

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

ACC

10000/109/723

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

10000/109/723

PUBLIC SECURITY, BOLOGNA AREA
NOV. DEC. 1945

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

109

Ex. (com)

25

Have you seen 18-20 to info?

Herewith copy of report at 18 to 16. Got a
and as requested in minute 3A, submitted
to signature. 18/12.

18/12

26

CSO

Copy 120 of course should get 120

Interior whose responsibility it is to maintain

law & order. Please P.S. not Com. 120

action?

18/12/12

18/12/12

27

Copy being sent by us to the Dir. of Interior.
I.S. S/C. Taking all necessary action - they
have written to the 16. Got & brought their
attention very strongly to the state of
affairs in Bolivia. 18/12
Letter to Dir. of Int. attached.

CSO

29

Interior whose responsibility it is to maintain
law & order. Plus P.S. and Com. letters

action?

12/2/50

copy to [unclear]

22.

Copy being sent by us to the Dir. of Interior.
P.S. S/C. taking all necessary action - they
have written to the Govt. & brought their
attention very strongly to the state of
affairs in Bolivia. 12/1/50
Letter to Dir. of Int. attached.

C.S.O.

22.

We must be careful not to get in the wrong
foot with regard to leadership of the present
disaster is primarily the responsibility of the Dir.
of Interior not of the P.W. If we want to send off
about an incident it should go to Dir. of Interior
and not

and not

12/2/50

708

34

OK → C.S.O. • Pre use ~~7-8~~ for info.

ELB 8/12

OK

Check whether P.S. have recd. copy: if not, send pre

ELB 8/12

Copy sent to CIA for 7/3/12

(12)

7-8 Search your - now what are P.S. doing about it?

APR 10/12

C.S.O. 10/12

(13)

Ref. man. P.S. do not consider that they can take any action: files ~~207-8~~ being a repetition of facts known to P.S. and constantly reported by them. P.S. action referred to in para 1 stands.

ELB 12/12

APR. C.S.O.

P.1

(13A)

Thin should of course be in the Bologna file in which we have 2 reports from Acta

the book. What is being done about

done about 10/12/12
 Ref min. 13A. PS do not consider that they
 can take any action. Files 27-3 Being a
 repetition of facts known to PS and constantly
 reported by them. PS action referred to
 in para 1 stands.

CRB 12/12

13A
 PS
 CRB

This should of course be in the Belogara
 file in which we have 2 reports from A.C.E.
 on the position. What is being done about
 those reports which should go to the H.Q.

21.

106

Ref Min. 13A, part underlined. All papers in this
 subject have now been combined in this file - 106/12/1

5.

CRO Endorse

1-cc to info. The rest of Italy is sweeping sharply to the right according to monthly reports. danger may not be as great as feared. At Sec have a copy.

BS. 4/12.

Time 4/12.

by

CRO

I am not so complacent about this as B. S.

I should like either the full reports (this & Oct monthly)

or a summary of both to be sent to C. S. and

William C. - the latter should be informed somehow.

BS 4/12

I am not so complacent about this one B.S.
I should like either the full reports (this is Oct monthly)
or a summary of both to be sent to B.S. and
Gottlieb. Both - the latter should be informed somewhere.

SS/1/10

SECRET

28

Ref: 5641/00

27 December 1945

Subject: Law and order in Bologna Region.

To : The Ministry of the Interior.

(20)

I am directed to forward for your immediate attention the attached letter 6.92 of 14 December 1945 (to the Ministry of War), from Land Forces Subcommission, Allied Commission.

Brigadier
Executive Commissioner

104

11
31
10
1/4

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Executive Commissioner

SECRET

23

Ref: 3641/26/20

21 December 1945

SUBJECT: Communist Activities - Bologna Province

TO : G-5, AFHQ

4

1. I am directed to forward for your information the attached memorandum N. AG/LG/PS/26.4 of 22 November 1945 on Communist activities in Bologna Province.

