unanimous opinion of the Security Officers in the North, that the perpetrators of these offences, which include blackmail, robbery with threats or violence, threatening of witnesses, etc., etc., are mostly communists. These persons are communists in so far as they hold the party card and wear red scarves and other emblems. Their knowledge of communism is very small and they are for the most part composed of undesirable elements of the population, who have found that a red scarf gives them a certain immunity, and a party card gives them priority over non party members.

4. The similar methods adopted by these persons in widely separated districts would tend to show that there may be a certain amount of co-ordination arranged by the leaders of the communist party, but there is at present no evidence to show that the offences are committed at the order of the

1. After the liberation of Northern Italy and the capitulation of the German armed, killings on a large scale were reported, particularly from industrial centers, such as Milan. In the early days the greater proportion of these killed were well known fascists and it can be said that in most cases the action taken was inspired by patriotic motives, and the number of murders for gain was proportionately small.
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4. The similar methods adopted by these persons in widely separated districts would tend to show that there may be a certain amount of co-ordination arranged by the leaders of the communist party, but there is at present no evidence to show that the offenses are committed at the order of the party, or that they form part of a concerted scheme with some political end as the motive. It is believed that the persons responsible act as small groups or individually, on their own responsibility.
5. While it cannot be said with certainty that the communist party leaders have ordered these illegal acts, security officers are agreed that the party makes no effort to put a stop to these practices, and appears to condone them.
6. It is known that the communist party is spending very large sums on propaganda, the welfare of its members, etc., and it is suggested that many local party officers are financed through the proceeds of robbery and extortion.

6306

7. It is also stated that persons attached to the Russian Delegation to the Advisory Council have been contacting communist leaders and supplying them with large sums of money drawn through the Allied Financial Agency.

8. The conclusions to be drawn are:-

(1) The Communist Party leaders are probably not, at the moment, ordering the commission of these acts of violence.

(2) They are almost certainly concealing them.

(3) ~~There is no evidence to show that, at the appropriate time, they will not order a general outbreak involving the destruction of public order.~~

While there is no definite evidence to show that they will, at the appropriate time, be an outbreak involving the destruction of public order, it is the general feeling that the danger is very real.

John W. Chapman
Colonel, U.S.A.
Director, Public Safety
Sub-Commission

CHH/af

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

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general feeling that the
danger is very real.

CEB/AT

John W. Chapman
John W. CHAPMAN
Colonel, J.A.S.D.
Director, Public Safety
Sub-Commission.

6307

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

CONFIDENTIAL

(9)

26 July 1945.

Ref: 3604/163/ED.

SUBJECT: Public Safety in N. ITALY.

TO : G-5 Section, A.F.H.Q.

Herewith for your information is copy of the minutes of a meeting held at this HQ on 14. July. 45 to discuss the public safety situation in N. ITALY. It is regretted that this document was not forwarded you earlier.

For the Chief Commissioner.

E. Talbot,

✓ Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

6305

Copy to: CA Sec

3604

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTES OF A MEETING

TO CONSIDER THE PUBLIC SAFETY SITUATION IN

THE NORTH

HELD AT HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION ON

14 Jul 45

PURPOSE:

Executive Commissioner.

VP CA Section.

P.Cs, LIGURIA, EMILIA, LOMBARDIA, VENETIAN REGIONS.

COL. BIRCHETT, representing R.C. PIEMONTE Region.

Director, Local Government & Deputy Director Public

Safety Sub-Commission.

Lt. Colonel TALBOT, Executive Commissioner's Office.

Lt. Colonel BOWMAN-CARTER, CA Section.

1. VP CA Section informed the meeting that the Chief Commissioner had expressed the greatest concern over the Public Safety situation in the North, particularly having regard to the recent jail-breaks at SOLO, MILAN, and GENOA. While appreciating that very large numbers of weapons had been collected from Patriots, everyone knew that a very large number remained in the hands of the populace and the Chief Commissioner was extremely anxious that a further drive should be made to get in more arms and that the Public Safety situation in the North should be more satisfactory when we came to restore territory to the Italian Government.

2. COL. DOWNEY said that each Regional Commissioner now had a mobile battalion of Carabinieri consisting of 12 Armoured Reconnaissance Cars and 578 Officers and Cpls. In addition, each Region had an Allied Security Officer who should be in a position to give information as to the whereabouts of dumps of arms. He was convinced that one big raid by mobile squads of the Carabinieri in force in each Region would have a great effect and would cause many more arms to be landed in and he recommended that systematic clearing up of dumps by strong mobile forces should be carried out. The only difficulty was the provision of general transport for carrying these mobile squads and he suggested

Safety Sub-Commission,
Lt. Colonel SALON, Executive Commissioner's Office,
Lt. Colonel BERNARD, CA Section.

