

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

ACC

10000/109/1139
(VOL. I)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

1139

ITALIAN ARMY POLICY
SEPT. 1944 - APR. 1945

92

Exec Commr:

To see folio 98, Land Forces S/c's statement re future control of Italian army. This letter is in answer to AFHQ's letter (folio 93) in which they request our recommendations.

At folio 100 there is a reply to AFHQ incorporating General Browning's statements. - *for your approval and signature.*

*Issue AS amended M/EP3
See P.100, reu by CSO 17/3*

103

TO: CSO to Exec Commr

Your attention is drawn to Folios 101 and 102.

28/3 Notes. Pls follow up on Gen Browning's return. Z.

J.A.Q.
28 Mar 45

Maj Starns

Pl see Col Fisher's memo

29/3

109

Chief Commissioner:

At 107, 106, 105 is General Browning's memorandum on relaxation of control of Italian Army. He makes three points:

104
May Steam

At sec Co Fisher

above

19/3

[Signature]

109.

Chief Commissioner:

At 107, 106, 105 is General Browning's memorandum on relaxation of control of Italian Army. He makes three points:

1. A very considerable relaxation of control has in fact already taken place through internal autonomy, subject only to SAC veto.
2. Territorial organization has been and is continuing to be established which in itself is a necessary and progressive step toward eventual transfer.
3. Any further steps in future are predicated on major policy decision with respect to post war Italian armed forces.

4/4/45

7
 N. E. F. 5868

At Exec. Comm.
Do see me re This

END

14/4

*108 Discussed with CC. & General Browning by Ex. Com. } Info. obtained from Do & CC
 EC. directs no action for time being. } 19 7A & EC.*

Chief Commissioner.

Attached is submitted for your information/signature/approval.

92 Then for A/President.

IT/Pres

TO note

Enc

MAR 4 1969

7/5/34/3

94

Exec Commr:

To see folio ⁹³, letter from AFHQ Chief of Staff regarding further policy in respect to control of Italian Army.

As it will be noted in folio ⁹⁴, Land Forces S/c have been asked to submit their recommendations to you as soon as possible.

96 When is the basic letter? 17/6/43

16/6/43

All above references tagged. L. 9/4.

L.C. to see also A/President's minute above at 91.

16. March is date of next Adv. Council Mtg

17/5/43

96.
When is the basic letter? MW/63

AM also references tagged. X. of.

~~4591~~

K.C. to see also Affidavit's minute above at 91.

16. March is date of next Adv. Council Mtg

MW/83

5967

84Exec Commr:

Please see folios 81 to 83 which summarize the position in regard to personnel of Italian Armed Forces of Yugoslav origin as requested in your minute 80. There is also attached a letter directed to GOC, Land Forces S/c, (MILA), in reply to his letter on the same subject of 21 Feb. This is submitted for your approval and signature.

*E.C. has seen 81-83 & letter
signed as requested. P. 3/3.*

[Signature]
1 Mar

86.

Mr. Halford,
Political Section.

Page 78 of this file was discussed at the Advisory Council meeting yesterday which was attended by the Executive Commissioner and yourself. The Executive Commissioner instructs me to request you to write a minute on this file giving a brief outline of the discussion which took place on this paper.

[Signature] 3/3.

87.

Executive Commissioner.

Reference minute No. 86.

The discussion at the Advisory Council Meeting on March 2nd, on the subject of the release from the Italian Armed Forces of Italian subjects of Slav origin led to no decisive result. The British and United States Representatives held the view that the question was primarily a military one on which the Council was not competent to pronounce. The Council could only suggest to the SACMED that he examine the position from the military aspect and indicate thereafter whether the Council could usefully debate the political side. The Yugoslav Representative maintained that the question was political and therefore its discussion was within the competence of the Council. He claimed that the military aspect of the question could be handled directly between the SACMED and Marshal Tito and that it was up to the Council to decide on the political implications. The Soviet

this paper.

Pa. 3 1/3

87.

Executive Commissioner.

Reference minute No. 86.

The discussion at the Advisory Council Meeting on March 2nd, on the subject of the release from the Italian Armed Forces of Italian subjects of Slav origin lead to no decisive result. The British and United States Representatives held the view that the question was primarily a military one on which the Council was not competent to pronounce. The Council could only suggest to the SACMED that he examine the position from the military aspect and indicate thereafter whether the Council could usefully debate the political side. The Yugoslav Representative maintained that the question was political and therefore its discussion was within the competence of the Council. He claimed that the military aspect of the question could be handled directly between the SACMED and Marshal Tito and that it was up to the Council to decide on the political implications. The Soviet Representative supported Dr. Smollika in this attitude. The French and Greek Representatives had no instructions from their respective Governments and could not therefore discuss the matter. It was eventually agreed to adjourn the debate so that the various representatives could report to their Governments and seek further instructions.

This question will be discussed again at the next meeting of the Council on March 16th.

5966

3/16/45.

W. S. R. H. FORD

Asst. Political Adviser

Ex Com

88

To see min 87.

Rob 3 Mar

Chief Commissioner

Confidential

CC #16 ✓

FEB 13 RECD

P 70 I consider that BOT L.C. Sub Com direct

approach to ATRQ on a matter which is one of general application to the Commission without consultation with you (or myself) is most inappropriate. The time has come for the machine I suggested some time ago between

At President, yourself & the General 7/8/13/2

COS

We prepare a letter to Dir. LFS/L
pointing out that his letter is out
of date - should have been
addressed to me. JWD

12/2

SEE 73.

16/2

17/2. 7/8/13/2

77.

Ex line

of details - should have been addressed to me. JWD

12

SEE 73. 46 CL
S. 17/2. 78 18/2

77.

Ex Com
Pl. sec 74 71 18/2

18/2

79

Ex Com
Please see 78. 18/23 Feb.

CSO Summarize the position as explained by tabs
on enclos file & draft reply to L.F. Sub Com copy to PO
Sec. 715 24/2

5900

61.

Chief Commissioner.

4th February 1945.

On pages 52 and 53, the Minister for War addresses a very sensible letter to General Browning on the call-up. This bears out our impressions that the recent call-up have been made without sufficient notice and preparation, particularly in co-operation with the civil authorities.

On pages 54 and 55, you will find certain decisions of the Council of Ministers based on January 18th, which have a bearing on the Italian Government's attitude towards the patriots, which cannot fail to do good. I am not quite certain what effect this will have on the recruitment of patriots for the Army, for it seems to me that they are going to get quite a lot of the plums before they join the Army.

M.S.L.

Brigadier.
Chief of Staff.

62.

*(COS you Min. 61. I join you in agreeing with D.E. Casati's observation. But I shall be grateful if you ensure that L.F. S/C implement them. This will need close supervision. JWD
CL
6/2*

63.

C80

Please draft letter to L.F. S.C. on, asking recapitulation (S.C. statement)

ing with D.F. Casati's observations. But
I shall be grateful if you ensure that
L.F. S/C implements them. This will need
close supervision. JWD
CL
b2

b3

C80

Please draft letter to L.F. Subcom, ~~receptiv~~ receptive
the general mistakes in the last call up - (Sicily, Napoli etc)
+ asking him to consult before call up. M/7/2

cos meeting. M/2/2.

65

5964

Capt Menden

This was discussed at Los Beeby and
it was decided not to send a further
letter. L.F. S/C are by now well aware
of the importance of coordination,
advance work etc.

9/2 PA

49

CC 155
JAN 18 1955

Chief Commissioner.

Attached is submitted for your information/signature/approval.

Copy has gone to AP President at his request which
you were aware

MS (18/1/55)

Voted 200

18/1

59

CSO To note files 50-58, in brief, this is a review and
summary of action taken by Italian Govt to improve
the lot of Italian recognizing the good work of the
Army and the Patriotic Gen Browning approves
JEB 30 Jan

60

Cos... 50-58 to read. In particular
on 10 54 the Italian Govt. has

CSO

To note files 50-58, in brief, this is a review and summary of action taken by Italian Govt to improve the lot and recognize the good work of the Army and the Patriots. Gen Browning approved
JWB 30 Jan

60

COS

50-58 to read. In particular on p 54 the Italian Govt. has determined some very constructive measures which should help the patriot situation. Also see para 3 of 53 in which Casati makes some suggestions of some "complementary" measures which might be taken by the Allies in connection with Call-ups. E. 1/2.

5963

18

Col.

1. AT 17 is the new direction for

The Land Force, Sub Commission (Under 1 a).

2. The name is now as stated above. An announcement will be made in the bulletin of this title.

3. The present functions are very clearly set out in para 3 and I think the red-underlined sentence in para 3 (a) will clear up past misunderstandings.

4. It supersedes all previous conflicting instructions. (para 9)

1.11.44

Ed. Singh 4507

21

Aching Ching Commissioner.

P. 9 Submitted. On the whole very satisfactory

HSE (3/11)

22

C of D helped in writing P 17 JWS

34

P.N. Advisors

JOS CAS

to see APC 17/11/44

22/11/44

Econ

21

Aeking Chia Commission.

P19 Submitted. Su Hsuehde very satisfactory

7/5/31

22

C of S Helped in writing P 17 2nd

34

P.N. Advisers } 10 sec. 11/11/31

Deos CAS

Each - HAVE OWN COPY.

48

TO: C.O.S.

1. Please see 43 to 47.
2. At 43 General Browning sums up his reasons for the impracticability of further Italian participation in combat. It is such an excellent memorandum that there is nothing to add,

15 Jan 45
Office, Chief of Staff.

59432

GOC Army Sub-Commission.

1. The points raised in my Page 1 to which you replied on Page 6, will be referred to AFHQ in order-that direction may be obtained.
2. I notice in para 6 of your memorandum that you state that MMIA are responsible for the military aspect of the Italian Army, AOC for the civil aspect. This would infer that there is a distinction between MMIA and the Army Sub-Commission. You will notice that para 13(a) of AFHQ directive AG 323/035 GCT-O dated 28 September lays down that the Army Sub-Commission (MMIA) is included in the AOC and that its status in the current organisation of the Commission will remain unchanged. It would therefore seem that while as MMIA your Sub-Commission is responsible for the military aspect, it also is responsible for the civilian aspect as the Army Sub-Commission under the authority of the Chief Commissioner.
3. I feel there may have been some misunderstanding on this point in the past and I should like to have your agreement.

10. Oct. 44.
MSL/JG.

MSL
Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

A/Chief Commissioner:

I refer to your minute A/CC 321-1 of 12. Oct. 44 at Page 7.

2. You will notice from my minute of 10. Oct above that I was thinking on the same lines and you will see the reactions of GOC Army Sub-Com on Pages 8 and 9.

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Chief of Staff.

10

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I refer to your minute A/CC 321-1 of 12. Oct. 44 at Page 7.

2. You will notice from my minute of 10. Oct above that I was thinking on the same lines and you will see the reactions of GOC Army Sub-Com on Pages 8 and 9.

3. I will take up the matter of the address with the staff.

14. Oct. 44.
MSL/JG.

M.S.L.
Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

(of)

Noted
5901
see's

20/10

Ack. 3. The correct address is
MSL/JG.

SUBJECT: Relaxation of control of the Italian Army

Land Forces Sub Com, A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)
File No: G/6
2 April 45.

TO : H.Q. Allied Commission
(For Chief Commissioner) (2).

APR 2 1945

FILE PREC/4500/22/AC
Folio 7

PREC/4500/22/AC
Folio 18

1. Ref your letter 8251/EC of 28 Mar and our conversation the same day, herewith two copies of a Memorandum giving my views on the whole subject.

2. (a) I have already sent you copies of the letters referred to in my Memorandum viz TS/G/12 of 4 Oct and 26 Dec 44 and TS/G/11 of 11 Oct 44.

(b) I also sent Brig. LUSH copies of same which he wanted for Mr. MACMILLAN on 6 Jan 45.

tvb.

Major General
M.M.I.A.

5960 -

COPY PASSED TO C.COM's OFFICE. - 3. APR 45.

See Minutes 109. 110. 111.

Folio 163, Vol. 2.

MEMORANDUM

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: Relaxation of control of the Italian Army.

Land Forces Sub Com, A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)

File No: C/6

2 April 45.

1. GENERAL

(a) Plans have been laid in accordance with the policy of the "new deal" for ITALY progressively to hand over control of ITALY to the ITALIAN Government.

(b) Nevertheless, in order to continue to obtain the maximum value from the Italian Army and its resources in aid of the Allied War Effort, the Chief of Staff, A.F.H.Q. in a letter dated 28 Feb directed that temporarily there would be no change in control as regards this aspect i.e. that the "status and functions of the Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C. (M.M.I.A.)" A.F.H.Q. letter A.C. 091.112/079 GCT-5 of 25 Oct 44 and the system of "Command and Administration of the Italian Army" A.F.H.Q. letter A.C. 091.711/169 of 16 Nov 44, would remain unchanged.

2. OBJECT

The object of this memorandum is to examine how Allied control of the Italian Army can in due course be relaxed and eventually handed over to the Italian Government.

3. FACTORS

(a) Transition Phases

There are three phases to be considered. The first, which exists at present, is complete Allied control. The third will be the establishment of the Italian Army under its own control on its post-war footing. Between the first and third phase lies the Second, which is the subject of this memorandum and specific plans for which cannot be made until further information on decisions re the third phase is available.

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(b) Italian Army Territorial Organisation

(i) Whatever the size and composition of the post-war Italian Army may be, an Administrative military organisation by areas covering all ITALY must be a component part. This is equally necessary now, in order that the Italian military authorities may sort out, administer and control their army (including ex-soldiers), military installations etc. both in liberated territory and North of the GOTHIC LINE as the remainder of ITALY is progressively liberated.

See Sec. 44

(ii) My proposals for this were set out in my TS/G/12 of 4 Oct 44, were agreed to by A.F.H.Q. and were implemented in my TS/G/12 of 26 Dec 44.

All right

(iii) To this extent the stage is set.

(c) Post-war Italian Army

At the request of Brig. NICHOLSON G-3 (Plans) A.F.H.Q. I wrote a memorandum TS/G/11 of 11 Oct 44 on this matter. This showed that definite conclusions or proposals were impossible for me to state, as these depend on high policy decisions by the Allied Governments.

See File 163

contd. sheet 2/..

3. FACTORS (Contd)

(c) Post-war Italian Army (Contd)

The memorandum, however, outlined the main factors that would have to be considered. This whole matter, I understand is now under active consideration by the C.C.S. at WASHINGTON.

(d) Allied assistance in maintenance of the Italian Army.

(i) The Italian Army is far from self supporting. The greater part of its rations, clothing, boots etc. is supplied by the Allies. In order to ensure correct and efficient distribution, an independent inter-Allied agency was set up by the C.C.S. under their FAN 338 of 26 Feb 44. M.M.I.A. is that agency and responsibility is on the "Country of ownership" basis, American or British. Control of the Italian Army must thus continue while FAN 338 is in force.

(ii) It is a matter of high policy as to whether the Allies would be prepared to hand over to the Italians control of the Italian Army, while still providing the latter with the essential means to exist. Moreover, if the Allies were prepared to do so, it would be possible for the Italians (by e.g. a reduction in the ration scale) to maintain a larger army than the 313,000 authorised. This would obviously be undesirable, particularly as I do not envisage the Italians being allowed by the Peace Treaty an Army as big as 313,000.

(iii) Certain administrative difficulties would have to be overcome. For instance it takes some 60 days after issue of supplies before full information becomes available to M.M.I.A. to complete its accounting procedure and correctly charge the Italians with the amounts owed to the British and American Governments. It would be possible to hand over the surplus supplies in depots in bulk on a given date, but we should have to insist on accurate returns for supplies issued up to that date and M.M.I.A. would have to continue its work for those 60 days.

(iv) The Italian Army is also very largely dependent on the Allies for all major items of fighting equipment such as M.T., guns, mortars, carriers etc. No Italian factories are producing these.

Allies were prepared to do so, it would be possible to main-
 Italians (by e.g. a reduction in the ration scale) to main-
 -tain a larger army than the 313,000 authorized. This
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 -lies issued up to that date and M.M.I.A. would have to
 continue its work for those 60 days.

(iv) The Italian Army is also very largely dependent on
 the Allies for all major items of fighting equipment such
 as M.T., guns, mortars, carriers etc. No Italian factories
 are producing these. It is a matter of high Allied policy
 as to whether the Italians shall be permitted to manufac-
 -ture these or to what extent the Allies would provide, if
 desirable.

(e) Date of hand-over of control of the Italian Army

(i) The Italian military authorities already possess a
 large measure of internal autonomy, subject to the orders
 or veto of S.A.C. through M.M.I.A. The policy throughout
 has been to try and make them stand on their own feet. They
 are being ridden more and more on the snaffle and less and
 less on the curb. Looked at in this way, virtual relax-
 -ation of control is thus already in progress. I consider
 that this state of affairs should continue until we hand
 over complete control officially on a given date; nor do I
 think that the Italians would object to this.

(ii) An Army is an entity with all its components inter-
 related. I do not see that we can relax control of one
 part while controlling the rest. Let us avoid further
 complications in an already complicated situation and have
 a clear-cut transfer of control on a given day, perhaps
 that of signing the Peace Treaty.

contd. sheet 3/...

3. (Contd)

(f) Position of M.M.I.A.

(i) The Allies will lay down certain terms in the Peace Treaty as regards the post-war size, composition and armament of the post-war Italian Army. It will therefore presumably be necessary to have an Allied Disarmament Commission to ensure that the terms of the Peace Treaty are carried out. It appears logical that, with their special experience and knowledge, the Service Sub Commission, A.C., should become this Disarmament Commission in a reorganised form. This form might be that of one Commission with 3 branches (Navy, Army, Air), the head being responsible to S.A.C. initially and in due course perhaps to the U.S. and British Governments through their respective Ambassadors in Rome.

(ii) Though acting as a Disarmament Commission, the Allied (or British, if it is decided to leave ITALY to British control) personnel could also perform the functions of Military Attaché, while at the same time giving such advice and help to the Italians as they might require.

(iii) If however a Disarmament Commission for co-belligerent ITALY is not considered necessary or desirable, I think it should be made mandatory on the Italians to accept an Allied Military Mission with carte blanche to go anywhere and obtain any information necessary. Only thus could the Allies ensure that the terms of the Peace Treaty were implemented.

4. CONCLUSION

From all the above, I submit that: -

- (a) the present system of "benevolent control" is not irksome to the Italians, is working well and should continue.
- (b) control cannot be relaxed gradually. It must be cleared-cut on a given date under definite conditions, which are a matter of high Allied policy to decide.
- (c) control should be continued at any rate until the situation is clearer after the cessation of hostilities in ITALY (which is likely to coincide with cessation in EUROPE) and per-

(iii) If however a Disarmament Commission for co-belligerent ITALY is not considered necessary or desirable, I think it should be made mandatory on the Italians to accept an Allied Military Mission with carte blanche to go anywhere and obtain any information necessary. Only thus could the Allies ensure that the terms of the Peace Treaty were implemented.