For the Chief Commissioner:


Brigadier
Executive Commissioner

103

PA

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref: 3641/21/30

20 December 1945

SUBJECT: Communist Activities - Bologna Province

TO : The Ministry of the Interior
Italian Government, Rome

1. I am directed to forward for your information the attached memorandum N. 13/16/22/26.4 of 27 November 1945 on Communist activities in Bologna Province.

2. In view of the gravity of the allegations made in this report, it would be appreciated if the situation could be investigated thoroughly as soon as possible.

For the Chief Commissioner:


Brigadier
Executive Commissioner

Copy to:
~~Subj-AMM~~
CA Section

SECRET & URGENT
DEC 17 1945

Subject: Law and Order in BOLOGNA Region.

Land Forces Sub Commission, A.O.,
(M.M.I.A.)
R O M E.
G. 32

14 December, 1945.

DEC 17 1945

To: The Minister of War.

SITUATION:

1. (a) I have received disturbing reports of the situation in BOLOGNA Region from G.C.O. 2 District and my L.O. with General CERICA (Commander BOLOGNA Territorial Region), who also, I know, is very concerned about the state of affairs.

(b) Lawlessness, in the form of banditry, gang storming and murder is rife. For example, on a recent occasion 50 armed men raided a village and committed robbery, murder and abduction. Unless checked sternly, such lawlessness will tend to increase. BOLOGNA may thus be considered a test case. If order can be restored there, that will deter similar activity elsewhere - an aspect which will become even more important in the event of the Southern Territories being handed back to the Italian Government. While appreciating that lawlessness after the past war is a world wide symptom, I feel that every effort should be made and every assistance given to the forces responsible for maintaining law and order.

FORCES AND MATERIAL AVAILABLE.

2. (a) The priority of responsibility for the maintenance of law and order is:-

The CC.PR normal units
The CC.PR mobile columns
The Independent Army Regiments
The Infantry Divisions.

In war time the needs of the army were paramount. But in view of the above order of responsibility, the needs of the CC.PR should now have first priority.

You will agree that it is inadvisable to use the Army Regiments and Divisions except in cases of need. The CC.PR are the first line of defence.

(b) The distribution, strength, armament and equipment of No. 1

(b) Lawlessness, in the form of banditry, gang storming and murder is rife. For example, on a recent occasion 50 armed men raided a village and committed robbery, murder and abduction. Unless checked shortly, such lawlessness will tend to increase. BULGARIA may thus be considered a test case. If order can be restored there, that will deter similar activity elsewhere - an aspect which will become even more important in the event of the new Soviet Territories being handed back to the Italian Government. While appreciating that lawlessness after the post war is a world wide symptom, I feel that every effort should be made and every assistance given to the forces responsible for maintaining law and order.

FORCES AND MATERIAL AVAILABLE.

2. (a) The priority of responsibility for the maintenance of law and order is:-

The CC.BR normal units.
The CC.BR mobile columns.
The Independent Army Brigades.
The Infantry Divisions.

In war time the needs of the army were paramount. But in view of the above order of responsibility, the needs of the CC.BR should now have first priority.

You will agree that it is indispensable to use the Army Regiments and Divisions except in case of need. The CC.BR are the first line of defence.

(b)

The distribution, strength, equipment and equipment of No. 3 Brigade CC.BR is, according to our latest information, as per Appendix 'A'. From this it can be seen that the strength and equipment are adequate, but there is a very serious shortage in M.T.

As regards M.T., the Italian Army repair workshops are only just keeping their heads above water repairing and maintaining the M.T. in existing units. The Ministry of Transport however owes the Ministry of War the equivalent of 1666 army vehicles, reconditioned and in running order. Delivery of these was promised at the rate of 500 per month commencing 1 Nov., but NONE have been delivered yet. I suggest that you exert the strongest pressure on the Minister of Transport to implement his bond under Aid arrangements generously made by A.C. to assist the public economy and to avoid political repercussions by withdrawing Italian Army transport illegally in possession of civilian firms or persons. I am asking H.Q. ... to exert similar strong pressure. I may say that the Minister of Transport has had 14,500 vehicles handed over to him by the Allies.

