

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

ACC

10000/109/830
(VOL. I)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

10000/109/830
(VOL. I)

FOOD SITUATION, SICILY
JULY-DEC. 1944

99.

Reply directly advise his report, approve his report
say that grain imports for Sicily are being
considered with those for whole of Italy MS/27/200

Anten as 10/10/100 L. U 29/12

CSO: Plo 222 p 59 - also minute at 55
 60
 cut 20/11

69.

TO: 030 - This summary for your & Major Rinaldi's information

1. Under date of 19 Oct - see folio 20 - the Italian Government were advised by the A/CC that it was the definite intention of SAC not repeat not to import additional grain into Sicily. The above information was relayed to the R.C. Sicily by the CUS - see folio 21.
2. On the 23 Oct - see folio at 32 - reaction to the non-import policy began to come in and the A/CC requested a survey to determine whether Sicily was self-supporting or no.
3. A copy of memo from Econ to Pol Section indicated that Sicily could only be considered self-supporting on a 200 gram bread ration whereas the nation had for some time past been increased to 300 grams.
4. In a meeting on 1 Nov - see folio at 34 - the Econ Sec proposed taking a realistic attitude i.e. that assessing results had been below expectations, that the increased ration scale was depleting reserves and that imports would be necessary in Dec and thereafter until the next harvest yield became available.
5. The full position was reported to AFN at 44.
6. At 57 the CC wrote to advise the Italian Government that wheat would be imported and that one shipload would be unloaded during Dec.
7. The CUS at 64 advises the R.C. Sicily of the position and directs setting up of soup kitchens.
8. The CUS proceeding to conference at AFN on 30 Nov is briefed at 67 and 68.

5 Dec 44.
 Office, Chief of Staff.
 Ext. 451

97.

72-75 Jan- 85 9/12

CSO: For P.S. to read folios 95-96.
 The C of S's letter (p. 94) answers many of the queries in RC's letter (p. 95-96).
 Definite decisions are yet pending on bread ration & grain importation policy. JCR 23/12

encl
 Ca-

1183

98

785017

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4. In a meeting on 1 Nov - see folio at 38 - the Egon Sec proposed taking a realistic attitude i.e. that assessing results had been below expectations, that the increased ration scale was depleting reserves and that imports would be necessary in Dec and thereafter until the next harvest yield became available.

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8. The CCS proceeding to conference at AFHQ on 30 Nov is briefed at 67 and 68.

5 Dec 44
Office, Chief of Staff.
Ext. 451

~~end~~
Cautious

97.

for CFS to read folios 95-96.

C S O: The C of S letter (p. 94) answers many of the queries in RC's letter (p. 95-96).
Definite decisions are yet pending on bread ration & grain importation policy. JEP 23/12

72-78 seen 22 9/12

98

1183

COS To see 96. - as stated in 97 above many of the questions are answered in 96
J.O. at 94. There is 'nothing' here can be done until final decision is made.

26/12.

Col.

37.

Ref 36 and note at the foot, the "Kashmir" is bringing this up at your meeting with him and Brig. Can also.

3/10

49

C.S.O.

Pl. See 47 & 48. A/cos should see

50

10/11

Alcal.

To see 47 & 48. I have not yet seen any communication from this HQ to HHA or to Brownie as a result of discussion at 39.

10/11

10/11 noted. +

53

C.S.O.

Pl. see 52 & 44

10/11

Col.

54

To see from 42 onwards

1173

49

CSO

Pl. See 47 & 48. A/cos should see

50

Σ 10/11

Alcal.

To see 47 & 48. I have not yet seen any communication from this HQ to HHA or to Rome as a result of discussion at 39.

Σ

10/11 word. +

10/11

53

e.s.o.

Pl. see 52 & 44

encl 10/11

Col.

To see from 42 onwards

54

1173

Σ

55

16/11

The undoubted fact remains that we allowed SAKMED to telegraph CES twice stating that no more grain would be imported into Sicily when we (8 GS) had already arranged to import food in early 1945. There has been lack of coordination.

17/11/21

32. Acting Chief Commissioner.

I submit a minute by Lt.-Colonel Shipp on 2 Paragraphs in a letter from Brigadier Carr (.27): I have already instructed Economic Section to prepare a survey of Sicily's past record on wheat imports and I agree that once we know the facts we must prepare careful propaganda.

2. I agree with the Prime Minister that it is premature for us to withdraw from Sicily at this moment. D.C.O.S. Establishment Section, has suggested that we should replace the Military staff there by Allied civilians. I am not wholly in favour of this compromise and I think we shall be committed to keeping our present staff in the island until the end of the year.

3. From the initial reports which have arrived on the Palermo riots, it would seem that bad leadership displayed by Caribiniari and Army officers was probably responsible for the disturbances resulting in a high casualty rate. I think that the Public Safety Sub-Commission should concentrate on internal reform among the Caribiniari and other police agencies in the island and that the High Commissioner and the Government should be told that quality and not quantity is required among these forces to prevent further outbreaks.

25th October 1944.

M.S.L.

Brigadier.
Chief of Staff.

33. (of 5)
I concur with last sentence

26/10

M.S.L.

DW

34.

DEOS. CAS to see. I was perhaps a little

unfair on C.C.R.R. but the principle remains

M.S.L.

To Public Safety 35.

26/10.

Please discuss This matter with me.

I feel we ought to get the G.A. to back

25th October 1944.

MSL

Brigadier.
Chief of Staff.

33. C of S

I concur with last sentence

26/10

MSL

Dwy

34.

DEOS. CAS to be. I was perhaps a little
unfair on CERB. But the principle remains

MSL

To Public Safety 35.

26/10.

Please discuss this matter with me.

I feel we ought to get the G.A. ~~187~~ back

reorganisation & reform straightaway.

J. P. M.

Spoke to Cripps who says inform I CERB is being
checked by AF Section with Italian Gov. info. 20 6/10 pm.

To be sent

ON 5 Nov

27.

TO: Chief of Staff.

27.

Comments on para 3 and 5 (d) folio 27.

1. *Specific* 26 has crossed your letter of 19 October (folio 21) which answers *in his last para.* the questions raised by Brig. Carr. Nevertheless it seems to me that he has raised two very pertinent points in paras. 3 and 5 (d), which are likely to form the basis of any argument the Italian Government may advance *as a result of* ~~in answer~~ to A/CC's letter to them of 19 October (folio 20). *Could or would*
2. It appears most unlikely that sufficient forces ~~will~~ be put into the island to ensure that enough grain is collected to feed the urban population. Appeals to the public spirit of the Sicilians are not likely to be any more productive. The Italian Government in face of the plain statement that no more grain will be imported till next harvest must try and save their own skins and the only way they can do so is by making out a case that there is in fact not enough grain in the Island. I think they may try to do this on the lines I have outlined above in para. 1. I think we must be prepared finally to rebut these arguments and that Economic Section should be asked to do so at once.
3. If SAC maintains his decision not to import grain and at the same time we maintain a Regional Commissioner with a Staff of Officers in Palermo, then we shall surely get the blame for any riots which occur (and it seems certain that they will).
4. Finally a decision should be made as to whether we are committed to staying in the Island. I think we cannot withdraw now after this riot at PALERMO. *If we stay* ~~Therefore~~ we should have plans ready now to deal with the disturbances which are bound to arise and at the same time give wide publicity to the facts: —
 - (a) That there is enough grain in the island.
 - (b) That we do not intend to import.

23.10.44

I have only seen 12 on 4805 after writing this. 23/10 (see 32 on file)

1177

For Supp 1561

15 Oct 44.

To: ACTING CHIEF COMMISSIONER.

I submit draft letter to Prime Minister for your signature and a letter I propose issuing to Regional Commissioner, Sicily, both making quite plain the future in Sicily if the Amassi fails.
I feel we should be wrong to allow the Italians and Sicilians to live in any fools' paradise on this matter.

MSR
Brigadier.
Chief of Staff.

To COT's
17. ^{of the} suggested a reduction in
The station. ~~that~~ Govt (or the High Comm)
will lay it at our door. That must
be their idea, as a medium to
speed up amassing The Amators

19 Oct.

18. MSR/19/15.
Issue as amended.

20/10

27.

Cat. 26 has apparently been up-
I have not yet read this.

1878
21/10

13.

TO: Chief of Staff.Ref 12.

1. At 12 is a long letter on the grain situation in Sicily from Brig. Carr. In general this letter reports that the campaign to collect the grain is going very badly for various reasons. The result of this will be that only enough grain to feed the Island up to the end of December will be obtained (see para.9).

2. In regard to para.3 of Brig. Carr's letter the recommendations (see folio 2) that he mentions as not being carried out have been followed up with MIA, Economic Section and Civil Affairs Section with the following results:

MIA. It is stated that the directive dated 6 July (folio 3) was not received by MIA and no action has been taken by them. They had two copies.

Economic Section. No specific action has been taken by Tyres and Tubes Section of Transportation Sub-Commission for the reason, it is stated, that the difficulties of obtaining civilian tyres and tubes are well known. I understand the Pirelli retreading plant is in operation and a priority demand may result in some retreaded tyres being obtained but I understand no tubes are available.

Civil Affairs Section. No action was taken by Civil Affairs Section, (then Admin. Section) as at that time Col. Hancock advised that the Italian Government was not desirous of arresting these men. Letter dated 22 September (folio 8) says that it now proposed to take proceedings against Aprile and the result will be reported in due course.

3. E.C.'s recommendations are summarized in para.12 and are six in number. I suggest that these recommendations should be passed to Deputy Chiefs of Staff as follows:

(a) 12 A and 12 E to Civil Affairs Section.

(b) 12 E to Economic Section.

4. The remaining suggestions should be dealt with by Chief of Staff Section as follows:

(a) 12 D to be taken up with Army Sub-Commission.

I don't know how strongly you wish this pressed but I do not think there is much likelihood of their agreeing.

(b) 12 C I do not think there is any use approaching IAI on this matter. 1173

agreed by CAS. (c) 12 D I understand that this has already been taken up with already taken up. not necessary again. Army Sub-Commission but it will do no harm mentioning it

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(b) 12 C I do not think there is any use approaching AI on this matter.

(c) 12 D I understand that this has already been taken up with Army Sub-Commission but it will do no harm mentioning it again.

Will you please say if you agree to these suggestions.

agreed by COS.

already taken up. not necessary to mention again.
(See 6710 5.
on file 823/CA)

3 Oct 44.

14.

Chief Staff Officer,
~~to~~ Chief of Staff.

The 2 relevant sections already have copies.

Ask them to produce a combined letter to P.M.

(with YAs) pointing out the salient facts, the

salient features, and suggested remedies. MS/3/x/vv

See 15 April.

W. J. P. L. L.

Ref: 4206/100/CNS

27 December 1944.

SUBJECT: Grain Situation in Sicily.

TO : Regional Commissioner, Sicilia Region.

1. I received your letter RC/433 dated 20 December 1944, have noted your remarks and approve of the action you are taking.

2. The policy for grain imports for Sicily is being considered with the present import policy for the whole of Italy and I will, of course, inform you as early as possible of any decisions taken in the matter.

(54D) E. T. A. B. E. T. *copy*
for Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

(in his absence
on duty)

Copy to Economic Section

MAJ 30/12

see Minutes 97 to 99

1173

785017

SUBJECT: Grain Situation in Sicily.

TO : Regional Commissioner, Sicilian Region.

1. I received your letter RC/433 dated 20 December 1944, have noted your remarks and approve of the action you are taking.

2. The policy for grain imports for Sicily is being considered with the present import policy for the whole of Italy and I will, of course, inform you as early as possible of any decisions taken in the matter.

(S.D.) E. T. W. B. R. T. M.

Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

(in his absence
on duty)

Copy to Economic Section

W. J. 30/12

see Minutes 97 to 99

11711

PA

2

785017

4206
C.O.S. 6243
SECRET 96
ALLIED COMMISSION
SICILIA REGION HEADQUARTERS
APO 394

OFFICE: REGIONAL COMMISSIONER
PHONE: 15353 EXT 1

FILE:RC/433

20 Dec 1944

SUBJECT: Grain situation in Sicily

22 DEC 1944

TO : Headquarters Allied Commission
R O M E

85 87 59 64
1. In continuation of my RC/433 of 13 NOV 44 (since which date correspondence has been on a demi-official basis- Chief of Staff's letter 171/4/COS of 2 DEC, my RC/201 of 7 and 9 DEC refer) the grain situation at the present moment is as follows.

2. The two partially loaded grain ships have arrived and have discharged at CATANIA 7000 tons of barley and at PALERMO 4000 tons of wheat.

The main grain ship expected to bring approximately 8000 tons wheat has not yet arrived but is expected shortly.

No official reduction has been made in the bread ration scale but the High Commissioner has been advised, in view of the uncertainty as regards future policy, to release grain only on the basis of a total bread ration of 200 grams, which has the effect of temporarily suspending the pasta ration. In this connection it is to be noted that for some time past the pasta ration has been on a sporadic basis, for instance, in the city of PALERMO the pasta ration has been issued only up to the end of September. I have raised no objection to a full pasta ration being made available for Christmas Day.

The High Commissioner has agreed to the release of grain on the above basis. He also concurs in the suggestion that as a general principle the large cities and towns should be given priority so far as distribution of grain is concerned. It is estimated by the local administration that on the basis of the above reduced ration there should be, after the arrival of the 8000-ton grain ship in the near future, sufficient grain on hand to feed the Island until 25 JAN. This date must be taken as an overall estimated date.

3. The High Commissioner has been advised that every effort must be made to continue and increase unassing as

see Minutes 97, 98, 99
7 Feb 100.

95

far as possible. Practically no grain is coming in though on one day, the 17th of December, 7000 quintals were reported as collected. The daily average, however, works out at a very low level. The recent disorders throughout the Island preclude the use of any special forcible measures as regards amassing.

4. Considerable anxiety has been shown by the Naval Bases in the Island as regards the unofficial reduction in the ration and the general uncertainty as to whether or not bread is likely to continue to be available for workers and their families in the cities affected. I am keeping them informed as to the situation. I have advised the High Commissioner to turn his attention to soup kitchens and communal feeding. Apart from grain shortage, certain progress has been made as regards soup kitchens in the principal cities for normal winter feeding but I feel I cannot advise the High Commissioner to make considerable extensions to such schemes until the grain importation policy for the Island has been finally decided.

I shall be glad to be informed as early as possible of any decisions taken in regard to the bread ration and the grain importation policy for this Island.

M Carr

M. CARR
Brigadier
Regional Commissioner

Copy TO: Vice-President Economic Section
Food Sub-Commission

1172

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

4206

SECRET.

94

Confidential

Ref: 4206/-/COS.

21 December 1944.

You have been kept rather in the dark I am afraid with regard to the food situation in Sicily. The reason has been that we have been fighting for over a fortnight a very intensive battle to get the 300 gram ration equalised all over liberated Italy, including Sicily. This, of course, has involved the revoking of the original order made by Deputy SACMED with regard to the importation of food into Sicily, which at the present moment stands as follows. The Allied Commission are allowed to plan for the import of food into Sicily on the 300 gram ration scale but not to put the plan into execution until we know what the answer will be with regard to the equalisation of the ration. We have convinced the authorities at AFHQ that grain hoarded now is not amassable, if I may use the word, even by force. At the same time we do not want to encourage the Italian authorities to relax their efforts in any way by telling them that the grain ration will be kept at 300 grams or that food will be imported. Diversion of ships and other arrangements are being made by the Economic Section in order to meet the situation after 10th January, up to which date, I understand, the present arrangements will take you.

This is all very untidy from your point of view but it has been impossible to send you an official direction without appearing to depart from the definite instructions laid down by Deputy SACMED and SACMED which would not only bring Sicily into the daylight, and involve a reduction of your ration straightaway, but might prejudice the approval of the COS for the 300 gram ration.

We have received a very good report from the CO.RR on the recent disturbances in the Island and the probable reasons therefor. I understand that you are sending us a separate report today or tomorrow and I shall be interested to see whether your conclusions are similar to those of the Italian authorities. You will have been told, I hope, by the Public Safety Sub-Commission of the proposed reinforcements of Carabinieri and military forces in the island. I also understand that an additional Public Safety officer has been sent to you.

You must be having an anxious time and I shall be glad to see from your report whether you think these disturbances are likely to continue or whether they are related only to the tactless handling of the call-up. With the present situation in Greece, eyes are likely to be turned to Sicily with some concern and I am anxious to be able to give an appreciation by someone in authority in the island.

With all Good Wishes for Christmas and 1945.

1171
M. S. LUSH

Brigadier M. Carr, CBE, MC,
Regional Commissioner,
SICILIA REGION.

Copy to: File 3618/COS.

785017

4206

005

EWS/dfs

93

13 December 1944

18 DEC 1944

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

In reply to your urgent message of December 12th, I am able to alleviate your anxiety about the wheat situation in Sicily to the extent that a shipment of wheat amounting to approximately five thousand tons has been diverted from the Mainland and will arrive in Palermo tomorrow morning, the 14th. A further eight thousand tons is scheduled to arrive in Sicily on December 20th.

Yours very truly,

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Commodore, USNR
Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi
President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
Rome

cc: Food Sub-Commission
Chief of Staff
Economic Section
A Files

1178
See Major Family
1A
13
12

4206

Trans mission

Interior Department

Urgent

Rome, 12 December 1944

Admiral Ellery Stone
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
R O M E

93.

