

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

ACC

10000/109/726
(VOL. I)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

10000/109/726
(VOL. I)

ALIENS
DEC. 1945 - DEC. 1946

92.

OFFICE NOTE

CC spoke to G-5 re their letter at Folio 91 pointing out that although the ~~it~~ may have been some slight delay with Polaris the matter was a complicated one and was dealt with as expeditiously as possible.

mc
E. GARE,
Brigadier,
Exec. Comm.

17 Dec 46.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

459

mc
L. CARD,
Prisoner,
Exec. Comm.

37 Dec 46.

87.

Chief Commissioner.

Ref AF Hep letter at 73 and AMG V.4.
 letter at 72. enclosed draft is submitted
 for consideration.
 You will probably wish to read State Minutes
 77 and 78.
 Draft reply is based on PAd(A)'s minute
 77. I cannot face any copy of the
 Dums Agreement at this time.

MacBryden
 E.C.

3/12/40

86

EL. 612

W.D. /
 W.D.

457

for consideration
 You will probably wish to read State Minutes
 77 and 78.
 Draft reply is based on Pofad(A) is minute
 77. I cannot face any copy of the
 Dums Agreement at this time.

McCarly Bayader
 E.C.

3/12/40

88

E.C. OK

EW

457

89

458

DEC 5 1946

Chief of Inclosure.

Attached is submitted for your signature. You appeared in chap.
 minutes

McCarly Bayader
 E.C.

5/12

80

MINUTE ON PAPER

78
I agree generally with Mr. Greene's minute of November 15th. But in view of the evident importance which A.M.G. V.G. attach to the proposal, it would seem that, rather than recommend its immediate rejection, it should be considered further in the light of Mr. Greene's observations and the comments of 1946. 73. invited thereon.

In order to gauge more accurately the reaction of the Italian and Yugoslav Governments, it would be useful to know roughly how many Italians and how many Yugoslavs in the area would be affected. It must be borne in mind that insofar as large numbers of Yugoslavs would be affected the proposed Order might have unpredictable consequences in the Council of Foreign Ministers' negotiations at New York.

If it is eventually decided to bring the Order into force, it would seem preferable to do so without previous consultation with the Yugoslav Government, if only to avoid an interminable and probably unsatisfactory interchange of correspondence.

with family
Poland B

November 26th 1946.

79
To Ex. Comm.

print at plus 75 in supply 78
letter from B.F.H.G. at plus 73,
with enclosure at plus 69.72.
Refer attached

File revised 2/12/46

6/2/46

File removed 2/12/46

6/1/46

3 Dec 45

would be affected the proposed Order might have unpredictable consequences in the Council of Foreign Ministers' negotiations at New York.

If it is eventually decided to bring the Order into force, it would seem preferable to do so without previous consultation with the Yugoslav Government, if only to avoid an interminable and probably unsatisfactory interchange of correspondence.

H.H. Farley
Roland B

November 26th 1945.

79

To Ex Comm

Just at this 75 in reply to
letter from AFHQ at this 73,
with enclosure at this 69-72,
is now the 74 you appear.

Toughella
Cap 56
3/12

- 77 -

Executive Commissioner.

I note that the Deputy Chief Legal Adviser and the Director of Public Safety Division both share my reaction that the Draft Order is rather loosely worded and vague. Whether or not this circumstance is intentional, I believe that the Order should not be published by AMB, for the following reasons:

1. As it stands, the Order appears practically unenforceable except in random cases which presumably would be singled out by the Venezia-Giulia police. Such random enforcement leads inevitably to well-founded charges of discrimination.
2. It is my understanding that a sizable number of the temporary population of Zone A comprises Italian refugees from Istria. It would be contrary to U.S. Government policy, which opposes forcible repatriation of political refugees, to deport any of these back to Zone B for violation of an order such as that proposed, in conformity with the normal procedure for deportation of undesirables back to their place of origin. Even if this procedure were not observed, I do not believe we can justifiably add to the already heavy refugee burden borne by Italy by attempting to deport anyone to Italy.
3. I believe the Order is untimely, given the present state of negotiations in the Council of Foreign Ministers about a statute for the Free Territory of Trieste. Further in this connection, I would note that the critical date for acquisition of original citizenship of that territory is tentatively set at June 10, 1949.
4. I believe the Order is unnecessary. If the police enforce Italian law governing visits and domiciles of foreigners as well as AMB regulations already promulgated for the control of movement of persons into Zone A within the provisions of the Duino Agreement, there should be no necessity for an order of this type. I believe the important thing at this time is to be sure that every person physically within Zone A is fully documented to show his status, whether a resident or a visitor from some other area.
5. Finally I consider it highly debatable whether the Order contravenes Appendix B of the Duino Agreement, the critical issue being whether freedom of movement implies freedom to change residence. In order to avoid any possible charge of violation of the Agreement, this point should in my view be cleared up by consultation with the Yugoslav authorities before any such order as this is issued.

1. As it stands, the Order appears practically unenforceable except in random cases which presumably would be singled out by the Venezia-Giulia police. Such random enforcement leads inevitably to well-founded charges of discrimination.
2. It is my understanding that a sizable number of the temporary population of Zone A comprises Italian refugees from Istria. It would be contrary to U.S. Government policy, which opposes forcible repatriation of political refugees, to deport any of these back to Zone B for violation of an order such as that proposed, in conformity with the normal procedure for deportation of undesirables back to their place of origin. Even if this procedure were not observed, I do not believe we can justifiably add to the already heavy refugee burden borne by Italy by attempting to deport anyone to Italy.
3. I believe the Order is untimely, given the present state of negotiations in the Council of Foreign Ministers anent a statute for the Free Territory of Trieste. Further in this connection, I would note that the critical date for acquisition of original citizenship of that territory is tentatively set at June 10, 1940.
4. I believe the Order is unnecessary. If the police enforce Italian law governing visits and domiciles of foreigners as well as AMG regulations already promulgated for the control of movement of persons into Zone A within the provisions of the Duino Agreement, there should be no necessity for an order of this type. I believe the important thing at this time is to be sure that every person physically within Zone A is fully documented to show his status, whether a resident or a visitor from some other area.
5. Finally I consider it highly debatable whether the Order contravenes Appendix H of the Duino Agreement, the critical issue being whether freedom of movement implies freedom to change residence. In order to avoid any possible charge of violation of the Agreement, this point should in my view be cleared up by consultation with the Yugoslav authorities before any such order as this is issued.

November 15, 1946.

Joseph N. Greene, Jr.
 Joseph N. Greene, Jr.,
 Political Adviser (A).

455

- 1) Legal Division
 - 2) Public Information 74
 - 3) Public Information
- Please see letter at this 29 & 30 with enclosure at this 71.

May we please take your letter on this matter

Impress *copy*

Ex Comm's Office

5 Nov 46

EX-108

75

EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER.

1. It is within the powers of AMG to prohibit immigration in territory under their control. Whether this is done on grounds of security or because of scarcity of dwellings and deterioration of sanitary conditions is not material.
2. The order is therefore perfectly legal if it does not contravene previous AMG legislation which is not abrogated in the recital.
3. The drafting is meant to give as little offence as possible on political grounds and therefore suffers somewhat in clarity.
4. Whether the order is comprehensive enough and will bring about the desired results is a matter for the Public Safety Division to decide.

7 Nov 1946

G. G. Hannaford

G. G. HANNAFORD,
Lt. Colonel,
Deputy Chief Legal Advisor.

EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER.

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7 Nov 1946

G. G. Hannaford

G. G. HANNAFORD,
Lt. Colonel,
Deputy Chief Legal Advisor.

- 76 -

REPLYING OFFICER.

Although this draft is rather loosely worded and allows considerable latitude I understand it is not intended to enforce it rigidly, but if the Order is put into force it will considerably strengthen the hands of A.S.G. in dealing with undesirable immigrants. I have no other criticisms or suggestions to offer.

E. J. Jones
E. J. JONES, Colonel
Director

Public Safety Division

9 Nov. '46

785017

Ex Comm

38

13 Please see in 57 John 48 9

m. 51, 53 & 59 refer

(2) John 56 is a summary of report at 48

I inform 17/10 H. 17/10

52.

Director, Disper S/C.

Reference Minute 57. I spoke Col. Hamblen, G-5 on this point. G-5 do not want out views on the report at this stage. I did however inform Col. Hamblen the views you give at Minute 51.

M. CARR,
Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

18 Oct 1946.

Ex Comm

60.

Noted -

18 Oct

to be known

62.

Please see folio 61 for info.

Folios 48, 54, 55, 56 & 57 refer to 53.

Director, Meyer G/O.

Reference Minute 57. I spoke Col. Hamblen, G-5 on this point. G-5 do not want out views on the report at this stage. I did however inform Col. Hamblen the views you give at Minute 51.

18 Oct 1946.

M. Cantor

M. CANTOR,
Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

E.C. J.M.C.M. 60.

Noted -

Oct 18 Oct.

to be

62.

Please see files 61 for info.

- Files 48, 54, 53, 52 to Super & 53,

57 & 59.

J.M.C.M. 24/10

M.P. 25/10

65.

453

Ex. Comm. Min.

Attached letter for your information, please file

Impeller Act M.P. 26/10

26/10/46

30

DRR spc

May we please have your comment on Mr. Rogers' Report at folio 48.

S m/cwm 10/10

51.

Executive Commissioner

Entire agreement. I would like to press for para 7 (d) - Summary of Recommendations - viz :-

Early transfer all Yugoslavs (Dis, Siles) now in camps in ITALY to holding camps overseas.

11 Oct '46
Ext 392.

USL
C.B. FIDELAY,
Col. Director.
D.P. & R.S.C.

52

Let to Com.
Please see report at folio 48. M. 51
refers.

S m/cwm 11/10 148. 12/10 M. 51
14/X.

53

Dr. J. J. J.

I presume that the Report at 48 is being considered by higher authority and that no comments or action are required by this Commission at this stage. I presume that

Director, Public Safety, D/C.

1. I discussed this with Colonel Hadden, 9-5, HBU as follows:

- a. In it intended that this matter should be discussed with the Russians? Colonel Hadden stated that it had been agreed by Gleds (Gardner) and decided that the Russians should take over.
- b. As regards para 2, Colonel Hadden stated that it would be for the British and Russians to sort out the question of return of the French and Russian zones.
- c. As regards para 3, Colonel Hadden agreed that the point had been entirely overlooked that Russians, Bulgarians, Greeks, etc. and other Europeans were involved. He also agreed that this matter should be passed to the Italian Government and the Commission concerned and that this Commission should not attempt to compile lists, etc.
- d. Colonel Hadden took a note of the point that no guidance had been given as regards political refugees.
- e. The latter will probably be cancelled and fresh instructions issued.
- f. Will you let me have a copy of this so that I can have a personal discussion with Polada on the question if I get an opportunity?

25 September 1946.

W. G. H.
 Brigadier,
 Executive Commissioner.

450

28

ALLIED XXXXXXXXXX COMMISSION
 INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

AC 14756/5/19

Minute No. 19

26th July, 1946

TO: CISO.

The control of Aliens, other than Displaced Persons is primarily a Public Safety Sub-Commission and Security Division subject. The original letter to the Prime Minister at Folio 6 was drafted by CAS and P.S. S/C and is on a P.S. file.

The subject has now also been dealt with on this file, on a D.P. file and there seems to be yet another file at Folio 14. Please see that PS S/C have copies of all key letters on this subject for their file and that in future correspondence is routed to PS S/C for initial action.

(Agd.) M. Lann. Aug.
M. Lann, Brigadier
A/C Executive Commissioner.

26/7

Minute No. 20

Public Safety S/C.

Ref. min. 19 Please take copies of any letters not on your file to complete your records.

26/7

Alan W. Knisely, Capt.

The control of Aliens, other than Displaced Persons is primarily a Public Safety Sub-Commission and Security Division subject. The original letter to the Prime Minister at Folio 6 was drafted by CAS and P.S. S/C and is on a P.S. file.

The subject has now also been dealt with on this file, on a D.P. file and there seems to be yet another file at Folio 14. Please see that PS S/C have copies of all key letters on this subject for their file and that in future correspondence is routed to PS S/C for initial action.

26/7

Minute 20.

Public Safety S/C.

Ref. min. 19 Please take copies of any letters not on your file to complete your records.

26/7

Alan W. Knisely, Capt.

(Agd.) M. Carr. Bug
M. Carr, Brigadier
A/C Executive Commissioner.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

149

3643 ST
ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 912

DEC 24 1946

Ex Comm

G-5: 945.04

20 December 1946

NO

SUBJECT: Delay in Answering Correspondence.

TO : Chief Commissioner,
Allied Commission,
APO 774.

96

1. Reference is made to a memorandum of the Executive Commissioner to you dated 17 December 1946 concerning the handling of AFHQ letter subject Registration of Aliens file G-5, 945.04 of 10 December 1946. The reference to delay by the Allied Commission was a statement of fact. Only if there was undue delay in reply can criticism be implied. This headquarters is fully aware of the personnel difficulties of ALOOM which difficulties are uniform throughout the Theater.

2. In the instance case the delay appears to have been caused by failure to receive advice promptly from the political advisors. Correspondence must not be delayed on this account. If technical advice is not available with reasonable promptness, the best advice available must be accepted and action taken based thereon. So far as political advice is concerned, it should be recalled that such advice is available at AFHQ. In case it is not readily available in Rome, it can be secured at this headquarters.

3. The dates of action on the subject paper by the various agencies in ALOOM would indicate that it was passed thru routine channels to these agencies in turn. At AFHQ it has been found advantageous to reproduce sufficient copies of correspondence requiring action by several agencies so that simultaneous action could be taken by them. When considerable delay is anticipated, the hand-carrying of correspondence by the "Action" agency to other interested agencies is indicated.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEE:



A. L. HAMBLET
Colonel, G.S.C.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

Learn by CC

MC

448 PA 27
12
PA 11K
30/12

Capt V 28/12

3643 ~~4459~~
ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

ALH/SHW/fs 97

G-5: 945.04

20 December 1946.

SUBJECT: Control of Immigrants - Venezia Giulia

TO : GHQ CMF

Reference your letter 5955/G of 12 December

1. It is agreed that it is undesirable that refugees should be permitted to remain in Zone A longer than is necessary to permit of their passage there through and enclosed is a copy of this Headquarters' letter G-5 953.13 of 5 December to the Allied Commission on this subject.

96- 2. For political reasons (see enclosed copy of this Headquarters' letter G-5 945.04 of 10 December) any order which could be interpreted as an attempt to restrict freedom of movement across the Morgan Line in contravention of the Duino Agreement is considered undesirable and untimely; but, apart from this it is very doubtful if any additional powers are really necessary.

3. Please see the summary of certain laws which it is understood are still in force in Trieste. The enforcement of these existing laws which seem ample for the purpose would not be open to the objection that they had been enacted by the Allied Military Government.

