Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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10000/109/1140
(VOL. II)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

/109/1140
.II)

ITALIAN ARMY POLICY
APR. - JULY 1945

EC / 8251


Vol II

Italian Army Policy

Restricted in Safe #3

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 787217

EMPTY



10000 / 109 / 1140

THIS FOLDER
CONTAINS PAPERS
FROM _____
TO _____
CATALOGUE-_____

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 1183017

MINISTERO DELLE CORPORAZIONI

GABINETTO

Nam. _____ *Cat.* _____

DATA	Numero di protocollo	DATA	Numero di protocollo	DATA	Numero di protocollo	DATA	Numero di protocollo	DATA	Numero di protocollo

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222

no special comments but I should
like to raise the question of the
future of the BLU's at tomorrow meeting.

July 31.

223.

No comment. Plan seems to be acceptable.
8/1/45

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218.

Executive Commissioner.

I have sent copies of "Plan for the Administration of the Italian Army", at folio 216, to VPs Civil Affairs and Economic Sections asking for their comments by 1200 hrs. on Wed., 1st Aug. 45. At folio 217 is a copy of the covering letter I have signed on your behalf.

CSO.

30 July 45.

I think we had better have a meeting on Wednesday (Nov) the CC And surely a copy should go to Land Force, & their comments be required (or there (treasury at the meeting) IM (30/VII

3 copies already with MMIA

Discuss at Ex Com's meeting

221

POLITICAL ADVISER (A)
" - (B)

Surely a copy should go [illegible]

3 copies already sent MMA.

Their comments be required (either (preferably at the meeting)

DMM (30/VII.

Discuss at Ex Com's meeting

221

POLITICAL ADVISER (A)
" " (B)

As agreed this morning AFHQ Political Plan for the Administration of the Italian Army" (= folio 214) is forwarded to you for perusal. I shall be grateful for any comments thereon and will thereafter this file can be returned to me before the Meeting to be held tomorrow afternoon at 1500 hours.

USE E. Talbot
C.S.O.1
To Ex Comm R.

Ext 300
31 July 45.

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192

E.C.

f 7 dec 189.

Para 3 is
absolutely in —
correct.

Pls see me

Sus

14/7

CL

193

Chief Commissioner.

Please see f. 190 & draft reply

DS Mc[illegible]

[illegible] 18 DEC

195

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193

Chief Commissioner.

Please see f. 190 & draft reply

18/7

195

CSO

Issue as fair enclosure
unofficial demand by S.G. for sum

Dte of Ex Comm 198

To 2d folios 196 & 197 for sign.

21/7/45

087

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186

6/10

See folios 182 & 184. — Folio 185 in reply & brief. As matter is still under consideration I shall follow up & inform you when a definite decision is arrived at.

3/7/45

Capt Hendley 187

186 to Stad. 185 & Van Horn &

Satisfactory Reply

4/7

190.

Executive Commissioner

To see folio 189 in reply to our letter at folio 170. Most unhelpful and para 6 (d) entirely misses the point.

Re Asst to replies to above letter

12/7. Signed by CC to CDS.

C.S.O.

Executive Commissioner

To see folio 189 in reply to our
letter at folio 170. Most unhelpful and
para 6 (d) entirely misses the point.
Re Post A.6 replies by a letter
12/7. Signed by CC to COS.

C.S.O.

9 intend to visit the CAO early & will discuss
with him.

191

DW 12.7.

u86

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 770174

178

Chief Commissioner.

Ref your letter to AFAO
at 170 please see
Sen Brownings memorandum
at 178 back to 171.
Ido not know how he dealt
this handled but, as a start,
I have prepared a draft
letter to AFAO for
his consideration.

Eb 31/5

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 771217

letter to ADCRA for
his consideration:

Sd. 31/5

[illegible] 1/6

~~180~~ 179A

Chief Commissioner.

Submitted for your Legislature
in Council.

Sd. 6/6.

(SIGNED & DISPATCHED 1/6 JUNE 45
SEE FOLIO 180)

(40)

(41).

180 seen by → [illegible] (8/6.

U8:

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Chief Commissioner.

1. Immediately under this you will find General Browning's comments on my draft at 147. At 158 is my reply. I am afraid I have added a paragraph to my final draft which you will find under General Browning's comments and which I submit for approval.

2. I am afraid that all this correspondence must go to AFHQ, but I would welcome a conference with the COS, AFHQ, G-5 AFHQ, yourself, General Browning and myself, and possibly the Acting President, in order to get this matter cleared up once and for all.

MSC

19.May.45

160

EC

OR

20/5

Ens

164

Chief Commissioner.

163

Attached is submitted for your information/signature/approval.

165.

MSC 19/5

EC

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164

Chief Commissioner.

163

Attached is submitted for your information/signature/approval.

165.

EC

Copy to GT DFHQ

see 166

167.

Response to Gen Browning & Col Pidsley of some length on lines of 163. He sees our point of view, will take immediate steps to obtain Min. of Def. views and will submit a scheme.

NOTED. BU 30/5.

DS/20/V.

68

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27 (137)

G.1(B)

Reference minutes # 138., may we have copies of telegrams referred to in telephone conversation this date, please?

F. Livermore
Exec Sec

Est Sec
7 May 45

Est Sec. (140) 28 (141)

Copy attached as requested.

G.1(B)
7 May 45.

R. Edwards
Asst.

29. (142)

Exec. Comm.

20 note Folio 140. and minutes 138 and 141.

Est Sec.
8 May 45

Noted

F. Livermore
Exec Sec

(V6)

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29. (142)

Exec. Comm.

20 note Folio ~~140~~ 140. and minutes ~~26~~ 138 and ~~28~~ 141.

Noted

Hurwitch
Exec Sec

Cat Sec.
8 May 45

083

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(2)

136

V.P. Ehrsec.

G.I.B. to submit telegrams agreed upon at conference 5 o'clock s/o subsequent.

785013

137

G-1(B): for appropriate action, please

Enf. Sec
6 May

Exd. Sec. — Action taken - 6 May 45.

JR.

G-1(B).

7. May 45.

138

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(10)

A/Sec'ies.

I suppose we should CC page 11 - perhaps we have already done so.

Sd/- 16/4.

---

(11)

Chief Commissioner.

Attached is submitted for your information/~~signature/approval~~.

(2)

17/4

(118)

A/Exec Comm

LF S/C should be informed of DECISION

16/4 decision at his Pol. Conf. on 12 April. Pls do. Sd/-

Copy of 9 sent to MAIA on 19/4.

---

19 (130)

Ex.Com.

To see folio 18. (19)

25th Ap.

A/Exec Comm
LF S/C should be informed of SOCHEN
KG/4 decision at his Pol. Conf. on 12 April. Pls do. [illegible]
Copy of 9 sent to MMIA on 19/4.

19 (130)

Ex.Com.

To see folio 18. (129)

MM 25/4

25th Apr.

SL 28/4

21 (132)

Ex.Com

To see folio ~~20~~ (131). and ~~23~~ (134)

4 May.

(133) SL 5/5

(131) To don but mention CCRR. Deals shew CAS SL

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CONFIDENTIAL

8251

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Chief of Staff

AUG 1 RECD
AUG 1 1945

DB/mlm/AMO

File: ASD/925.1

28 July 1945

SUBJECT: Future of the Italian Army

TO : Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission

References are your 8251/197/EC of 20 July 1945 and letter from this office dated 16 July on the above subject.

1. The question of the future organization and composition of the Italian Armed Forces is now under detailed examination at this Headquarters, prior to making final recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Your letter of 20 July 1945 is being considered in the examination now being made.

2. As soon as plans are finalised you will be further informed.

By command of Field Marshal ALEXANDER:

for W. D. MORGAN, Major General, G.S.C.,
Lieutenant General
Chief of Staff

Copies to: Asst Chief of Staff, G-3
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

CONFIDENTIAL

9993

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220

TOP SECRET

Confidential

Ref: S254/220/SC. 31 July 45.

SUBJECT: Plan for the Administration of the Italian Army.

TO : 1. Director, Navy Sub-Commission.
2. Director, Air Forces Sub-Commission.

215

1. Attached is copy No. 26 of AFHQ Paper "Plan for the Administration of the Italian Army."

2. Attention is drawn to the fact that it is a planning paper only and has not received the approval of the Deputy Chief Administrative Officer. It does not, therefore, contain approved policy or provide the basis for executive action.

3. A meeting will be held on Thursday, 2 August 45, at AFHQ to discuss this paper. The Chief Commissioner will attend this meeting.

4. Will you please give the paper your immediate consideration and report with comments by Wednesday, 1 August 45, 1200 hrs.

5. Director, Navy Sub-Commission, is requested to pass to the Director, Air Forces Sub-Commission, as early as possible in order to permit the latter's comments to reach this office in accord with preceding paragraph.

6. Will the Director, Air Forces Sub-Commission, please return the enclosed plan to this office with his comments.

For the Chief Commissioner:

/s/ R.W. Kemsley

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

Incl: As stated in
Para. 1 above.

See 232.
233

078

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220A

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394

31 July 1945.

* * * U R G E N T * * *

MEMORANDUM TO: Executive Commissioner.

It is extremely important that Log.P.120/6 of 29 July, "Plan for the Administration of the Italian Army", be reviewed with Admiral Warren and AVM Brodie in view of the references made in connection with administration of the Italian Navy and the Italian Air Force.

HILLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief Commissioner

See 220

Ex Com

Sir,

A copy of the paper is being circulated to Admiral Warren & AVM Brodie today & they are being asked to attend Commissioner's meeting with the Chief Commissioner

EC

31/7

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(217)

TOP SECRET

Confidential

Ref: 8251/217/SD. 30 July 45.

Subject: Plan for Administration of the Italian Army.

To: VP, Civil Affairs Section.
VP, Economic Section.

215

1. Attached are copies of "Plan for the Administration of the Italian Army (Copies 26 and 27 for Economic Section, 28 for Civil Affairs Section.) (RECEIVED 31 JULY 45)

2. Attention is drawn to the fact that it is a planning paper only and has not received the approval of the Deputy Chief Administrative Officer. It does not, therefore, contain approved policy or provide the basis for executive action.

3. A meeting will be held on Thursday, 2nd August, 45, at AFHQ to discuss this paper. The Chief Commissioner will attend this meeting.

4. Will you please give the paper your immediate consideration and report with comments by Wednesday, 1st August, 1200 hours.

5. For VP, Economic Section.

Your attention is drawn particularly to Appendix "D", reverse of the final sheet of the documents enclosed.

For Chief Commissioner:

/s/ L.E. TALBOT

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

Encls.

Sec 234
213

077

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(216)

:::::::::::::
:TOP SECRET :
:Auth: SAC :
:Initials :
:29 Jul 45 :
:::::::::::::

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Confidential

Log. P. 120/6/C

JUL 30 1945

To: Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission (Copies No. 24 - 28)
Director, MMIA (" " 29 - 31)

SUBJECT: Plan for the Administration of the Italian Army

(215)

1. Attached paper, copy numbers as above, on "Plan for the Administration of the Italian Army" is forwarded.

2. Attention is drawn to the fact that it is a planning paper only and has not received the approval of the Deputy Chief Administrative Officer. It does not, therefore, contain approved policy or provide the basis for executive action.

3. A meeting, convened by the Deputy Chief Administrative Officer, will be held on Thursday, 2 August, in the G-1(B) Conference Room AFHQ at which this paper will be discussed and at which you are requested to be represented.

C.B. MAGRUDER,
Major-General,
Deputy Chief Administrative Officer.

(SEE 203)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

TOP SECRET

8251

215

:::::::::::::::::::::
:TOP SECRET :
:Auth: SAC :
:Initials Amm :
:29 Jul 45 :
:Copy No 25 :
:::::::::::::::::::::

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Log. Plans Section

Confidential

JUL 30 1945

Log. P. 120/6

29 Jul 45

To: D/CAO (Copy No. 1)

214

Attached paper on "Plan for the Administration of the Italian Army" is submitted for approval.

A.M. MILNE,
Colonel,
Log. Plans.

Ack 30/7

Distribution:

G-1(A)	Copy No 2
G-1(B)	" 3
G-3	" 4 - 7
G-4(A)	" 8 - 12
G-4(B)	" 13 - 15
G-4(Mov & Tn)	" 16
G-5	" 17 - 18

TOP SECRET
DRAFT

TOP SECRET

Log. P. 120/6

(214)

PLAN FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ITALIAN ARMY

GENERAL

1. The Italian Army is largely under Allied operational control and is dependent to a major degree on Allied administrative assistance to perform its operational role. It is desired to pass as much responsibility as possible for the Italian Army to the Italian Government;

a. To accord with the CCS policy of relaxing Allied control over the Italian Government (FAN 487).

b. To give them the resources necessary, when the remainder of ITALY now under Allied Military Government (excluding VENEZIA GIULIA and other small areas) is passed to their direct control, with which to maintain internal security and to control such parts of the Italian frontier which will then be their responsibility to guard.

c. To relieve Allied resources from a heavy administrative commitment.

PRESENT POSITION

2. Composition of the Italian Army

a. These various categories which together form the Italian Army have developed over the last two years in accordance with circumstances which existed at the time. As a result the administrative organisation of the Army and the procedure by which

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other small areas) is passed to their direct control, with which to maintain internal security and to control such parts of the Italian frontier which will then be their responsibility to guard.

c. To relieve Allied resources from a heavy administrative commitment.

PRESENT POSITION

2. Composition of the Italian Army

a. These various categories which together form the Italian Army have developed over the last two years in accordance with circumstances which existed at the time. As a result the administrative organisation of the Army and the procedure by which it is maintained are now matters of considerable complexity.

b. Details of the composition of the Italian Army are given at Appendix 'A'. (The serials quoted in the following paragraphs refer to the categories given in this Appendix).

(208)

3. Present Administrative Responsibilities

(206)

The present responsibilities of the British and US Army and of the Italian Government are given at Appendix 'B' in which it is shown that the Allies exercise considerable administrative responsibilities for supplies, equipment and administrative services for the Italian Army.

4. Italian Administrative Organisation

a. The Italian administrative organisation consists of eleven territorial HQs covering all of ITALY and SICILY with under

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command district and regimental depot HQs. Territorial and district HQs (Serial 5) control the Italian administrative services (Serial 6) which comprise administrative units for the direct support of Iti/Iti units, some Br/Iti and US/Iti units and assistance in administration in the other Br/Iti and US/Iti units within their territories.

b. There are also seven administrative divisions (Serial 2), five of which are Br/Iti and two US/Iti, which are superimposed on the territorial administrative organisation. These divisions, which consist of little more than HQs, are in the main concerned only with Br/Iti and US/Iti service troops. They function largely in a liaison capacity between local Allied military HQ and the Italian administrative organisation but they also directly control certain administrative services in the territorial organisation (Ord dumps etc) which are used to maintain the Br/Iti and US/Iti service units. They also exercise certain responsibilities such as welfare for the Italian combat forces (Serial 1) and give some assistance in the administration of Iti/Iti units which are located in their respective areas. Six of the administrative divisions are located in NORTH ITALY and one is in 3 District area.

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only with Br/Iti and US/Iti service troops. They function largely in a liaison capacity between local Allied military HQ and the Italian administrative organisation but they also directly control certain administrative services in the territorial organisation (Ord dumps etc) which are used to maintain the Br/Iti and US/Iti service units. They also exercise certain responsibilities such as welfare for the Italian combat forces (Serial 1) and give some assistance in the administration of Iti/Iti units which are located in their respective areas. Six of the administrative divisions are located in NORTH ITALY and one is in 3 District area.

FUTURE 'INTERIM' ITALIAN ARMY

5. Time at which control should pass to Italian Government

It is estimated that by the end of September all NORTH ITALY, with the exception of VENEZIA GIULIA and certain other small areas, will have been handed back to the Italian Government who will then, with the same exceptions, be responsible for the internal security throughout the whole of ITALY, SICILY and SARDINIA. It is desirable, therefore, that from this date, the Italian Government should assume operational responsibility for the 'interim' Italian Army, subject to the over-riding right of the Allies to intervene should necessity arise.

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Composition of the Italian Army

The Italian Army should be established as a self sufficient force, complete of its own administrative services and be capable of fulfilling its operational role without assistance from Allied administrative units. On the basis that the Army :

a. will be used to prevent the violation of the Italian frontiers and in an "internal security" role

b. will be composed partly of internal security troops which need only be semi-mobile and partly of a mobile combat force.

c. will be able to make use of civilian operated facilities such as railways, ports, communications and workshops,

it is considered that an overall force 140,000 (excluding Carabinieri) will be required. Proposed detailed composition is given at Appendix 'C'.