Original
file 91

n. 16155/45 Reference former message 9 December I inform Your Excellency about the very serious situation in Sicily because wheat supply will last only till the 15th. I beg your Excellency to intervene by this Commission so that it should kindly examine the proposal of the High Commissioner for Sicily to make agreement with local Commissariat General Alimentation, keeping in mind that failure to solve this grave problem would prevent regular explanation activity government. I remain.

PRESIDENT COUNCIL MINISTER INTERIOR
ROMA

original given to SO to CC
Chief Commissioner is replying to this
today, copy to COS
encl.
13/12

Trans. E.O.

1163

1163

Mod. 842

Ministero dell'Interno

GABINETTO

UFFICIO DEL TELEGAFO E DELLA CIFRA

Telegramma N.

URGENTE

DEC 12 1944

(in busta)

Roma, 12 dicembre 1944.

Ammiraglio HELBERRY STONE
Commissario Capo Commissione Alleata

ROMA

no16135/473 stop Relazione precedente dispaccio 9 corrente
segnalo V.E.gravissima situazione Sicilia causa consistenza gra-
no sufficiente sino 15 corrente stop Prego vivamente V.E.inter-
venire presso codesta Commissione perchè esami benevolmente
proposta Alto Commissario Sicilia intesa locale Commissariato
Generale Alimentazione tenendo presente che mancata soluzione
tale grave problema impedirebbe regolare esplicazione attività
Governo stop Ringrazio

PRESIDENTE CONSIGLIO MINISTRO INTERNO
BONOMI

GABINETTO

UFFICIO DEL TELEGRAFO E DELLA CIFRA

Telegramma N.

URGENTE

DEC 12 1944

(in busta)

Roma, 12 dicembre 1944.

Ammiraglio **HELBERRY STONE**

Commissario Capo Commissione Alleata

ROMA

n°16135/473 stop Relazione precedente dispaccio 9 corrente
segnalo V.E.gravissima situazione Sicilia causa consistenza gra-
no sufficiente sino 15 corrente stop Prego vivamente V.E.inter.
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tale grave problema impedirebbe regolare esplicazione attività
Governo stop Ringrazio

PRESIDENTE CONSIGLIO MINISTRO INTERNO

BONOMI

1168

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO SIZ

Ref. F-4

13 December 1944

SUBJECT: Wheat for Sicily

MEMO TO: C.A.C.

1. The pre-harvest estimate of the 1944-45 Sicilian wheat crop indicated the possibility of sustaining a bread ration of 300 grams per person for 10.6 months or of 250 grams for 13 months.

An August estimate adjusted the figures to 8 and 10 months respectively.

The actual emment produced only sufficient for approx 4 months, or until 15 Dec.

2. The failure to amass is attributed to (1) weak Italian administration, (2) political intrigue plus separatism and (3) resistance of farmers.

3. It is proposed that wheat be imported into Sicily during Jan - June 1945 in quantities sufficient to insure the feeding of the large population centers on a parity with the adjusted program for the Mainland and Sardinia. This can be accomplished within the import program presently agreed by the CCS. Such action will insure against unrest, will contribute to the morale of the people and will lend needed support to the new Italian Govt. at a psychological moment.

For the Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5:

Incl: Table

J. E. BUTTERWORTH
Colonel, C.A.C.
Chief, Economics & Supply Division

Sicily

A.	<u>Estimates</u>	<u>Tons (000)</u>	<u>Months of Supply at</u>			<u>Ration Card Population</u>
			<u>300 Grs.</u>	<u>250 Grs.</u>	<u>200 Grs.</u>	
	Pre-harvest	297	10.6	13	16	3.25 million
	August	280	8	12	12	"
	September	300	7.2	8.7	11	"
	Actual	126	4	5.5	7	"

B.		<u>300 Gr.</u>	<u>To insure</u>		<u>Notes</u>
			<u>250 Gr.</u>	<u>200 Gr.</u>	
	Monthly Import Requirement in (000) tons Jan - June 1945	29. (3.3)	24. (5.5)	19. (2.2)	() Ships/month.
	Total for 6 months	174 (19)	134. (15)	114. (13)	() " /6 months.

Notes: (1) 250 gr bread is equivalent to 200 gr flour, which was approved by CCS in 1943.

(2) CCS has agreed 107,000 tons wheat per month (shipping permitting).

(3) 107,000 tons is equivalent to 18 ships.

(4) Requirements would be reduced in proportion to additional grain assessed or ration card holders reduced.

FILE

88

ALCOM SICILIA REGION

8085

12 Dec

Confidential

TOPSECRET PD

PERSONAL FOR CARR FROM LUSH PD

PAREN TO ALCOM SICILIA REGION FROM ALCOM SIGNED STONE PAREN PD

YOUR LETTERS DECEMBER SEVEN⁸⁷ AND NINE⁸⁵ PD MATTER WAS RECONSIDERED BY SACMED
ON DECEMBER NINE AND I AM ATTENDING FURTHER MEETING DECEMBER ONE THREE AS
RESULT OF WHICH HOPE INSTRUCT YOU ON LINES YOUR PARA FOUR PAREN ABLE PAREN
DECEMBER SEVEN PD LAST SENTENCE YOUR DECEMBER NINE IS UNDER URGENT
CONSIDERATION HIGHEST LEVEL PD I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT EVERYTHING IS BEING
DONE TO PERSUADE AUTHORITIES TO PROVIDE FOR MINIMUM NEEDS OF ISLAND IN SPITE
OF DEFAULT IN AMASSING. PD IN MEANTIME AMASSING MUST REPEAT MUST PROCEED
AT INCREASED TEMPO AND FORCE MUST BE USED IF NECESSARY

Coping to: Good S/Cmn.

CHIEF OF STAFF.

243

M

S.

Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

XXXXXXXXXX

1165

ALCOM SICILIA REGION

8004

10 DEC 44

Confidential
11 DEC 44

PRIORITY

SECRET PD

PARA ONE PD BEAUSSEJOUR GRAIN SHIP NOW DISCHARGING CROTONS ORDERED TO PALERMO TO ARRIVE NOT LATER THAN TWELVE DECEMBER PD

PARZEN TO ALCOM SICILIA REGION FOR CARR FROM HQ ALCOM FROM ANTONINI SIGNED STONE PAREN

PARA TWO PD BARLEY SHIP NOW DISCHARGING CASTELLAMARE ORDERED TO CATANIA PD

PARA THREE PD SUGGEST RETURNING TRANSPORT BACK LOADS BARLEY FOR PALERMO PD
PARA FOUR PD ~~BARLEY~~ GRAIN SHIP DUE PALERMO APPROXIMATELY TWO ZERO DECEMBER

COPY TO: CHIEF OF STAFF
ECONOMIC SECTION

FOOD SUB COMMISSION

489081 Extn. 206

N.W. DRAGNETT
MAJOR, AGE 31 6 3 1/2

4206

88A

P/A
11/12
P/R

8004

10 DEC 44

PRIORITY

Confidential

7781331
11 DEC 1944

SECRET PD

PARA ONE PD BRAUSEJOUR CHAIN SHIP NOW DISCHARGING CROTONE ORDERED TO
PALERMO TO ARRIVE NOT LATER THAN TWELVE DECEMBER PD

PAREN TO ALCOM SICILIA REGION FOR CARR FROM HQ ALCOM FROM ANTOLINI SIGNED

STONE PAREN

PARA TWO PD BARLEY SHIP NOW DISCHARGING CASTELLAMARE ORDERED TO

CATANIA PD

PARA THREE PD SUGGEST RETURNING TRANS PORT BACK LOADS BARLEY FOR PALERMO PD

PARA FOUR PD ~~MESSAGE~~ CHAIN SHIP DUE PALERMO APPROXIMATELY TWO ZERO DECEMBER

COPI TO: CHIEF OF STAFF
ECONOMIC SECTION

FOOD SUB COMMISSION

489081 Extn. 206

N.W. DRAGNER
MAJOR, AGE 41
ADJUTANT

785017

4206

(88B)

JCK

10: AFHQ CITE PHONG PHGDM RPT TO ALCOM SOUTHERN REGION RPT
TO ALCOM SICILY REGION

7994

10 DECEMBER 4

Confidential

10 DEC 1944

SECRET PD

PARA ONE PD REFERENCE BRIGADIER LUSH CONVERSATION OF NINE DEC PD
PARRE TO AFHQ CITE PHONG PHGDM RPT TO ALCOM SOUTHERN REGION RPT
TO ALCOM SICILIA REGION FROM ALCOM HQ FROM TAYLOR PAREN

PARA TWO PD SICILY REQUIREMENTS CAN BE MET UNTIL ARRIVAL OF
SHIP IN UNCLE GEORGE SUGAR SIX TWO BY DIVERSION OF FORT BRASSOUR
FROM CROTONE TO PALERMO ON ONE TWO AT LATEST CMA BY WHICH TIME
IT IS ESTIMATED THERE WILL REMAIN THREE FIVE ZERO ZERO BAGGED
WHEAT ON BOARD PD

PARA THREE PD ALSO IMMEDIATE DIVERSION OF IONION WITH BAGGED
BARLEY TO CATANIA PD

PARA FOUR PD FREE AGREED FOOD PD

DISTRIBUTION:

c.o. C.O.S. Food Sub-Commission.
Economic Section.

Transportation Sub-Comm
478704

NICHOLAS PIOMBINO?
CWO., USA.,
Assistant Adjutant

1163

785017

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

ALLIED COMMISSION
SICILIA REGION HEADQUARTERS
APO 394

Rec'd 11/28/44
12 Dec 1944

87

FILE:RC/201

9 Dec 1944

My dear Lord,

Further to my D/O letter RC/201 of 7 DEC there are one or two more points I wish to add.

Organisation of soup kitchens, communal restaurants, etc., to assist in feeding whole cities takes time and money.

The existing bread ration situation is very critical especially as the grain ship arriving shortly is, you say, carrying only 7000 tons and not 9000 tons as had been stated verbally previously. Those concerned here must plan in the light of the existing situation and for the future. In my view an immediate reduction should be made in the ration scale here. It is doubtful whether any official here will have the courage to do this.

I cannot stress too strongly therefore the need for the very early issue of instructions by the Italian Government including directions regarding any reduction in the bread ration. I consider the High Commissioner for SICILY should return to the Island at once.

Special consideration will have to be given to the feeding of the Islands of PANTELLERIA (5000) LAMPEDUSA (4300) and LINOSA (700) - approximate populations in brackets - which are under Allied Military Government. Under the proposed policy it will be impossible for this Island to feed them and it seems highly doubtful whether they should continue to be fed through the medium of SICILY.

As you will be aware there is a very large export programme in hand of lemons etc. to the U.K. There is also the export of sulphur and other items. These may be seriously affected.

I am not thinking only in terms of SICILY and I try to avoid painting too dark a picture. I am aware that the Allies and the Italian Government have most pressing problems on the Mainland but I feel it my duty to draw your attention to all aspects of our problem here.

The more I think of this matter the more difficult I find it to understand how support can be found for a policy which must eventually leave the unemployed and those who work for a living in the cities of this Island without any bread.

See 88

whatever while at the same time the full existing war ration is continued in the rest of Liberated Italy. The fact that this part of ITALY is separated from the Mainland by the Straits of MESSINA does not seem to me to affect the situation since in any case it is not proposed to move grain from the Mainland. It seems to me that the least that should be done would be to reduce the ration on the Mainland in order to provide a bread ration of some kind for the workers here at least during the winter months.

Yours sincerely
M Carr

M. CARR
Brigadier
Regional Commissioner

Brigadier M.S. Lush C.B. M.C.
Chief of Staff
Allied Commission Headquarters
ROME

ALLIED COMMISSION
SICILIA REGION HEADQUARTERS
APO 394

7 Dec 1944

Recd. 12 Dec.

2. I feel I should draw your attention again to the situation here which I have already set out many times either verbally or in official correspondence.

a. To feed the population here on the existing ration scale for 12 months at the present rate of consumption of 290,000 quintals per month and with the present number of ration card holders consumes:-

3,480,000	quintals
-----------	----------

3,480,000 quintals

10. Taking the harvest at the accepted maximum of 7,000,000 quintals a completely successful amassing of 43% would have produced leaving a deficiency of

	quintals or approx
5,010,000	quintals
470,000	2 months supply

c. It is agreed, I believe, that completely successful amassing was never contemplated under existing war conditions and taking the estimated figure of your Headquarters of leaves a deficiency of

2,000,000	quintals	or approx
1,480,000	quintals	supply
-	5 months	

As you well know your Headquarters estimate has not been reached. If one takes the consumption figure at say 280,000 quintals per month deficiencies decrease accordingly. If above is eliminated the gravity of the situation is clear. I assume that SACMD Committee are fully aware of the above facts and that they are no longer under the delusion that large reserves of grain are known to be available. I note that they envisage starvation as a possibility.

3. I presume that some other parts of liberated Italy are in a similar situation i.e. they have not had a complete massing or have not attained the massing to reduce successfully massing and/or have failed to reduce headquarters and/or minimum. I gather

verbally or in official correspondence.

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3. I presume that some other parts of liberated Italy are in a similar situation i.e. they have not had a completely successful amassing or have not attained the amassing figure set by your Headquarters and/or have failed to reduce the number of ration card holders to the minimum. I gather that in the case of such territories requisitions to cover them are being accepted but that an example is to be made of SICILY. I hold no brief for this nation as a whole nor for the local administration or population but in my opinion the policy which is being adopted towards SICILY is quite illogical and quite incomprehensible. I consider in all equity that SICILY should be treated on a parallel basis with others in a similar position. Further SICILY has, I understand, never amassed its grain as it should.

I see from para 3 of your Headquarters Weekly Bulletin No.35 of 5 DEC just received that the 300 gram ration has been accepted as the basis of all further subsistence planning for

84
 Liberated Italy and that the mechanics are being worked out with AFHQ Caserta. SICILY is therefore apparently to be excluded from this scheme, treated as a "separate" territory and to have a much lower ration scale or none at all.

4. The fact that I may not be able to understand the policy adopted by higher authority does not mean that I and my staff will not do our utmost to further that policy. We shall. The information you give me is for my own "personal indigestion". It will be difficult enough to get anything done in any case to meet the crisis but still less can be done without coming into the open. I will do what I can by pressure and advice to get soup kitchens, communal feeding etc., initiated without disclosing your information. But time is short and the following steps should be taken by me immediately:-

a. Advise and bring pressure to bear on the High Commissioner immediately to reduce the existing bread ration scale to be low minimum say from 240 grams to 100 grams of flour all told or to cancel it altogether. It appears to me to be unthinkable that SICILY should squander its one and only grain ship in an endeavour to maintain the existing ration up till 15 JAN which is the policy to be inferred from your letter.

b. Summon a meeting of representatives of the Naval Bases and warn them that from the civil point of view their employees must be without bread for say five months. This situation might be met in one of two ways:-

- (1) Either the installations concerned must obtain flour from military sources
- or (2) The 7000 tons of grain which is being imported in the one and only ship must be arranged with your Headquarters be reserved only for service employees.

In either case the Allied authorities would have to make arrangements to bake the bread for their own employees as it would be impossible for employees living in scattered districts of towns to obtain bread from any local sources. I cannot see that one can make any special provision for other workers drawing Scale A rations such as Sulphur etc., Miners and Railway workers.

I should like to know at a very early date whether I have the authority of your Headquarters to act on the above lines. As the grain ship is due in 12 days a very early reply is essential.

5. I consider that the visit of a representative of the Economics Section to advise on the crisis as outlined above and to discuss alternatives is absolutely essential. I can of course come to your Headquarters at any time to discuss matters if any good purpose can be served but the facts are plain and perhaps my presence here may be more useful. ⁵³ ~~the~~
 Messing is at a standstill for all practical purposes and

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and to discuss alternatives is absolutely essential. I can of
course come to your Headquarters at any time to discuss matters
if any good purpose can be served but the facts are plain and
perhaps my presence here may be more useful.
Amassing is at a standstill for all practical purposes and
due to the dwindling grain resources and to the lavish promises
which have been given publicity in the Press and elsewhere I
can see no prospect of the Italian Administration reviving it.
As you have written to me D/O on the subject, I have replied
through the same channel but once the policy is notified of-
ficially I will set out my views officially or can do so now if
desired.

6. Time does not permit of any delay in regard to a defin-
ite and final open statement of policy. Also I should like an
answer to 4(a) and (b) above at a very early date.

I hope that SACMED's Political Meeting appreciate to
the full what will be the consequences of the policy outlined

in your letter. Among masses who have received frequent public assurances that they will be given their daily bread those consequences will be serious and in my humble opinion for this and other reasons the line being adopted will, if taken, prove to be untenable.

I would ask you to show this letter to the Chief Commissioner and to any other high authority you may think appropriate. I am enclosing one spare copy. I feel that all high service authorities having installations here should be informed of the situation. If the High Commissioner for SICILY is still in ROME I presume he will be informed of the latest developments.

Yours sincerely
M Carr

M. CARR
Brigadier
Regional Commissioner

If the High Commissioner for SICILY is still in ROME I presume he will be informed of the latest developments.

Yours sincerely
Mc Carr

M. CARR
Brigadier
Regional Commissioner

1158

Brigadier M.S. Lush C.B. M.C.
Chief of Staff
Allied Commission Headquarters
R O M E

Transl on

83

Ministry of the Interior

Rome, December 9th

n. 16135

Admiral Ellery Stone
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission,
R o m e

The High Commissariat of Sicily wired on the 9th of this month, that the situation of the provinces of Palermo Catania and Messina was very serious because of the lack of wheat.

The High Commissionariat begs me to intervene by this Commission, so that it should order to send flour or wheat without delay, at least a hundred thousand quintals from the depots in North Africa. It is the only way to avoid consequences which it is impossible to foresee.