Copy sent : CA Sec ^{1/2} / (c)

See M 25.26.

- 2 -

2. (c) The clothing situation, I understand, is improving. This now is, of course, your responsibility, and with the large handover to you recently of cloth and uniforms out of "captured enemy material", together with the release to you of the CCMD clothing factory the problem is one of distribution rather than supply.
- (d) The P.O.L. question is most unsatisfactory. The prefect allots P.O.L. to the CC.RR as he thinks fit. In BOLOGNA (and I understand also in GENOVA), region the amount allotted is only barely sufficient for the CC.RR to maintain and feed themselves, with none available for the CC.RR normal units or mobile columns to perform their necessary functions. My staff have already taken this up with you (see our letter ST/1604/9 dated 28 Nov 45 and Gen. LIUZZI's reply in agreement CC/3083/SEXT. 6/2 dated 6 Dec 45) in connection with the mobile columns. I now feel that you should go further and that all P.O.L. requirements for the CC.RR should be indented for on C.I.P. and distributed through the Ministry of War. A reserve should also be built up in each centre or region as soon as possible.

- (e) At present intercommunication for CC.RR is by land-line only. Obviously wireless links between the various H.Q.'s and internally in the Mobile Columns is essential as well, particularly in the event of various disorder when land-lines would be cut. My signal officer is at this moment investigating the whole question of the wireless needs of and provision of suitable equipment for the CC.RR. I will inform you further when he has completed his investigation in a week or so.

REORGANIZATION OF CC.RR.

3. The BOLOGNA question raises the whole problem of the organization of the CC.RR. From a short survey it appears that points which must be considered are the possibility, inter alia, of organizing the CC.RR territorially with the same boundaries as the Army Regions; of organization of communal distribution of CC.RR; and of reorganizing the mobile columns themselves with a view to increasing flexibility and effectiveness. I am taking this matter up with General BUNETTI and Public Safety Sub Commission A.C.

CONCLUSION.

- A. (a) The above presents my general view of the problem, as I see it.
(b) The immediate problem for you appears to be :-

GC/1983/SPRV. 6/2 dated 6 Dec 45) in connection with the mobile columns.

I now feel that you should go further and that all P.O.L. requirements for the CC.RR should be indented for on C.I.P. and distributed through the Ministry of War. A reserve should also be built up in each centre or region as soon as possible.

- (e) At present intercommunication for CC.RR is by land-line only. Obviously wireless links between the various H.Q.'s and internally in the Mobile Columns is essential as well, particularly in the event of serious disorder when land-lines would be cut. My signal officer is at this moment investigating the whole question of the wireless needs of and provision of suitable equipment for the CC.RR. I will inform you further when he has completed his investigation in a week or so.

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I am taking this matter up with General RANZETTI and Public Safety Sub Commission A.C.

CONCLUSION.

4. (a) The above presents my general view of the problem, as I see it.
- (b) The immediate problem for you appears to be :-
- (i) to ensure first priority of issue of material (clothing, M.S. etc.) to the CC.RR - particularly in BOLOGNA Region.
- (ii) to press the Minister of Transport to honour his bond as regards A.T. owed by him to the War Ministry!
- (iii) to take over the demand for and distribution of P.O.L. for the whole CC.RR.
- (c) I have not mentioned the political aspect in respect of subversive action on the part of Italian officials outside the CC.RR. That will be dealt with by Public Safety Sub-Commission, A.C.

/as regards

- 3 -

4. (c) contd.

As regards such elements inside the CC.RR I feel sure you are taking the strongest action to purge such ruthlessly, in order to create a non-party, national CC.RR police force.