1. VP CA Section informed the meeting that the Chief Commissioner had expressed the greatest concern over the Public Safety situation in the North, particularly having regard to the recent jail-breaks at SOUS, MILK, and GELDA. While appreciating that very large numbers of weapons had been collected from Patriots, everyone knew that a very large number remained in the hands of the populace and the Chief Commissioner was extremely anxious that a further drive should be made to get in more arms and that the Public Safety situation in the North should be more satisfactory when we came to restore territory to the Italian Government.
2. Col. DUBBY said that each Regional Commissioner now had a mobile battalion of Carabinieri consisting of 12 Armoured Reconnaissance Cars and 576 Officers and GPs. In addition, each Region had an Allied Security Officer who should be in a position to give information as to the whereabouts of dumps of arms. He was convinced that one big raid by mobile squads of the Carabinieri in force in each Region would have a great effect and would cause many more arms to be handed in and he recommended that systematic clearing up of dumps by strong mobile forces should be carried out. The only difficulty was the provision of general transport for carrying these mobile squads and he suggested that All civilian resources should lend their vehicles for the purpose of these raids. It was important that Allied Officers should personally lead these raids so as to give confidence to the GPs.
3. R.D. VIKELIE Region said that the Mobile Battalion he had received had been a disappointment to him. The reconnaissance Cars were in bad condition and the Carabinieri were not trained in their use and were not well equipped. He agreed, however, that much could be done but pointed out that the real difficulty was the obtaining of information on which to act. House-to-house searches were useless. It was generally known that the Allies intended to pull out at the beginning of September and it was simply impossible to get the local populace to give information which would lead to the discovery of these dumps and the apprehension of the offenders.
4. In reply to a question from the EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER, PC VIKELIE Region said he did not think a postponement of the date of restoration for 2 or 3 months would improve the situation. It was known that the Allies were not going to stay long and that was sufficient. The PC

See 17th 6.7.8.

Form 9

(2 SLATES)

(Not a record)

stated, however, that it might be desirable for URSI, TRIVISO and VERONA to remain under ASD as lines of communication were involved.

5. R.C., LIGURIA Region agreed with R.C. VENETIA. He pointed out that there were other difficulties. He had a large number of partisans in the Italian Sicilian and other Police Agencies who were ill-trained and frequently difficult to handle. In addition, he was having much trouble with the Questura, most of whom were political appointments and inexperienced in the work. He had removed one or two and had asked for professional replacements from ROME, who, he hoped, would be better. He regarded the whole situation as most unsatisfactory but did not see how it could be cured in a day. What was required was better training of Carabinieri in their mobile role, to which they were new, professional and stronger Questura and the thorough weeding out of the Partisan police. This would take some time.

6. R.C., LOMBARDIA Region agreed with the R.C.s who had spoken. He pointed out the great trouble he had had with some of his Questura and with the Partisan Police. Schools to train police had been set up but it must necessarily be some time before they would show results. He did not think that the problem could be solved in a day.

7. Deputy Director, Public Safety Sub-Commission said that ROBERTI was going up to MILAN, where he would have his Headquarters, on Tuesday, and would act as Inspector General of Public Security in the North. He would be available for advice and consultation over the problems facing Questura. All R.P.S.C.s. had been informed.

8. The VT CA Section pointed out that the new Government were going to approve of Questura sent to the North in future but it was known - off the record - that the Government in fact, submitted the names to the CIIAI and this meant that, although Questura would then be acceptable to the local CIIAI, their policy might not be very strong or independent. Furthermore, there was bound to be some delay in getting these men approved.

9. R.C., EMILIA Region said that one of his difficulties was that if he staged one big mobile raid in EMILIA, it used up the monthly allowance of PCL for the police forces.

10. R.C., LIGURIA Region then stated that he was very short of troops of any kind to re-inforce his police forces. The Allied Headquarters were extremely helpful but troops would not be present much longer and he thought that it was essential for the maintenance of order that Italian troops should be sent to LIGURIA. They must be there before

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11. The EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER explained the difficulty over troops and pointed out that even in Italian Government territory, AFHQ had moved Italian troops about contrary to the wishes of the Italian Government and without consulting the Allied Commission. It was agreed that further urgent representations would be made to AFHQ to permit the Italian Government to have operational control and disposition of their troops for security purposes.
12. The EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER then asked R.C. EMILIA if he thought it would be wiser to postpone the restoration of EMILIA to the Italian Government beyond the 31 July 45. The R.C. replied that he did not think the Public Safety situation would get any better and he himself felt it would be a good experiment to see what happened in EMILIA during the 31st of August before the remainder of the North was handed over to the Italian Government.