Kindly examine this possibility, and also that of a possible loan on the Allied stores in Sicily.

I remain,

PRESIDENT OF COUNCIL MINISTER
OF INTERIOR
BONOMI

see letter 92-93

trans. E.C.

Lo K Ce.

1157

*1 copy sent up to EC Sec 1630 today
for comment.*

El 9/12

*Ec. Sec are holding up answer
till return of Brig Lash.*

785017

Mod. 842

Ministero dell'Interno

GABINETTO

UFFICIO DEL TELEGAFO E DELLA CIFRA

Telegramma A.

DEC 9 1944

(in busta)

Roma, 9 dicembre 1944

No 16135
Ammiraglio HELLERY STONE

Commissario Capo Commissione Alleata

R O M A

Alto Commissariato Sicilia telegrafo in data otto corrente che situazione provincia Palermo Catania Messina a cagione deficienza grano est delicatissima stop

Alto Commissariato prega vivamente intervenire presso codesta Commissione perchè disponga urgentissimo invio farina aut grano almeno quintali centomila da depositi Africa Setentrionale solo mezzo per evitare incentivo per imprevibili conseguenze stop

Prego esaminare tale possibilità come pure quella per possibile prestito su depositi alleati Sicilia stop

Ringrazio

PRESIDENTE CONSIGLIO MINISTRO INTERNO

BONOMI

1158

785017

(in busta)

Roma, 9 dicembre 1944

Ammiraglio HELLERY STONE

Commissario Capo Commissione Alleata

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Prego esaminare tale possibilità come pure quella per possibile prestito su depositi alleati Sicilia stop

Ringrazio

PRESIDENTE CONSIGLIO MINISTRO INTERNO

BONCOMI

1158

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR SICILY.

Palermo, 8 December 1944

To : Mr ANTOLINI
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
ECONOMIC SECTION

This follows the conversation I was honored to have with you yesterday afternoon, about the general economic conditions of the Island.

With regard to the wheat situation I wish to repeat to you what I already wrote several times to President Bonomi, to the Minister of Agriculture and to Commodore Stone.

On the 15th of December Sicily will be without wheat. The ration-holders, -they are 3,000,000.- will find themselves without bread and without pasta.

The wheat stocked in the provinces of Piana, Agrigento, Caltanissetta has been distributed, to the last quintal, to the provinces of Messina, Trapani, Palermo, Siracusa, and lately, also to the Catania province.

I have been assured that on the 20th of December a schooner with 9,000 Tons of wheat (representing a ten-days supply for the whole Island) was due. I hurried to require a consignment of 25 kgs per person from each producer entitled to keep wheat. (my order of 25th November.)

With such a quantity, -if duly consigned- I will be able to supply bread to the Sicilian population until January 1st. With the announced 90,000 quintals of wheat, I will be able to go on until January 10th, 1945. And then ?

The situation is both alarming and unbearable.

I have made all this known long ago, I repeat it. I have declared, definitely, that if I don't get definite assurance with regard to the wheat situation, I will resign from the position of High Commissioner for Sicily.

After all you told me yesterday, giving me to understand that the wheat problem for Sicily has not yet been solved, I can only confirm my great concern and follow my intention to place my resignation in the right hands.

I am aware of, and I greatly appreciate the work that members of A.C. have done and are doing to help Sicily, but you will understand that if, to the thousands of worries implied in the Direction of the complex and difficult problems of Sicily, I have to add the anxiety to see, very shortly, the Sicilian population without a minimum food supply, human forces are not sufficient and I hope you will not be surprised if I wish to clear my situation and follow my way.

I beg you to understand me, and with most cordial salutations,

S. Aldisio.

TOP SECRET.

Chief Commissioner.

Attached is submitted for your information/~~signature~~/approval.

I added a little to ~~form~~ final para &
have telephoned amendments to G.S. who will
probably hold until result of your meeting is known
tomorrow.

MS/10/11

See by G.S.

DRAFT

FROM : SACRED

TO : CCS

Food situation in SICILY is subject.

Since last harvest (July) no imports of wheat have been made into the island. The monthly consumption for 3 1/2 million ration card holders on 300 grams basis is 29,000 tons. The excess target is 200,000 tons. The Italian administration has collected only 130,000 tons and even with use of further force which must now be employed will probably fall far short of target.

Situation at present is that wheat stocks in hands of administration will be exhausted by December 15th. In order to avoid serious disorder which must arise from this emergency I have arranged for despatch to island of 14,000 tons with instructions that ration shall be immediately reduced to 200 grams. This relief should provide food on 200 grams basis until January 10th, although the repercussions of decreasing of ration will probably be violent and we must expect disorder.

Decision on Policy is needed after January 10th. I would point out that even if Italian administration had amassed total of 200,000 tons that this would have met the demand at 300 grams ration until March only, and that although Italian Government are in default by 70,000 tons, even if full excess had been effected, the Allied Governments would have had the obligation to import wheat to total of 121,000 through February to June if 300 grams ration was to be maintained.

1153

If I maintain policy defined in my *Memorandum* of September 26th not to import further supplies into SICILY then we must face situation that on January 10th there will be little or no food to feed 3 1/2 million people. Disease.

the island. The monthly consumption for 34 million ration card holders on 300 grams basis is 26,000 tons. The assessed target is 200,000 tons. The Italian Administration has collected only 130,000 tons and even with use of further force which must now be employed will probably fall far short of target.

Situation at present is that wheat stocks in hands of administration will be exhausted by December 15th. In order to avoid serious disorder which must arise from this emergency I have arranged for despatch to island of 14,000 tons with instructions that ration shall be immediately reduced to 200 grammes. This relief should provide food on 200 grams basis until January 10th, although the repercussions of decreasing of ration will probably be violent and we must expect disorder.

Decision on Policy is needed after January 10th. I would point out that even if Italian Administration had assessed total of 200,000 tons that this would have met the demand at 300 grams ration until March only, and that although Italian Government are in default by 70,000 tons, even if full assessed had been effected, the Allied Governments would have had the obligation to import ¹¹⁵³ must to total of 121,000 through February to June if 300 grams ration was to be maintained.

If I maintain policy defined in my *Memorandum* of September 16th not to import further supplies into SICILY then we must face situation that on January 10th there will be little or no food to feed 34 million people. Disease, starvation and unrest must follow if no further imports are allowed. I have no intention of seeking approval to imports more than will maintain the people on a 200 grams ration. At the same time we must accept the fact that the Italian Government to whom we have handed over responsibility have demonstrated their inability to exercise their authority in order to compel the producers to surrender food to the non-producers. We are, however, committed to the policy of preventing disease and unrest.

-2-

I therefore recommend (a) that the Italian Government be told that owing to their inability to exercise government the ration must be cut to 200 grams and that every means at their disposal must be used to produce the 70,000 tons deficit. (b) That in anticipation of shortage we should plan to ship to Sicily 10,000 tons of wheat from January 15th onwards but that this information should, in order that they should not relax their efforts to amass, be withheld from the Italian Government. (c) That if Italian Government succeeds in amassing further supplies these monthly imports should be reduced.

[* The lowering of the ration is a departure from the President's expressed wish to maintain the ration at 300 grams.] ~~The importance of the situation~~
This ~~is~~ is a reversal of policy. Both are due to the administrative weakness of the Italian Government. This weakness is largely due to ~~the~~ political and economic conditions arising out of the war for which the Italian Government cannot be held fully responsible. At the same time I consider it essential that disease and unrest should be reduced to a minimum and that disorders if they must arise not be directed against Allies thereby involving use of Allied Forces to put them down. This would undoubtedly occur if the decision to import no further wheat became known.

I seek urgent instructions.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Ref: 4206/78/COS

Tel: 451

8 December 1944

SUBJECT: Attached Message. To Bonomi

TO : DCOE Economic Section.

1. Reference is made to attached message.
2. The Chief Commissioner directs that you draft reply today for his signature to the above.
3. Please submit in the usual way through the COS.

enf
Chief Staff *1131*

To the Chief of Staff.

cont to go to Chief Commissioner.

Trans: Ion

Ministry of the Interior

Urgent

Admiral Ellery Stone
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission

8 December 1941

R o m e

n. 160529 ab.

We have been informed that there is a very serious shortage of wheat in Sicily; it is to be feared that the town of Palermo will be left without any supplies. This situation would prevent the regular distribution of bread to the town of Palermo. On the other hand the first allied steamer for wheat transport to Sicily is due on the twentieth. Strict instructions have been given to all the prefects of Sicily to collaborate by every means to supply Palermo with flour. However, the necessity to obtain an advance on the Allied supplies is obvious. Will you kindly examine this matter without delay and take such steps as the situation requires. Thanking you, I remain,

PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL
MINISTER OF INTERIOR
BONOMI

Trans. S.O.

SECRET

CITE: REG 354

DEC 080900

0/2236
DEC 081630
PRIORITY

FROM: AICOM SICILY REGION (CAHR)

58 DEC 1944

TO: HQ AICOM FOR INFO RPT FOR INFO TO ECONOMIC SECTION, FOOD FOR LEGG

Confidential FOR INFORMATION ONLY

SECRET.

conf 8/12



Para 1. Subject is food.

Para 2. Having been constantly assured by local authorities and by statistics that grain reserves were sufficient to feed population till end of year these authorities now state grain will last only to 25 December.

Para 3. Owing to difficulties in and resistance to movement of grain from districts in possession to big towns authorities report that dated many cities will be without bread approximately 15 December and that trouble is feared.

Para 4. Have informed authorities that no immediate AGO is available.

Para 5. Situation critical PA; ERMO CATANIA MESSINA.

DIET

ACTION FOOD SC (2)
INFO CHIEF COMMISSIONER
CoS —
ECON SEC
C & SEC
TN SC
FILE

SECRET

1143

TO: Sicilian Region.

Ref. No. 704.

7 Dec. Confidential

URGENT PD

220 303

RECEIVED YOUR TWO THREE FIVE THREE OF NEWY DORSEY PD

PAPER TO ALVIN SIMOLA INQUIRY FOR CASE FROM IN ALON FROM LASH PAPER

MAKER NEW UNDER DISCUSSION THIS WITH ALONSO PD

YOU WILL BE INFORMED EARLY

Chief of Staff.

300.

NICHOLAS W. DRAGETT,
MAJOR, AGO,
ADJUTANT.

Ref. No. 702.

7 Dec.

Confidential

INQUIRY PD

260 303

REMARKS FOR INFO THREE FIVE THREE OF SEVEN DECEMBER PD

PAPER TO NORTH SOUTHERN JOURNAL FOR OVER FOUR H ALON FIVE JUNE PAPER

MATTER NEW UNDER DISCUSSION HERE WITH ADDRESS PD

YOU WILL BE INFORMED EARLY

Chief of Staff.

30.

THOMAS W. DEANER,
MAJOR, AGED,
ADJUTANT.

1149

1150

75
7 December 1944.

AIDE MEMOIRS FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER.

1. Deputy SACMED has directed that General Wilson's policy not to import further wheat supplies into SICILY shall not be modified.
2. The result of this will be that as from January 15th the Sicilian administration will have no stocks with which to meet the demand for flour which, on the existing 300 grams ration, amounts to 28,000 tons a month.
3. The amassing of wheat in SICILY has failed. Out of a target figure of 200,000 tons only 130,000 tons have been collected. The resistance of farmers, inefficiency of the Italian administration, political intrigue coupled with separatism, are all responsible.
4. But even had the amassed target of 200,000 tons been reached the Island could not have supported the ration population (3½ million) on a ration of 300 grams for more than 3 months. The cupboard would have been bare by March and imports at the rate of 28,000 tons a month would have been necessary. The Italian administration is in default to the amount of 70,000 tons and not the full 121,000 tons required to feed the Island until the next harvest.
5. If, therefore, we refuse further imports to SICILY, we are in fact telling the Italian Government that we intend to penalise the ration population of SICILY for the Government's failure to amass, not only for 2½ months, but for a further 4 months for which available resources simply do not exist.
6. We must avoid starvation, disease and unrest: we must minimise our shipping requirements: we must galvanise the Italian administration into facing up to responsibilities. The High Commissioner has in fact just issued an order

the result of this will be that as from January 15th the Sicilian

administration will have no stocks with which to meet the demand for flour which, on the existing 300 grams ration, amounts to 28,000 tons a month.

3. The amassing of wheat in SICILY has failed. Out of a target figure of 200,000 tons only 130,000 tons have been collected. The resistance of farmers, inefficiency of the Italian administration, political intrigue coupled with separatism, are all responsible.

4. But even had the amass target of 200,000 tons been reached the Island could not have supported the ration population ($3\frac{1}{2}$ million) on a ration of 300 grams for more than 8 months. The cupboard would have been bare by March and imports at the rate of 28,000 tons a month would have been necessary. The Italian administration is in default to the amount of 70,000 tons and not the full 121,000 tons required to feed the Island until the next harvest.

5. If, therefore, we refuse further imports to SICILY, we are in fact telling the Italian Government that we intend to penalise the ration population of SICILY for the Government's failure to amass, not only for $2\frac{1}{2}$ months, but for a further 4 months for which available resources simply do not exist.

6. We must avoid starvation, disease and unrest: we must minimise our shipping requirements: we must galvanise the Italian administration into facing up to responsibilities. The High Commissioner has in fact just issued an order that all producers shall bring in 25 kilos per head to meet this month's emergency.

7. But whatever may be the shortcomings and apathy of the local Administration in SICILY, the policy to be adopted would be regarded as inequitable. Moreover, disorders must follow as a result of the shortage or complete absence of food and will probably take an anti-Allied form as well as anti-Government and whereas disorder of any kind is to be avoided, anti-Allied demonstrations which might necessitate the use of Allied forces, must be avoided at all costs. It will be necessary, in the long run, to import wheat in whatever manner it is subsequently distributed.

-2-

8. The possibility of introducing a universal item of soup-kitchens in the towns is now being examined by the Allied Commission with the High Commissioner for SICILY now in ROME. The difficulties in achieving the necessary organization in a short time would probably be insuperable for the Italians themselves. On the other hand, introduction of Allied control at this stage, even in this small but most vital sphere, would, it is submitted, be impolitic and it is doubtful whether the suggestion is really practical.

9. Just as the Italian administration has an undoubted obligation to produce 70,000 tons (deficit from the amassi) so the Allies have a moral obligation to produce such wheat necessary to maintain the 500 gram ration (to which we are committed) - it is not available from local resources, i.e., the Italian Government has no legal right to extract it from the producers. An amount of 121,000 tons has already been included in our programme. It is suggested that the Italian Government be informed that the deficit between the amassi target and the achievement will not be met by imports but that the 121,000 tons will be met by imports based over 6 months instead of $4\frac{1}{2}$ months, i.e., wheat will be imported at the rate of 20,000 tons a month through January to June instead of 28,000 tons from mid-February to June. The discrepancy (8,000 tons) between demand and supply, must be met by the Italian Government either by extracting the grain from the Sicilian farmers, reducing the ration scale or reducing the number of ration card holders.

10. If this policy was approved and made public at the same time as it was communicated to the Italian Government, there could be no accusation of withdrawal from our commitments. It is probable that the Sicilians would accept the situation and might even produce some of the deficit in the amassi.

11. It is submitted that such a course is not a surrender to the inefficiency of the Italian administration nor the resistance of the Sicilian farmers. It is a logical course dictated by supply and demand, is politically

produce 70,000 tons (deficit from the amassi) so the Allies have a moral obligation to produce such wheat necessary to maintain the 300 gram ration (to which we are committed) - it is not available from local resources, i.e., the Italian Government has no legal right to extract it from the producers. An amount of 121,000 tons has already been included in our programme. It is suggested that the Italian Government be informed that the deficit between the amassi target and the achievement will not be met by imports but that the 121,000 tons will be met by imports based over 6 months instead of 4½ months, i.e., wheat will be imported at the rate of 20,000 tons a month through January to June instead of 28,000 tons from mid-February to June. The discrepancy (8,000 tons) between demand and supply, must be met by the Italian Government either by extracting the grain from the Sicilian farmers, reducing the ration scale or reducing the number of ration card holders.

10. If this policy was approved and made public at the same time as it was communicated to the Italian Government, there could be no accusation of withdrawal from our commitments. It is probable that the Sicilians would accept the situation and might even produce some of the deficit in the amassi.

11. It is submitted that such a course is not a surrender to the inefficiency of the Italian administration nor the resistance of the Sicilian farmers. It is a logical course dictated by supply and demand, is politically and administratively sound, and if explained fully will be accepted by the Allied Nations as the proper course to follow.

73
7 December 1944.

MEMORANDUM:

WHEAT IN SICILY.

Deputy Supreme Allied Commander has directed that:

- (1) Policy to withhold imports of grain from SICILY and to leave to the local administration the problem of forcing an equitable distribution of the resources which were known to be available, should be maintained without modification.
- (2) The Allied Commission inform the Italian Government that no imports of wheat to SICILY could be expected by them after December shipments already promised.
- (3) The study (by G-5) of the feasibility of organizing emergency distribution of food in SICILY under Allied control.
- (4) The study (by GAO, AFHQ) of the repercussion on operational shipping commitments if the imports required to maintain the bread ration in SICILY at 300 grams were sanctioned.

1. The setting up of soup-kitchens for 5 million people in the bigger towns would not seem entirely practical. It would interfere with the work of public utilities, railways, etc: it would be impossible for Italians to organize: it would require considerable numbers of Allied officers and necessitate the reimposition of a degree of Allied control which seems inconsistent with policy.