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- (a) the present system of "benevolent control" is not irksome to the Italians, is working well and should continue.
- (b) control cannot be relaxed gradually. It must be clear-cut on a given date under definite conditions, which are a matter of high Allied policy to decide.
- (c) control should be continued at any rate until the situation is clearer after the cessation of hostilities in ITALY (which is likely to coincide with cessation in EUROPE) and perhaps till the signing of the Peace Treaty.
- (d) the major factor on which any plans for transfer of control must be based is a decision on the size, composition and armament of the post-war Italian Army.
- (e) even when control is transferred, some kind of Allied organisation (either in the shape of a Disarmament Commission or an accredited Mission to the Italian Army with wide powers of search) will be necessary to ensure that the terms of the Peace Treaty are implemented.

tvS.

A. Browning

Major General 5957
M.M.I.A.

EMS/hjp

28 March 1945

Dear *General*:-

I should be grateful if upon your return you would have a word with me on the subject of the attached letter.

W. Stone
MELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Major General L. Browning
GOC, Land Forces Sub-Commission
Allied Commission

*Gen. Browning is writing
the subject as result
of conference with CC.*

see M 1037104

*B/u 3 to Maj. St.
5454
further
46*

1st Apr.

~~SECRET~~

100
MRE/hjp

8251/EC

CONFIDENTIAL

28 March 1945

SUBJECT: Italian Army

TO : Allied Force Headquarters, APO 512.
(Attention: Chief of Staff)

1. Reference is made to your letter of 28 February and this Headquarters' reply--8251/100/EC of 11 March.

2. In view of the possible cessation of hostilities in Italy in the near future I am taking steps to have re-examined the decision contained in this Headquarters reply--8251/100/EC of 11 March, and will shortly communicate to you further on this subject.

95
100
/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

cc: G-5 AFHQ
GOC Land Forces S/C, AC
Exec Comm, AC

See 108

5955

SECRET

~~SECRET~~
CONFIDENTIAL

Ref: 8251/100/EO.

11 March 1945.

SUBJECT: Italian Army.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
Attn: Chief of Staff.

1. The contents of your letter of 23 February have been considered both by Chief of Staff, 15th Army Group, GOC, Land Forces Sub-Commission (ALFSA) and myself.

2. At this stage it is not considered possible to formulate any progressive steps by which control should be handed back to the Italian military authorities. In order to obtain the maximum aid to the war effort by the Italian Army, it is necessary to retain the existing control until, at any rate, hostilities in Italy cease and the question of a postwar military organization can be examined.

For the Chief Commissioner.

M. S. LUSH

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

REL/JG.

Copy to: G-3, AFHQ
GOC, Land Forces S/C (ALFSA)

SECRET

PA
5
13
3

~~SECRET~~
CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Control of Italian Army

Land Forces
Sub Commission, AC (MMIA)
Rome
G/6

8 March 1945

MAR 9 1945

To : Hq Allied Commission for Executive Commissioner

Reference your 8251/EC dated 6 March and CGS AFHQ letter to Chief Commissioner, subject Italian Army, dated 28 February, paragraphs 4 and 5

While at Florence recently, I discussed the above-mentioned letter from CGS AFHQ with General Gruenther, Chief of Staff, 15th Army Group, and we agreed that there should be no change in the existing methods as regards control and administration of the Italian Army. We also considered that it was not possible, at this stage, to formulate any "progressive steps by which control should be handed back to the Italian military authorities as and when the operational situation permits". In order to obtain the maximum aid to the war effort by the Italian Army, it is necessary to retain the existing complete control until, at any rate, hostilities in Italy cease and the question of the post-war military set-up begins to arise.

LB/lak

L. Browning

Major General
Land Forces
Sub Commission, AC (MMIA)

see M999100

For Ext 341

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

LWS/al

APC 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref. 8251/20

6 March 45

SUBJECT: Italian Army

TO : GOC, Land Forces Subcommittee (MILA)

1. Reference AFHQ Chief of Staff letter, subject as above, dated 26 February, directed to the Chief Commissioner, copy of which was passed to your office on March 5.
2. Your attention is particularly invited to paragraph 1 thereof, and it is desired that your recommendations in regard to this matter be submitted to the Executive Commissioner as soon as possible.

Chief Staff Officer
Executive Commissioner

TO : GOC, Land Forces Subcommission (MIA)

93

1. Reference ~~WFM~~ Chief of Staff letter, subject as above, dated 28 February, directed to the Chief Commissioner, copy of which was passed to your office on March 5.
2. Your attention is particularly invited to paragraph 4 thereof, and it is desired that your recommendations in regard to this matter be submitted to the Executive Commissioner as soon as possible.

Handwritten: 1 Feb 73

Signature
Chief Staff Officer
Executive Commissioner

5932

CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Chief of Staff

28 February 1945.

MAR 5 1945

SUBJECT: Italian Army.

TO : Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, AFO 394.

Reference letter, Land Forces Sub-Commission A.C. (MMIA),
File No. G/6, dated 6 February 1945, Subject: Italian Army.

1. The primary consideration in the formation of policy in respect of the Italian Army in the past has been that of ensuring its employment to the fullest extent in the furtherance of the War effort. This object still remains of paramount importance and it is considered that any attempt to alter the present organization of the Italian land forces or the system whereby they are controlled at this stage would, by reducing the effectiveness of the Italian effort, adversely affect the achievement of the object in view. Consequently no changes can be accepted while the War against Germany continues except by agreement with Commanding General, 15th Army Group.

2. It is therefore temporarily agreed in accordance with para 2(b)(iii) that no change be made in the following documents:

- (i) AG 091.112/079 GCT-O of 25 October 1944.
"Status and Functions of the Land Forces
Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission
(MMIA)."
- (ii) AG 091.711/169 GCT-O of 16 November 1944.
"Command and Administration of the Italian
Army."

3. Although no specific mention of the Italian Army is made in FAN 487, it will obviously be desirable at some future date to apply the same principles of transfer of responsibility to the Italian Army as are stipulated for the Italian Government as a whole.

4. It is therefore necessary to consider what steps shall in the future be taken to place progressively increasing responsibility upon the Italian Military authorities. In order that the question may

See

(100)

-1-

CONFIDENTIAL

see 39 AH Dist
1 Eyo. Commission
1 Land Forces
1 - cc files
5951

SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL

(92)

be fully reviewed, you are directed to have this matter carefully examined, and to report at an early date the progressive steps by which you recommend control should be handed back to the Italian Military authorities as and when the operational situation permits.

5. A copy of this letter is being forwarded to Commanding General, 15th Army Group who is responsible for the operational efficiency of the Italian troops under his command, and with whom you should consult in connection with the examination of this subject to ensure that any recommendations which you may submit are compatible with his operational requirements.

By command of Field Marshal ALEXANDER:

John Harding LGM

JOHN HARDING,
Lieutenant General,
Chief of Staff.

Copy to:
CG, 15th Army Group

SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL

3950

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref. 8251/81/80

1 March 45

SUBJECT: Personnel of Italian Armed Forces of Yugoslav Origin

TO : GOC, Land Forces Subcommittee, (MMIA)

1. Reference your letter, file G/6, dated 21 Feb 45, subject as above, your apprehension in this matter is fully appreciated. The subject will be brought up at the March 2 meeting of the Advisory Council where it is included in the agenda as "Yugoslavs actually in units stationed on the islands of Corsica and Sardinia to join the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia."

2. The Political Section has advised me that the stand of both the British and American representatives at this meeting will be one of delay. Actually the question, when it is presented, will be approached from the British and American standpoint as primarily one of military significance and accordingly it will be recommended that it be referred to SACMED on that basis. In other words, it is not anticipated that any positive action will be promoted by either representative.

M. S. LUSH

Brigadier.
Executive Commissioner.

Copy to Political Section

Encl: Memorandum to Executive Commissioner
concerning above subject.

~~SECRET~~

5949

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

83

Tel Ext 341

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Executive Commissioner

LWS/el

Ref. 8251/82/EO

1 March 1945

MEMORANDUM TO: Executive Commissioner

SUBJECT : Personnel of Italian Armed Forces of Yugoslav Origin

Summary of this problem as requested in your minute EO is presented below:

1. Originally Marshal Tito at AFHQ conferences held in August 44 expressed hope that Italians of Croat and Slovene origin serving in the Italian Army in Sardinia and Sicily be permitted to volunteer for service with the Yugoslav Army of National Liberation.
2. The problem was accordingly taken up by G-5, AFHQ, and on 25 August Allied Commission was directed to refer the question to the Advisory Council for guidance. Prior to such reference the Chief Commissioner discussed the matter with both Sir Noel Charles and Mr. Alexander Kirk who raised doubts as to the propriety of the Council making any recommendation to the Supreme Allied Commander. It was felt the question was not so much legal as military, the principal point at issue being the effect such recruitment might have on the fighting qualities of the Italian Army, Navy, and Air Force.
3. The Chief Commissioner then requested (2 Sept 44) permission from AFHQ to take the matter up with Admiral Morgan, General Browning and Air Force Marshal Bowen-Buscarlet and that the official viewpoint of the Italian Government should be obtained. G-5 replied that it had no objection to this request but at the same time urged that the question be put at once before the Advisory Council. In addition G-5 stated that the disposition of the Yugoslav members of the Italian armed forces in Corsica was being considered at AFHQ and would be accordingly brought up at SACMED's political meeting for discussion in accordance with Mr. Harold Caccia's recommendation.
4. Accordingly, the Chief Commissioner referred the problem to the Service subcommissions and in addition requested advice from the Legal Subcommittee as to the status of the Italian law concerning such action.
5. The Legal Subcommittee advised that there were four main difficulties connected with such volunteer service:
 - a. Members of the Italian armed forces volunteering for service in a foreign force would be liable to be charged with desertion, etc., under the Military Penal Code (Articles 143 to 152).

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CONFIDENTIAL

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- b. If he is not serving with Italian armed forces and is subject to call-up he would be liable to punishment for failure to report under articles 151 and 152 of the Code.
- c. The national would lose his rights of Italian citizenship.
- d. The recruiting agency would be liable to punishment under article 288 of the Penal Code, if such action was without governmental approval.

Thus the Legal Subcommittee recommended that the Italian Government in order to overcome these difficulties should take the following steps:

- a. that the Ministries of War, Marine, and/or Air should grant these nationals permanent leave;
- b. the Minister of the Interior should refrain from giving to the nationals concerned an intimation to abandon and might be asked to give a formal letter approving the enlistment;
- c. the President of the Council of Ministers should grant an approval to the recruiting agency.

6. Reply of Air Forces Subcommittee -- The Air officer commanding stated that he felt it might be an attempt to influence the return to the Croats and Slovenes of the provinces taken over by Italy after the last war (thus influencing peace conference action) and regarded the matter quite serious from that standpoint.

7. On 20 September, G-5, AFHQ, notified Allied Commission that the Supreme Allied Commander had directed that the matter be held in suspense and that no further action be taken for the present.

8. Since this date no further direct communications have been received by this Headquarters on the subject other than the question as presented on the agenda for the March 2 meeting of the Advisory Council. It appears as #3 on the agenda:

"Yugoslav actually in units stationed on the islands of Corsica and Sardinia to join the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia."

9. Mr. Halford of the Political Section advises that both the British and American representatives will approach the matter as primarily one of military significance and accordingly it will be recommended that it be referred to SACMED on that basis. In other words, it is not anticipated that any positive action will be promoted by either representative. In fact, Political Section's latest information is that the UK Government has instructed the British Resident Minister to take up the question with General Alexander, thus, in effect, countermanding UK's previous instructions to the British Ambassador to support the request.

SECRET

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SECRET

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10. The attached letter is prepared for your signature as a reply to General Browning's letter. (Has been seen by Mr. Halford).

CONFIDENTIAL

J. W. Stearns
Chief Staff Officer
to the Executive Commissioner *May*

- 3 -
SECRET

5946

8251
SUBJECT: Personnel of Italian Armed Forces
of Yugoslav Origin

Land Forces Sub Com. A.C.
(N.M.I.A.)

C/G

21 Feb 45

TO : Political Section, Allied Commission

FEB 22 1945

Copy to: Executive Commissioner

1. It was stated at the Executive Commissioner's meeting this morning that:-

(a) Yugoslav Gov't under Marshal TITO had approached U.K. Gov't to order the return to the Yugoslav Army of Liberation, those members of the Italian Army who are of Yugoslav origin.

(b) U.K. Gov't had instructed the Yugoslav Representative in Rome to raise this matter at the next meeting of the Advisory Council i.e. 2 March.

(c) U.K. Gov't had instructed British Ambassador, Sir MEL CHAMBERS, to support the request.

In connection with the above, I should like to mention that:-

(a) Although these soldiers may have been of Yugoslav origin many years ago, (i.e. before Trieste/Udine region was transferred to Italy) these soldiers are at present time citizens of Italy and as such are liable for service in Italian Army, where they are now absorbed into service units.

(b) Approximately 1000 of these troops have recently been transferred from CORSICA to SOUTHERN FRANCE, where they are performing useful duty as dock labour for the American forces. AFHQ plans to move the remaining 4000 from CORSICA to SOUTHERN FRANCE for similar duty as soon as shipping becomes available.

2.

(a) Yugoslav Gov't under Marshal Tito has approached U.K. Gov't to order the return to the Yugoslav Army of liberation, these members of the Italian Army who are of Yugoslav origin.

(b) U.K. Gov't had instructed the Yugoslav Representative in Rome to raise this matter at the next meeting of the Advisory Council i.e. 2 March.

(c) U.K. Gov't had instructed British Ambassador, Sir ROEL CHARLES, to support the request.

In connection with the above, I should like to mention that :-

(a) Although these soldiers may have been of Yugoslav origin many years ago, (i.e. before Trieste/Gdine region was transferred to Italy) these soldiers are at present time citizens of Italy and as such are liable for service in Italian Army, where they are now absorbed into service units.

(b) Approximately 1000 of these troops have recently been transferred from CORSIKA to SOUTHERN FRANCE, where they are performing useful duty as dock labour for the American forces. AFHQ plans to move the remaining 4000 from CORSIKA to SOUTHERN FRANCE for similar duty as soon as shipping becomes available.

3. While in no way wishing to go contrary to U.K. Gov't's instructions, I suggest that it is inadvisable on military grounds at this juncture to transfer these Italian soldiers to the Yugo-Slav Army of Liberation. The Italian Minister of War holds the same view very strongly on political grounds and this whole question, as you know, has been a very "tender" one with the Italian Gov't.

Internal:
A/C
SD/152

Major General
R.M.I.A.

M.9

L. Brown 5945

S-25

8251

SUBJECT: Reorganisation of Central
Military Organs

LAND FORCES SUB-COM. A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)
File No. SD/7
16 Feb 45

TO : CHIEF OF STAFF A.C.

FEB 17 1945

1. I attach herewith copy of letter from Minister for War setting out the new organization at the Italian War Ministry.
2. I approve these changes and feel that the proposed organization is progressive and will prove beneficial.

D. Browning

Major General
M. M. I. A.

W5

5944

COPY

SUBJECT: Reorganisation of Central Military Organs

TRANSLATION

FROM : MINISTRY OF WAR
TO : M.M.I.A.

Ref.: 203552/II
222-5-21
Date: 9 Feb 45

With reference to the resolution of the Council of Ministers, dated January 30th last, regarding the Italian General Staff, and with a view to streamlining the central administration charged with the prosecution of the war and bringing it more into accord with the present emergency, the following was ordered:-

1. - Italian Army General Staff

On and after the 10th inst.:

- (a) will revert to the status of a technical and advisory organ of the Minister of War and will resume the functions and tasks established by law No. 3088 of December 24, 1928.
- (b) will take it upon itself to deal fully with the following subjects: S.D., mobilisation, territorial services, military censorship, which are now partly dealt with by the Cabinet.
- (c) will maintain liaison with the Allies upon order of the Minister, and by availing itself of the Allied Liaison Office, which will be brought under the control of the General Staff, will, on and after March 1st, discontinue the operation of its administration offices and General HQ, which will be merged with the corresponding departments at the Ministry.

2. General Directorate of Artillery

- (a) will be merged with the general directorate of administrative services and will be named "general directorate of artillery and motorisation".

(b) General Directorate of Military Supplies

- will be merged with the general directorate of administrative services and will be named "general directorate of the services of administration and supply".

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(c) will maintain liaison with the Allies upon order of the Minister, and by availing itself of the Allied Liaison Office, which will be brought under the control of the General Staff,

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2. General Directorate of Artillery

(a) will be merged with the general directorate of administrative services and will be named "general directorate of artillery and motorisation".

(b) General Directorate of Military Supplies

will be merged with the general directorate of administrative services and will be named "general directorate of the services of administration and supply".

(c) The merger of the afore-mentioned general directorates will be carried out progressively, within the current month.

After the merger is consummated, there will be eliminated some of the similar offices now in existence at the general directorates to be merged, and, consequently, it will be possible to benefit by a saving in personnel.

3. The "pension service", now under the directorate general of administrative services, will remain independent and will, on and after March 10th be named "inspectorate general of pensions".

4. The "Soldier Welfare Office", now under the Military Undersecretary and the "statistical section" will merge as of the 10th inst and will thereafter be under the control of the Cabinet.

(Sgd) A. CASATI

5943

Ref: 3251/73/022

16 February 1945

SUBJECT: GOC Directive PAR 487.

TO : GOC, Land Forces Sub-Com (SMLA).

1. I was surprised to find from your G/6 of 6 February that you had addressed your observations on PAR 487, so far as it concerned the Land Forces Sub-Commission, directly to the Chief of Staff and Chief Administrative Officer at A.F.H.Q., without consultation with myself. As I have pointed out before it is important that, on matters of policy affecting the Commission and the Italian Government, the Allied Commission should address itself to SACMAD with one voice.

2. I fully realise that you have responsibilities with regard to the Italian Army on which you receive operational and administrative instructions direct from A.F.H.Q. But on matters of policy, particularly when operations are not concerned, you, as Director of the Land Forces Sub-Commission, should advise me as Chief Commissioner of your views in order that in my turn I may represent to SACMAD, the President of the Commission, the views and recommendations of the Commission as a whole. Your letter should have been addressed to me.

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief Commissioner

Copy to: Chief of Staff, A.F.H.Q.
Chief Administrative Officer, A.F.H.Q.

5942

Subject: Italian Army

CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET

Land Forces Sub Com AG.
(M.M.I.A.)

File No. G/6

6 Feb 45

FEB 12 1945

ATHQ for Chief of Staff.
" Chief Administrative Officer.

Reference new Directive EAM 467 from C.C.S. on the Allied Commission, I have the following observations to make :-

1. Land Forces Sub-Commission AG (M.M.I.) has two separate functions and methods of procedure in its capacity of :-
 - (a) Land Forces Sub-Commission AG.
 - (b) M.M.I.

See your AG. 091.112/373 GCMO of 25 Oct 1944.

2. (a) It has always been the policy of this Sub-Commission to give as much responsibility as possible to the Italian Army in order to :-

- (i) Give Allied manpower.
- (ii) Raise Italian morale.
- (iii) Gradually enable the new Italian Army to stand on its own feet.