4. The Allied Military Government also seems to have ample power to prevent overcrowding without any further legislation not only does Article 5 of Decree 1092 of July 1939 forbid letting to non residents but their own Area Order No. 6 of September 45 prohibits lettings to persons not "usually resident in the Comune".

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEE:


A. L. HANBLEN
Colonel, G.S.C.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

Copy to AMO VG
ALCOM
w/ copy summary only
Encls. as abv.

C
O
P
Y

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APG 512

G-5: 945.04

10 December 1946

SUBJECT : Registration of Aliens.

TO : Allied Military Government,
Venetia Giulia.

1. Reference your letter VG/AVG/129 of 15 October 46. Reply has been delayed because of the failure of the Allied Commission to respond to AFMC letter of 30 October 46 requesting comments on the "Prohibition of Immigration into the Territory" order. Reply has now been received and is forwarded for your information. While this Headquarters does not concur fully in the details of the AFMC comments, it is of the opinion, based largely on political implications, that such an order is untimely and should not now be issued.

2. It is presumed that the ordinary Italian law regarding the registration of aliens and the necessity for having a permis de sejour is in force.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEE:

A. L. HAMBLEN
Colonel, G.S.C.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

Encl:

Alcom ltr 3643/80/20
of 5 Dec 46.

Copy to:

Allied Commission.

F98 refers

C
O
P
Y

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

G-5: 953.13

December 1946

SUBJECT : Refugees.

TO : Chief Commissioner,
Allied Commission,
APO 794

Reference is made to ECAG 73 letter VC/AMG/20 of 19 November,
copy to you.

1. This Headquarters is not in favour of unrestricted immigration into Zone A. The Duino Agreement however provides for free transit over the Morgan Line and this provision cannot be ignored.
2. There is, however, no reason why refugees should be permitted to remain indefinitely in Zone A. The care of its nationals is an obligation of the Italian Government. Adequate and proper provision for these refugees should be made so that with the exceptions mentioned below, refugees should not remain in Zone A longer than is reasonably necessary for their transit there through.
3. Will you please take the matter up with the Italian Government with a view to arrangements being made for the early evacuation of these refugees to territory under Italian control.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEE:

A. L. HAWBLEY
Colonel, G.S.C.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

Copy to:
AMC
Vanexia Giulia

445

Summary of Special Laws Affecting
Immigration into the city of Trieste

1. Article 1 of the Law 6 July 1939, No. 1092 provides that no person may transfer his residence to the Comune of Trieste unless able to show that he is obliged to do so by reason of his employment, office, or profession, or that he has in the Comune a permanent paid appointment, and in all cases that he has sufficient income to maintain himself.
2. Under Article 5 of the said Law, the granting of leases and sub-leases of dwelling houses or rooms to persons who have unlawfully taken up residence in the city is forbidden.
3. Illegal immigrants are debarred from having their names enrolled in the Communal Register of permanent residents in which only persons who are legally permanent residents are entitled to be enrolled (Art. 2 of R.D. 2 December 1929, No. 2132).
4. Persons who enter the town in breach of the above requirements of the law are not entitled to receive the Communal "libretto di lavoro", which is a document necessary for obtaining any employment, which may be given only to persons legally resident in the Comune. (Art. 2 of Law 10 January 1935, No. 112). Consequently the Labor Office should not register such persons in the unemployed persons register.

Trieste, 24 August 1946.

Summary of Special Laws Affecting
Immigration into the City of Trieste

1. Article 1 of the law 6 July 1939, No. 1092 provides that no person may transfer his residence to the Comune of Trieste unless able to show that he is obliged to do so by reason of his employment, office or profession, or that he has in the Comune a permanent paid appointment, and in all cases that he has sufficient income to maintain himself.
2. Under Article 5 of the said law, the granting of leases and sub-leases of dwelling houses or rooms to persons who have unlawfully taken up residence in the city is forbidden.
3. Illegal immigrants are deterred from having their names enrolled in the Communal Register of permanent residents in which only persons who are legally permanent residents are entitled to be enrolled (Art. 2 of R.D. 2 December 1939, No. 2132).
4. Persons who enter the town in breach of the above requirements of the law are not entitled to receive the Communal "libretto di lavoro", which is a document necessary for obtaining any employment which may be given only to persons legally resident in the Comune. (Art. 2 of Law 10 January 1935, No. 112). Consequently, the Labor Office should not register such persons in the unemployed persons register.

3643 57
ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

G-5: 3643.04

10 December 1946

SUBJECT: Registration of Aliens.

TO : Allied Military Government,
Venezia Giulia.

1. Reference your letter VG/AMG/129 of 15 October 46. Reply has been delayed because of the failure of the Allied Commission to respond to AFHQ letter of 30 October 46 requesting comments on the "Prohibition of Immigration into the Territory" order. Reply has now been received and is forwarded for your information. While this Headquarters does not concur fully in the details of the ALCOM comments, it is of the opinion, based largely on political implications, that such an order is untimely and should not now be issued.

2. It is presumed that the ordinary Italian law regarding the registration of aliens and the necessity for having a permis de sejour is in force.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEE:

A. L. HATHLEN

A. L. HATHLEN
Colonel, G.S.C.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5.

Encl:
ALCOM ltr 3643/80/SC
of 5 Dec 46.

Copy to:
Allied Commission.

442

Copy V 700
15/12

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DEC 10 1946

DEC 7 1946

6. Comm

1061

90

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

G-5: 945.04

5 December 1946.

SUBJECT: Registration of Aliens - Venezia Giulia.

TO : Chief Commissioner,
Allied Commission,
APO 794.

May your reply to this Headquarters letter G-5: 945.04
of 30 October on the above subject please be forwarded.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEE:



A.L. HAMBLIN,
Colonel, G.S.C.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5.

See FC 80

440

10/12

PR 10/12

Ref: 5645/89/30

30
5 December, 1946.

SUBJECT : Registration of Aliens - Venezia Giulia.

TO : ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Attention: G-5 Section

1. Reference is made to your letter G-5: 945.04 of 30th October 1946.
2. The Draft Order which proposes to prohibit immigration into Zone A, A.M.G. Venezia Giulia, has been given careful consideration by my Legal and Public Safety Divisions and by my American and British Political Advisers. It is considered that the order should not be published for the following reasons:-

a) The number of Italian refugees from Istria would be a considerable one since the proposed order will be retroactive as of June 12th 1945, and it would be contrary to U.S. Government Policy, which opposes forcible repatriation of political refugees, to deport any of these back to Zone B for violation of an order such as that proposed. In the alternative that the Italian refugees in Zone A express the desire to be transferred into the territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government, I believe we cannot justifiably add to the already heavy refugee burden in Italian Government territory by asking the Italian Authorities to accept more refugees.

It is also to be considered that the proposed order will undoubtedly affect many Yugoslavs who at present are in Zone A and who will have to be transferred to Zone B by effect of this order. Under the present circumstances I do not think this should take place without previous consultation with the Yugoslav Authorities.

b) Because of the present state of negotiations in the Council of Foreign Ministers about the statute for the free territory of Trieste I believe that the order is untimely, since the critical date for acquisition of original citizenship of that territory is tentatively set at 10th June, 1940.

c) If the Police enforce Italian law governing visits and domiciles of foreigners as well as A.M.G. Regulations already promulgated for the control and movement of persons into Zone A within the provisions of the Duino Agreement, I think there should be no necessity for an order of this kind.

-2-

d) As to para. 4 of Colonel Bowman's letter of 15th October addressed to you on the subject of the proposed draft order, I am informed by my Political Advisers that it is highly debatable whether the order contravenes Appendix 'H' of the Duino Agreement, the critical issue being whether freedom of movement does not imply freedom to change residence as well.

e) With reference to ARTICLE 1 - Section 1 of the proposed Order, it is stated that those who are not legally inscribed as permanent inhabitants since 12th June 1945 shall be prohibited from entering the territory for the purpose of establishing therein their permanent residence. It is not clear however, what is the intention of the Order in respect of those who have been in the territory since 12th June 1945.

3. In my opinion the benefit which will be obtained from this Order will be much less than the undesirable political repercussions which will result in consequence of its publication.

KILBY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Copies to: Polad A
Polad B
Public Safety Division
Legal Division

Exe Com

3643

NOV 23 1946

NOV 25 1946

C Comm

74

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

G-5: 945.04

21 November 1946

SUBJECT: Registration of Aliens - Venezia Giulia.

TO : Chief Commissioner,
Allied Commission,
APO 794.

30

73

May a reply to this Headquarters' letter G-5
945.04 of 30 October please be forwarded.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL ~~MORGAN~~:

[Signature]

A. L. HAMBLIN
Colonel, G.S.C.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

435

G-5 V

PA 5
M

785017

EC.

Responsible
4/11

3642 9

NOV 5 1946

C. COMM

73

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

NOV 4 1946

G-5: 345.0.

30 October 1946

SUBJECT: Registration of Aliens - Venezia Giulia.

TO : Chief Commissioner,
Allied Commission,
APO 794.

Enclosed are copies of AMG VS letter VG/AMG/129 of 15 October and of the draft of an order proposing to prohibit immigration into the Territory. Will you please let this Headquarters have your comments and recommendations upon the proposal.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN:


A. L. HAMBLIN
Colonel, G.S.C.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5.

Encls: as above.

434

See H- 76, F 91

(Case V)

72
VENEZIA GIULIA

HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT

IS CORPS

Office of the Senior Civil Affairs Officer

ACB/jen

VG/RMG/129

15 October 1946

Memorandum to: ACOS G-8,
AFHQ.

1. I enclose a copy of our proposed Order No. 244, "Prohibition of Immigration into the Territory".

2. This has been approved in writing by the heads of my Legal, Labor, Welfare and Displaced Persons Divisions, the Economic Section, and the Chief of Staff General Headquarters on behalf of General Harding.

3. I believe that there is an acute need for this Order. The matters recited in the "whereas" paragraph are critically serious. There can be no doubt that a great deal of the lag in the disposal of refugees coming here is deliberate and financed by persons desiring to build up national majorities for a plebiscite or other purposes. These are in general the same persons who scream most loudly when there is any suggestion that additional private property be used for community or refugee use.

4. It should be noted that the Order relates not to movement, but to the establishment of residence in the territory and that it should not therefore be regarded as contrary to the Belgrade or Duino agreements or to Allied policy.

5. It is recognized that the publication of this Order will have political repercussions and I should therefore be grateful if, before it is signed, you would indicate formally or informally your approval to supplement those of my experts and the General Headquarters.

Alfred C. Bowman

ALFRED C. BOWMAN
Colonel, J.A.G.D.
Senior Civil Affairs Officer

432
PA

7-73,91

HEADQUARTERS

ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT

VENEZIA GIULIA

ORDER N.244

PROHIBITION OF IMMIGRATION INTO THE TERRITORY

WHEREAS it is deemed necessary to meet the present excessive overcrowding and the extreme scarcity of dwelling accommodation and to prevent a consequent deterioration of sanitary conditions in that part of Venezia Giulia administered by the Allied Forces (hereinafter referred to as the "Territory").

NOW, THEREFORE, I, ALFRED C. BOWMAN, Colonel,
J.A.G.D., Senior Civil Affairs Officer,

ORDER :

ARTICLE I

PROHIBITION OF IMMIGRATION FOR NON-RESIDENTS

Section 1.) Any person not appearing to be inscribed in the Register of permanent inhabitants of any of the Communes within the Territory on the 12th of June 1945 or legally inscribed on said register since said date, in accordance with the laws relating to registration as permanent inhabitants, shall be prohibited from entering the Territory for the purpose of establishing therein his permanent residence.

Section 2.) Prohibited persons as defined in Section 1, residing in the Territory in excess of 15 days, shall within the inten-

the "Territory".),

NOW, WHEREFORE, I, ALFRED C. BOWMAN, Colonel,
J.A.G.D., Senior Civil Affairs Officer,

O R D E R :

ARTICLE I

PROHIBITION OF IMMIGRATION FOR NON-RESIDENTS

Section 1.) Any person not appearing to be inscribed in the Register of permanent inhabitants of any of the Communes within the Territory on the 12th of June 1945 or legally inscribed on said register since said date, in accordance with the laws relating to registration as permanent inhabitants, shall be prohibited from entering the Territory for the purpose of establishing therein his permanent residence.

Section 2.) Prohibited persons as defined in Section 1, residing in the Territory in excess of 15 days, shall within the intention of this order be presumed to be residing therein for the purpose of establishing a residence.

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ARTICLE II

PROHIBITION OF ASSISTANCE TO PERSONS AS EXCLUDED IN ART. I

Section 1.) No ration cards shall be issued, and no lodgings or economic help or any other kind of assistance shall be given

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by any person or any institutions public or private to prohibited persons mentioned in Art. I of this Order who have entered the Territory after the effective date of this Order.

ARTICLE III

PERMITS OF TEMPORARY RESIDENCE

Section 1.- Civil Affairs Officers may for good reasons shown and in exceptional cases, issue permits exclusive of permits issued under Art. IV (b) for temporary residence within their respective Communes, to persons within the prohibited categories of

Art. I for such periods as conditions warrant.

Section 2.- The permit of temporary residence shall entitle the holder to obtain the ration cards for the same period of time.

Section 3.- Upon expiration of the term fixed in the permit, the above-mentioned persons shall return their ration cards and leave the territory immediately.

ARTICLE IV

EXCEPTIONS IN THE APPLICATION OF THIS ORDER

The provisions laid down in the foregoing Articles shall not apply:

- a) to that part of the Territory included in the Commune of Pola.
The Area Commissioner of Pola shall have the power to issue his own provisions regarding the matter:
- b) to professional and specialized workers living outside the Territory, who are in possession of a permit of a temporary residence within the Territory which shall be issued to them

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under Art. IV (b) for temporary residence within their respective Communes, to persons within the prohibited categories of Art. I for such periods as conditions warrant.

Section 2.- The permit of temporary residence shall entitle the holder to obtain the ration cards for the same period of time.

Section 3.- Upon expiration of the term fixed in the permit, the above-mentioned persons shall return their ration cards and leave the territory immediately.

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EXCEPTIONS IN THE APPLICATION OF THIS ORDER

The provisions laid down in the foregoing Articles shall not apply:

a) to that part of the Territory included in the Commune of Pola.

The Area Commissioner of Pola shall have the power to issue his own provisions regarding the matter:

b) to professional and specialized workers living outside the

Territory, who are in possession of a permit of a temporary

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residence within the Territory which shall be issued to them by the Labor Office in accordance with the existing regulations and enabling them to be employed there for a determined work.

After the cessation of their employment they shall leave the Territory within ten days, and their employer shall forward a notice thereof to the competent Labor Office.

ARTICLE V

PENALTIES

Any person violating any of the provisions of this Order shall be tried by an Allied Military Court and, upon conviction, shall be punished by imprisonment or fine or both, as the Court shall determine.

Any person sentenced for staying in the Territory contrary to the regulations of this Order shall, after having served his punishment, be evacuated from the Territory by the Police Force and through the existing relief organizations according to the system adopted with regard to refugees.