2. It will be necessary to import a modicum of food to avoid starvation: there appear to be the following courses:

- (a) To inform the Italian Government that the 300 gram ration is to be maintained; that imports to cover the difference between the massai target (200,000 tons, which would have covered a 200 gram ration) and the amount necessary to cover 300 grams, will be made.
- (b) To advise the Italian Government to reduce the ration at once to 200 grams in SICILY and to provide the difference between the massai achievement and the massai target.
- (c) To advise the Italian Government to reduce the ration at once to 200 grams and to provide the food from local resources.

-2-

3. In any case the Italian Government must be told of SACRED's decision and advised that the number of ration card holders must be reduced from 78% to 70% and that food imports will be based on that figure.

MSL/30.

MSL
Brigadier,
Chief of staff.

1144

1144

4206 ~ 171
INCOMING MESSAGE
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Originator's Reference: CITE REC 253
Date/Time of Origin: DEC 07NFT

Message Centre No: 9/3114
Date Time Rec'd: DEC 071400A
Precedence: PRIORITY

FROM: ALCOM SICILY REGION (CARR)
TO: HQ ALCOM PERSONAL FOR LUSH

Confidential

ACTION

SECRET.

1. Your 171/4/COS of 2 December.
2. Drastic cut should be made immediately in ration scale.
3. Scale A workers affected.
4. Request policy your Headquarters urgent.



see 76
DIST

ACTION: C.O.S. 4
INFO: Chief Commissioner
File

Note: Info copy filed 171/COS.

Scan By COS

SECRET

1142

(2 copies held)

4206 U

70

INTER OFFICE MEMO

WJL/ml

Tel: 584

6 December 1944

Ref: 21-2/43/FOOD

59
6 DEC 1944

SUBJECT: Letter from Regional Commissioner, Sicily
On Grain Position Ref. RC/433 of 13 Nov.

TO : Chief of Staff, HQ AC

63

Reference your 1206/63/COS of 29 November 1944.

1. The present situation with regard to grain imports into Sicily is defined in 171/4/COS dated 2 December 1944.
2. A Meeting with the High Commissioner for Sicily and the Economic Section is planned for 6 December when all aspects of the situation will be discussed. The Regional Commissioner will be kept fully informed on all matters of policy and planning.

For the Chief Commissioner:

64

W. J. Legg

W. J. LEGG
Colonel

Director, Food Sub-Commission

1142

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISS ON

APO 394

Office of the Chief of Staff

(68)

29 November 1944.

MEMORANDUM:

1. Target figure - amassing..... 200,000 tons
 Amassing up to 15.Nov.44..... 126,000 "
 Stocks as of 15.Nov.44..... 32,000 "
 Consumption per month..... 28,000 "
 One ship planned to arrive about 7,000 "
 20.Dec.44.....

Situation considered safe up to 15.Jan.45 but if not another ship can be diverted. From 15.Jan.45 onwards 28,000 tons per month required. This included in total demands - 165,000 tons.

2. Commission was aware that SACMED had stated in telegram to CCS that no food would be imported into SICILY but included in their 1945 programme (7.Aug.44) an **ensurance** against possible failure to amass.

Sicily is not an economic entity & amassing is not sufficient: cf. past year 8-6-24.

I think we have to bring in the food but on day to day basis.

Orbda 11. But other reply. No control. This does not mean bringing more ships than have been sanctioned.

Do not tell P.C. that 28,000 tons f.m. will come but with a day to day basis

78%.

1141

TO: COS

(67)

1. Analyzing the present stock and consumption position in SICILY the consumption figure is estimated at 25,000 Tons per month.

Stocks on hand of Nov 15 were 31,830 tons

~~Stocks on hand of Nov 15 were 31,830 tons~~ Stocks will be exhausted by 20 Dec.

There are two favorable modifying factors in addition to the scheduled arrival of a 7000 ton plus wheat ship on or about 20 Dec.

1) There is still a trickle of grain being amassed. Week ending 22 Nov grain and barley amassed previous 7 days 1333 quintals. Week ending 28 Nov grain and barley amassed 2667 quintals.

2) There is a considerable amount of barley amassed, the exact figure not known. Instructions have been given that 20% barley is to be included in the flour mix which would have the effect of increasing the flour issue or the bread produced by the same percentage.

end

1143

29/11

785017

Sicily

1 Present Amassing - 125,670 tons

Reduced
Target200,000
tons

(66)

2 Present Stocks - 31,830 tons - as of 15 Nov.

Consumption 28,000 tons.

3 Ship planned to arrive with 7000 tons
wheat about Dec. 20

1 ship 9000 tons July.

Shuman
MayDid not have full rate stock until
mid AugustRevised

Note: Slightly earlier
ships than 20 Dec possible.
Depends on whether cargo
bagged & thus possible to
unload in Sicily.

We can get another ship in January

1133

HQ. A. C. C.

Date

FOOD SUB COMMISSION

FROM

TO

	COL W. J. LEGG	
	LT. COL W. N. STEWART	
	MAJOR J. IMRIE	
	MAJOR A. W. TOLMAN JR	
	MAJOR H. F. H. MYATT	
	MAJOR J. M. RORIMER	
	MAJOR V. R. A. COWPER	
	MAJOR A. J. PARKER	
	MAJOR L. H. KAUFFMAN	
	MAJOR H. EBSWORTH	
	CAPT E. G. LUSH	
	CAPT R. J. CURRAN	
	CAPT E. L. DION	
	CAPT R. H. KLEIN	
	CAPT G. E. LUKAS	
	CHIEF CLERK	

FOR:

Necessary action Recommendations and remarks
 Information retention Perusal and return
 Approved or Disposal Filing
 Investigation and report Dispatch

REMARKS:

HQ ALCOM SICILIA REGION

7236

28/NOV/44. 1700

PRIORITY

65
Confidential

SECRET PD

PARA ONE PD REFERENCE IS ALE FOX HOW QUEEN CABLE FOX XRAY FIVE EIGHT FOUR
ZERO NINE DATED TWO SIX NOVEMBER PD STRESS THAT WHEAT ON FORT BEAUSEJOUR
NOT REPEAT NOT FOR SICILY BUT LIGHTENING AT CATANIA TO TWO FIVE FEET AND
THEN TO CROTONE FOR TOTAL DISCHARGE PD WHEAT TAKEN OFF AT CATANIA FOR REGGIO
PD ARRANGEMENTS RAIL WHEAT UNLOADED CATANIA TO REGGIO WILL BE MADE BY MOV
AND TRANSPORTATION PD AGREED TRANSPORTATION SUB COMMISSION PD

PAREN TO HQ ALCOM SICILIA REGION FROM HQ ALCOM FROM LEGG SIGNED STONE PAREN

PARA TWO PD REFERENCE IS YOUR ROGER CHARLIE SLANT FOUR THREE THREE DATED
TWO FOUR NOVEMBER PD ONE BAGGED WHEAT SHIP SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE SICILY TWO
ZERO DECEMBER APPROX PD TO FACILITATE MOVEMENT WILL ENDEAVOUR TO ARRANGE
TWO PORT DISCHARGE PALERMO SLANT CATANIA PD PLEASE INDICATE PROPORTION
OF CARGO REQUIRED AT EACH PORT

*encl
4/12*

N. W. DRAGNETT
MAJOR, AGD
ADJUTANT

FOOD SUB-COMMISSION

489081 EXT 206

Not

1138

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

Ref: 171/4/008.2 December 1944.

Thank you for your letter BG/204 of 27 November.

The present situation with regard to imports of food into Sicily is as follows. One food ship of 7000 tons is now being routed for Sicily. This, we understand, should get you through up to 15 January. A very strong case was made at SACMED's Political Meeting on 30 November for further imports as included in our total requisition for Italy amounting to 28,000 tons per month. The matter was fully discussed and I regret to say that the Deputy SACMED ruled that no further food should be imported into the Island and that the Italian Government should be informed of this.

The Chief Commissioner is awaiting receipt of the minutes and instructions before taking action with the Italian Government.

The Deputy SACMED did leave a loophole. He directed that in order to avoid starvation in the cities and towns the Italian authorities should set up soup-kitchens throughout the Island and that application for food to supply these soup-kitchens could be considered. This subject is now being examined by the Economic Section who, I understand, will probably send a representative to Sicily to discuss this matter ad hoc with you.

The Chief Commissioner and all of us realize the gravity of the situation and you may be quite certain that we shall do our utmost to help you and to seek some alternative to the very flat directions which we have at the moment. I do want you, however, to turn your mind at once to the organisation of the soup-kitchens, communal restaurants, and the like, in order that a proper alternative may be examined in order to meet the directions. I know at the same time you will impress on the High Commissioner or his representative the absolute necessity of taking in every single grain of maize possible.

M. S. DASH

Brigadier M. Carr, CBE, MC,
Regional Commissioner,
Allied Commission,
SICILY REGION.

1137

Copy to: File 4206/COS.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Chief of Staff

Tel. 151

Ref. 4206/63/COS

29 November 1944

SUBJECT: Letter from Regional Commissioner, Sicily
on Grain Position Ref. RC/433 of 13 Nov.

TO : Economic Section for Food S/C.

59

1. Reference above letter copy of which was forwarded directly to you: will you please prepare a reply earliest for the signature of the Chief of Staff.

2. The Regional Commissioner had not received information at the time he wrote that grain was to be imported into Sicily. This information has now been passed to him and it is most important that Food S/C keep the Region fully informed of policy changes, future planning etc.

Capt. C. R. ODEN

Chief Staff Officer,
To the Chief of Staff.

64
gives full info to R.C.
and
4/12

1138
12

1206/62/COS.

27 November 1944.

Dear General:

Thank you for your letter of 20 November in which you referred to the talk you had with Colonel Goodwin on the food situation in Sicily.

I share his concern about this question and you will remember that representations have been made by this Commission to SACMED and by the latter to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Very truly yours,

ELLEN W. STONE
Commodore, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Lieut. General J.W.G. Clark, CB, MC,
Chief Administrative Officer,
ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS.

1135

1135

→ 6053
Place me 3- 61

CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER
ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
C.M.F.

10 November 1944.

My Dear Stone

I have just come back from Sicily where I had a talk to Colonel Goodwin who is our Area Commandant on the island.

Goodwin is not an alarmist but I think he genuinely felt there was a cause for concern about the food situation in Sicily. It appears that the island is not receiving any consignments of either grain or flour but is expected to produce enough for its own support.

Goodwin tells me (I do not know if he is correct or not) that there is not any stock in the island beyond next January and that the so-called stocks in the centre of the island do not in fact exist.

I thought you should know this for your own information.

Yours
W. E. Clark.

Commodore Ellery W. Stone, U.S.N.R.,
Office of the Chief Commissioner,
HQ Allied Commission,
A.P.O. 394,
U.S. Army.

Letter

1132

4206 2
 UNITED COMMISSION
 STOKER REGION HEADQUARTERS
 APC 394

11/18/58

11/18/58

18 NOV Recd

SUBJECT: Main situation in SOUTHERN

TO : Headquarters Allied Commission
 RHC

2. Main references to your 1005/11/58 of 18 OCT and
 my discussions with your representatives during that week ending
 1 NOV, the object of this letter is to put on record the
 results of these discussions and to suggest the present grain
 situation in SOUTHERN.

1. I repeat it has been agreed that even on a complete
 in successful marketing, that is 10% of an estimated harvest
 of 7 million bushels, SOUTHERN could not feed itself till the
 next harvest on the present ration of 200 grams per day
 the present number of ration card holders, which entails a
 monthly cost of expenditure of 200,000 pounds as agreed by
 your representatives.

It is admitted that the local administration has
 failed in its duty in that management has fallen in short of
 the target figure set by your representatives of 1 million bushels
 of, this means in this case a most critical situation as
 regards the feeding of the population.

As regards grain, it should have been possible
 to obtain a harvest of 10 million bushels out of the island
 and is therefore unobtainable. As far as the greater proportion
 has passed into the hands of speculators and recovery under
 normal conditions is, in general, impossible. The local ad-
 ministration is to be asked to make the greatest possible
 effort to continue management and to recover broken grain.

It is difficult to reconcile the self-evident fact
 that, if the existing ration scale is maintained, SOUTHERN
 could not feed itself until the next harvest under the best
 possible conditions, still less so on the target figure set
 by your representatives, with the official policy recently nomi-
 nated that no grain will, under any circumstances, be imported
 into SOUTHERN.

1133

11/18/58

1. With reference to your WFO/AL/273 of 19 OCT and discussions with your representatives during the week ending 1 NOV, the object of this letter is to put on record the minutes of these discussions and to reflect the present grain situation in SINGAPORE.

2. It appears to me from a report that you are in a complete state of confusion, that is 100% of an estimated harvest of 7 million bushels, SINGAPORE could not feed itself till the next harvest on the present ration of 300 bushels and with the present number of ration card holders, which entail a monthly rate of consumption of 350,000 bushels as worked by your headquarters.

It is indicated that the local administration has failed in its duty in that management has fallen far short of the target figure set by your headquarters of 2 million bushels, thus causing it to face a most critical situation as regards the feeding of the population.

As rice is a staple which should have been stored in SINGAPORE, it has been consumed by the population out of the island and is therefore unavailable. As far as the greater proportion has passed into the hands of speculators and recovery under normal conditions is, in general, impossible. The local administration is to be pressed to make the greatest possible effort to continue management and to recover hidden grain.

It is difficult to reconcile the self-evident fact that, if the existing supply scale is maintained, SINGAPORE could not feed itself until the next harvest under the best possible management, still less so on the target figure set by your headquarters, with the official policy recently notified that no grain will, under any circumstances, be imported into SINGAPORE.

Non-importation of grain, but only up to a point when the island could reasonably be expected to have fed itself which, based on a million bushel assessment, would be approximately the middle of March, might be a feasible policy if purely civilian interests only were concerned and if the political and public safety consequences would be disregarded.

In existing circumstances, however, as each policy must have very serious effect on the allied fortifications on the island, principally naval bases, and on industries working for the war effort such as the rubber mines, etc., and on the transportation services.

THE QUARTERS

18 NOV 1944

A

C

1133

It is understood that for political reasons grain collecting of course, even though available, are not to be sent to the island. This is most regrettable as it is felt that their activities might have assisted the war effort by diminishing the need for the use of allied shipping for importation of grain. The time for their useful employment is rapidly passing.

It is regretted also that it has not been found possible so far (attention was drawn to this matter in my NO/133 of 28 Sep) to send any forces to strengthen the police or grain collecting agencies and that a valuable six weeks has passed. The difficulties of this aspect are fully appreciated.

3. The present situation is as follows. The Island has approximately sufficient grain to feed itself until the end of December. As pointed out at your headquarters to make existing grain resources last until the end of February 1945 would entail the reduction of the existing ration of 500 grammes to 100 grammes with effect from 15 NOV 1944 and proportionately to cover any lesser or greater period.

The rate of grain consumption has increased slightly recently and for the 7 days ending 9 NOV amounted to 14,000 quintals or an average of 2,000 quintals per day. The present total consumption is 1,554,000 quintals and it will be appreciated that to reach the target of 3 million quintals grain consumption would be necessary at the rate of approximately 10,000 quintals per day for the next two months, a figure impossible of attainment in existing circumstances.

I saw the High Commissioner for S.C.M. on 11 NOV, the earliest possible day after my return from RCM, and discussed the whole matter with him. I informed him that the policy of no grain being imported into S.C.M. as recently notified still held good but that the whole question had been raised again with the Government Allied Commander. I pointed out that the situation was most critical especially as regards the winter months and that it was essential that maximum effort be continued to secure grain.

When the question of a local reduction in the standard bread ration was raised, I advised the High Commissioner, as agreed with your headquarters, that no reduction should be made at this stage. From this the High Commissioner must deduce that some modification of existing policy is required to the importation of grain is under consideration but beyond that I gave him no indication as to whether or when grain for import might be available.

It will be appreciated, therefore, that except for bringing pressure to bear on the local administration to increase and, if possible, to take other steps to increase the police, I have no other reference and to meet the critical bread situation facing the Island have been taken here.

I shall be glad to be kept informed as early as possible as and when any further developments in this matter take place. I shall continually be reminded that any grain available

1132

785017

approximately sufficient grain to feed itself until the end of December. I pointed out to your Headquarters to make existing grain resources last until the end of February 1945 would entail the reduction of the existing ration of 300 grams to 105 grams with effect from 15 NOV 1944 and proportionately to cover any lesser or greater period.

The rate of grain consumption has increased slightly recently and for the 7 days ending 8 NOV amounted to 12,000 quintals or an average of 2,000 quintals per day. The present total amount is 1,834,000 quintals and it will be appreciated that to reach the target of 2 million quintals grain consumption would be necessary. At the rate of approximately 10,000 quintals per day for the next two months, it seems impossible of attainment in existing circumstances.

I saw the High Commissioner for Storm on 11 NOV, the earliest possible day after my return from Rome, and discussed the whole matter with him. I informed him that the policy of no grain being imported into Storm is recently notified still held good but that the whole question had been raised again with the Supreme Allied Commander. I pointed out that the situation was most critical especially as regards the winter months and that it was essential that maximum effort be continued to secure grain.

When the question of a local reduction in the standard bread ration was raised, I advised the High Commissioner, as agreed with your Headquarters, that no reduction should be made at this stage. From this the High Commissioner must assume that some modification of existing policy in regard to the importation of grain is under consideration but beyond that I have him no indication as to whether or when grain for import might be available.

