

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

ACC

10000/109/718
(VOL. 3)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

10000/109/718
(VOL. 3)

PUBLIC SECURITY
DEC. 1945 - JAN. 1947

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

Chief Commissioner.

Approved
Attached is submitted for your signature. You approved DRAFT AT 258A

258

11/1

McLean Bug
E.C.

Mimite No. 259

JAN 8 1947

6th January, 1947

TO: Chief Commissioner.

Reference ATKQ letter of Folio 255; draft reply of Folio 258 is submitted for your consideration.

I am in doubt whether the words underlined in the last sub-paragraph should be included in the letter. They are copied from the ATKQ instructions of Folio 239, but appear to me to be an internal Allied military matter and might only encourage the Italian authorities to ask for assistance, as they ~~know~~ ^{must} know that the matter would be referred to ATKQ.

McLain Boydell
M. CART, Brigadier.
Executive Commissioner.

F.L.

260

Have approved, but what is
the "sub-paragraph" you are re-
ferring to?

8/1/47

Dus
cc

261

Ex Comm.

Ref no 259, 260. Letter submitted
for signature of C.E. H.S. 10/1

M. CARR, Brigadier.
Executive Commissioner.

260

Ed.

Have approved but what is
the "sub-paragraph" you are re-
ferring to? *Enc*

8/1/47

261.

Ex Comm.

Ref is 259 + 260. Letter submitted
for signature of C.E. *W.S. 10/11*

0.500

245

Chief Commissioner

Attached is submitted for your signature
 243

24/5/46

11/1/46

253

Ex Comm.

Letter # 251 submitted for signature
 of P.O. This is ack. to # 250A.
 Orders have been forwarded to AFHQ. (see 1252)
 H.L. 23/12

DEC 28 1946

Chief Commissioner

251

Attached is submitted for your signature
 23/12

McFar/Buy
 E.C.

256

Ex Comm.

201 draft efforts for approval

785017

Letter of 4-20-68 submitted for signature

of P.C. This is ask. to 1 250A.

Orders have been forwarded to AFHQ. (see 4252)

H.S. 23/12

Chief Commissioner

251

Assigned to submitted for power of attorney

Signature

23/12

McLan B. J.
E.C.

256.

Ex Comm.

2nd draft opposite for approval.
This is action in C-5 letter at plus 255.

H.S. 7/11

6499

237

CSO folio 236 for info. folio 189 refer
please. *auth 2/13*

25 10/4 10-5/1

242

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

A.P.O. 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

TO: Chief Staff Officer.

14th November, 1946

240

The Chief Commissioner has discussed with me the new instruction issued by AFHQ on internal security.

There is an ambiguity in para 7 in regard to the use of tear gas.

When we pass the papers to the Italian Government, it is to be made clear to them that para 7 is not intended to place any limitation in regard to the use of tear gas ~~in the hands of the troops~~ when troops, police etc., are under the control of the Italian authorities.

McCarthy

M. CARR, Brigadier.
Executive Commissioner.

243

200 Ex Comm.

By folio 241 and unim no 242, suggested
draft apposite for your approval, please

auth 10/11

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

TO: Chief Staff Officer.

14th November, 1946

The Chief Commissioner has discussed with me the new instruction issued by AUSA on internal security.

There is an ambiguity in para 7 in regard to the use of tear gas.

When we pass the papers to the Italian Government, it is to be made clear to them that para 7 is not intended to place any limitation in regard to the use of tear gas ~~in the hands of the troops~~ when troops, police etc., are under the control of the Italian authorities.

McAulley

M. GARR, Brigadier.
Executive Commissioner.

243

ass to Comm.

Ref to 241 and min no 242, suggested draft opposite for your approval, please

H. A. A. 19/11

Chief Commissioner

244

NOV 19 1946.

Draft

Submitted for your signature
in approval
of the instruction

McAulley
EC

18/11

6498

225
 E.C. Please see Lister's comments on p. 224 in reply to your query of 27.

226
 P.D.C. Please see folio 221 - minutes 220 & return file L. E. Co. Office
 please buy
 a book

31 Jan. 227
 E.C. Sec. Folio 221 and Min 220 Com.
 Transmitted.

31 Feb. 228
 E.C. way like to see folio 219 - an anonymous
 message sent to the British Embassy.
 Passed to us by Lord B. Public Safety
 appear to have no comments to make.

229
 Miss L. H.S. 112 68 3/11
 W.P.B. as with all anonymous messages
 H.S. 412 178/112

232
 Also H.S. 512.
 See see 231-30 for info: a jolly good bit off by
 Gen Browning! H.S. 512.
 233

State to Comm.

228.

Ex. C. may like to see Jolic 219 - an anonymous message sent to the British Embassy. Passed to us by Postal & Public Safety appear to have no comments to make.

Miss S.

MS. 112 68 3/11

229.

W.P.B. as with all anonymous messages.

MS. 412

173/112

APSO MS. 512.

232

See see 231-30 for info: a jolly good tick 78 by Gen Browning!

MS. 512.

MS. 512

Ex Comm.

233

130-231 for info. MS. 512.

234.

Chief Commission

PP 230-231 for info

MS. 412

MS. 412
C. 6/11/71

E.C.

7/11

✓ 6/11/71

216

Ex. Comm.

We spoke. AT 215 is a revised memorandum on this subject.

M. Carr, Brigadier
VP.C.A.S.

5/11/46 MC 5/1

AT

Chief Commissioner

Note re p 204 submitted

~~JAN 3 1946~~

MSL 5/11/46

JAN 12 1946

Copy to Mr. [unclear]

218

211

I believe you have not seen re - letter to
Ministry of War from PIRA laying down the
priority of wages to be employed in the
maintenance of public order. B 151

This file has been with Civil Affairs & the
[unclear] have come back

Chief Commissioner

Note re p 204 submitted

JAN 5 1951

MSL 6/2/46

JAN 12 1951

Wm

copy to Mr. [unclear] 12/1

218

211

I believe you have not seen re - letter to
 Ministry of War now PMA laying down the
 priority of troops to be employed in the
 maintenance of public order. *15/1*

This file has been with Civil Affairs & the
 Chief Commissioner & only came back
 to our office today.

MC # 222

CA Section

you may like to see 221 & enclosure
 at 220 (translation at 219) *18 27/1*
 Ex. Co office

6498

207

S. C. Sec.

Please see 206

A memo might be sent to AFSA, when they 204
 The insufficiency of the patch is a most important point
 and strong representations might be made on this. If such
 representations are made it will still be necessary to get them
 effect is felt on the ground. The double letters for "H" in 204 is
 is very obvious.

208

H. H. H. H.

CA Sec

Please preface with in reply to this memorandum. 5/5

(in form of memorandum)

178/15/11

209

CA Section:
 Memorandum of draft reply submitted for approval

Shapman
 G. L. A. P. A.

24 Dec 1945.

210

Ex. Comm.

213
 At 205 is a memo on this subject but it is
 in draft - unsigned because before it is finally agreed
 I feel I should know how the reply is intended and
 also the origin of the memorandum at 204 which is
 unsigned. ~~and~~ ~~has~~ ~~ing~~ and has no identification marks.
 I am at a complete loss to understand what authority

175/10/10

(in form of memorandum)

209

CA Section:

Memorandum of draft reply submitted for approval

24 Dec 1945:

Hagmann
C. L. D. P. A.

210

Ex Comm.

213

At 20077 is a memo on this subject but it is in draft - unsigned, because before it is finally agreed I feel I should know for whom the reply is intended and also the origin of the memorandum at 204 which is unsigned and undated and bears no identification marks. I am at a complete loss to understand what authority can suggest on Dec 6th -

~~Not a separate report~~

1. Recruitment of local police forces.
For some time past it has been the accepted policy of the H.Q. in agreement with the Italian Government that local police forces should not be recruited but that recruitment should be into existing official police agencies.
2. Police forces without pay.
It has been the policy of the H.Q. to not authorize since before the liberation is agreed with the Italian Govt. that all such employment as possible should be found for ex-partisans, in the form of police, police force, prison services - similar organizations. U.S.G.
3. A further service without commitment.
The Commission are one of the recognized parties & are represented in the Central Government.
27/12/45. H. G. A. S.

