

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

ACC

10000/109/835

MIL
APR

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

10000/109/835

MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR THE HARVEST
APR., MAY 1945

C.S.O. ¹⁵ There are files 14. If you appear for ^{signal} ~~the~~ ~~signal~~ to send by Gen. Sec. following up signal of 14 day (file 13)

APR 26/1945

16

Speed.

Lab. Sec. Sec.
W. Sec. Sec.

27/8/45

20

C.S.O. ^{Ref. file 18} Lab. Sec. said Telephonis reply received. - Must personnel referred. Offer made of 10000 German P.O.W. but Lt. Antikton referred & accept. New funding by Ag. Sec. show sufficient local labor on hand & handle labor.

APR 26/1945 H 116

1253

Ex. Com.

7

To see folio 6. Feb 2 May.

V.P. Economy Sect.

One P. 6 in the
2.

CSO.

- (1) Staff machine 4/5
- (2) Await action by Econ Sect.
178/3/5

Capt Arnold - 9

Delivered at meeting. We have
await action by Econ Sect.

P.L. follow up. Feb 2 May
5/5.

10-

10/5

A check with Econ Sect. decided that they are waiting for a letter
from ARHQ. - an app. from Min of Agriculture - & letter from Labor Officer PH
from Agriculture Law Command. - by a sample of them & a decision will
be forthcoming. See P/V at 2. Feb 2 May

1253

No. 785017

CSO.

- (1) Staff meeting 4/5
- (2) Award given by Ecom Sect.

124/31

Capt. Arnold — 9

Discussed at meeting. We have
await action by Sen. Sect.

Pl. / *Stems* up.

2007-04-03

5/5

10-

1253

A check with Econ Sect. disclosed that they are waiting for a letter from ASTRG. - an appeal from Miss Gaglianone - & letter from Labor Officer from Administrative Law Council. - for receipt of them ~~and~~ a decision will be forthcoming. See R/S at 2. (20)

250

A cable was sent off 16/1/48 by Econ Sect. & A.G. 1000 asking authority
to use St. Army personnel for the harvest. The cable was shown to
Gen. Browning & Brig. Gen. before transmission. 38912

17/07/15

Noted for
15 May

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

4209A
ALLIED ~~CONTROL~~ COMMISSION
INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Italian Army Labor for
Harvesting

FILE NO. BS/10.03

TO : Executive Commissioner
 Att: Capt. Arnoldby

29 May 1945

MAY 30 1945

1. Reference your memo 4209/17/EC of 26 May 45.
2. As requested, the attached signal on the above subject was dispatched by the Economic Section on 29 May 45.

James Macarthy
 CHARLES W. WASTON
 Colonel
 Deputy Chief, Supply Division
 Economic Section

1 Attachment
 Signal 8062

(Capt Arnoldby)

BU 6 *Noted*
 6 (Capt Arnoldby)
 Full Closure on
 REPLY.

1252

785017

GEORGE DASH FIVE AFHQ

HQ ALCON

8662

29 MAY 1945

PRIORITY

RESTRICTED PD

SUBJECT IS ITALIAN ARMY LABOR FOR HARVESTING

PARA ONE PD REFERENCE CABLE SEVEN SIX NINE ONE UPONE SIX MAY ONE NINE
FOUR FIVE REQUESTING ITALIAN ARMY SOLDIERS FOR HARVEST ONE ^{10,000} ZERO ZERO
ZERO ZERO FOR FOGGIA AND TWELVE THOUSAND FOR MATERA PD

PARIN TO AFHQ FOR GEORGE DASH FIVE FROM ALCON CITE AGECO PAREN

PARA TWO PD IT IS URGED THAT ACTION BE TAKEN AND ADVICE BE FURNISHED
ON THE PROPOSAL BECAUSE HARVEST SEASON COMMENCES EARLY IN JUNE

1251

ALCON SECTION

460

NICHOLAS DIOMBINO
CWO USA
ASST. ADJ.

785017

ALLIED [REDACTED] COMMISSION

INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

Office of the Executive Commissioner

ANA/cam

SUBJECT: Italian Army Labor for Harvesting

FILE No.

4209/17/EC

TO : Romano Section

28 May

1945

1. Reference is made to your letter ES/10.03 of 24 May.
2. Follow-up signal, referred to in your para three, to AFHQ has been approved by the Acting Executive Commissioner for transmittal.
3. Please send this signal and forward a copy to the Executive Commissioner's Office.

BU 31/5 11/6/45

151 AB AR 1250
✓ Chief Staff Officer
To Executive Commissioner

785017

1. 460

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
ECONOMIC SECTION
SUPPLY DIVISION

CWW/ba

111

Ref. ES/10.03

24 May 1945

SUBJECT: Italian Army Labor for Harvesting

TO : Office of the Chief Commissioner

MAY 25 1945

1. Reference is made to Signal 7691, 16 May, to G-5, AFHQ, requesting Italian army labor for Foggia and Matera.

2. Conversations with Major Byles in G-5 have indicated that the outlook is not good for obtaining the Italian army personnel. Subsequently, a conversation was held with General Hamblin, who, by implication, suggested that AC send a follow-up signal.