It will be appreciated, therefore, that except for bringing pressure to bear on the local administration to increase consumption, no other steps to implement the policy laid down in letter under reference and to meet the critical bread situation facing the Island have been taken here.

4. I shall be glad to be kept informed as early as possible as and when any further developments in this matter take place. I shall continually bear in mind that any grain available for importation must in the first instance be considered as a reserve and that every effort must be made to feed the population as long as possible on grain obtained from resources within the Island.

McLan Bryader

M.C.M.
Bryader
Regional Commissioner

COPIES TO: D.C.O.S. Economic Section
D.C.O.S. Administrative Section

See 63

4206

57
100

20.01/ES

16 November 1944

18 NOV Recd

My Dear Prime Minister:

Your letter N. 11619 of 7 November 1944 has received careful consideration.

My advisers still are convinced that there is a large amount of wheat hidden in Sicily, but, in order that the just may not be punished with the unjust, it has been decided in view of your request to reconsider our position. It is now planned that one shipload of wheat will be brought into Sicily in December and that, with this help, the Island must feed itself until the middle of January. Shipments will be arranged for subsequent months, but their amount must of course depend on the general food situation in Italy, and on the availability of shipping for imported supplies.

I am as anxious as you are that the question of the general ration of bread and pasta for liberated Italy as a whole should be resolved as early as possible. The estimate in your letter of 7 November of the amount of grain needed by Italy has been noted, and is being studied by us. Meanwhile, the figures of actual wheat-flour imports to date, and details of our present knowledge of expected tonnages until next harvest, are attached for your information as an appendix to this letter.

Members of my staff have already gone over with H. E. Bergami, Under Secretary of Food, the problems involved in transferring the responsibility for food to your Government. While the wheat problem is by no means completely solved, it is hoped that current consultations between the Italian Government and the Allied Commission may lead to a solution as satisfactory as possible to all concerned, in view of the supply and shipping limitations under which we are all working.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLEERY W. STONE
Commodore, USNR
Chief Commissioner

1131

H. E. Ivanoe Bonomi
President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government

Rome

cc/Ed. Sec.
Food S/C

Copy to Regional Commissioners, Sicily

APPENDIX

ACTUAL CEREAL IMPORTS INTO ITALY FROM ALLIED SOURCES
July 1, 1944 - October 31, 1944
 (all figures in tons)

	<u>Wheat</u>	<u>Flour</u>	<u>Barley</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>1944</u>				
July	36,009	-	-	36,009
August	52,721	-	-	52,721
September	18,066	-	-	18,066
October	34,310	11,528	15,161	60,999
			TOTAL	167,815 Tons

EXPECTED IMPORTS, NOVEMBER 1, 1944 - JUNE 30, 1945
 (all figures in tons)

	<u>Wheat</u>	<u>Flour</u>	<u>Barley</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>1944</u>				
November	49,853	17,162	22,485	89,500
December	-	-	-	93,000
<u>1945</u>				
January	-	-	-	93,000
February through June	107,000 monthly			535,000
			TOTAL	810,500 Tons

NOTES:

1. Total for year July 1st 1944 to June 30th 1945 - 978,315 tons.
2. Figure quoted for February 1945 to June 1945 is not fixed firm. Increase or decrease will depend upon shipping available.
3. Of the imports from November 1944 to June 1945 a considerable quantity must be earmarked for the estimated needs of North Italy, to be utilized there after its liberation.

785017

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
ECONOMIC SECTION

LDD/es

51

12 November 1944

20.01/85

SUBJECT: Wheat Imports for Sicily.

13 NOV Recd

MEMO TO: Chief of Staff.

44 33

47

14/11
any

1. Reference your 4805/13/COS, 26 October 1944, above subject.

2. Attached is Inter-Office memorandum from Food Sub-Commission (Ref: 21-2/17/Food of 5 November 1944) which contains the survey mentioned in para 3 of A/CC 400-2 of 23 October.

3. For your further information inclosed is copy of letter 70-6/47/Food of 11 November 44 to AFHQ, G-5, "Wheat Situation Sicily" which is notice to AFHQ to the effect, "It is therefore proposed to bring into Sicily one shipload of wheat in December and to tell the Italian Government that with this help the Island must support itself until January 15. Shipments in January and subsequently must depend upon the general food situation in Italy."

4. It is proposed, too, that the Chief Commissioner will give notice of the above to H. E. Bonomi in his reply to N11819 of 7 November 44 (C of S Ref. 4296/43/COS, 10 November) which reply is now being drafted by Economic Section.

48

A. G. ANTONINI

Acting Deputy Chief of Staff
Economic Section

51

47

Incl. 1. Inter-office memo Ref 21/2/17/Food.
Incl. 2. cc Ltr to AFHQ, G-5, Ref 70-6/47/Food, 11 Nov.

cc: Food S/C

44

1123

51

Office of Chief of Staff.

Wheat for Sicily.

4205/43/003.

DCOS Economic Section.

10 November, 1944.

48

I enclose a translation, with original, of a letter No. 11819 dated 7 Nov 44 from H. W. Bonomi to the A/CC. You will no doubt wish to discuss this matter with A/CC and A/COS before drafting a reply for the former's signature.

E. T.

Chief Staff Officer,
To Chief of Staff

Copy to: 30 to A/CC.

1128

BU 14
Noted 11
PA 10
11

Translation

The President of the Council of Ministers
Minister of the Interior

n. 11819

Rome, 7 November 1944

48

Dear Admiral,

It is my duty to request you to examine personally the situation of the wheat supply of this country.

The wheat supply of Sicily will soon be exhausted, and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forests has stated the matter several times (for the last time in letter n. 2/1/4398/1417/C of October) to the Allied Agriculture Sub-Commission, specifying the needs of the island. If in Sicily the amount of wheat brought to the 'granai del popolo' hasn't reached the foreseen figure, it must be noted that the difference between the foreseen quantity and the quantity which was collected is greatly inferior to the amount of wheat required to feed the inhabitants of the island from the middle of December - when the supply will probably come to an end - till the next harvest. Therefore, the severe regulation, which has been discussed, and by which no wheat should be sent to Sicily, thus striking the mass of the population which kept nothing from the 'granai del popolo', does not seem just.

Nevertheless, the Sicilian question, essential not only in itself, but also because of the political repercussions it can have, is but the regional aspect of a problem by which the whole of liberated Italy is being faced. Calculating the daily distribution of 200 gr. of bread and 80 gr. of pasta to all those who have the food-rations cards, the amount of wheat required till the next harvest, would be roughly of seven million quintals, besides the existing supplies, and the amount which will probably be collected in future.

Italy needs seven million qis, and hopes in the kind comprehension of the Allied Governments; its trust is even greater now that President Roosevelt has publicly expressed his wish to see the bread ration to be raised to 300 grs daily in Italy.

For us Italians, this is a vital problem requiring swift action. The lack of transport, prevents wheat being brought from one province to another yet this might keep a certain balance between the various provinces for a certain length of time at least. I rely on your help, dear Admiral, to eliminate the obstacles and help to come to some agreement. Meanwhile, I remain,

Truly yours,

/s/ I. Bonomi

Admiral Ellery W. Stone
Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission

R o m e

trans. E.C.

1127

785017

INTER OFFICE MEMO

GEL/s1

5 November 1944

Tel: 206

Ref: 21-2/17/FOOD

SUBJECT: Self-sufficiency of Sicily in Wheat

FROM : Food Sub-Commission

TO : 1 Colonel L. D. DEISMORE, Chief of Staff,
Economic Section

1. Reference your memorandum ES/31 dated 1 November 1944.
2. Memorandum ACC/400-2 dated 23 October 1944, subject: Wheat Imports for Sicily was addressed to the Chief of Staff, H.Q., ACC. This memo came to the attention of the Food Sub-Commission for the first time through the copy attached to your memorandum referred to in para 1 above. Therefore, our memo ACC/21-2 of 26 October addressed to the Political Section was not intended as a reply to ACC/400-2.
3. A complete study on the "Situation of Sicily's Principal Food Crops" was made by the Agriculture Sub-Commission on or about 21 October 1944 for Mr. Antolini which included a section on wheat. In this study it was reported that in years of average production (1932-36), Sicily's net imports of wheat were 90,000 metric tons annually but that with bumper crops such as the one harvested in 1938, it had a surplus.
4. From various sources a table (attached) has been compiled to show by years the production, ammassment and consumption of wheat in Sicily. Although some of the figures in the table must be considered with reserve, the basic results are probably reliable. This table indicates that prior to the war and during the war, with the exception of years in which crops were unusually bountiful, the wheat crop in Sicily was not sufficient to meet the requirements of the population. Even though there has been a downward trend in consumption since 1938 due no doubt to increased severity in ration scales, the deficiency has tended to increase each year because during the same period there have been even greater decreases in production and ammassment.
5. The Food Sub-Commission has consistently contended that Sicily would require wheat imports. In a memorandum to AFHQ, G-5 Section prepared for the Vice President, Economic Section under date 7 August 1944, it was stated that Sicily would require wheat imports of 130,000 metric tons during the year beginning 1 July 1944. This estimate was predicated on an estimate that 221,000 metric tons would be ammassed. Any decrease in ammassment would, of course, increase import requirements if current ration scales are to be maintained. Colonel W. J. IECG's proposed program recently presented to authorities in Washington calls for resumption of wheat imports in February 1945 with a total of 121,000 metric tons to 30 June 1945.

Encl 1

CONTINUED:

9,200 tons had been imported up to that time, with no further imports scheduled prior to 1945, this latter estimate is consistent with the earlier estimate. To the extent that ammassment falls below 221,000 tons it will be necessary to increase imports and also schedule imports for earlier arrival.

6. It must be concluded that the High Commissioner's assertion that Sicily was not self-sufficient in wheat in earlier years and is not self-sufficient in the current year is correct.

For the Acting Chief Commissioner:

W. J. Legg

W. J. LEGG

Colonel

Director, Food Sub-Commission

WHEAT PRODUCTION, AMASSMENT AND CONSUMPTION - SICILY
(Metric Tons)

	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944
(1) Amassed	285,860	341,962	464,917	367,762	327,926	277,890	139,206	91,000	150,000
(2) Retentions	601,568	624,539	603,139	551,643	557,574	513,910	410,094	456,300	520,000
(3) Total Production	887,428	966,501	1,068,056	919,405	885,500	791,800	549,300	547,300	670,700
(4) Consumption	920,000	940,387	950,337	930,337	917,574	873,910	767,929	638,700	871,100
(5) Deficiency or Surplus	-32,572	+26,164	+118,019	-10,932	-32,074	-82,110	-227,629	-151,400	-200,400
(6)									

(1) Amassment figures are taken from Annuario Statistico Italiano for 1936 through 1942. Figure for 1943 is taken from table supplied by the Agriculture Sub-Commission in "Situation of Sicily's Principal Food Crops". Figure for 1944 is the Regional Commissioners' latest estimate. Hq. AC target is 200,000.

(2) Retentions for food consumption, animal feeding, seed, etc. are derived from total production and amassment figures and therefore represent illegal as well as legal retentions.

(3) Production figures for 1936 through 1938 and 1940 through 1943 are taken from annuario Statistico Italiano. Figure for 1939 estimated on assumption amassment was 40% of total crop (average of the preceding and the following year). Figure for 1944 taken from table supplied by Agriculture Sub-Commission in "Situation of Sicily's Principal Food Crops."

(4) Consumption figure for 1936 estimated on basis of consumption in other years when crop was substantially the same. Figures for 1937 through 1939 derived from tables prepared by OSS, making slight adjustments as between years in accordance with variation in the crops, the average for the three years being 940,337 metric tons. Figures for the years 1940 through 1942 are taken from an Italian statistical table (official source unknown). Figure for 1943 is taken from a table supplied by Agriculture Sub-Commission in "Situation of Sicily's Principal Food Crops". Figure for 1944 is based on a rationed population of 3,200,000 and the current ration scale of 300 grams of bread per person per day plus 12½ for various supplementary rations. Consumption by rationed population plus retentions equals total.

(5) The figures on this line should be taken to indicate a situation or a trend rather than as an absolutely correct computation of net wheat imports. For example, consumption figures for the years 1937 through 1939 represent human consumption. In other years, the consumption is total consumption for all purposes including seed and animal feeding. Therefore, it is probable that the surpluses indicated for 1937 and 1938 are somewhat overstated while the deficit for 1939 is probably understated. Also, available data does not permit making adjustments between years for stock carried over from one year into another nor is it possible to obtain perfect correlation between the consumption year, the production year and the amassment year.

(6) Imports in year beginning 1 July 1944 have been 9,200 tons. Unless present program is implemented, there will be no further imports.

12/2/44

SECRET

COPY

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Economic Section

Confidential 44

Tel: 478807

11 November 1944

Ref: 70-C/47/FOOD

SUBJECT: Wheat Situation Sicily

TO : AFHQ, G-5 SECTION

*copy
15/11*

1. It is desired to clarify the past and present situation with regard to Sicilian wheat.

2. The statement was originally made that Sicily would be self-sufficient in wheat production on a 300 gram ration basis, which was the ration prevailing when estimates for wheat requirements were first made.

3. When the question of the 300 grams ration first arose, the estimated amassing figure for Sicily was given by Agriculture Sub-Commission as 297,000 tons. This was not considered unreasonable, as amassing totals for year 1937-1940 had been well above that figure. In addition, it was then considered a possibility that numbers of ration card holders might be reduced to 2,300,000, which was the average number from October 1941 to March 1942. The 300 gram ration based upon that number of Ration Card Holders could just have been supplied from the 297,000 tons amassing estimate. Self-sufficiency for Sicily was therefore still a possibility and the goal at which we aimed.

4. In early August two new factors arose. First. The number of Ration Card Holders could not be reduced below 2,300,000. Second. A revised estimate of amassing brought the total down to 221,000 tons.

As a result of this, it was then recognized that imports would be required over the year if the 300 gram ration were to be retained. In our memorandum to you of 7 August 1944 it was stated that Sicily would require wheat imports of 130,000 metric tons during the year beginning 1 July 1944.

5. This view was not publicized beyond our memorandum to you, as it was considered essential psychologically to keep the pressure upon the Sicilians to amass to the greatest possible extent. It was, however, included in the estimates prepared by Food Sub-Commission in mid-September and shown to you before being taken to Washington by Colonel LEGG. That program called for a resumption of wheat imports in February 1945, with a total of 121,000 metric tons to June 30, 1945. Amassing estimate was still retained at 221,000 tons.

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SECRET

- 2 -

Confidential

6. Later, revised emassing estimate was fixed at 200,000 tons, but the Regional Commissioner does not think that we shall get more than 150,000 tons without repressive measures, which are not considered advisable at the moment. If this view is accepted, then Sicily cannot feed itself after the end of December. It is therefore proposed to bring into Sicily one shipload of wheat in December and to tell the Italian Government that with this help the Island must support itself until January 15. Shipments in January and subsequently must depend upon the general food situation in Italy.

7. Recent estimates submitted of wheat imports required to maintain bread ration of 300 grams, i.e. 165,000 tons monthly from November 1944 onwards, are in line with the situation expressed in Para 6.

For the Chief Commissioner:

A. G. ANTOLINI
Acting Deputy
Chief of Staff
Economic Section

Copies to:

Chief Commissioner
Food Sub-Commission
Political Section
File

SECRET

112220

785017

42

Office of the Chief of Staff

Tel. 451

Wheat Imports - SICILY.

4805/18/COS

Economic Section.

6 Nov

33

Reference our request for a survey on the above
named subject - 4805/13/COS of 26 October, may we please
have an early reply.

encl
Chief Staff Officer,
To the Chief of Staff.

60/13/11

An answer
imminent.

BU

10 Nov

~~1121~~
11/24/61

11/24/61
11/24/61

X

785017

42064

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JGW/is

1 November, 1944

4 NOV Recd

29A

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

This is in reply to your letter of the 18th of October, 1944, with reference to certain exceptions to the regulations concerning the delivery of grain and barley to the "Granai del Popolo" in Sicily.

Enclosed is copy of a letter under date of 27 October 1944 (Ref. Agr. 137.1) which was forwarded to the Minister of Agriculture.

Sincerely yours,

EWS

Ellery W. Stone
Commodore, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

H. E. Ivanoe Bonomi,
President of the Council of Ministries,
ROME, ITALY.

NOTE: Action was taken
on Agric file 137.1.

1123

Rec. 4/11

2 November 1944

49

SICILY: WHEAT AND GRAIN OIL

4. WHEAT

1. Sicily has fallen considerably short of measuring the wheat which all the figures showed was available for measuring. The original figures, many months ago, showed that Sicily was roughly self-sufficient at the 200-grain ration, if the target measuring figure was met. A later estimate showed Sicily feeding herself up to April 1945 at 300 grains, if the relatively conservative measuring figure of 2,000,000 quintals was met. At present, the picture is that only about 1,300,000 quintals have been measured, the ration is still at 300 grains, and Sicily will barely get through the month of January on its own stocks.

2. The Acting Chief Commissioner has written to the Prime Minister stating that Sicily should feed herself and would get no imported wheat. From the economic standpoint, it is clear that this position is not tenable.

3. If we have to hold Sicily out anyway, the decision should be made early, and the first shipment of wheat should actually arrive in December. Reason: it would be inefficient, from the transport standpoint, to move local grain from interior centers to coastal cities until stocks in the interior were exhausted, and then a month or two later to have to move imported grain back from the ports into the interior provinces.