205 8234
 C.A.S. Please get P.S. Sub Com to comment

DEC 17 1945

in the recommendations without delay

Wester

C.A.S.

205

Reference recommendations referred to above.

2. Right order is in hand at AFHQ which, if issued, will cover recommendations.

It would be impractical to consider strengthening the C.C.R. in Lombardy and Piemonte at the expense of I.G.T. The overall strength of C.C.R. is not sufficient to adequately perform all the varied duties for which they are now being held responsible - post police, train guards, private guards, etc. The strengthening situation as to C.C.R. in Northern Region is as follows.

Region	Establishment	Actual Strength	Under - Construction

C.A.S.

206

Reference recommendations referred to above.

2. Right order is in hand at AFHQ which, if issued, will cover recommendation 2.

3. It would be impractical to consider strengthening the CCRR in Lombardy and Piemonte at the expense of LGT. The overall strength of CCRR is not sufficient to adequately perform all the varied duties for which they are now being held responsible - post police, train guards, private guards, etc. The strength situation as to CCRR in Western Region is as follows.

Region	Establishment	Actual Strength	Under - Com.
Liguria	2617	2126	491
Lombardy	4497	4288	189
Piemonte	4139	4254	115
Valley	5599	7005	1406

It is suggested that R.C. Vignola be directed to go on to transfer from Vignola existing the sufficient to bring Liguria and Lombardy up to strength at least.

4. AFHQ is handling equipment and transport for CCRR. CCRR can take care of the existing

With proper equipment and transport, at this stage, border & the police education.

5. Development of local police forces, at this stage, border & the police education. CCRR can take care of the existing

17 Dec. 43

3636

517

267

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-3 Section
APO 912

Ex Comm

G-3: 94112

22 January 1947

SUBJECT: G-3 Memo, "Internal Security."

TO : Chief Commissioner,
Allied Commission,
APO 794.

Reference paragraph 4 of this Headquarters letter,
G-3: 94112 of 3 January.

Can you please say what the position now is with regard
to the Italian Internal Security instructions.

BT LESTER F. GARNER, Major:

[Signature]
L. S. HANLEY
Colonel, G.S.C.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

See file 266

6493

C.S.A. HS 2711

P/A 27
27

Ref: 5634/266/101

27 January, 1947

SUBJECT: Ops Memo (A) "Internal Security".

TO: ALLIED FORCES HEADQUARTERS
Attention: G-3 Section.

Reference your letter G-5; 941.12 of 3rd January, 1947.

This Commission has drawn the attention of the Italian Government to para. 2 of Supplement 'A' of the Italian Government's request where it is said that "Italian Authorities..... can apply to Allied Troops for help. Such a demand will not be accepted at once but will be submitted immediately to GHE Allied Forces" thus inferring that the assistance requested will be forthcoming.

The Prime Minister with a letter dated 15th January, 1947, has informed this Commission that the word "at once" in para. 2 of Supplement 'A' was due only to a mistake in the translation and that it has been rectified by circular No. 642/963 of 15th January 1947, copy of which is enclosed herewith.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

M. GARR, Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

3636 41

JAN 21 1947
265

TRANSLATION

THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

Rome, 15 January 1947.

Dear Admiral,

With reference to your letter No. 3636/258/E.C. dated 13 January 1947, I wish to inform you that the addition of the words "senz'altro" in paragraph 2 of supplement A of the Operative Memorandum No. 85 of General Headquarters Allied Forces, dated 8 November 1946, was due only to a mistake in the translation.

This mistake has been rectified in circular No. 442/963 dated 15 January 1947, a copy of which I herewith enclose.

(s) De Gasperi.

Admiral Ellery W. Stone
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
Rome.

See 7266

80

264

TRANSLATION

MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR
No. 442/963.

Rome, 15 January 1947.

~~SECRET.~~

TO: PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF VAL D'AOSTA
AOSTA.

HIGH COMMISSIONERS FOR SICILY & SARDINIA

PREFECTS THEIR RESPECTIVE SEATS

QUINTORS ROME

opc MINISTRY OF WAR ROME

GENERAL HQ. OF THE CARABINIERI ROME


With reference to circular No. 442/24287 dated 12 December 1946, notice is given that in paragraph 2 of Supplement A, the sentence ".... such a demand will not be accepted at once, but will be immediately submitted to General Headquarters of the Allied Forces" is to be substituted by ".... such demands will not be accepted, but submitted immediately to General Headquarters of the Allied Forces."

It is definitely confirmed that eventual demands for assistance that may be submitted in case of serious disturbance of public security to Allied Forces, will not be accepted but submitted to the General Headquarters of the Allied Forces.

Acknowledgement of the rectification of Supplement A is requested.

FOR THE MINISTER
(s) Ferrari.

6490



*Al Presidente
del Consiglio dei Ministri*

Roma, 14 15 gen. 1947

Cavo Sig. Ambasciatore,

In relazione alla Sua lettera N. 3636/258/B C del 13
gennaio 1947, Le comunico che l'aggiunta delle parole
"senz'altro" nel paragrafo 2° dell'allegato A del
Memorandum Operativo N. 85 del Quartier Generale delle
Forze Alleate dell'8.11.1946, fu dovuto a mero errore di
traduzione.

A tale errore si è ora ovviato con la circolare N. 442/
961 del 15.1.1947, della quale Le rimetto copia.

P. J. J.

Caro Sig. Ammiraglio,

In relazione alla Sua lettera N. 3636/258/3 C del 13 gennaio 1947, la comunico che l'aggiunta delle parole "senza altro" nel paragrafo 2° dell'allegato A del Memorandum Operativo N. 85 del Quartier Generale delle Forze Alleate dell'8.11.1946, fu dovuto a mero errore di traduzione.

A tale errore si è ora ovviato con la circolare N. 442/363 del 15.1.1947, della quale Le rimetto copia.

Signifying

Sig. Ammiraglio Eileen W. STONE
Comissario Capo della Commissione
Alleata

R. O. M. A.
STONE

6489

Mod 839

262

Ministero dell'Interno

DIREZIONE GENERALE DELLA P.S. DIVISIONE A.C.R. SEZ. 2^a

N. 442/963 di Prot.

OGGETTO: Ordine pubblico.

Roma, li 15 Gennaio 1947

SEGRETO - DOPPIA RUSTA

SIG. PRESIDENTE DEL CONSIGLIO DELLA

VAL D'AOSTA

AOSTA

ALTI COMMISSARI SICILIA E SARDEGNA

PREFETTI

QUESTORE

LOCO SEDE

R O M A

e.p.c.: MINISTERO DELLA GUERRA - Gabinetto R O M A

COMANDO GENERALE DELL'ARMA DEI CARABINIERI

R O M A

Con riferimento alla circolare Ministeriale, n° 442/24287 del 12.12.1946, relativa all'oggetto, si avverte che nel paragrafo 2° dell'allegato "A", alla frase ".....Una tale richiesta non sarà senza altro accolta, ma verrà trasmessa immediatamente al Quartier Generale delle Forze Alleate", deve essere sostituita la seguente: ".....tali richieste non saranno accolte, ma verranno comunicate immediatamente al Quartier Generale delle Forze Alleate."

Resto confermato, in definitiva, che eventuali richieste di assistenza, inoltrate in caso di grave perturbamento dell'ordine pubblico, alle forze alleate, non saranno accolte, ma soltanto inoltrate al Quartier Generale delle forze predette, per le determinazioni di competenza.

Si prega, pertanto, di autorizzare la citata variazione all'allegato

SIG. PRESIDENTE DEL CONSIGLIO DELLA

VAL D'AOSTA

AOSTA

ALTI COMMISSARI SICILIA E SARDEGNA

PREFETTI

LOMO SEDU

QUESTORE

ROMA

e.p.o.:

MINISTERO DELLA GUERRA - Gabinetto ROMA

COMANDO GENERALE DELL'ARMA DEI CARABINIERI

ROMA

Con riferimento alla circolare Ministeriale, n° 442/24287 del 12.12.1946, relative all'oggetto, si avverte che nel paragrafo 2° dell'allegato "A", alla frase ".....Una tale richiesta non sarà senz'altro accolta, ma verrà trasmessa immediatamente al Quartier Generale delle Forze Alleate", deve essere sostituita la seguente: ".....tali richieste non saranno accolte, ma verranno comunicate immediatamente al Quartier Generale delle Forze Alleate."