In this connection see my SD/3 of 6 Feb 45 re proposed reduction of British Cadres with Italian Pack Tpt Coys.

- (b) (i) On the other hand, there is unfortunately still a considerable amount of inefficiency in the Italian Army, from the Ministry of War downwards. The Italians lack initiative, organising ability and a sense of urgency. There also is an undercurrent of reaction and disinclination to remove inefficient officers. It is not enough for M.M.I. to order some-

See your AG. 091.112/073 CCM-O of 25 Oct 1944.

2.

(a) It has always been the policy of this Sub-Commission to give to the responsible authority as possible to the Italian Army in order to:

- (i) Save Allied manpower.
- (ii) Raise Italian morale.
- (iii) Gradually enable the new Italian Army to stand on its own feet.

In this connection see my SD/3 of 6 Feb 45 re proposed reduction of British Cadres with Italian Pack Tpt Coys.

(b) (1) On the other hand, there is unfortunately still a considerable amount of inefficiency in the Italian Army, even the Ministry of War downwards. The Italians lack initiative, organising ability and a sense of urgency. There also is an undercurrent of demotivation and disinclination to remove inefficient officers. It is not enough for MHA to order something to be done; in many cases we have to tell the Italian how to do it and watch to see that it is done.

(ii) Unless we retain the right of veto and "Supervision of appointments, promotions, dismissals ... of Italian Army personnel" of all ranks (see para 4(c) of your AG 091.111/169 CCM-O of 16 Nov 44) I consider that we cannot effectively control the Italian Army and that the result will be a lessening of the direct Italian Military aid to the Allied war effort. The same applies as regards the efficient working of the supply line.

(iii) I therefore recommend that NO change be made in your AG 091.111/169 CCM-O of 16 Nov 44. "Command and Administration of the Italian Army"; or of your AG 091.112/073 CCM-O of 25 Oct 44.

(c) The above is in particular reference to para 2(d) of Pan 487.

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(1142.1142)

-2-

3.

The other main aspects of FAN 487 with which my Sub-Commission is concerned are :-

para 2(h)

I have already submitted to AC my views as to the future status of "cooperators" - see P.W. Sub-Commission AC file 1PW/36.

para 7(b)

I am working in cooperation with Industry & Commerce Sub-Commission AC over this. Briefly, the Italian Army has enough stocks to maintain the service units and Internal Security Divisions working for the Allies. The Combat Groups are armed and equipped with British Equipment, Depending on such factors as the possibility and advisability of importing material, machinery etc, to restart factories "to further the military effort in other theatres"; the urgent necessity to turn production into civil rehabilitation channels; the post war set up and function of the Italian Army etc, - there appears to be no need to apply Italian industrial facilities to the production of lethal munitions of war.

J. Brown

Major General
(M.M.L.A.)

Copy to: HQ AC

" " Naval Sub-Commission A.C.
" " Air Force Sub-Commission A.C.

Army etc, - there appears to be no indication of
Italian industrial facilities to the production of
lethal munitions of war.

d Browning

Major General
(M.M.I.A.)

Copy to: HQ AC
" Naval Sub-Commission A.C.
" Air Force Sub-Commission A.C.

5940

CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET.
URGENT.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Chief of Staff

+++++

Ref: 4001/COS.

5 February 1945.

SUBJECT: New Directive from CCS on
the Allied Commission.

TO : VP, CA Sec
VP, Pol Sec (2)
VP, Econ Sec
VP, Est Sec
Dir, WMD & IPR Sec.
Dir, Comms Sec.

- is
1. Attached/copy of the new directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff addressed to the Supreme Allied Commander.
 2. The Chief Commissioner will discuss the implications of this directive with you at 1600 hours, Tuesday, 6 February, and directs that you should study it in the meantime.
 3. The terms of the directive are to be considered as SECRET and should not be referred to publicly in any way. The CCS are at present considering a simultaneous announcement in the United States, United Kingdom and Italy.

MSL/JC.

MB
Brigadier,
Chief of Staff

5939

Copy to: Chief Commissioner.
Land Forces Sub-Com (MMIA)
Air Force Sub-Com
Navy Sub-Com.

} Not required to attend
meeting.

COPY.

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

NEW DIRECTIVE FROM COMBINED CHIEFS OF
STAFF ON THE ALLIED COMMISSION.

PAN 487.

Following is Directive from Combined Chiefs of Staff.

1. In order to implement the joint declaration of the President and the Prime Minister of 26 September, 1944, the US and UK Governments have agreed to relax the control of the Italian Government under the armistice and surrender instrument and only to exercise such control when military needs require it, thus developing in the Italian Authorities a greater sense of responsibility. The rights under the armistice and surrender instrument will be held in reserve in the matter of day to day administration, subject to overriding military needs and the requirements of the campaign in Italy.

In the light of this agreed US-UK policy, you should take action as rapidly as possible in conformity with the following paragraphs:

POLITICAL SECTION.

2. (a) The Political Section of the Allied Commission will be abolished. The Allied Commission will obtain advice from the US and UK Ambassadors in Rome. There is NO intention, however, to make any change in the responsibility of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, acting through the Allied Commission; the Combined Chiefs of Staff, will, therefore, as occasion requires, continue to transmit directives in regard to the combined views of the two Governments on matters of major policy, and such other matters as are within the scope of the activities of the Allied Commission.
- (b) The Italian Government shall be permitted to have direct relations with foreign diplomatic representatives accredited to the Quirinal, provided that the Allied Commission is kept generally informed by the Italian Government of any negotiations in which they engage with other governments.
- (c) The Allied Commission shall abandon the practice of

2. (a) The Political Section of the Allied Commission will be abolished. The Allied Commission will obtain advice from the US and UK Ambassadors in ROME. There is NO intention, however, to make any change in the responsibility of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, acting through the Allied Commission; the Combined Chiefs of Staff, will, therefore, as occasion requires, continue to transmit directives in regard to the combined views of the two Governments on matters of major policy, and such other matters as are within the scope of the activities of the Allied Commission.

(b) The Italian Government shall be permitted to have direct relations with foreign diplomatic representatives accredited to the Quirinal, provided that the Allied Commission is kept generally informed by the Italian Government of any negotiations in which they engage with other governments.

(c) The Allied Commission shall abandon the practice of approving the decrees and other legislation enacted by the Italian Government in the territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government. Any new Italian Government will be requested to confirm that they will adhere to the obligations under the terms of surrender undertaken by their predecessors.

(d) The Allied Commission shall abandon the practice of approving any Italian appointments in territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government except in regard to Service Ministers and such military appointments as you may determine.

(e) The Allied Commission shall as soon as possible withdraw all its officers stationed in the field in the territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government. However, the Allied Commission should retain the right to send its representatives into territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government for any special tasks when Allied interests require it.

-2-

- (f) The US and UK Governments have agreed that the Italian Government will be advised that it is the Allied desire to encourage free trade in knowledge and learning with the Italian people. As far as the exigencies of the military situation permit you will facilitate any arrangements for the flow of books and other publications of a scientific, political, philosophical and artistic nature between ITALY and the United Nations and for the movement of scholars, artists and professional men between ITALY and the United Nations.
- (g) The US and UK Governments have agreed that in accordance with the terms of the MOSCOW declaration it is desirable to encourage the holding of elections for local public offices in territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government and you should be guided accordingly.
- (h) The status of Italian Prisoners of War now or hereafter held in ITALY other than those captured since the armistice was signed should be terminated by you upon adequate assurance being given by the Italian Government that their services will continue to be made available on terms satisfactory to you as Supreme Allied Commander subject to Combined Chiefs of Staff approval.

ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION.

3. The internal organisation of the Allied Commission is primarily your responsibility. In the reorganisation of the Allied Commission it is desired that you give consideration to the following policies and objectives:
- (a) The Staff of Allied Commission Headquarters should occupy itself primarily with consultation and advice to the Italian Government at high levels.
 - (b) As far as certain Sub-Commissions of the Allied Commission Headquarters are concerned such as Education, Arts and Monuments, Local Government, Labour and Legal, their advisory functions in respect of Italian Government territory should be exercised only when requested by the Italian Government. NOT be exercised in respect of territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government.
 - (c) The Sections and Subcommissions of the Allied Commission Headquarters should be progressively civilianised to the fullest extent which in your opinion circumstances allow,

your responsibility. In the reorganization of the Allied Commission it is desired that you give consideration to the following policies and objectives:

- (a) The Staff of Allied Commission Headquarters should occupy itself primarily with consultation and advice to the Italian Government at high levels.
- (b) As far as certain Sub-Commissions of the Allied Commission Headquarters are concerned such as Education, Arts and Monuments, Local Government, Labour and Legal, their advisory functions in respect of Italian Government territory should be exercised only when requested by the Italian Government. Control should NOT be exercised in respect of territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government.
- (c) The Sections and Subcommissions of the Allied Commission Headquarters should be progressively civilianised to the fullest extent which in your opinion circumstances allow, except the Service Subcommissions and except to the extent that Subcommissions exercise functions with respect to territory under Allied Military Government (AMG).
- (d) To the extent feasible, officers of Allied Commission Headquarters dealing with AMG functions should be located at places other than Allied Commission Headquarters.

ECONOMIC SECTION.

4. It is necessary that the maximum production and effective and equitable distribution and control of consumption of local resources possible under existing conditions be secured. The Italian Government should be advised that to this end and as a prerequisite to increased economic assistance it must formulate and implement appropriate economic controls and take all other steps possible. In the event that these conditions are NOT met the Allied authorities will NOT hesitate to impose the necessary controls or take other appropriate measures.
5. For the duration of combined operations, the combined US-UK military authorities will be responsible for providing:

- 66
- (a) Those quantities of food, fuel, clothing, medical, sanitary and other agreed essential supplies necessary to prevent disease and unrest prejudicial to such operations.
 - (b) Those supplies such as fertilizer, raw materials, machinery and equipment, the importation of which will reduce military requirements for the import of essential civilian supplies for the purposes referred to in this paragraph. As the time when combined military responsibility will terminate will NOT be known when requisitions are being prepared and considered, the importation of supplies under this sub-paragraph will NOT be excluded merely because the effect of such imports may NOT be felt during the period of combined military responsibility.
 - (c) Those supplies necessary for the restoration of such of the Italian power systems and transportation and communication facilities as will further the military effort against GERMANY and JAPAN.

To the extent contemplated by this Paragraph 5, essential civilian supplies cannot be divorced from the military supply programme and ITALY must be treated as a whole. It is understood that the date of termination of combined military responsibility for providing supplies as set out above will be decided by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on your recommendation.

6. The Allied Commission shall be advised to assist the Italian Government in the preparation of programmes of supplies designed to rehabilitate Italian industry. These supplies will be in addition to those to be provided as a military responsibility. Such programmes when established by the Italian Government will NOT be subject to screening by Allied Force Headquarters, but will be reviewed and transmitted directly with appropriate comments and recommendations by the Allied Commission to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, which will transmit the programmes to the Combined Liberated Areas Committee for action by the appropriate civilian agencies of the UNITED STATES and British Governments. The UNITED STATES and British Governments will each make available such shares as may be mutually agreed of the cost of the provision of such of these programmes as may be approved by the Combined Liberated Areas Committee. Procurement covering such programmes should immediately be put in hand without reference to the present shipping position in order that the supplies may be called forward as and when shipping space becomes available. In this connection see Paragraph 8 below.

6. The Allied Commission shall be advised to assist the Italian Government in the preparation of programmes of supplies designed to rehabilitate Italian industry. These supplies will be in addition to those to be provided as a military responsibility. Such programmes when established by the Italian Government will NOT be subject to screening by Allied Force Headquarters, but will be reviewed and transmitted directly with appropriate comments and recommendations by the Allied Commission to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, which will transmit the programmes to the Combined Liberated Areas Committee for action by the appropriate civilian agencies of the UNITED STATES and British Governments. The UNITED STATES and British Governments will each make available such shares as may be mutually agreed of the cost of the provision of such of these programmes as may be approved by the Combined Liberated Areas Committee. Procurement covering such programmes should immediately be put in hand without reference to the present shipping position in order that the supplies may be called forward as and when shipping space becomes available. In this connection see Paragraph 8 below.

7. The questions raised by you in Sub-paragraphs A, B and C of Paragraph 4 of MAF 778 are answered as follows:

(a) The prime responsibility for the control of inflation in ITALY, including the imposition and administration of appropriate financial and economic controls and appropriate utilization of supplies, must rest with the Italian Government. Your responsibility in this connection, other than with respect to the importation of supplies, is, through the Allied Commission, to advise and assist the Italian Government.

(b) It is desired that industrial rehabilitation in ITALY be carried out by the Italian Government to the fullest extent permitted by the Italian resources and such supplies as you may be authorised to import, consistent with the discharge by you of your military mission, with the exception that industries for the production or repair of munitions or other implements of war shall be rehabilitated only to the extent required by you in discharge of your military mission and as will further the military effort in other theatres. Except

-4-

for these industries the rehabilitation of which is essential to the discharge of your military mission and in furtherance of the military effort in other theatres, which rehabilitation should be given first priority, industries other than those excluded by the preceding sentence will be given such precedence in rehabilitation as may be determined by the Italian Government.

- (c) The extent of your responsibility with respect to the importation of supplies into ITALY is defined in Paragraphs 5 and 6 hereof. Except as is so defined, you have NO responsibility for the importation of supplies into ITALY.
- (d) Within the limitation of available shipping and subject to military considerations as determined by you, the extent to which exports are to be stimulated and the development of machinery to handle export trade are for determination by the Italian Government. The appropriate civilian agencies of the British and American Governments are currently considering methods by which the Italian Government may be assisted in these respects and as soon as decisions in this connection are reached, you will be advised with respect thereto.
8. Nothing herein contained shall constitute a commitment with respect to shipping. Any supplies to be imported into ITALY must be transported within such shipping as may be allocated from time to time.
9. The two Governments are discussing proposals for giving the Italian Government a greater measure of responsibility in financial matters; a further directive on these matters will follow.

FINANCIAL SECTION.

8. Nothing herein contained shall constitute a commitment with respect to shipping. Any supplies to be imported into ITALY must be transported within such shipping as may be allocated from time to time.

FINANCIAL SECTION.

9. The two Governments are discussing proposals for giving the Italian Government a greater measure of responsibility in financial matters; a further directive on these matters will follow.

DRAFT

64

Ref: 8251/ /COS

SUBJECT: Italian Call-up.

TO : Land Forces Sub-Commission (LMSA)

1. Recent events in SICILY have shown how ^{early} latent unrest can be precipitated into public disorder, and whilst admittedly, conditions in SICILY are peculiar, at the same time an occasion such as a military call-up can be used as a means for fomenting trouble, possibly anywhere in Italy at the present time.

2. The letter from the Minister of War dated 21 Jan 45 and the report by Lt.Col. Howard and Major Mandesley on the riots in RAGUSA both agree that more notice of the intention to call classes to colours must be given, ^{shortness of notice} ~~being advanced~~ being advanced in the report as one of the reasons for the riots. I am sure it is now fully appreciated by all concerned that ample notice must be given, but the Chief Commissioner directs me again to ^{emphasize} ~~emphasize~~ that this matter must be treated as an administrative problem ~~which~~ capable of having widespread repercussions affecting ~~as it does not only the Italian Army~~ but the welfare of the ^{and that} nation ~~as a whole~~ ^{as a whole}, a full coordination between the Italian Government and the Allied Commission is very necessary.

3. I have received from you a list of projected calls-up, which is useful as a guide, but does not indicate the state of the process.

that more notice of the situation of notice being advanced in the report as one of the given, reasons for the riots. I am sure it is now fully appreciated by all concerned that ample notice must be given, but the Chief Commissioner directs me again to ^{emphasize} that this matter must be treated as an administrative problem ~~which~~ capable of having widespread repercussions affecting ~~the Italian Government and~~ but the welfare of the ^{and that} nation ~~whole~~ ^{whole} full coordination between the Italian Government and the Allied Commission is very necessary.

3. I have received from you a list of projected calls-up, which is useful as a guide, but does not indicate the state of the preparations. I ~~suggest~~ ^{will} ~~that~~ ^{therefore} so long as preparations are being made for calls-up if you please ~~render me a weekly report of the steps which have been taken.~~

Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

P7H

See Minutes 19/12

5536

Appl letter

considered

Genl. W. 9/12

but but h/v

no action or

8251
J
LAND FORCES SUB-COM. A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)
File No. 22/0/4
26 Jan 48

JAN 29 1945

TO : AFHQ GS (G2) (S)

Copy to: CHIEF OF STAFF, A.C. (S)

42
50/57
In continuation of my 22/0/4 of 1 January 48 herewith for information is a statement of action taken by Italian Government to ameliorate the lot of the IRI soldiers and to recognize the good work done by the Patriots.

I consider these measures will have a most beneficial effect.

L. Browning

Major General
M. M. I. A.

5835

2 pages held

TRANSMISSION

CIRCULAR

FROM: Ministry of War

Ref: 207740/II

TO : Same Addressees

Date: 31 Dec 44

SUBJECT: Renewable discharges and leaves

Further to and re Circulars:-

300/II and 550/II of 2 of 2 dated 15 Dec 1943.
656/II 2 of 2 dated 31 Dec 1943.
10393 Supreme Command dated 17 April 1944.
5710 2 of 2 dated 15 July 1944.

The Directives existing on the basis of the a/m Circulars regarding renewable discharges and leaves for military of the Italian Army

- who are members of families in special circumstances
- who are civil servants
- who are technicians, agricultural agents, farm managers or skilled workers, are modified and explained as follows:-

1. Circular 300/II of 2 of 2 dated 15 Dec 1943:

Para 6 section I (allowing discharge of only son of widowed mother over 55 years of age) is suspended.

Para 1 section II (allowing parents to request discharge of 1 son if they have 3 or more sons in the service at the same time) can also be applied when there are only 1 or 2 sons in the service, whenever:-

- (a) There are, besides the sons in the service, no other sons over 18 years of age who are able to work.
- (b) The parents, or the living parent, undergo an examination by a medical board at the military hospital of the jurisdiction and are found permanently unable to perform remunerative work.
- (c) The respective CC RR Headquarters forwards information to the effect that the parents are without means of subsistence.

1. Circular 605/II of M of W dated 25 Dec 1943:

Para 4 section I (allowing discharge of only son of widowed mother over 55 years of age) is suspended.

Para 1 section II (allowing parents to request discharge of 1 son if they have 3 or more sons in the service at the same time) can also be applied when there are only 1 or 2 sons in the service, whenever:-

(a) There are, besides the sons in the service, no other sons over 18 years of age who are able to work.

(b) The parents, or the living parent, undergo an examination by a medical board at the military hospital of the jurisdiction and are found permanently unable to perform remunerative work.

(c) The respective GO ER Headquarters forwards information to the effect that the parents are without means of subsistence.