3. Therefore, it is recommended that a follow-up signal be sent to AFHQ substantially as follows:

"Reference 7691 16 May 45 requesting Italian army soldiers for harvest ten thousand for Foggia and twelve thousand for Matera, it is urged that action be taken and advice furnished on the proposal because the harvest season commences early in June."


E. B. MCKINLEY
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
Deputy Vice President

1243

cc Labor Sub-Commission
Agriculture Sub-Commission

(CAPT. ARNOLD)

115816
8717

4209
Lio

Alba

13

C O P Y

G-5 AFHQ

HQ ALCOM

7691

16 May 45
1000

RESTRICTED

ROUTINE

LABOR SUB COMMISSION

MAY 20 REC'D

RESTRICTED PD

PARA ONE PD MINISTRIES OF AGRICULTURE AND LABOR HAVE STATED DEFINITELY THAT IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO RECRUIT CIVILIAN LABOR FOR THE ONE NINE FOUR FIVE HARVEST SEASON IN THE FOGGIA AREA PD BOTH MINISTRIES INSIST THAT ITALIAN TROOPS MUST BE USED FOR THIS WORK PD

PARA TWO PD BECAUSE OF THE SHORTNESS OF THE SEASON AND THE IMMEDIACY OF THE NEED FOR WORKERS IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR LARGE SCALE MIGRATION OF WORKERS FROM DISTANT DISTRICTS PD

PARA THREE PD THIS IS IMPOSSIBLE BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES CMA HOUSING AND BEDDING EQUIPMENT CMA LACK OF SUPPLEMENTARY RATIONS AND POOR LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS PD

PARA FOUR PD WHILE THERE MAY BE MANY UNEMPLOYED WORKERS IN THOSE REGIONS AT THE PRESENT TIME CMA MOST OF THEM WILL BE EMPLOYED IN THEIR COMMUNITIES FOR THE HARVEST SEASON PD

1248

PARA FIVE PD LAST YEAR AND IN PREVIOUS YEARS ITALIAN TROOPS HAVE BEEN NEEDED AND USED FOR THE HARVEST SEASON IN THE FOGGIA AREA PD THEIR USE IS CUSTOMARY IN COUNTRIES WHERE CONSCRIPTION IS IN FORCE PD THIS YEAR THE NEED FOR THE USE OF TROOPS IS JUST AS GREAT AS LAST YEAR BECAUSE THOUSANDS OF ITALIAN CIVILIAN WORKERS IN THAT

(CAR. ARNOLD)

See 17. 11. F 14

C O P Y

- 2 -

REGION ARE ENGAGED ON SEVERAL ALLIED FORCES PROJECTS PD
PARA SIX PD UNLESS TROOPS ARE USED MOST OF THESE CIVILIAN WORKERS
NOW WORKING FOR THE ALLIED FORCES WILL UNDOUBTEDLY LEAVE THEIR
JOBS TO ACCEPT WORK IN THE FIELDS WHERE THEY WILL BE PAID WAGES
OF FIVE ZERO ZERO LIRE PER DAY AND WILL RECEIVE BETTER AND MORE
FOOD ALLOWANCE PD THESE ADVANTAGES MUST BE COMPARED WITH THEIR
PRESENT ALLIED FORCES WAGES OF ABOUT ONE EIGHT ZERO LIRE PER DAY
PD REPRESENTATIONS HAVE ALREADY BEEN MADE BY ADRIATIC BASE COMMAND
AND GEORGE DASH FIVE AFHQ EXPRESSING THEIR FEAR THAT CIVILIAN LABOR
WILL BE LOST TO THEM PD MMIA OPPOSE THIS REQUEST STATING THAT
REDUCED CEILING OF THREE HUNDRED THIRTEEN THOUSAND IS FULLY EM-
PLOYED AND COMMITTED AND BECAUSE CEILING MAY BE FURTHER REDUCED
PD MOREOVER FIFTY THOUSAND OVER-AGE PERSONNEL NECESSARILY BEING
DEMOBILIZED AND LEAVE PERCENTAGE BEING INCREASED TO FIFTEEN TO
MAINTAIN MORALE AND DISCIPLINE PD MMIA STATE THEY CANNOT TOUCH
COMBAT TROOPS CMA ITEM SUGAR DIVISIONS AND GUARD BATTALION AND
THAT SERVICE UNITS ARE EMPLOYED UNDER ALLIED COMMANDERS PD GENERAL
BROWNING FEELS THAT ADDITIONAL COMPLICATIONS SHOULD NOT BE IMPOSED
ON ITALIAN MILITARY AUTHORITIES PD