- (3)
13. All Regional Commissioners agreed that the Public Safety situation was unsatisfactory; they were doing everything they could to remedy the situation but it was not possible, by taking snap measures, radically to alter the position. They were confident that they could hold on to the position while there were reasonable numbers of Allied troops in the country, but AMG without troops behind it was of no value and when AMG withdrew would be a grave period - whatever it happened.
 14. The EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER then suggested that it would be desirable to continue A.M.G. for 2 or 3 months longer and to revise the original provisional date of the 1 Sep 45.
 15. All H.C.s agreed that no good purpose would be served by continuing AMG after the 1 Sep 45. R.C. LACERLA pointed out that very soon he would be without any Allied troops in his area and emphasized that he could not carry on Military Government without that assistance.
 16. The VI CA Section stated that the sanction behind Allied Military Government was the presence of Allied troops in substantial numbers and if Allied troops were not present it was impossible to ask Regional Commissioners to be responsible for Military Government if they only had Italian security agencies to rely on.
 17. The EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER then asked H.C.s whether they felt they should pull out completely on the restoration to the Government or whether Provincial Commissioners and their staffs should remain for some time in an advisory capacity as had been the case in SICILY. After some discussion which dealt with the necessity for the retention of certain technical officers - e.g. Transport - and the desirability of retaining liaison officers with Military Headquarters, it was agreed that in principle Provincial Commissioners should not remain in the field after restoration. However, the EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER stressed the desirability of making the hand-over carefully and slowly so that Provincial Headquarters might not, in some cases, close up until as late as 3 weeks to a month after restoration. In the meantime he instructed H.C.s. to let him have their recommendations by the 31 Jul 45 as to what liaison officers should be left in their respective regions after the termination of AMG.

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(2A)

EXTRACT FROM MINUTE SHEET FILE 3694-C

155

Executive Commissioner

x x x. 157 has come in. For your information
and interesting.

(sgd) E.T.
G.S.O.

18 July 1945.

155

The letter is very weak. Copy should go to US Embassy
and Mr. Jones should be notified.

Sgd) M.S.L.

25/7.

(See List On Folio 1.)

6301

CONFIDENTIAL

SKC/100

HEADQUARTERS
VENETIAN REGION
Allied Military Government
APO 394

TO : HQ. A.C.,
Attention: Executive Commissioner.

17 July 1945

JUL 15 1945

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prefects.

FILE No: XXII/024.13

Yesterday afternoon, Monday 16 July, I received a visit from the seven Prefects of Udine, Venezia, Belluno, Treviso, Padova, Vicenza and Verona. The Prefect of Rovigo who was unable to be present desired to associate himself completely with the discussion. Perhaps the most important feature to note is that all the Prefects present were nominees of the C.L.S.. Matter, the Prefect of Venice, was nominated by the C.L.N.A.I. and all of them had taken a prominent part in the resistance movement. I have been very impressed with them and particularly with Avv. Sebastian of Padova and Matter of Venice.

Of the seven present four were Christian Democrats, three Partito d'Azione and the missing Prefect from Rovigo is a Liberal.

The conference started off on a number of economic matters which were comparatively easy to deal with on the basis of last week's conference in Rome.

Later in the meeting, however, and in an atmosphere of considerable seriousness, they wished to have a private talk with me on the subject of public security. They completely confirmed to me what, in effect, I had already reported to you on Saturday morning, that there is a species of reign of terror in the countryside; that people are very frightened of real gangsterism of the worst sort and that it is exceedingly difficult to stand up against

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I do not wish it to be thought that there is at this present moment a great deal of actual physical violence although political murders do continue. I have already expressed to you my own opinion that the affair at Schio and the publicity involved has come as a severe shock even to the more lawless elements. I believe that we may quite well have a six-weeks period of reasonable tranquillity but there can be no doubt as to the genuine apprehension regarding the autumn entertained by all these Prefects. It is quite true that they represent the right center and center and may be urged that they are unnecessarily frightened of the left. On the other hand they do represent, in my opinion, the very best selections that the various C.L.N. could put forward and I think it would be most wrong to ignore their representations.

1
I explained to them that the decision to bring Allied Military Government to an end on the 1st of September had been taken at the highest level and that I could not in any way reopen that discussion. I said that in the meantime we were doing all in our power to further the efficiency and morale of the Carabinieri and that we could support every action taken by the Prefects or Questore to improve the morale and efficiency of the police agents.

I further said that I would represent their views in connection with the possible distribution of Italian regular armed troops. I also said that, if such opinions were strongly held by them, it seemed to me to be their duty to report them to the Italian authorities themselves and particularly to the President of the Council of Ministers. I know in this connection that Matter is a personal friend of Francesco Perri and I believe that he will in fact write to the Prime Minister. I finally said that if they wished to put their views in writing I would communicate them directly to you as rapidly as possible. I think it very likely that I shall receive a letter from them, or at least from Sabadin and Matter representing the others, within the course of the next few days.


Regional Commissioner

Ex Com's Distribution - 26 Jul 45

Action - Ex Com

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Ex Com's Distribution - 26 Jul 45

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PULAD (B)

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