ARTICLE VI

EFFECTIVE DATE OF ORDER

This Order shall become effective on the date of its publication in the Allied Military Gazette.

Dated at TRIESTE, this ____ day of October 1945

ALFRED C. BOWMAN,
Colonel, J.A.G.D.
, Senior Civil Affairs Officer.

the Court shall determine.

Any person sentenced for staying in the Territory contrary to the regulations of this Order shall, after having served his punishment, be evacuated from the Territory by the Police Force and through the existing relief organizations according to the system adopted with regard to refugees.

ARTICLE VI

EFFECTIVE DATE OF ORDER

This Order shall become effective on the date of its publication in the Allied Military Gazette.

Dated at TRIESTE, this ____ day of October 1946

ALFRED C. BOWMAN,
Colonel, J.A.G.D.
, Senior Civil Affairs Officer.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

OCT 24 1946

21 October 1946.

C-5: 945.01

SUBJECT: Extradition.

To: Chief Commissioner,
Allied Commission,
APO 794.

Reference para 1(b) of Minutes of Exec. Com. Meeting of
8 October.

1. This letter is written in case there is any misunderstanding. This Headquarters has no intention of writing you further with regard to P-33012. This Headquarters letter C-5: 945.01 of 23 September stated that the Italian Government must take up the question of Extradition direct with the governments of the countries to which the persons were respectively to be repatriated; but in view of para 6 of this Headquarters letter GS.1. 389.500/40 of 9 May, it gave you the option of making the representations if you so preferred. Para 3 of this Headquarters letter C-5: 945.01 of 7 October concurred with your view that it would be better if the Italian Government acted directly.

BY ORDER OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL BOGARD:

HGR

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[Signature]

A.L. BARNES,
Colonel, U.S.A.C.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5.

See F 64

[Handwritten notes]
200 - Rome
JRV

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RR

JRV
(Capt V.)
(Thompson)

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APC 724

DISPLACED PERSONS DIVISION

NOV 23 1946

DPW/42/Q

Tel. 48908; Ext 434

23 October 1946

SUBJECT : Plans for implementing Ryes Recommendations.

TO : G-5 A.P.H.Q. (2)

Reference A.P.H.Q. letter D-133.7 dated 18 October

1946.

1. Assessing - Present Population of Camps approximately 13,000 assuming 1,000 of the Poles, at present in Displaced Persons Camps, are due to go to Britain. Balance in the Camps would be 12,000. To these must be added a maximum of 3,000 mainly Yugoslavs (approximately 1,000 returned to date) due to resenter camps on cessation of employment with Allies.

Total capacity required without CHETNIKS 14,500.

Capacity of Displaced Persons Camps at present is estimated at 17,000 to 18,000 according to whether additional single men or families have to be accommodated. Certain above capacities e.g. REGIO BELLIA could be raised a few hundreds - given equipment.

It can be assumed that without increasing overheads or numbers of camps some 1,000 to 2,000 Chetniks could be admitted on above estimates.

2. Location - In order to avoid racial complications, certain conditions must be observed, viz not to mix Chetniks with extreme CHOCATS and for choice not with SLOVAKS. It is considered advisable to put as few Chetniks in one camp as possible.

3. The outline initial plan is as follows : -

BARLATA - 1,000 Chetniks (on departure of Poles early Nov)
REGIO BELLIA - 1,000 Chetniks (might necessitate some others elsewhere)

END

1. Assuming - Present Population of Camps approximately

13,000 assuming 1,500 of the Poles, at present in Displaced Persons Camps, are due to go to Britain. Balance in the Camps would be 11,500. To these must be added a maximum of 3,000 mainly Yugoslavs (approximately 1,000 returned to date) due to resenter camps on cessation of employment with Allies.

Total capacity required without CHETNIKS 14,500.

Capacity of Displaced Persons Camps at present is estimated at 17,000 to 18,000 according to whether additional single men or families have to be accommodated. Certain shown capacities e.g. ASPOLIO MILLIA could be raised a few hundred - given equipment.

It can be assumed that without increasing overheads or numbers of camps some 3,000 to 4,000 Chetniks could be admitted on above estimates.

2. Location - In order to avoid racial complications, certain conditions must be observed, viz not to mix Chetniks with extreme CROATS and for choice not with SLOVENES. It is considered advisable to put as few Chetniks in one camp as possible.

3. The outline initial plan is as follows: -

BARLETTA	-	1,000 Chetniks	(on departure of Poles early Nov)
ASPOLIO MILLIA	-	1,000 Chetniks	(might necessitate moving others e.g. 250 there)
JESI	-	700 Chetniks	(moving most of present camp to BARLETTA or TRANI)
BAGNOLI	-	100 Chetniks (Croat)	
TRANI	-	300 Chetniks (Slovenes)	

For the Chief Commr's signature

EDWARD PURDY
Lieut. Colonel
Asst. D/Director.

Copy to : Executive Commissioner.

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OCT 14 1946

EX 72599

R/7165

OCT -----

OCT 14 0830

ROUTINE

ACMO - IOWED JAWED CITE FRGEG FROM MR - ROY E

PROCESSED LONDON FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS IGCR

INFO: AG AR - A SINGLES FOR CDR HQ GND CMT ALGOW BOME

SECRET

SECRET

1. The following is a summary of recommendations my report on Alien Refugee problem in Italy.

" A. To relieve the Allied Military Forces in Italy of their refugee burden and to meet the overall refugee problem an International Interim Organization should begin to operate in Italy at the earliest possible moment.

3. An agreement should be made with the Italian Government that it continue to supply rations and wages if necessary on a replacement repayment basis.

C. There should be an early progressive transfer of responsibility for the refugees now under the care of the Military Authorities. Their advice and existing facilities should be utilized. Some experienced Officers now in the theater whose active military service is about to terminate may be available to the new organization.

D. The new Interim organization should negotiate with the Italian Government for undertaking the formal protection of valid refugees.

E. All Displaced Persons and Surrendered Enemy Personnel except those who come under the IRO exclusion clauses should be classified as refugees. This should be applied to persons in and out of camps estimated at 50000.

F. Efforts towards repatriation should be increased

1. Reshifting active dissident elements in camps.

(S/COMD M.N.) H.M.C.N.

S/COMD M.N. 38 F 48, M.S. 5940

OCT 14 1946

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PAGE TWO

SECRET

Secret

3. A well planned publicity programme co-ordinated with land Repatriation Missions.
3. Indirect ballots.
4. All other ethical needs.
2. The Ukrainian Ex-Wehrmacht SS group 5000 at Rimini should be transferred to US and British camps in Germany.
- H. To meet the special problem of the Yugoslav refugees which is politically the most embarrassing to the Italian Government.
 1. The Ex-Wehrmacht elements should be transferred to Allied camps in Germany.
 2. The Chetnik groups should be broken up where possible they should be re-classified as refugees and transferred to other camps.
 3. Those not classifiable as refugees, i.e. Para-Military leaders should be transferred to Allied camps in Germany or otherwise moved out of Italy.
 4. To meet an acute situation a radical solution would be to transfer all Yugoslavs in camps to holding camps overseas.
1. In addition to the many refugees at present outside of Italy provision should be made for a large number of new entries who might flood in to Italy unless exclusion from care is considered desirable.
2. Paper is still under examination by GHO CEF. Preliminary reaction of AFHQ is concurrence in the report its conclusions.

60-14 1945

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PAGE THREE

SECRET

SECRET

and recommendations they consider however that in view of rapid re-deployment of British and U.S. forces it will not be possible to implement some of above recommendations before termination care of refugees in Italy by Military Authorities unless early instructions are issued by appropriate higher authorities and unless certain extra personnel and facilities are provided.

AC DIST

Info Action: Dir Far S/C (2)

Info: Chief Commissioner

Executive Commissioner

Polad (A)

Polad (B)

File

Skelaton

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4/23.8/G/CA

OCT 10 1946
9 October 1946

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have been instructed by Allied Force Headquarters to inform you that they have been receiving from the French, Greek, Yugoslav, Russians and other Government requests for the arrest and extradition of their nationals for trial as traitors, to which Allied Force Headquarters are replying by informing these countries that when the person required is living at large in Italy, their requests should be addressed to your Government through the usual diplomatic channels.

It is understood that there are already cases in which certain persons required by other nations are being held by the Italian Authorities. For instance, it is believed that the Italian Authorities hold five alleged Russians in Parma prison and fourteen Russians at Modena prison. I would be glad if this Commission could be informed of what is happening about these persons.

I would also be grateful if you could furnish details of how the Italian Government is proposing to deal with these requests and in particular: -

- (a) Does the Italian Government arrest and hold persons without production of a charge and, if so, how long are they held if no charge is produced?
- (b) What steps are taken to ascertain the true nationality of persons detained?
- (c) What steps are taken to see that an offence has been committed?
- (d) Does the accused have an opportunity to reply?
- (e) Is the hearing in open court?
- (f) Are genuine political refugees afforded shelter?

I would appreciate it, my dear Mr. Prime Minister, if I could be given an early reply on the matter.

Yours very truly,

WILLIAM W. S. 420
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Dr. Alcide de Gasperi,
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government,
ROME.

100 (PA 10/10)

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C O P Y

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

49A

G-5: 945.01

2 October 1946

SUBJECT: Registration and Repatriation of Aliens.

TO : Chief Commissioner,
Allied Commission,
APO 794

With reference to the queries raised by you on this Headquarters' letter G-5: 945.01 of 25 September.

1. This Headquarters has no desire to say anything which might lead to less close cooperation between the Allied Commission and the Embassies or fetter your freedom to consult them whenever you wish to do so. It is, however, pointed out that it is a principle of Staff procedure at this headquarters that no letter that has political implications should be despatched from it without prior consultation with the Supreme Allied Commander's political advisers; who, if they consider the matter so requires, consult the Embassies before giving their advice or concurrence. The letter under discussion was concurred with by both Political Advisers.

2. With reference to para 2, the representation should be made to the Embassy of the power occupying the Zone to which the undesirable alien is to be deported. The letter under reference would have been more complete if France and Russia and the French and Russian Embassies had been mentioned in paragraph 2 and the consequential reference had also been included in paragraph 3. Will you please so read them.

3. It is agreed that it is better that the Italian Government should deal direct with the Embassies concerned.

4. With regard to refugees: there are no military objections to the Italians deporting undesirable aliens living at large in Italy. Political objections, should there be any, should be taken up diplomatically. The Italian attitude as to refugees would be known had this Headquarters received a reply to its letter G-5: 934.50 of 6 September 1945.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN:

419

A. L. HARKEN
Colonel, G.S.C.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5.

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SECRET

EXC.

PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE ALIEN REFUGEE PROBLEM IN ITALY

OCT 19 1946

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

1. To relieve the Allied Military forces in Italy of their refugee burden and to meet the overall refugee problem, an international interim organization should begin to operate in Italy at the earliest possible moment.
2. There should be an early, progressive transfer of responsibility for the refugees now under the care of the military authorities. Their advice and existing facilities should be utilized. Some experienced officers now in the theatre, whose active military service is about to terminate, may be available to the new organization.
3. An agreement should be made with the Italian Government that it continue to supply rations and wages, if necessary, on a replacement/repayment basis.
4. All displaced persons and surrendered enemy personnel, except those who come under the IIC exclusion clauses, should be classified as refugees. This should be applied to persons in and out of camps, estimated at 160,000.
5. The interim organization should negotiate with the Italian Government for undertaking the formal protection of valid refugees.
6. Efforts towards repatriation should be increased by:
 - a. Resisting active dissident elements in camps.
 - b. A well planned publicity program coordinated with homeland repatriation missions.
 - c. Indirect ballots.
 - d. All other ethical means.
7. To meet the special problem of the Yugoslav refugees, which is politically the most embarrassing to the Italian Government:
 - a. The ex-Wehrmacht elements should be transferred to Allied camps in Germany.

terminate, may be available in the new organization.

3. An agreement should be made with the Italian Government that it continue to supply rations and wages, if necessary, on a replacement/repayment basis.
4. All displaced persons and surrendered enemy personnel, except those who come under the ILO exclusion clause, should be classified as refugees. This should be applied to persons in and out of camps, estimated at 150,000.
5. The Interis organization should negotiate with the Italian Government for undertaking the formal protection of valid refugees.
6. Efforts towards repatriation should be increased by:
 - a. Reshifting active dissident elements in camps.
 - b. A well planned publicity program coordinated with homeland repatriation missions.
 - c. Indirect ballots.
 - d. All other ethical means.
7. To meet the special problem of the Yugoslav refugees, which is politically the most embarrassing to the Italian Government:
 - a. The ex-Wehrmacht elements should be transferred to Allied camps in Germany.
 - b. The Chetnik groups should be broken up. Where possible they should be reclassified as refugees and transferred to other camps.
 - c. Those not classifiable as refugees, e.g., Chetnik paramilitary leaders, should be transferred to Allied camps in Germany or otherwise moved out of Italy.
 - d. To meet an acute situation, a radical solution would be to transfer all Yugoslavs in camps to holding camps overseas.
8. The Ukrainian ex-Wehrmacht SAP group (9,000) at Rimini should be transferred to U.S. and British camps in Germany.
9. In addition to the many refugees at present outside camps, provision should be made for a large number of new entrants who might flood into Italy, unless exclusion from care is considered desirable.

(5/continued)

See memo 51, 52, 53, 54 MS, 57, 58, 59
in 54, 55, 56

47
PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE ALIEN REFUGEE PROBLEM IN ITALY1. INTRODUCTION:

In Italy today there are an estimated 160,000 aliens, persons who may be approximately classed as displaced persons or refugees. These break down into the following groups:

a. 18,600 under the care of the Allied Commission, in camps, mainly disidents from Eastern European States. This is a relatively stable figure. Although there is a small amount of repatriation, this is off-set by new arrivals. The figure of 18,600 includes some 4,000 at present employed by the Allied Military Authorities. These are due to return to the camps shortly.

b. 21,000 retained in camps by the Military Authorities, at present classified as "SEP" (Surrendered Enemy Personnel).

c. 23,000 under the care of UNHRA. Of these, 8,000 are Jews in UNHRA camps, 7,500 in Hachsharoths (administered by AJDC) and some 7,500, mainly Jews, on UNHRA outside relief. The number of Jews fluctuates considerably.

d. Some 90,000 - 100,000 who at present are not the responsibility of any of the above-mentioned authorities. This figure is speculative, as the Italian Authorities have not yet completed their registration of aliens. It includes a small number already assimilated into the economy of Italy, though the majority are, or soon will become, destitute, their employment having come to an end or their funds having been exhausted.

This interim report will not concern itself with the special problem of Jewish refugees. It will touch on group d, as these may, in the course of time, become part of the general problem. For a statistical breakdown of groups a and b, by nationality, see Annex 1.