The discharge proposed in the s/a para 1 section II may also be granted to newly drafted military (in this case provisional unlimited discharge) when the other sons who are considered in the service can not take advantage of it because they are prisoners or missing in the present war (circumstances to be ascertained through documents issued by the respective military authorities or, if this is not possible, through legal papers - issued by the respective municipal authorities - and information from the respective GO ER HQs).

2. Circular 605/II of M of W dated 31 Dec 1943:

Discharge proposed for military recalled or held in the service who are civil servants can be granted only upon request from the respective administration - to the officials or regular employees of the classes of 1919 and older.

3. Circular 10 of Supreme HQ dated 17 Jan 1944.

The 90 day renewable leave without pay proposed for military recalled or held in the service who are skilled workers in private industries can be applied only to those skilled workers who are employed in industrial establishments performing important work for the Italian or Allied Armed Forces (this latter condition must be documented by the requesting firm and confirmed by information from the respective CO RR HQ).

4. Circular 9710 of M of N dated 15 July 1944:

Discharge proposed for those who are qualified technicians, agricultural agents or farm managers is limited to MOEs and CRE recalled or held in the service, of the classes of 1918 and older if they are classified as "general assignment", while it can also be granted to those of the classes of 1918-20-21 and 22 if classified as "limited assignment". The granting of discharges furthermore depends upon whether the respective Provincial Agricultural and Forestry Directorate declares explicitly and under their own responsibility that they have "without a doubt ascertained, on the basis of documents submitted by the applicant and through first hand information":

(a) That the military whose discharge is requested actually qualified, prior to his induction into the service, as a technician, agricultural agent, or farm manager in an agricultural establishment of great importance on account of its extension or the kind of products it turns out;

(b) That the presence of the recalled technician, agricultural agent, or farm manager is essential in order not to compromise the full productive efficiency of the establishment where he was employed.

All decisions regarding renewable discharges or leaves for military who are not members of the army, are to be handled by the Ministry which controls the Armed Force to which the a/m military belongs.

All renewable discharges and leaves granted since 8 September 1943 and prior to the date of this circular to military who - on the basis of above directives - would no longer be entitled to such grants, remain in force.

(a) That the military whose discharge is requested actually qualified, prior to his induction into the service, as a technician, agricultural agent, or farm manager in an agricultural establishment of great importance on account of its extension or the kind of products it turns out;

(b) That the presence of the recalled technician, agricultural agent, or farm manager is essential in order not to compromise the full productive efficiency of the establishment where he was employed.

All decisions regarding renewable discharges or leaves for military who are not members of the army, are to be handled by the Ministry which controls the Armed Forces to which the s/a military belongs.

All renewable discharges and leaves granted since 8 September 1943 and prior to the date of this circular to military who - on the basis of above directives - would no longer be entitled to such grants, remain in force.

All grants made prior to 8 September 1943, however, to military who are no longer in a position to claim a status as per this circular, are revoked. Therefore, the districts must re-examine the status of military who are enjoying renewable discharge of leave on the basis of measures prior to 8 September 1943, and in case the grant has to be revoked because it no longer corresponds to the s/a directives, the military in question must be sent into the service in conformity with the rules which will be published in this respect through recall proclamations or other circulars.

The Minister

(sgd) A. CADAFI

Incl No 2 to letter
300293/C.A. of 21 Jan 45

TRANSLATION

PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

Press Office

65

MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

The Council of Ministers has among other things concerned itself this morning with measures for the benefit of the combatants, draftees, Patriots and their families.

The Gov't, being certain of expressing the unanimous feeling of solidarity and patriotism towards its fighting sons in the army, the navy and the air force, as well as towards the Patriots who are proudly up in arms for the liberation of the lands still under the invader;

hoping to see new possibilities arise which would allow a greater direct participation in the war effort;

has approved the following measures for the benefit of the military and their families:

1. Setting aside of one billion annually for extraordinary subsidies for the neediest families of the junior NCOs and CAs of the 3 armed forces, to be determined by special conjugal committees, on which all social elements will be represented in order to guarantee greater impartiality, and according to principles which will be established.
2. Assignment of funds at the disposal of the commanders of operational units to enable them to grant financial aid and premiums to the most deserving military and to their neediest families.
3. Payment of an induction indemnity, beginning Dec 1944, to the needy families of CAs and junior NCOs at the rate of 3,000 lire for re-called men and volunteers and 2,000 lire for newly drafted military, to be paid by the mayors upon presentation of a district commander's certificate attesting that the man reported for induction was actually assigned.
4. An increase in the amount of extra-ration meal improvement and

1. Setting aside of one billion annually for extraordinary subsidies for the neediest families of the junior MOs and COs of the 5 armed forces, to be determined by special communal committees, on which all social elements will be represented in order to guarantee greater impartiality, and according to principles which will be established.

2. Assignment of funds at the disposal of the commanders of operational units to enable them to grant financial aid and premiums to the most deserving military and to their neediest families.

3. Payment of an induction indemnity, beginning Dec 1944, to the needy families of COs and junior MOs at the rate of 3,000 lire for re-called men and volunteers and 2,000 lire for newly drafted military, to be paid by the mayors upon presentation of a district commander's certificate attesting that the man reported for induction and was actually assigned.

4. An increase in the amount of extra-ration meal improvement and of the issue of cigarettes to military assigned to operating units of the armed forces.

The Council of Ministers has then confirmed:

1. That the veterans who have conscientiously done their military duty will be given preference in civil service employment.

2. A further increase of funds to all veterans' welfare institutes.

3. That the veterans be granted rebates and preferential securities for participation in cooperative and mutual agencies.

The Council has furthermore determined the establishment of the "Campaign of liberation" ribbon (after the 8 Sept 1943) and the respective citation for all military who have actually served in operating units and for the wounded; and to authorize the combat group commanders to grant decorations for military valor up to and including the bronze medal, in the field, to the military up to and including the rank of Capt.

Copy of this folio filed on 3202/cas Folio 135.

5932

- 2 -

The Council of Ministers has finally determined:

- (a) to authorize a free "pro patriots" subscription among all the armed forces as a demonstration of good will and solidarity among the combatants.
- (b) to recognize the freedom volunteers' ranks (up to the rank of Lt Col) which they held in the patriots' fighting units, at the time of the reorganization of the armed forces, and after due ascertainment.
- (c) to extend the granting of compensation for bravery to the patriots under the same principles as those already governing the armed forces.
- (d) to establish a "volunteers of liberty" ribbon to be granted to the patriots who have been for 3 months members of a partisan unit, or who have been wounded.
- (e) to extend to the patriots and their needy families the same moral and material welfare measures as those already planned for the combatants of the armed forces.
- (f) to grant the same kind of pensions due to military also to the fighting patriots and to civilians who were killed or made invalid through enemy violence, and to their families.

Rome 16 Jan 1945

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

fighting patriots and to civilians who were killed or made in-
valid through enemy violence, and to their families.

Home 18 Jan 1945

3931

TRANSLATION

FROM: The Minister of

TO: Maj. Gen. BROOKING

Ref: SC090/2A

Date: 21 Jan 48

Dear General

I quite agree to the contents of your SC/20/1 dated 29 12 44 regarding the problem of the call-up and I have not replied earlier in order to be able to give you more complete information.

1. As regard exemptions the corresponding instrs have already been revised and the rights to exemption limited (see letter SC7740 dated 31 12 44 Insl No. 1).

I have most willingly taken into consideration the suggestions you gave me regarding the org of the call-ups.

In this respect the activities carried out by the Military Serv. Mus of Lario and Campanie as well as the CC NA GR are summarized in the Insl appx.

2. From a more general point of view and one of greater interest, I have already proposed to the cabinet, who have already approved part of them, a series of measures - both economic and moral - tending to insure the fulfillment of military duties (Insl No. 2)

3. I would call your attention however, to an aspect of the problem which I feel sure you have not missed i.e. to the fact that the call-ups could be more successful if aided by complementary measures to be taken by the Allies.

In essence it would be necessary for

- (a) be allowed more time both to prepare and organize and to actually carry out the call-up operation. Too short a time does not allow for an accurate valuation of all the possible practical difficulties and consequently no preventive measures can be taken in good time.

For example, both in Lario and in Campanie it has been impossible to issue and affix the posters in time in all the towns (Provinces of Avellino and Benevento, internal zone of Lario) owing to chronological conditions. It can be taken for a fact that the same difficulties will be encountered in order to get the recruits to the districts and in order to send them afterwards to the towns.

3. I would call your attention however, to an aspect of the problem which I felt sure you have not missed i.e. to the fact that the call-ups could be more successful if aided by complementary measures to be taken by the Allies.

In essence it would be necessary to:

- (a) be allowed more time both to prepare and organize and to actually carry out the call-up operations. Too short a time does not allow for an accurate valuation of all the possible practical difficulties and consequently no preventive measures can be taken in good time.
- (b) For example, both in Lazio and in Campania it has been impossible to issue and affix the posters in time in all the townships (Provinces of Avellino and Benevento, internal zone of Lazio) owing to chronological conditions. It can be taken for a fact that the same difficulties will be encountered in order to get the recruits to the districts and in order to send them afterwards to the training centres.
- (c) granting means of transport which are at present absolutely insufficient.
- (d) Naples 20 has an absolute of 24 medium or heavy lorries, 7 m/c's and 1 car yet at present all they can avail themselves of is 15 lorries.
- (e) grant of premises, some of them partly occupied by the Allies for example the Regina Margherita barracks in Rome.
- (f) A faster drafting of the recruits to units from the camps where (as in Afragola) the recruits remain for long periods without clothing and under very difficult living conditions which obviously have a deleterious effect on their morale and on hygiene.
- (g) better equipment of the camps also in order to eliminate that depressing effect on the morale of the personnel.

Copy of this folio filed on 8270/cas.

I feel sure, General, that my having put forward to you quite frankly the requirements of the Italian side will meet with your understanding.

I firmly believe that you, like me, will not wish to leave untried any channels that may tend to increase and improve morally and materially the success of the sell-up to further the common interests and the fulfillment of duty.

I remain very sincerely yours,

(Sgd) A. GIACATE

1405

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

8266 -

15
Appx to letter 300920/CA
dated 21 January 1948

NOTIFICATION

MEASURES FOR THE CALL-UP IN LAZIO AND CAMPANIA

1. Along the General lines issued directly by this Ministry to the two military Territorial Commanders of Rome and Naples in a special meeting with them, these commanders in their turn have laid down the general orders for carrying out the call-up operations in agreement with the district commands.

2. The Territorial Commands of Rome and Naples have contacted the district commands directly in order to outline, on the spot and for each district, the needs and plans for the various operations.

On these occasions the commands have also contacted the local political authorities, the local CC RR Commands, the party chiefs and the church authorities.

3. The available time for the posting of the proclamations - about 10 days - was not sufficient. Due to the adverse climatic conditions and to the scarcity of MF the proclamations arrived late in the various townships. In several townships in the interior of Lazio and Campania the posting of the proclamations was even definitely belated. Some townships were not even reached due to the interruption of communications.

It is well to assert again how absolutely essential it is that the preparatory period of the operations be given more breathing space and that it be adapted to the pressing conditions of communications and transport.

4. The scarcity of transport has markedly handicapped the development of the operations. The available MF is altogether insufficient for the various requirements; what little was somehow distributed to the districts arrived very late at the place of employment.

Particularly, Rome and Naples still lack passenger cars, their assignment being essential in order to allow the CC RR to be present often enough at the operations.

Naples needed rfts of 10 medium and heavy trucks of which 12 only were granted.

This problem of MF is particularly important: most of the time one counts on possibilities which in practice do not materialize; thus for Naples, where the help which was expected from the units of the region has shrunk to a few vans because these units are either engaged in other work or have their vans deadlined. The same applies to Rome when neither the CC RR nor the Ministry was able to furnish the MF; not even the CC RR.

It is well to exert again how absolutely essential it is that the preparatory period of the operations be given more breathing space and that it be adapted to the pressing conditions of communications and transport.

4. The scarcity of transport has markedly handicapped the development of the operations. The available MT is altogether insufficient for the various requirements; what little was somehow distributed to the districts arrived very late at the place of employment.

Particularly: Rome and Naples still lack passenger cars, their assignment being essential in order to allow the HQ Officers to be present often enough at the operations.

Naples needed 100 of 12 medium and heavy trucks of which 12 only were granted.

This problem of MT is particularly important: most of the time one counts on possibilities which in practice do not materialize; thus for Naples, where the help which was expected from the units of the region has shrunk to a few vans because these units are either engaged in other work or have their vans deadlined. The same applies to Rome when neither the ~~MT~~ nor the Ministry was able to furnish the MT: not even by requisitioning ~~it~~ it is possible to have the necessary MT available. It is evident that in view of the serious contingencies caused by the lack of MT, those few vans which could be gathered will be strictly employed only for duties directly connected with the call-up.

5. To each proclamation has been added an MT service schedule for the transportation of the draftees. A second run has also been planned to gather the stragglers; this however too, for obvious reasons not published on the proclamations.

6. Orders have been issued for a strict control of rations, barracks stores etc. The district commanders will supervise this.

7. The CC RA will collaborate with the districts and will carry out the work of persuasion to keep the called up personnel arriving. It has furthermore been directed that those who do not report are arrested at once. Agreements with the CC RA have also been made regarding the mopping up to be done immediately following the call-up.

50/

8. As regards propaganda the aid of all dailies has been insured directly for the Ministry and by the respective military commands.

Likewise for radio propaganda; radio addresses on the question were made on the 14th, 16th and 17th inst.

Furthermore in the centres as well as in the various zones the church authorities, the rep of the political parties and the local political authorities have been contacted.

In the collection centres special information offices, meeting rooms, telephone booths and writing rooms have been set up and orders have been issued to enable the draftees to telegraph free of charge.

The Territorial Commands have visited the provinces in their jurisdiction giving the district Commands orders and directives on the organization to be set up.

During these visits the a./s Commands have personally contacted the prefects and the ecclesiastical and civil authorities.

Officers of the Territorial Commands have been sent to the districts to control and regulate the development of the call-up operation.

The Minister will see to controls in the various zones during the call up operations.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

5927

The minister will see to controls in the various heads during the
up operations.

8251
10
~~SECRET~~
CONFIDENTIAL 47

Subject: Further Italian participation in combat.

Land Forces Sub-Com, A.C.
(M.M.L.A.)

C/6

14 Jan 45.

JAN 15 1945

JAN 16 1945

Chief of Staff, A.C. ✓

39-46

As requested verbally by you to my 2nd i/c while I was on tour, herewith a short memorandum stating the salient points effecting the Italian demand for a larger Italian Combat Force to fight the Germans and liberate Italy.

L. Browning

Major General,
M.M.L.A.

see Minutes 48 & 49
5926

ENHANCED ITALIAN PARTICIPATION IN COMBAT

1. THE CURRENT ASPECT

(a) (1) Six Italian Combat Groups, strengthened approximately 9000 each, with auxiliary service units were authorized last July - the clothing and equipment of all natives (roughly the equivalent of 5 British Divisions) to be furnished by the British. Owing to lack of clothing and equipment, only five combat groups are being organized and trained. Two groups are ready for battle, two are approaching completion and the sixth is now in process of formation.

(2) A small part of the Italian Army (about 2%) is used purely for Italian internal administration and for the operation of hospitals, supply installations, recovery and utilization of Italian Army property, and for the repair and renovation of Allied clothing and materials used to clothe and equip the entire Army, less the Combat Groups.

(iii) The balance of the Italian Army (about 72%) is used for planners, engineers, railway, etc.

and for the operation of hospitals, supply
installations, recovery and utilization of
Italian Army property, and for the repair and
renovation of Allied clothing and materials used
to clothe and equip the entire Army, less the

Combat Groups.

(111) The balance of the Italian Army (about 73%)
is used for pioneer, engineer, railway, ~~air~~
mule pack, guard, post and internal security duty.

(b) Between Dec 1943 and July 1944, a Combat Force
of Italian troops (C.I.L.), approximately 30,000, was in
action with the 5th and 8th Armies. This was equipped
with Italian arms, clothing and equipment, but it was
necessary for the Allies to assist with motor vehicles.
The short supply of Italian arms and ammunition and the
lack of organization did not permit this force to remain
larger in combat.

0020

Sheet 2/000000

45
-2-

- (c) (1) Certain Italian small arms and ammunition have to be put in reserve, as all Italian troops, except the Combat Groups, are armed with Italian small arms. This includes the CG.RR and Internal Security divisions on the islands. Above this requirement, there is no surplus for any additional Combat Force, nor are there any working factories or facilities to manufacture replacements for the Italian arms and ammunition which are used up through normal attrition. To restart factories would be a long process, even assuming that the necessary raw material could be imported, factories reconditioned, trained operatives made available and Allied policy as regards rearmament permitted. In any event, these factories could not turn out the vast range of complicated arms and equipment (particularly of the heavier natures) required in modern war against the Germans.
- (11) The Italian Army motor vehicles which were available at the time of the armistice were in poor condition. Even at best, these vehicles are not equal to the demands of modern warfare. After months of repair operations (principally cannibalisation because of lack of spare parts)

raw material could be imported, factories

reconditioned, trained operatives made available and Allied policy as regards rearmament permitted. In any event, these factories could not turn out the vast range of complicated arms and equipment (particularly of the heavier natures) required in modern war against the Germans.

(ii) The Italian Army motor vehicles which were available at the time of the armistice were in poor condition. Even at best, these vehicles are not equal to the demands of modern warfare.

After months of repair operations (principally cannibalization because of lack of spare parts) it has not even been possible to keep in operation sufficient vehicles to service the existing Italian Army, and the continued operation of these vehicles is limited due to lack of tyres. So, even to service the normal needs of the Italian Army, the Allies have had to lend motor vehicles.

(iii) Except for Combat Groups, the Italian Army exists on worn Allied and Italian clothing and boots which are repaired, cannibalized, dyed etc before issue. The greatest difficulty has been experienced in maintaining even the existing Italian Army under these circumstances.

1. (c) (iv) Thus, any increase in the combat element of the Italian Army would require the provision of clothing, arms and equipment of all natures from Allied sources at a time when such provision is not available even for the Sixth Combat Group.

2. THE ASPECT OF ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING

Even if the necessary equipment could be provided from Allied sources, additional Italian Combat Forces would have to be organized, at least partially, on Allied lines. Training by the Allies in the handling of technical equipment (particularly on a higher and more powerful scale than the Italian Army has been accustomed to) is essential. This, with the addition of the language difficulty, is a slow process and requires a high percentage of specialists. After concentration of personnel, experience has shown that a minimum of 4 months is required till troops are ready for combat - always assuming that adequate equipment is available at the time required.

3. THE PERSONNEL ASPECT

- (a) Generally speaking, the Italian rank and file are good material as soldiers, BUT the officers are the weak link. The latter lack the capacity for leadership and any conception of man-management. This is particularly so at present, as the best troops are either P of W or in the more virile population of NORTH ITALY. Even so,

troops are ready for combat - always assuming that adequate equipment is available at the time required.