4. On the other hand, our availability of imported wheat is low.

Both our November and December shipments were cut 50%, -- an aggregate

bite of some 70,000 tons out of the 200,000 tons that was supposed to come

1113

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4. On the other hand, our availability of imported wheat is low. Both our November and December shipments were cut down, -- an aggregate bite of some 70,000 tons out of the 200,000 tons that was supposed to come in during the two months. To put a shipload of wheat into Sicily during December (as will be necessary if the decision is made to bail Sicily out) would mean robbing the stockpile for the north of that much wheat -- when it has already been robbed of the outbeck apportion to the November and December arrivals. And of course we don't know whether the combined Chiefs of Staff will give us what we requested (enough to maintain a 300-grain ration in the whole country) on the wheat to arrive from January on.

1113

391

-2-

Com. Ad. Sicily: Wheat and Olive Oil.

5. From a strictly economic point of view, without considering the political angles, we recommend that we tell the Italian Government (e) that we will give them one shipload (8-9,000 tons) of wheat in December, and on that basis the island must take care of itself on a 1934-grain ration until the 15th of January; (b) that the situation after that, including consideration of a possible reduction in the ration, will have to depend on the availability of imported wheat; and (c) that the Government should redouble its efforts, by every means at its disposal, to increase the availability of wheat through an increased rate of amassing. (In connection with (c), the proposed system of bartering fertilizer for wheat may be of some help.)

SUBJECT: Food - SI Y.

TO : Chief of Staff.

1st November, 1944.

1. At a meeting held in your office yesterday afternoon in your absence Mr. Antolini asked RC Sicily how much more grain over and above the 1,300,000 qtls already amassed he was likely to get this year. Brigadier Carr said he did not expect to get any appreciable extra quantities at all. He asked RC Sicily ^{up to} what date the island could feed itself. Brigadier Carr replied that it was estimated that the island could feed itself until the end of December.
2. RC Sicily drew attention to the phrase "to leave to the local administration the problem of forcing an equitable distribution of the resources which are known to be available", which occurs in the fifth paragraph of the A/CC's letter to the Prime Minister. This appears to be copied from the seventh paragraph of General Wilson's airgram of 24th September to the C.C.S. Brigadier Carr pointed out that no resources were known to be available in the sense of being obtainable. The High Commissioner for Sicily had been constantly urged to intensify grain collection but it was now so late in the season that it was anticipated that only small quantities would be forthcoming. Grain which had not been amassed had either been consumed, smuggled to the mainland, passed into the hands of speculators, or hidden. To bring the total assessment figure up to 1,500,000 would mean an additional 200,000 quintals which would entail grain collection at the rate of over 3000 quintals per day during the months of November and December. There appeared to be no prospect whatever of amassment being revived to this extent. Grain had been coming in recently at the rate of 600 to 1000 quintals per day and the average was falling rapidly.
3. After discussion, Economic Section (Mr. Antolini and Major Inrie), felt that a realistic attitude must be adopted but pointed out that only 9000 tons from reserves could be sent to the island in December. This was only sufficient for one third of a month but must suffice the island up to January 15th, after which date the full monthly requirements of 29,000 tons would be required. This would have to be cleared with the A/CC. Presumably the SAC's approval would be necessary and the policy letter sent to the Prime Minister and to Sicilia Region would require drastic modification.
4. Mr. Antolini was unable to see the A/CC last night but I understand that he was going to point out the necessity of baling out Sicily in January and to discuss with the A/CC how we should present to AFHQ our case in this matter.
5. Mr. Antolini reported that the Italian Government had written to the Allied Commission saying that they proposed to increase the price of olive oil ^{in Sicily} from L.60 to L.75 per kilo. He pointed out that this appeared to be a decision on the part of the Italian Government and that they were not asking for our permission in the matter. However, he would like to have the RC's comments on this. Brigadier Carr stated that the High Commissioner had written to him suggesting a price of L.80. Brigadier Carr said that he was doubtful about a special price for olive oil in Sicily on the following grounds. It was questionable whether any reasonable price would lead to successful olive oil

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Mr. Antolini suggested that the higher price ought to be operative only up to a fixed date or for a fixed quantity which ever was reached first and that after this point the price should revert to L.60. Unless it was decided to dispute the Italian Government's decision it was felt that their attention should be drawn to the necessity of imposing the time and quantity limits suggested above.

W. Shipp

Lt. Col,
Chief Staff Officer,
to the Chief of Staff.

GWIS/JG.

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
ECONOMIC SECTION
AFC 394

JT/ml

36

Tel: 761

AFC/21-2/FOOD

26 October 1944

INTER OFFICE MEMO

SUBJECT: Investigation Report

TO : Political Section

28

1. Reference your memorandum of 21 October 1944 on the subject of imports of wheat into Sicily.
2. Sicily during the last four years has never achieved sufficient wheat to cover the needs of the population on a 300 gram bread ration basis. The quantities amassed, however, have always been less compared with the total harvest.
3. The estimate of selfsufficiency of grain in Sicily was made on a 200 gram bread ration basis. As a result of the increase of the ration to the equivalent of 300 gram, and a lowering of the estimated amount to 200,000 tons, it was realized that imports of grain into Sicily would be necessary by February 1945. These estimates which include a figure of 8,000 tons for February and 29,000 tons per month subsequently were included in the figures recently presented to Washington by Brig. Gen. Sawyer and Col. Legg.

A.G.A.

A.G. ANTONINI
Acting Head
Economic Section

Copy to: Acting Chief Commissioner
Chief of Staff

→ TO Chief of Staff -

This makes my recent letter
to Bonomi wrong. Shall we modify
it?

Recd. 30/10

1118

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C O S

Ext. 300

Wheat Imports for Sicily.

4805/13/COS

Economic Section.

26 Oct

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I refer to letter No. A/CC 400-2 (~~400-12~~) of the 23rd of October from Acting Chief Commissioner.

Would you please arrange for the survey mentioned in para 3 of this letter to be made as soon as possible and forward it to me?

L V
Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

BU 280

11AED

See 18

11A 20/11

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4805 *dg*

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Office of the Acting Chief Commissioner
APC 394

EMS/bjp

A/CC 400-2

23 October 1944

23 OCT Recd

SUBJECT: Wheat imports for Sicily

TO : Chief of Staff, Hq ACC

1. At my meeting with High Commissioner Aldisio on October 19th, I anticipated my letter to the Prime Minister by telling Aldisio that in the face of this year's harvest of between six and seven million quintals the Allies would not be justified in importing further wheat into Sicily and that it was up to the Government to ensure equitable distribution of the total wheat available on the island.
2. In the course of our discussion, Aldisio stated that contrary to Allied belief, Sicily is not self-supporting on wheat and was not in past years. I asked him if he could prove this statement statistically and he promised to forward such figures promptly, but to date they have not been received.
3. In the meantime I should like you to have a survey of this question made by the Economic Section (Food Sub-Commission) as to Sicily's past record on wheat imports, possibly thru the Italian Office of Statistics and Supply Information.

W. H. Stone

ELBERT W. STONE
Commodore, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

cc: Economic Section

see 33

1114

3.

31.

2. The State and electric power: the needs of post-war reconstruction make the help of the Government indispensable. Amabile Giarolani suggests that the State might have a participation in private enterprises, and in some cases it would have the direct management of certain power plants.

3. The Stand of the A.S.A. seems to benefit no one but the producers.

RISORGIMENTO LITURALE (Liberal) (4 21 oct)

1. The O.N.C. Land question. Comment on Viale's letter in which - surprised by the fact that the liberal party should be the one most against him, he states that the solution of the land problem, as prospected by the liberal party, is exactly what the O.N.C. has already done and continues doing. A.M. says that O.N.C. has not given the land to the workers, as it had promised to do, except in very few cases.

2. The Palermo sad tragedy is evidently due to separatists, and it happened just while in Rome many important Sicilian problems were being taken in consideration. Alvisio had spoken very strongly about the wheat situation; it is not true, as everybody, even the Allies seem to believe, that Sicily can be self-sustained. She only has wheat for about six months in the year.

3. Is it not possible to render exchange of goods between one province and another, an authorized enterprise instead of a black market one?

4. Fiat robbed by man wearing British officer's uniform.

TEMPO (Independent)

1. Democratic peace in Turco: will only be possible if Germany's power is reduced to nothing, as it was after the treatise of Westphalia. We have had our lesson after Versailles, says Filippo Giolli.

2. Still against more or less clandestine gambling clubs.

3. Refugees in dreadful condition corpse left on the straw for almost two days, bad food. Could not most of them be sent home?

UNITA' (Communist)

1. Violent article about the Palermo incident: under a democratic regime the police mustn't fire on the people. In Sicily, reaction must be crushed, latifondisti imprisoned and their estates divided among the peasants.

2. Interview with the delegates of the Syndicates of the Soviet Union who explain the work of reconstruction undertaken by Russia.

3. 300 working families are without water, because of

113

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4. Flat robbed by men wearing British officer's uniform.
TRNPO (Independent)

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3. Refugees in dreadful condition: corpse left on the straw for almost two days, bad food. Could not most of them be sent home?

UNITA' Communist)

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2. Interview with the delegates of the Syndicates of the Soviet Union who explain the work of reconstruction undertaken by Russia.

3. 300 working families are without water, because of the lack of electric power in V. Dicia.

4. The SABA factory must be made to pay the allotment for the high cost of living.

5. Fascists have kept their jobs in several hotels, and the working class has to submit to their tyranny.

6. A.C.C. takes the parts of the latifondisti. Perhaps because some officers are on friendly terms with Roman aristocracy.

GENERAL : 1) The Council of Ministers: approval of the allotment for the high cost of living; help will be given to the employees of the State; one million six hundred thousand lire for the economic rehabilitation of the country.

2) Articles on the Palermo incidents, and declaration of Alvisio.

785017

File 30

Office of the Chief of Staff.

Enforcement of Corn Delivery
Regulations - SICILY.
Economic Section.

4206/COB.

22 October

4

29

Please draft reply to attached letter from Italian
Ministry of the Interior for signature of the Acting Chief
Commissioner.

H. N

Chief Staff Officer,
To the Chief of Staff.

1112

Copy to : Major Quayle.

Translation

A 9917

THE PRESIDENT OF THE
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR

Rome, 12 October 1944

Dear Admiral,

In the first days of September, the High Commissioner for Sicily, in agreement with the Government, made, for the island, the following exceptions to the regulations about delivering corn to the 'granai del popolo':

1) to the producers, the state will grant 100 lire for every ql. of corn delivered to the granai, as a compensation for the transportation expenses from the threshing-floors to the collecting centers.

2) Besides the quantity fixed by the law in force, the producers will be allowed to keep 25 kgs of corn or barley for each cultivated hectar, for the needs of the enterprise.

These regulations, acknowledging the special situation of the cultivation of corn in Sicily and respecting old customs, were meant to promote the delivering of the products to the 'granai'; this had met with obstacles, not for economic reasons, but because of a general feeling of hostility, created purposely or by preconceived mistrust.

In its letter n. 7138, of September 19th, the Department of Agriculture and Forests has asked the Agriculture Sub-commission of the Allied Commission to ratify the regulations made by the High Commissariat.

Because of the special political situation of the island, it is very urgent that these regulations should be enforced. I beg you therefore, my dear Admiral, to interpret my wishes to the Agriculture Sub-commission, so that the requested ratification should be soon granted.

I remain,

Yours sincerely,

/s/ I. Bonomi

Admiral Ellery W. Stone
Chief Commissioner
Allied Control Commission
R o m e

trans. E.C.

1111

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

HQ A.C.C. ECONOMIC SECTION ¹⁴

20 Oct 44

(Date)

Fr. A. G. ANTOLINI To

ECONOMIC SECTION	
AGRICULTURE SUB-COMMISSION	
COMMERCE " "	
FINANCE " "	
FOOD " "	
INDUSTRY " "	
LABOR " "	
P.W. & U. " "	
RESOLUTION DIVISION	
TRANSPORTATION SUB-COM.	
SHIPPING SUB-COMMISSION	
CHIEF COMMISSIONER	
CHIEF OF STAFF	
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF	
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION	
ESTABLISHMENT SECTION	
For: Appropriate action	
Remarks/Recommendation	
Investigation & Report	
Information	
Noting and Return	
Noting and Retention	
Signature	
Dispatch	
File copy	
Noting & circulation	

Remarks:

Lt. Col. Shipp
CV Affrs Branch

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
AGRICULTURE SUB-COMMISSION
APO 394

LGA/cam

Tel: 262
AGR/37.

16 October 1944

22 OCT Recd

SUBJECT: Granai del Popolo, Sicily

TO : Economic Section, Attention: Lt. Atkins

1. Reference Sicily Region Headquarters letter RC/433 of 23 Sept 44 and 4206/14/CO3 of 5 Oct 44.

2. The situation as set forth in the letter from Sicily indicates that wheat collections are lagging and may cause a serious food situation there this winter. Causes of this situation are given as lack of enforcement personnel, lack of civilian transport discipline and control, and low moral of UPSSA officials whose salaries have been two months in arrears.

3. Suggested remedies for this situation which will assist also in the amassing of olive oil this Fall consist of:

- a. Appropriate Italian Government department take steps to pay UPSSA officials whose salaries are in arrears. A telephone conversation with Dr. Patrissi in the Ministry of Agriculture on 13 Oct 44 indicates that this is being corrected.
- b. Appropriate action to correct discipline and strengthen control of civilian transport.
- c. Retain necessary enforcement personnel and Italian Army battalions on the Island. This matter has been taken up with AFHQ in recent correspondence according to letter by Lt. Col. G. W. Shipp.


W. A. HARTMAN
Lt. Col.
Director

cc. (Mr. [unclear])
File 1113
26710

16 Oct 44
11
Shipp

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
POLITICAL SECTION
APO 394

21 October 1944.

MEMORANDUM TO: Economic Section.

22 OCT Recd

You will see from the attached copy of the Roman newspaper "IL TEMPO" that the Italian High Commissioner for Sicily yesterday said:

"It will be recalled that the amount of wheat presently available for feeding Sicily is scarcely sufficient for two months and that a responsible authority in the ACC even yesterday stated that the Allies have decided not to send more wheat to Sicily, as they were certain that in this respect Sicily was self-sufficient.

That is the result of propaganda put out by the Separatists, which is based amongst other things on the self sufficiency of the Island in feedstuffs.

The truth is that Sicily, especially in these last four war years, has always received wheat from continental Italy to cover six months need."

Should he have?

H. A. Caccia
Vice-President

Copies to:
Chief of Staff ✓
Acting Chief Commissioner

H.A.C. The A/C.C. made the statement.

Mux

1703
Which Para 1
only? or Para 3
also? H.A.C. 25/12

4206
ARMED CONTROL COMMISSION
SICILIA REGION HEADQUARTERS
APC 384

26
S. 951
Confidential

FILE:RC/433

17 Oct 1944

SUBJECT: Grain assessment - SICILIA Region

TO : H. V. A. G. S. ROME
Chief of Staff

COPY TO: Vice President Economic Section
Vice President Administrative Section
Agriculture sub-commission

CABr
Econic
Agric
Adm Sec

12.

Econic (2)

Assessed by
21 which
Assessed
U 26/10

1. In continuation of my letters RC/433 of 9 OCT and of 28 SEP I have further investigated the grain situation and now report as follows. This letter omits reference to many difficulties which have beset the amassment of grain in the Region and which are known to your Headquarters.

2. In the opinion of this Headquarters this Island produced sufficient wheat this year to feed the population possibly till the next harvest but at least to within a month or two of it. Very few civilians, if any, would agree with this opinion and the High Commissioner is not in agreement. To have obtained this sufficiency for the purpose of producing bread for the population would, however, have required a thoroughly efficient amassing organization, 100% cooperation on the part of the producers, and a proper withdrawal of all bread ration cards from producers. None of these essentials have been present.

3. As your Headquarters has been informed, the target figure set by this Headquarters for the Granai del Popolo was 3,100,000 quintals which, it was estimated, was approximately the quantity required to feed the population till the next harvest. The targets allotted to each province and the amounts amassed on October 13th may be found in Appendix A to this letter. There has been constant criticism of these figures on the grounds that they are exaggerated and not in accordance with ground cultivated or production yields. It is also stated that between provinces the burden of amassment was inequitably distributed and not in accordance with previous harvests.

In this connection, I observe that the target figure included in documents emanating from your Headquarters is 2,000,000 quintals as compared with 3,100,000 quintals set by this Headquarters.

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4. I have endeavoured to calculate what is the true position but have found this impossible because of the absence of any reliable statistics from U.P.S.B.A. or of any frank information or of agreement on the part of provincial officials. The following are given as instances.

(a) In the Province of PALERMO endeavour was made to obtain figures as regards one hundred of the biggest producers in the province. After a lapse of about one month, the names of 44 large producers were forthcoming about 25 SEP. Of only 16 of these were figures available as to the amounts which had been amassed to date. In these 16 cases alone a total of approximately 2,200 quintals of grain or 220 tons was shown as still due to the Granai del Popolo.

(b) I made a personal investigation into the situation in TRAPANI, which is the province with the worst record so far. The Region I target figure of 300,000 quintals for this province was arrived at about May 15th 1944 as follows:-

Hectares cultivated	65,000	total yield	645,000 qtls
Yield per hectare	9.9 qtls		
Retention for seed for 65,000 Hectares	65,000		
Retention for food for 80,500 Producers	161,000		
	<u>246,000</u>		<u>246,000</u> "
Amassable			399,000 "
To allow a margin the figure was fixed at			300,000 "

At the time the above calculations were made the provincial authorities wished to estimate on a yield of 8 quintals per hectare but this was considered too low by the Regional Agricultural Officer and the Ispettore Agrario.