2. CLASSIFICATION OF GROUPS:

For all practical purposes groups a and b should be classif-

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b. 21,000 retained in camps by the Military Authorities, at present classified as "SEP" (Surrendered Enemy Personnel).

c. 23,000 under the care of UNRRA. Of these, 9,000 are Jews in UNRRA Camps, 7,500 in Hachsharoths (administered by AJDC) and some 7,500, mainly Jews, on UNRRA outside relief. The number of Jews fluctuates considerably.

d. Some 93,000 - 100,000 who at present are not the responsibility of any of the above-mentioned authorities. This figure is speculative, as the Italian Authorities have not yet completed their registration of aliens. It includes a small number already assimilated into the economy of Italy, though the majority are, or soon will become, destitute, their employment having come to an end or their funds having been exhausted.

This interim report will not concern itself with the special problem of Jewish refugees. It will touch on Group d, as these may, in the course of time, become part of the General problem. For a statistical breakdown of groups a and b, by nationality, see Annex 1.

2. CLASSIFICATION OF GROUPS:

For all practical purposes groups a and b should be classified as refugees, rather than as displaced persons. Group a, in Allied Commission camps, are mainly civilians, displaced during, and as a result of, the war, but who did not accept the opportunity of returning to their homelands. They are now, properly speaking, refugees instead of displaced persons. Group b, in SEP Camps, are military personnel who are unable or unwilling to return to their homelands and who, when released from military custody, could in part be classified as refugees.

It is noteworthy that the bulk of persons now at large in the country under group d, may qualify as refugees under the IRO basic definition (Part 1, Section A, 1(a) and 2), although no definite information is at present available concerning them. However, of those included within the basic definition, a considerable portion may be subject to the exclusion clauses.

Under Group A:(1) Croats. (Total in A.C. Camps 3,300)

Some 600 Croats, ex-service men, who served in the ranks of the Croat armed forces, definitely fighting under German command. There may be a further few hundred of this category who have not yet been identified. In addition to these ex-Wehrmacht Croats, recent screening has caused some 200 to be put into PW camps for further investigation on suspected Ustaachi or war criminals. A present estimate would make approximately half the 3,300 Croats in Allied Commission camps possibly subject to the exclusion clauses. This number would include their dependents.

(2) Slovenes. (Total in A.C. Camps 2,000)

As regards these, the number who have served under German command is not known. The Demobran and other such Slovenes who did serve with the Germans may amount to several hundred as may be later established.

(3) Serbs. (Total in camps and working for the Allies 4,700)

Among these there may be some of the Neditch quelling army, but these have not yet been identified. The reason for this is that screening was carried out primarily with a view to identifying Ustaachi, war criminals and Soviet citizens. Apart from these, most of this group of Serbs served with the British Army or Navy and are definitely not subject to the exclusion clauses.

(4) Poles. (Total in camps 5,300)

It is anticipated that, when all POLCORPS dependents have proceeded to Britain, there will be approximately 3,000 remaining in camps. Although these have been screened by the Poles for collaborators they have not yet been screened by Allied Commission. This is now commencing. In view of the above-mentioned Polish screening, it is not anticipated that many will be found to come under the exclusion clauses.

(5) Hungarians. (Total in camps 400)

approximately half the 3,300 Croats in Allied Commission camps possibly subject to the exclusion clauses. This number would include their dependents.

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(4) Poles. (Total in camps 5,300)

It is anticipated that, when all POLCORPS dependents have proceeded to Britain, there will be approximately 3,000 remaining in camps. Although these have been screened by the Poles for collaborators they have not yet been screened by Allied Commission. This is now commencing. In view of the above-mentioned Polish screening, it is not anticipated that many will be found to come under the exclusion clauses.

(5) Hungarians. (Total in camps 400)

<u>Baltics.</u>	(" " " 270)
<u>Albanians.</u>	(" " " 700)
<u>Russians.</u>	(" " " 340)

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Of these groups the Russians consist entirely of Stateless (White) Russians. Soviet citizens having already been screened and subsequently moved to a PW Camp. Some of them may have served the Germans (espionage, etc.), but there is no evidence to this effect.

Balts were originally displaced persons, having been taken for forced labor to Western Europe, subsequently reaching Italy. As in the case of the Russians, none are known to be subject to the exclusion clauses.

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The Albanian group presents an involved picture, as it is made up of a number of factions who fought each other in the homeland. Some fought with the Germans and Italians at one time or another in this internecine warfare, as well as with the guerrillas of different camps. Some may eventually come under the exclusion clauses. There are many pre-war Albanians (estimated at 2,000) in the country, and the recent Christian refugees may find some opportunity to settle down with them. The Moslem elements, however, appear to be more interested in resettlement in the Near East.

- (6) The remaining few hundreds of various nationalities are largely those awaiting repatriation facilities. There is a rumor who have dubious antecedents, e.g., the "Turks," of whom only 7 have been accepted by the Turkish Consul as Turkish Nationals.

Under group b: e

(1) Chechniks (mainly Serbs)

Under the Military as SEP, total 11,760, of whom some 6,000 are located in one camp at Eboli. The remainder are employed elsewhere on various duties.

These have not been screened and it is possible that some Reditch ex-Wehrmacht may be among them.

The Chechniks are a military formation, definitely hostile to the existing Yugoslav regime. Whether they come under the exclusion clause (Part 2, Sections 2 and 6) will be discussed below in a special item on Chechniks.

(2) Ukrainians

Under the Military as SEP, total 9,000 located in PW camp at Rimini. These are stated to be entirely from the Polish side of the September 1939 frontier. These formed part of a Ukrainian division who fought for the Germans and are definitely ex-Wehrmacht.

3. CHECHNIK PROBLEM:

The Yugoslav SEP group based on Eboli, generally referred to as Chechniks, number 11,760. Most of these originally formed part of Mikhailovich forces. They are still organized partly in

the "Turks," of whom only 7 have been accepted by the Turkish Consul as Turkish Nationals.

Under group b: *

(1) Chetniks (mainly Serbs)

Under the Military as SEP, total 11,760, of whom some 6,000 are located in one camp at Kpelli. The remainder are employed elsewhere on various duties.

These have not been screened and it is possible that some Heilich ex-Wehrmacht may be among them.

The Chetniks are a military formation, definitely hostile to the existing Yugoslav regime. Whether they come under the exclusion clauses (Part 2, Sections 2 and 5) will be discussed below in a special item on Chetniks.

(2) Ukrainians

Under the Military as SEP, total 9,000 located in PW camp at Rimini. These are stated to be entirely from the Polish side of the September 1939 frontier. These formed part of a Ukrainian division who fought for the Germans and are definitely ex-Wehrmacht.

3. CHETNIK PROBLEM:

The Yugoslav SEP group based on Kpelli, generally referred to as Chetniks, number 11,760. Most of these originally formed part of Mihailovich forces. They are still organized partly in their former military units (Dinars Division, Shkadia Division, Drina Regiment, etc.), and include 5,860 Serbs, 290 Croats and 485 Slovenes, with an additional 1,000 women and children. At the present time there are some 6,000 at Kpelli Camp, the remainder being employed on various duties at different points in the country. At 444

* For all under groups a and b, who may be subject to the exclusion clauses, the question of force should be given consideration, particularly in the case of those conscripted in contrast to volunteers. The question of the senior officers may present a special problem.

The Chetniks form a special problem because they still regard themselves as an army, and in fact, as SLPs, still have their own military organization. Their commander, General Miodrađ Đemjanović, regards himself as the successor to Mihailović, and as such in command of not only the Chetniks at Eboi but of all Yugoslavs in Italy, Austria and Germany, except for the Great Ustaški elements. He regards this "army" as a single command, and does not want it broken up. In response to questions as to the future of the army, he proposed several alternatives:

a. To be kept intact, in Italy or France, for what he regards as the liberation of Yugoslavia, to be utilized in the meantime for Allied guard duties;

b. If this is not possible, to have his forces stationed in North Africa;

c. Although not seriously considering resettlement overseas, he would not oppose this as a last resort, providing they were settled as a military colony. At present he wants his forces reclassified from SLP status to that of an Allied element, with himself as commander. He also requests free movement, with access to all camps containing Yugoslavs, for himself and his staff. The atmosphere at Eboi can fairly be described as that of an active military force prepared for war. Any man leaving this force is regarded as a traitor, in the same way as an American or British soldier going over to the enemy.

Because of this situation, and in view of the coming withdrawal of the Allied military forces from Italy, steps should be taken now in order to ease the problem for any interim organization which takes over. A simple speedy solution would be to remove them en masse to American and British camps in Germany. Less drastic solutions are, however, worth considering.

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b. Steps should also be taken to break up the Eboi bloc. Since General Đemjanović resents the present SLP status of his forces, he could not seriously oppose a change of status and consequent redisposal of his personnel. At any rate it could

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b. Steps should also be taken to break up the Eboli bloc. Since General Djandjanevich resents the present SEP status of his forces, he could not seriously oppose a change of status and consequent redispersion of his personnel. At any rate it could be done progressively, on this basis, by a call for volunteers, or, if this might raise unwanted incidents, by the transfer of the above working parties to other camps and replacing them with others from Eboli. This program would raise immediate problems of policy. The change of status from SEPs as a British commitment to that of refugees would involve the question of future commitment, whether it was to be still British or Joint. But this question would be naturally solved if an interim organization took over. It has been suggested that a change of status would be resented by the Yugoslav Government, but there could be no serious objection from that quarter providing those receiving refugee status had been thoroughly screened. The same would apply to objections by the Italian Government.

To make easier the handling of Chetnik elements by the coming interim organization, it would be necessary to screen and separate officers from men while the military forces were

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in Italy. It would be advisable for the interim organization progressively to take over groups in their new positions under the guidance and aid of the Allied military. Finally, it would be necessary to keep such Croatian elements away from camps where other Yugoslav elements are now located, to avoid the spread of their martial sentiment, although there is plenty of such sentiment already in the camps. This might also avoid the increase of anti-repatriation sentiment.

4. REPATRIATION:

a. Hard core estimates

At this time it would be optimistic to assume that more than 10% of the total number of refugees now in Italy can be voluntarily repatriated in the predictable future. This ratio will probably increase for such groups as civilian Poles, Czechs and other small elements, if economic conditions improve in the homeland, but it will not change the overall picture. For the large Yugoslav group repatriation for the present year has totalled less than 5%. Some 12% of the Yugoslavs in Austria have been repatriated this year and this figure may be reached in Italy. But in general it would appear that there remains a hard core of some 40% of the total amounting to some 140,000 persons) and this figure may have to be reckoned with by any interim administration, although it is by no means certain that this so-called hard core will not be cut down as conditions clarify in the homeland and under a different refugee set-up. e

b. Factors in repatriation

It is difficult to isolate single factors in the anti-repatriation complex. There is not much doubt as to why certain elements refuse to return to the homeland. They are active opposition elements, making up perhaps 20% of the refugees, either hostile to the present regime in the homeland, or determined not to return on account of certain of their past activities, which they have reason to believe, may be held against them by the present home authorities. These include ex-military, former politicians and present nationalists, economically displaced persons (including some industrialists, larger landowners and businessmen) and a miscellany of other dissidents including intellectuals.

For the great mass of refugees, fear is undoubtedly a dominating deterrent to repatriation. For most, the fear is that of uncertainty as to what conditions of living will be permitted them in the homeland, and there is a decided tendency to choose the security of camp life to this uncertainty. This fear is further promoted by press items and rumors of possible war, concentration camps, religious suppression and economic

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UNHRA officials here state that many more refugees could be repatriated - a figure of 50% having been suggested. However, repatriation from Allied Commission Yugoslav camps, operated by UNHRA during the first 6 months of 1946, did not show an overall increase during that period. Repatriation figures for the British Zone in Austria for the first 6 months of 1946 show a total of 2876 (a 12% average), of which 680 came out of UNHRA camps and 2150 had no contact with the camps. This represents a repatriation of 8% of persons in UNHRA camps, and 17% of persons having no contact with the camps. The UNHRA repatriation program was thus far less effective than the natural home-going urge, unfettered by controlled camp conditions.

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hardships in the homeland. The foreign-language papers that reach the camps from abroad, particularly from America, are violently opposed to homeland regimes of the refugees and this is also true of private correspondence from overseas. On the other hand, up to the present there has been little counter-publicity from the homelands.

A second factor against repatriation is the method used in the organization of camp life. The military authorities, of necessity operating the camps with a minimum of Allied personnel, have, for details of camp administration, been obliged to utilize the services of the active dissidents (ex-military officers, intellectuals, etc.), because of their linguistic abilities, clerical or administrative experience and natural qualities of leadership. A parallel type of refugee organization also has some influence over refugees living outside camps. Thus the individual is kept in line by the leaders, who are almost invariably, by reason of their former status, as referred to above, among those most opposed to any idea of returning home.

Until recent months the care of SEP and DPs was regarded as being in the nature of a temporary task for the military authorities, in which the maintenance of health, order and discipline was the primary objective. Repatriation activities, i.e. the provision of transport facilities etc., were carried on as normal functions for the assistance of the large numbers willing to go home. A relatively heavy repatriation continued until about the end of 1945, when the harder core was reached, but up to that time the process did not generally involve the necessity for a program of persuasion. It is only within the last six months that the hard core has become an acute problem.

Camp self-management follows a semi-military form. Each group has its elected representative who exercises general control. In addition there are generally room leaders, floor leaders and wing leaders. The camp police are an additional force. This system gives the active dissident leaders control over the every-day life of their groups, in effect amounting to a mild form of intimidation, although there is no evidence of terrorization in Allied Commission camps. The difficult problem facing the camp administration in this connection, and the atmosphere in a SEP camp, may be gathered from the official report of the commander of a Yugoslav camp, in which he says: "The Yugoslav mentality is such that, if it is known that anyone voices against popular opinion, the fact that that man must be beaten up and possibly killed is not considered unlawful or even odd." Some fear of being harmed may also exist in Allied Commission camps for refugees who would like to apply for repatriation. Provision is made to protect repatriation candidates prior to their departure, but it is difficult for the ordinary

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c. Encouragement of repatriation

As already stated, the great bulk of the 150,000 aliens can be regarded as valid refugees, under the IHO basic definitions. The question therefore is not who is a refugee but how far officials can go in persuading refugees to return home. In effect, under the basic principles a refugee can refuse to return home for any reason he sees fit to give, as long as he associates it with fear or uncertainty of life in the homeland. For example, a refugee peasant who finds camp life more comfortable than his normal existence at home may prefer not to return to hardships in a war-devastated homeland - and this may apply to tens of thousands. Camp life, offering a fair diet, free medical services, clothing and recreation facilities, may compare favorably with the working-class standards in the homelands. For the younger element, camp facilities also include education, in some cases including university courses. Under such conditions great numbers may actually refuse to return home; because, as against the natural desire to return home there is the great normal emigration urge which has characterized the populations of Central and Eastern Europe for decades. Thus, generally speaking, the camps are regarded by refugees not as transit points for repatriation but as staging areas for resettlement abroad.