L. Browning

Major General,
M.M.I.A.

Copy to : H.Q. A.C. (for Chief Commissioner) - 2 copies
Public Safety Sub Commission, A.C.
Transportation Sub Commission, A.C.
General BRUNETTI, Comd. CC.RR.
H.Q. 2 District.

Internal :

List "A" (less 10, 17 and 19.)

Appendix "A" to MILA
letter G/92 dated
11 December 1945

No 3 Bde. CC. RR.

1. H.Q. BOLOGNA

2. Consists of :-

(a) Bde H.Q.

(b) Four legions, one each at

BOLOGNA
ANCONA
FLORENCE
LIVORNO

{ 7 Groups
{ 5 Groups
{ 5 Groups
{ 5 Groups

(c) H.Q. Mobile Bn. Gp. at

BOLOGNA

(d) Two Mob. Bns., one each at

BOLOGNA
FLORENCE

3. Strength (BOLOGNA Area only)

	Actual		W.E.	
	Offrs	O. Ra.	Offrs	J. Ra.
(a) Bde. H.Q.	9	9	4	10
(b) BOLOGNA Legion	67	3425	58	3252
(c) H.Q. Mob. Bn. Gp.	2	40	7	40
(d) BOLOGNA Mob. Bn.	7	538	30	548
TOTALS	76+	3803+	99	3850

1. H.Q. BOLOGNA

2. Consists of :-

(a) 200 H.Q.

(b) Four Legions, one each at

BOLOGNA
ANCONA
FLORENCE
LEGHORN
{ 7 Groups
{ 5 Groups
{ 5 Groups
{ 5 Groups

(c) H.Q. Mobile Bn. Qp. at

BOLOGNA

(d) Two Mob. Bns., one each at

BOLOGNA
FLORENCE

3. Strength (BOLOGNA Area only)

	Actual	W.R.		
	Offrs	C.Rs.	Offrs	C.Rs.
(a) H.Q. H.Q.	?	?	4	10
(b) BOLOGNA Legion	67	3425	58	3252
(c) H.Q. Mob. Bn. Qp.	2	40	7	40
(d) BOLOGNA Mob. Bn.	7	338	50	548
TOTAL	76+	3803+	99	3850

LB/30

Sheet No. 2.

4. Vehicles.

	M.C. Solo		M.C. Combination		Cars		Lt. Load carrying vehs		Hy. Load carrying vehs		Tech.
	W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held	W.E.
(a) Bde. H.Q.	1				2						
(b) BOLOGNA Legion	874	75	9	3	60	38	73	3	9	14	9
(c) H.Q. Mob. Bn. Gp.					2		1				1
(d) BOLOGNA Mob. Bn.	95	NIL			3	NIL	26	NIL	20	2	
TOTALS	970	75	9	3	67	38	100	3	29	16	10

5. Arms.

	Pistols Mod 34		Automatic Rifles		Carbines Mod 91		L M G Breda	
	W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held
(a) Bde. H.Q.	14		2		8		2	
(b) BOLOGNA Legion	3310	1253	649	467	2603	3251	123	61
(c) H.Q. Mob. Bn. Gp.	47				40		4	
(d) BOLOGNA Mob. Bn.	578	86	187	45	361	937	21	6
TOTALS	3949	1539	838	513	3012	3788	150	67

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Sheet No. 2.

Appendix "A" to MIA
letter G/92 dated
14. December 1945

M.C. Solo		M.C. Combination		Cars		Lt. Load carrying vehs		Hy. Load carrying vehs		Tech. vehs		Armed vehs		REMARKS
W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held	
1				2										
874	75	9	3	60	38	73	3	9	14	9	NIL			
				2		1				1				
95	NIL			3	NIL	26	NIL	20	2			12	12	
970	75	9	3	67	38	100	3	29	16	10	NIL	12	12	

Pistols Mod 34		Automatic Rifles		Carbines Mod 91		L M G Breda		REMARKS
W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held	
14		2		8		2		
3310	1253	649	467	2603	3251	123	61	
47				40		4		
578	86	187	46	361	537	21	6	
3949	1339	838	513	3012	3783	150	67	

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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Being made

(15)

I cannot would
it also be possible for the Bureau
to refer to lack of type. A
lot have been released to the
Italian Govt but have been
sent to the CORP.