7. Provision of units to form the Italian Army

The following are available to form the nucleus of the 140,000

Serial		Theoretical strength
1	Combat force (Br/Iti)	64,000
3	Internal security divisions (Iti/Iti)	15,000
5	Italian command and administrative organisation (Iti/Iti)	3,000
6	Italian administrative services (Iti/Iti)	24,000
	TOTAL	106,000

Balance of the force would have to be formed by making the best use of

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7. Provision of units to form the Italian Army

The following are available to form the nucleus of the 140,000

Serial		Theoretical strength
1	Combat force (Br/Iti)	64,000
3	Internal security divisions (Iti/Iti)	15,000
5	Italian command and administrative organisation (Iti/Iti)	3,000
6	Italian administrative services (Iti/Iti)	24,000
	TOTAL	106,000

Balance of the force would have to be formed by making the best use of personnel released from the Br/Iti and US/Iti service troops (Serial 2), Iti/Iti guard units (Serial 4), and by recruitment. Allowing for reduction in Br/Iti and US/Iti service troops and Iti/Iti guard units, this force can be formed within the overall Iti ceiling of 333,000.

ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES FOR THE 'INTERIM' ITALIAN ARMY

8. Availability of service units

The following will be the situation at the end of September :-

a. ST Transport

Assuming the retention of British vehicles at present in possession of the combat forces and allowing for recaptured Italian vehicles, the Italian Army initially should have

Tyrs. Civil Rpt 2% 7%

074

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NA includes ECRR

adequate administrative transport.

b. ST Depots

Iti/Iti personnel are now available for depot units. These units are taking over where Italian troops have been dependent on Allied units.

c. Ordnance

Ordnance dumps already exist and the Italian equivalent of a BOD is being formed.

d. REME

Italian workshops are now being formed and there will shortly be civil facilities available to which major repairs can be let out by the Italian Government.

All auditing NO.

e. Petrol

By the end of September all petrol for the Italian Army can be drawn through the CIP organisation.

f. Medical

This is already the responsibility of the Italian Government using Italian hospitals.

By the end of September the Italian Army of 140,000 should not therefore be dependent on Allied administrative services.

PROVISION OF MAINTENANCE, CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT FOR 'INTERIM' ITALIAN ARMY

[illegible] Maintenance, Clothing and

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c. Petrol

By the end of September all petrol for the Italian Army can be drawn through the CIP organisation.

f. Medical

This is already the responsibility of the Italian Government using Italian hospitals.

By the end of September the Italian Army of 140,000 should not therefore be dependent on Allied administrative services.

PROVISION OF MAINTENANCE, CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT FOR 'INTERIM' ITALIAN ARMY

9. Method by which Maintenance, Clothing and Equipment should be provided.

a. Italian Unit Transport, Clothing and Equipment

Transport, clothing and equipment of British and US origin at present held by Italian units from which the 'interim' Italian Army is to be formed should be retained by these units.

b. Rations

It is feasible for rations for the Italian Army to be provided through Italian Government channels and to be included with the normal civil supply requirements for the civilian population. This will involve a small increase in the import programme if the Italian civil ration is not to be impaired. Details of this increase are given at Appendix 'D'. Provision of rations need not, therefore, be a British and US military responsibility.

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c. Clothing

Industrial capacity and skilled labour exists in ITALY, but the Italian Government is dependent on the import of raw materials and coal for the manufacture of items of clothing. Estimated requirements of raw materials are given at Appendix 'D'. Until this manufacture is possible, clothing will be provided in accordance with para 10 below.

d. Petrol

This can be imported with civil requirements.

6,300 tons Army Air
18,000 Civil monthly

e. Non-warlike Equipment and Accommodation Stores

These can partly be provided from recaptured material and local manufacture. Deficiencies should be procured in accordance with the principles given in para 10 below.

f. Warlike Equipment

It is the interpretation of TAM 638 that the Italian Government can be directed by this HQ to resume production of warlike stores required for the equipment and maintenance of the 'interim' Italian Army. For some time, however, warlike stores will have to be provided in accordance with para 10 below until production in ITALY is possible.

10. Supply of Clothing, Equipment and Accommodation Stores

Clothing, warlike, non-warlike equipment and accommodation stores should be found from the following sources :-

a. Indigenous Italian resources including recaptured material and

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It is the interpretation [illegible]

can be directed by this HQ to resume production of warlike stores required for the equipment and maintenance of the 'interim' Italian army. For some time, however, warlike stores will have to be provided in accordance with para 10 below until production in ITALY is possible.

10. Supply of Clothing, Equipment and Accommodation Stores

Clothing, warlike, non-warlike equipment and accommodation stores should be found from the following sources :-

a. Indigenous Italian resources including recaptured material and local manufacture. Raw materials for this purpose should be demanded by the Italian Government on the appropiate civil agencies in US and UK for import with that part of the Italian Government programme termed category 'B' items.

b. Purchase of items from military stocks in ITALY which have been declared surplus by the British and US Disposals organisations.

c. Should there be items which cannot be obtained locally in accordance with sub paras a. and b. these items should be demanded as finished products in the category 'B' import programme.

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11. Handling of Maintenance, Clothing and Equipment obtained through Italian Government channels.

All items for the Italian Army provided from sources outside ITALY will be imported on Italian Government account to be received and handled by the Italian Government through their own organisation and as their own responsibility. Items made available from surplus stocks in this theatre through the US and British organisations should be handed over by the US and British Army to the appropiate Italian Army base depot.

12. Date by which the Italian Government should assume full responsibility for the provision of Maintenance, Clothing and Equipment for the 'Interim' Italian Army.

This date cannot be determined until examination has been made of current import programmes and of the time required to procure such items as have not been previously requisitioned or cannot be procured locally. Responsibility of AFHQ in this respect should, however, cease by the end of September or as soon after as is practicable and, in any event, not later than 31 December 1945. It may be necessary for the Italian Government to assume provisioning responsibility in stages in respect of the different items of provisioning.

Revan

DEGREE OF ALLIED CONTROL OVER 'INTERIM' ITALIAN ARMY

13. Administrative Control

a. It is to be doubted whether the Italian Army will ever be efficiently administered as compared with British and US standards.

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have not been previously requisitioned [illegible]

Responsibility of AFHQ in this respect should, however, cease by the end of September or as soon after as is practicable and, in any event, not later than 31 December 1945. It may be necessary for the Italian Government to assume provisioning responsibility in stages in respect of the different items of provisioning.

DEGREE OF ALLIED CONTROL OVER 'INTERIM' ITALIAN ARMY

13. Administrative Control

a. It is to be doubted whether the Italian Army will ever be efficiently administered as compared with British and US standards. The Italian Government must, however, at some time assume full administrative responsibility and there is every advantage in making them responsible as early as possible while Allied troops and resources are available to remedy any immediate crisis that may arise after they have assumed control. Any transfer of control to the Italian Government should, however, be subject to :-

i. The Allied right to re-assume control in the event of the Italian Government being incapable of performing their operational role.

ii. The submission by the Italian Government to the Allied authorities of all information regarding the administration & organisation of their army.

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iii. The retention by the Allies of the right to control the use of accommodation, railways, ports, communications and facilities generally in ITALY as required for US and British purposes.

b. About end September it is proposed to transfer operational control of the 'interim' Italian Army to the Italian Government. By this date this army should, on present plans, be administratively self supporting in respect of service units. While it may not be possible for the Italian Government to assume full provisioning responsibility by this date it is considered that administrative control should be transferred at the same time as operational control. The direct control functions of AFHQ and MMIA over this army will therefore cease by end September except in respect of the screening of such items of provisioning which cannot be transferred by this date - see para 12.

14. Administrative Functions of MMIA

After end September the functions of MMIA in respect of the 'Interim' Italian Army, should be largely advisory and of a liaison nature. They should, however, retain the right of inspecting the Italian Army and its administrative organisation to enable them to report to this HQ on matters which are prejudicial to Allied interests or are contrary to the provisions of any peace treaty which may be signed. MMIA should, in fact, merge into

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September except in respect of the [illegible] provisioning which cannot be transferred by this date - see para 12.

14. Administrative Functions of MMLA

After end September the functions of MMLA in respect of the 'Interim' Italian Army, should be largely advisory and of a liaison nature. They should, however, retain the right of inspecting the Italian Army and its administrative organisation to enable them to report to this HQ on matters which are prejudicial to Allied interests or are contrary to the provisions of any peace treaty which may be signed. MMLA should, in fact, merge into such inspectorate organisation as may be established by the peace treaty.

REMAINDER OF 'PRESENT' ITALIAN FORCES

15. In addition to 'Interim' Italian Army there remain :-

Carabinieri (Serial 7)
British and US Italian Service Troops (Serial 2)
Iti/Iti units under Allied operational control (Serial 4)
Italian Navy (Serial 8)
Italian Air Force (Serial 9)

16. Carabinieri (Serial 7)

The Carabinieri are already largely the administrative responsibility of the Italian Army, but the US are responsible for providing rations for the Carabinieri held in the Iti/Iti category and the British are responsible for providing rations for the Carabinieri held in the Br/Iti category. Future administration should be as follows :-

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a. Administrative Services

The Carabinieri should continue to be maintained through the territorial organisation and the Italian administrative services which are included as part of the 'interim' Italian Army at Appendix 'C'.

b. Provision of Maintenance Supplies and Clothing

When the responsibility for the provision of rations for the 'interim' Italian Army is made the responsibility of the Italian Government the responsibility for feeding the Carabinieri should, at the same time, also be assumed by the Italian Government. Requirements for this purpose should, as necessary, then be included with the supply requirements of the Italian Government. Additional imports required are included in the figures at Appendix 'D'. Clothing is, in practice, provided now from Italian Government resources and this should formally be made their responsibility.

c. Administrative Control

This will continue to be the responsibility of the Italian Government subject to such responsibilities as it may be decided to give to an Allied Police mission should such a mission be established.

17. Br/Iti and US/Iti Service units (Serial 2) and Iti/Iti units under Allied operational control (Serial 4)

a. These units are required to meet Allied requirements to operate

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Additional imperative requirements are listed in Appendix 'D'. Clothing is, in practice, provided now from Italian Government resources and this should formally be made their responsibility.

c. Administrative Control

This will continue to be the responsibility of the Italian Government subject to such responsibilities as it may be decided to give to an Allied Police mission should such a mission be established.

17. Br/Iti and US/Iti Service units (Serial 2) and Iti/Iti units under Allied operational control (Serial 4)

a. These units are employed to meet Allied requirements to economise in manpower. There will be a diminishing requirement for these units as redeployment proceeds and the number of personnel employed will be reduced accordingly. Estimated rate of reduction is as follows :-

US/Iti Service Units - reduced to 30,000 by end of August, thereafter a gradual reduction will be made until end of December when there will be no requirement for their employment.

Br/Iti Service Units - reduced to 96,000 by September and thereafter further reduced at a rate of 6,000 a month to the end of the year.

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Iti/Iti units under Allied control - no reduction envisaged for some time.

b. Present responsibilities of the Italian Government, British Army and US Army regarding provision of maintenance, clothing and personal equipment should continue. Administrative services should be provided to an increasing degree by the territorial organisation and administrative services which will have been incorporated into the 'interim' Italian Army. It will be necessary for MMIA to exercise their present responsibilities over the Italian administrative organisation to ensure that these service and guard units are adequately administered and are able to carry out their operational role. While inconvenient, MMIA consider it possible for this control to be exercised in respect of service and guard units while giving the Italian Government full control over their administrative organisation in respect of its administratice functions performed for the 'interim' army of 140,000.

18. Italian Navy (Serial 8)

a. The British Army is responsible for such provision of rations and clothing to personnel of the Italian Navy as is normally supplied to all Br/Iti personnel. In practice the greater part of the clothing for the Italian Navy is provided from Royal Navy sources.

b. As it is likely that the Italian Navy will continue to exist at

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army of 140,000.

18. Italian Navy (Serial 8)

a. The British Army is responsible for such provision of rations and clothing to personnel of the Italian Navy as is normally supplied to all Br/Iti personnel. In practice the greater part of the clothing for the Italian Navy is provided from Royal Navy sources.

b. As it is likely that the Italian Navy will continue to exist at some strength not yet decided, it should be made administratively self-supporting. Responsibility for the provision of rations should be transferred to the Italian Government at the same time as the similar responsibility for provision of rations to the Italian Army is transferred. The provision of clothing should likewise be made an Italian Government responsibility to be obtained from Italian Government sources, including imports made on Italian Government account.

19. Italian Air Force (Serial 9)

(This is still under discussion with RAF MedME and AAF/MTO).

Should not (G) above be offlisted with

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CONCLUSIONS

20. Future of Italian Army

The present Italian Army should be divided into two parts :-

a. that which is required to control the Neither frontiers of ITALY and to maintain internal security in ITALY, SICILY and SARDINIA. The control of this part - the 'interim' Italian Army - is a legitimate responsibility to give to the Italian Government.

b. that which is employed as a British and US requirement in relief of British and US manpower. The control of this part should remain the responsibility of the British and US.

21. Composition of 'Interim' Italian Army

This army should be established as a self sufficient force in no way dependent on Allied administrative units for its support. The proposed army of 140,000 includes the necessary complement of administrative troops which, by using present Iti/Iti administrative troops, can be organised as a self sufficient army by the end of September.

22. Time when administrative control of 'Interim' Italian Army should be given to the Italian Government

Administrative control over the 'interim' Italian Army should be made the responsibility of the Italian Government when operational control of its army is transferred. This is likely to take place about the end of September.

23. Provision of Maintenance for 'Interim' Italian Army

a. Clothing, transport, warlike and non-warlike equipment, including

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dependent on Allied administrative units for its support. The proposed army of 140,000 includes the necessary complement of administrative troops which, by using present Iti/Iti administrative troops, can be organised as a self sufficient army by the end of September.

22. Time when administrative control of 'Interim' Italian Army should be given to the Italian Government

Administrative control over the 'interim' Italian Army should be made the responsibility of the Italian Government when operational control of its army is transferred. This is likely to take place about the end of September.

23. Provision of maintenance for 'Interim' Italian Army

a. Clothing, transport, warlike and non-warlike equipment, including items of lease lend origin, at present in possession of units from which the 'interim' Italian Army will be formed, should be retained.

b. Supply of all items of maintenance, clothing, warlike and non-warlike equipment, should be made the responsibility of the Italian Government. Such items which cannot be provided from indigenous Italian resources should be purchased through Italian Government channels from civil disposal agencies in this theatre or civil procurement agencies in US and UK.

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24. Carabinieri

Maintenance for the Carabinieri should be made the responsibility of the Italian Government on the same basis as the 'interim' Italian Army and should be assumed at the same time as they assume administrative control of the army.

25. Italian Service and Guard Troops employed to meet Allied requirements

Present Italian Government, US Army and British Army responsibilities for these units should continue both as regards provision of maintenance, clothing and personal equipment and as regards administrative services. Control should continue to be exercised by MMIA.

26. Italian Navy

Rations and clothing for the Italian Navy should be provided by the Italian Government and this responsibility should be transferred to the Italian Government at the same time as the similar responsibility for these items for the 'interim' Italian Army is transferred.

27. Italian Air Force

(This is still under discussion with RAF MedME and AAF/MTO).

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Italian Government at the same time as the similar responsibility for these items for the 'interim' Italian Army is transferred.

27. Italian Air Force

(This is still under discussion with RAF MedME and AAF/MTO).

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APPENDIX 'A'

PRESENT COMPOSITION OF ITALIAN ARMY

The Italian Army can be divided into the following general categories:-

Serial	Nature of Unit	Br/Iti US/Iti or Iti/Iti	Theoretical strengths (round figures)	Remarks
1	Combat forces	Br/Iti	64,000	Consisting mainly of five Gruppi, the Garabaldi Regt, certain auxiliary combat units and administrative ancillary troops. These units are in general dependent on British administrative units for their maintenance.
2	Service units	Br/Iti	106,000 +	Consisting of administrative units on Allied WE/TO employed in direct support of British and US forces in the theatre. They are under complete Allied control though their administration is largely effected through the Italian administrative organisation (Serials 5 and 6). In this category are included
		US/Iti	83,000 +	

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2	Service units	Br/Iti US/Iti	106,000 + 83,000 +	Consisting of administrative units on Allied WE/TO employed in direct support of British and US forces in the theatre. They are under complete Allied control though their administration is largely effected through the Italian administrative organisation (Serials 5 and 6). In this category are included the Italian Administrative Division Headquarters which are in some degree responsible for the administration of Combat and Service units.
3	Italian Security Divisions	Iti/Iti	15,000	Comprising two divisions in SICILY and one division in SARDINIA. These are under the control of the Italian Government.

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Serial	Nature of Unit	Br/Iti US/Iti or Iti/Iti	Theoretical strengths (round figures)	Remarks
4	Italian units under Allied operational cond	Iti/Iti	24,000	Comprising guard units on Allied installations, intelligence units, certain AC transport units, mine clearance and "refugee" units. These units, while Iti/Iti are in effect borrowed from the Italian Government and are under Allied operational control.
5	Italian Command and adm control organisation	Iti/Iti	3,000	Comprising Supreme Command, General Staff HQ, Territorial, District and Regimental Depot HQ. These are under the control of the Italian Government.
6	Italian adm services	Iti/Iti	24,000	Comprising base hospitals, administrative depots etc for the supply and maintenance of Iti/Iti army units and personnel. In most cases these administrative services also maintain British and US Iti/Iti units (Serial 2). These admin-

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5	Italian Command and adm control organisation	Iti/Iti	3,000	Comprising Supreme Command, General Staff HQ, Territorial, District and Regimental Depot HQ. These are under the control of the Italian Government.
6	Italian adm services	Iti/Iti	24,000	Comprising base hospitals, administrative depots etc for the supply and maintenance of Iti/Iti army units and personnel. In most cases these administrative services also maintain British and US Iti/Iti units (Serial 2). These administrative services are under the control of the Italian Government.
7	Carabinieri	Iti/Iti	65,000	These are under the control of the Italian Government where territory has been handed back to the Government, and under Allied Military Government control where the territory is still administered by Allied Military Government.