Resto confermato, in definitiva, che eventuali richieste di assistenza, inoltrate in caso di grave perturbamento dell'ordine pubblico, alle forze alleate, non saranno accolte, ma soltanto inoltrate al Quartier Generale delle forze predette, per le determinazioni di competenza.

Si prega, pertanto, di apportare la citata variazione all'allegato A ~~in~~ ^{alla} circolare suddichata, assicurando.

6438

PER IL MINISTRO

ft. Ferrari

*P.C.C.
Allegato Cap. d. P.
L. L. L.*

258

January, 1947

Ref: 3636/258/X

My dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I refer to para. 2 of Appendix "A" of Allied Force Headquarters Operation Memorandum No. 85 dated 8th November, 1946, forwarded to you under covering letter 3636/258/XC of 21st November, 1946, and to para. 2 of Appendix "A" of the instructions given by the Ministry of the Interior for the implementation of the said memorandum, copy of which was forwarded to me with your covering letter of 12th December, 1946.

In para. 2 of Appendix "A" of Operation Memorandum No. 85 it is stated that, although under certain circumstances Italian authorities may possibly request assistance of Allied Troops "such requests will NOT be honoured, but will be reported immediately to Allied Force Headquarters."

In para. 2 of Appendix "A" of the instructions issued by the Ministry of the Interior the following sentence is included:-
"Una tale richiesta non sara' sens'altro accolta, se verra' trasmessa immediatamente al Quartier Generale delle Forze Alleate."

The word "sens'altro" may infer that the assistance requested may be forthcoming. This is not however in accordance with the policy of Allied Force Headquarters.

I would be very glad, my dear Prime Minister, if your instructions to the Italian authorities could make it quite clear that if requests for assistance of Allied Troops are made they will NOT be honoured. Will you please let me have a copy of your amended orders for the information of the Supreme Allied Commander.

Yours very truly,

ELMER E. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Dr. Alcide De Gasperi,
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government,
ROME.

4.265 *refus*

6487

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

G-5: 941. 12

3 January 1946

SUBJECT: Ops Memo 85 "Internal Security".

TO : Chief Commissioner,
Allied Commission,
APO 794.

Reference your letter 3636/951/EC "Public Order", 23 December 1946 and enclosures thereto.

1. As reflected in the Italian Government's resume of the Ops Memo there seems to be a misunderstanding as to the policy of this Headquarters in case of public disorder.

2. By para 2 of Annexure 'A' to the subject Ops Memo, it was clearly pointed out that, although under certain circumstances Italian authorities might possibly request assistance, such requests were NOT to be honoured. The fact that such requests were to be reported back to AFHQ was not meant to imply that they were likely to be met.

3. By para 2 of Supplement 'A' of the Italian Government's resume, it is stated that "Italian Authorities can apply to Allied Troops for help. Such a demand will not be accepted at once but will be submitted immediately to GHQ Allied Forces." This infers that the assistance requested will then be forthcoming. This is not in fact the case.

4. Will you please clarify this matter with the Italian Government and furnish this Headquarters with a translated copy of the Government's correcting publication.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL MORGAN:

A. L. HAMLEN
Colonel, G.S.C.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

See 4266
6486

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

File
252

Ref. : 3636/254/32

28 December 1946

SUBJECT: Public Order.

TO : JPM,
G-3 Section

Referring to this H. signed 3636 dated 18 Dec. 46, I forward herewith copy of a letter from the Prime Minister enclosing instructions given by the Ministry of the Interior for the maintenance of public order.

FOR THE CHIEF OF THE G-3 SECTION

N. W. HIND-SATD

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

Copies to: JPM, G-3 Section
Public Safety Div
Land Forces G/C
Air Forces G/C
Navy G/C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6483

translation

252^A

THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

Dear Admiral,

Referring to your letter No. 3656/345/23 dated 21 Nov.
1946, I enclose copy of the instructions given for the implemen-
tation of the Order issued by Allied Force Hq.

(s) De Ganyeri

Rome, 12 December 1946.

Dear Admiral Ellery W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner,
Allied Commission,
R. o. M. e.

2525

TRANSLATION

MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR
No. 442/24287

Rome 12 December, 1946.

SUBJECT:- Public Order.

The Allied Commission, in order to determine the competence and tasks of the Allied and Italian Authorities, respectively, for the maintenance of public order in the national territory, has sent a communication, the fundamental points of which are summed up in the two enclosures.

The regulation regarding the use of tear-gas bombs and smoke-bombs, (an allotment of which will be made soon), does not exclude that they may be used by the police and Italian troops even when the latter are not operating under the control of the Allied Authority.

The present provisions repeal those contained in the circular no. 442/8734 of 4 July 1945 sent to the Prefettura, then administered by the Italian Government.

See

250

FOR THE MINISTER.

TRANSLATION

GENERAL ORDERS

1. This Operative Memorandum substitutes the Operative Memorandum N. 78 (Territorial Defence) dated 22 July 1945 that is therefore cancelled.
2. For the maintenance of the internal security (that is the maintenance of law and order and the defence against sabotage) within the zone of competence of SACMED,
 - a) The Commander in Chief G.H.Q Allied Forces of the Allied Forces Mediterranean Theater, will be responsible for the provinces of Udine and Venezia Giulia;
 - b) The Italian Government will be responsible for all the remainder of the Italian territory.
3. The material security of installations and locations of Allied Forces in Italy, wherever located, is due to the Allied Troops that occupy these installations and locations. The respective concerned commandants will ascertain that plans for protection of their own installations will be prepared.

MILITARY ZONES

4. The Supreme Command Allied Forces Mediterranean Theatre is reserving the right of declaring Military Zone particular zones subjected to the Italian jurisdiction. After promulgation of such a declaration the exercising of the powers of a Military Government in the zone in question will be assumed by the Supreme Command Allied Forces Mediterranean Theater. It is however intended that this right will only be used in case of gravest threat to Allied interests.

USE OF TROOPS IN SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES

5. For special orders, integral for the maintenance of law and order and for the prevention of sabotage in Italy see supplement "A".

252^D

TRANSLATION

SUPPLEMENT "A"

A. ITALIAN TERRITORY EXCEPT PROVINCES OF UDINE AND VENEZIA GIULIA

1. Within the Italian Territory, excepted the provinces of Udine and Venezia Giulia, the Italian Government is competent for the maintenance of law and order, and has therefore at his disposal the forces of the Police, the Carabinieri, and the Army.

2. Should the situation become worse, so that the Italian Authorities could not maintain law and order with their own resources, they can apply to Allied Troops for help. Such a demand will not be accepted at once, but will be submitted immediately to G.H.Q. Allied Forces. Should the disorder however menace directly Allied military property and installations and impend to interfere with operations of Allied Forces, the local commandant will take all measures that seem to him opportune for protecting Allied interests. With approval of G.H.Q. Allied Forces and on behalf of SACMED, he can as a last resource declare the threatened zone as Military Zone. In this case he will assume the command of all troops and of the whole Italian Police in this zone.

3. In case the local commandant should consider the state of emergency so serious and immediate that he has not sufficient time for asking the permission of G.H.Q. Allied Forces, he can act on his initiative. He has to refer all facts successively to G.H.Q. Allied Forces in the shortest possible time.

B. PROVINCES OF UDINE AND VENEZIA GIULIA

OMISSIS

C. LACRIMATORS AND SMOKE GROWING BOMBS

7. In any case Italian and Allied troops, Police or Carabinieri should be used under Allied command for soothing civil disorder, they can make use of lacrimator or smoke growing bombs, but not of white phosphoric bombs, with the following limits:

- a) All precautions have to be taken that the depots of these bombs are not available for unauthorized persons.
- b) All superior commands will issue orders to their dependent parties about the use of these bombs setting up the limitation that no bomb will be issued to the troops nor be used by them unless by order of an officer. In exceptional cases the responsibility for issuing such orders can be delegated to a non-commissioned officer. The use of these bombs will be permitted only if the use of force is necessary and the purpose can be reached with less damage for the persons by using lacrimators or smoke-growing bombs than by opening fire.