A repatriation program for the camps depends, in part at least, on the funds available for care and resettlement. Given a large enough expenditure all refugees could be cured for and eventually resettled. In this case there would be no need for intensive repatriation activities. Such funds would also have to cover added thousands who, when the word got around, would naturally be attracted from the homelands to the camps for purposes of being settled abroad. If such vast sums for refugee care are not to be forthcoming, there will be need for some clarification of the basic principles, to enable the interim organization to establish a working system of priorities, and lay down a general guide for repatriation persuasion.

At present persuasion activity is limited to the following:

- (1) providing transport to the homeland, and prior protection to applicants;
- (2) some distribution of newspapers, in recent months, from the homeland;
- (3) missions from the homelands, which in most cases

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- (2) some distribution of newspapers, in recent months, from the homeland;
- (3) missions from the homelands, which in most cases have visited the camps, the exceptions being Polish and Yugoslav representatives who did not visit the camps because of the danger of incidents;
- (4) in recent months the refugees have been warned that American and British forces may soon be withdrawn from Italy, that their situation as refugees may then become precarious, that resettlement abroad is unlikely for most of them for a long time, and that all who can safely return home should do so. The total effect of this has been slight. The refugees are not convinced that the Allied authorities are serious, and most of the refugees hardly appreciate the situation.

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A repatriation program should include the following:

- (1) Eventual shifting of elements from one camp to another, separating the active dissident leaders from the more passive members of their groups, to eliminate dissident control. This may require major transfers from one camp to another. Such change may make for some inefficiency in camp administration - a price to be paid for producing an atmosphere more conducive to repatriation.
- (2) Some tightening of camp conditions may be practicable. The present basic ration of 2100 calories cannot be cut down much without physical harm. The present basic ration is, however, based on military scales and provides for a considerably varied diet; it would be possible to reduce the variety of the diet and make it comparatively dull and monotonous, at the same time keeping both its caloric value and its nutrient content at a level adequate for healthy life. Camps in Austria are officially on a ration of some 1200 calories, although this is supplemented by Red Cross parcels and vegetables grown in camp gardens. An increase in refugee labor would appear to be desirable for work inside and outside the camps. This might discourage those who like to loaf and might encourage them to return home. This has been successful in Austria, but in Italy, with its two and a half million unemployed, any alien competition in the labor market is opposed by the Italian authorities. For refugee labor in camps, the wage scale is now low. Pay for full employment ranges from 40 to 80 lire a day. This would appear to be a minimum but could conceivably be cut. In all refugee employment, however, consideration should be given to those having little or no private means which is not done at present. Moreover, the general question of private means should be reviewed, and a policy established for admission to the camps. At present, private means do not disqualify an otherwise valid refugee from admission to camp.

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- (a) It is important that too much authority should not be given to camp committees, 09
- (b) Equipment for refugees, such as clothes, blankets, eating utensils, etc., be clearly recognized as property of the international organization. UNHRA has found that refugees tend to regard clothes given to them as their own property, to be sold on the black market.
- (c) Refugees in camps who continually go absent without leave for periods of a month and more. Their refugee status, locked at

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From the point of view of IRO definitions, is often doubtful, and they furthermore tend to engage in black-market activities of various sorts illegal under Italian law. Case-sheets should be kept for each refugee in the camps, preferably by non-refugee personnel, which would show petty crimes, absences without leave, Italian convictions and imprisonments, etc., committed by the particular refugee. Such case-sheets should be from time to time considered in conjunction with the screening records of the particular refugee, and decision made from time to time as to whether people with bad records should be regarded as any longer eligible for international assistance.

- (3) An increased program of information in the camps, including printed matter, films and radio, showing conditions in the homeland. This would require the cooperation of the homeland regimes. It would also assume that conditions in the homeland were sufficiently congenial to counteract the hostile atmosphere that now prevails in all camps. To implement this program effectively, would call for specialized repatriation officers.

- (4) Cooperation by homeland regimes. A homeland repatriation commission, made up of a cross-sectional panel of citizens, should visit all camps. This might involve some difficulties, and could not be applied to the Chetnik camp as at present organized. If properly conducted, such a commission might produce results, especially if arrangements were made to remove immediately from the camps any refugee who responded. A Yugoslav commission recently visited Austrian camps, but the leader happened to be somewhat notorious and was personally resented by many of the refugees. This commission should have been more representative, to include refugees who had returned to the homeland. An effective method of persuasion would be for the homeland governments to issue passports which would permit refugees to return to the homeland whenever they chose. This would obviously have to be done on a selective basis. It is doubtful whether such governments would agree to this, but they will be approached on the subject. A further example of good-will gestures was that of the Polish Ambassador in Italy, 198

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(5) Allied plans to repatriates. Arrangements are reported to have been made by UNHRA in Germany, to provide Polish repatriates with 90 days rations on crossing the border. This should be an effective incentive, and should be extended to refugees generally under proper safeguards. This would appeal particularly to a peasant refugee who would consider this amount of rations as a fortune. It would also minimize his natural anxiety over possible conditions he would be up against on arrival in the homeland. The 270 pounds of ration would have to be given him on his departure from camp or present residence, because of his distrust of promises, but repatriation conductors would take charge of the rations as far as the frontier station, to insure that the refugees would not abscond with the rations. The price of these rations, per repatriate, would be cheap, compared to the cost of maintenance and resettlement.

(6) Balloting on repatriation. A ballot would be useful for the purpose of identifying refugees who are willing to return home but fear to express this desire. Under present conditions it would be difficult to get a true expression of opinion. A more accurate poll would be possible after the more disident elements had been separated from their groups. The normal western secret balloting would have little meaning to refugees from Central and Eastern Europe, and few would believe in such secrecy. In addition few peasants would be expected to cast ballots on which their names appear, and fewer would do so in so controversial a matter, to eliminate, as far as possible, this resistance to balloting, several indirect methods could be used. The following example would avoid the use of a ballot altogether. Well prior to the operation a nominal roll, in alphabetical order, of all heads of families and single adults, would be prepared and numbered consecutively. A similar number would be put on each individual's ration card (as a normal method of checking up ration cards). The poll would be conducted by a special registration officer assisted by the camp commander. The poll would not be announced. Instead, heads of families and single adults would be requested to assemble, preferably in a closed place, at a given time, and bring their ration cards. Their numbers would be called by an assistant stationed outside the recording room. Each would enter the recording room individually. The

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5. TRANSFER AND RESETTLEMENT:

The refugee problem in Italy today is unlike the much larger refugee problem in Germany and Austria in that it is pressing and urgent. A top priority is to relieve the Allied military

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authorities in Italy of their refugee burden at the earliest possible moment. It is also essential to relieve the country as soon as possible of those refugee elements that are politically most embarrassing to the Italian Government. For the immediate present the interim organization will provide a buffer between the Italian Government and the Slovenian Government, but it may be necessary to adopt the more radical solution of removing these elements from the country by simple transfer or resettlement. This applies to some 10,000 Yugoslavs in Allied Commission camps, and 11,000 Croats and 8,000 Slovenians in SLP camps. The Slovenians can be dealt with, as ex-Wehrmacht personnel, by transferring them to American and British camps in Germany. Some of the Yugoslavs (mainly Croats) can also be transferred to Germany as ex-Wehrmacht personnel, but this leaves a balance of some 10,000 Yugoslavs (including Croats) who must be resettled overseas. The vast majority of these Yugoslavs would accept an opportunity to go overseas; but as resettlement may not be possible by the time the Allied armies are withdrawn, consideration might be given to a transfer of these people to an overseas holding camp pending resettlement opportunities. It is doubtful whether such a project, even if financed by the Americans and British, would be accepted by any government, but it may be worth exploring. The great residue of 130,000 refugees, including many Yugoslavs, will remain as a long term problem. Added to this is the possibility of large numbers of new arrivals, attracted by the facilities provided by the Allies for free care and eventual emigration.

6. INTERIM ORGANIZATION, POLICY AND PRACTICES:

Should the Military Authorities cease to be responsible for groups now in their care, as appears to be likely in the course of the next few months, the task of caring for these groups will fall on an interim organization until IAO is able to assume responsibility.

The interim organization will be greatly handicapped if it starts work at the last moment. It will, therefore, be to its advantage to start operations as early as possible, in order to benefit by the aid and experience of the military. It should start on a small scale, taking over camp by camp, as personnel, equipment and facilities become available. This would make for a natural process of development.

The breaking up of large military groups of SLPs, well prior to the withdrawal of the Allied forces, would be facilitated if an interim set-up were ready to take charge. Practical measures for instituting such an organization would depend on which of these policies were adopted:

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The breaking up of large military groups of SHPs, well prior to the withdrawal of the Allied Forces, would be facilitated if an interim set-up were ready to take charge. Practical measures for instituting such an organization would depend on which of three policies were adopted:

- a. Limitation strictly to formal protection of refugee groups, throwing the burden of maintenance on the Italian Government. This would call only for a small international staff, which would be responsible for certifying the refugee status of individuals. These individuals would then live either in camps organized by the Italian Government, or, as the case in respect of many refugees at present, out of camps on their own resources. Persons not certified by the interim organization as bona fide refugees would be dealt with at the discretion of the Italian Government. This would, in many cases, involve forcible repatriation or its equivalent. Should the Italian Government agree to take this burden, which is questionable, there would still be a danger of its discarding the burden at the first opportunity, either for economic reasons, or under pressure by the home governments of the refugees, especially if these home governments did not recognize the refugee status as defined in the constitution of IRO.

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b. Continuation of the present system for the maintenance in camps organized by DRRSC, AC, but with the interim organization replacing DRRSC. This involves a headquarters staff of Allied personnel as well as the employment of Allied personnel in camps. The Italian Government would continue to meet all life expenses in Italy except for the wages and maintenance of Allied personnel.

c. Extension of the present system to cover care and maintenance by the interim organization. This would involve a post to the interim organization of approximately thirty times that of the continuation of the present system as described in b. above.

Whichever of these policies be adopted, the refugees outside camps should be protected by the interim organization as described in sub-paragraph a above.

A factor to be considered in connection with either of these policies is the position of RAs and the attitude the Italian Government might take toward them. It is conceivable that the care of the ordinary refugee groups might be undertaken by the Italian Government, without great risk of political repercussions, although further screening might be necessary. On the other hand it is hardly likely that the Italian Government could be persuaded to undertake the care of RAs, regardless as to how they might be re-classified.

The relationship between the Italian Government and the interim organization will involve the question of membership of the Italian Government in the international organization (IOGC, OHI) but this will probably not be actively considered until the end of the present Paris Conference. It should be recalled that the French Government makes to the IOGC a considerable contribution in France to be spent in France on an unofficial contribution that France expenditure should be matched by equivalent dollar or sterling expenditure in France. It may be possible to make a similar arrangement with the Italian Government and thus reduce the financial burden of the American and British Governments. For this purpose, the present official exchange rates of lire against dollars and sterling should not be regarded as inviolable. Dollar or sterling contributions might be made to the Italian economy by means of goods not specifically earmarked for the refugee operations. It may also be possible to obtain funds from the Italian Government under the heading of reparations, if the British and American Governments wish to forego some part of their reparations share.

Whichever of these policies be adopted, the refugees outside camps should be protected by the interim organization as described in sub-paragraph 1 above.

A factor to be considered in connection with either of these policies is the position of SHPs and the attitude the Italian Government might take toward them. It is conceivable that the care of the ordinary refugee groups might be undertaken by the Italian Government, without great risk of political repercussions, although further screening might be necessary. On the other hand it is hardly likely that the Italian Government could be persuaded to undertake the care of SHPs, regardless as to how they might be re-classified.

The relationship between the Italian Government and the interim organization will involve the question of membership of the Italian Government in the international organization (IOGC, ORT) but this will probably not be actively considered until the end of the present Paris Conference. It should be recalled that the French Government makes to the IOGC a considerable contribution in francs to be spent in France on an unofficial contribution that franc expenditure would be matched by equivalent dollar or sterling expenditure in France. It may be possible to make a similar arrangement with the Italian Government and thus reduce the financial burden of the American and British Governments. For this purpose, the present official exchange rates of lire against dollars and sterling should not be regarded as inviolable. Dollar or sterling contributions might be made to the Italian economy by means of goods not specifically earmarked for the refugee operations. It may also be possible to obtain funds from the Italian Government under the heading of reparations, if the British and American Governments wish to forego some part of their reparations share.

For the sake of economy, apart from the formal protection of refugees outside camps, there could thus be a two-fold operation: one covering the regular A.C. groups, the main burden of cost falling on the Italian Government; the other covering and maintenance of the SHP groups.

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Interim Organization - SCOPE:

An estimate of the financial expenditures involved in the alternative plans will of course depend on the number of people to be taken care of. It is taken for granted that persons who would be subject to persecution in the homeland should be provided for.

As already stated, there are now some 160,000 persons in Italy who might qualify as refugees, a large proportion of whom may well become a public charge. Although the estimated expenditures discussed here are limited to those persons actually

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 in camps (40,000). It is important to bear in mind these out of camp refugees.

These estimated expenditures can serve as a yard stick and can be reduced, if necessary, by a system of priorities.

The basic principles of the IRO draft do not distinguish between physical repatriation and lesser hardships, and the principles of the Atlantic Charter are also general in character. There is no basis for instance, as to what constitutes a minimum of religious freedom entitling a person to claim refugee status on religious grounds. The same applies to the variation as to what constitutes freedom of speech, or what constitutes want. In view of the complexity of this problem it may be necessary to rely on the IRO clause (Part I, Section A-4) which provides that persons who are "unable or unwilling to return to their home-lands are to be regarded as refugees."

Should it prove necessary to reduce the estimate of expenditure, the following system of priorities might be observed:

- a. Ex-Royal Yugoslav Army, Navy and Air Force personnel (4,000), the fight with the British. There are also some official talk of considering this group as British commitment, which may be given preferential treatment, similar to that of POLONERS.
- b. Refugees definitely not falling under the exclusion clauses of IRO (estimated at 8,000). Of this large group, the Yugoslavs form an acute problem.
- c. Chetniks (11,700) who are now SLIPs. Most of these may qualify under IRO.
- d. Ukrainians (9,000) who fought for the Germans. Some say be found to have been exploited or forced, thus not falling under the exclusion clauses of IRO. Probably a solution would be to transfer the whole group to American and British camps in Germany, where the time limit is not acute as it is in Italy.
- e. All other nationals (estimated at 2,000) under the exclusion clauses of IRO, who, for the same reason, should also be removed to Allied camps in Germany.

7. BUDGETARY ESTIMATE FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD (For example estimates see Annex 3)

Under the present set-up in the eleven Allied Commission camps, wages, accommodation, stores and maintenance are now sub-

Should it prove necessary to reduce the percentage of expenditure, the following method of priorities might be observed:

- a. Ex-Royal Yugoslav Army, Navy and Air Force personnel (4,000) who fought with the British. They have been some excellent soldiers considering this group of British combatants, which may be given preferential treatment, similar to that of POLCOMS.
- b. Refugees definitely not falling under the exclusion clauses of IRO (estimated at 9,000). Of this large group, the Yugoslavs form no acute problem.
- c. Chechaks (11,750) who are now SERs. Most of these may qualify under IRO.
- d. Ukrainians (9,000) who fought for the Germans. Some may be found to have been conscripted or forced, thus not falling under the exclusion clauses of IRO. Probably a solution would be to transfer the whole group to American and British camps in Germany, where the time limit is not acute as it is in Italy.
- e. All other nationals (estimated at 2,000) under the exclusion clauses of IRO, who, for the same reason, should also be removed to Allied camps in Germany.