Await copy of the final ~~AC~~ 70
letter Mr. Costan 8/14/70

SECRET & URGENTSubject:- Law and order in BOLOGNA RegionLand Forces Sub-Commission, AC
(M.M.I.A.)G/92
14 December 1945.Headquarters, ALLIED COMMISSION.
(for Chief Commissioner)Ref. F.Q. 2 District letter 2015G(C) dated 5 December 1945
on the above:-

1. Herewith DRAFT of a letter I propose to send to the Minister of War and also to discuss with him personally.
2. I would particularly ask your assistance in exerting pressure on the Minister of Transport ref para 2(b) of attached.

The situation is (equivalent tonnage):-

PROMISED :- 153 vehicles in October
500 " on Nov. 1st.
500 " " Dec. 1st.

RECEIVED :- 143 " in Dec (of which 50% non-runners)
NIL " on Nov. 1st.
NIL " " Dec. 1st.

In fact the vital matter of M.T. for the CC.FR is completely stultified by the failure of Minister of Transport to implement his promise.

3. I view with alarm the subversive political activities of the non-career Prefect and Sindaco of BOLOGNA (and probably other places). The fact of his starving the CC.FR of P.O.L. (as H.Q. 2 District mention in para 5 of their letter) shows the way the wind lies.

Action as in para 2(d) of my DRAFT letter herewith would go some way towards nullifying his activities.

4. You will appreciate that the task of dealing with the complete reorganization of the CC.FR must inevitably be a slow one, in view of the fact no extra staff for a "CC.FR Section" in my sub-commission has yet been furnished to me.

5. May I have your comments or approval to my DRAFT. I send you

2. I would particularly ask your assistance in exerting pressure on the Minister of Transport ref para 2(b) of attached.

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500 " on Nov. 1st.
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In fact the vital matter of M.T. for the CC.RR is completely stultified by the failure of Minister of Transport to implement his promise.

3. I view with alarm the subversive political activities of the non-career Prefect and Sindaco of BOLZENA (and probably other places). The fact of his starving the CC.RR of P.C.L. (as H.Q. 2 District mention in para 5 of their letter) shows the way the wind lies.

Action as in para 2(d) of my DRAFT letter herewith would go some way towards nullifying his activities.

4. You will appreciate that the task of dealing with the complete reorganization of the CC.RR must inevitably be a slow one, in view of the fact no extra staff for a "CC.RR Section" in my sub-commission has yet been furnished to me.

5. ⁹⁷ May I have your comments or approval to my DRAFT. I send you this for your consideration as I consider it is such an important matter, necessitating the fullweight of your influence and authority on a high level.

6. This matter has already been discussed in general terms with Col. FYE and Col. CHAPMAN.

LB/cc

d. Browning
Major General,
M.M.I.A.

WVA

3641

EX-COMMUNIK

SUBJECT : Aids to Civil Power.

S E C R E T

HQ 2 DISTRICT, GMP.

2015 G(8)

5 DEC 45

DEC 5 1945

GMP GMP.
MMIA.

Copy to : Chief Commissioner, AG.
217 Area.

7 DEC 1945

XXXXX

Further to my 2015 G(8) of 23 OCT 45, a copy of which is attached for GMP GMP.