Ref. : 3636/250/33

23 December 1946

My dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I acknowledge your letter dated 12 December 1946 enclosing the Orders given by the Ministry of the Interior for the maintenance of Public Order.

I have forwarded copies of these Orders to Allied Forces Headquarters.

Yours very truly,

ELBERT W. SPENCE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Dr. Alcide De Gasperi,
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government,
ROME.

Translation

3636 41

DEC 23 1946

250

THE PRIME MINISTER

-1-1-1-

Rome, 12 December 1946.

Dear Admiral :

Relative your letter dated 21 November u.s. No. 3636/243/EC.

I enclose copy of the orders given for the actuation of the Operative Memorandum of the G.H.Q. of the Allied Forces.

(s) Do Gasperi

To : Admiral Ellery W. STONE
Chief Commissioner,
Allied Commission
R O M E

cc Hansen

on 17 Dec

23
64/12
AK

150 of call 5839 of 18 Dec



Il Presidente
del Consiglio dei Ministri

Roma, 11 12 dicembre 1946

Esce Garin

*has not been
acknowledged.*

9

Caro Sig. Ammiraglio,

in relazione alla Sua lettera in data 21 novembre
u.s. n° 3636/243/EC, Le rimetto copia delle disposizioni
impartite per l'attuazione del Memorandum Operativo
del Quartiere Generale delle Forze Alleate.

L. Garin

Sig. Ammiraglio Ellery W. STONE
Commissario Capo Commissione
Alleata

ROMA

6478

Mod. 839

Ministero dell'Interno

DIREZIONE GENERALE P.S. - DIVISIONE A.G.R. - SEZIONE II

A.442/24287

Roma, 11 12 dicembre 1946

SEGRETA - DOPPIA BUSTAALTI COMMISSARI
PREFETTISICILIA ET SARDEGNA
LORO SEDI

QUESTORE

ROMAe p.c. MINISTERO GUERRA
GabinettoROMA

COMANDO GENERALE CARABINIERI

ROMA

OGGETTO: Ordine pubblico.

La Commissione Allente, allo scopo di precisare le attribuzioni e i compiti rispettivamente delle Autorità Italiane ed Allente per il mantenimento dell'ordine pubblico nel territorio nazionale, ha inviato una comunicazione i cui punti fondamentali sono riassunti nei due allegati.

Si avverte che le norme relative all'impiego delle bombe lacrimogene o fumogene, riportate nell'appendice A, non escludono che di tali armi - di cui è prevista una assegnazione - possano fare uso la polizia e le truppe Italiane anche quando non operano sotto il controllo delle Autorità Allente.

Tanto si comunica per opportuna norma avvertendo che le presenti disposizioni abrogano quelle contenute nella circolare n.442/8734 del 4 luglio 1945 inviate alle Prefetture allora amministrate dal Governo Italiano.

Si gradirà ass. curazione.

ALTI COMMISSARI
PREPETTI

SICILIA ET SARDEGNA
LORO UFFICI

QUESTORE

ROMA

e p.c. MINISTERO GUERRA

Gabinetto

ROMA

COMANDO GENERALE CARABINIERI

ROMA

Oggetto: Ordine pubblico.

La Commissione Alleata, allo scopo di precisare le attribuzioni e i compiti rispettivamente delle Autorità Italiane ed Alleate per il mantenimento dell'ordine pubblico nel territorio nazionale, ha inviato una comunicazione i cui punti fondamentali sono riassunti nei due allegati.

Si avverte che le norme relative all'impiego delle bombe lacrimogene o fumogene, riportate nell'appendice A., non escludono che di tali armi - di cui è prevista una assegnazione - possano fare uso la polizia e le truppe Italiane anche quando non operano sotto il controllo delle Autorità Alleate.

Tanto si comunica per opportuna norma avvertendo che le presenti disposizioni abrogano quelle contenute nella circolare n. 442/8734 del 4 luglio 1945 inviate alle Prefetture allora amministrare dal Governo Italiano.

Si gradirà ass. curazione.

DEL MINISTRO

6471

DISPOSIZIONI GENERALI

1. Questo memorandum Operativo sostituisce il Memorandum Operativo N° 78 (Difesa Terrestre) del 22 luglio 1945, che viene pertanto abrogato.
2. Pel mantenimento della sicurezza interna (cioè il mantenimento della legge e dell'ordine e la difesa contro il sabotaggio), entro la zona di competenza del SACMED, sarà responsabile:
 - a) Il Comandante in Capo del Quartier Generale delle Forze Alleate del Mediterraneo per la Provincia di Udine e della Venezia Giulia;
 - b) Il Governo italiano per tutto il restante territorio italiano.
3. La sicurezza materiale delle installazioni e delle stazioni di dislocamento Alleate in Italia, dovunque situate, competerà alle truppe Alleate che occupano tali installazioni e dislocamenti. I rispettivi comandanti interessati si accerteranno che verranno predisposti piani per la protezione delle loro installazioni.

ZONE MILITARI

4. Il Comando Supremo Alleato del Teatro di Operazioni Mediterraneo, si riserva il diritto di dichiarare zona militare particolari zone del territorio sottoposte alla giurisdizione italiana. Con l'emissione di una tale dichiarazione eserà l'esercizio dei poteri di governo militare nella zona in questione sarà assunto dal Comandante Supremo Alleato, Teatro di operazioni Mediterraneo. Comunque, è inteso che soltanto in caso di gravissime minacce agli interessi alleati sarà invocato tale diritto.

IMPIEGO DI TRUPPE IN APOGGIO DEL POTERE CIVILE

5. Per disposizioni speciali inerenti al mantenimento della legge e dell'ordine ed alla prevenzione del sabotaggio in Italia vedi appendice "A".

- b) Il Governo italiano per tutto il restante territorio italiano.
3. La sicurezza materiale delle installazioni e delle stazioni di dislo-
camento Alleate in Italia, dovunque situate, competerà alle truppe Allee-
te che occupano tali installazioni e dislocamenti. I rispettivi comandan-
ti interessati si accertano che vengano predisposti piani per la prote-
zione delle loro installazioni.

ZONE MILITARI

4. Il Comando Supremo Alleato del Teatro di Operazioni Mediterraneo, si
riserva il diritto di dichiarare zone militari particolari zone del ter-
ritorio sottoposto alla giurisdizione italiana. Con l'emanazione di una
tale dichiarazione sarà l'esercizio dei poteri di governo militare nella
zona in questione sarà assunto dal Comandante Supremo Alleato, Teatro
di operazioni Mediterraneo. Comunque, è inteso che soltanto in caso di
gravissima minaccia agli interessi alleati sarà invocato tale diritto.

IMPIEGO DI TRUPPE IN APOGGIO DEL POTERE CIVILE

5. Per disposizioni speciali inerenti al mantenimento della legge e dell'
l'ordine ed alla prevenzione del sabotaggio in Italia vedi appendice "A".

2500

A. SANTITONIO ITALIANO UNO LE PROVINCE DI UDINE E DELLA VENEZIA GIULIA

1. Nell'ambito del territorio italiano, meno le province di Udine e della Venezia Giulia, è competente il Governo Italiano per il mantenimento della legge e dell'ordine e per assolvere questo compito ha a disposizione le Forze di Polizia, i Carabinieri e l'Esercito.