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APPENDIX 'A' (Contd)

Serial	Nature of Unit	Br/Iti US/Iti or Iti/Iti	Theoretical strengths (round figures)	Remarks
8	Italian Navy	Br/Iti	75,000	These are under the control of C-in-C Med but are partly administered by the Italian Army administrative organisation.
9	Italian Air Force	Br/Iti	24,500 +	These comprise 2,500 service troops supporting the RAF and 6,500 service troops supporting AAF/MTO. Balance 22,500 Br/Iti are operational air force personnel part of whom are employed to assist in meeting RAF operational requirements (e.g. Air Sea Rescue). The Italian Air Force are partly administered by the Italian Army administration.
		US/Iti	6,500 +	

+ These are diminishing commitments (see paras 17 & 19)

ϕ "Refugee" units are Collecting Posts, Transit Camps etc. employed on the administrative services for displaced persons.

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employed to assist in meeting RAF operational requirements (e.g. Air Sea Rescue). The Italian Air Force are partly administered by the Italian Army administration.

+ These are diminishing commitments (see paras 17 & 19)

ϕ "Refugee" units are Collecting Posts, Transit Camps etc. employed on the administrative services for displaced persons.

2. Maintenance Responsibilities - Italian Army.

Responsibilities of the US Army, British Army and the Italian Government for the provision of maintenance, clothing and equipment are given at Appendix 'B'.

3. Maintenance Responsibilities - Italian Navy

These responsibilities are the same as for Army Br/Iti personnel, namely:

Rations — British, less Italian element provided by Italian Government.

Clothing — British, with assistance by Italian Government from Italian stocks.

Equipment — Personal equipment largely from Italian sources.

The provision of rations is a British Army commitment. The provision of clothing is a British Army commitment in theory but in practice the greater

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part is provided from Royal Navy sources.

4. Maintenance Responsibilities - Italian Air Force

These responsibilities are the same as for Army Br/Iti and US/Iti personnel, namely:-

a. Br/Iti

Rations	British, less Italian element provided by Italian Government.
Clothing	British, with assistance by Italian Government from Italian stocks.
Equipment	Personal equipment largely from Italian sources. Technical equipment for aircraft supplied from British sources from RAF.

b. US/Iti

Rations	US, less Italian element provided by Italian Government.
Clothing	US, with assistance from the Italian Government.
Equipment	Personal equipment largely from Italian sources.

The provision of rations and clothing is a British Army responsibility for Br/Iti Air Force personnel and a US Army responsibility for US/Iti personnel. In practice certain clothing is made available from RAF and AAF/ETO sources.

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b. US/Iti

Rations	US, less Italian element provided by Italian Government.
Clothing	US, with assistance from the Italian Government.
Equipment	Personal equipment largely from Italian sources.

The provision of rations and clothing is a British Army responsibility for Br/Iti Air Force personnel and a US Army responsibility for US/Iti personnel. In practice certain clothing is made available from RAF and AAF/ATO sources.

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PRESENT ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE ALLIES AND THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT FOR THE ITALIAN ARMY

Serial	Nature of Unit	Provision of items of maintenance and equipment		Responsibility for Provisi	
1.	Combat forces	Rations	British less Italian element provided by Italian Government.	ST Tpt	Combat 2nd lir
		Clothing	British	ST Depots	Mainto future
		Equipment	British	Ord	Combat dump st for the
				REME	Except LiDs wh equipmc in Briti
				Petrol	Maintai
2.	Br/Iti Service Tps	Rations	British less Italian element provided by Italian Government	ST Tpt	Units p this usu Br units

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APPENDIX 'B'

NSIBILITIES OF THE ALLIES AND THE
FOR THE ITALIAN ARMY

		Responsibility for Provision of administrative services
ance and equipment		
n element provided nt.	ST Tpt	Combat forces have own tpt up to and including 2nd line.
	ST Depots	Maintenance from British depots and planned in future to be maintained from Italian Depots. (Serial 6)
	Ord	Combat forces have ord facilities up to "ADOS" dump standard otherwise stocks of ord stores for these forces are held in British depots.
	REME	Except for first line repairs performed in LADs which are part of the Combat forces, equipment and vehicles are, in the main, repaired in British workshops.
	Petrol	Maintained from Allied depots
ian element provided nent	ST Tpt	Units possess small quantity of own tpt but this usually has to be supplemented by tpt of Br units.

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Serial	Nature of Unit	Provision of items of maintenance and equipment		Responsibility for Provision
2.	Br/Iti Service Tps (Contd)	Clothing	British with assistance by Italian Government from Italian stocks.	ST Depots	In 3 Dist through I Italian d generally units wit Italian a being tak supply di troops by
		Equipment	Personal equipment largely from Italian sources.	Ord	This is l controlle
				Petrol	Maintaine
2.	US/Iti Service Tps	Rations	US less Italian element provided by Italian Government.	QM Tpt	Units pos usually h
		Clothing	US with assistance by Italian Government from Italian stocks.	QM Depots	Maintaine services.
		Equipment	Personal equipment largely from Italian sources.	Ord	This is l from US De
				Petrol	Maintaine

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		Responsibility for Provision of administrative services
nd equipment		
y Italian stocks. y from	ST Depots	In 3 District units are generally maintained through Italian territorial organisation from Italian depots. In 1 and 2 Districts units are generally maintained from British DIDs by British units with whom they are working, assisted by the Italian administrative divisions. Steps are, however, being taken to hand over the majority of the British supply distribution responsibilities for Italian troops by 1 Aug 45.
	Ord	This is largely clothing and held in Ord dumps controlled by the administrative divisions.
	Petrol	Maintained from Allied depots.
provided by elian stocks. ly from	QM Tpt	Units possess small quantity of own tpt but this usually has to be supplemented by tpt of US units.
	QM Depots	Maintained almost entirely by US administrative services.
	Ord	This is largely clothing and is issued largely from US Depots.
	Petrol	Maintained from Allied depots.

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Serial	Nature of Unit	Provision of items of maintenance and equipment		Responsibili
3.	Italian Security Divs	Rations	US less Italian element provided by Italian Government	ST & C
4.	Italian units under Allied operational command	Clothing	Italian Government assisted by the US and British on 50/50 basis	ST & C
5.	Italian command and administrative control organisation	Equipment	Personal equipment largely from Italian sources	
6.	Italian administrative services			
7.	Carabinieri (of which 10,000 at present count against Br/Iti ceiling and are provisioned in same manner as Br/Itis).			Ord De

Petrol

Medical: For all serials medical facilities are provided by the Italian Governme

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ns of maintenance and equipment	Provision of administrative services
s Italian element provided by	ST & QM Tpt. Units largely possess small quantity of tpt but some assistance given by US and British.
n Government	
h Government assisted by the British on 50/50 basis	ST & QM Depots In 3 Dist and PBS area generally maintained through Italian territorial organisation from Italian depots. In 1 and 2 Districts and Fifth Army areas maintained from US or British depots or through the Italian administrative divisions from dumps under their control.
el equipment largely from n sources	Ord Depots. This is largely clothing. In 3 Dist and PBS area clothing is issued through the territorial organisation. In 1 and 2 Districts and Fifth Army areas clothing is either supplied through the territorial organisation or through Ord dumps controlled by the adm divisions.
	Petrol Maintained from Allied depots

ties are provided by the Italian Government and medical stores by the British.

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APPENDIX 'D'

ADDITIONAL IMPORT REQUIREMENTS
FOR
MAINTENANCE OF ITALIAN ARMY AND CARABINIERI.

1. RATIONS

If following items of food are imported, the Italian Army, of strength 140,000, and Carabinieri, of strength 65,000, can be fed from Italian Government sources without impairment of the civil ration.

	Tons per annum				
Item	Flour	Dried veg	Sugar	Pepper	Coffee
Army of 140,000	25,000	2,800	1,600	8	800
Carabinieri of 65,000	11,600	1,300	720	4	400

Above figures do not include items or tonnages provided from indigenous resources.

2. CLOTHING

Following is estimated tonnage of raw material requirements to enable an initial issue and one year's maintenance to be provided to the Italian Army of 140,000.

Shoddy	1,472	tons
Cotton	396	"
Virgin wool	2,046	"

Army of 140,000	25,000	2,800	1,600	8	800
Carabinieri of 65,000	11,600	1,300	720	4	400

Above figures do not include items or tonnages provided from indigenous resources.

2. CLOTHING

Following is estimated tonnage of raw material requirements to enable an initial issue and one year's maintenance to be provided to the Italian Army of 140,000.

Shoddy	1,472	tons
Cotton	396	"
Virgin wool	2,046	"
Leather	1,000	"

3. POL

Requirement for Italian Army of 140,000 estimated at 6,000 tons a month.

Air For ~~500,000~~ 1500 tons

Navy 1.

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APPENDIX 'C'

PROPOSED COMPOSITION OF 'INTERIM' ITALIAN ARMY

1. A suitable composition is considered to be as follows :-

a. CONTROL

S.M.G. and M of W.	2,000
Territorial Regional HQs, Districts and Regimental Depots	7,000

b. ADMINISTRATION AND TRAINING

Services	31,000
Training and reinforcements	10,000

c. TROOPS

Five Combat Gps and Garibaldi Regt.	50,000
SICILY (as now) two I.S. Divs	10,000
SARDINIA (as now) one I.S. Div	5,000
Ten I.S. Bdes (one per Terr Region excl SICILY)	25,000
	140,000

2. Above does not include Carabinieri or Italian units employed to meet Allied administration or guard requirements.

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Five Combat Gps and Garibaldi Regt.	50,000
SICILY (as now) two I.S. Divs	10,000
SARDINIA (as now) one I.S. Div	5,000
Ten I.S. Bdes (one per Terr Region excl SICILY)	25,000
	140,000

2. Above does not include Carabinieri or Italian units employed to meet Allied administration or guard requirements.

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Copy No. 2

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AFHQ PERSONAL FOR GENERAL MACRUDER

2751 30 JULY 1945 PRIORITY

TOPSEC PD

YOUR FOX XRAY TWO NINE FIVE EIGHT SEVEN PD

PAREN TO AFHQ PERSONAL FOR GENERAL MACRUDER FROM ADMIRAL STONE FROM HQ

ALCOM CITE ACSCC PAREN

I WILL ATTEND

Topsec cable advising meeting on future administrative arrangements for the Italian Army to be held at AFHQ on 2/Aug at 2-30 pm.

Dests: Copy No.

Signal M/C 1

Exec. Commr 2

Chief Commissioner 3

Chief Commissioner 4

TOP SECRET

Chief Commissioner

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ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

(s/Cono Percy)

064

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(97)

Confidential

Ref: 8251/197/EC

10 July 1945

SUBJECT: Use of Italian Army and its effect on redeployment of Allied Troops from ITALY

TO : Allied Force Headquarters
Attn: Chief of Staff

(190)

1. I note from your letter of 16 July that the whole question of the future of the Italian Army has been referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. I wish to make it abundantly clear, however, that it is essential for the Italian Government, to whom we intend to hand over the whole of Italy with a few exceptions on September 1st, should have on that date its own Army at a strength recommended by them, to be at their disposal. Without an army no government can govern.

(180)

2. In my letter 8251/180/EC I recommended that the strength of the Italian Army, excluding such troops which may be required by the Allies, and excluding C.C.R., should be 140,000. The President of the Council feels strongly that in view of the period of uncertainty in public safety upon which the country appears to be entering, the interim strength of the Army should be increased by two additional divisions, thus raising the proposed strength from 140,000 to 160,000. I support this view.

3. I should be glad, therefore, if a decision could be given to me before the end of this month and, if necessary, arrangements could be made for the units of the Italian Army to be located during the month of August according to the requests of the Italian Government reflected in my letter of June 7th.

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Copy to: G-5 AFHQ

See 324

(To CSO) 24/7 NOTED

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INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM

ECONOMIC SECTION

827

CHW/es

Confidential

17 July 1945

TS-100/8/ES

JUL 19 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER:

Subject: Requirements for Italian Army.

1. I have informed Colonel Miln, Log Plans, G-3, AFHQ, of the following food import requirements to support the Italian Army (140,000) and the Carabinieri (65,000), fulfilment of which would avoid impairment to the civilian ration scale.

	Tons Per Annum		
	Italian Army (140,000)	Carabinieri (65,000)	Total
Flour	25,000	11,600	36,600
Dried Vegetables	2,800	1,300	4,100
Sugar	1,600	742	2,342
Pepper	8	4	12
Coffee	800	400	1,200

2. For clothing and shoes the following are the raw material requirements for the Italian Army based on initial equipment and one year's maintenance.

	Tons Per Annum
Shoddy	1,472
Cotton	396
Virgin Wool	2,046
Leather	1,000

3. I told him that the computed POL requirement for the Italian Army is 1,425,000 gallons (Imp) per month. His attention was invited to the fact that the computation was on a manpower basis which is not satisfactory to PETSEC but is the best basis MMIA can use at the present time because of the lack of information on vehicles.

4. Colonel Miln was told of the inadequacy of rubber generally, but further informed that vehicular figures are so indefinite that we are unable to project requirements for rubber at this time.

We are under orders not to make any estimates for internal consumption

Charles W Walton

CHARLES W. WALTON
Colonel, A. C.
Chief, Supply Division

cc: Acting Vice President
Directors, Food, Industry, Commerce S/Os
MMIA
Col. Miln, G-5, Log Plans, AFHQ

(Capt Arnold)

See M.198.

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8251

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394

(194)

18 July 1945.

JUL 18 1945

MEMORANDUM TO: Executive Commissioner.

This is just a reminder to stress, in any comments you make on the recent paper from AFHQ on Employment of Italian Troops, the point that the President of the Council feels strongly that the size of the interim Army should be increased to include two additional divisions, raising the proposed strength, therefore, from 140,000 to 160,000 men.

(190)

HILLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

(CSO)

061 (See 197)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785617

8251

SECRET

EX COMMISSIONER

5530

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff
A. P. O. 512

Confidential JUL 17 1945

16 July 1945

190

SUBJECT: Use of Italian Army and its Effect on Redeployment of Allied Troops From ITALY.

TO : Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.

180

(Folio 11 File 82/3)

1. I am instructed by Field Marshal ALEXANDER to acknowledge your letters of the 7th and 15th of June on the above subject. It is regretted that no reply has previously been made but the whole question is dependent on receipt of a reply from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to a signal from this Headquarters dealing with the withdrawal of Allied forces from ITALY and the maintenance of a reserve in that country. In the meantime the matter of the organization of the Italian Army is also under study here.

2. As soon as the position is clarified you will be further informed.

By Command of the Supreme Allied Commander:

L. L. Lemnitzer

L. L. LEMNITZER
Major General, G.S.C.
Deputy Chief of Staff.

Copies to:
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

See 197

SECRET

061

9407

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

CONFIDENTIAL

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8251

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 1612

RHF/mlm
AP 438

16

AG 091.711/115 SAC-O

10 July 1945

JUL 12 1945

SUBJECT: Use of Italian Army

TO: Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
APO 394

1. Reference is made to letter, Allied Commission, file 8251/170/EC, dated 24 May 1945.

2. While it is agreed that the future of the Italian Army must be actively considered, the Allies presently maintain Italian troops on a special ration scale and largely with Allied clothing and equipment, in order that they may perform purely military duties as guards, service and Internal Security units. For this reason it has always been considered that wherever tasks could be performed by civilians, the Italian Army should not be used. This ruling is even more important now that the question of unemployment and unrest in Italy is causing concern.

3. The final decision of the Allied Governments as to the future size of the Italian Army has not yet been received, but it is known that the Italian Government is at present of the opinion that the country would be unable to support more than 140,000 troops for the next few years. Such an army may eventually become the only means by which the Italian Government can defend its frontiers against possible aggression.

4. It is known that the Allied Governments are anxious to reduce the ceiling of the Italian Army as soon as military requirements allow. Any troops used in the ways suggested by your letter under reference, would have to be fed and maintained by the United States or United Kingdom on the full Italian Army scale. Such a course would be uneconomical, where this work could be done by civilians.

5. As the training and organization of the future Italian Army will be a considerable task, it is difficult to foresee a time when either MMIA or the Italian Army would be free to take on any extensive commitments which could be handled by civilians.