1. Since writing the letter referred to above in which I stressed how greatly handicapped the GCRP were, a visit has been paid to BOLOGNA by Col. E.J. BYE, the Deputy Director Public Safety Sub Commission, AG. He is making recommendations about the supply of good clothing, petrol and vehs to the GCRP and I am writing now because my certainty of the need of these improvements has recently increased.
2. The province of BOLOGNA is both a hot bed of militant communism and a focal point of British communications. Lawlessness in the form of banditry, gael storming and murder is rife. I attach a report of a more than usually serious but not untypical incident where fifty armed men raided a village and committed robbery, murder and abduction.
3. General GERICA, the Italian Territorial Commander at BOLOGNA, is certain that there will eventually be an armed communist uprising centred on BOLOGNA. The Comd of 217 Area is by no means so certain but agrees that it is not impossible. Were it ever to happen you will appreciate that several thousand armed men could hold or destroy the PO bridges and prevent the arrival of either 6 Arm'd Div or the Combat Groups to the north of the PO.
4. The situation is complicated by the fact that both the Prefect and the Sindaco are Communists and untrustworthy, and that communists have been placed in so many public positions of responsibility that it is not safe for ordinary citizens to expose them. The last man to give reliable information about hidden arms is now dying as the result of reprisals. It is therefore extremely hard to get information on which to make raids for arms, and there are undoubtedly many in the area. In addition, General GERICA is not entirely happy about the reliability of his own staff, and as a

(APT C)

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See M 9-13A-F14 20

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A 214 6 214

- 2 -

W (7)

result of this infiltration of terrorist influence the Italian Govt is not keeping law and order in this area.

5. Under these circumstances the need of equipment for the GCRH becomes even more marked. They can never move to a scene of disorder for lack of petrol. since their allotment is made by the Prefect who has no wish to make them mobile in case they impede his party's plans.

6. I would therefore again urge that petrol be allocated direct to the GCRH and not through the Prefect, that a drastic comb out of the GCRH be undertaken to eliminate the ex-partisans and that every encouragement, material and moral, be given to this body on whom rests the major responsibility for preventing civil disorder. If an increase in efficiency is not secured the use of combat troops, either Italian or British, to do a police job will be inevitable.

P. A. H. d. m. a. n.

Major General,
Commanding, 2 District.

Copy to CA Sec for PS 3/4.

~~Handwritten~~
C.A. Section (2)
10/12/45.

ALLIED COMMISSION
LIAISON OFFICE
BOLOGNA

3641

HA 5

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SECRET
26 Nov 45

Ref : AC/BOL/LG/P/3

Subject : Communist Activities - Bologna Province

DEC 3 1945

To : Executive Commissioner,
HQ Allied Commission.

1. Attached is a copy of a report from Major Ray, my Public Safety Officer, submitted for your information; copies have been sent to Public Safety Sub-Commission and Area Commander. The latter is talking to G.O.C. District about the matter in the near future.

2. The information contained in the report has been obtained from sources which we consider to be reliable and by no means unduly alarmist. Much of it has been confirmed from enquiries made by Italian Military authorities, and is now being checked by F.S.S.

The General commanding the Italian Military in Bologna is by no means certain that some members of his own staff can be relied upon and any action taken through his HQ will have to be done with the greatest circumspection.

3. So far as can be gathered at the moment, the provinces mainly concerned are Bologna and Modena, but should real trouble start it would spread very rapidly. Incidentally the Prefect of Modena, Gen. Zanetti, told me the other day that he is afraid of a situation arising here in the near future, similar to that which caused the fighting in Greece.

T.W.J. Walters
T.W.J. WALTERS, *Lt. Col.*
Lieut. Colonel,
Liaison Officer.

TWJ/GAS

94

(1 copy copy)

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(11335)

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 11
 ALLIED COMMISSION
 Liaison Office I.C.T.
 Bologna

Ref. AC-LG/PS/26.4

22nd Nov. '45

Subject: COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES. BOLOGNA PROVINCE.

To: Lt. Col. Walters,
 A.C. Liaison Officer,
 Bologna.