2. Nel caso che la situazione dovesse peggiorare in maniera tale che le autorità italiane non fossero in grado di mantenere la legge e l'ordine con le proprie risorse, esse potrebbero rivolgersi alle truppe Alleate per assistenza? Una tale richiesta non sarà come un'altra esecolte, ma verrà trasmessa immediatamente al Quartier Generale delle Forze Alleate. Come si è discusso, i disordini dovessero minacciare direttamente le proprietà e le installazioni militari alleate e minacciare di interferire l'opera delle Forze Alleate, il Comandante Locale adotterà quelle misure che crederà opportune per proteggere gli interessi alleati. Come ultima risorsa, con l'approvazione del Quartier Generale delle Forze Alleate e in nome del COMAND, egli potrà dichiarare la zona minacciata come zona militare, nel qual caso egli annovererà il comando di tutte le truppe e di tutta la polizia italiana in quella zona.

3. Nei casi in cui il comandante locale ritenga lo stato di emergenza così grave e così imminente da non disporre di tempo sufficiente che gli permetta di chiedere l'autorizzazione del Q.G.P.A., egli ha facoltà di agire di sua propria iniziativa, riferendo successivamente i fatti occorsi al Q.G.P.A. entro il più breve tempo possibile. —

R. PROVINCIA DI UDINE E DELLA VENEZIA GIULIA

0 1 2 3 4 5

2. ROBERT LACROIX & ASSOCIATES

7. In ogni caso in cui truppe italiane e alleate, polizia o carabinieri saranno impiegati sotto il comando alleato per sedare disordini civili, potranno essere impiegato bombe lacrimogene o fucilate, ma non bombe a fosforo bianco, con le seguenti limitazioni:

a) Ogni premiazione di sicurezza dovrà essere implementata per assicurare che i depositi di dette bombe non cadano in mano di persone non autorizzate. -

b) Tutti i comandi superiori emaneranno istruzioni al reparto dipendente circa l'uso di dette bombe, ponendo la limitazione che nessuna bomba es-

Forse Alleste, il Comandante locale adatterà quelle misure che crederà opportune per proteggere gli interessi alleati. Come ultima risorsa, con l'approvazione del Quarter Generale delle Forze Alleste e in nome del SACRAM, egli potrà dichiarare la zona minacciata come zona militare, nel qual caso egli assumerà il comando di tutte le truppe e di tutta la polizia italiana in quella zona.

1. Nei casi in cui il comandante locale ritenga lo stato di emergenza così grave e così imminente da non disporre di tempo sufficiente che egli permetta di chiedere l'autorizzazione del Q.C.F.A., egli ha facoltà di agire di sua propria iniziativa, riferendo successivamente i fatti accaduti al Q.C.F.A. entro il più breve tempo possibile.

R. PROVINCE DI UDINE E DELLA VENEZIA GIULIA

OMI S E I S

BOMBE LACRIMOGENE O FUMOGENE

C.

7. In ogni caso in cui truppe italiane e alleste, polizia o carabinieri saranno impiegate sotto il comando alleato per sedare disordini civili, potranno essere impiegate bombe lacrimogene o fumogene, ma non bombe a fosforo bianco, con le seguenti limitazioni:

a) Ogni prescrizione di sicurezza dovrà essere implementata per assicurare che i depositi di dette bombe non cadano in mano di persone non autorizzate.

b) Tutti i comandi superiori emetteranno istruzioni ai reparti dipendenti circa l'uso di dette bombe, ponendo la limitazione che nessuna bomba sarà consegnata alle truppe e impiegata dalle truppe se non per ordine di un ufficiale. In casi eccezionali la responsabilità per l'emanazione di tali ordini potrà essere delegata ad un sottufficiale. Queste bombe saranno impiegate soltanto quando si riterrà necessario l'uso della forza e lo scopo potrà essere raggiunto con minor danno alle persone mediante l'uso di gas lacrimogeni o bombe fumogene che aprendo il fuoco.

642

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~~SECRET~~
CONFIDENTIAL

DEC 19 1946

249

ALCON CITY ACSOC FROM ADMIRAL STONE

161030A December 1946

AFHQ FOR ACTION GEORGE THREE INFO GEORGE FIVE

5839

~~SECRET~~

241

YOUR LETTER GEORGE THREE AFHQ SLANT SEVEN THREE OF EIGHT NOVEMBER REFERS PD
HAVE NOW RECEIVED COPY OF MINISTRY OF INTERIORS ORDERS DATED TWELVE DECEMBER WHICH
WILL BE TRANSLATED AND FORWARDED PURSUANT PARAGRAPH FIVE REFERENCE LETTER

DISTRIBUTION:

MMIA
AF S/C
Navy S/C
Pub Safety
Ex Comm
CC Files

ref your file 3636/

CONFIDENTIAL

6474

PRIORITY

Chief Commissioner

~~SECRET~~

JOHN L. BATES
Major, AGO
ADJT

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

RECEIPT FORM

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Items contained here in
are identified by the
following numbers:

Via

Date

To

21/11/46
AFHQ

No. 351

Ref 3636 213/EC

Received by

Organization

J. A. Clippins by KE
G-5 AFHQ

Please sign original and return IMMEDIATELY to

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394

Time

1730

Date

28/11/46

Duplicate copy should be retained by addressee (547?)

NOTE: The title of a Secret or Confidential Document must not be written on this form.

785017

247

CONFIDENTIAL

November 1946

Ref: 3536/233/75

My dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I enclose for copies of Allied Force Headquarters Operation Memorandum No. 35 dated 5 November 1946. This is overhauled superseded Allied Force Headquarters Memorandum No. 70 dated 22 July 1946.

You will observe that this Memorandum reiterates the right of the Supreme Allied Commander to reorganize Allied Military Government in areas of Italian Government controlled territory.

Under the terms of this Memorandum this right is intended to be invoked only as a last resort and then in a limited area for the duration of an emergency only. In effect, it does not actually envisage the reorganization of Allied Military Government as usually exercised but rather the institution of martial law for a limited area and period.

You will also observe that in paragraph 7 of the Memorandum, certain conditions are laid down for Italian troops, police and Carabinieri, who they are employed under Allied command. This paragraph is in no way intended to place any limitation in regard to the use of your own and/or other personnel when Italian troops, police or Carabinieri are employed under the control of your authorities.

I am directed by the Supreme Allied Commander, my dear Mr. Prime Minister, to request that you will publish the necessary orders to support this Memorandum without delay and that a copy of such orders be submitted to this Command for the information of the Supreme Allied Commander.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Henry V. Stone

HENRY V. STONE
Deer Admiral, USA
Chief Coordinator

Mr. Alcide De Gasperi,
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government.

Enc.

6472

Copy to: G-5, AFHQ
P/S, AFHQ
C. L.
and from S/P

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

3636
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Executive Commissioner


TO: Chief Staff Officer.

14th November, 1946

The Chief Commissioner has discussed with me the new instruction issued by AFHQ on internal security.

There is an ambiguity in para 7 in regard to the use of tear gas.

When we pass the papers to the Italian Government, it is to be made clear to them that para 7 is not intended to place any limitation in regard to the use of tear gas except white phosphorus when troops, police etc., are under the control of the Italian authorities.


M. CARR, Brigadier.
Executive Commissioner.

6471

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

MEMORANDUM:

TO : Executive Commissioner.

The CC requests that you take the necessary action in connection with paragraph 4 of the attached letter.

EDSS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3636 R
ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-3 SECTION

NOV 13 1946
241
CONFIDENTIAL

8 November 1946

FILE : G-3 AFHQ/73

SUBJECT: Internal Security

TO : Chief Commissioner, ALCOM

1. There are enclosed copies of ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS Operations Memorandum No. 85 of 8 November 1946. This memorandum supersedes ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS Operations Memorandum No. 78 of 22 July 1945.
2. You will note that this memorandum reiterates the right of the Supreme Allied Commander to reimpose Allied Military Government in areas of Italian government controlled territory.
3. Under the terms of this memorandum this right is intended to be invoked only as a last resort and then in a limited area for the duration of an emergency only. In effect, it does not actually envisage the reimposition of Allied Military Government as normally exercised but rather the institution of martial law for a limited area and period.
4. It is desired that you present copies of this memorandum to the Italian government requesting that they publish the necessary orders to support it.
5. It is requested that this headquarters be provided with translations of the Italian government's orders referred to in paragraph 4 above when published.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN:

T.S. AIREY
Major General
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

K.C. COOPER
Brigadier, G.S.
AC of S, G-3

Incl. 10 copies 87-96.