3. THE PERSONNEL ASPECT

(a) Generally speaking, the Italian rank and file are good material as soldiers, BUT the officers are the weak link. The latter lack the capacity for leadership and any conception of man-management. This is particularly so at present, as the best troops are either P of W or in the more virile population of NORTH ITALY. Even so, no great improvement will be possible without a radical change in the system of selection and training of officers extending over many years.

(b) Despite the demands by political parties for a larger Italian Army, the fact remains that the Italian male answers the call-up most unwillingly. Recent cell-ups have produced only 50% of expectations. Evasion and desertion are rife (Ministry of War have 70,000 cases outstanding), particularly in those units employed in forward areas. The reasons for this and the steps being taken to mitigate it are given in MILIA letter

TS/G/4 of 1 Jan attached.

Sheet 4/.....

43
3. (b)(Contd). The conclusion would appear to be that the Italian males of military age do not share the views of their so-called political leaders.

(c) Apart from the matter of formation of new units, the replacement of wastage at the accepted rate of 4% per month (probably higher in the case of Italians) must be catered for.

4. TO SUM UP

(a) There is no Italian equipment suitable for Combat troops, nor can any be manufactured. Equipment available from Allied sources is only sufficient to equip and maintain 5 Combat Groups out of the 6 originally planned.

(b) Assuming the availability of further Allied equipment, a period of at least 6 months (including concentration of personnel, organisation and training) would elapse before the first new Combat formations could start becoming available for battle.

(c) It is, to say the least, very doubtful whether sufficient officers and men of the requisite calibre would in fact be forthcoming to form and maintain any more units than those we already have.

of personnel, organization and training) would elapse before the first new Combat formations could start becoming available for battle.

(e) It is, to say the least, very doubtful whether sufficient officers and men of the requisite calibre would in fact be forthcoming to form and maintain any more units than those we already have.

L. Brown

Major General,
M.M.I.A.

SUBJECT: Italian Army Strength

SECRET

LAND FORCES SUB-COM. A.C.

(M.M.I.A.)

File No. 15/10/4

/ Jan 45

TO : AFHQ (G-3 Org) - 5 copies

GENERAL

1. Ref your FX 73294 dated 23 Dec, I feel that you should know the difficulties confronting MIA as regards maintenance of Italian Army Strength and the action taken.

CELLING AND STRENGTH

2. Appendix "A" attached shows the ceilings and strengths by categories as at 22 Dec 44. From this it can be seen that some 48,000 personnel were required to complete to ceiling, apart from replacement of wastage, while the "free" reinforcements total only 2,000 for BR-ITIS.

PAST HISTORY

3. In Aug 44 the Army was 32,000 over strength and MIA was instructed to reduce to 309,000.
4. In Oct 44 the strength fell by 17,000 and this was reported to you with reasons in MIA letter G/11/5 of 29 Oct 44.
5. On 31 Oct 44 EGS (SD) AFHQ personally visited this HQ and stated that owing to lack of clothing all call-ups should be temporarily suspended. However, after discussion, he agreed to nominal call-ups and this was confirmed in MIA letter SD/49 of 31 Oct.

6. Since then, Call-ups have taken place as follows:-

AREA	TARGET	RESULT
ROME and LAZZIO	14,000	3,750

CEILING AND STRENGTH

2. Appendix "A" attached shows the ceilings and strengths by categories as at 22 Dec 44. From this it can be seen that some 48,000 personnel were required to complete to ceiling, apart from replacement of wastage, while the "free" reinforcements total only 2,000 for HR-ITIS.

PAST HISTORY

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4. In Oct 44 the strength fell by 17,000 and this was reported to you with reasons in MMLA letter C/11/5 of 29 Oct 44.

5. On 31 Oct 44 BGS (SD) AFHQ personally visited this HQ and stated that owing to lack of clothing all call-ups should be temporarily suspended. However, after discussion, he agreed to nominal call-ups and this was confirmed in MMLA letter SD/49 of 31 Oct.

6. Since then, Call-ups have taken place as follows:-

<u>AREA</u>	<u>TARGET</u>	<u>RESULT</u>
ROME and LAZZIO	14,000	3,700
ABRUZZI	6,000	2,000

7. A Call-up is proceeding in SICILY now - see para 12 (e) below.

8. A further call-up is projected:-

(a) For SARDINIA in Feb and March - vide MMLA signal SD 1948 dated 17 Dec. This depends on shipping.

(b) For UMBRIA and MARCHE. This depends on accommodations for the personnel called up. The Italian owned barracks are now in occupation of the Allies. My AQ/2483 dated 31 Dec refers.

FACTORS

9. The two main reasons for the present situation are:-

- (a) Meagre results of Call-ups.
- (b) Heavy and abnormal wastage.

5922

10.

The reasons for 9 (a) are:-

- (a) Lack of enthusiasm to enlist, owing to war weariness, sense of defeat and despair, economic conditions, conditions of service including shortage of clothing, blankets etc. This is the fundamental reason.
- (b) Feeling against enlistment due to the remains of pro-Fascism, to reluctance to enter an Army which had failed so disastrously and reluctance to furthering the Allied Cause at a time when the Armistice terms are not known and ITALY is being treated as a conquered nation - vide in this connection report by Captain OLLIVER 51 Field Security Section dated 28 Dec on the SICILY Call-up.
- (c) Over-lenient exemption laws.
- (d) Lack of territorial organization.
- (e) Difficulties and inefficiency of the Italian Military Authorities in organizing Call-ups.
- (f) Weakness and loss of prestige of CC RR in enforcing Call-up.
- (g) Shortage of transport in collection or round-up of personnel in Call-up.
- (h) Difficulty of estimating the numbers of each class owing to the great movement in population.

11.

The reasons for 9 (a) are:-

- (a) Widespread desertion or A.W.O.L. for reasons as in 10 (a) coupled with the high prices realized by deserters in the Black Market for their blankets, boots etc.
- (b) Difficulty of prevention of desertion, owing to poor discipline and lack of control, ease of "get-away" under existing conditions and lack of adequate punishment.
- (c) Many changes of plan, doubtless inevitable, such as:-
 - (1) Clothing for Combat Groups - during Sept/Oct. the responsibility for provision was changed 4 times, resulting in men having only their worn out summer clothing till Nov.
 - (11) Re-e of PIONEER Combat Group - changed from Combat to I.S. to loan to CC RR and now required to...

(n) Difficulty of estimating the numbers of each class owing to the great movement in population.

The reasons for 9 (b) are:-

- (a) Widespread desertion or A.W.O.L. for reasons as in 10 (a) coupled with the high prices realized by deserters in the Black Market for their blankets, boots etc.
- (b) Difficulty of prevention of desertion, owing to poor discipline and lack of control, ease of "get-away" under existing conditions and lack of adequate punishment.
- (c) Many changes of plan, doubtless inevitable, such as:-
 - (1) Clothing for Combat Groups - during Sept/Oct. the responsibility for provision was changed 4 times, resulting in men having only their worn out summer clothing till Nov.
 - (ii) Rate of PIGEON Combat Group - changed from Combat to I.S. to loan to CC RR and now required to provide reinforcements.

This naturally had wide repercussions on the morale of this sentimental and despondent people.

ACTION TAKEN

12. The following action has, however, been taken:-
- (a) Attempt has been made to raise enthusiasm and morale by statements in the Press of the good work done by the Italian Army: parade of Combat Groups through Rome; improvement in pay and conditions of service; a drive for better welfare arrangements; an Italian Army Newspaper (about to be started); insistence, as far as possible, that Italian Officers (the weak link) look after their men etc.
 - (b) Stricter exemption laws. In this connection, I would mention the large number of exemptions in 3 District approved in your FI 65505 of 8 Dec. PRS give practically no exemptions.

(o) Introduction of a complete Territorial organization - vide MMIA letter TS/G/12 dated 28 Dec.

(4) Better organization of Call-ups. MMIA LO's have been present during the ARRUZZI and SICILY Call-ups and their comments and recommendations have been sent to Ministry of War.

(e) The head of the CC RR has been ordered to take energetic steps to see that CC RR do their job properly. In SICILY, for instance, some 60 men who did not obey the Call-up have been arrested and punished. The result has been that this Call-up is proceeding more satisfactorily than any to date.

Moreover, with the organization of mobile CC RR Bns (see your AG 14.12/253 CCT-O of 28 Dec) CC RR will have more control and their prestige will be raised thereby. This can be extended to all ITALY and SARDINIA in due course.

(f) Owing to the repair organization set up by MMIA in SARDINIA (to be extended later to the mainland) more M.T. is becoming available.

(3) Organization of proper reinforcement Depots at BRACCIANO, ARICCIA, TRANI and ORVIEITO, in place of the large number of dispersed small depots.

(h) Request to you for the return of 3,000 personnel of PICENO Combat Group lent to CC RR, who are now over their ceiling. HQ A.O. letter 3606/CCS of 31 Dec refers.

(2) Introduction by Ministry of War of a more severe scale of punishments and quickening up of the procedure for awarding same. This includes the setting up of Divisional Tribunals with wide powers of punishment.

(3) I have discussed with the Italian Military Authorities the possibility of demanding the repatriation of P of W for service with the Italian Army. The C.G.S. has applied to P of W for repatriation A.O. for the repatriation of 2,500 officers and 2,500 men. These would be specially selected, the officers largely of the Army General Staff and the men specialists - which we so badly need. I am entirely in favour of this scheme, which will be forwarded to you shortly. I have reason to believe that there would be a willing response from the P of W, though I appreciate the shipping and other difficulties.

It is to be noted that the best section of the Italian people is either in the P of W or in the Army.

(a) Introduction by Ministry of War of a more severe scale of punishments and quickening up of the procedure for awarding same. This includes the setting up of Divisional Tribunals with wide powers of punishment.

(b) I have discussed with the Italian Military Authorities the possibility of demanding the repatriation of P of W for service with the Italian Army. The C.G.S. has applied to P of W for repatriation A.C. for the repatriation of 2,500 officers and 2,500 men. These would be specially selected, the officers largely of the Army and the men specialists - which we so badly need. I am entirely in favour of this scheme, which will be forwarded to you shortly. I have reason to believe that there would be a willing response from the P of W, though I appreciate the shipping and other difficulties.

It is to be noted that the best section of the Italian people is either P of W or the more viable population in the North. We are thus trying to compete with, on the whole, the least suitable Italian manpower.

(k) I have on many occasions discussed all the above personally and forcibly with the Minister of War and he has been taking a strong line with his people to see that this action is properly carried out.

CONCLUSION

13. (a) From all the above it will be realized that the present situation of affairs is the result of a conglomeration of inevitable causes, inherent in the existing situation and many of which are beyond MILA control.

(b) Energetic action will continue to be taken and it is hoped that the Italian manpower situation will gradually right itself when the Last/New Year period (which has resulted in much A.W.O.M.) is over and as the action taken begins to take effect.

COS to: G.A.O.

d. Browning
Major General
M.O. I. to do

785017

ITALIAN ARMY - STRENGTHS AND CEILINGS

as known at 22 Dec 1944

US - ITIS			BR - ITIS			ITI - IT IS		
CLASS	WEAKNESS	STRENGTH	CLASS	CEILING	STRENGTH	CLASS	CEILING	S
Service Units	79,000	71,801	Service Units	93,000	56,518	Italian Adm	27,000	
Rfts	4,500		Combat Tps (Incl FIGERO Group)	57,000	55,537	AA & CD		
			Rfts	10,500	12,503	AC Internal Security & Italian Int Sec(SIN)	38,300	
						Rfts	3,700	
						Carabinieri	55,000	
						Army personnel on loan to CC,RR		
<u>TOTALS</u>	83,500	71,301		160,500	124,558		124,000	

NOTE: US-ITIS has no "free" reinforcements except those carried in the U.S. Service Ceiling.

BR-ITIS. Of the 12503 shown, 5,000 are already in process of assignment to BR-ITI Serv sent forward as reinforcements for Combat Groups or towards the muleteer program are thus only 2,000

ITI-ITIS. Of the 5953 shown, 4500 were in SARUNIA awaiting shipment to the mainland and the remaining 1400 were personnel in transit or contained in small units orders. There are thus no "free" reinforcements.

5919

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

ITALIAN ARMY - STRENGTHS AND CEILINGS

as known at 22 Dec 1944

SECRET

Appendix 1 to CIA
Letter 10,000 of 1 Jan 45

- ITIS		ITI - IT IS		TOTAL ITALIAN ARMY	
CEILING	STRENGTH	CLASS	CEILING	STRENGTH	
93,000	56,518	Italian Adm	27,000	24,679	
57,000	55,537	AA & CD			
		AC Internal			
		Security &	38,300	36,419	
10,500	12,503	Italian Int			
		Sec (SE)			
		Rfts	3,700	5,953	
		Carabinieri	55,000	54,377	
		Army personnel on loan to CC. RR		1,299	
160,500	124,558		124,000	122,727	368,000 319,086

cept those carried in the U.S. Service Ceiling.

already in process of assignment to BR-ITI Service Units. A further 5500 have since been
or Combat Groups or towards the muleteer programme. The "free" reinforcements available

SARUNIA awaiting shipment to the mainland and subsequent assignment to Categories; while
in transit or contained in small units ordered to be disbanded or not at that time assigned.
ements.

COPY FOR COS FILES.

(Original returned to Gen. Browning 9 Jan. 45)

SUBJECT: M.M.I.A. Future Planning.

Land Forces Sub Com., AC.
(MILA)

TS/G/13
7 Jan 45

A.F.H.Q. for G-3 (Org.) NOT SENT

JAN 10 1945

1. In addition to daily routine duties under my present charter, it is now becoming necessary to plan ahead for eventualities during the concluding phases of the war in ITALY and for the post-hostilities period. These problems, which require constant liaison with outside authorities and other postwar planning staffs cannot adequately be dealt with by M.M.I.A. Staff as at present organised or allowed me by W.E.

2. To ease the burden on my staff I have been doing a great deal of this myself, but cannot continue to do so without detriment to other commitments. I consider I need a small post-war planning section, proportionately comparable to those at other Headquarters, whose principal problems would be:-

- (a) Future liaison and relationship with Italian military authorities.
- (b) Post-war organisation and strength of Italian Army.
- (c) Contemplated changes in administration and status of the Italian Army.
- (d) Repatriation of Italian Prisoners of War from all over the world. (See also 3(c) below).

These include a multitude of associated details which should be studied now but with which I am quite unable to deal.

3. (a) This section should stand in relation to the rest of my staff in much the same way as the ad hoc Special Section has stood over the organization of the Combat Groups, which arrangement has worked extremely well.

(b) I should like it to be composed of regular officers who already have a knowledge of these matters and who are less likely to be affected by demobilisation.

If approved, I would particularly like to have:-

Colonel DUNSTON - who is completely en courant with M.M.I.A.

(c) Contemplated changes in administration and status of the Italian Army.

(d) Repatriation of Italian Prisoners of War from all over the world. (See also 3(c) below).

These include a multitude of associated details which should be studied now but with which I am quite unable to deal.

3. (a) This section should stand in relation to the rest of my staff in much the same way as the ad hoc Special Section has stood over the organization of the Combat Groups, which arrangement has worked extremely well.

(b) I should like it to be composed of regular officers who already have a knowledge of these matters and who are less likely to be affected by demobilisation.

If approved, I would particularly like to have:-

Colonel PIDSLEY - who is completely au courant with M.M.I.A. organisation, procedure and problems; and who has organised the Italian Combat Groups.

Major GREGSON - who similarly has a full knowledge of the working of M.M.I.A. from A/Q aspect.

This would ensure continuity. When the time came to implement their plans, the staff would become executive and continue as part of whatever post-war establishment M.M.I.A. is to have when M.M.I.A. is transformed, presumably, into a Disarmament Commission.

(c) By taking over the P.W. Section of A.C. as already proposed by the Chief Commissioner) and other officers loaned to me by A.C. there need hardly be any overall increase in personnel.

4. I request approval in principle so that I can:-

(a) Begin tentative reorganisation on the lines suggested.

(b) Make formal application for a W.E.

and thus anticipate future possibilities, relieving my present staff of functions not strictly within their orbit and with which they have not the

/P.T.O.

) 2 (

time to deal.

5. I have discussed this with H.Q. Allied Commission who are in entire agreement with me.

(signed) L. BROWNING.

Major General,
M.M.I.A.

Copy of handwritten note.

Major Gen. Browning.

We spoke about this and I gathered that you will be content with retention of Col. PIBLEY on your strength but not on your Establishment. This is the case at the moment and will not be altered.

Copy of handwritten note.

MajGen. Browning.

We spoke about this and I gathered that you will be content with retention of Col. PIBLEY on your strength but not on your Establishment. This is the case at the moment and will not be altered.

M.S.L.

9.1.45.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

5251
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Chief of Staff

19 December 1944.

23 Dec 1944

SUBJECT: Italian Army Policy.

TO : Chief of Staff.

1. To remind you that at the last Chief of Staff's Meeting on 15 December you undertook to take up with the Chief Commissioner the question of the policy of the Allied Governments with regard to Italy and Japan. There was an impression that recruiting for the Italian Army was prejudiced by a belief that Italians might be sent to the Far East.

2. Political Section are anxious to know what this policy is and, if possible, to get out an announcement.

W. Shipp
Lt. Col. 918
Chief Staff Officer.

VPs meeting

Only previous correspondence is para 7 of minutes of COS
Mtg of 15 Dec. — NFA. Lr 23/12

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5

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

8251 C.O.S. 6214
JC/etb
AP 424
: S E C R E T :
: Auth: SAC :
: Initials: *W* :
: 20 December 1944 :
: : :
CONFIDENTIAL

AG 091.112/119 OCT-0

20 December 1944

22 DEC 1944

SUBJECT: Responsibilities of Land Forces Sub-Commission (MIA) to Italian Gruppi.

TO : President, Allied Commission, APO 394
FOR: Land Forces Sub-Commission (MIA)

1. In order to clarify the responsibilities of the Land Forces Sub-Commission towards the Italian Gruppi when the latter pass from under command of SMRE (General Staff Headquarters of the Italian Army) to that of Allied formations, authorization is made for the Land Forces Sub-Commission to communicate direct with BLUs attached to Combat Groups under command of Allied formations on the following points:

- All matters of purely Italian administration.
- Strengths and reinforcements.
- Discipline.
- Conditions of service, welfare, etc.

2. Copies of all correspondence on the above matters should be sent to the Allied Headquarters concerned.

3. All operational, executive and policy matters, also proposals by BLUs or Combat Groups for changes in organization will be made through normal staff channels to the Allied Headquarters concerned for decisions or recommendation to MIA.

By command of Field Marshal ALEXANDER:

R. H. Frese

R. H. FRESE
Captain, ACD,
Asst Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2 - Addressees
- 1 - 15th Army Gp
- 1 - ALCO
- 1 - G-3 Ops
- 1 - G-3 Org (1)
- 1 - G-1 (B)
- 1 - G-4 (E)
- 2 - G-3 (Org) Foreign
- 2 - AG Records
- 1 - AG IAD

AC Inst
AG: LAND FORCES G/C (2)
W: C.O.S.