6. Italian Prisoners of War. In reply to your specific suggestions:

a. If Italian Prisoners of War on repatriation were considered to be members of the Italian Army from the time of their arrival in Italy until the Italian Army had processed them and

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

arranged for their discharge, it would be necessary to obtain authority from the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the importation and issue of additional Army rations. For this reason it would be preferable that all repatriates should be treated as civilians on arrival. Moreover, very few of the repatriates will be eligible for enlistment into the Italian Army, and the great problem will be in their absorption into civil life.

b. It is agreed that the Italian War Ministry should screen repatriates for suitable material for the Italian Army, and that it will be necessary for the Italian Army Territorial organization to deal with documentation dischargees. While the requirements of Internal Security permit, every endeavour will be made to leave the 6,000 Combat Group troops under your command as at present, to assist with repatriation, but as Allied troops are withdrawn you will appreciate that it may be necessary to return these troops to their primary task.

c. As the Territorial organization of the Italian Army is very largely civilianized, it is felt that the Italian staff built up to deal with repatriates can be equally civilian, employing only the minimum assistance from the Italian Army.

d. Transfer of control of the PW Sub-Commission to MMIA will be a matter of domestic arrangement within Headquarters Allied Commission should MMIA pass from under direct operational control of this headquarters. At present, such a transfer would imply direct control of Italian repatriation by this headquarters, whereas it is desired that the responsibility should lie as far as possible with the Italian Government. It is preferred that you make no change meantime.

7. Clearance of Land Mines. This subject is now under separate consideration with a view to the employment of German surrendered or prisoner of war personnel. The possiblity of releasing to the Italian Government some US-ITI or BR-ITI personnel to guard and to assist in training mine-clearance teams is also being examined.

8. Harvesting. It is understood that you are making alternative arrangements owing to the lack of Italian troops. Should German prisoners of war be employed, an effort will be made to find guards from Italian sources, but reliance should not be placed on this arrangement, as the ration difficulty remains to be solved.

9. In principle, the use of the Italian Army in the Rehabilitation of Italy is supported, but until the Italian Government is able to feed and clothe its own army, such employment would further

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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(183)

LCT AFHQ AG 091.711/115 SAC-O
20 July 1945 (Cont'd)

strain the already difficult Allied food situation. It is therefore requested that every possible use be made of civilian manpower, to enable the Italian Army to be reduced in size as quickly as possible, and trained for the defence of Italian soil.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

EDMUND R. SHUGART
Colonel, AGD
Asst Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
5 - Addressee
1 - COC, Land Forces Sub Commission, MC, MMIL.
1 - G-1 (A)
1 - G-1 (B)
3 - G-3 AMO
1 - G-3 (Org-2)
1 - G-4 (A)
1 - G-4 (B)
1 - G-5
1 - CAO
2 - AG Records
1 - AG M&D

Exc List - 12 Jun 45
(8251/Sec)
15 Chief Comm
16 Exec Comm
17 C.A. Sec
18 Econ Sec
19 WMD & IPOW Sec
24 Land Forces SC
(Received Direct)

3

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

8251

Copy #1 (185)

TOP SECRET

Tel. 460

JMA/bd

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
ECONOMIC SECTION
SUPPLY DIVISION

Confidential

Ref: TS 100/B/1S

2 July 1945

JUL 2 1945

SUBJECT : Relaxation of Italian Army Control

TO : Executive Commissioner

(184)

1. Reference your 8251/184/EC of 27 June 1945.

2. The ability of the Italian economy to support an interim force is under consideration by the Economic Section.

3. The problem resolves itself into full consideration of the extent to which the Allies must supply either the Italian economy or the force itself. Requirements sent this Section by MMIA necessitate further discussion with MMIA primarily because of the vast quantities of material required to meet MMIA scales. This will be presented to MMIA for review and possible revision of scales.

Charles W. Walton
CHARLES W. WALTON
Colonel
Chief, Supply Division

cc M.M.I.A.

see M 186 187

TOP SECRET

057

(CHIEF ARMOLOGY)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Ext 451

ABA/el

Ref: 8251/184/SC

27 June 45

SUBJECT: Relaxation of Control of the Italian Army

TO : A/Vice President, Economic Section

1. Reference our memorandum 8251/182/SC, 21 June 45, regarding above subject.

2. It would be appreciated if an early reply could be had as to what the result is of the examination you were requested to make reference paragraph 13(d) of General Browning's memorandum.

A. B. ARNOLDY

Chief Staff Officer,
To Executive Commissioner.

056

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Ex. Comm.
RVB/wp

8251

SECRET

AP 272

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

SECRET
Auth: SAC, IT
Initials: RVB
Date: 22 June 1945

183

14

Confidential

22 June 1945

3782

AG 091.711/207 GCT-O

JUN 24 1945

SUBJECT: Command and Administration of Italian Army.

TO: All Concerned.

Letter, this headquarters, file AG 091.711/169 GCT-O, subject as above, dated 16 November 1944, is amended to add the following paragraph:

"17. g. Personal effects, medical records and other documents of Italian casualties who pass through Allied units or hospitals will be delivered to the nearest Italian Administrative Divisional Headquarters or Italian Medical unit for proper disposition. A properly authenticated receipt will be obtained by the Allied unit or hospital for all items delivered."

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

HEADQUARTERS
23 JUN 1945
A. G.

ROBERT V. BENHAM
Captain, AGD
Asst Adjutant General

Amended 24/6/45

DISTRIBUTION:

20 - HQ 15th Army Gp
20 - Land Forces Sub-Commission Allied Commission (MMLA)
10 - HQ Eighth Army
10 - Fifth Army
10 - Number 1 District
10 - Number 2 District
10 - Number 3 District
10 - FBS
5 - Rome Allied Area Comd
1 - No 50 Br Liaison Unit
1 - No 51 Br Liaison Unit
1 - No 52 Br Liaison Unit
1 - No 53 Br Liaison Unit
1 - No 54 Br Liaison Unit
5 - HQ Allied Commission
2 - C-in-C Med
2 - HQ AAF
2 - G-1 (B)
2 - G-1 (MTOUSA)
2 - G-2
2 - G-3 (Ops)
2 - G-3 (Org-B)
2 - G-3 (Org-A)
2 - G-4 (A)
2 - G-4 (B)
2 - G-5
5 - AAF/MTO
5 - AAFSC/MTO
2 - Adriatic Base Comd
1 - CWS
1 - Director of Works
1 - Engr
1 - Financial Adviser (Br)
1 - Fis Dir, MTOUSA
2 - JAG
2 - Director of Labor
2 - Medical (Br)
1 - D Prov M Sec
1 - QM
1 - REME
1 - S & T
2 - Q (Maint)
2 - Q (AE)
1 - Signals
1 - G-4 (M & Tn)
1 - Tn (A)
1 - Tn (B)
1 - Dep Mil Sec
5 - G2E CMF
1 - DPIC
1 - CAO
1 - Welfare (Br)
1 - 8 Comd Pay Office
30 - Spares (To G-3 (Org) Foreign)
2 - AG Records
1 - AG M & D

CC: Econ. Sec.
Navy Sig -
Air Sig -
G-4 (B) -

PA

055

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

182

21 June 1945.

Ref: 8251/182/20.

SUBJECT: Relaxation of control of the Italian Army.

TO : A/Vice President,
Economic Section.

1. Under reference 8251/180/20 dated 7 June 1945 I enclosed a copy of a memorandum prepared by General BROWNING, D.C.C. Land Forces Sub-Commission (M.M.I.A.) on the subject of the relaxation of control of the Italian Army.

2. I shall be grateful if you will let me know, as early as possible, the result of the examination you were requested to make, reference para 13(d) of General BROWNING's memorandum.

For the Chief Commissioner:

E. Talbot,
Lt Col
Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 183017

(180)

TOP SECRET.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Chief Commissioner

Confidential

Ref: 8251/180/EC. 7. June 1945

SUBJECT: Use of Italian Army.

(177 (LESS APPENDIX 'A')) (179)

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
Attention: Chief of Staff.

1. With reference to my letter of 24 May 1945, 8251/170/EC, I have now received a memorandum on this subject from COC, Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA), a copy of which I enclose.

2. I am in general agreement with this memorandum and make the following recommendations:

(a) That the strength of the Italian Army, excluding such troops which may be required by the Allies, and excluding CC.RR, should be 140,000 until it has been decided at the Peace Conference what the final strength should be.

(b) That complete administrative control of the "interim Army" (as in para (a) above) be handed over to the Italian Government on 1 September 1945, subject to the Allied right of:

(i) re-assuming control in the event of disturbances to the detriment of Allied interests;

(ii) having priority for the accommodation, requisition, rail and port facilities, and

(iii) receiving full and advance information of consultations on Italian Army projects and plans.

(c) That a forecast be made of the number of Italian troops required by the Allies on 1st September and thereafter until so long as the Allies retain troops in Italy.

(a) That the strength of the Italian Army, [illegible] which may be required by the Allies, and excluding CC.RR, should be 140,000 until it has been decided at the Peace Conference what the final strength should be.

(b) That complete administrative control of the "interim Army" (as in para (a) above) be handed over to the Italian Government on 1 September 1945, subject to the Allied right of:

(i) re-assuming control in the event of disturbances to the detriment of Allied interests;

(ii) having priority for the accommodation, requisition, rail and port facilities, and

(iii) receiving full and advance information of consultations on Italian Army projects and plans.

(c) That a forecast be made of the number of Italian troops required by the Allies on 1st September and thereafter until so long as the Allies retain troops in Italy.

(d) That AFHQ accept responsibility for supplying Italian troops working for them as in (c) above.

Your early consideration of the above recommendations is requested.

3. In the meantime I will instruct Economic Section to make an examination as recommended in para 13(d) of General Browning's memorandum.

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Copy to: G-5 AFHQ (2) (with copy of relevant correspondence).
Land Forces Sub-Com (MMIA)
CA Sec
Econ Sec
WMD & LFW Sub-Com
File
Float
Spare (3)

-do- (For action in accordance with para 3 above).

See M.181

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 110317

9251

~~SECRET~~ Confidential

Subject:- Relaxation of control of the Italian Army.

Land Forces Sub Com, A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)

MAY 30 1945

G/3
30 May 45

H.Q., Allied Commission
(for Executive Commissioner)

163

Ref you 8251/EC of 20 May:-

1689

1. As ordered by Chief Commissioner, I discussed the above with the Minister of War personally(see my DO/2 of 21 May to the Minister, copy to you).

171

Appendix "A" to attached memorandum shews the outcome.

2. In the memorandum itself I have outlined the salient factors of the problem and a possible solution, as I see it.

3. I must mention that, inevitably, decision from C.C.S. take much time(up to 60 days or more) to come through. If this occurs in this case, there will not be time by 1 Sep for the Italians to implement the plan authorized, without considerable rush and confusion. Therefore, if my plan is accepted, it would seem that A.F.H.Q. would have to authorize a temporary plan pending decision by C.C.S. or the general lines on which the problem should be tackled or further explored pro tem; or alternatively press for a very early reply from C.C.S.

4. The Minister of War tells me that he would have liked further time(i.e. till Saturday 2 June) to discuss all this with Gen. CADORNA. But, in view of the time factor and the nebulous state of the problem at present, I have told the Minister that I am forwarding his general views now and that, if he wishes, he can send Gen. CADORNA's suggestions later.

L. Browning

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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L. Browning

Major General,
M.M.I.A.

cc/

(Encl. 2 copies of Memorandum and Appendix "A".)

(Action 180)

(1 spare copy of Memorandum)

(Lt Col Talbot)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 763017

MEMORANDUM

TOP SECRET

(177)

Subject:- Relaxation of Control of the Italian Army

Land Forces Sub-Comm. A.C.
(M.E.I.C.)

Confidential

G/3

30 May 45.

PREAMBLE

1. Chief Commissioner, A.C. envisages the handing over of all ITALY to the Italian Government in due course, tentative date being 1 Sep 45. In order that the Italian Government may then be able to fulfil its functions, it is to be assumed that it must control its own Army.

OBJECT

2. The object of this Memorandum is to examine to what extent and how the control of the Italian Army maybe handed over, subject to the Allied interests involved.

FACTORS

3. Ceiling. The whole problem is conditioned by the ceiling of 313,000(excl. CC.RR) authorized by the C.C.S. which in turn is dependent on world wide supply availability. Presumably this ceiling is not to be increased and may even be reduced in view of world wide shortage of supplies.

4. Peace Treaty. The Peace Treaty will define the size, composition, armament and conditions of service of the Italian Army. But the Peace Treaty may not be worked out and signed for many months. We therefore have to consider the organization and distribution of an "interim force" which the Italian Government may control and which would be adjusted and merged in due course into the Army authorized by the Peace Treaty.

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interests involved.

FACTORS

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4. Peace Treaty. The Peace Treaty will define the size, composition, armament and conditions of service of the Italian Army. But the Peace Treaty may not be worked out and signed for many months. We therefore have to consider the organization and distribution of an "interim force" which the Italian Government may control and which would be adjusted and merged in due course into the Army authorized by the Peace Treaty.

5. Interim Force. This falls into two broad subdivisions:-

(a) the part which the Italian Government requires to fulfil its functions, exclusive of service units required by the Allies to save Allied man-power,

(b) the service units referred to in (a). These will be a variable and constantly decreasing figure.

6. Capacity for self-support. 31

(a) The Italian Army is NOT at present capable of supporting itself. Basic rations are provided by the Allies. Clothing and boots are supplied largely by the Allies, either in the form of new articles or worn items which are renovated by the repair organization set-up.

2/.....

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Confidential

6. (a)(cont'd) The Italians have relatively small stocks of arms and equipment; this is particularly evident in the Combat Groups which are equipped throughout by the British.

(b) There are, therefore, two aspects of this:-

(i) what steps can the Italians take by 1 Sep(and thereafter)to make their Army self-supporting ?

(ii) what will or can the Allies provide or leave with the Italians to make up the deficiency ?

On this will depend the size and composition of the Interim Force. It is also bound up with the Peace Treaty matter as to whether the Italians shall maintain any armament industry or whether they shall be dependent on the Allies for such armaments as are necessary.

7. Type of Control.

(a) The administration of the Italian Army is carried out by the central plan and procedure produced by the Ministry of War, under Allied direction(through M.M.I.A.) and depending(see para 6) on the supplies made available by the Allies. Administratively therefore it would be impracticable to hand over to the Italians complete Administrative Control or responsibility for their own supply or part of their Army, while the Allies retained such functions for the remainder. This would result in complications such as separate supply depots, a different ration scale for the two parts and difficulties in allotment of personnel; officers removed for delinquency

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 763017

necessary.

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(b) (i) There are two types of general control as regards the Army as a whole viz. operational and administrative.

(ii) Operational control of their Internal Security Divisions in SICILY and SARDINIA is a function of the Italians, no Allied troops being present in these limited areas surrounded by water.

3/.....

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7. (b) (ii)(Cont'd) The matter of operational control is more complex on the Mainland, where large numbers of Allied troops will remain for a long time to come and where Allied interests are more concerned and more affected in the event of disorder.

(iii) A decision will therefore be necessary:-

firstly, as to whether the Allies are prepared to hand over Operational Control under these circumstances

secondly, as to what rights of information and advice or powers of veto the Allies will retain, if such Operational Control is handed over.

(iv) Administrative Control by the Allies, through M.M.I.A., is at present complete and detailed, including the organizational aspect of strengths, the three ITI categories, approval of promotions, removal of inefficients etc.(see AG.091.711/169 GCT-O dated 16 Nov 44 "Command and Administration of the Italian Army").

(v) A decision will therefore be necessary:-

firstly, as to whether the Allies(particularly in view of para 6(a) above) are prepared to hand over Administrative Control under the circumstances. This would involve an immediate examination of the point mentioned in 6(b) and would necessitate bulk allotments of rations, clothing and boots by the Allies to the Italians for the latter's control and distribution in detail.

secondly, as to whether the Allies are prepared to hand over Administrative as well as Operational Control

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 783017

promotions, removal

GCT-O dated 16 Nov 44 "Command and Administration of the Italian Army").

(v) A decision will therefore be necessary:-

firstly, as to whether the Allies(particularly in view of para 6(a) above) are prepared to hand over Administrative Control under the circumstances. This would involve an immediate examination of the point mentioned in 6(b) and would necessitate bulk allotments of rations, clothing and boots by the Allies to the Italians for the latter's control and distribution in detail.

secondly, as to whether the Allies are prepared to hand over Administrative as well as Operational Control, or only the latter.

thirdly, as to what rights of information and advice or powers of veto the Allies will retain if such Administrative Control is handed over.

(c) In any event, it seems clear that no matter what degree of relaxation of control is granted, the Allies must retain the power to ensure that ITALY carries out the terms of the Peace Treaty without evasion.

8. Phasing.

(a) If the reasoning outlined in para 7 is accepted and decisions are in the affirmative, it follows that either operational control or administrative control or both must be handed over complete on a given date. That is the only phasing possible.

4/.....

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8. (b) The date or dates depend on:-

(i) the speed with which the Peace Treaty is signed. If this is before 1 Sep., presumably the hand over takes place then, subject to safeguards such as continuing the existance of Italian service units so long as the Allies require the assistance of these.

(ii) the speed with which the necessary decisions can be given and the plan thus worked out, particularly as regards the supply aspect.