CONFIDENTIAL

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Info - CC

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Extra copies - 2

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AP 129

ARMED FORCES HEADQUARTERS

88

OPERATION (SECRET)

3 November 1945

NUMBER 65

INTERNAL SECURITY

SECRET

NR

1. This Operation Memorandum (Superior Operation Memorandum) No. 78 (Ground Defence) of 28 July 1945 which is hereby rescinded.

2. The preservation of internal security (i.e. the maintenance of law and order and defence against sabotage), within A.S. D's area of responsibility, will be the responsibility of:-

a. GOC-IN-C GR. 17 in the provinces of UDINE and VERONA. CIVIL.

b. The Italian Government in all other Italian territory.

3. The physical security of Allied localities and installations in Italy, wherever located, will be the responsibility of the Allied troops occupying such localities and installations. Commanders concerned will insure that plans are prepared for the protection of their installations.

SECRET

4. The right is reserved by the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre, to declare specific areas of Italian Government territory to be military zones. By the issue of such a declaration, the clearance of the ports of military government in the zone in question is assumed by the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre. However, only in case of a most urgent threat to Allied interests is it intended that this right will be invoked.

SECRET IN ID OF CIVIL POWER

no. 16 (Ground Defence) of 22 July 1955 which is hereby rescinded.

2. The preservation of internal security (i.e. the maintenance of law and order and defence against sabotage), within a 3.3 km area of responsibility, will be the responsibility of:-

a. GOC-in-C GHQ, 22 in the provinces of UDINE and VERONA. (U.D.I.).

b. The Italian Government in all other Italian territory.

3. The physical security of Allied localities and installations in Italy, wherever located, will be the responsibility of the Allied troops occupying such localities and installations. Commanders concerned will insure that plans are prepared for the protection of these installations.

ARTICLE 17

4. The right is reserved by the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre, to declare specific areas of Italian Government territory to be military zones. By the issue of such a declaration, the allegiance of the people of military government in the zone in question is assumed by the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre. However, only in cases of a most urgent threat to Allied interests is it intended that this right will be invoked.

ARTICLE 18

5. For special instructions covering the preservation of law and order and the prevention of sabotage in Italy see appendix 'A'.

BY ORDER OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER

T. S. LIND
Major General
Chief of Staff

ORIGINAL
for S. S. CUGLAR
originals 0.3.
10 of 10, 0-5

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFICATION 0-3 (less HQ AUSA)

1 copy - Appendix 'A'

SECRET

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix 'A' To Staff Memorandum 83

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING MILITARY DISCIPLINE, ORDER, AND MAINTENANCE
OF LAW AND ORDER

A. ITALY LESS PROVINCES OF UDINE AND VENEZIA: JULIA

1. Within Italy, other than the provinces of UDINE and VENEZIA, the Italian government is responsible for the maintenance of law and order and to accomplish this has the Police Force, the Carabinieri and the Italian Army.
2. Should the situation deteriorate to such an extent that the Italian authorities are unable to maintain law and order with their own resources it is possible that they may request assistance of Allied troops. Such requests will not be honored, but will be reported immediately to Allied Force Headquarters. However, should disorders directly threaten Allied military installations or property or threaten to interfere with the execution of Allied military missions the local commander will take such steps as may be necessary to protect these Allied interests. As a last recourse, with the approval of Allied Force Headquarters and in C/Allied's name, he may declare the threatened area to be a military zone, in which case he will assume command of all Italian troops and Police in that area.

3. In cases where the local commander considers the emergency so grave and so immediate that time does not allow for requesting Allied Force Headquarters authority he may act on his own initiative, reporting the full facts to Allied Force Headquarters at the earliest possible moment.

B. PROVINCES OF UDINE AND VENEZIA: JULIA

4. In the provinces of UDINE and VENEZIA, until the Allied Military Government is responsible for the maintenance of law and order and the Police Forces are under the control of Allied Military Government for this purpose. Should additional assistance be required, the Allied Military Government will appeal to the nearest Allied Military Commander. It is essential that close liaison exists between Allied Military Government officers and the nearest Allied Military Commander.
5. A disturbance in which military personnel are involved is a military responsibility and will be dealt with by the appropriate military authority.
6. Immediate reports will be made through normal channels in all cases of riots or civil disturbances which are not of a serious nature.

allied military installations or property or threaten to interfere with the execution of Allied military missions the local commander will take such steps as may be necessary to protect these Allied interests. As a last recourse, with the approval of Allied Force High Commanders and in official news, he may declare the threatened area to be a military zone, in which case he will ensure compliance of all Italian troops and police in that area.

3. In cases where the local commander considers the emergency so grave and so immediate that time does not allow for requesting Allied Force Headquarters authority he may act on his own initiative, reporting the full facts to Allied Force Headquarters at the earliest possible moment.

4. PROVINCES OF UMBRIA AND VALLE D'AOSTA

4. In the provinces of Umbria and Valle D'Aosta, Italy, the Allied Military Government is responsible for the maintenance of law and order and the Police Forces are under the control of Allied Military Government for this purpose. Should additional assistance be required, the Allied Military Government will appeal to the nearest Allied Military Commander. It is essential that close liaison exists between Allied Military Government officers and the nearest Allied Military Commander.

5. A disturbance in which military personnel are involved is a military responsibility and will be dealt with by the appropriate military authority.

6. Immediate reports will be made through normal channels in all cases of riots or civil disturbances, whether or not it has been necessary to employ Allied troops.

7. THE SAN GIORGIO DISTRICT

7. In any instance where Allied or Italian troops, police or carabinieri are employed under Allied command to quell civil disturbances, tear gas and/or smoke grenades, but not white phosphorus smoke grenades, may be employed subject to the following restrictions:-

- a. Every security precaution will be employed to ensure that stocks of smoke grenades do not fall into unauthorized hands. **6468**
- b. All major commands will issue instructions to lower echelons concerning the use of these grenades, subject to the restriction that no grenades will be issued to troops or used by troops except on command of an officer. In exceptional cases the responsibility for issuing such orders may be delegated to a NCO.

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These grenades will be employed only when it is considered that use of force is necessary and that the object will be achieved with fewer casualties by the use of tear gas and/or smoke, than by opening fire.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

6467

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

238

Ref : 9636/059/10

18 April 1946.

SUBJECT: Disturbances - East Area.

SC : C-5
RUC

Ref your C-5 : OX. 3 of 14 Nov 45. I have now been informed by the Italian Prime Minister that panel proceedings of those responsible for the disturbances which took place in May and June of last year in the districts of Milanese, Rome, Anzio, and Genoa, are being prepared and the relative enquiry is almost completed.

The progress of these cases will be reported to you for the information of the Supreme Allied Commission.

A. W. Keisely.

✓
Brigadier,
Acting Chief Commissioner.

3636 98

Ex Com 236

TRANSLATION

To.
63064/40062/1.6.4

THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

Rome, 12 March, 1946.

Dear Admiral,

I am in receipt of your letter of 23 November 1945, N. 3636/199/EC,
and inform you that penal proceedings of those responsible for the disturbance
which took place in May and June of last year in the communes of Minervino,
Murge, Andria, and Corato, ^{our being prepared} are in course, and the relative enquiry is almost
completed.

I wish to assure you that the development of the proceeding is being
keenly followed by the Attorney General.

Believe me,

Yours truly,

(s) De Gasperi.

Admiral Ellery W. Stone
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
R O M E.

ELDIST- 21 Rev 1

ACTION- EX COMOR.

INFO- CC

- CA SEC.

PA 22
6463

See Memo 237 + 238

(10)

(CAPT K)



no.

235

*Il Presidente
del Consiglio dei Ministri*

63064/40062/A. G. 4

Roma, 18 marzo 1946

Caro Ammiraglio,

in relazione alla Sua lettera del 23 novembre u.s., n. 3636/199/EC, Le comunico che i procedimenti penali a carico dei responsabili dei disordini verificatisi nel maggio-giugno u.s. nei Comuni di Minervino Murge, Andria e Corato sono tuttora in corso; la relativa istruttoria è prossima ad essere completata.