7. BUDGETARY ESTIMATE FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD (For example estimates see Annex 3)

Under the present set-up in the eleven Allied Commissions camps, wages, accommodation, stores and equipment are now supplied as follows:

- a. by the Americans and British. The pay and rations of American and British personnel are now being carried by their respective military authorities, with some few exceptions. Such personnel are mainly drawn

at 15,000 (\$4,000) outside camps employed by Allied forces in A.C. camps, 21,000 in sub camps. UNRRA camps are not included in these budgets as it would appear that UNRRA is to continue to operate its camps until June 1947.

At 4 American and British civilians are hired on a hire basis and paid by the Italian Government.

from the military, the number at present employed in the eleven camps being: 34 officers (including civilians); 13 welfare workers, mainly provided and paid for by the British Red Cross; and 25 enlisted men and other ranks. Also carried by the American and British Military Authorities is the provision of road transport vehicles, repairs and POL (fuel, etc.). The provision of medical equipment is now carried by UNRRA, in exchange for the large medical stores handed over to UNRRA by the Allied Commission in December 1945.

b. By the Italians. At present the Italian Government bears all the expenses for accommodation, rations, live wages, and other camp expenses (Annex 2 shows breakdown for August 1946). The personnel now paid by the Italian Government, drawn from refugees as far as possible, and supplemented by Italians, includes doctors, dentists, nurses, office staff, police, storemen, drivers, etc.

c. Mixed. All stores and blankets have been provided by either the Allied Military, the Allied Commission, the Italian Government, or by the DPRSC from salvaged material. These should eventually pass to the Italian authorities, with the exception of such supplies as were issued by the Allied Military Authorities. The office machinery in these camps is mainly the property of the American or British Authorities. (A list of all property in camps is available at HQ DPRSC, AG).

Casserta, Italy.
October 8, 1946.

Matron W. Roper.

b. By the Italians. At present the Italian Government bears all the expenses for accommodation, rations, lire wages, and other camp expenses (Annex 2 shows breakdown for August 1946). The personnel now paid by the Italian Government, drawn from refugees as far as possible, and supplemented by Italians, includes doctors, dentists, nurses, office staff, police, storemen, drivers, etc.

c. Mixed. All stores and blankets have been provided by either the Allied Military, the Allied Commission, the Italian Government, or by the DPMSC from salvaged material. These should eventually pass to the Italian authorities, with the exception of such supplies as were issued by the Allied Military Authorities. The office machinery in these camps is mainly the property of the American or British Authorities. (A list of all property in camps is available at HQ DPMSC, AO).

Ceserte, Italy.
October 8, 1946.

Matteo R. 42.

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ANNEX I

SITUATION OF A.C. CAMPS at September 1946.

Breakdown by Nationalities.

NATIONALITY	No.	NATIONALITY	No.	NATIONALITY	No.
Albanian	703	East African	11	Polish	5277
American	15	Finnish	3	Roumanian	103
Arab	7	French	12	Russian	337
Armenian	5	German	50	South American	47
Austrian	13	Greek	93	Spanish	63
British	56	Hungarian	394	Turks	119
Bulgarians	17	Indian	2	Yugoslavs	6025
Chinese	444	Irak-Iranian	19	Norwegian	1
Czechs	58	Latvian	57	Syrian	1
Dutch	6	Lybian	4	Stateless	29
Egypt	7	Lithuanian	182	Italian	408
Estonian	29	Palestinian	2	TOTAL	14,592

SITUATION OF SERBIA IN CAMPS as at 26 September 1946.

CHETNIKS			
Serbs	Creates	Slovenes	Totals
Male: Female: Children	Male: Female: Children	Male: Female: Children	Male: Female: Children
4609: 770	1: 1	1: 1	1: 1

Austrian	13	Greek	93	Spanish	63
British	56	Hungarian	374	Turks	119
Bulgarians	17	Indian	2	Yugoslavs	6825
Chinese	444	Irak-Iranian	19	Norwegian	1
Czechs	58	Latvian	57	Syrian	1
Dutch	6	Libyan	4	Stateless	29
Egypt	7	Lithuanian	132	Italian	408
Estonian	29	Palestinian	2	TOTAL	14,592

SITUATION OF SERB'S IN CAMPS as at 26 September 1946.

CHETNIKS									
Serbs		Croat		Slovenes		Totals			
Male	Female	Children	Male	Female	Male	Female	Children		
		M	F						
Edell	4609	770	275	116	106	23	6032		
Bologna	828								
Forli	204						1332		
Milan	257						204		
Naples Area	3963	9			101	365	257		
	9851				207		4438		

UKRAINIANS

9000 Males.

In addition to the above there are some 4000 Royal Yugoslavs who have until recently been employed on military duties under the Allies, at present being absorbed into A.C. Camps. This figure brings the total number to 18,592.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

CAMP EXPENSES--PAID BY ITALIAN GOVERNMENT MONTH OF AUGUST 1946

D.P. Camps	Wages	Fuel Cook	Bread Making	Pasta Making	Maintenance	Special Foods	Repairs Elec. Light	Medicine Hospital	Repairs Veh.	Bldg. Material
No. 18	344,259	24,541	25,400	874						
No. 1	686,173	37,937			5,700					
No. 12	681,375					431,542	27,595	3,627		
S & T	319,441								1,250	
No. 9	623,183					4,750				150,
No. 7	245,106				262					1,
No. 11	268,713		45,751		2,091			2,282	6,121	
No. 6	291,555									1,
No. 3	1,925,084	5,100				26,195	7,245			40,
No. 8	598,772	150,073								40,
No. 13 & 14	1,157,288	23,000	60,170	30,545	52,665	2,821			11,250	36,
No. 2	584,576					5,420				8,
No. 10	310,044				22,712					
TOTALS	8,235,569	240,651	131,331	31,418	83,430	470,728	34,840	5,909	18,621	278,

Grand TOTAL 9,707,473
 Memo Acct. 3,2,350
 10,049,803

Camp Tot.
 15,273

*Bldg. Material - 150,529 L was unusual expense due to movement of camp and preparation of new camp.
 - Other such expenses are permanent improvements necessary to property.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

CAMP EXPENSES--PAID BY ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

MONTH OF AUGUST 1946 (In Lire)

ANNEX II

Posta Living	Mainten- ance	Special Foods	Repairs Elec. Light	Medicine Hospital	Repairs Veh.	Bldg Mat.	Telephone	Memo Acct.	Misc. Exp.
874									11,032
	5,700								49,225
		431,542	27,595	3,627					3,600
					1,250				920
		4,750				150,529		74,950	1,345
	262					1,380		9,259	12,530
	2,091			2,282	6,121				9,584
						1,625		7,080	4,895
		26,195	7,245			40,395			
						40,001		167,000	
30,545	52,665	2,821			11,250	36,000	10,931	7,800	44,806
		5,420				8,550			29,359
	22,712							76,241	
11,418	83,430	470,728	34,840	5,909	12,621	278,480	10,931	(342,330)	165,574

Memo Acct.
Outside Medical
Assistance

Bldg. Material - 150,529 L was unusual expense due to movement of camp
and preparation of new camp.
- Other such expenses are permanent improvements necessary
to property.

ANNEX 3 - SAMPLE BUDGETARY ESTIMATES

The rough estimates which follow will indicate a monthly cost for the interim care of refugees, according to whether they are for formal protection, for the continuation under international auspices of the present PRSC commitments, for actual care and maintenance, or for the adaption of the three. It should be noted that these estimated expenditures do not include the following, which cannot now be calculated as they depend on governmental decisions: (a) capital charges for vehicles, office machinery, medical equipment, and all other stores transferred from their present owners to the international organization; (b) rent for offices, and capital expenditure necessary for their equipment; (c) travelling, administration and office expenses, (d) initial transportation of staff, leave fares, and return fares at the end of their contracts.

For illustrative purposes the lowest salary in each grade paid by UNRRA has been adopted as a working basis. The British scale is used here to come into line with Allied Commission expenditure - approximately 12% should be added to meet the (UNRRA) American salary rate.* Many of the categories employed by UNRRA have been eliminated from the proposed interim set-up, the number proposed being about the same as that at present working in Allied Commission Camps.**

It is proposed to drop the present enlisted personnel, substituting them with selected refugees or Italian civilians. In addition to salaried the staff will receive basic refugee rations, plus a supplement of £ 10 per month, paid in kind.

Accommodation for the staff will be in camps, as at present. If personnel are required to live out of camps, thereby having to meet their own expenses regarding accommodation, food, etc., the supplement referred to above would have to be very largely increased, according to circumstance. The administrative set-up should be based on Rome, for the essential contacts with government agencies and diplomatic offices, and as a convenient point for both northern and southern camps. The northern camps in the Bologna area, are twelve hours by rail from Rome, and are difficult to reach by road in winter. A liaison officer, with an assistant, would have charge of the northern camps, while the southern camps would be supervised from Rome, only four or five hours distant. The central office will have 9 officers, including a director, assistant director, administrative officer, S & T officer, 1 repatriation and screening officer with assistant, medical officer, finance officer, record officer and locally recruited clerks. The total budget including pay and rations for the central office staff, however, has been provisionally assessed at £ 1,000 per month.

For illustrative purposes the lowest salary in each grade paid by UNRRA has been adopted as a working basis. The British scale is used here to come into line with Allied Commission expenditure - approximately 12% should be added to meet the (UNRRA) American salary rate.* Many of the categories employed by UNRRA have been eliminated from the proposed interim set-up, the number proposed being about the same as that at present working in Allied Commission Camps.**

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For policy b or c described on page 16, the overall cost per month in £ sterling for the American and British Camp staff, may be provisionally assessed as follows:

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* The salary scales were not made available to us by UNRRA in print form but were given orally and may not be accurate.

** UNRRA group organization, for four or five camps, thus included the following: group supervisor, with an assistant and secretary, administrative officer, transport officer, stores officer, and assistant; dietitian, nurse, welfare officer, repatriation officer, medical officer, sanitary officer.

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Central Office	: 9 Officers plus £ 10 ration supplement:	£ 1,000
1 Liaison Officer	: 1 Officer at £ 105 per month	" £ 115
	1 Officer at £ 78 "	" £ 88
	2 Secretaries £ 32 "	" £ 84
11 Camp Commandants:	at £ 92 per month plus	" £ 1,122
11 Asst. Camp Comdts:	at £ 78 "	" £ 968
18 Welfare Workers	: at £ 45 "	" £ 990
	TOTAL	<u>£ 4,367</u>

Light Transport 2 per camp - 12 Central Pool.

Maintenance, Petrol, Oil, Lubricant, etc.

estimated £ 30 per month -

£ 1,020

Total Monthly Budget

£ 5,345

(2) For Policy c described on page 12, the requirements for care and maintenance per month. (15,000 Refugees) are estimated as follows, based on the present cost of Allied Commission camps:

- | | |
|--|----------|
| (a) Present expenses borne by the Italian Government: | £ 11,000 |
| (b) Estimated cost of rations for 15,000 refugees at 140 lire per day: | £ 75,000 |
| (c) Transport - (Repairs, Petrol, Oil & Lubricants) | |

No reliable maintenance data is available as Military Authorities supply Allied Commission camps. Each camp requires 4 x 3 tonners, 2 light vehicles, 1 ambulance, 1 Water Truck. Total per camp 8 vehicles plus 12 in Central Pool.

Grand Total - 150 vehicles say at £ 30 per month £ 2,000

- (d) Medical stores medicines, etc.
Average £ 100 per month per camp -

£ 11,000

Light Transport 2 per camp - 12 Central Pool.

Maintenance, Petrol, Oil, Lubricant, etc.

estimated at 30 per month -

TOTAL £ 4,267

£ 1,020

Total Monthly Budget £ 5,345

(2) For Policy c described on page 12, the requirements for care and maintenance per month. (15,000 Refugees) are estimated as follows, based on the present cost of Allied Commission camps:

(a) Present expenses borne by the Italian Government: £ 11,000

(b) Estimated cost of rations for 15,000 refugees at 140 lire per day: £ 75,000

(c) Transport - (Repairs, Petrol, Oil & Lubricants)

No reliable maintenance data is available as Military Authorities supply Allied Commission camps. Each camp requires 4 x 3 tonners, 2 light vehicles, 1 ambulance, 1 Water Truck. Total per camp 8 vehicles plus 12 in Central Pool.

Grand Total - 100 vehicles say at £ 30 per month £ 3,000

(d) Medical stores medicines, etc.

Average £ 100 per month per camp -

£ 11,000

(e) Clothing for refugees at £ 1 per head -

£ 12,000 **298**

MONTHLY GRAND TOTAL

£ 112,000

(f) Accommodation - It is presumed Italian Authority would supply this free.

(3) SEP now under Military Authorities.

The recommendation in this report is that the Military break up the bulk camps of SEP well before the interim organization takes over. However if the interim organization took over these in their present situation, the initial cost of moving them to separate camps and setting up these camps from the beginning would be considerable.

It is agreed that possible 2-3,000 additional could be fitted into existing Allied Detention camps after all the Poles going to Britain have left. Camps taken over in this country, have always been found in extremely bad condition, hygiene and electric fittings especially requiring extensive repairs. This work has hitherto been carried out largely with the help of the military and by salvaging. The possibility of either has practically terminated. If new camps are required an initial cost of £ 2 per head might well be incurred to make buildings reasonably hygienic. The cost of accommodation, stores, blankets, etc., would also have to be faced unless the military provided these. This will involve a minimum cost of £ 5 per head.

(4) Estimated expenditures are summarized, on the basis of policies, as follows in sterling per month, showing cost borne by Interim Organization.

- | | |
|---|-----------|
| (a) Policy b Estimated Expenditures, for 15,000 Italian Authorities bearing total costs for 15,000 refugees except for American and British supervisory personnel:..... | £ 5,345 |
| (b) Policy c Estimated Expenditures. Interim Organization providing care and maintenance for 15,000 refugees. Supervisory staff as in (a):..... | £ 117,345 |
| (c) Policy c Estimated Expenditures, for 35,000 Interim Organization providing care and maintenance for 35,000 refugees - double supervisory staff as in (a):..... | £ 277,335 |
| (d) Split Estimated Expenditures. Interim Organization providing care and maintenance for 20,000 SEP - Italian Authorities bearing expenses for 15,000 refugees. Double supervisory staff as in (a):..... | £ 159,990 |

have left. Camps, taken over in this country, have always been found in extremely bad condition, hygiene and electric fittings especially requiring extensive repairs. This work has hitherto been carried out largely with the help of the military and by salvaging. The possibility of either has practically terminated. If new camps are required an initial cost of £ 2 per head might well be incurred to make buildings reasonably hygienic. The cost of accommodation, stores, blankets, etc., would also have to be faced unless the military provided these. This will involve a minimum cost of £ 5 per head.