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8251

Cops. (35)
4969

Subject: Italian Army - Stoppages of Pay - BR-ITIS.

Land Forces Sub Comm. A.C.
(M. M. I. A.)
R O M E
AQ/8

6 Dec 44.

To : ALL MMIA LO's

(33) 17 DEC 1944

1. AFHQ has ordered (AFHQ ltr AG 091.711/169 GCT-O, dated 16 Nov 44), that the system of stoppages of pay from soldiers of the Italian Army may continue to be made in cases of loss of or damage to items of clothing or equipment on official loan or issue to the Italian Army from W.D. sources.
2. Such stoppages will be awarded as a disciplinary measure only. The amounts so collected will be retained by the Italian Government and not re-funded to the British Public.
3. This H.Q. does not, therefore, require to receive copies of Courts of Inquiry, or other documents giving details of stoppages awarded. Such information should be passed to the Ministry of War through normal Italian channels.

SPA/wk

F. J. Noakes
F. J. NOAKES, Col,
for Major General,
M. M. I. A.

Copies to: HQ AAI
HQ Rear 8 Army
Br Increment Rear 5 Army
HQ No. 1 Dist (5)
HQ No. 2 Dist (5)
HQ No. 3 Dist (5)
HQ A.C. (5)

RECEIVED
7 DEC 44
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AP41

RHF/awm

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

~~SECRET~~
: Auth: SAC, MT :
: Initials: G.D.K. :
: 16 November 1944 :
: 16 November 1944 :
: 16 November 1944 :

AG 091.711/169 GCT-0

SUBJECT: Command and Administration of Italian Army.

TO : All Concerned.

HEADQUARTERS
18 NOV 1944
A. C.

1. This instruction governs the relationships between the Allied Armies and the Italian Army in regard to Command and Administration, and is divided into the following sections:

Section I - Allied Control of the Italian Army.

Section II - General Organization and Administration of the Italian Army.

Section III - Italian Army Units Maintained by the US and the British.

Section IV - Italian Army Units Maintained Internationally.

Note - No part of this Instruction applies to Italian Cooperators (ex Prisoners of War) or Italian POW Service Units under US control.

Section I - Allied Control of the Italian Army

2. GENERAL. The Italian Army is at the disposal of this headquarters for the performance of such tasks as may be allotted from time to time.

3. CONTROL. Control of the Italian Army is exercised by the Supreme Allied Commander through the Land Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission (NMIA) under command of this headquarters.

4. NMIA WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR:

a. Transmission and interpretation of Allied orders and requirements to the appropriate Italian Military Authority.

b. Supervision of administration and supply of the Italian Army as laid down in letters, this headquarters, AG 400/105 D-O dated 22 September 1944 and AG 400/031 GDS-O dated 6 October 1944.

c. Supervision of appointments, promotions, dismissals, discipline and drafts (call ups) of Italian Army personnel.

d. Liaison between employing Allied formations and the State and Ministry of War.

e. Representation of the views of the Italian Military Authorities to this headquarters.

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AC 601 711/165 GGT-O
101 15 NOVEMBER 1944 (CONT'D)

5. FORMATION OF NEW UNITS. The formation of new units or the reorganization of existing units of the Italian Army by Italian Military Authorities, or by Allied formations is prohibited except as authorized by this headquarters.

6. EMPLOYMENT:

a. Allied formations will employ only those effective units or individuals of the Italian Army who are specifically assigned or attached to them. Allied formations will employ and maintain only those persons who are properly enrolled into the present Italian Army. Persons who were members of the former Italian Army are civilians until they are enrolled or drafted through the proper present Italian military procedure.

b. An effective member of the Italian Armed Forces is defined as "one who is a bona fide member of the Italian Armed Forces, either officers, non-commissioned officers or other ranks, duly enrolled or enlisted therein, and subject to the laws of war and the Geneva Convention and borne on the rolls of the Ministry concerned, and actually performing the duty to which assigned as shown on the official strength returns of the Ministry concerned."

Section II - General Organization of the Italian Army

7. ORGANIZATION. The Italian Army is divided into categories as follows:

a. Troops maintained Internationally (short title ITI-ITI) including:

- (1) Troops for the administration of the Italian Army itself.
- (2) Troops engaged on Internal Security, guard battalions, etc (all of which are subject to assignment under Allied Command as organized).

b. Troops maintained by the British (short title BR-ITI) either diluted or complete units.

c. Troops maintained by the US (short title US-ITI).

8. ADMINISTRATION.

a. In principle the Italian Military Authorities are responsible to this headquarters through MMIA for the Administration of all categories, except as specified otherwise herein.

b. Italian Administrative Headquarters for the Administration of ITI-ITI troops are provided from the administrative troops under Italian Command.

c. Italian Administrative Headquarters for US-ITI and BR-ITI troops are provided from personnel assigned organically as a part of such category. These headquarters are under US and British Command respectively.

d. The general administration of the Italian Army is vested in the Ministry for War, the personnel for which is obtained from administrative troops.

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(dtd 14 November 1944 (Cont'd))

9. COMMAND.

a. Allied Commanders are given power of Command over such Italian formations or units as are placed under their jurisdiction. As far as circumstances permit, orders will be transmitted through the appropriate Italian Army Channels of Command.

b. Allied Commanders under whose command Italian Units or individuals have been placed have authority to suspend temporarily any Italian Officer for cause at any time. Should such suspension be made, the next officer in the Italian Channel of Command will succeed pro-tem the officer suspended, until a suitable successor is appointed by the Italian Military authorities. The suspended officer will be directed to report to the next Superior Italian Headquarters. The Allied Commander will forward to MMIA at the time of suspension, a full statement of facts in the case so as to form the basis for action to be taken by the Ministry of War and this headquarters.

c. All personnel of the Italian Army will be subject to Italian Military Law, which will be administered by Italian Officers in accordance with the Italian code. Where there is no Italian officer competent, under the Italian code, to deal with the offence in the unit concerned, the offender will be sent to the nearest Italian Authority competent to act. When the offender is a member of a unit under Allied Command, the Allied Commander will be informed of the action taken. In cases where the Allied Commander considers the action taken was unsatisfactory, or the punishment insufficient, the Allied Commander will submit a statement of facts to MMIA for such additional action as is indicated.

d. Where Italian troops are under Allied Command, relevant Allied Commanders will demand removal and replacement of unsuitable Italian officers up to and including Lt Colonels, by the appropriate Italian Commanders concerned. If the action taken by the Italian Authority is unsatisfactory, the Allied Commander will report through normal Allied Channels to the Army, District or Base Section Commander under whose Command the Italian Army unit has been placed. The Army, District or Base Section Commander will refer the matter to the Senior Italian Authority under his command. If, after this reference, satisfactory action is not taken, details of the case, together with the recommendations of the Allied Army, District or Base Section Commander, will be sent to MMIA for action with the Minister of War. In the case of officers above the rank of Lt Colonel, a full report will be made by the appropriate Allied Commander to MMIA who will take necessary action with the Minister of War. In all cases where the Allied Commander considers that the Italian officer should be eliminated from the service, regardless of the action taken by the Italian Authorities in accordance with the demand of the Allied Commander, a full report should be sent to MMIA, to ensure that the officer concerned will receive such disciplinary action as is warranted by the facts in the case.

10. ARREST.

a. Allied Military Authorities are given power to arrest and hold in temporary custody Italians subject to Military Law alleged to be guilty of any offence punishable by Italian Law, pending investigation and handing over the

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dt'd 16 November 1944 (Cont'd)

offender for trial by the Italian Authorities. This power will be exercised in the same manner as for the arrest of Allied personnel.

11. LEAVE.

a. If the military situation permits, privilege leave may be given to Italian Army personnel for a period of seven days, exclusive of travelling time, not more than once in six months. The movement, on leave, of personnel, between the mainland and SICILY and SARDINIA will be governed by current regulations.

b. Compassionate leave may be given in proper cases by a superior Italian Military Authority, Colonel or above, for fourteen days exclusive of travelling time, with the concurrence of the Allied Commander concerned, if applicable.

c. Not more than five percent of a unit may be away on privilege and/or compassionate leave at one time. Absenteeism due to previous leave draft will count against the five percent until such time as absentees have rejoined or been struck off strength and reinforcements provided.

d. Agricultural or special leave will be the subject of special orders from time to time.

e. Allied Commanders may, at their discretion, suspend the granting of leave to members of Italian Army units under their command, for operational or other reasons.

f. Italian Army personnel on leave are not entitled to rations from Army sources during the period of absence.

12. APPOINTMENT AND ASSIGNMENT OF OFFICERS.

a. The Italian Minister of War is responsible for the appointment of Officers, subject to such restrictions as may be imposed from time to time by this headquarters.

b. Assignment of officers is a function of the Minister of War. In units employed under Allied Command, officers will not be relieved by the Minister of War until a suitable replacement has reported for duty and no transfer or reliefs generally will be effected without prior notification to the Allied Commander concerned.

13. ABSENTEES.

a. Personnel absent without leave over 30 days will be struck off the authorized strength of the Italian Army.

b. Personnel who have been struck off the authorized strength of the Italian Army will, when apprehended, be subject to such disciplinary action as the Italian Army considers appropriate, but during trial and sentence will not be maintained or rationed within the ceiling of the Italian Army. If such personnel are again available for duty as effectives, the personnel will be returned to the center for reassignment.

SECRET

(d 16 November 1944 (Cont'd))

14. PERSONNEL UNDERGOING IMPRISONMENT OR DETENTION.

a. Italian Army personnel sentenced to imprisonment or detention, or confined awaiting trial, are, for periods under 30 days, confined in unit cells, and are retained on the strength of the unit.

b. Italian Army personnel who are absent from their unit awaiting trial for over 30 days, or who are sentenced to detention for over 30 days, will be struck off the authorized strength of the Italian Army, and will be confined in Civil prisons. On release from the Civil prison, if they remain eligible for service in the Army, such personnel will be sent to a replacement center for reassignment. Such personnel will not be reincorporated in the old unit unless assigned thereto through the replacement center. During the period of confinement in civil prisons, such personnel will not be rationed from Army sources.

c. Effective Army personnel will not be employed in the operation of Civil prisons, camps or detention centers, for the confinement of personnel for periods in excess of 30 days.

15. ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION. No member of the Italian Army will be paid any salary, wages or emoluments from Allied sources as an addition to his pay from the Italian Government.

16. WELFARE.

a. Welfare will be the responsibility of the Italian Government.

b. Issues, sales, or gifts of Post Exchange or NAAFI supplies from Allied sources to Italian troops under Allied command is prohibited except as authorized specially by this headquarters.

17. HOSPITALIZATION.

a. Personnel undergoing treatment in hospitals or convalescent camps will be carried by their units as "sick in hospital" for periods up to 30 days inclusive.

b. Personnel remaining in hospital or convalescent camps over 30 days will be transferred to the rolls and carried on the strength of the replacement center. Separate instructions will be issued to cover Combat Groups.

c. Personnel remaining in hospital or convalescent camps over 60 days will be struck off the authorized ceiling of the Italian Army, and will be transferred to Civil hospitals operated by the Italian Government, thereafter being issued no rations from Army stocks.

d. The Italian Government will be responsible for organizing and operating civilian hospitals and convalescent camps to care for personnel who require hospitalization in excess of 60 days.

e. Personnel who have been struck off the authorized strength of the Army as a result of being in hospital over 60 days will be carried on the rolls of the Italian Army.

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AFHQ Ltr 16 Oct 44 (16) OCT-0
 101st Airborne Div 1944 (cont'd)

the Army, if physically qualified, upon discharge from the Civil hospital. Recall will be effected through the normal recall channels and reassignment will be through the replacement center.

f. The figure of 60 days may be reduced by orders of this headquarters if it is found by experience that an excessive number of sick is being carried on the rolls of the replacement center.

G. See folio 183 Vol II.

18. REINFORCEMENTS AND REPLACEMENTS: The system and organization for the provision of replacement personnel will be as follows:

a. Recruits will be called up by the Ministry of War at the direction of MMIA.

b. Recruits will report to "Call-up Centers", the staffs of which will be ITI-ITI personnel.

c. Separate base replacement depots will be set up for US-ITI's, BR-ITI's and ITI-ITI's respectively. MMIA will be responsible for arranging delivery of recruits and personnel available from other sources to the depots and for their maintenance prior to arrival. Thereafter, the nationality concerned will be responsible for the maintenance and training of replacement personnel and distribution to units.

d. The responsibility for establishment, and maintenance of staffs of base replacement depots is as follows:

- | | | |
|-----------------|---|--------------------------|
| (1) For US-ITI | - | CG MTOUSA |
| (2) For BR-ITI | - | AFHQ (British Element) |
| (3) For ITI-ITI | - | The Italian War Ministry |

e. The replacements held on the rolls of replacement depots will not exceed the authorized number in each instance.

f. On the first of each month MMIA will forecast to this headquarters the output of types of personnel from Call-up Centers and other sources of personnel during the succeeding month and furnish any other information required to enable this headquarters to apportion the required quota between the US-ITI, BR-ITI and ITI-ITI, Replacement Depots. The distribution in specific Replacement Depots of the nationality concerned will be in accordance with the requirements of CG MTOUSA for US-ITI's, this headquarters for BR-ITI's, War Ministry for ITI-ITI's.

g. MMIA will authorize call-up of personnel on the basis of demands at f above.

Section III - Italian Army Units Maintained By The US and British. (US-ITI's and BR-ITI's)

19. PROVISION OF UNITS:

a. The entire resources of personnel of the Italian Army are at the disposal of this headquarters, which allots Italian Army units and personnel to the various categories.

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REF ID: A6 091 711/169 GCT-0

Classified by 1944 (cont'd)

20. ORGANIZATION.

a. Units or sub-units maintained by the British (BR-ITI's) are or will be organized on WEs to be decided by this headquarters.

b. Units serving and maintained by the US (US-ITI's) are or will be organized on provisional TOs as decided by the Base Section, Army or similar headquarters.

c. MML will be informed of any changes in organization or WE/TO of units.

21. REPLACEMENTS.

a. The holding of replacements for Service Units, exclusive of Combat Groups, is limited to 5% of the total authorized service units maintained by the Allies.

22. FINANCES.

a. Wherever possible the Italian Government will be responsible for the payment of Italian Army personnel and for meeting such other expenses as are necessary.

b. Wherever due to local conditions, it is NOT practicable for payment to be made by the Italian Government, the following emergency measures are authorized:

(1) Units serving under British Command:

(a) Italian units will draw bulk advances from the nearest British Field or Area Cashier.

(b) In diluted units the senior Italian officer will draw advances from the nearest British Field or Area Cashier. Such amounts will not appear in the Imprest accounts of the British units concerned.

(c) All advances will be in bulk sum.

(d) A list of authorized units will be supplied by this headquarters to the Command Paymaster, Number 8 Command Pay Office, CMF. In the case of diluted units the British Commanding Officer will nominate the Italian officer to whom payment should be made.

(2) Units maintained by the US:

Finances will be subject to special instructions issued by CG MTOUSA.

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REF ID: A6-091-27 269 GGT-C

1998

Section IV - Italian Army Units Maintained Internationally

23. ORGANIZATION. These units are divided into three categories:

A. Internal Security formations whose principal functions are:

- (1) Acting as a force to support the civil power.
- (2) Providing guards for Allied installations and Vital Points.
- (3) Special duties under Allied Command (e.g for AG, etc)

b. Administrative depots and services. The size, location and organization of the units are determined by the Italian Military Authorities under the direction of MMIA.

c. Para-Military personnel, ie, Carabinieri, the majority of whom are subordinate to the civil administration.

24. COMMAND. Except for Carabinieri and units allotted or attached to Allied formations for Internal Security or guard duties, these formations and units are under command of the Italian Military Authorities. If a state of emergency arises (such as the intervention of the enemy in the area concerned) these troops will come under command of the Allied Headquarters in whose area they are located. The Carabinieri (CC.RR) except those units within Army formations in the role of Military Police, are a civil police organization under the command of the Commanding General of the Carabinieri and directed by the Public Safety Sub-Commission, Allied Commission.

25. RELATIONS WITH ALLIED COMMANDERS. Local Allied Headquarters in whose area these units are located will be responsible for allotment of accommodation. Units will be subject to Allied orders on administration, which concern them as a result of their presence in the area, eg, curfew and road movement.

26. RESCISSION OF PREVIOUS PAPERS. Pending the rescission of documents already issued which are in conflict with this instruction, this instruction will govern.

By command of General WILSON:

H. V. ROBERTS, C
Colonel, AGD,
Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION:
(See next page)

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20 - HQ AAI	1 - AA & CD
20 - Land Forces Sub-Commission	1 - CWS
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10 - Number 3 District	2 - Director of Labor
10 - PENBASE	2 - Medical (Br)
10 - CG MTOUSA	1 - D Prov M Sec
5 - Rome Area	1 - QM
1 - No 50 Br Liaison Unit	1 - REME
1 - No 51 Br Liaison Unit	1 - S & T
1 - No 52 Br Liaison Unit	2 - Q (Maint)
1 - No 53 Br Liaison Unit	2 - C (AE)
1 - No 54 Br Liaison Unit	1 - Signals
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2 - Ho MAAF	1 - Tn (B)
2 - G-1 (B)	1 - Dep Mil Sec
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LAND FORCES (20)

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AIR SC

ECOM SEC

G-4 (B)

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
ESTABLISHMENT SECTION

8 November 1944

Subject: Military Call-Up - Exemptions

To : Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C., (MIA)

26
8 NOV Recd

Reference your AM/30 of 4 November, the question of exemption of civilian personnel (Italian) from military call-up is handled by G-2 (A), this Hq.

Lt. Montant Jr.,
1st Lt., AGD,
For Colonel, DCS,
Establishment Section.

Copy to G O S Section
for file 8251/27/008

PAK 5910

LWS/el

Office of the Chief of Staff

Military Call-up - Exemptions

8251/27/003

The Establishment Section

7 November 44

Will you kindly inform the Land Forces Subcommittee, AG, (MMIA), your decision in regard to paragraph 2 of the attached memorandum and pass the information on to this office?

Chief Staff Officer
To the Chief of Staff

- 1 Incl.
Cy ltr LF S-c (MMIA), 4/11/4
Sub as above

5909

8251
Subject: Military Call-up - Exemptions.

Land Forces Sub Comm.A.C.
(M.M.I.A.) R O M E.
AQ/30

To: Chief of Staff Office.

14 Nov 44

43 file 521/cos. 16 NOV Recd

1. AAI Adm Instruction No.52 of 22 Aug 44 rules that "HQ ACC" shall be a competent authority for the purpose of granting exemptions from call-up.
2. May it be ruled which section or Subcommittee is nominated as the executive section or subcommittee in order that the necessary details may from time to time be discussed.

F.J. Noakes
F.J.NOAKES Lt.Col.
for Major General.
M.M.I.A.