(iii) the internal conditions in ITALY and the general international situation on her frontiers e.g. TRIESTE, BOLZANO and AOSTA.

(iv) the extent to which the hand over is kept simple and on broad lines.

(c) In general, I consider that the earlier the hand over takes place, the better. It would give the Italians longer and more experience to set their military house in order while the Allies "hold the ring" in ITALY. Moreover it would be a gesture of trust and would conduce towards the atmosphere of a "friendly ITALY" which is so desirable and which may not be easy if the Italians consider the terms of the Peace Treaty to be severe. Despite the fact that removal of Allied control will undoubtedly result in a loss of Italian military efficiency and of value for supplies rendered, we should accept this. ITALY has got to make a start on her own sometime and,

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785217

(iv) the extent to which the hand over is kept simple and on broad lines.

(c) In general, I consider that the earlier the hand over takes place, the better. It would give the Italians longer and more experience to set their military house in order while the Allies "hold the ring" in ITALY. Moreover it would be a gesture of trust and would conduce towards the atmosphere of a "friendly ITALY" which is so desirable and which may not be easy if the Italians consider the terms of the Peace Treaty to be severe. Despite the fact that removal of Allied control will undoubtedly result in a loss of Italian military efficiency and of value for supplies rendered, we should accept this. ITALY has got to make a start on her own sometime and, within reason, the sooner the better.

For these reasons and also on the grounds of SIMPLICITY, the hand over of complete operational and administrative control(subject to safeguards) on a definite date seems the correct answer.

9. Position of Allied H.Q's and troops

(a) (i) Assuming hand over of complete operational and administrative control, Allied H.Q's and troops would become "free priority tenants" - a self-controlled organization super-imposed on the self-controlled ITALIAN State.

(ii) The Allied right of reassuming control in the event of disturbances to Allied interests; of priority use of accomodation, requisition and rail and port facilities; of receiving full and

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 778017

Confidential

9. (a) (ii)(Cont'd) advance information and consultation on Italian projects; and finally of veto; would be safeguarded in the hand over.

(iii) The Ministry of War would work through its Territorial Regional H.Q's. Allied Armies, Districts and Base Sections would work in conjunction with these Regional H.Q's; Ministry of War with A.F.H.Q., through M.M.I.A.

(b) Assuming hand over of operational control only, the Italian forces authorized for this(Combat Groups, I.S. Divs., Guard Bns.) would operate similarly to the CC.RR under the War Ministry through Territorial Regional H.Q's, Allied H.Q's being consulted beforehand.

(c) For efficient and economical effort to ensure Allied priority it would seem that Movement Control should still be retained by the Allies, the Italians bidding for what they require in this respect on a national(not military alone)basis.

10. German P.W.

The respective functions of the Italian Government and the Allies as regards these would need to be specified.

11. Patriots.

The pre-requisite of any plan must be a solution of the difficulties between the C.L.N.A.I. and the existing Italian Government, with, as a corollary, the complete patriot military organization being made subservient to the official Italian War Ministry.

12. Position of M.M.I.A.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 782017

(c) For efficient and economical [illegible]

it would seem that Movement Control should still be retained by the Allies, the Italians bidding for what they require in this respect on a national(not military alone)basis.

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The respective functions of the Italian Government and the Allies as regards these would need to be specified.

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The pre-requisite of any plan must be a solution of the difficulties between the C.L.N.A.I. and the existing Italian Government, with, as a corollary, the complete patriot military organization being made subservient to the official Italian War Ministry.

12. Position of M.M.I.A.

(a) Should the hand over of operational control only be permitted, M.M.I.A. will still require its full steff, as its duties will remain virtually unchanged.

(b) Should the hand over of administrative control be permitted as well, M.M.I.A. can be reduced to a liaison, advisory, information and inspecting staff, in order to ensure that nothing contrary to Allied interests occurs until the Peace Treaty and that after signature of the latter its terms are faithfully observed by ITALY.

PLAN.

13. Bearing in mind the Preamble, the Object and the above Factors, I suggest the following Plan:-

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6/.....

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 783017

Confidential (172)

13. (a) Complete operational and administrative control to be handed over(subject to safeguards) on 1 Sep. 45, except for Movement Control which will be retained by the Allies.

(b) "Interim Force" to be authorized ~~as at Appendix "A"~~ - to be replaced by the "Peace Treaty Army" when known.

(c) A forecast of Italian Service Units required by the Allies on 1 Sep.(and thereafter) to be obtained by A.F.H.Q. from Armies, Districts and Base Sections. Meanwhile these units can be progressively reduced when no longer necessary.

(d) An examination by A.C. in conjunction with the Italian Government as to the extent to which the Italian Economy can support the authorized "interim force" on 1 Sep.(and thereafter) in order to ascertain what the Allies should provide in the way of supplies and equipment, excluding armaments.

(e) A decision on the question of armaments.

(f) Acceptance by the Allies of the liability to supply the service units working for them.

(g) The functions and position of Allied H.Q's and troops and of M.M.I.A. in the new set-up, to be defined - M.M.I.A. establishment, bearing in mind post-war duties, to be redesigned.

N O T E.

I have specified 1 Sep. 45 as the hand over date, as requested by Chief Commissioner, A.C. I do not know whether the necessary decisions or the economic examination necessary can be made in time to

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 118017

certain what the Allies should provide in the way of supplies [illegible] equipment, excluding armaments.

(e) A decision on the question of armaments.

(f) Acceptance by the Allies of the liability to supply the service units working for them.

(g) The functions and position of Allied H.Q's and troops and of M.M.I.A. in the new set-up, to be defined - M.M.I.A. establishment, bearing in mind post-war duties, to be redesigned.

N O T E.

I have specified 1 Sep. 45 as the hand over date, as requested by Chief Commissioner, A.C. I do not know whether the necessary decisions or the economic examination necessary can be made in time to work out the detailed plan and implement it by 1 Sep. I would stress that very early decisions will be necessary, so that a comprehensive directive may be issued by A.F.H.Q., allowing adequate time to work out all details and inform all concerned, without rush.

L. Browning

Major General,
M.M.I.A.

cc/

016

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 783017

TOP SECRET

Confidential

Appendix "A" to Allied Commission Memorandum C/S dated 30 May 45

(171)

1. The desiderata as regards composition of the "Interim Force" to be at the disposal of the Italian Government in order that it may carry out its functions are:-

(a) control machinery

(b) administrative and training organization

(c) forces for internal security and the maintenance of law and order internally.

2. The following represents a possible "interim force" which would meet Italian needs pro tem with the present disturbed state of the country and difficulties of transportation:-

(a)	<u>control</u>	
	S.M.G. and M. of W.	2,000
	Territorial Regional HQ's, Districts and Depots	7,000
(b)	<u>administration and training</u>	
	services	31,000
	trg and reinfts	10,000
(c)	<u>troops</u>	
	five combat gps and GARIBALDI Regt.	50,000
	SICILY(as now) two I.S. Divs.	10,000
	SARDINIA(as now) one I.S. Div.	5,000
	ten I.S. Bdes(one per Terr. Region	

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 781017

	Districts and Depots	7,000
(b)	<u>administration and training</u>	
	services	31,000
	trg and reinfts	10,000
(c)	<u>troops</u>	
	five combat gps and GARIBALDI Regt.	50,000
	SICILY(as now) two I.S. Divs.	10,000
	SARDINIA(as now) one I.S. Div.	5,000
	ten I.S. Bdes(one per Terr. Region excl. SICILY)	25,000
		140,000

This presupposes the presence of Allied troops as an indirect influence as regards Internal Security. Round figures only are quoted as a detailed study has not yet been made. It does NOT include Service Units working for the Allies, NOR 65,000 CC.RR which A.C. consider necessary.

045

cc/

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 763017

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 783017

(140)

SECRET.

Confidential

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Chief Commissioner
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Ref: 8251/170/EC.

24 May 1945

SUBJECT: Use of Italian Army.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
Attention: Chief of Staff.

1. The creation of the Italian Army, its organisation and development, and its conduct both on the lines of communication at the base ports and in the combat zone, are, I submit, a tribute not only to the troops and the military commanders themselves but especially to the Land Forces Sub-Commission (AMIA).

2. Hitherto, the Italian Army has been rightly employed as an integral part of the Allied Armies in Italy. They have played a great part in the liberation of their country.

3. I submit that now hostilities have ceased we should consider their employment in a new role. They must, of course, be used for purposes of defence and for the maintenance, in emergencies, of internal security. But they can, especially in the transitional period between the present time and their final composition under the Peace Treaty, be employed to help in the rehabilitation of their country. Politically it is most important that the Italian Army should take its part in the reconstruction of Italy. From the practical point of view we have a number of organised, disciplined units and a military organisation distributed throughout the country which we must use to help Italy. The partisans have done magnificent work in the liberation of the North and in the maintenance of administrative and economic life in the newly liberated areas. The Italian Army has done no less though perhaps has enjoyed not so much publicity and it should, and must, take advantage of its organisation to show that it is an Italian Army created for the benefit of Italy.

4. Three practical uses to which parts of the Italian Army can contribute come immediately to the front:

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4. Three practical uses to which parts of the Italian Army can contribute come immediately to the front:

(a) Italian Prisoners of War. The reception and welfare of Italian POW from all parts of the world and especially from Germany and Austria and the whole organisation for dealing with this problem. This is a responsibility of the Army in any normal country. In fact, the Ministry of War has appointed a High Commissioner to deal with it in this country. The machinery of the Army should be put into full operation to deal with this difficult subject. Hitherto, on the Allied side the matter has been dealt with by that part of the War Material Disposal Sub-Commission known as the Italian POW Division. This Division should now be taken over by the Land Forces Sub-Commission forthwith and the whole problem dealt with by that Sub-Commission which normally deals with the Ministry of War.

(b) Clearance of Land Mines. It is submitted that immediate steps should be taken to employ all engineering units of the Italian Army for this purpose. Some of them must already be provided with apparatus: more can probably be obtained, even on loan from Allied troops. The employment of the Army

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for this vital matter in the rehabilitation of agriculture would earn the gratitude of a vast number of the population who are now prevented from following their normal vocations and would increase the local production of food.

Hitherto, this matter has been handled by a Division of the Civil Affairs Section, who, with assistance from the Land Forces Sub-Commission, have achieved remarkable results. It is clearly, I submit, a function which should now be transferred to the Land Forces Sub-Commission.

Areas to be cleared and priorities to be given could be decided by the Italian Government and, if necessary, by the Allied Military Government.

(c) Harvest. In line with most Continental countries which practise conscription, it has been the custom in this country to release during harvest time a large number of troops either on agricultural leave or on temporary duty to assist in the harvest. There are many practical advantages in using troops rather than civilian labour, particularly when the latter are urgently needed by the Allied military authorities. Their transportation, their accommodation, their general administration, can be far better organised than would be the case if civilian labour was employed. It is therefore recommended most warmly that the request of the Ministry of Agriculture and Labour for the provision of 10,000 men to assist in the harvest in FOGGIA area should be made without delay. This has been the subject of a separate telegram.

5. I recommend, therefore, that the reception and welfare of Italian POW and the clearance of land mines should be undertaken by the Italian Army under the Italian supervision of the Ministry for War and under the Allied supervision of its counterpart in the Allied Commission of the Land Forces Sub-Commission. I also recommend that the customary release of Italian service personnel for the harvest be approved.

6. There will be other fields in which I shall make recommendations for the employment of the Italian Army from time to time. It will need a reorientation in the ideas of the Ministry of War and a broadening of the directives of the Land Forces Sub-Commission. It may need adjustment in the method of administration and the provision of food. But it is essential for the sake of the Army as well as for the rehabilitation of this country that we encourage the Italian Government to use the manpower they have at their direct command in the services of their country now no longer at war.

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7. I had hoped to be able to add that these recommendations had the concurrence of the GOC, Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA). Unfortunately this is not so. I attach a letter written by him and my Executive Commissioner's reply. I am in full agreement with the latter. The Land Forces Sub-Commission is an integral part of the Allied Commission and it must share with the other Sub-Commissions of this Commission the work of reconstruction and rehabilitation to which we have committed ourselves in this country. We must shift the balance from MMIA and its completely military chain of command and outlook to the Land Forces Sub-Commission, the counterpart of the Ministry for War in the Italian Government.

8. I feel sure that you will welcome in this respect recommendations from this Commission as to the future of the Italian Army and their dispositions. If the Italian Army is to become part of the Italian nation we must detach them from their operational Allied commanders as rapidly as

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Confidential

possible and bring them, under the Ministry of War, more into the Italian picture as an instrument of the Italian Government rather than of the Allied command. I am requesting GOC, Land Forces Sub-Commission to submit recommendations in implementation of this principle which, of course, will make the Land Forces Sub-Commission far more a part of the Allied Commission.

Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Copy to: G-5 AFHQ (2)
~~Acting President~~) With copies of relevant
Chief Commissioner) correspondence.
Land Forces Sub-Com(AMLA) (2)
CA Sec
Econ Sec
WSD & IPW Sub-Com
File
Floct
Spares (3)

14

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WMD & IPW Sub-Com
File
Float
Spares (3)

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10

042

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

8251/40 SECRET 68A

Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)
R O M E.
DO/2

Confidential

21 May, 1945.

My dear Count Casati

MAY 22 REC'D

1. While there is as yet no indication of what the eventual role, composition and strength of the Italian Army are to be, and while we are not at liberty to discuss this question, I have been considering the matter of the "interim army"; that is from the present time until the peace terms are made known.

2. It is not easy to find the answer to this problem in which there are so many unknown factors, but it would help me to have your personal opinion, based on the following premises:-

(a) You should assume that the role of the Interim Italian Army is that of internal security, frontier protection from minor aggression, assistance in the rehabilitation of Italy and that it should be complete with the necessary administrative, maintenance and training organisation.

(b) You should not include any service troops which the Allies might require for their own maintenance or for guarding Prisoners of War. These will probably be required for some time in decreasing numbers and I will obtain my own data for them from other sources.

(c) As any decisions by higher authority would be influenced by the supply problem, your estimate of the extent to which the forces as in 2(a) could be self supporting, possibly by phases, (and consequently of the bulk requirements from Allied sources) would

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(b) You should not include any service troops which the Allies might require for their own maintenance or for guarding Prisoners of War. These will probably be required for some time in decreasing numbers and I will obtain my own data for them from other sources.

(c) As any decisions by higher authority would be influenced by the supply problem, your estimate of the extent to which the forces as in 2(a) could be self supporting, possibly by phrases, (and consequently of the bulk requirements from Allied sources) would be of value.

3. As this is a problem of some complexity, I think it would help if we discussed it together as soon as you have made your preliminary broad examination and before you give a more definite answer. I therefore propose a meeting on Thursday evening the 24 May at 1700 hours. Will you please inform me if this is agreeable to you.

Yours Sincerely

Langley Browning

The Minister of War.

Copy to / A.C. As a result of my conversation with Executive Commissioner on 19 May I attach a copy of a letter I have to-day sent to the Minister of War, as desired by Chief Commissioner.

(Mr Stearns)

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TOP SECRET.

(166)

Ref: 8251/166/EQ.

21 May 1945.

Confidential

SUBJECT: Relaxation of control of Italian Army.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
Attn: G-5 Section.

(107)

I enclose for your information copy of COS, Land Forces Sub-Commission's memorandum, G/6 dated 2 April 1945, on the above subject, together with a copy of the Chief Commissioner's reply thereto.

For the Chief Commissioner.

(163)

M. S. LUSH

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

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Top SECRET

(163)

Confidential

Ref: 0251/XC.

20 May 1945.

SUBJECT: Relaxation of control of Italian Army.

TO : C-in-C, Land Forces Sub-Com (MMIA).

(107)

1. Your memo C/6 of 2 April 1945 was written while hostilities were in progress. We should clearly now make a new approach to the problem and put forward definite proposals as required by the Chief of Staff, AFHQ, in his letter of 28th February.

2. The final composition of the Italian Army, in common with the other fighting services, will be decided if and when a Peace Treaty is made between the Allies and Italy. Consideration of this will take many months but this delay should not deflect us from carrying out the policy of the Allied Governments to hand over control of Italy to the Italian Government progressively and rapidly.

3. The situation in the North and the general state of affairs in Italy predict the wisdom of expediting the turn over of civil administration, and I am recommending as a provisional date that we should make plans to do so by September 1st. Events and developments may prove my appreciation wrong but I wish all Sections of the Commission to work to this end.

4. The control of its Army is essential to any Government and, with certain provisos which will safeguard Allied military interests, such control could and should, in my opinion, be given to the Italian Army. Many difficulties of administration will have to be overcome but we should examine these without delay and this Commission should submit plans to meet them.

5. We should, as I view the problem as a layman, approach the matter as follows.

6. Once Phase II has been reached in N.Italy the combat groups of the Italian Army will presumably pass from the command of the 5th and 8th Armies and their disposal must be considered.