- (4) Estimated expenditures are summarized, on the basis of policies, as follows in sterling per month, showing cost borne by Interim Organization.
- (a) Policy b Estimated Expenditures, for 15,000 Italian Authorities bearing total costs for 15,000 refugees except for American and British supervisory personnel:..... £ 5,345
 - (b) Policy c Estimated Expenditures. Interim Organization providing care and maintenance for 15,000 refugees. Supervisory staff as in (a):..... £ 117,345
 - (c) Policy c Estimated Expenditures, for 35,000 Interim Organization providing care and maintenance for 35,000 refugees - double supervisory staff as in (a):..... £ 277,335
 - (d) Split Estimated Expenditures. Interim Organization providing care and maintenance for 20,000 SEP - Italian Authorities bearing expenses for 15,000 refugees. Double supervisory staff as in (a):..... £ 159,990

3643.47 26

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

G-5: 945.01

25 September 1946

SUBJECT: Registration and Repatriation of Aliens.

TO : Chief Commissioner,
Allied Commission,
APO 794.

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Reference your AG/14756/5 PS of 13 September.

1. Will you please inform the Italian Government that, except in the case of Germans and Austrians, the deportation of aliens, who are not protected or employed by the Allied Military Authorities (e.g.: inmates of Displaced Persons Camps), is a matter which lies entirely between the Italian Government and the government of the country to whom the unwanted person belongs.

2. The deportation from ITALY of undesirable German and Austrian civilians has no military implications so far as the Supreme Allied Commander is concerned and it is considered therefore that any representations on the subject should be made to LONDON and WASHINGTON by the British and U.S. Embassies rather than by this Headquarters.

3. As in para. 6 of this Headquarters letter GHI 389. 508/40 of 9 May, the Italian Government was expressly invited to refer matters connected with the disposal of aliens to the Allied Commission, it is considered desirable that in this instance you should pass on the Italian request to the U.S. and British Embassies and invite them to take action thereon. You should, however, direct the Italian Government to refer future requests direct to the Embassies. At the same time, it should be pointed out to the Italian Government that the respective Allied Governments will require full names and particulars of the persons to be deported including their native towns, in the form of separate lists for the U.S. and British Zones of GERMANY and AUSTRIA. These lists should be sent direct to the Embassies.

4. It would also seem appropriate that the repatriation of the 1,000 Germans interned in BOLZANO Province, who were

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lately handed over to Italian custody, should be made the subject of diplomatic representations by the Italian Government.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN:



A. L. HAMBLEY
Colonel, G.S.C.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

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Translation U.S.S.R.

STUDY OF THE
P.S. General Location

U.S.S.R. Div. and Sec.

Mr. M. J. A. 1966

Mr. J. 1966

Mr. J. 1966
Mr. J. 1966
Mr. J. 1966
Mr. J. 1966

Mr. J. 1966

The conditions of various international and internal factors determined, as it is known, the influence to Italy of a large number of foreigners. This mass of people, upon which no control is being kept, is not only a heavy burden for the national economy, but also a constant provocation for the public order and security, both owing to the relevant number of the foreigners and owing to the indifference of the law which would control them.

Generally, these individuals come to Italy owing to the war, or also, after the end of the war, for work or social reasons or because of their dislike of the political direction of their countries of origin. Many of them, arrived in Italy without being in possession of the prescribed authorizations, did not even fill the elementary but explicit duty of making a foreigner declaration (No. 642 of the public safety disposal issued with U.S.S. 773 - 12/5/1951). This circumstance, while making a complete view on the proportion of the phenomenon utterly impossible, also created nearly insurmountable difficulties in identifying the single foreigners and keeping an eye on their activities in order to find out those not deserving the granted hospitality.

For these reasons, we decided to conduct a census of all foreigners presently in Italy, providing at the same time, to the regularization of their position in accordance with the foreign and with various Italian laws connected to it. To this aim, all foreigners, the members of the foreign delegations and of the diplomatic and consular corps as well as the members of the allied armed forces included, will be invited, across the press and the radio etc., to present themselves, within a period of to the local competent offices in order to make a foreigner declaration, at the risk of facing, in case of indifference, the penalties of reason by the law. When these, who eventually have already made a foreigner declaration and are kept in possession of the relevant document, must fill this duty. The foreigners must present themselves to the local competent or In case these are not with us, they will go to the local

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of foreigners. This means of people, upon which no control is being kept, is not only a heavy burden for the national economy, but also a constant provocation for the public order and security, both owing to the relevant member of the foreigners and owing to the indifference of the law which governs them.

Secondly, these individuals come to Italy owing to the war, or also, after the end of the war, for work or social reasons or because of their dislike of the political direction of their countries of origin.

Many of them, arrived in Italy without being in possession of the prescribed authorizations, did not even fill the elemental but explicit duty of making a solemn declaration (Art. 142 of the Public Safety Decree Law of 1938, 773 - 10/6/1938). This circumstance, while making a complete view on the propriety of the phenomenon utterly impossible, also created nearly insurmountable difficulties in identifying the single foreigners and keeping an eye on their activities in order to find out those not deserving the granted hospitality.

The above persons, so inclined to conduct a course of all foreigners assembled in Italy, providing at the same time, to the regularization of their position in connection with the solemn and with various duties connected to it.

To this aim, all foreigners, the members of the Negro College and of the Militant and Camilleri Corps as well as the members of the Allied Armed Forces excluded, will be invited, across the press and the radio etc., to present themselves, within a period of to the local competent P.S. Offices in order to make a solemn declaration, at the risk of facing, in case of indifference, the penalties of reason by the law.

Even those, who eventually have already made a solemn declaration and are known to possession of the relevant document, must fill this duty. The foreigners must present themselves to the local authority of P.S. Carabinieri. In case there are no such offices, they will go to the local P.S. Station.

Attached herewith is a scheme of settlement (encl. E).

The foreigners, who, filling the a/a dispositions, will present themselves to the P.S. Offices, must be divided in two categories:

- 1) foreigners regularly entered into Italy,
- 2) foreigners irregularly entered into Italy.

FOREIGNERS REGULARLY ENTERED INTO ITALY

These are the ones, who have their normal residence in any country and the ones who have been temporarily, provided they are both in possession of regular authorizations to entry into Italy.

There can be two different situations and that is, that the concerned foreigners has or has not made a solemn declaration and consequently

is as is not in possession of the of the collection document. A. that of the P.S. Department and Mr. 2/4 - 252 of the collection when referred with A.S. 6/3 - 6/3/1960.

In the first case, that is if the Consul has already done a request declaration, the P.S. office will proceed - the following operations:

- 1) - Drawing up of the census form A - yellow - to be kept in the files.

In case that other relatives not older than 16 years live together with the foreigners, they must be also described each in a census form A - yellow -

- 2) - Affixing on the normal request declaration (form B, on 21 - white -) already in possession of the consular functionary, of a stamp bearing the words, in capital letters, "the bearer has made the request declaration of control for himself and relatives on the - the signature of P.S. Consular, the stamp must be possibly affixed on the words "Request of foreigners in Italy".

In the second case, that is if the foreigner, although regularly entered into Italy, did not give any request declaration, the P.S. office will proceed to the following operations:

- 1) - Issues of the normal request document (form B, on 21 - white -) and consequent operations according to it. 262 of the Rules.
- 2) - Affixing on the same document of the stamp bearing the aforementioned words.
- 3) - Drawing up of the form of form of census A - yellow -.

FOREIGNERS ENTERING ITALY FROM OTHER COUNTRIES

These are the case, who entered into our territory without being in possession of the prescribed authorization by the Ministry or Consulate, even if their residence in Italy goes back to a long time ago even if they are provided with the request document. In this category must necessarily be included the alienated persons, the refugees and generally all those who have been, for war, social or political reasons, even if they are admitted to be repatriated or transferred to other countries.

The P.S. office will then proceed to the following operations in their request:

- 1) - Withdrawal of the normal request document (form B, on 21 - white -) in case of the foreigner is already in possession of it.
- 2) - Issues of the special request form B - blue - and consequent operations according to it. 262 of the Rules.
- 3) - Drawing up of the census form A - blue - to be kept in the files.

It must be born in mind and clearly pointed out to the concerned person that there are no differences whatever between the request form B - blue - and the normal request form - white -. Consequently, the duties assigned to it are the same, particularly the one of request document of the consular P.S. office in case of transfer to another locality. After all operations have been completed, the office will form two groups of the census form A - yellow and 262 - blue -

the following operations:

- 1) - forms of the naval seamen document (Form 26, ex 22 - white -) and corresponding operations according to it, 26/2 at the bottom.
- 2) - affixing on the main document of the stamp bearing the official words.
- 3) - Keeping up of the form of forms of seamen A - yellow -.

REMARKS: INFORMATION ON THE SEAMEN DOCUMENT

When are the men, who entered into our country without being in possession of the prescribed authorization by the Ministry of Maritime, even if their presence in Italy goes back to a long time ago even if they are provided with the seamen permit. In this category must necessarily be included the displaced persons, the refugees and generally all those men to Italy for war, work, racial or political reasons, even if they are subject to be registered or transferred to other countries.

The I.L. Offices will have passed to the following operations in Italy:

- 1) - withdrawal of the naval seamen permit (Form 26, ex 22 - white) in case of the foreigner is already in possession of it.
- 2) - forms of the seamen permit Form 26 - blue - and corresponding operations according to it, 26/2 at the bottom.
- 3) - Keeping up of the Seamen Form 26 - blue - to be kept in the files.

It must be born in mind and clearly pointed out to the concerned person that there are no differences whatever between the seamen Form 26 - blue - and the naval seamen Form 26 - white -. Consequently, the action required to it are the same, particularly the two of present example of the seamen Form 26, ex 22 in case of transfer to another locality. After all operations have been completed, the officers will form two groups of the seamen Form 26 - yellow and 291 - blue - according to an alphabetical order.

Moreover, the I.L. Administration and O.L. Offices will forward them to the competent authorities, attaching a list.

In their side, the seamen will provide for the forwarding of the forms to the central office for the seamen.

The importance of this census which will enable the Government to have a full view on the position of the foreigners in Italy and to consequently establish the line, in the future.

For this reason the operations must be carried out with the utmost attention, so much the more that the official authorization are going to be helpful. In fact, they agreed that investigations be carried out also in regard of those interned in the various Allied camps. Operations will be taken in order to carry out the relative operations in the best way.

20

We shall forward you parcels containing the forms, and beg you to urgently issue dispatches inviting the foreigners to present themselves to the competent Offices, and to immediately take contacts with the Allied authorities in those districts, where Allied Detaching-Centres are placed.
Acknowledge receipt by wire, please.

for the Minister

COPY

18

Ref

: ~~14356/5/RS~~
~~14356/5/RS~~

26 July

SUBJECT : Internal Security Measures of the
Control of Aliens.

TO : Ministry of Interior,
Palazzo Viminale,
Rome.

1. With reference to your letter No. 443/50810 dated 28 June 1946 and further to this Headquarters' letters DPR/11/EA and 3643/19/EC dated 25 May and 26 June respectively.

2. It would be appreciated if you would expedite the drafting of a plan for the control of aliens in Italy on the lines suggested in the above quoted letters. I feel that you will agree that the registration and documentation of all foreigners in Italy should be carried out as soon as possible and that delay in putting the scheme into effect will increase the difficulties of applying control.

For the Chief Commissioner:

Brigadier

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

Copy to: Public Safety S/C.

1719 289

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30/2

COPY

14

Ref. SC 31290

Jul. 201030B

From: US FORCE EUROPEAN THEATER MAIN SIGNED COLONEL BRUNO ALBERT MCARNEY
CITE ITALC

To : Allied Control Commission Rome

UNCLASSIFIED.

Italian liaison section this Headquarters request following message
transmitted to cabinet of Italian War Ministry DCOLN Q7953 N Q4369/G.
Please provide this section with roster of undesirable Italian and
foreign citizens not entitled to enter Italy.
Said Roster should be obtained from our Interior Ministry.

AC DIST

ACTION LIAISON 2
INFO CHIEF COMMISSIONER
FILE
FLOAT 2

COPY

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Copy

translation

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
Public Safety Director
443/50810

Rome, 28 June 1946

SUBJECT: Control of foreign people in Italy.

TO : Headquarters A.C.
Executive Commissioner.

This Ministry is in agreement in taking the control of all the foreigners in Italy as previously, and will let you know, in a short time, for your information, all the details of the matter.

We are working now in order to definitely establish satisfactorily and take all appropriate action.

for the MINISTER
/a/

COPY

15

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref. : 3643/19/EO.

26 June 1946.

SUBJECT: Internal Security Measures for the Control
of Aliens.

TO : Ministry of Interior.

With reference to my letter No. DPR/11/EA dated 25 May on
the a/c subject; I would be grateful if you would let me have your
comments on this matter.

For the Chief Commissioner.

N. W. HIND-SMITH

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

Copy to:- Dr. Rombassei.
Disper.

Ref: DHR/11/EA

25 May, 1946

SUBJECT: Internal Security Measures for the Control
of Aliens.

TO : Ministry of Interior.

- COPY 14
1. Further to this Commission's letter GB1.389-506/40 dated 9 May 1946.
 2. The Displaced Persons and Repatriation Sub-Commission recently sent a representative to the French Zone of Austria and Germany in order to put forward suggestions and coordinate the movement of Italian and Non-Italian Displaced Persons into Italy. The following tentative agreement was reached:-
 - (a) MITTENWALD, 3. Bavaria, would be the clearing centre in Germany for those Displaced Persons who travel to or transit through Italy.
 - (b) Italian Displaced Persons would continue to be documented in the same way as before by Italian Liaison Officers. It is understood that the present system of documentation meets the requirements of the Italian Authorities. An Italian Liaison Officer would accompany the Italian drafts as far as the BRENNER Frontier Control Post and would ensure that no unaccepted Displaced Persons attached themselves to the convoys.
 - (c) Non-Italian Displaced Persons, whose transit through Italy is unavoidable, would be screened at MITTENWALD by their national Liaison Officer. The Displaced Persons and Repatriation Sub-Commission would obtain authority for transit through Italy from your Ministry, who would inform the appropriate Frontier Control Post of the impending move. The Displaced Persons and Repatriation Sub-Commission would send a "conveying officer" to MITTENWALD to take charge of the convoy and bring it to Italy.
 3. Displaced Persons and Repatriation Sub-Commission have also suggested that the Italian Public Safety Authorities take appropriate action under Italian Law in cases where Civilian Refugee Organizations are suspected of aiding and organising illegal movement. This to include Displaced Persons Camps with notice, having first informed the Camp Commander.

13

4. It has also been suggested that illegal entrants should not be given the full refugee scale of rations nor should they be accorded the status of Displaced or Stateless Persons.