FJN/hh

see 27

5908

25

LWS/el

Office of the Chief of Staff

Redesignation of Army Subcommittee

8251/19/COS

1 November 44

The Adjutant, Hq, AGC

The following notice is for publication in the Daily Bulletin:

"Pursuant to the authority contained in paragraph 4 of AFHQ letter AG 091.112/079 GCT-O, dated 25 October 44, the Army Subcommittee will hereafter be known and referred to as LAND FORCES SUBCOMMISSION (MNIA). Accordingly, paragraph 4, Daily Bulletin #274, dated 26 October 44, is rescinded."

G. W. L. SHIFF

Chief Staff Officer
To the Chief of Staff

5807

PA- [Signature]

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

8251.34
O
SUBJECT: Change of Designation

Land Forces Sub Commission A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)

G/25

1 Nov 44

H.Q. A.C.

3 NOV Recd

Ref AFHQ letter AG 091.112/079 GGT-0 of 25 Oct 44.

Will you please issue amendment to your DAILY BULLETIN
No 274 of 26 Oct in accordance with the a/q letter and the
attached Office Instruction.

L.M. Ingledew
Major General
M.M.I.A.



OFFICE INSTRUCTION No. 54.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CHANGE OF DESIGNATION

1. W.E.F. date of this instruction the address and title of this H.Q. for all official purposes will be:-

"Land Forces Sub Comm. A.C. (M.M.I.A.)"

and for out-stations:-

"Liaison Officer

Land Forces Sub Comm. A.C. (M.M.I.A.)

c/o H.Q. _____" (e.g. 1 District, Rear 8 Army etc)

2. Signal and Private postal addresses will remain unchanged.

L. M. Ingleden

Lt. Col.
General Staff

/ Nov 44

Distribution:-

All Branches and Sections
All Liaison Officers
War Diary (2)

RESTRICTED

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ANALYST: J. H. HARRIS

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WATERBURY, CT 06702.

Theater policy is unchanged. From that stated in paragraph 3 Annex C to letter
this HQ, 22 September 44 File AG 400/105 D/O. subject is supply of Italian armed forces.

folio 13 of 8.255/cos.

NOTE: Information Only.
Copy also on file
8255 COS. "Supply of
Italian Armed Forces."

12 PAGE
ACTION - ECON SEC
INFO - 1/00 (2)
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AIR SEC
FOOD SEC (2)
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HEADQUARTERS
1 NOV 1944
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~~SECRET~~ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512C. S. 1956
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:Auth: SAC, MT
:Initials: *as*
:Date: 30 October 44
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AG 091.711/169 GCT-0

30 October 1944

1 NOV Recd

SUBJECT: Transfer From AAI to AFHQ of Responsibility for Control of Italian Army Manpower and Organization.

TO : All Concerned.

1. OBJECT:

The object of this letter is to define the changes in the responsibilities of AFHQ and AAI as the result of the handing over to AFHQ by AAI of the control of Italian Army Manpower and Organization.

2. DATE OF HANDOVER:

AFHQ will assume the responsibilities set out in the following paragraphs with effect from 1 NOVEMBER 1944.

3. CEILING OF THE ITALIAN ARMY:

AFHQ will decide the distribution of personnel to categories within the ceiling laid down from time to time by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

4. PROVISION OF PERSONNEL:

a. Through the agency of the Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA), The Allied Commission, AFHQ will undertake the provision of personnel to meet the Allied requirements within the categories of the ceiling.

b. The present proportionate distribution, i.e:

	<u>Specialist Personnel</u>	<u>Non-Specialist Personnel</u>
US	1/3	1/3
British	1/3	2/3
Combat Groups	1/3	

will continue in force until amended by AFHQ, and the personnel made available will be allotted between US and British in those proportions.

c. AFHQ will take over control of Priority List 8 - British Requirements of Italian Army personnel for Service Units, and Priority List 7 - Priority of shipment of personnel and units from SARDINIA to ITALY.

5. FORMATION OF UNITS:

AFHQ will undertake the formation of all units, the transfer of the relevant Formation Orders, for all units to be formed from Italian personnel to operate under Allied Command.

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9 GCT-O,
dtd 30 October 1944 (Cont'd)

6. WAR ESTABLISHMENTS:

AFHQ will publish War Establishments for British controlled units where necessary, but AAI is authorized to publish or amend and implement War Establishments for British controlled units peculiar to the Operational Zone.

7. ALLOCATION OF UNITS:

AFHQ will allot units as between the Operational Zone and L of C Area.

8. TRAINING OF ITALIAN COMBAT GROUPS:

AFHQ, being responsible for training facilities and equipment of Combat Groups, will supervise the training of these formations.

By command of General WILSON:

H. V. Roberts
H. V. ROBERTS,
Colonel, AGD,
Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION:

5 - HQ AAI	1 - Ord (B)
5 - The Allied Commission	1 - Ord (A)
5 - Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA)	1 - S & T
2 - Number 1 District	1 - Engrs
2 - Number 2 District	2 - Medical
2 - Number 3 District	1 - Signals
2 - PBS	1 - Provost
2 - COMZONE NATOUSA	1 - CWS
2 - RAAC	1 - O2E, CMF
2 - MAAP	1 - AA & CD
1 - C/S NATO	1 - Director of Labour
1 - SGS	1 - Financial Adviser
1 - G-1(A)	1 - Fiscal Director
3 - G-1(B)	11 - Spares (G-3)
1 - G-2	2 - AG Records
10 - G-3	1 - AG M & D
1 - G-4(A)	
1 - G-4(B)	
2 - G-4(M & Tn)	
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1 - CAO	
1 - Q(AE)	
1 - Q(Maint)	
1 - REME	
1 - QM	

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Declassified R.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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AP 848

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512: S E C R E T :
: Auth: SACIT :
: Initials :
: 25 October 1944 :
: :
1912 17

25 October 1944

31 OCT Recd

AG 091.112/079 GCT-0

SUBJECT: Status and Functions of the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the
Allied Commission (MFA)

TO : All Concerned

1. OBJECT

a. To establish the functions of, and channels of communication for, the operation of the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (MFA).

b. To clarify apparent misunderstanding as to the operation and functions of this organization.

2. HISTORY OF THE SUB-COMMISSION

a. Upon the conclusion of an Armistice with the Italians, and to relieve the Allied Army Staffs of extra work arising from this Armistice, a Mission was established, known as the Italian Military Mission, and subsequently as the Military Mission to the Italian Army, to act as the liaison between the Allied and Italian Armies, and to supervise the implementation of the Armistice Terms. Its duties consisted chiefly of demilitarization and demobilization, and organization of the remaining Italian land forces under the terms contained in the Armistice.

b. Subsequently, the Italians were accepted by the Allies as co-belligerents, and the functions of the MFA logically increased to include such duties as organization of personnel, training, equipping, maintenance and supply matters generally for the Italian Land Forces.

c. Consequent on the decision to include a Land Forces Sub-Commission within the Allied Commission, it was decided that the MFA should be constituted as the Land Forces Sub-Commission.

d. Then the Combined Chiefs of Staff directed that an agency be established to control the provision of supplies to the Italian Armed Forces, this duty was given to the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (MFA), whose staff was augmented to carry out the new commitment.

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2 copies received

Copy No 7 passed to 306 A/cc.

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Ltr AFHQ, AG 091.112/079 GCT-0
dtd 25 October 1944 (Cont'd)

3. PRESENT FUNCTIONS AS ESTABLISHED. From the above history, it is seen that the functions of the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (LMIA) are twofold, namely:

a. Sub-Commission business: The primary concern of the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (LMIA), so far as its sub-commission business is concerned is to implement the terms of the armistice, particularly with relation to demilitarization and demobilization. It is the vehicle by which the Allied Commission deals with the Italian Government on such Italian Army matters as concern it. For these purposes the Land Force Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (LMIA) was constituted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and requires the authority of the Combined Chiefs of Staff for any alteration in its functions.

b. Military Mission business: Consequent upon the grant of status of co-belligerency to the Italian nation, it became necessary to provide an organization to direct the armed forces of the Italian Government in accordance with the policies of the United Nations. To achieve economy in personnel and continuity of action, the duties which would otherwise have been undertaken by a special military mission set up for this purpose were assigned to the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (LMIA). The Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (LMIA) will in its capacity as a Military Mission normally deal directly with the military authorities (see paragraph 6).

4. DESIGNATION OF MISSION: To avoid confusion that has been prevalent in the past, the title to be used for correspondence concerning the Land Force Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission, either in its capacity as a sub-commission of the Allied Commission or in its capacity as a Military Mission to the Italian Army, will in future be Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (LMIA).

5. CHANNELS OF REPORT AND COMMUNICATION. For Sub-Commission business referred to at paragraph 3 a above, the channel of communication will be the usual one for Sub-Commissions of the Allied Commission.

6. The channel for Military Mission business referred to at paragraph 3 b above is Allied Force Headquarters. This business includes the following:

- a. Organization and supply matters generally in relation to Italian Army personnel.
- b. Personnel ceilings.
- c. Organizations of units and formations for:

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c Ltr AFHQ, AG 091.112 79 GCT-O,
dtd 25 October 1944 (Cont'd)

- (1) Combat.
- (2) Service units for support of combat troops both Italian and Allied.
- (3) Miscellaneous units for internal security and related duties, both under direct Allied military control and under the Italian Government as directed by Allied Commission.
- d. The direction of Italian Army manpower to meet Allied requirements.
- e. The training of personnel for employment in the above roles.
- f. The provision and holding of reinforcements (replacements).
- g. The equipment of Italian Army personnel to meet Allied requirements.
- h. Arrangements for, and supervision of, holding, distribution, and accountancy arising from the execution of the above functions.
7. The Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (MMIA) is authorized to maintain direct liaison with Allied Armies in Italy in order to effect such modifications in the arrangements for which they are responsible under paragraph 6 above, as are operationally desirable and can be undertaken without conflict with policies set by Allied Force Headquarters.
8. The Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (MMIA) is responsible for keeping the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, informed of all relevant business undertaken in its capacity as a military mission to the Italian Army.
9. Pending the rescission of documents already issued which are in conflict with this instruction, this instruction will govern.

By command of General WILSON:

H. V. Roberts
H. V. ROBERTS,
Colonel, AGD,
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

See Reverse Side

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Ltr AFHQ, AG 091.112/079 GCT-O,
dtd 25 October 1944 (Cont'd)

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2 - AC	1 - Q(AE)
2 - Land Forces Sub-Com (MHIA)	1 - Q(Maint)
2 - Hq 1 Dist	1 - REE E
2 - Hq 2 Dist	1 - Engr
2 - Hq 3 Dist	1 - Surg
2 - PBS	1 - S & T
2 - COMZONE, NATO	1 - Ord (A)
1 - C/S NATO	1 - Ord (B)
1 - SGS	1 - QM
1 - G-1 (A)	1 - Signals
1 - G-1 (B)	1 - CWS
1 - G-2	1 - Provost
10 - G-3	1 - Director of Labor
2 - G-4 (A)	1 - Director of Works
2 - G-4 (B)	1 - AA & CD
2 - G-5	1 - G-4 (I&Tn)
	2 - AG Records
	16 - Spares (G-3 (Org) Foreign)

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RESTRICTED

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

A/ce 707

OCT 22 1944

ARK/at

1158/15

AG 400/105-0

SUBJECT: Land Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Control Commission.

TO : Deputy President, Allied Control
Commission, APO 394.

21 October 1944

31 OCT Recd

1. Reference is made to your A/CC 321 dated 16 September 1944,
requesting an amendment to our AG 091.711-1 (Italian) GCT-AGM (Revised)
of the 10 February 1944.

2. The above-mentioned letter has not been rescinded by the
publication of our AG 400/105 D-0 of the 22d September 1944, and in
consequence, the amendment you requested does not remain necessary.

3. An instruction is shortly being issued by this headquarters
clarifying the functions and operation of the Land Forces Sub-Commission
of the Allied Control Commission, which will enable the Chief Commissioner
to appoint a representative of his own choice with Allied Armies in Italy.

By command of General WILSON:



av King
A. B. KING,
Major, AGD,
Asst Adjutant General.

cc.
File - on a file

12 NOV.

81. 31/10

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7. Out.
10. E.A. Sec
12. C.A. Sec
13. ESTAB SEC
Pol SEC
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HEADQUARTERS
27 OCT 1944

8251-58
ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

G-3 SECTION.

C.O.S. 14
1579
CONFIDENTIAL
23 October 1944

FILE NO : ASD/925.2
D22.

SUBJECT : Allied Occupation of Northern Italy.

28 OCT Recd

MEMO TO : Land Forces Sub-Commission (SEIA).
Allied Control Commission.

1. Reference is made to your TS/G/12 dated 4 October requesting authority to implement a plan for an Italian Military organisation covering all Italy.

2. You are authorized to make the necessary arrangements for implementation of this plan now, and as the Allied advance continues.

3. The provision of personnel for this project will be within the present International ceiling, and will be found from the following:

A figure shown at present as "Miscellaneous"	310
Reinforcements.	385
	695
	—

4. All interested should be kept informed as the reorganisation takes place in order that full use may be made of it in future plans.

D. Masie BGS
2
DANIEL NOCE,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

DE/vr -----

COPIES TO : Hq. XXI
Hq. ACC

CONFIDENTIAL
HEADQUARTERS
27 OCT 1944
G.S.C.

5899
~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Office of the Chief of Staff

TOP SECRET
Secret.

12/11/45

Ref: 6589/34/COS.

19 October 1944

JAN 11 1945

SUBJECT: Proposed Appreciative Statements on the Italian Forces.

TO : G.O.C., Army Sub-Commission.

The following extract of minutes of Political Committee Meeting held at AFHQ on 11 October 1944 is forwarded for your information :

"8. PROPOSED APPRECIATIVE STATEMENTS ON THE ITALIAN FORCES.

(Paper No. PC (44) 122)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper indicating that the New York office of OWI had requested Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, through PWB, to make an appreciative statement on the Italian forces serving under him. Similar requests were also being made of the Supreme Allied Commander, Air C-in-C, C-in-C AAI and Commanding General, Fifth Army.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM queried the desirability of making any appreciative statement on the Italian forces remarking that it would be unfavourably received in MALTA, FRANCE and elsewhere.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

- (a) Directed that Director PWB, inform OWI that publication of any appreciative statements on the Italian forces was considered undesirable so long as fighting continued on Italian soil.
- (b) Directed that Air Commander-in-Chief, Commander-in-Chief, AAI, and Commanding General, Fifth Army, act accordingly if approached and that G-3 telegraph Commander-in-Chief, AAI, and Commanding General, Fifth Army, in this sense."

M S. LUSH

Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

Q. PIA

5898

LWS/el

Major L.W. STEARNS
Office of the Chief of Staff

Notice for the Daily Bulletin

The Adjutant, Hq, ACC

24 October 44

TITLE OF ARMY SUBCOMMISSION: All sections, subcommissions, and other units of this Headquarters will refer to the Army Subcommission in their correspondence and other records as the ARMY SUBCOMMISSION and not MMIA.

(SGO) L W STEARNS

L. W. STEARNS
Major, AGD
Office of the Chief of Staff

DB # 274
TP4
+ 273-#2

24/10

PAVE

8251/05. 2

SUBJECT: Responsibility of M.I.I.A.

9

Military Mission Italian Army
ROME.

C/6

12 Oct. 44.

Chief of Staff, A.C.C.

13 OCT Read

Ref your minute on page 7 dated 10 Oct: -

1. (a) From an analysis, it has been found that 97% of the work of MIIA is purely military, with little or no repercussion or effect on the civil control of ITALY by A.C.C. proper. On this basis, MIIA should logically be direct under A.F.H.Q. now (A.A.I. hitherto).
- (b) Nevertheless, as you say, the A.F.H.Q. Directive of 28 Sep retains MIIA under the authority of the Chief Commissioner A.C.C. This, I understand, is necessary as MIIA owes its legal existence to the setting up of A.C.C. at the MCSCW conference - despite the fact that MIIA was an independent military mission to the Italian Army previously.
2. (a) In order to: -
 - (i) overcome the above anomaly.
 - (ii) implement practically the functions and work of MIIA
 - (iii) prevent burdening A.C.C. proper with matters which are not its real concern and which in most cases it knows nothing about.
 - (iv) avoid unnecessary paper and delays.

it was ruled earlier this year by Generals ALEXANDER and MACFARLANE that MIIA would deal direct with A.A.I. on military matters, consulting with A.C.C. on subjects where civil considerations were involved.

- (b) This arrangement has worked very well and must continue, except that in purely military matters MIIA now has to deal direct with A.F.H.Q. and A.A.I.

3. Another complication exists in the fact that part of the work of

- (i) overcome the above anomaly.
- (ii) implement practically the functions and work of MMIA
- (iii) prevent burdening A.C.C. proper with matters which are not its real concern and which in most cases it knows nothing about.
- (iv) avoid unnecessary paper and delays.

it was ruled earlier this year by Generals ALEXANDER and MACFARLANE that MMIA would deal direct with A.A.I. on military matters, consulting with A.C.C. on subjects where civil considerations were involved.

- (b) This arrangement has worked very well and must continue, except that in purely military matters MMIA now has to deal direct with A.F.H.Q. and A.A.I.

3. Another complication exists in the fact that part of the work of MMIA comes direct under NATCUSA through A.A.I. I refer to the aspect of the American supply organisation.

- 4. As regards MMIA being "responsible for the civil aspect" -

I agree that MMIA must take civil considerations into account, but I do not feel that MMIA is "responsible for the civil aspect." It is the duty of MMIA to carry out the military orders of A.A.I. or A.F.H.Q., and to represent to them the military pros and cons of any subject which has a civil as well as a military aspect. The decision then rests with A.A.I. or A.F.H.Q.

In my opinion, no other arrangement is possible, as, on occasions, the civil aspect and wishes of A.C.C. run directly counter to the military aspect and even to the MMIA charter or the orders issued to MMIA by A.A.I. or A.F.H.Q. direct.

- 5. (a) As you will know, the whole position and status of MMIA is very difficult and peculiar. We really have 4 masters - A.C.C., A.A.I., A.F.H.Q., and NATCUSA (through A.A.I.).

- (b) I consider it is quite impossible to state categorically in words what is the exact position and responsibility of MMIA in all the various and diverse aspects of its work.

-2-

5. (Contd)

(c). The whole business (like the British Constitution and other illogical British organisations - which do work) must exist and carry on on a basis of common sense, goodwill and cooperation.

6. As I see it, that is the situation - which remains unchanged from what has been in practice for months past, except that MIA now has an additional direct master in A.F.H.Q. !

tvS.LB.

L. Browning

Major General.
MIA.

1461

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

5895

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8251 + 212
COG

Policy FILE 2

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Office of the Acting Chief Commissioner
AFG 394

EWS/afe

12 October 1944

A/CC 321-1

12 OCT Reed

Subject: Title of Army Sub-Commission

To: Brigadier Lush, Chief of Staff

1. I note that your office has fallen into the natural, because convenient, habit of designating the Army Sub-Commission as MMIA. I think this has a tendency to support their attitude that they are not part of the Commission. I find that even G-5 recently returned a letter to the Army Sub-Commission saying that MMIA should have taken it up with AGC!