On my visit early this month the provincial authorities agreed that 65,000 hectares had been cultivated but produced communal calculations to show that the yield per hectare averaged only 6 quintals. It was agreed, however, that 7 quintals per hectare might be equitable.

This meant that the total provincial production was 455,000 quintals. 380,000 quintals were claimed for retention allowance and seed, leaving a balance of 95,000 quintals, or only 21% of total production to be amassed. When this very high figure for retention and seed was disputed, statistics were produced to show that covering the years 1936-43 the average amount amassed was only 27% of total production and the provincial officials considered that not more than 21% could be expected under existing conditions. To date only 58,000 quintals of this provincial estimate of 95,000 quintals have been amassed.

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(c) There appear to be very many cases throughout the Island where even now denunciations are still standing.

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Confidential

(d) There is invariably a wide difference between the estimates made by the Alimentation authorities (who are concerned with bread ration cards for non-producers) and those made by the Agricultural authorities of the quantity of grain required for retention allowances for producers.

5. The present situation is as follows:-

(a) Grain collection is now practically at a standstill and is averaging about 1,000 quintals per day or under.

(b) A special enforcement party has been at work in PALERMO Province since August 20th. Their operations have not produced any extensive results though it is true that the PALERMO figures have improved considerably and what little grain is now coming in comes from PALERMO Province.

(c) The High Commissioner, in conjunction with the Commander of the XII Italian Army Corps, is, it is understood, forming from the slender resources available a special unit of Carabinieri for grain enforcement with the most modern armament and equipment available in the Island and with as much motor transport as can be spared. The High Commissioner considers that this unit, which will number about 500, cannot cover more than one Province. This would mean that considerable time must elapse before all main grain producing provinces here are dealt with and, in the meantime, more grain will go into hiding or be irregularly disposed of.

(d) A new issue of bread ration cards, effective 1 NOV, is now in process of being made. The High Commissioner has been urged to take every possible step to ensure that bread ration cards are issued only to those entitled to them and he has again been informed that the percentage of holders should not exceed 53.9% of the population which was the figure agreed by my predecessor with your Headquarters (and presumably the late High Commissioner for SICILY). Claims are now being made by the Italian authorities that the correct percentage is approximately 75%. Ration cards are not being released by the central authorities for issue until precise details have been received from the Province (or Commune) and checked by the appropriate Italian authorities.

6. I do not consider that it would be safe, under existing circumstances, to count on more than a maximum of 1,500,000 quintals of grain being amassed which is 75% of the target figure set by your Headquarters or 50% (fifty) of that laid down by this Headquarters. At the present rate grain is coming in it does not appear that even this figure will be reached by the end of the year.

The extent to which this figure might be increased by the dispatch of additional forces to the Island would depend

largely on the way they were used. The higher administration here inspire one with little or no confidence when it comes to a task requiring careful planning, energy, and fearless and impartial action. There is much talk but little or no concrete action and too much time is spent in playing politics. It would appear to be very difficult to obtain the necessary particulars as to where the grain should be. The necessary information, however, is probably common knowledge in the communes, but the officials will not or are afraid to take action particularly in the case of large producers.

23
Confidential

7. If the present bread ration scale remains in force, this Island will require imported flour with effect from approximately the beginning of January 1945. The High Commissioner has, I understand, already written to his government to this effect and has suggested that importation should begin about the middle of November in order to obviate grain being moved from one part of the Island to another, thus effecting transportation economy. I have warned the High Commissioner that I have no information as regards any grain being available for importation.

8. I am anxious to know at a very early date what is the situation as regards the prospects of importation of grain into SICILY and whether it is proposed to send any additional police or other forces to this Island so as to give the Italian authorities no excuse for not applying as drastic measures as possible in order to amass increased quantities of grain and so reduce to a minimum the need for importation. I presume that general directions in this matter will be given in the reply to my RC/433 of 28 SEP 44.

(12)
M Carr Brigadier

M. CARR
Brigadier
Regional Commissioner

1105

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RC/133 of 17 OCT 44

APPENDIX A

October 13th

Estimated Per Ha.
field au-
tumn sown

target
qli

Wheat
amount
amassed
Qtl

Wheat
&
Barley
target \$

PROVINCES						
AGRICULTO	9	7	500.000	135.182.49	15.294.35	55.0 \$
CALABRISSENA	12	11	600.000	182.719.00	29.706.00	52.2 \$
CATANIA	12	9	400.000	175.277.00	17.837.00	48.2 \$
ENNA	10	8	300.000	182.893.30	7.420.00	53.3 \$
MESSINA	8	7	50.000	15.412.21	373.12	32.0 \$
PALERMO	9	6	600.000	166.085.83	2.726.24	28.1 \$
RAVUSA	9	7	90.000	67.145.00	13.340.00	90.0 \$
SIRACUSA	8.5	8	260.000	83.451.00	11.501.00	35.5 \$
TRAPANI	10	9	300.000	54.700.16	3.125.53	19.3 \$

Total wheat and barley amassed by 13 OCT 1,294,781 qtl

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

HEADQUARTERS,
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
APO 394

Office of the Chief of Staff

Ref: 4206/21/COG.

19th October 1944.

SUBJECT: Grain Collection - SICILY.

TO : Regional Commissioner, SICILIA Region.

1. Colonel Jordan has given me an appreciation of the grain situation in SICILY and an estimate of the feeding of the population.
2. The Acting Chief Commissioner fully appreciates the efforts that you and your staff have made in helping the High Commissioner and the local governments to collect sufficient grain to maintain the urban population until the coming harvest. It is, however, perfectly clear to him, as it is to me, that the grain exists in the island and that the producers are not bringing it forward.
3. You should make clear to the High Commissioner the contents of the Acting Chief Commissioner's letter to the Prime Minister. You should tell him that immediate action is necessary, first of all to intensify the collection of the grain, and secondly, to take every step possible to see that the minimum number of the urban population, are made entitled to ration cards. The Acting Chief Commissioner is not satisfied that a sufficient reduction in those alleged to be entitled to ration cards has been made.
4. The Acting Chief Commissioner is pressing AMI to substitute two battalions recently removed from Sicily by two battalions of the Calabria Division now in Sardinia: at the same time, for reasons of security in the North he will not be able to stop the reduction of the Carabinieri, for trained men are needed for NW Italy. At the same time, the Civil Affairs Section hopes to replace any Carabinieri removed from the Island by an equivalent number of Italian troops who will be allocated by AAI and IRIA but who, of course, will not be trained in police duties.

(Sas) MS LUSH

Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

MHL/JG.

Copy to: DCOB, Econ Sec
DCCB, CA Sec

1103

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20

Ref: 4206/20/COS.

19th October 1944.

My dear Prime Minister:

The collection of grain in Sicily has, as you and I well know, produced a serious problem, a problem which has been tackled with energy by the High Commissioner with the advice of the AGC Regional Commissioner and his staff of AGC officers in the Island. In this connection you will be aware that I have reinforced the staff of the Regional Commissioner with a number of officers in order to help the local provincial government in the collection of grain.

In spite of this the collection has fallen far short of the target, and my present advice is that it is doubtful even whether that target can be reached.

My Regional Commissioner informs me that an approximate estimate of the grain harvested in Sicily amounts to no less than 7 million quintals. The amount of grain to be issued monthly on the present ration basis of 500 grams per day totals 220,000 quintals monthly. You will realise that in order to feed the whole of the population, that is to say those entitled to grain, until the next harvest in 8 months time, will consume 1,760,000 quintals. You will appreciate that this is far less than the total amount of grain harvested in the Island and therefore in the hands of the people.

Although there is in the collection depots sufficient grain to feed those on ration scales until the end of this year, the Regional Commissioner sees little prospect of collecting more than an additional month's supply for these people.

I feel you should understand and should inform the High Commissioner for Sicily that it is the definite intention of the Supreme Allied Commander not to import additional grain for Sicily and to leave to the local administration the problem of forcing an equitable distribution of the resources which are known to be available. No grain will therefore be imported to Sicily between this date and the coming harvest.

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The High Commissioner, therefore, on present figures is faced with the problem of feeding the ration population of Sicily from January until mid-July on the grain which exists in the Island and which, as I am advised at present, will not be amassed.

I recommend that you take the earliest opportunity of making this clear, not only to the High Commissioner but to the people of Sicily, so that there can be no doubt in their minds, as in the minds of others, that the grain exists in the Island and that it is for the Island to show sufficient public spirit to provide sufficient grain, and it is only a small proportion of the harvest, to feed those in the urban areas who depend upon the producer for their daily bread.

I must repeat that no further grain can be imported into Sicily and I must ask you to make this perfectly clear to all concerned.

(Sd) LILLERY W STONE.

HARRY W. STONE
Commodore, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

Since dictating the above, I have discussed this question with SE Aldisio.

(Above manuscript by Commodore STONE)

See 32.

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HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Office of the Chief of Staff

Ref 2206/11/COS.

5th October, 1944

SUBJECT: Granà del Popolo, Sicily.

TO : Economic Section.

1. I refer to Sicily Region Headquarters' letter No. MC/433 of the 28th of September.

2. With regard to proposals made by Brigadier Carr in para 12 of his letter the points with regard to Italian Army dispositions have been taken up with AFHQ in two recent letters in which it was asked that any proposed alterations in the military garrison of Sicily should be referred to this Headquarters before implementation and that the military garrison in Sicily should not be reduced below two Italian internal security battalions.

3. Would you please in consultation with the Civil Affairs Section produce a letter to the Prime Minister setting out the main facts of the case as reported by Brigadier Carr, the weaknesses as they appear to this Commission and any remedies which you recommend to be taken.

Chief Staff Officer,
To the Chief of Staff.

Copy to:
Civil Affairs Section.

Revised at Col. King's

15/10

Bo 15/10 1103

Noted
Em

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND

No.

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Cpt Villet and

At let me see the letter
which was written saying

2 more Bus. were required
in Italy. 823/CA

203.2
 ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
 SICILY REGION HEADQUARTERS
 APC 594

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE:RC/433

SUBJECT: Granai del Popolo

TO : R.C. A.C.C. ROME
 R.C. & M.G. Section

COPY TO: Vice President Economic Section
 Vice President Administrative Section
 Agriculture Sub-Commission

28 Sept 1944

9 SEP Read

HEADQUARTERS

29 SEP 1944

A. C. C

1. This letter contains a report on the situation as regards the Granai del Popolo in SICILY as I found it on taking over control of Region I and on the most recent developments in the collection of grain.

2. I have been in SICILY, since taking over Region I and since my return from the Regional Commissioners Conference at Four Headquarters, about one month. During this period, the High Commissioner has been away from SICILY on two visits to ROME and from PALERMO from time to time touring the Island. I have necessarily carried out some tours to gain first hand knowledge of the situation. My only Agricultural Officer was away from duty on account of sickness for one week. Grain collecting officers have been changed twice during the period and at the moment only one is at work on the Island, though another three have been asked for.

The above factors, together with the negligible number of Provincial Officers now in the Region and the recent reductions in staff, have made the task of obtaining full information in the matter and of coordination and continuity of advice difficult and have been responsible for some delay in making this report. I have, however, had frequent discussions with the High Commissioner and other Italian officials concerned on this most important matter.

3. I find, unfortunately, that the more important recommendations made in the memorandum under your 205/28/CA of 6 JUL have not been implemented. I refer in particular to those relating to the forces available or required for the enforcement of grain collection, the provision of tyres for vehicles, and the removal from the Island of certain individuals whose presence was considered undesirable.

Enclosure banded over to me it was

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4. At the time my predecessor handed over to me it was decided that the time had come for the application of compulsion and forcible measures, particularly in the provinces most in arrears. I later advised the High Commissioner that, owing to the alleged small numbers of police and military available for this purpose, concentration of the forces of compulsion appeared necessary and that these should be used in the main grain producing provinces. Few, if any, steps were taken in this respect during the period to date owing to the following circumstances.

The High Commissioner, on return from his last visit to ROME, announced, as already reported to your Headquarters, certain additional inducements towards the furtherance of the campaign. These were (a) the payment of L.100 per quintal towards cost of transport charges (b) a special retention allowance for farm workers and (c) a special retention

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~~Confidential~~

allowance for farm animals. The first of these was notified to Prefects before I was made aware of it and the last two, which were announced, according to the High Commissioner, in error and contrary to his instructions, were later suspended on my advice and as a result of information that none of these measures had been agreed with your headquarters. These announcements followed by suspension probably had an adverse effect on grain collection. Further the High Commissioner fixed the period of 5 SEP to 16 SEP as that during which all denunzie could be rectified and must be completed. This naturally caused a very considerable falling off in grain transfers to the warehouses for the time being.

5. As regards denunzie, the officials concerned estimate that, of those required at the beginning of the harvest, about 3% may be considered as still outstanding. I have grave doubts as to whether 97% have already been rendered and dealt with.

As regards the denunzie or accertamenti required in the second phase, very large numbers of these remain to be dealt with. At the rate at which they are being handled in many places, it would seem that many months must elapse before the work is completed. U.P.S.E.A. records generally appear to be in a state of chaos. This state of affairs is attributed by the responsible officials to shortage of staff.

The Head of the U.P.S.E.A. reports that two years ago the strength of staff was three times that at work today. To take the case of PALERMO Province, the strength allowed for this years amassing was 150. When 110 officials had become available, orders were received that the staff should not be further increased.

The Head of the U.P.S.E.A., in addition to being in charge of PALERMO Province, is responsible for coordination throughout the Island, but he was unaware as to the U.P.S.E.A. personnel situation in the remainder of the Island. The U.P.S.E.A. in PALERMO has only one car at the disposal of its staff (in which connection see the following paragraph). My first reaction was that the whole machinery had broken down but I am informed by those concerned, including the High Commissioner, that this is not the case and this may be so, judging by Italian standards.

6. I found that there was a lamentable lack of cars available for U.P.S.E.A. officials throughout the Island. From the time I took over, I have been pressing for this state of affairs to be remedied even though so late in the campaign. Results to date have been disappointing. I am convinced the vehicles could be obtained if energetic action were taken by those concerned, but they seem to be either afraid or incapable of taking action.

In the case of PALERMO Province mentioned in para 5 above where at present the U.P.S.E.A. officials, including the Head responsible for co-ordination throughout the Island, have

1093

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In the case of PALERMO Province mentioned in para 5 above where at present the U.P.S.E.A officials, including the Head responsible for co-ordination throughout the Island, have one car only, there are a considerable number of taxis plying or standing on ranks in the city of PALERMO and only 50% can be in use at anyone time.

When the High Commissioner is pressed on this and similar matters, he explains that the Prefects have their instructions and complains bitterly of lack of cooperation on the part of the Prefecture and Guesture.

As regards lack of tyres for vehicles, I am not clear whether the inner tubes which were to be made available immediately under your Memo 203/28/CA of 6 JUL were for requisitioned A.C.C. vehicles or for vehicles for officials. Tyres are required for both types. In any case, no inner tubes have been forthcoming.

In this connection, however, a complete lack of civilian transport discipline and control seems to prevail on the

Island.

Confidential

7. I found that the pay of U.F.S.M. officers first came to my attention, months in arrears. When this matter first came to my attention, it had apparently not been brought to the notice of the High Commissioner through the Head of the U.P.S.M.A. or any other channel. The High Commissioner undertook to have the matter remedied at once but it seemed to me to reveal a serious state of affairs in circumstances where I have heard it said that the farmers are indifferent about handing in grain because they suspect some officials of passing the grain "around the back of the warehouses" to the Black Market.

8. As regards forces available for compulsory measures one Infantry Bn of the Italian Army had recently left the Island shortly before I took over. It was agreed between my predecessor, myself, the High Commissioner and the Italian Corps Commander that at least another three Battalions were essential. I took this matter up during the last Regional Commissioners' Conference without result. I also understand that the Italian Army authorities here applied for such reinforcement without success. When I discussed this matter unofficially with M.M.I.A., I respectfully suggest that the position was not then fully appreciated. Mention was made that a very much smaller number of Allied troops could carry out a much greater task. Such argument overlooks the fact that here it is the civilians who have the modern armament and that to comp a considerable area of country in a reasonable space of time, to control movement to enforce the law, and to unearth hidden supplies require numbers as well as adequate armament. The situation has recently been most seriously jeopardised further by the withdrawal on 25 SEP of another Italian Infantry Bn and, during the last few days, of some 500 Carabinieri of which another 1000 are alerted to follow shortly. These facts have already been reported to your Headquarters but, had I been kept informed of these moves in the proposal stage, I should have protested much earlier. The maintenance of law and order generally is also affected by the available police and other armed forces and this is very closely inter-related here with the collection of grain.

The existing position is that present forces available permit of one Grain enforcement squad being at work in PALERMO province and I understand from the Italian Corps Commander that he may find it possible to reinforce the CC.RR. so as to permit also of an enforcement squad for the province of AGRIGENTO.

Although somewhat outside my purview, I have discussed the whole situation with the Italian Corps Commander and he considers that, from the point of view of internal security and of grain collection enforcement, another three full-strength Battalions are required or, alternatively, that uniforms and equipment should be made available immediately and authority granted to enable him to call up 2000 men locally but, naturally, would prefer not to have Sicilian troops.

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Confidential

9. Grain collection has fallen to alarming extent during recent days. The time allowance up to the 15th of September granted by the High Commissioner in respect of certain returns naturally held up collection but it is now some days past that date and collection shows no sign of revival. Collection for the past seven days has averaged only 5000 quintals per day. As regards future food prospects, if at least 5,000,000 quintals are required to feed this island for the twelve months to the next amassing, with the 1,200,000 quintals already collected there is in sight, at the rate grain is coming in at the moment, only flour approximately sufficient to feed this island up to the end of December, having regard to the fact that the island came on to local supplies of grain in JULY.