PARA SEVEN PD IN SPITE OF THESE REPRESENTATIONS CMA I CONSIDER
THAT THE TROOPS REQUIRED BY MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND LABOR
SHOULD BE SUPPLIED PD

PARA EIGHT PD THE PROBLEM IS URGENT BECAUSE THE HARVEST SEASON
BEGINS THE FIRST WEEK OF JUNE PD IT IS ESTIMATED THAT AT LEAST
ONE ZERO ZERO ZERO ZERO SOLDIERS WILL BE NEEDED FOR FOGGIA AND
TWELVE THOUSAND FOR MATERA PD

SECRET

SUBJECT: Italian Army personnel for harvesting
in FOGGIA

LAND FORCES SUB-COM, AC (MATA)

G/104

30 APR 45

MAY 1 REG

TO : HQ AC (for Executive Commissioner) ←

In confirmation of our conversation on 28 Apr on the above subject:-

1. I understand that you are considering demanding some 15000 Italian Army personnel for harvesting in FOGGIA from about 1 June.

2. From the military point of view I must oppose this for the following reasons:-

(a) Situation 1944 as compared with 1945

Last year we had a very large surplus of unused soldiers and it was thus possible to allot 16000 (which proved 2000 too many) from the 200,000 odd available in SARDINIA. This year the reduced total of 313,000 is fully employed and committed. Any removal of soldiers to this civilian task must thus be at the expense of the war effort. It is of course possible that by 1 June the Italian Army commitments may not be so great. But these depend on the course of operations and the internal situation after liberation of NORTH ITALY, and therefore cannot be fully foreseen. It is also possible, even probable, that the existing ceiling of 313,000 may be drastically reduced

(1) in view of the world wide shortage of supplies 1243

(ii) because ITALY is already, to all intents and purposes, liberated and this is surely likely to be an accomplished fact very shortly.

The remaining Italian Army would then certainly

785017

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(11) because ITALY is already, to all intents and purposes, liberated and this is surely likely to be an accomplished fact very shortly.

The remaining Italian Army would then certainly not be available to provide harvesters, as the only units kept would be those required for essential military purposes.

In any event, at this late stage, time is very short for implementing any plan that might be authorised for the use of military personnel.

(b) Source of Army provision

Even assuming that the use of military personnel was authorised, both on operational and I.S.

grounds (particularly as you consider 10000 more CCR are necessary), we cannot touch Combat Groups, I.S. Divs and Guard Bns; or their reinforcements which require training.

see M. T. 11.9
10
BO 2-2
AM 13.2/..

(HAS STEWARTS)

Sheet 2.

2. (Contd.)

- (b) We cannot touch the Directing (M of W) or Administrative part of the machine, otherwise the whole will break down. We would thus have to draw from Service Units (BR and US) and their reinforcements.

(c) Service Units

- (i) These are fully employed. In fact under Priority List 8, we are still rapidly forming new units as a military necessity. Presumably therefore such units cannot be spared.

- (ii) Apart from normal wastage, 5% of a unit is authorised to be on leave. On discipline and morale grounds this may be increased to 10% or even 15% (see my A.O.16 dated 24 Apr). In addition we will have to demobilise at an early date some 50,000 over-age personnel of the 1913 and older classes and of the first 4 months of the 1914 class whose homes are in the North. Such classes have already been demobilised in liberated (prior to our recent offensive) ITALY. We are faced (on these counts alone, apart from general grounds) with the possibility shortly of a very big drop in Army strength and it seems doubtful if the Army could bear a further strain of 15000 for harvesting.

- (iii) For administrative (mainly clothing) reasons we can only take in some 19000 a month into the Army.

- (iv) If a levy of 5% on every unit were made (to produce the 15000 harvesters) executive difficulties would arise. The collection and movement of all these small parties from a large number of units in itself is a big task; we do not know where many units will be in a few weeks time and we have to bid for movement facilities 2 weeks ahead; temporarily movement of leave personnel has been stopped owing to the strain on the railways, which presumably will be at least as

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(v) Reinforcements in depots should not be touched. These are largely young untrained men and are necessary to replace wastage.

3. CONCLUSION

(a) I know that pre-war it was accepted and normal that the Army should get agricultural leave. But conditions this year, even compared with 1944, are vastly different.