7. Immediate consultation should take place between yourself and AFHQ, at C-in-C(Org) level, and yourself and the Minister for War, with regard to the location of these groups, having regard to the overall requirements of Italy and the Allied Armies in Italy. We should then recommend that these combat groups be placed under the Ministry for War who would put them under the command of the Regional military administrations which you have already distributed throughout Italy, always with the provision that they would be at the disposal of the Allied Military Commanders if needed.

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8. A simultaneous review of the location of the security battalions should also be made and these also should pass to the command of the Italian Regional Commander with the same purview.

9. The employment of large numbers of German POW will, it is hoped, release a similar number of Italian service units now working for and under the command of the Allied forces. It is a matter for immediate consideration as to how many of these service units will be required for the Italian Army and the Minister of War will presumably submit proposals.

10. With regard to maintenance of the Army, I fully realize that it is far from self-supporting and that many administrative difficulties will have to be overcome if control is handed over to the Italians. But we should adopt the policy of decontrol as early as possible and in this respect I do not agree with your recommendation that the date of the hand-over of control should be that of the signing of the Peace Treaty. We must make plans for the interim stage when the Italian Government is in control of this country but is not yet legally at peace with the Allies, just as we are doing with the other activities of the Italian Government.

11. I realize that much of the action suggested above may have already been taken by you, but from now onwards I think that the Allied Commission should take the initiative in its proposals for the composition, location and employment of the Italian Army, remembering that now that hostilities have ceased, military necessity should become military convenience and that the Commission must lay before AFHQ the needs, as we see them, of the Italian Government which, as I have said above, cannot function properly as a Government unless it has some control over its national army.

12. I shall be glad if you will forward your proposals to me as soon as possible.

[s] [illegible] Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

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Notes for Stafford Re — State in Army. (Conversation with Gen Wade). (161)

1. We do not agree with approved view that plans cannot be made for transition phase nor that transition should be sudden result of gradual.

2. The directive from CCS stating placing greater responsibility on Italian govt indicates not only the need to make such tentative plans but based upon them to make recommendation to CCS.

3. MMIA being familiar with this subject it seems desirable that their ideas be considered, however in absence of plans and recommendation from them for consideration here it will be necessary for AFHQ to prepare such plans and recommendation.

4. Under the existing policy of gradual greater responsibility, we are failing in our duty if MMIA does not take steps to train appropriate personnel to carry out administrative

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functions now performed by MACV, so that any future one is to assess zero, but so that when the time comes they will be ready to accept the responsibility. (160)

— Transfer of Combat Groups and necessary service elements to maintain them?

— Training Programs

— Supply Systems

— Time Schedule on actions, Goal.

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160A

8251 A O

SECRET

Chief Commissioner

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

SECRET
By Authority
SACMED
Initials Rmf
Dated May 1945

AG 091.711/373 GSUSA

MAY 19 REC'D

114

SUBJECT: Employment of Italian Troops Outside ITALY

TO: Commanding General, Fifth Army, APO 464
Commanding General, Peninsular Base Section, APO 782

1. Reference is made to AFHQ letter, file G/6 dated 10 April 1945, copy attached.

2. The following general policy has been established regarding the employment of Italian troops outside ITALY:

a. Restraint will be observed in the use of Italian troops in vessels ONLY.

b. The following exceptions to the above policy will be authorized:

(1) Use of VESSELS by Italian naval vessels and employment of Italian military personnel at that port.

(2) Such other employment of Italian military personnel in the immediate area of the Allied Zone of Communication into Austria as for military reasons, might be unavoidable.

3. When Italian Army personnel are no longer required by employing headquarters, disposal instructions will be issued by this headquarters on receipt of details.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

R. E. [illegible]
Major, AGD
Asst Adjutant General

1 Incl
AFHQ ltr, G/6 dtd 10 Apr 45

Copy furnished
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Land Forces Sub Commission AFHQ(SCA)

G-1 (A)
G-1 (B)
G-3 (Org) Foreign

SECRET

(Mrs Stanwix)

Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

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U3 PAGES

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 11281

SECRET.

Confidential

Ref: 8251/AF/EC.

18 May 1945.

SUBJECT: Use of Italian Army.

TO : GOC, Land Forces Sub-Com (MMIA).

1. I should like to reply in detail to your A/619 of 17 May because I think if we try to reorientate our views on the disposal and functions of the Italian Army, many of your objections can be met. Such reorientation does include a change in the functions of the Land Forces Sub-Commission, or rather, a shift of balance from its purely military aspect, i.e., MMIA, to its function as an integral part of the Allied Commission in which the Land Forces Sub-Commission is the counterpart of the Ministry of War. This Ministry is part of the Italian Government and has already undertaken, on behalf of the Italian Government, a great many of these commitments which you describe as civil and which, in fact, are the duty of the Government.

2. In this respect I join issue with the great distinction which you draw between the Allied Commission and MMIA. If we think in terms of the Land Forces Sub-Commission, then there is no distinction and if as the Head of the Land Forces Sub-Commission you can review the use to which the Italian Army can be put for the rehabilitation of Italy, now that it has completed its task as a fighting force, then I think it will be possible for you to agree that as part of the Allied Commission the Land Forces Sub-Commission can undertake functions in this planned reconstruction just as the Ministry of War is doing in the Italian Government.

3. If we accept this premise then I would give the following answers to your para 1:

(a) Para 1(a). We all agree.

(b) Para 1(b). Such units as can be spared by the Allied military authorities having in view the great number of

civil and which, in fact, are the

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3. If we accept this premise then I would give the following answers to your para 1:

(a) Para 1(a). We all agree.

(b) Para 1(b). Such units as can be spared by the Allied military authorities having in view the great number of German POW now at their disposal. The recommendation in this respect would come from the Land Forces Sub-Commission who, with their knowledge of the present dispositions of the Italian Army, are in the best position to initiate such recommendations.

(c) Para 1(c). The responsibility for control and organisation lies with the Allied Commission who will use its Land Forces Sub-Commission as its functional agent.

4. Replies to para 2 are as follows:

(a) Para 2(a). Land Forces Sub-Commission should make recommendations with regard to availability in consultation with AFHQ having regard again to German POW.

(b) Para 2(b). A strong case could be made for the rationing and clothing of such men by the Allies in view of the undoubted assistance they would bring towards the early rehabilitation of Italy which, in its turn, must prevent disease and unrest. The Allied Commission, briefed by the Land Forces Sub-Commission, would make such a case.

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5. Replies to para 3:

(a) Para 3(a). I agree that AFHQ must make the final decision but I consider that the Allied Commission, again briefed by the Land Forces Sub-Commission, can make a case with regard to (a).

(b) Para 3(b). We should immediately make recommendations for the transfer of such units to the Italian Army from the Allied military authorities to the Ministry for War, having regard to military needs, 2(b) and 3(d).

The solution is by no means easy but the initiative in preparing the way and finding a solution should come from us.

6. Replies to para 4 have been, in part, met in my preamble:

(a) Para 4(b). The responsibility of the Allied Commission will be delegated to the Land Forces Sub-Commission.

(b) Para 4(c). For "MMIA" read "Land Forces Sub-Commission" which, I repeat, is an integral part of the Allied Commission. I agree that the greater must include the less.

(c) Para 4(d). I protest - members of the Land Forces Sub-Commission attend the Chief Commissioner's and Executive Commissioner's meetings and are in the picture. A very small transfer of staff from other Sub-Commissions to the Land Forces Sub-Commission would settle the matter.

(d) Para 4(e). The plan is working satisfactorily but there are endless difficulties because several Sub-Commissions are dealing with the Ministry of War who naturally would find it far easier to deal with one. The line of command appears to be wrong.

(e) Para 4(f). The fact that during hostilities the proposal to handle POW was rejected by AFHQ does not make me desist from endeavouring to put these matters on a proper basis now that hostilities have ended. Formidable as may be the present task of the Land Forces Sub-Commission I do not think that the extra commitments which are being supervised at present by a very small Allied staff, would present an insuperable problem to the Land Forces Sub-Commission with the considerable staff and machinery for implementation at its

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7. Your para 5:

(a) The aspects of the problems of POW as set out in Appendix "A" exaggerate some of the difficulties. It would seem far easier for the Land Forces Sub-Commission, with a purely military staff, to be able to organise camps and movements, than the IPOW Sub-Com which has to wrestle with another Sub-Commission for every soldier they obtain. And surely it would be just as easy for the Land Forces Sub-Commission to cooperate and work jointly with the Displaced Persons and Repatriations Sub-Commission as does the POW Division of the WND & IPOW Sub-Commission. We should reduce complications by making it a matter for two Sub-Commissions instead of three. A distinction must always be drawn between POW and ordinary refugees whoever handles the matter.

(b) Similarly with regard to Appendix "B", the functions in para 2 are carried out by one G.II in Civil Affairs Section. It has been made a civilian matter for the reason that the mines have got to be cleared and failing assistance in organisation from the Land Forces Sub-Commission, somebody had to do it. But there seems no reason why it should not

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Confidential

be handled by Italian military units now presumably not fully employed under the organisation of the Land Forces Sub-Commission who will, as part of the Allied Commission, work in very close contact with the other organisations of the Italian Government and Allied Military Government responsible.

8. Your para 6:

(a) Para 6(a)(i). If you ask the Italian Government who is responsible for POW and mine clearance, they will say, "the Minister for War" who is part of the Italian (Civil) Government. I see no reason why the Land Forces Sub-Commission should not assume an equivalent responsibility in the Allied Commission which deals with both civil and military matters.

(b) Para 6(a)(ii). If these functions are dealt with in the Allied Commission by that part of the Commission which deals with the Ministry for War rather than with two other Sub-Commissions, it must lead to greater efficiency.

(c) Para 6(a)(iii). Every part of the Allied Commission has to assume formidable and new tasks as the whole of Italy is liberated. It is in an attempt to make an equal distribution of these new tasks and to effect simplicity in their handling within the Allied Commission that it is proposed to make these recommendations to AFHQ. Your objections and this reply will be attached to the Chief Commissioner's letter.

M. S. LUSH

MSL/JC.

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

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is liberated. It is in an attempt to make an equal distribution of these new tasks and to effect simplicity in their handling within the Allied Commission that it is proposed to make these recommendations to AFHQ. Your objections and this reply will be attached to the Chief Commissioner's letter.

M. S. LUSH

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

MSL/JG.

032

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155

Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)
R O M E.

A.019

17 May, 1945.

My dear Maurice

1. Herewith my views on your draft.

2. I can assure you that INGLEDEW did not feel "uncomfortable" at your meeting! He was merely stating our views in M.M.I.A. and explaining facts in connection with your proposals.

3. I am sorry I cannot agree with you. It is not a matter of refusing cooperation. It is merely that we (both American and British) consider that it is not possible or reasonable to be asked to do what you suggest, when one gets down to brass tacks as to what really is involved.

Yours Sincerely

Langley Browning

Brig. M.E. Lush, C.B., C.B.E., M.C.,
Executive Commissioner, A.C.

031

SECRET

Confidential

SUBJECT: Use of Italian Army for Civilian purposes

LAND FORCES SUB-COM, A.C. (MMIA)

A/019

17 May 45

TO : HQ, ALLIED COMMISSION
(for EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER)

Ref your draft letter on the above, my comments are as follows.

1. ASPECTS

The three matters you mention (as will be the case in similar matters with a civil genre) present the same problem with 3 main aspects.

(a) Should the Italian Army be used for these purposes?

(b) What soldiers of the Italian Army can be used for these purposes?

(c) Where should the responsibility for control and organization lie? i.e. A.C., as at present, or MMIA?

2. REF 1(a) ABOVE

In principle I agree that Italian soldiers should be used to assist, provided that:-

(a) They are available after the military needs of AFHQ have been met.

(b) The Allies are prepared to ration and clothe such men, taking into account world wide shortage and demand.

3. REF 1(b) ABOVE

AFHQ alone is in possession of knowledge of all the factors to decide this and would have to consider:-

(a) The category and international supply aspect.

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(b) What soldiers of the Italian Army can be used for these purposes?

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3. REF 1(b) ABOVE

AFHQ alone is in possession of knowledge of all the factors to decide this and would have to consider:-

(a) The category and international supply aspect.

(b) The fact that over 85% of the Italian Army are under the direct command of Armies, Districts and Base Sections whose military needs presumably have to be met first.

(c) The factor as in 2(b).

(d) Whether German P.W. can replace Italian Service Units.

The solution is not as easy as might appear on the face of things.

4. REF 1(c) ABOVE

(a) This where I oppose your proposals most strongly.

(b) The existing responsibility is the civilian one of A.C.. The mere fact of putting more troops at the disposal of A.C. does not alter that responsibility.

0.K.

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Confidential

(c) The major portion of the responsibility (clothing, rations, accomodation, transport, contacts with Italian civil ministries etc) is civil. The greater must include the less. Otherwise MMIA is put in the position of handling projects, the main elements of which are dependent on A.C.

(d) MMIA is not in the picture. The plan has been designed by A.C. and is in motion. Continuity would be broken by transfer to MMIA, who, in view of all their other commitments, have neither the controlling staff nor the time to take up the reins at this advanced stage of the proceedings. Transfer of P.W. Section A.C. to MMIA does not solve this, as the Senior Staff Officers MMIA would still have to assume control, under me.

(e) If the A.C. plan is working satisfactorily, why change it? If it is NOT, surely MMIA should not be saddled with the task of putting it right?

(f) Last November, provided certain essentials were guaranteed to me, at your request I was prepared to take over P.W.. I foresaw at that time an ample period to organize and get the whole business going. These conditions do not now apply.

Nevertheless, your November proposal to AFHQ to this effect was turned down, mainly on the grounds that MMIA had a specific charter from C.C.S. and had quite enough "on its plate". Now MMIA has even more on its plate and is faced as well with a serious loss of Officers (estimated 40% of American Officers, for instance, in the next few days) whose replacements will take time to learn our complicated procedure and set-up.

Under these circumstances I cannot agree to accept new and formidable responsibilities. Our main task is to compete with the official Italian Army and there must be no risk of breakdown in this objective.

5. IMPLICATIONS

(a) At Appendix "A" I attach some more detailed implications of the task you propose I should take on as regards P.W.; and at Appendix "B" ditto as regards Mine Clearance.

(b) From these it is clear that the work involved is very considerable and by no means as simple and straightforward as might be thought without analysis of the

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(b) From these it is clear that the work involved is very considerable and by no means as simple and straightforward as might be thought without analysis of the Executive action necessary.

(c) It is not enough just to give orders to Italians. To achieve success (as you so kindly state in respect of our creation of the Italian Army) we have found that supervision and inspection are necessary.

6. CONCLUSION

(a) In view of the above therefore:-

(i) I strongly disagree with your proposals as regards transfer of responsibility from A.C. to MMIA in respect of P.W. and Mine Clearance, both of which functions are purely and wholly the responsibility of the civil Government, and have no connection with the Army other than for provision of personnel.

(ii) I do not see that they can conduce to efficiency or continuity, considering all the factors involved.

02.

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 Confidential (157)

(iii) I feel that it is NOT right that these formidable extra civilian tasks and responsibilities should be imposed on my organization at this late stage in the proceedings, contrary to the policy long since laid down by AFHQ and at a time when we will be suffering severe losses in personnel and yet trying to compete with the innumerable difficult problems of the Italian Army proper, converting from a war basis through a transition period to a post-war layout, which is our main task.

(b) Should you still wish to represent your proposals to AFHQ, I must ask that a copy of this letter of mine go with them, in order that my full views may be made known.

L. Browning

(Major General)

WS

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 780017

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

U2S

SECRET
Confidential (151)
Appendix "A" to Secretariat letter
A/019 dated 17 May 1945

SOME ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM OF PRISONERS OF WAR (ITALIAN)

GENERAL

1. (a) The repatriation of a Prisoner of War is normally one of the responsibilities of his own Army using its own resources. In this theatre, however, the Italian Army has little or no resources of its own. It is dependent on the Allies for its rations, clothing, transport etc - in the same way as the civilian is largely dependent on A.C.

(b) Moreover, the Italian Army for which MMIA by its charter is responsible today consists of soldiers enrolled de nuovo since the Italian Armistice. All other pre-Armistice soldiers, including P.W., are therefore civilians. This is the ruling of the C.C.S.

(c) Thus the conditions mentioned in (a) and (b) constitute a different state of affairs to normal and fundamentally affect the whole issue.

PERSONNEL INVOLVED

2. Repatriation which has taken place and is now taking place is of both alleged POW's and civilian refugees. The 250,000 now in the PO Valley Area consist of returning forced labour, republican forces, displaced persons and refugees as well as P.W. - and are all housed in the same camps.

3. Repatriation from the Balkans comprises both civilians and ex-soldiers. - Since last November 40,000.

4. Personnel now involved number over a million all over the world.

To compete with P.W. taken by the British alone, there is at the W.O. a Maj. Gen. and relative staff.

ADMINISTRATION

5. Rations, clothing, accommodation and transport must be provided

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To compete with P.W. taken by the British alone, there is at the W.C. a Maj. Gen. and relative staff.

ADMINISTRATION

5. Rations, clothing, accommodation and transport must be provided from civilian sources. Contacts are with civil ministries.