10. The High Commissioner is, I feel, untiring in his efforts to achieve a successful amassing, but he cannot obtain co-operation and is severely handicapped by lack of drive and a spirit of *laissez-faire* (coupled with the normal official working hours) from all subordinate offices, and passive resistance on the part of the farmers, including the big landowners. All the matters referred to in this letter (except that referring to the employment of Allied troops) have been brought in writing or verbally to the attention of the High Commissioner.

11. Presumably, it might become necessary in the not too distant future, in view of the grave broad problem with which the island may be faced, to take some stern and comprehensive measures, such as the requisitioning of all grain on the island and of all mills. Such measures could only be taken if backed by sufficient force.

12. In view of the foregoing I therefore request that:-

- a. Further withdrawals of armed forces (including CC.RR.) from SICILY should be suspended forthwith.
- b. Arrangements be made for the early despatch to the island of such Italian armed forces as are considered necessary. It is estimated at the moment that at least 3 Battalions of Italian Infantry appropriately equipped are required.
- c. Consideration be given to the matter of sending Allied troops (with the necessary transport) to the island, part of which could be used for grain collection enforcement.
- d. I should be kept informed of all future movements of armed forces into or away from SICILY.
- e. Due note should be taken of the serious food situation which will arise in the not too distant future should the existing state of affairs con-

1093

efforts to achieve a successful unassessing, but he cannot obtain co-operation and is severely handicapped by lack of drive and a spirit of *laissez-faire* (coupled with the normal official working hours) from all subordinate offices, and passive resistance on the part of the farmers, including the big land-owners. All the matters referred to in this letter (except that referring to the employment of Allied troops) have been brought in writing or verbally to the attention of the High Commissioner.

11. Presumably, it might become necessary in the not too distant future, in view of the grave bread problem with which the Island may be faced, to take some stern and comprehensive measures, such as the requisitioning of all grain on the Island and of all mills. Such measures could only be taken if backed by sufficient force.

12. In view of the foregoing I therefore request that:-

- a. Further withdrawals of armed forces (including CC.RR.) from SICILY should be suspended forthwith.
- b. Arrangements be made for the early despatch to the Island of such Italian armed forces as are considered necessary. It is estimated at the moment that at least 3 Battalions of Italian Infantry appropriately equipped are required.
- c. Consideration be given to the matter of sending Allied troops (with the necessary transport) to the Island, part of which could be used for grain collection enforcement.
- d. I should be kept informed of all future movements of Armed Forces into or away from SICILY.
- e. Due note should be taken of the serious food situation which will arise in the not too distant future should the existing state of affairs continue.
- f. The appropriate Italian Government department should be approached to ensure that in case there is any local difficulty in this matter, the U.P.S.E.A. officials are paid up to date forthwith and promptly in future.

M. Carr

M. CARR
Brigadier
Regional Commissioner

769 2
CAB 8
2345
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
SICILY REGION HEADQUARTERS
APO 394.

FILE : RPS 014.1. 22nd September 44.
SUBJECT : Sicilian Independence Leader - 20 SEP Recd
APRILE Pinocchiaro.
TO : Allied Control Commission Headquarters,
R.C. & M.G. Section. 244

27/28. 6-7 2045
Reference signal from this Region RPS 54 dated
18th September, 1944 and reply NR 3563 of 21st :

1. Attached for information is copy of a full
report from the Questore, Palermo, of the incident in which
the above named was involved on 17th September, 1944.

2. It is understood from the Questore that it
is now proposed to take proceedings against APRILE by way
of denouncement and not to arrest him. The result of these
proceedings will be reported in due course. I personally saw
the High Commissioner the day after the incident and strongly
advised him to have APRILE arrested - there was the complication
however that APRILE should presumably have been arrested at the
time the breach of the peace was committed. I have not had an
opportunity of discussing the matter with the HC since.

M. Carr
M. CARR,
Brigadier,
Regional Commissioner.

Enclosure : Translated copy of Questore report of
incidents at attempted Separatist meeting
at Mondello - 17/9/44.



Regia Questura di Palermo

Copy of Phonogram.

17/9/44.

SUBJECT : Sicilian Independence Meeting.

This Office was informed yesterday that the leaders of the Sicilian Independence Movement had arranged to meet in the afternoon of today in the vicinity of VALDESE.

Since no authorisation had been requested, adequate services had been ordered to prevent the meeting.

The Commissario Cav. URSO was entrusted with the direction of these services assisted by Commissari Dr. LA PAROLA and Dr. SPAMPINATO, who had adequate numbers of CCR and Agents of PS at their disposal.

At 1500 hours, as soon as Cav. URSO arrived at the place, since he was informed that this meeting was to be held in the open in front of PATTI, Giuseppe's hut, who had arranged a small stage for the speakers, he (Cav URSO) approached him (Patti), and stated that the meeting could not be held because of the orders of his superiors. At these words, however, PATTI answered that the meeting would be held anyway, either in front of his hut or in a Villa nearby.

At about 1630 hours 10 leaders of the movement arrived at the place, amongst whom was the dreadful, previously convicted and ex-confined person ACCARDI, Vincenzo. Being informed by Dr. Cav. URSO that the meeting could not be held, these persons went away without causing any incident. About 1700 hours a group of about 30 Separatists, headed by ex-Deputy APRILE FINOCCHIARO, bearing a red and yellow flag, coming from the vicinity of the bathing establishment, going towards PATTI's hut.

Then, Cav. URSO, gently approaching APRILE, informed him that the meeting could not be held as he had not received the prescribed authorisation. At these words APRILE, with his right hand raised in a threatening manner, arrogantly asked Cav. URSO who he was, and being informed that he (URSO) was a P.S. Commissario, director of the service, pronounced the following words - "From whom have you received the order to stop the meeting? Who are your superiors - that cuckold of ALDISIO and that 'coglione' of the Prefect? Get away from the 'coglione', and no one is able to

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Maintaining the maximum calm, Cav. URSO advised APRILE to desist from his proposal, letting him understand that his resistance was useless because he would not permit the holding of the meeting. **1094**

As APRILE continued to utter offensive words against the functionary, and to instigate his leaders to rail against him, Cav. URSO ordered a part of his force to intervene in order to disperse those attending the meeting, numbering about 100.

6
coming from PALERMO and other towns, amongst whom we noticed individuals who are supporters of MAFIA, later a group of them entered a nearby villa, where they attempted to approach other Separatists/ This was however prevented, so the leaders of the movement started to offend and outrage the public force.

At this point Cav. URSO ordered the dispersal of the meeting and seizure of the standard by force. A struggle followed from which contusions were received by Agents, Carabinieri, and demonstrators, one of whom reported a wound in the head.

After this APRILE protesting, went with a few of his leaders to the Command of British Police located in the suburbs of MONDELLO, where he complained against the behaviour of the public police and authorities, who did not tolerate the meeting.

As APRILE proposed, amongst other things, to the demonstrators to go and find S.E. ALDISIO, who he knew to be in the vicinity, uttered the following words - "Let's go and find that cuckold Aldisio". Cav. URSO with the force at his disposal prevented them carrying out this proposal. At this APRILE, leaving with some of his demonstrators, addressed the following words - "All of you are disgusting".

These words provoking a lively resentment on the part of the CCRR and Agents, who would have liked to react.

Amongst the other leaders of the movement we noticed there Avv. VARVARO, Avv. SANFILIPPO, and Rag. CAMPISI.

Although APRILE was responsible for outrage, violence and resistance against public forces, also for infraction of the institution of the state and even infraction of the PS laws as he attempted to hold a meeting in the open without being previously authorised, Car. URSO did not proceed to his arrest of the a/m for opportune reasons.

CARBO
Questore.

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GARBO
Questore.

Excellent "Garbage".

Se 11/10.

1092

769

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ACC REGION I

3563

ACC HQ

RESTRICTED

3563

ROUTINE

19 Sep 44

4

Civil Affairs Br.

REF YOUR SIGNAL ROGER PETER SUGAR FIVE FOUR OF ONE EIGHT SEPTEMBER PD
PAREN TO ACC REGION ONE FROM ACC HQ PAREN PD MAY WE HAVE FULLER INFORMATION
OF INCIDENT INVOLVING APRILA

see 81

L.T. MONTANT JR
1st LT, AGD
ADJUTANT

1091
1095
28
10/11/44
10/11/44
10/11/44

SECRET

351769

LIED CONTROL CON MISSION

INCOMING MESSAGE

CARR

4

5637

TO: HQ ACC FOR INFO PUBLIC SAFETY SUB COMMISSION

SIGNAL MESSAGE CENTER No: 10/19

FROM: ACC REGION 1 (CARR)

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

REFERENCE No: RES-51

PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY

DATE AND TIME OF ORIGIN: SEPT 18 OFFICE OF ORIGIN: HQ ACC 10 SEP 1944

~~Confidential~~

ACTION

SPECIAL SITUATION REPORT. APRILA SEPARATIST LEADER INVOLVED IN INCIDENT
PALERMO ON 17TH SEPT. ITALIAN AUTHORITIES CONSIDERING ARREST. HAVE AGREED LINE OF
ACTION WITH HIGH COMMISSIONER

5

ACC DIST

ACTION C A ER (2)
INFO A/CC
R SAFETY
ADM SC
FILE

Isola di APRILA

8 19/7

see file 2

HEADQUARTERS
10 SEP 1944
A.C. 1093

REFERENCE No: REG-51 PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY
DATE AND TIME OF ORIGIN: SEPT 18 OFFICE OF ORIGIN: ROME 19 SEP 1944
Confidential

ACTION

SPECIAL SITUATION REPORT. APRILA SEPARATIST LEADER INVOLVED IN INCIDENT
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see S

ACC DIST
ACTION C A BR (2)
INFO A/CC
P SAFETY
ADM SC
FILE

15th 4 APRIL
98 17/9
see file 2

HEADQUARTERS
10 SEP 1944
A.C. 10936

SEPT 190950

DATE and Time of RECEIPT

Distribution:

SECRET

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HEADQUARTERS,
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
APO 39.

Regional Control and Military Government Section.
+++++

Ref: 203/28/OA.

6 July 1944

SUBJECT: Enforcement of Grain Collection in Sicily.

TO : Vice President,
Economic Section.
Administrative Section.
Army Sub-Commission.
Regional Commissioner, Region I.
Regional Commissioner, Region II.
Secretary General.
P.R.O.
P.W.B.

file 1-2

1. By direction of the Acting Chief Commissioner I enclose memorandum on the enforcement of grain collection in Sicily which was discussed at the Vice Presidents' Meeting on 5th July.
2. The Acting Chief Commissioner wishes action to be taken by the authority named in the left hand column and directs that co-ordination at ACC HQ shall be arranged by the R.C. & M.G. Section.

MS [Signature]

MSL/JG.

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

1083

Amendix "A" to 203/28/CA
dated 6 July 1944

ENFORCEMENT OF GRAIN COLLECTION IN SICILY.

ACTION BY.

1. The terms of the decree ordering the collection of grain is to be enforced in Sicily with the greatest vigour. We must expect opposition and obstruction from the people and drastic measures will be necessary.

2. The following action by the Italian Government, ACC and other authorities is recommended:-

A. By the Italian Government.

(i) A firm statement should be made by the Prime Minister over the air and in the Press, to be repeated at frequent intervals, making it clear:-

(a) that the price of L. 1000 per quintal will not be increased by war bonus or any other means;

(b) that the collection of grain will be enforced by every means at the disposal of the Government and that heavy penalties will be imposed on offenders;

(c) that it is the duty of all Sicilians to make themselves self-supporting as an Island by bringing in the grain for proper distribution.

(ii) This statement to be followed by continuous propaganda and to be backed up by personal tours of the Island by the Minister of Agriculture and if possible the Prime Minister himself (not by Under-Secretaries), directed towards the collection of grain and not towards political purposes. The High Commissioner and Signor Orlando should carry out similar tours.

(iii) Direction to be given to the High Commissioner and the Italian tribunals that penalties against the decree must be increased to the maximum and offenders brought immediately to trial.

(iv) Instructions to be issued by the Ministers of Interior and Agriculture to Prefects and Agriculture Inspectors insisting on drastic action being taken and a Special Order of the Day to be issued to the Carabinieri concerning their responsibilities in helping to collect the grain and to arrest speculators.

(v) Arrangements to be made (with MGA) to place the maximum

Adm Sec
PRO
FWB

Econ Sec.
Adm Sec.

Adm Sec.

Adm Sec.
Econ Sec.

Sec Gen.

1088

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Adm Sec
PRO
FWB

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Econ Sec.
Adm Sec.

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Adm Sec.

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Adm Sec.
Econ Sec.

(v) Arrangements to be made (with MMIA) to place the maximum number of Armed Forces (including Carabinieri) at the disposal of the High Commissioner to enforce the decree.

Sec Gen.
MMIA.

(vi) The acceleration of the promulgation of the road haulage decree which enforces the formation of the Provincial Consorzio to utilise private trucks on call at fixed tariffs.

Econ Sec.

(vii) The removal from Sicily of the heads of the Separatist movement, specially FINOCCHIARO AFRILE, AVVORATO DE MARTINO, BARON CESAR, BRUNO DI BELMONTE, and other members of the so-called National Committee for the Independence of Sicily.

RC & MG Sec.

-2-

ACTION BY.
RC & MG Sec
Political Sec.

B. By the Vatican.

The intervention with special directions to Cardinal LAVITRANO for a special drive through the Churches.

C. By A.C.C. Headquarters.

(1) The appointment of Colonel A. YOUNG, Assistant Director of Public Safety Sub-Commission, as officer in charge of enforcement of grain collection under the authority of Regional Commissioner, Region I.

RC & MG Sec
Adm Sec.

(ii) Arrange for the employment in Sicily of 7000 parole POW about to be made returnable to the Italian Army for the despatch of two battalions from elsewhere.

MG Sec.

Econ Sec.

(iii) Arrange for the immediate despatch of inner tubes for motor tyres for requisitioned cars.

Adm Sec.

(iv) Consultation with the Ministry of Justice for the rapid trial of offenders against the decree.

Sec Gen.

(v) Immediate consultation with PWB and PRO with the object of setting out forceful propaganda appealing to the emotions of the people and despatching suitable officers for this purpose. The present staff is weak. Draft appeal by Colonel Zellars attached (Appendix "B"). The use of local journalists to be encouraged. Special reference to be made to the dangers of inflation in really forceful propaganda.

RC & MG Sec.

(vi) Another appeal to AAI to assist in every manner by provision of transport, military police.

Adm Sec.

(vii) Numbers of Carabinieri to be increased if possible.

D. By A.C.C. Region I.

(1) Regional Commissioner will convoke the High Commissioner and his Giunta Consultiva on return to Palermo in order to intensify deliveries to the granaries and to warn them that no inducement will be forthcoming and that force has got to be used.

Regional
Commissioner.

(ii) Similar action with the Committees of Liberation and with local governments in Provinces.

3. Most of the above also applies to Region II but the following special action is necessary:-

A. By A.C.C. Headquarters.

(1) Arrange for permanent use of at least one platoon of 2½ - 3 ton trucks for Region II in addition to those already provided from British sources and operating on road haulage (approx. 110).

Econ Sec.

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(vi) Another appeal to AMI to assist in every manner by provision of transport, military police.

(vii) Numbers of Carabinieri to be increased if possible.

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(1) Arrangements for permanent use of at least one platoon of 2½ - 3 ton trucks for Region II in addition to those already provided from British sources and operating on road haulage (approx. 110).

(ii) Increase Carabinieri by 200, if possible.

MAIA

Econ Sec.

Adm Sec.

Sec Gen.

RC & MG Sec.

Adm Sec.

Regional Commissioner.

Econ Sec.

Adm Sec.

Appendix "B" to 203/28/CA
dated 6 July 1944

PUBLICITY - GRANAI DEL POPOLO.

1. 1944 is bringing to Italy good fortune in that she is at last being liberated from the yoke of dictator gangs, through Allied assistance.
2. Nature also is provident. Food, a sufficiency for all, is now at hand.
3. The most bountiful crop of grain in twenty years has been harvested without waste. Through this rich blessing Italy can feed herself well in a world in which many people are not so fortunate.
4. The threshing of this gigantic crop of grain is well under way. The collection and the distribution of the crop has begun.
5. The important phase of placing bread and pasta in the hands of all - each person in Italy is entitled to sufficient to sustain his life - has now arrived.
6. It is the sacred duty of all Italians to collect and properly distribute the grain - farmers, Prefects and their staff, Sindaci and their communal committees, the Consorzi, labourers, warehouse men, judges, priests, yea, all must do their part in this, the most important function in the restoration of Italy.
7. Wagons, motors, rail, must be used to move the grain from the overflowing threshing floors to the towns and cities for people to eat who otherwise would go hungry in a land of sufficiency.
8. The Allies guarantee that grain grown on Italian soil will be eaten by Italian people - no shipments will be made outside of Italy of grain grown in Italy.
9. Italians must do the job of collection and distribution. The Allies will support and assist. This collection and distribution of the grain is the first real test of character and fortitude facing Italy in her post War reconstruction.
10. This important and necessary operation is so humanitarian that it transcends political parties or selfish interests. Arise liberated Italy, unite in your efforts and make sure that people of Italy get the food grown on Italian soil.
11. Hard work, team work, and head work, backed up by a determined populace will assure this momentous job.

0 5 5 1