1. Reference this office monthly report for Oct. 1945, paragraph 12.

2. Further Enquiries have been made as to the activities of the Communist party in Bologna Province, and the following report is drawn from a number of sources believed to be reliable.

3. Bologna, city and province, is divided into "cells" on the usual Communist pattern, each one independent of the others, and having separate leaders and headquarters.

4. The city of Bologna has six such cells, and its leaders are charged with the duty of organizing and maintaining contact with all "useful" elements of the former Brigata G.A.P.

5. These elements, mostly young men between the ages of 18 and 25, born and brought up under Fascism to believe that brute force and violence are symbolic of good citizenship, are those who in the first months after the occupation of this province, murdered some six hundred persons in cold blood and kidnapped many others whose fate is as yet unknown.

6. These form the "shock" troops of the Communist party, and are controlled by men with brains.

7. In the event that the party decides to resort to violence to gain its ends, plans are already prepared and each cell has certain objectives to

N/R in E.C. office

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6. These form the "shock" troops of the Communist party, and are controlled by men with brains.

7. In the event that the party decides to resort to violence to gain its ends, plans are already prepared and each cell has certain objectives to carry out.

8. Here it may be added that the cells described above do not merely cover geographical areas, but have smaller branches and organizations in every industrial plant and all public works - railways, transport, communications etc.

9. The objectives to be gained at once are as follows:-

(a) The removal of all persons known to be contrary to the Communist party or who from their position, public or professional, are considered likely to be. Such categories include army officers, particularly Carabinieri; police officials; priests;

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persons who have occupied public office, or who may have in any way some influence over the mass of the population; chiefs of former partisan groups who are known to be anti-Communist or even without definite political views of any kind.

The details of these lists are believed to be largely the work of "Jacopo" (Dott. Cucchi), as stated in monthly report for Oct.

(b) Seizure of the broadcasting station, post and telegraph offices, road and rail transport. As mentioned above, each of these organizations has already a nucleus ready to take possession when called upon. As regards the railways, the organization of the "Polizia Ferroviaria," dependent as far as can be ascertained from Rome, and locally the responsibility of the Capo Compartimento for the WHOLE of EMILIA, appears to be entirely recruited from former Partisan - and therefore Communist - elements.

(c) Occupation of the Questura, the sectional P.S. offices, CC.RR. stations. As previously reported the admission of some 300 ex-Partisans to the Corps of Agents of the Questura, the recruiting of "Volontari in ausilio ai Carabinieri" from the same source in each comune, and the forming of the "Pattuglie Cittadine" have a very obvious purpose. See reports dated 22 Sept. '45, AC-LG/FS/23.4 and 31 Oct. '45, AC-LG/FS/23.4-I.

(d) Occupation of barracks and other large buildings, in city and province, having useful strategic positions.

10. Among the members of the G.A.P. who would be particularly entrusted with such operations are many common criminals whose past history is known to those in control of the movement, and who maintain this control now by threat of denunciation.

11. Having served their purpose, if all goes well, these dangerous persons would themselves be eliminated by the real leaders behind the movement.

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12. Ever since the date of occupation, there have been repeated reports of clandestine formations drilling and practising in the mountains, and the sound of machine gun and light automatic fire could be heard daily in the more deserted and devastated areas during the summer months. This latter can be directly confirmed, but no proof of the former was ever forthcoming.

13. Certain individuals can be identified as being definite local leaders.

(a) BARONTINI ELIO, better known locally as "Dario". This man was the leader of CUMER - Comando Unitario Militare Emilia-Romagna - at the time of the

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occupation. He is a strong and active Communist. Trained in Russia, he was the commander of a unit of the International Brigade in Spain. Later he went to Abyssinia, and organized Abyssinian irregulars against the Italians. He is considered, however, to be a better Communist than soldier. Latterly he has been more active in Milan, and Livorno where he is believed to have an important position (possibly Secretary) in the Camera del Lavoro. There is, too, some evidence for believing that this man has recently actually visited Russia, leaving Livorno on a Russian ship, and only returning to this country at the beginning of November. Since that date he has visited Bologna, but met very few people, as far as is known only (b), (c), (g), (j) and (k) below.