ORGANIZATION

6. I am told that there are eight civil camps, three Eighth Army Camps and three Fifth Army Camps now operating in the North for all classes of refugee irrespective of ex military or civil status. A further ten are planned.

7. I gather that these camps are not on any War Establishment, are run by civilian, paid and voluntary, and military personnel. They are assisted by two Nuclei which operate jointly with AMG, Displaced Persons and Repatriation S.C., A.C. and the POW Division of MMD and IPW S.C., A.C.

POLICY

8. The present Italian Army ceilings as laid down by C.C.S. are full and will be reduced gradually, beginning almost immediately. The ex-soldier

027

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 783017

Confidential

P.W's will therefore not be absorbed into the Italia[illegible] (with the exception of a few specialists) and will remain civilians.

CONCLUSION

9. If the responsibility for Italian P.W. were now switched to MMIA - thereby transferring the problem to the control of another intermediary - the following would be involved immediately:-

(a) Establishment of parallel organizations for administration of displaced persons and refugees on the one hand and of alleged P.W's who are ex-soldiers on the other, both of which are a civilian commitment.

Endless argument would ensue as to whether an individual was a displaced person or an ex-soldier. At the present time no satisfactory distinction has been made among the 250,000 in the PO Valley who are being dispersed as rapidly as possible.

(b) Re-coordination by MMIA with all agencies involved both here in A.C.; with AMG and Regional Commissioners; with the Italian Government civilian High Commissioner for POW, and his ministry; with the Italian General who has been working with the P.W. Division of WMD and IPW S.C.; with 15 Army Group and with G-5 at AFHQ.

(c) Re-organization of that part of the two parallel repatriation organizations dealing with ex-soldiers on proper WE's; replacement of civilian personnel; on a military order of Battle.

(d) Establishing a military chain of command and integrating the 6,000 personnel from BR-ITI Combat Ceiling allotted to A.C. with the present civilians - AMG - A.C. chain.

(e) Producing some method of administration. MMIA has no rations, clothing or transport from civilian sources under its control.

10. For the future, the problem is bound up with international policy and world politics. Matters of international allocation of labour are involved; as also international legal questions, e.g. Italian P.W. interned by neutrals or in U.S.S.R. controlled territories; the status of P.W. awaiting shipment to ITALY post-peace Treaty etc.

It is clear that the problem has enormous scope, with potentialities of the highest international and economic order. These can only be settled satisfactorily by A.C. and NOT as an offshoot of MMIA.

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WS

026

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 783017

Appendix "B" to MMIA letter
Vol dated 1 Nov 1945

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Confidential

SOME ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM OF MINE CLEARANCE

1. At present, mine clearance is undertaken by A.C., with the undermentioned:

(a) Central Mine Clearance Office) 130
)
(b) Personnel and dets engaged on trg civilians) ITI-ITI

(c) Four Mine Clearance Coys - each 209 equals 836 ITI-ITI.

(d) Civilian Mine Clearance Gangs A.C.

2. If the present and future work were to be undertaken by MMIA, as a continuation of the present A.C. set-up, we should have to do the following:-

(a) Find out location of all areas to be cleared. This would involve liaison with Italian Local Government bodies. The existing mine clearance organization works on a civilian regional system.

(b) Form an estimate of the task to be undertaken and the personnel and equipment required for all ITALY.

(c) Negotiate with AFHQ and 15 Army Group for Tps to perform such tasks. Civil Affairs Sec A.C. estimate they require a total of twelve coys for the work (i.e. 2508 personnel).

(d) Depending on A.C. rulings, allot priority of work, including the allocation of tasks at present performed by civilian mine clearance teams.

(e) Request AFHQ for an allotment of mine detectors and arrange for same to be distributed according to priorities and task decided.

(f) Arrange for Allied Officers to see that the work detailed is in fact being carried out. No personnel now available.

(g) Collection and collation of reports.

(h) The undermentioned variety of personnel would be engaged on mine clearance and arrangements would have to be made for the administration, clothing, food, pay, accomodation, transport, etc of such personnel.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

(c) Negotiate with AFHQ and 15 Army Group for Tps to perform such tasks. Civil Affairs Sec A.C. estimate they require a total of twelve coys for the work (i.e. 2508 personnel).

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(g) Collection and collation of reports.

(h) The undermentioned variety of personnel would be engaged on mine clearance and arrangements would have to be made for the administration, clothing, food, pay, accomodation, transport, etc of such personnel.

Civilian Gangs	ITI-ITI
Trg Dets	ITI-ITI
Mine Clearance Coys	ER -ITI
Fd Coys	ER -ITI or US-ITI
Other Units	
? PW Units	
Allied supervisory personnel	British or US

(i) Arrange with AFHQ for stores, transport and equipment without which work could not satisfactorily proceed.

3. From the above, it is clear that this is a civilian matter of considerable scope which can only be handled by A.C. with military Executive assistance and NOT as an offshoot of MMLA.

625

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 783017

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the ~~Chief~~ Ex. Commissioner
APO 394

(148)

Brig Mkjohn

Draft for comment.

(147)

MAY 17 REC'D

175/1515

Brig Lush

We have spoken on this.
I suggested a slight disengaging of para 1.
You suggested the inclusion of a para on
use of a truck coy for civilian purposes.

Spaatz

PA- When will Gen Boccaccio

Speech

SS/1715

021

SECRET — DRAFT ONLY

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Chief Commissioner

Confidential

Ref: 8251/ /AC.

May 1945.

SUBJECT: Use of Italian Army.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
Attn: Chief of Staff.

1. The creation of the Italian Army, its organisation and development, and its conduct both on the lines of communication at the base ports and in the combat zone, are, I submit, a tribute not only to the troops and the military commanders themselves but especially to the Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMTA).

2. Hitherto, the Italian Army has been rightly employed as an integral part of the Allied Armies in Italy. They have played a great part in the liberation of their country.

3. I submit that now hostilities have ceased we should consider their employment in a new role. They must, of course, be used for purposes of defence and for the maintenance, in emergencies, of internal security. But they can, especially in the transitional period between the present time and their final composition under the Peace Treaty, be employed to help in the rehabilitation of their country. Politically it is most important that the Italian Army should take its part in the reconstruction of Italy. From the practical point of view we have a

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 719284

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2. Hitherto, the Italian Army has been rightly employed as an integral part of the Allied Armies in Italy. They have played a great part in the liberation of their country.

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4. Three practical uses to which parts of the Italian Army can contribute come immediately to the front:

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 783017

Confide...194

(a) Italian Prisoners of War. The reception and welfare of Italian POW from all parts of the world and especially from Germany and Austria and the whole organisation for dealing with this problem. This is a responsibility of the Army in any normal country. In fact, the Ministry of War has appointed a High Commissioner to deal with it in this country. The machinery of the Army should be put into full operation to deal with this difficult subject. Hitherto, on the Allied side the matter has been dealt with by that part of the War Material Disposal Sub-Commission known as the Italian POW Division. ~~It is wrongly recommended that~~ This Division should now be taken over by the Land Forces Sub-Commission forthwith and the whole problem dealt with by that Sub-Commission which normally deals with the Ministry of War.

(b) Clearance of Land Mines. It is submitted that immediate steps should be taken to employ all engineering units of the Italian Army for this purpose. Some of them must already be provided with apparatus: more can probably be obtained, even on loan from Allied troops. The employment of the Army for this vital matter in the rehabilitation of agriculture would earn the gratitude of a vast number of the population who are now prevented from following their normal vocations and would increase the local production of food.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 183217

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Hitherto, this matter has been handled by a Divison of the Civil Affairs Section who, with great assistance from the Land Forces Sub-Commission, have achieved remarkable results. It is clearly, I submit, a function which should now be transferred to the Land Forces Sub-Commission.

Areas to be cleared and priorities to be given could be decided by the Italian Government and, if necessary, by the Allied Military Government.

(c) Harvest. In line with most Continental countries who practise conscription, it has been the custom in this country to release during harvest time a large number of troops either on agricultural leave or on temporary duty to assist in the harvest. There are

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 743017

Confidential

many practical advantages in using troops rather than civilian labour, particularly when the latter are urgently needed by the Allied military authorities. Their transportation, their accommodation, their general administration, can be far better organised than would be the case if civilian labour was employed. It is therefore recommended most warmly that the request of the Ministry of Agriculture and Labour for the provision of 10,000 men to assist in the harvest in FOGGIA area should be made without delay. This has been the subject of a separate telegram.

5. There will be other fields in which I shall make recommendations for the employment of the Italian Army from time to time. It will need a reorientation in the ideas of the Ministry of War and of the Land Forces Sub-Commission. It may need adjustment in the method of administration and the provision of food. But it is essential for the sake of the Army as well as for the rehabilitation of this country that we encourage the Italian Government to use the manpower they have at their direct command in the services of their country now no longer at war.

KELLEY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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HILLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 763017

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

SECRET

Confidential

8257

Confidential

FX 76319
MAY 15/23292

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

X/97A
MAY 26/16365

FROM: ATSA, SERVICE ARMED SERVICES

TO : ADVANCE 25 ARMY GROUP, 5 ARMY AIR FOR, NAVY 8 ARMY, DIVISION, CORPS, REGIMENT, ARMOR ZERO, REAR 8 ARMY

MAY 16 RECD

131

SUBJECT.

My AG 091.711/173 GCT-0 of GB. Addressees will report earliest to this Hq stating disposal arrangements all Italian Army personnel affected by para 3 reference letter. Where addressees wish to dispose with Italian units or individuals altogether disposal will be arranged by this Hq

HEADQUARTERS
15 MAY 1945

ACK:

ACTION: AAI, FAN, FRUS, SC

INFO: A/[illegible]
G-1 (2) (2)
WILL (2)
PLOAT

SECRET

(Mrs Stevens)

02

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

8257

CONFIDENTIAL

AO 55
MAY 061700B

Confidential

MAY 070945B
ROUTINE

FROM: 15 ARMY GROUP
TO : AFHQ INFO MMLA, GS 5TH ARMY, GS 5TH ARMY FOR BR INT 'A', 8TH ARMY, BITSTONE, ALLIED COMMISSION, PBS

CONFIDENTIAL.

MAY 7 RECD

Reference MMLA signal A 1053 of 04 not to all.

Subject demobilisation Italian Army.

1. Agree demobilised personnel may at present proceed to destinations within area bounded by roads PADUA VERONA BRESCIA MILAN TURIN GENOA all inclusive. In case of personnel proceeding forward of Rear Army security control line normal AFS pass required in addition to discharge papers.

PLT

INFO-ACTION: Land Forces S/C 2
" " P Safety S/C
INFO: A/President
Chief Commissioner
Executive Commissioner
CA Sec
File

HEADQUARTERS
7 MAY 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

(MAC STEARNS)

U19

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

FOR ACTION AFHQ

7115 6 MAY 45 Confidential PRIORITY

SECRET PD

PAREN TO FOR ACTION AFHQ FROM AIOOM CITE ACCIB PAREN

PARA ONE PD REFERENCE MIKE MIKE ITEM ABLE SIGNAL SUGAR DOG TWO SIX FIVE EIGHT OF FIVE MAY PD

PARA TWO PD SUBJECT PROVISION OF ITALIAN ARMY PERSONNEL FOR DISPLACED PERSONS AND RETURNING PETER OBOE WILLIAM PD

PARA THREE PD IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT NO LESS THAN FOUR TWO SEVEN ZERO ITALIAN OFFICERS AND MEN BE PROVIDED TO HANDLE THE HEAVY RESPONSIBILITY OF DEALING WITH AN ESTIMATED ONE MILLION DISPLACED PERSONS AND RETURNING PETER OBOE WILLIAM UNCONFIRMED REPORT FROM INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS STATES THAT SEVEN FIVE THOUSAND HAVE ALREADY ARRIVED IN BOLZANO MOST STRONGLY URGE THAT ONE FIVE ARMY GROUP BE ORDERED TO PROVIDE THIS TOTAL FROM ITALIAN COMBAT FORCES NOW ATTACHED TO THEM SUGGEST ONE SLANT TWO ARTILLERY REGIMENT PAREN SUGAR PAREN WOULD SUIT PURPOSE PD

PARA FOUR PD IN VIEW OF THE URGENCY SUGGEST THAT RESTRICTION OF BRI DASH ITI PERSONNEL BEING PROVIDED FOR INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENT BE WAIVED IN THIS INSTANCE PD

PARA FIVE PD MIKE MIKE ITEM ABLE STATES THEY ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO RECOMMEND OR EMPOWERED TO SAY HOW MANY TROOPS UNDER COMMAND OF ONE FIVE ARMY GROUP ARE EMPLOYED PD

PARA SIX PD REQUEST IMMEDIATE DECISION PD

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION
DISPLACED PERSONS AND REPAT. SUB COMM.
WAR MAT.DISP. & ITALIAN PW SUB COMM.

G-1 (B)

573

NICHOLAS PIGNBINO
CWO, USA
ASST ADJUTANT

INFO Ltr H/142 dtd 22 May 45 to AFHQ 2216/EC
" " " " 8262/EC

PA

018

S257

SECRET

23

135

SUBJECT : Proposed Increase to AC ITI - ITI Ceiling (Cat 5a)

LAND FORCES SUB-COM, AC (MMIA)

Confidential

SD/94/5

4 May 45

TO : EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER A.C. (5 copies)

MAY 5 REC'D

134

1. AFHQ has instructed MMIA to hold a conference on the recent request by AC for 6000 additional Italian Army personnel.

2. It is proposed that this meeting shall be held in the MMIA Conference Room 7th Floor AC Building at 1530 hours 5 May 45 to discuss the attached Agenda. Will you please send representatives on a First Grade Staff Officer level to attend, with powers to make decisions.

J.M. Ingledew
for Major General
MMIA

Internal : MA to GOC
C of S
A - will you please send a rep.
Q

emg

Col Campos
Lt Col Fortescue
} will attend

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

f.r Major General [illegible]
MMIA

Internal : MA to GOC
C of S
A - will you please send a rep.
Q

emg

Col Campos
Lt Col Fotheringill
Lt Col Campbell
} will attend.

GW 5/5

Ec List - 5 MAY 45

ACTION: (C.A. Sec (3)
: (WMD & I POW Sec

INFO: Ex Comm R.

136-143
see M. 132 & 142.

017

(MAS TALBOT)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 775217

SECRET

Confidential

AGENDA

1. (a) A.C. request is for 6000 military personnel broken down as under :-

Eight Mine Clearance Coys and three Bn Hqs		1732
Twenty Frontier Repatriation Posts) Twenty Transit Centres) Five Group Hqs)	-	2015
Twenty Collection and Transit Centres (WMD & PW sub-com)		1320
	Total	5067
Spare to cover further requirements		933

(b) AFHQ has recommended that the military components for all camp staffs be ten key personnel supplemented by civilians.

(c) Is the above agreed (either in whole or in part) and to what extent will the commitment in para 1(a) above thereby be reduced?

2. Are there any other reductions which can be made in 1(a) above?

3. How soon is the personnel required?

4. To what extent does the present AC ceiling cover the revised demands?

5. How is the balance (if any) to be met?

cgl.

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2. Are there any other reductions which can be made?

3. How soon is the personnel required?

4. To what extent does the present AC ceiling cover the revised demands?

5. How is the balance (if any) to be met?

cgl.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 773017

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

SECRET

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

/mlm AP 740

SECRET
AUTH: SAC, AFHQ
Initials:
Date: 2 May 1945

2 May 1945

AG 091.711/173 GCT-O

Ex. Commissioner.
MAY 4 REC'D

SUBJECT: Employment of Italian Troops Outside Italy.

TO: President, Allied Commission
President, Allied Commission For: Land Forces Sub-Commission, AMGIA
Commanding General, 15th Army Group, APO 777
Headquarters Fifth Army British Increment *
Headquarters Eighth Army
General Officer Commanding, Number 1 District
General Officer Commanding, Number 2 District *
General Officer Commanding, Number 3 District

1. Reference is made to letter, AMGIA file G/6 dated 10 April 1945.

2. The following general policy has been established regarding the employment of Italian troops outside Italy:

a. Restraint will be observed in the use of Italian troops in VENEZIA GIULIA.

b. The following exceptions to the above policy will be authorized:

(1) Use of TRIESTE by Italian naval vessels and employment of Italian personnel at that port.

(2) Such other employment of Italian personnel in the immediate area of the Allied L of C into AUSTRIA as, for military reasons, might be unavoidable.

3. British Headquarters and units to which Italian troops are attached will shed such personnel at a suitable time before entry into AUSTRIA.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

Edmund R. Shugart
EDMUND R. SHUGART
Colonel, AGD
Asst Adjutant General

DIST

DISTRIBUTION:
3 - Each Addressee
(*) With copy of AMGIA letter G/6 of 10 Apr 45
1 - SACS
1 - CAO
1 - G-1 (A)
1 - G-4 (A)
1 - G-4 (B)
1 - G-1 (B)
1 - G-3 (Org-2)
2 - G-3(Org)Foreign
1 - G-5
2 - AG Records
1 - AG M&D

CHIEF COMM.
EX. COMM.
NAVY S/C
LAND FORCES S/C (3)

SECRET

8251

SECRET
&
URGENT

Confidential

SUBJECT: REPORT ON THE ITALIAN ARMY OF THE LIBERATION OF NORTH ITALY.