2. AFHQ letter AG 323/035 GCT-O, 28 Sep 44, subject: Reorganization of Command and Administration in ITALY, para 13a, clearly supported and confirmed my position that MMIA is not a separate entity but is the Army Sub-Commission of the Allied Control Commission.

"13. a. The Allied Control Commission, including the Army Sub-Commission (MMIA) will be under command of this headquarters. The status of the Army Sub-Commission in the current organization of the Allied Control Commission will remain unchanged."

3. Would you pass this word to your staff.

W. L. Stone
ELLEN W. STONE

Commodore
Acting Chief Commissioner

See 13

cc: "A" file

Subject:- Role of Italian Army in the rehabilitation of ITALY

Military Mission Italian Army
R O M E

G/6
6 Oct 44

9 OCT Recd

Chief of Staff, A.C.C.

The whole thing boils down to this:-

1. We have a ceiling of 313,000 (latest AFHQ proposals to CCS) which is subdivided into categories for employment e.g. Combat, I.S., Service Units etc. with the object of directly aiding the war effort.
2. The 313,000 are not enough to do all the military tasks required.
3. Any allotment out of the 313,000 for ACC tasks must therefore be at the expense of some purely military task.
4. Thus, allotment must be a matter of priorities; and AFHQ, after discussion with AAI, must decide as to whether and which ACC "rehabilitation" demands outweigh military demands on the 313,000 personnel available.
5. Americans and British at AFHQ will have to agree as to whether it is legitimate to use Italian Army personnel on ACC tasks, because:-

- (a) The issue of food, clothing and boots is dependent on strict orders from CCS at WASHINGTON that such personnel must be engaged on "effective" duties.
- (b) It will be necessary to decide which "classification" any personnel allotted for "rehabilitation" work is to come from. The state of affairs now is that the British are responsible for the maintenance of Italian personnel working solely for the British (BR - ITIs), the USA for their own Italian personnel (US - ITIs) and MMIA for the Italian personnel working on an Allied basis (ITI - ITIs).

Italian personnel allotted for ACC "rehabilitation" purposes

4. Thus, allocation must be a matter of priorities, and ACC "rehabilitation" with AAL, must decide as to whether and which ACC "rehabilitation" demands outweigh military demands on the 313,000 personnel available.

5. Americans and British at AFHQ will have to agree as to whether it is legitimate to use Italian Army personnel on ACC tasks, because:-

(a) The issue of food, clothing and boots is dependent on strict orders from CCS at WASHINGTON that such personnel must be engaged on "effective" duties.

(b) It will be necessary to decide which "classification" any personnel allotted for "rehabilitation" work is to come from. The state of affairs now is that the British are responsible for the maintenance of Italian personnel working solely for the British (BR - ITIs), the USA for their own Italian personnel (US - ITIs) and MMIA for the Italian personnel working on an Allied basis (ITI - ITIs).

Italian personnel allotted for ACC "rehabilitation" purposes will have to be classified as ITI - ITIs and if taken from BR - ITIs or US - ITIs will have to be transferred to the ITI - ITI classification. This will raise supply and shipment difficulties, unless the British and American staff at AFHQ agree to put an equal number of BR - ITIs and US - ITIs at the disposal of ACC for "rehabilitation" purposes.

6. MMIA are responsible for the military aspect of the Italian Army, ACC for the civil aspect. MMIA executes the orders of higher authority, who should weigh and adjudge on the relative merits of the civil and military aspects, where these conflict.

L. Browning

Major General
MMIA

5893

SECRET

SUBJECT:- The Responsibilities of AAI for the organisation of the Italian Army.

HQ ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY

Tel: MILPOT 23

1605/50/46/e(SD1)

2 Oct 44

3 OCT Recd

General organisation of the Italian Army

1. The attached Memorandum (1605/50/46/e(SD1) of 19 Sep 44) was submitted to AFHQ in order to clarify the relative responsibilities of AFHQ and AAI wef 10 Sep for organisation and control of Italian Army manpower. The recommendations at para 24 have been accepted by AFHQ.

2. While the mechanism of staff control of Italian Army manpower remains with AAI, it will be necessary for AFHQ to take executive action on arrangements which must be made in the L of C Area. Service units on British account, on completion of formation, are at the disposal of AFHQ. AAI, nevertheless, has an interest in these units since they may be allotted to the Operational Zone or relieve units in the L of C Area. Branches and Services therefore are requested to continue their interest in the Service unit programme and to keep their opposite numbers at AFHQ and the MIA fully informed of previous plans and proposed changes as a result of unforeseen developments in the operational situation.

The Combat Groups

3. Attached are the recommendations of AAI to AFHQ on the status of and responsibilities for the Groups (1605/50/57/e(SD1) of 2 Oct).
4. G in C considers that the Groups are potentially of considerable operational importance. Every effort will be made to ensure that the Groups are completed according to Schedule.
5. Branches and Services will keep in close touch with the progress of training and organisation of the units of the Groups through the appropriate branches and Services of MIA and the relevant training organisations of the DMI.
6. Copies of this memorandum have been forwarded to MIA.

The Combat Groups

3. Attached are the recommendations of AI to AFHQ on the status of and responsibilities for the Groups (1505/50/57/G(SD1) of 2 Oct).
4. C in C considers that the Groups are potentially of considerable operational importance. Every effort will be made to ensure that the Groups are completed according to Schedule.
5. Branches and Services will keep in close touch with the progress of training and organization of the units of the Groups through the appropriate branches and Services of MIA and the relevant trig organizations of the DMT.
6. Copies of this memorandum have been forwarded to MIA.

K. M. Chatterjee
for
Brigadier,
G(SD & T).

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ACC Liaison

5092

Memorandum on the transfer from MLI
to AFHQ of responsibility for control
of Italian Army Manpower and Organi-
zation.

SECRET
HQ ALLIED ARMS IN ITALY

Tel: FILPOT 23

1605/50/46/G(SDI)

19 Sep 44

Object of this Memorandum

Policy for the transfer of responsibility for organization and manpower control of the Italian Army is stated in AFHQ letter AG 091.112/079 GGT-3 of 10 Sep. The object of this Memorandum is to recapitulate the current policy and procedure followed by MLI and to make recommendations on the passing of responsibility to AFHQ.

PART I - CURRENT POLICY AND PROCEDURE

Provision of personnel to meet US, British, Combat and international requirements.

1. MLI policy is that :-

(a) Allotments of specialist and non-specialist personnel available to meet requirements are made on a proportionate basis between US and British.

(b) The present proportionate allotments are :-

	Specialist Personnel	Non-specialist Personnel
US	1/3	1/3
British	1/3	
Combat Gps	1/3	2/3

Mechanism for implementation of programme

2. (a) Allocation of personnel is made between US and British by MLI in the proportions at para 1(b) above.

(b) Personnel allotted to the British are applied by MLI to meet the requirements of a programme (Priority List 8).

(c) MLI are responsible for

(a) Allotments of specialist and non-specialist personnel available to meet requirements are made on a proportionate basis between US and British.

(b) The present proportionate allotments are :-

	Specialist Personnel	Non-specialist Personnel
US	1/3	1/3
British	1/3	}
Combat Ops	1/3	
		2/3

Mechanism for implementation of programme

2. (a) Allocation of personnel is made between US and British by MILA in the proportions at para 1(b) above.

(b) Personnel allotted to the British are applied by MILA to meet the requirements of a programme (Priority List 8).

(c) MILA are responsible for :-

- (i) deciding the sources from which personnel required by US and British are met.
- (ii) informing ALI of the priority in which personnel are to be shipped from SAUDMIL.
- (iii) assessing the effective strengths of units.

Organisation of British Combat and Service units

3. The state of British Service units and the programme for the completion of the British ceiling are shown in the following documents (attached to this Memo).

Minutes of a Meeting - 1605/50/63/G(SM) of 5 Sep.
Revised Agenda of a Meeting - 1605/50/63/G(SM) of 3 Sep.
with

- Appx 'A' - Revised State of Italian Army Service units under British Comd
- Appx 'B' - Programme for provision of personnel to meet deficiencies.

...../Sheet 2.

5891

- 2 -

4. The programme is of considerable complexity. Radical changes at short notice can only lead to delay, confusion and dislocation of the Italian administrative machinery.

WE's of units under British command

5. All Italian Army service and combat units under British command are or will be organised on WE's approved by WEC AAI.

Formation orders for units under British command

6. Formation orders are issued by 'A' Branch AAI. The procedure is governed by the following principles:-

- (a) where the source of manpower is under command a District or Army, the District or Army is responsible for supervision of formation in conjunction with Italian Army HQ allotted to the District or Army.
- (b) In other cases, MMLA is responsible for supervision of formations.

Rfts

7. Rfts are distributed between US and British as part of the proportionate allotments in para 1(b) above. MMLA distribute rfts for British units in accordance with instructions issued by 'A' Branch AAI.

8. No organised system for the distribution of rfts has yet been established. The recommendations of AAI were embodied in the draft command instr attached to 1605/50/19/G(SDI) of 6 Jul which will now require modification as a result of the introduction of national and international categories in FAN 387 and FAN 391.

Breakdown of the ceiling

9. The current breakdown is in Appx 'A' to 1605/50/63/G(SDI) of 22 Aug. It is understood that additions have since been made to US allotment and that AA & CD are virtually no longer required.

10. A final working ceiling is essential as a basis for planning and for the economical distribution of manpower.

PART II - THE HANDOVER TO AFHQ

The AFHQ letter of 10 Aug

units are distributed between US and British as part of the proportionate allotments in para 1(b) above. NMIA distribute rfts for British units in accordance with instructions issued by 'A' Branch AAI.

8. No organised system for the distribution of rfts has yet been established. The recommendations of AAI were embodied in the draft adm instr attached to 1605/50/19/G(SD1) of 6 Jul which will now require modification as a result of the introduction of national and international categories in FAN 387 and FAN 391.

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10. A final working ceiling is essential as a basis for planning and for the economical distribution of manpower.

PART II - THE HANDOVER TO AFHQ

The AFHQ letter of 10 Sep

11. Paras 2 and 3 state that during an interim period responsibility for Italian Army organisation and manpower will be divided between AFHQ and AAI as follows :-

(a) AFHQ to be responsible for

- (i) all questions of organisation of service units
- (ii) establishing priorities between combat and service units.

(b) AAI to be responsible for organisation of combat units.

In view of the complexities of the Italian Army manpower situation such a division of responsibility is not practicable.

12. It is recommended that either

- (a) AFHQ take over complete control of Italian Army manpower and organisation as soon as possible.

or

(b) AAI continue to provide the mechanism of staff control under the general direction of AFHQ until the appropriate staff section of AFHQ is fully informed as to the complex background of the present state of the Italian Army.

13. Immediate assumption of complete control by AFHQ would require from AFHQ decisions on questions of detail without knowledge of past history.

14. If it is decided that the mechanism of staff control is to remain temporarily with AAI, then it is recommended that the following procedure should be adopted during the interim period.

Channels between AFHQ and AAI

15. On all questions of manpower and organisation AFHQ should deal with AAI through AAI.

Allotment between US and British

16. Any necessary revision of the proportionate allotment between US and British would be decided by AFHQ in consultation with AAI.

Disposal of personnel allotted to US

17. Would be decided by AFHQ or CG MTOUSA.

Shipments from SARDANIA

18. Priority List 7 would be maintained by AAI.

Disposal of personnel allotted to British

19. (a) Subject to the general direction of AFHQ priorities between service and combat units would be decided by AAI.

(b) AAI would distribute personnel for Service units in accordance with Priority List 8 which would be maintained by AAI. AFHQ would inform AAI of any alterations required in priorities. AAI would advise AFHQ of the effects of such alterations.

(c) Formation orders for :-

(i) Service units would be issued by AFHQ on information supplied by AAI.

Shipments from SARDINIA

18. Priority List 7 would be maintained by LAL.

Disposal of personnel allotted to British

19. (a) Subject to the general direction of AFHQ priorities between service and combat units would be decided by LAL.

(b) MLI would distribute personnel for Service units in accordance with Priority List 8 which would be maintained by LAL. AFHQ would inform LAL of any alterations required in priorities. LAL would advise AFHQ of the effects of such alterations.

(c) Formation orders for :-

(i) Service units would be issued by AFHQ on info supplied by LAL.

(ii) Combat units would be issued by LAL.

(d) After completion of formation, AFHQ would decide the allotment of Service units between the Operational Zone and the I of C Area.

Organisation of units under British command

20. WE's would be approved by WEC LAL.

Rpts for British units

21. Would be distributed by MLI between units in accordance with priorities decided by G1 AFHQ in consultation with 'A' Branch LAL.

Coiling

22. The distribution of personnel to categories would be decided by AFHQ 890 in consultation with LAL.

AFHQ Reqs

23. Representatives of G-3 AFHQ should be attached to HQ AAI as soon as possible.

Conclusion

24. It is recommended that:-

- (a) the current policy described at Part I should continue until the reorganization of the Italian Army is completed
- (b) during the interim period before AFHQ assume complete control, the procedure at paras 15 - 23 should be adopted.

*K. McEwen
for*

DISTRIBUTION:- G-3 (Org) AFHQ (10 copies)
DGAO
DAG
DQMG

Brigadier,
G(SD & T).

SUBJECT: Formation of COMBAT GROUPS

HQ ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY

Tel: FILPOT 23

1605/50/57/C(SDI)

2 Oct 44

AFHQ (20)

Copy to:-

MEMA (5)	Q(Mov)	Ord
MS	Tn	REME
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SSI(a)	SVY	Welfare
GEL(b)	Fostal	ACC Liaison
Q(Tre)	ST	HQ RAC
A	Catering	Hq Inf
Q	Prints	DMT (3)
Q(AE)	Med	

1. Six Italian Combat Groups are forming or will shortly commence formation in the area FIEDIMONTE D'ALIFE - SAN GIORGIO. It is desirable that the responsibilities of AFHQ, AII, MMIA and the Italian General Staff in relation to these Groups should be defined. The recommendations of AII are as follows.

2. Comd

(a) The Groups should continue to be under comd of the Italian General Staff, subject to the supervision of the MMIA, under the general direction of AII. On completion of training, Groups should pass to under comd AII.

3. Training

Policy should be decided by AII and implemented by DMT in his capacity as adviser to AII.

Prints
Med

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Q(43)

DMT (3)

1. Six Italian Combat Groups are forming or will shortly commence formation in the area PIEDIMONTE D'ALIFE - SAN GIORGIO. It is desirable that the responsibilities of AFHQ, AAI, MMIA and the Italian General Staff in relation to these Groups should be defined. The recommendations of AAI are as follows.

2. Comd

- (a) The Groups should continue to be under comd of the Italian General Staff, subject to the supervision of the MMIA, under the general direction of AAI. On completion of training, Groups should pass to under comd AAI.

3. Training

Policy should be decided by AAI and implemented by DMT in his capacity as adviser to AAI.

4. The present system is as follows:-

- (a) Cadres of personnel or specialist arms are allotted courses by DMT at various Schools and Trg Ests. These cadres return to the Groups to train their units.
- (b) Under direction of DMT, ELUs and Trg Increments to ELUs are responsible for supervision of trg within the Groups.

5. Organization

Proposals for WEs should be approved by WEC at AAI and then forwarded to AFHQ. WEs of Groups have been passed by WEC AAI and forwarded to AFHQ under 1701/23/48/G(3D2) of 28 Aug. WEs of auxiliary units are in course of preparation.

6. Designation of Units

Titles of units should be in English. Orders of battle of the Groups will be published later.

7. Formation and Provision of Manpower

The main sources of manpower for each Group are certain Italian Divisions. These formations will provide a fair proportion of the manpower. The balance will be obtained by call up and movement of personnel from S.R.D.I.I.A. It is not expected that in practice the requirements for Service units and the Groups will conflict. M.M.I.A. is responsible for deciding source of personnel and for informing A.M.I. of specific instances when the question of priority arises between Service units and the Groups. Major issues will be referred to AFHQ. Formal orders for the formation of units for Groups and the ancillary units should be issued by AFHQ. Formation should be supervised by M.M.I.A.

8. Location and Local Adm

Arrangements have been made for Groups to form in the area SAN GIORGIO - PIEDIMONTE D'ALIFE. While, in principle, the Italian General Staff is responsible for the administration of the Groups, 3 District should co-operate with M.M.I.A. in rendering assistance in matters which are beyond the resources of the Italian General Staff.

9. Equipment

The procedure for equipping Groups is laid down in AFHQ Q(AE) Adm Instr No 3 of 17 Sep.

10. There other requirements of A.M.I. conflict with the needs of the Groups, A.M.I. should be informed by AFHQ in order that A.M.I. may decide priorities.

11. Maintenance

Although Groups are initially under command Italian General Staff, personnel should be a British responsibility for maintenance under the terms of AFHQ Letter AC 400/105 D.O dated 22 Sep 44.

12. Conclusion

It is requested that early approval may be given to the recommendations above.

The procedure for equipping Groups is laid down in AFHQ Q(4E) Adm Instr No 3 of 17 Sep.

10. Where other requirements of AAF conflict with the needs of the Groups, AAF should be informed by AFHQ in order that AAF may decide priorities.

11. Maintenance

Although Groups are initially under command Italian General Staff, personnel should be a British responsibility for maintenance under the terms of AFHQ letter AG 400/105 D-C dated 22 Sep 44.

12. Conclusion

It is requested that early approval may be given to the recommendations above.

W M Cullen

flot /w

General,
Commander-in-Chief.

HEADQUARTERS,
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
APO 394

Office of the Chief of Staff.

Ref: 825/1/cos.

2nd October 1944.

SUBJECT: Role of the Italian Army in the
rehabilitation of Italy.

TO : G.O.C., Army Sub-Commission.

5888

1. The Acting Chief Commissioner has asked me to discuss with you the question of the use of the Italian Army in its relations to Italy as a whole with the object of ensuring that it can play its part in the rehabilitation of the country and whether such employment can be reconciled with its use by AAI and AFHQ for purely military reasons.

2. It is fully realised that the primary object of re-organising the Italian Army is to use it in aid of the Allied war effort in this country. At the same time it would seem that it must perform a certain role as part of the Italian nation. Can we reconcile its function as part of the Allied forces in this country with this secondary objective?

3. You have already been approached by the Civil Affairs Section with regard to the employment of an Italian battalion in Rome. From recent correspondence you will have seen the views of the Acting Chief Commissioner on the close relation the location of internal security divisions has on public order. You are aware that the services of units of the Army have been requested for the urgent business of clearing mines, particularly in agricultural areas. You will also have had requests for the employment of troops to assist the Italian Government in repatriation.

4. Other problems which have arisen are the responsibility of the Italian Army in repatriation of demobilised Italian soldiers and Italian POW and the care of sick and wounded POW after landing in this country.

5. It would seem that the time has come when a definition is needed as to the responsibilities of the Italian Army with regard to all the points mentioned above for there is a conflict of views.

6. Would you give me the opportunity of discussing these matters at an early date.

MSL/JG.

M. S. MacL...
Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

Sub

PIA