Desidero comunque assicurarla che lo svolgersi del procedimento viene seguito con particolare interesse dal Procuratore Generale.

Mi creda, molto cordialmente.

Regami

All'Ammiraglio Ellery W. STONE
Commissario Capo della Commissione Alleata
R C M A

6464

SUBJECT: Maintenance of Public Order

LAND FORCES HQS COM, AG (MELA)

5/92

2 Dec 46

To : Ministry of War

1 Ref my letter 5/92 of 21 Dec 45.

1. I have been informed that the GARIBOLDI Regt of the MOLORE Div is being ordered to SICILY for the purpose of assisting to restore public order.

While I appreciate that it is entirely a matter for the ITALIAN Govt to decide where and when additional troops are needed for this purpose, I feel I am bound to draw your attention to certain unsatisfactory aspects of the situation in SICILY which have made this action necessary.

2. Provision has been made in the layout of the Interim Army for two Internal Security Divisions for SICILY, each 5,000 strong, plus one COBR Mobile Battalion 578 strong. These forces have been considered by your Ministry to be ample for maintaining law and order in the island, and there is no doubt in my mind that if they are up to strength and have been properly employed there should be no need for extra troops at this time.

3. Your circulars 226090/41 of 6 Dec and 227900/41 of 20 Dec lay down precise instructions on how and when the military are to co-operate with civil powers to restore or maintain law and order, but from reports I have received there appear to have been several cases in SICILY recently in which:

- (a) troops were called out hurriedly without adequate consultation between civil and military authorities as to the object to be achieved and the method to be followed;
- (b) troops were given insufficient orders and instructions by the military command as to the precise task that they were to undertake, and the way they were to carry out that task.

3636 26 231

Ref my letter G/92 of 21 Dec 65.

1. I have been informed that the CARABALDI Regt of the MILITARY Div is being ordered to SICILY for the purpose of assisting to restore public order.

While I appreciate that it is entirely a matter for the ITALIAN Govt to decide where and when additional troops are needed for this purpose, I feel I am bound to draw your attention to certain unsatisfactory aspects of the situation in SICILY which have made this action necessary.

2. Provision has been made in the layout of the Italian Army for two Internal Security Divisions for SICILY, each 5,000 strong, plus one OCIA Mobile Battalion 578 strong. These forces have been considered by your Ministry to be ample for maintaining law and order in the island, and there is no doubt in my mind that if they are up to strength and have been properly employed there should be no need for extra troops at this time. NR

3. Your circulars 226095/11 of 6 Dec and 227904/11 of 20 Dec lay down precise limits on how and when the military are to co-operate with civil powers to restore or maintain law and order, but from reports I have received there appear to have been several cases in SICILY recently in which:

(a) troops were called out hurriedly without adequate consultation between civil and military authorities as to the object to be achieved and the method to be followed;

(b) those troops were given insufficient orders and instructions by the military command as to the precise task that they were to undertake, and the way they were to carry out that task

and as a result they were employed in a totally ineffective manner.

4. A particular instance occurred recently at MONTEDONE, when, after the place had been attacked by bandits, a bn of inf was hastily called out and dispatched towards the town without any operational plan or specific instruction of how it was to deal with the bandits when it got into the town.

.....2/

See M. 232 233 234

6467a p 2 g

785017

230

- 2 -

5. It is registered that at the time in question:

- (a) The Territorial Guard was engaged in political activities entirely out of keeping with his post;
- (b) That relations between military and civil authorities were strained;
- (c) That the High Commissioner was absent in Rome during the critical period;

and it is understood that this has come to the notice of the appropriate authorities and that this state of affairs is not likely to be repeated.

6. Over and above this, however, it would appear that no attempt was made to deploy the Mobile Bn of the Guard before resorting to the use of arms, and this may have been due to:

- (a) Previous dispersal of this Bn so as to make it unavailable at short notice;
- (b) The Bn being understrength;
- (c) Lack of arms to make the Bn mobile;
- (d) Lack of adequate equipment.

7. I feel that the first essential in restoring the situation in SICILY is to reinforce with men and equipment the OREO Mobile Bn in PALERMO, at the expense of Regiments that are at present less unsettled, so as to provide a readily available striking force and so reduce the necessity of calling out troops. In this connection, news from Allied Army sources of 125 Armoured cars is shortly to be expected and it is hoped that the first Armoured cars to be delivered will be made available by you to the PALERMO Bn.

8. When, however, it may still become necessary to make use of military forces, I trust that the most careful consideration will be given by the military commander:

- (a) To the method of employment of the troops on a proper military plan;

(b) To the coordination of their action with that of the GARR.

6. Over and above this, however, it would appear that an attempt was made to deploy the Mobile bn. of the 6888 before resorting to the use of 1st, and this may have been due to:

- (a) Previous dispersal of this bn so as to make it unavailable at short notice;
- (b) The bn being understrength;
- (c) Lack of 1st to make the bn mobile;
- (d) Lack of adequate equipment.

7. I feel that the first essential in restoring the situation in SICILY is to reinforce with men and equipment the 6888 Mobile bn in PALERMO, at the expense of 1st, which are at present less unsolicited, so as to provide a readily available striking force and to reduce the necessity of calling out 1st. In this connection, I have from Allied Army sources of 1st Armored Corps is shortly to be executed and it is hoped that the first Armored Corps to be delivered will be made available by you to the PALERMO bn.

8. When, however, it may still become necessary to make use of military forces, I trust that the most careful consideration will be given by the military commander:

- (a) To the method of employment of the 1st on a proper military plan;
- (b) To the co-ordination of their action with that of the 6888;
- (c) That clear and comprehensive orders be issued to the officer in command of the 1st that are to be employed.

WES/L.S.

L. Browning

Major General.
M. M. L. A.

Copies to: HQ, Allied Commission. (2) - 1 Copy for Public Safety Sub Com.
War Diary (2)

6462

Exec. Comm. Personal
3636 T
Poled (A) Ins 224

January 28, 1946

Col. Stearns:

223
The Ambassador thought the attached para-
phrase of telegram from the American Consulate
in Palermo, dated January 25, might be of in-
terest to Admiral Stone.

Anne Carroll.

→ DP Sub C

Any information about Para 2?

6461

MS (27/1) See to 225/1
PA 1/2

Tr. Com.

(2/20) H 19/1

Nil. C.A.T. 28/1



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

223

- 1 "Since January 18, Montelepre has been quiet, though acts of violence continue in neighboring areas. Principal among these have been attack on Carabinieri in outskirts of Palermo, hold-ups in Palermo and Alcamozos, and Palermo-Trapani train.
- 2 Regarding infiltration of Jews from Bari, from six hundred up to one thousand have arrived during past two months - some have joined Juliano bandits, many have been able to leave for Palestine.
- 3 Confirmed that volunteers are being recruited for SVI and that arms are being sold."

See 224

6460

3636 90
Office of British
Political Adviser

221

Executive Commissioner,
Allied Commission.

220
219
The enclosed was sent anonymously to the
British Embassy a few days ago. I have given
a copy to the Secretary-General of the Italian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

25.1.46

[Signature]
Political Adviser(BR)

See N 222
N 226
N 227-9

P.A

(NCS 5)

42

A
642
72

220

E' doveroso informare che il Partito Comunista, sezione di Fano (Pesaro) ha dato ordine a tutti gli iscritti di armarsi potentemente in vista del prossimo ordine che verrà dall'alto per fare scoppiare gravi disordini. In conseguenza di ciò sono e stanno affluendo grandi quantitativi di armi, pistole di ogni tipo, mitragliatrici anche pesanti, centinaia e centinaia di casse di proiettili vari, bombe, mine e persino cannoncini lanciagranate.

Queste armi sono depositate in sotterranei e qualche capo ha sotterrato nell'orto.

See 221

6438

219

TRANSLATION

It is our duty to inform you that the Communist Party, Section of Fano (Pesaro) has ordered all the members to strongly arm themselves in view of the next order, which will be given by higher men, to provoke serious disorders.

In view of the above a great deal of arms, every kind of pistols, machine-guns, hundreds of boxes of various projectiles, bombs, mines and even bomb-towers are arriving thereat.