- (b) Whether the existing ceiling of 313,000 is retained as necessary for the War Effort or is reduced owing to lesser commitments, the Army cannot afford to allot 15,000 men to a non-military task.
- (c) We have handed a large part of ITALY (in which FOGGIA lies) to the Italian Government. Surely we cannot accept that the Italian Government are so weak or inefficient that out of a population of some 20 millions in liberated ITALY alone (prior to our offensive), they cannot organize and draft into FOGGIA a labour force of a mere 15,000. This relatively small total cannot possibly, as I see it, upset the domestic or industrial economy in other directions.
- (d) At this late stage in the proceedings and bearing in mind the potential changes and still nebulous future of the Italian Army, I feel that this additional complication should NOT be imposed on the Italian Military Authorities and that the Italian Government should be ordered to stand on their own feet in carrying out this civilian commitment.
- (e) The whole matter is of course one for decision by AFHQ but I would like this letter to be attached to any communication you may make to AFHQ on the matter, as representing the military views of MMIA.

L. Browning

Major General
MMIA

1242

785017

Ref: 4209/EC.

30 April 1945.

SUBJECT: Harvest - Use of Italian Soldiers.

TO : Vice President,
Economic Section (2).

1. On April 22 Colonel Denmore brought one of the staff officers of the Adriatic Base Depot and we discussed the question of provision of Italian Army personnel on agricultural leave for the collection of the harvest on the Adriatic Coast, particularly in Foggia Province. It was arranged that formal application should be made by the Minister of Agriculture to the Minister for War who then, presumably, would pass it to the Land Forces Sub-Commission. Simultaneously, Adriatic Base Depot would apply for some such help in order to avoid diminution of labour resources available to the Allied military authorities.

2. If the Agriculture Sub-Commission is in agreement with the Minister of Agriculture that 10-15,000 troops on agricultural leave are needed, the time has come when we should take steps to obtain AFMC approval for the use of these troops. This is not going to be easy because Land Forces Sub-Commission will not agree. Speed is therefore essential.

M. S. LUSH

MSL/EC.

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

1243

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785017

4209 W01

(2)

LABOR OFFICE MEMORANDUM

ECONOMIC SECTION

7.08/ES

28 April 1945

SUBJECT: Assignment of Italian Troops to Assist in Coming Wheat Harvest.

APR 30 1945

TO : Supply Division for Agriculture S/C.

1. As a result of a conference held this morning between Lt. Colonel Crosby, Labor Officer, Adriatic Base Command, with the Executive Commissioner, it was decided:

a. Agriculture S/C would again request the Minister of Agriculture to make a formal request in writing on the Minister of War for the assignment of 20,000 Italian troops to assist in the coming wheat harvest. It was thought advisable for the Minister of Agriculture to include in the request that a certain number, to be determined by the Minister of Agriculture, of Italian troops be made available to assist Italian civilian officials with the amassing of wheat in Italian Government territory.

b. It is anticipated that the Minister of War would approve the request and transmit it on to MMIA for implementation approval. However, past experience of the Minister of Agriculture has been to the effect that his requests on this matter have not been transmitted by the Minister of War to MMIA. Therefore, it is desired that the Minister of Agriculture through the Agriculture S/C provide the Executive Commissioner's office with a copy of the formal request which the Minister of Agriculture places upon the Minister of War.

c. Labor Officer of the Adriatic Base Command will submit a formal letter through channels to Headquarters, Allied Commission, requesting that the Italian troops be made available for harvesting the wheat crop.

d. When the Executive Commissioner has received the copy of the Minister of Agriculture's request on the Minister of War and the letter from the Adriatic Base Command, he (Executive Commissioner) will formally take the matter up with AFHQ. In the meantime the Executive Commissioner is holding an informal conference with MMIA on the matter.

(sgd) L. D. DENSMORE

L. D. DENSMORE
Colonel, FA, CSO
Economic Section

see M10

cc: Executive Commissioner ✓
Production Div. for Labor S/C

(Mrs. RYAN)

G-5 AFHQ

5277

12 April 1945

ROUTINE

RESTRICTED ID

SUBJECT IS MILITARY PERSONNEL FOR FOGGIA HARVEST ID

PARM TO GEORGE DASH FIVE AFHQ FROM HQ ALCON CIES AGO TO PARM

PARA ONE ID UNDERSTAND GEORGE DASH THREE ORGANIZATIONS FOREIGN AFHQ HAS REQUESTED NINE MORE FROM AFHQ TO MAKE SUGGESTIONS AS TO HOW TWENTY THOUSAND MILITARY PERSONNEL MAY BE POOLED FOR FOGGIA HARVEST ID

PARA TWO ID NO FORMAL DEMAND HAS YET BEEN MADE BY THIS HEADQUARTERS FOR ANY MILITARY PERSONNEL FOR THIS PURPOSE ID

PARA THREE ID PLANS NOW BEING FORMULATED AND WILL BE COMMUNICATED TO YOU IN DUE COURSE

Int. Dist.

O.A. Sec.
Economic Sec. (3)
Land Forces S/C

Office of Exec. Commissioner

300

Major E. Talbot Major.

1241

13 Apr

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Bolet 18/4
not received
to B. B. C. C.

0 6 8 7