5. Your early comments on the above proposals would be appreciated.

For the Chief Commissioner.

M.S. LUSH

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

COPY 12
ALLIED COMMISSION HEADQUARTERS.
APO 394.
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION.

Ref: 6/18B/CA

SUBJECT: Undesirable Aliens.

To: Chief Liaison Officer,
BOLZANO.

17th April 1946.

10
With reference to your AGLO/BZ.29 of the 12th April 1946, the whole question of Aliens in Italy is now under consideration by AFHQ, and it is anticipated that in conjunction with the Italian Government a Policy will be laid down with regard to the method of dealing with undesirable aliens.

With reference to paragraph 14 of your letter under reference, if No. 23 DP Camp is handed over to the Italian authorities, it cannot remain under Allied control if it is to be used to accommodate undesirable aliens for whom the Italian Government are responsible.

It is hoped that the consideration which is being given by higher authority to the question of undesirable aliens will assist in the solving of problems which face the Italian authorities in Bolzano Province.

M. CARR, Brigadier.
VP. CA. Section.

cc Executive Commissioner.

copy

11

CABLE

From ALCOM BOLZANO

03-1130

To ALCOM ROME

REF. ACLO/BZ/29 UNCLASSIFIED FOR DPMSC PD LARGE NUMBER
ALIENS INCLUDING ENEMY ALIENS STILL IN BOLZANO PROVINCE PD
SEPARATION CENTRE HAS CLOSED DOWN PD

IF NO. 23 DP CAMP, CLOSES ITALIAN GOVERNMENT CANNOT COPE WITH
REPATRIATION PD RECOMMEND CONTINUANCE THIS CAMP UNTIL ITALIAN GOVERNMENT
HAS ESTABLISHED MACHINERY FOR REPATRIATION PD LETTER FOLLOWS FROM
MAJ STEWART PD

URGENT
IMPORTANT

ACLO/BZ/29

12 April 1946
SWM/gn.

Apr 15 1946

SUBJECT : Undesirable Aliens.

TO : HQ, Allied Commission,
Civil Affairs Section,
ROME.

1. I have to report that a number of undesirable aliens still remain in the Province and the Questore states he cannot place an effective control on them or deport them to their country of origin.
2. As is well known, people of many nationalities came to the Province of Bolzano during the closing stages of the war and are still here. Numbers of these people are quite respectable citizens and have sufficient means to support themselves in Italy, but for various reasons, mostly political, but in some cases economical, do not desire to return to their native countries.
3. In such cases the Italian Government is adopting a very tolerant attitude and despite their own troubles as far as feeding the population of Italy is concerned, are prepared to allow these aliens to remain in Italy.
4. In addition to the aliens already described, members of international swindlers and the like have found their way into Bolzano Province.
5. They are mostly Czechoslovacs, Yugoslavs, Hungarians and Rumanians.
6. These aliens very quickly take advantage of the more or less easy life in Italy as compared with other countries in Europe and engage in black market activities with Italian black-marketeers.
7. It is very difficult for the Italian Police to detect the offences committed by these aliens and deal with them before their Courts.
8. In times of peace the answer would be simple, such aliens would be immediately deported from Italy or incarcerated in jail until arrangements can be made for their deportation.
9. Unfortunately, owing to the existing conditions, neither of these solutions are possible at the present time.
10. There are so many regulations governing civilian travel across Europe, that deportation is out of the question. The Italian jails are so full, that there is no room for them there.

11. The primary consideration of the Italian authorities at the present moment is effectively to control these people whilst they remain in Italy and the only answer would appear to be an internment camp.

12. I would stress that in the case of Austrians and Germans provided they do not live in the Russian occupied zones of those countries, can be dealt with as long as No. 23 D.P. Camp Bolzano remains a staging area for repatriation of Austrian and German nationals to their native countries. But the undesirables of other nations could only be sent floating from one part of Italy to another and, although there are some guard arrangements at the various D.P. Camps in Italy, such guard arrangements are not sufficient to keep in custody such undesirable aliens as are disturbing life in Italy.

13. In accordance with instructions received from Director D.P. Sub-Commission, I had made tentative arrangements with the Prefect of Bolzano for the taking over of the buildings in No. 23 D.P. Camp as soon as the present occupants have been repatriated. (I understand trains for this purpose are due on or about the 20th of April) and I have, however sent a telegram to Rome on the 3rd of April a copy of which is attached. A reply has not yet been received.

14. I do, however, recommend the continuance of this Camp under Allied control until such time as the Italian Government has established machinery for repatriation, otherwise it can be only a concentration camp.

15. The need for a concentration camp will eventually arise in view of the fact that the Northern extremities of this Province are the Italian frontiers through which there is quite a disturbing clandestine traffic of illegal entrance into Italy. The Camp would therefore supply an answer for the Italians to look after such persons until their deportation can be arranged.

16. If the illegal emigrants are Austrian, it is an easy matter to send them back over the border, but in most cases they are nationals other than Austrian, and Allied Military Government of Austria will not accept them back, unless arrangements can be made for their safe passage through Austria to their native country, which in most cases is impossible at the present time.

1 encl.

S.W. MILLER, Colonel,
Chief Liaison Officer
BOLZANO.

Copy to:

The Executive Commissioner,
H.Q. Allied Commission.

H.E. the Prefect of Bolzano (2x)

H.Q. Allied Commission DPSC
Maj. A.J. STEWART, D.C. NW Group DERSC Milan
No. 23 D.P. Camp Bolzano / Public Safety.

COPY

3643

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8 15

GBI. 389-506/110

9 May 1946
MAY 24 1946

SUBJECT : Internal security measures for the control of aliens.
TO : Ministry of the Interior.

1. This Commission has given further consideration to the question of control of aliens in the country referred to in your letter of 16/00368/47 dated 3 January and my reply reference AG/14756/523 dated 5 February.

2. Subject to the conditions mentioned in my letter, it is felt that energetic measures can be taken to bring about an improvement in a situation which is at present extremely confused.

3. Your consideration is therefore invited to the suggestion that the Italian Authorities should proceed to the documentation of all aliens in the country with a view to classifying them and arranging for the disposal of undesirable elements. This should include aliens inside as well as outside D.P. camps.

4. It has been suggested that this procedure might take the following form:

- a. Require all aliens to register their presence at Quentura.
(So far as aliens in Allied camps are concerned facilities for this purpose will be arranged.)
- b. Record particulars of all such aliens including personal data: time, date, place and authority for entering the country, present activity, original domicile, reason for presence in country.
- c. Provide aliens with document showing that they have registered.
- d. Form central index by nationalities and classify cases into groups indicating the action the Italian Authorities wish to take, i.e. "undesirable-for deportation", "acceptable", "sojourn to be limited to 2 months", etc.

.../2

See 7-26-63

- 2 -

e. Organise transit camps into which undesirable aliens illegally in the country and whose deportation is desired by the Italian Government could be placed pending their disposal.

f. Reintroduce all normal alien control measures, i.e. registration at hotels, requirement to report to Questura at intervals, etc.

5. The Italian Police could then proceed to the arrest of those aliens who failed to register.

6. By these means, it is felt that a proper appreciation of the situation could be made and, when the necessary information had been collected, the Italian Authorities could approach this Commission regarding the disposal of undesirable groups.

7. Your comments on the above suggestions would be appreciated.

BRIGADIER,
Executive Commissioner.

Copy to:- Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Ref: AC/14756/5/PB.

5 February 1946.

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have received your letter 18/00368/47 dated 5th January 1946, written from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which you raise the question of the authority of the Italian Government to deport undesirable aliens. Some weeks ago this same question was presented to us by the Ministry of Interior and the matter has been under consideration with higher authority.

It is agreed in principle that the Italian Government has the right to deport undesirable aliens, but the exercise of the right must of necessity be limited at present.

For instance, the Italian Government would obviously be required not to apply deportation laws to persons in the following categories without agreement with the authorities concerned:

- (a) aliens in the custody of the Allies;
- (b) aliens in the care of Allied Commission or of UNRRA;
- (c) aliens whose presence in Italy has already been approved by the Allies and who continue to be so sponsored.

Moreover, the Allies have contracted not to return political refugees by force to their countries of origin. Numbers of these persons are presently at large in Italy. The Italian Government would no doubt wish to adopt the same policy as the Allies to such people.

Subject to the above, my dear Mr. Prime Minister, there is no objection to the Italian Government exercising the right to deport undesirable aliens.

Yours very truly,

MILVY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

276

Dott. Alcide de Gasperi,
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government,
R O M E.

Copy to: Chief Commissioner
Ex. Commissioner
Filed (A) & (B)

(CAPT B) 1017

Rough Translation

State Department
16/00368/47

Rome, Jan. 5th, 1946

JAN 11 1946

Dear Admiral Stone,

I had these days occasion to hear that the Italian Government's authority to take adequate measure against aliens whose permanence in Italy appears on 'proven grounds' - to be undesirable, hasn't yet been recognized.

It follows that the Italian Authorities are deprived of the power to expell alien citizens guilty of breaches of the law. In fact a note addressed by the P.S. Subcommission of the Allied Commission to the Ministry for the Interior makes clear that no alien can be enjoined to leave Italy unless with his own consent!

I believe it to be unnecessary to call your attention on the many and serious complications which may arise from such a state of affairs, from the point of view of public order and also under other aspects which are of particular importance as for instance that of food-stuffs.

Moreover the question is of special importance also in principle inasmuch as it affects the very prerogatives of the Italian Government whose authority to regulate the entry of foreigners into the country has already been recognized. It is therefore obvious that the Italian Government shall also be entitled to istate, wherever necessary, the expulsion of those who have made themselves undesirable.

The above refers particularly to German citizens, who, as enemy aliens, ought to be interned and gradually repatriated to Germany, individual cases excepted. A quite peculiar situation has arisen whereby the Germans, who must underlie in all other countries to special controls and are being repatriated, continue to reside freely in Italy because the allied authorities have vetoed that similar measures be adopted against them.

I kindly ask you, therefore, dear Admiral Stone, to kindly obtain that full authority on the alien may reverse to the Italian Government, and to begin with, that said authorities may be immediately exercised in dealing with German subjects.

Please accept, dear Admiral Stone, my heartfelt greetings.

G. De Gasperi

Admiral Henry W. Stone
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
Rome

See 6

785017

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 312

C-5: 091.1 Italy

11 January 1946

SUBJECT: Aliens in Italy

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission
APO 394

Reference is made to your letter SD/540.01-3 dated 4 Jan 46.

1. While it is desirable that the Italian Government should assume responsibility at an early date for the deportation of undesirable aliens, as envisaged in the letter from the Ministry of the Interior, there is some doubt whether it is feasible.

2. The Italian Government cannot be permitted to apply deportation laws to:

- a. Aliens in the custody of the Allies.
- b. Aliens in the care of Allied Commission or of UNRRA.
- c. Aliens whose presence in Italy has already been approved by the Allies and who continue to be so sponsored.

3. The Allies have contracted not to return political refugees by force to their countries of origin. Some such agreement may well be incorporated in the final peace treaty with Italy. Numbers of such persons, notably the adherents of the former Royalist Fascist regime, are presently at large in Italy and it is clearly undesirable that action should be taken now which is likely to conflict with the ultimate peace terms.

4. Allied assistance cannot be given to effect such deportations as the Italian Government may deem desirable, neither can the Allied authorities be associated with such deportations. Any negotiations with other States concerning deportations must be effected through such direct diplomatic channels as may be open to the Italian Government. It will readily be seen that the provisions of this paragraph are of themselves a serious limitation.

5. From the foregoing it appears that except in a few isolated cases it is not practicable at this time for the Italian Government to avail themselves of the right of deportation. There is, however, no objection in principle to the granting of this right.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN:

/s/ A.L. HAWLEY
Brigadier General, G-5
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5.

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Copy to: 2-2
Reamin
Filed.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 104
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

SD/540.03-3

4 Jan 46

SUBJECT: Aliens in Italy

TO : Allied Force Headquarters for C-5
APO 512.

1 Attached hereto is a letter from the Ministry of Interior dated 2 Dec, 1945, raising the question of authority of the Italian Government to deport undesirable aliens from the country.

2 The present policy of not permitting forced repatriation seems to be one of the difficulties in the minds of Italian officials in both the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The other difficulty which appears is the lack of accord between the Italian Government and other governments and authorities under which undesirable deserters from Italy would be accepted.

3 May this Headquarters please be advised as to the policy to be adopted.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

/s/ M. CARR, Brig.
VP CA Section.

ENCLOS: Letter from Min of Interior
Text of Public Safety Laws.

See 4

(Translation M.B.)

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
D.S. General Direction

Rome 2 December 1945

A.G.R. Division 3 Section

To: ALLIED COMMISSION
SUB COMMISSION OF P.S.
R.O.M.E.

443/35254

SUBJECT: Sojourn in Italy of undesirable foreign subjects.

With note 10/540-03 dated 18th last October, your Commission acknowledged receipt of our Ministerial dated 9th of said month and forwarded further communications on behalf of foreigners to expel and drive back from the kingdom.

The matter had been already pointed out with other notes to your Commission.

Actually, the well-known situation in Italy does not enable the Government to allow the sojourn in the kingdom of many categories of strangers. Said matter is essentially concerning the subjects of States which were formerly enemies, who have clandestinely entered into the kingdom, or are in Italy following military events. It further concerns people who, being authorized to temporary sojourn here, did not want or were not able afterwards to leave the Italian territory.

Owing to evident opportunity reasons, this Ministry pointed out only the cases which are most urgent and important. Any way, investigations about the very numerous strangers who still live in the kingdom, revealed that the position of most of them is irregular. They are getting more and more dangerous to the Public Safety and for the general economical position of the country.

In fact, even when said foreigners can prove that their activity is not illegal, they make the present problems caused by the unemployment and by the shortage of food, clothing and transportations still worse; on the other hand they do not bring an appreciable contribution to our production. Besides, provisions caused by same reasons are being taken in some big towns even against Italian subjects.

The situation is still more dangerous as far as it concerns those foreigners who are displaying uncertain and uncontrollable activities, such as clandestine trade in Italy and between Italy and foreign States. Daily Police operations show as these foreigners are often most dangerous criminals.

Accordingly, this Ministry has decided to proceed to the gradual and ordered repatriation of said foreigners, starting from the most dangerous ones, to the persons who do not bring any contribution to the Italian production. Certainly, the reciprocal treatment used towards Italians by their countries, shall be especially considered of.

To this aim, this Ministry could turn to the Allied authorities as during the past time, but considering the difficulties and the slowness of this proceedings, we deem it opportune to appeal to laws concerned in

- 2 -

Par. 150 of the T.N. of the F.S. Regulations approved by R.D. 21th June 1931 Nr. 773 and 267 and 11. of the Regulation 5th May 1930 Nr. 636.

Anyway, before proceeding to carry out said provisions this Ministry should be glad to know the opinion of your Commission on behalf of matter in question.

For the Minister

s/ Ferrari.

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