Such arms are hidden underground and some one has buried them in the orchard.

See 221
G M. 228.229

NOTE ON MORANDUM DATED 6 DECEMBER 1945

215
204
1. As regards the issuance of an order declaring all Allied arms and German equipment in the hands of civilians to be illegal, an order to this effect is being issued in the remaining AMG territory of Udine and Venezia Giulia also requiring that such weapons must be turned over forthwith to Carabinieri stations.

Discussions are taking place with the Italian Government with a view to issuance of a Decree having the same effect in Italian Government territory.

2. As regards the strengthening of Carabinieri in the Lombardia area, this is a matter for the Italian Government.

One of the main difficulties is that Carabinieri reinforcements are in demand not only in the North but also in the south of Italy. The overall strength of the Corps has been definitely fixed at 65,000 Officers and men. Before AMG ceased in North Italy certain readjustments in Carabinieri strength were made, 200 being sent to Genoa, 100 to Milan, 150 to Alessandria, 100 to Torino and 150 to Bolzano.

As regards the matter of issuance of adequate equipment and transport to the Carabinieri, this is a matter for the Italian Ministry of War. Adequate equipment and transport are not available from Italian sources but active steps are being taken to improve the situation. The necessity of the Carabinieri being given first priority in the matter of allotment is constantly being stressed with the Italian Ministry of War.

3. As regards the development of local Police Forces; it has been the accepted policy of the Allied Authorities in agreement with the Italian Government that local Forces should not be developed but that recruitment should be into existing official police agencies. The Italian Government has approved a considerable increase in the strength of the Police Agencies, other than Carabinieri, but there remains the serious problem of supplying uniform equipment and transport for such additional forces having regard to the fact that the original forces including Carabinieri are not

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The development of Police Forces without partisan or communist affiliations would appear to be quite impracticable in view of the fact that the Communists are one of the recognised parties in the Government and it has been the accepted policy to give as much employment as possible to ex-partisans by recruiting them into the armed Forces, Police Agencies and other similar State organisations.

645b

See memo 24724

ly

Ref/2

785017

24 December 1945.

202
Vol. II

28/ Henry W. Stone

Dr. Alcide De Gasperi,
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government,
R O M E.

bs. v/a.

Copy to the house
to the house

6455

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APO 394

Tel: 478427

DEC 28 1945
24 December 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR REPLY TO MEMORANDUM AT 204.

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 6 December, 1945.
2. As to your first recommendation it may be said that this Headquarters has requested Allied Force Headquarters to issue a General Order specifically declaring that Allied weapons and enemy weapons are the property of the Allies and that such weapons must be turned over forthwith to Carabinieri stations. In view of the imminent handover of the Northern Provinces to the Italian Government, it is not known whether such an order will now be issued.
3. Concerning your second recommendation, you are advised that orders have been issued sending 200 carabinieri to Genoa, 100 to Milan, 150 to Alessandria, 100 to Torino and 150 to Bolzano.
 - a. On the subject of strengthening the Carabinieri in any area, it should be understood that, although the overall strength of the Corps is approximately 65,000 officers and men, there are more than 4,800 stations which must be manned and in addition many are engaged as port guards, railway guards, guards on both public buildings and private dwellings and other assignments which prevent them from being available for normal police duties.
 - b. Concerning the matter of issuance of equipment and transport, again you should understand that every effort has been, and is being, made to issue equipment and transport to the Carabinieri.

212

However, adequate equipment and transport are not available from Italian sources and efforts to obtain them from Allied sources become so involved in red tape and conversations as to render speedy accomplishment almost hopeless.

4. The suggestion that local police forces be developed immediately without Partigiani or Communist affiliations, especially in Milano and Torino, is rather startling to say the least. It has been the policy not only to permit partigiani to enroll in the Questure forces, if qualified, but also to accept partigiani as auxiliary police without any particular inquiry into their qualifications.

To attempt to sort out the partigiani and communists at this stage would be a herculean task for which AMG does not now have the time and for which the Italian Government is incompetent. In addition to the task of screening and enrolling, there would be encountered the more serious problem of supplying equipment and transport. This problem is even more difficult than that of supplying carabinieri since the authorities who control such supplies seem to feel little or no obligation toward the civil police agencies.

JWC/ae

JOHN W. CHAPMAN
Colonel, JAGD
Director.

SUBJECT: Maintenance of Public Order.

LAND FORCES SUB COM. A.C. (MILIA)

C/92

21 Dec 45TO : MINISTRY OF WAR

DEC 21 1945

1. Allied Policy for the maintenance of public order has been that troops shall be employed in the following order of priority:

- (a) Static OGR
- (b) Mobile battalions OGR
- (c) Independent Regts and Internal Security Divs (classified by AFM) as "local reserves" for this purpose
- (d) Infantry Divs (classified by AFM as "mobile reserves").

2. It has been reported to this HQ that in some cases Prefects are expecting Independent Regts to carry out duties in aid of the Civil Power before calling upon or using to the full the Static OGR or the Mobile Battalions of OGR located in their areas.

3. This use of Independent Regts is also reported to be being made contrary to the advice and wishes of the Military Territorial Commander concerned.

4. Such employment of Independent Regts is not only contrary to the policy outlined in para 1 above, but also precludes the necessary training of these regts which is the direct responsibility of the Territorial Commander.

5. In agreement with the Public Safety Sub Commission C3, this HQ therefore suggests, provided that you are in agreement with existing policy, that in conjunction with the Ministry of the Interior a Directive should be issued to all Prefects and Territorial Commanders, clearly stating the priority in which available forces will be employed in aid of the Civil Power, and the responsibility of Territorial Commanders for training Independent Regts and for advising Prefects to the responsibility or otherwise, in each specific case, of employing these Regts in such a role.

Handwritten signature/initials

that troops shall be employed in the following order of priority:

- (a) Static CMR
- (b) Mobile Battalions CMR
- (c) Independent Regts and Internal Security Divs (classified by HQ as "local reserves" for this purpose)
- (d) Infantry Divs (classified by HQ as "mobile reserves").

2. It has been reported to this HQ that in some cases Prefects are expecting Independent Regts to carry out duties in aid of the Civil Power before calling upon or using to the full the Static CMR or the Mobile Battalions of CMR located in their areas.

3. This use of Independent Regts is also reported to be being made contrary to the advice and wishes of the Military Territorial Commander concerned.

4. Such employment of Independent Regts is not only contrary to the policy outlined in para 1 above, but also precludes the necessary training of those Regts which is the direct responsibility of the Territorial Commander.

5. In agreement with the Public Safety Sub Commission 3, this HQ therefore suggests, provided that you are in agreement with existing policy, that in conjunction with the Ministry of the Interior a list of active should be made to all Prefects and Territorial Commanders, clearly stating the priority in which available forces will be employed in aid of the Civil Power, and the responsibilities of Territorial Commanders for training Independent Regts for providing Prefects on the first call, or otherwise, in each specific case, of employing these Regts in such a role.

ABOS/4u

Copy to: AC for (Executive Commissioner) ✓
" " (Public Safety Sub Commission)

Major General,
H. H. I. A.

6452

See M. 216

3636
6 December 1945

DEC 17 1945

MEMORANDUM

From information received from reliable and well-informed sources it is believed that there will be widespread disorder verging on anarchy in the Lombardi and Piedmont areas if the AMG government and Allied troops are withdrawn prior to:

- a. Disarmament of Partigiani and/or bandit groups operating under the guise of patriotic organizations.
- b. Increase in the strength of the Carabinieri and their proper armament equipment and development of local police forces without Partigiani or Communist affiliations.

It is suggested that action be taken without delay to:

- a. Secure issuance of order declaring all Allied arms and German equipment in the hands of civilians to be illegal and requiring turn-over to Carabinieri or Allied forces without delay.
- b. Strengthening the Carabinieri in the Lombardi area and issuance of equipment and transportation adequate to successfully cope with armed bandits in the areas.
- c. Development of local police forces, especially in Milano and Torino without delay.

See Mr
205
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211 212 213

See 213
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6451

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