He is believed to be returning to Russia again in the very near future.

- (b) Dott. CUCCHI, better known as "Jacopo", former second in command to "Dario" when CUMER existed. A violent and dangerous type, believed to be largely responsible for the murders that took place in this province following the occupation. Then also known as "Il Boia" - the executioner. A member of A.N.P.I. and as such travels over the whole region.
- (c) Walter NEGROSSI, Secretary of A.N.P.I. Believed to be associated with Cucchi in compiling the lists of those to be eliminated.
- (d) PACITTI, known as "Arturo", associated with Negrossi in the Commission of A.N.P.I. Believed to be responsible for several murders and kidnappings.
- (e) A certain RICCI, also associated with (c) and (d).
- (f) Dott. STERMINI, of the Clinica S. Orsola. An active Communist and close associate of Cucchi.
- (g) MALAGUTI, Secretary of the Camera del Lavoro of Bologna, who lends his active support to the

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- (g) MALAGUTI, Secretary of the Camera del Lavoro of Bologna, who lends his active support to the "Federterra".
- (h) BONAZZI, an associate of (g).
- (i) Mario PIAZZA, who was a well known Communist agitator in this province after World War I and has now again started to incite the "contadini" against the land proprietors.
- (j) BETTI, Communist party representative of the C.R.L.N., who has complete control over this body.
- (k) DOZZA, Sindaco of Bologna, an active and convicted Communist who gave his support to the action of a certain "servizio d'ordine" which appeared at the Communist organized meeting for the "Co-

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stitution" held in Bologna, as elsewhere, on 14 Oct. '45, and reported on corres. AC-LG/PS/-26.3 of 1 Nov. '45.

This man has made every effort to enrol ex-partisans in the Vigili Urbani.

(1) Gianguido BORGHESI, Prefetto of Bologna, a prominent Socialist but in his actions and speeches is more "leftist" than some Communists. A clever, astute individual, who like Dozza was plausible enough to win the support of A.M.G. during that period.

14.12 Certain particular localities in the province can be named as centres where Communism is strongest, and where politically inspired disturbances may be expected, e.g.:-

Budrio, Molinella, Medicina, Galliera, S. Giovanni in Persiceto, Crevalcore, Castelmaggiore, Minerbio Marzabotto, S. Giorgio di Piano, Pieve di Cento, Argelato, Ozzano Emilia, S. Benedetto Val di Sambro, Castiglione, Sasso Marconi, Sala Bolognese, S. Matteo Decima, Castel S. Pietro, Castenaso, Monterenzio, Castel d'Argile, Malacappa, and Granarolo.

15. Nothing need be said about arms and ammunition, except that it need not be doubted that more than adequate supplies of both are available if and when necessary.

16.3 Sufficient information has come to light in the last seven months, during the whole of which period the writer has served in Bologna Province, for it to be stated that the facts as set out above are true. Whether disorders and disturbances will actually take place or not, it is impossible to say, but there is no doubt whatever that the possibility exists, and many Italian officials, civilian and military (who after all should know something of their fellow countrymen) are firmly convinced of their probability.

17.13 In conclusion, the situation in the province is very similar to that obtaining after World War I. Communism was rife, then as now, in the same centres

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17. 3 In conclusion, the situation in the province is very similar to that obtaining after World War I. Communism was rife, then as now, in the same centres and districts. As a consequence, landowners then were unable to live on their estates, and were disposing of them; there is of course now, no question of the landowners 'disposing' of their properties, they are simply seized and occupied. Fascism began in these parts as the opponent of Communism, it remains to be seen what form of "ISM" will appear this time.

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Andrew G. F. May
ANDREW G. F. MAY, MAJOR
Public Safety Officer

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