LAND FORCES SUB-COM; A.C. (MMIA)

A/016

24 APR 45

APR 25 RECD

TO : A.F.H.Q. (3 copies)

OBJECT

1. The object of this letter is to examine the effect of the liberation of NORTH ITALY on the Italian Army, particularly as regards its strength, discipline and equipment.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

2. As NORTH ITALY is liberated, a variety of new factors (many unpredictable) will come into play. Among the major ones are:-

(a) The feeling of elation at the success of battle and liberation.

While tending to make the Italian Army proud of its efforts, this will also tend to make the volatile Italian "kick over the traces" and resort to acts of indiscipline such as desertion, A.W.O.L., fracas with

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 763017

regards its strength, discipline and equipment.

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(a) The feeling of elation at the success of battle and liberation.

While tending to make the Italian Army proud of its efforts, this will also tend to make the volatile Italian "kick over the traces" and resort to acts of indiscipline such as desertion, A.W.O.L., fracas with Allied troops etc.

The last mentioned already tends to increase and the matter has been taken up strongly with the Minister of War, who in turn has issued an equally strong letter to all Commanders.

(b) The desire of men to re-unite with their families

All with homes in the North will want to see their families at once and many will go without leave. Many with homes in the South will also want to go, feeling that the war is over and that there is no serious reason why they should not go.

(MAS STEPHENS)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 830017

Confidential

(b) The desire of men to re-unite with their families, con't

There are in addition, an estimated total of 50,000 over-age personnel which have been held because their homes are in the North, but who are entitled to demobilisation when their homes are freed. These comprise the 1913 and older classes, limited service troops and the first four months of the 1914 class. We are already demobilising such men whose homes are in liberated Italy. Your AG 091.715/121 GCT-O dated 29 March 1945 refers.

(c) The attitude of the Patriots

This needs no comment. The Allied policy has been decided on and it is hoped that this problem will be solved by the methods proposed.

The inevitable results of the above will be losses in strength, discipline and equipment, ranging in degree according to developments and the steps taken now to deal with the situation when it arises.

STRENGTH

5. (a) At AMGIA request, the Italian War Ministry have produced an estimate of the numbers of serving soldiers whose homes are in the North. Their estimate is about 180,000 including the 50,000 mentioned in para 3(b). Possibly this is an over-estimate. But the War Ministry have asked all

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Methods proposed.

The inevitable results of the above will be losses in strength, discipline and equipment, ranging in degree according to developments and the steps taken now to deal with the situation when it arises.

STRENGTH

3. (a) At MMIA request, the Italian War Ministry have produced an estimate of the numbers of serving soldiers whose homes are in the North. Their estimate is about 130,000 including the 80,000 mentioned in para 2(b). Possibly this is an over-estimate. But the War Ministry have asked all units for figures by 1 May; though with the poor and slow Italian intercommunication, the dispersion of the numerous Italian formations and units, and the continuous turn-over of personnel, these figures are not likely to be very exact. At any rate the estimate gives us a figure to work on for the time being.

(b) (i) Owing to the ceiling we cannot call up men now to meet potential losses and those latter are an uncertain quantity. Nor could we replace abnormal losses as they occur by the normal call up procedure, which takes time to implement and involves considerable transportation and administrative commitments.

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STRENGTH(cont'd)

3. (b) (ii) In the North however there should be a fairly big source of tappable manpower in the shape of volunteers, patriots and ex-soldiers of military age. These could be collected and absorbed ad hoc more readily and with greater administrative ease, which would in turn assist the political situation.

(iii) On the other hand, in any event presumably adminis- (particularly as regards clothing and equipment) trative/and transportation difficulties will continue to limit new intakes to a maximum of 19,000 a month.

(c) From the above it would seem that:-

(i) No definite plans can be made now owing to inevitable lack of data and of accurate knowledge of future developments.

(ii) If wastage is normal and the Italian Army is to be kept up to strength, over-age personnel would have to be held(some for at least 3 months, owing to the limiting administrative factor of 19,000 a month) till replaced from another source.

(iii) But wastage is bound to be abnormal and there are likely to be serious repercussions if the over-age personnel are retained too long.

(d) Therefore, it is recommended that:-

(i) Plans be made ad hoc as the situation develops.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

developments.

(ii) If wastage is normal and the Italian Army is to be kept up to strength, over-age personnel would have to be held(some for at least 3 months, owing to the limiting administrative factor of 19,000 a month) till replaced from another source.

(iii) But wastage is bound to be abnormal and there are likely to be serious repercussions if the over-age personnel are retained too long.

(d) Therefore, it is recommended that:-

(i) Plans be made ad hoc as the situation develops.

(ii) A reduction in strength due to abnormal wastage be accepted temporarily.

(iii) In view of the possibly reduced commitments of the Italian Army after liberation of the North and of a possibly lower than 315,000 post-war ceiling, the question of a permanment reduction in strength be considered.

(iv) The above be explained to Armies, Districts etc. so that they will not demand that units be at full strength when this is not possible and perhaps unnecessary or even in-advisable.

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Confidential

(15) (126)

STRENGTH

5. (d) (v) In principle, the 50,000 over-age personnel be demobilised as soon as operational factors permit.

(vi) Replacements be drawn in the first instance from the North.

(vii) Every effort should be made to minimise abnormal wastage by the methods shown below.

DISCIPLINE

4. (a) It is likely that attempts will be made by large or small parties to desert and return to their homes, in some cases even using stolen unit transport and taking supplies and arms for the journey. Alternatively attempts may be individual. There will undoubtedly be numerous other acts of indiscipline with which the present physical and moral powers of the Italian disciplinary machine may be unable to cope. I am hopeful that it will stand the strain, but the Italian under stress of emotion is a somewhat unpredictable individual. Moreover, there will be many cross-currents, some subversive e.g. the attitude of the patriots to the regular army; the attitude of the North to the South and to the existing Government; Communist or subversive propaganda; the remains of Fascist influence; the resurgence of nationalistic feelings etc.

(b) Even when ITALY(or the major part of it)is liberated, the Allies will have a considerable interest in the maintenance

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 763017

with which the present physical and moral powers of the Italian disciplinary machine may be unable to cope. I am hopeful that it will stand the strain, but the Italian under stress of emotion is a somewhat unpredictable individual. Moreover, there will be many cross-currents, some subversive e.g. the attitude of the patriots to the regular army; the attitude of the North to the South and to the existing Government; Communist or subversive propaganda; the remains of Fascist influence; the resurgence of nationalistic feelings etc.

(b) Even when ITALY(or the major part of it)is liberated, the Allies will have a considerable interest in the maintenance of law and order, both on the grounds of general peace and rehabilitation and also from the aspect of untrammelled avenues of supply for the further prosecution of the war further north.

(c) Control will of course follow the normal stages - Allied Army and A.M.G. control; A.C. control, Italian Government control. Nevertheless the Ministry of War are responsible for Italian Army internal administration, discipline, punishments etc. The Minister therefore, on my advice, is sending out a strong circular to all commanders -

(i) Calling attention to the whole matter of discipline as ITALY is progressively liberated.

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Confidential

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DISCIPLINE

4. (c) (ii) Insisting on rigid enforcement of same, so that the Italian Army shall continue to play its valuable part in aid of the Allied war effort.

PUBLICITY AND PROPAGANDA

5. (a) A major corollary to discipline is publicity and propaganda; and much will depend on this psychological approach to the problem. The publication in the Italian Army newspaper ("La Patria") of information, plans and decisions regarding leave, demobilisation, pay etc. would at least show the soldier that his problems are being tackled. Education on current conditions, the difficulties of the problems and the necessity not to hinder Allied efforts, combined with a statement on the consequences of disobedience and disorder should help considerably.

(b) I recommend action on the lines shown in Appendix "A".

LEAVE

6. (a) A further corollary to discipline is the matter of leave. The existing authorised percentage for leave is 5. The problem in the North is also bound up with the question as to the rate of demobilisation of the 50,000 over-age personnel whose homes are in the North. Leave will have to continue on a unit basis, both on operational and practical grounds so as to prevent the complete emasculation of a unit full of Northerners. As the number of Northerners varies on each

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considerably.

(b) I recommend action on the lines shown in Appendix "A".

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6. (a) A further corollary to disciplins is the matter of leave. The existing authorised percentage for leave is 5. The problem in the North is also bound up with the question as to the rate of demobilisation of the 50,000 over-age personnel whose homes are in the North. Leave will have to continue on a unit basis, both on operational and practical grounds so as to prevent the complete emasculation of a unit full of Northerners. As the number of Northerners varies so much as between unit and unit, the only solution appears to be a broad policy, with a definite leave percentage, applicable in so far as operational conditions and developments permit.

(b) In my A/17/1 of 30 Mar. I recommended an increase in the leave % to 10 as soon as an appreciable portion of ITALY was freed. The date on which this can be authorised cannot be stated now, as obviously it must depend on the progress in liberation. But it would undoubtedly help discipline and morale if you would agree <u>now</u> in principle to such an increase "as soon as an appreciable portion of ITALY is liberated and in so far as operational conditions permit", to be followed later perhaps

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Confidential (13) 124

LEAVE

6. (b) (cont'd) by a further extension to 18% "when ITALY or the major part of it is fully liberated". Publication of such an Allied decree would undoubtedly be beneficial and would perhaps merely anticipate what might happen anyway. I doubt if the effect on Allied troops would be harmful.

CONCLUSION

7. (a) It is realised that the form which the liberation of NORTH ITALY will take cannot be foreseen completely, depending as it does to a great extent on the policy of withdrawal adopted by the German High Command.

(b) Nevertheless, the above is an attempt to anticipate possible developements and to minimize as far as possible any breakdown in the Italian Army which might hinder or upset Allied plans.

(c) I would therefore be grateful for -

(i) Your decisions as regards paras 3(d), 5(b) and 6.

(ii) Your orders as regards any further action you consider I should take, in the light of the above.

(iii) The whole matter to be treated as one of URGENCY, in order that I may have time to implement all action necessary.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 798017

(c) I would therefore be grateful for -

(i) Your decisions as regards paras 3(d), 5(b) and 6.

(ii) Your orders as regards any further action you consider I should take, in the light of the above.

(iii) The whole matter to be treated as one of URGENCY, in order that I may have time to implement all action necessary.

L. Browning

Major General,
M.M.I.A.

c/o

(Copy to - M.G., A.G. for Executive Commissioner) ←

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 778017

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 178217

(12)

Appendix "A" to MMIA letter
A 016 of 25 April 1945

LIBERATION OF NORTH ITALY
PUBLICITY SCHEME

The following columns should, it is suggested, appear in "LA PATRIA" as soon as possible, subject to the security aspect, details being written by Italians and agreed with MMIA Publicity Officer, and made known in "Liberation Columns". The articles to be written in plain language, easily understandable by all. Emphasis to be placed on the fact that the efforts of Italian Soldiers are for the sake of Italy, not only the Allies. When stating facts make them clear and concise.

1. **Looking Ahead** - Preliminary announcement - Italian Command with the Allied HQ is thinking out plans for allowing soldiers to get news of and to visit or return to their families in North Italy at the earliest moment that military consideration permit. Further articles will appear on this subject showing aspirations, considerations, plans and methods to be adopted. Not an easy problem. Patience and self discipline needed for the common good, but long and good service will be rewarded and shirkers or unruly will not go unpunished. Details later.

2. Reunion in North Italy- Italian Command desire to reunite with their families soldiers who have done their duty. Plans for (a) Liberation Leave for all with homes in North Italy,

military consideration permit. Further articles will appear on this subject showing aspirations, considerations, plans and methods to be adopted. Not an easy problem. Patience and self discipline needed for the common good, but long and good service will be rewarded and shirkers or unruly will not go unpunished. Details later.

2. Reunion in North Italy- Italian Command desire to reunite with their families soldiers who have done their duty. Plans for (a) Liberation Leave for all with homes in North Italy. (b) Demobilization for men of 1913 and older classes. It will take time. Details are nearly complete and will soon be published.

3. Liberation and Discipline - While waiting for news of liberation, leave and demobilization, it is well to remember and reiterate need for strong discipline when the time comes. Reason (a) to make the scheme work justly to all concerned; (b) not to prejudice the war effort and military requirements of the Allies; (c) to arrange proper supplying of

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Confidential

passes, transport and pay; (d) ensure adequate punishment of those who try to take the matter into their own hands to the detriment of their comrades chances; (e) keep up the good name of Italy. Well to remember that other members of the Allied Armies have been away from their homes for several years, e.g., British, Americans, Poles, Greeks, etc., with no immediate possibility of returning. Everyone has a job to do and until it is finished, each man should feel it his duty to remain at his post. Present and future objective for Italians: establish the firm and determined purpose of democratic Italy to assume her place in the family of nations.

4. Liberation Leave - Scheme in general - numbers - time factor, transport, return punctually - others waiting; punishment of those who don't return punctually; patience - justice - hardship to others. Transport has many commitments. In addition to the pressing military transport needs, there are in addition the civilian requirements, e.g., transporting food, water, medical supplies, clothing etc. all for Italians.

5. Demobilization and Mobilization Scheme - General conditions, pay, Transport and clothing. Patience and self-discipline required while turn is waited for. To be effective and without

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Italy to assume her place in the family of nations.

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5. <u>Demobilization and Mobilization Scheme</u> - General conditions, pay, Transport and clothing. Patience and self-discipline required while turn is waited for. To be effective and without prejudice to military requirements, demobilization must be orderly, by classes based on age. Demobilization must be offset by mobilization of younger classes. The two problems are interrelated and every soldier must be intelligent enough to understand this.

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During demobilization, every effort will be made by Allied and Italian Commands for quick and efficient release of personnel. Outline briefly how Italian soldiers are demobilized. (a) That units are authorized to issue discharge papers; (b) Travel orders and final pay

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will be given at time of discharge and every effort made to arrange for transportation.

6. Resume - Since 8 Sept 1943 much has been accomplished. Combat Groups are fighting courageously drawing the praise of Allied leaders; thousands are in service units doing excellent and important work so vital to the war effort; many others are performing the dangerous and noble task of clearing the fields of Italy from mines left by the Germans so that these fields may again be plowed and furnish food to Italy. None of these tasks, to which thousands of Italian military personnel are assigned, can be drastically curtailed overnight. Italians have not been able to see their families and friends for a long time but this is one of the hardships common to soldiers of all nations. The ultimate goal, to which all Italians have dedicated themselves, is within reach. For that final effort to be successful the organized, disciplined effort of every Italian soldier is asked for and expected.

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EXTRACT

~~SECRET~~ 8251.

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K 147

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (P) (45) 7th Meeting
12th April 1945

TOP SECRET

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

****

4. EMPLOYMENT OF ITALIAN FORCES IN OCCUPATION OF VENEZIA GIULIA

(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 21)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper noting previous discussions at SAC (P) (44) 32nd Meeting - Minute 10 and SAC (P) (44) 33rd Meeting - Minute 7, where it was considered that restraint should be observed in the use of Italian forces for policing VENEZIA GIULIA, and requesting exceptions to this policy in regards to the use of TRIESTE by Italian Naval vessels and the employment of Italian personnel at that port.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM stated that there were a number of Naval problems in regard to the opening of the port of TRIESTE which must be settled before military needs were met. Since any electric power provided in the port must come from a vessel equipped for the purpose, the use of an Italian ship was militerily desirable, as also was the employment of an Italian Cooperator Engineer Company. In response to a question by Mr. Offie, he stated that the use of an Italian corvette would obviate the necessity for use of a French vessel.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER stated that while Marshal Tito's forces might be in possession of a large part of VENEZIA GIULIA at the time of our occupation of TRIESTE, he nevertheless believed that there was little likelihood of Jugoslav objections to the use of Italians in the port of TRIESTE, since these Italian forces would be under the Allied Military command. In any case he would not allow any political considerations to interfere with the development of the port of TRIESTE, which would be his main military base, in any manner he thought fit. Similar considerations would apply in the immediate area of the military L of C from TRIESTE into AUSTRIA. However, no Italian personnel should be introduced into those parts of VENEZIA GIULIA

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 183017

Italian forces for forming [illegible], and [illegible] policy in regards to the use of TRIESTE by Italian Naval vessels and the employment of Italian personnel at that port.

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MR. KIRK agreed with the view expressed by Admiral Cunningham that military necessity in the use of Italian forces would overrule political desirability.

005

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON was of the opinion that the introduction of any Italian troops into VENEZIA GIULIA was undesirable, even though these might be attached to British or American army units. There were, for example, a number of Italian personnel attached to Headquarters Eighth Army as cooks, mess ordelies, and batmen. It was his view that in the occupation of VENEZIA GIULIA these troops should not accompany that headquarters, especially as it would at a later date move into AUSTRIA.

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~~TOP~~ SECRET Confidential

MAJOR GENERAL AIREY considered that any introduction of Italian personnel would be undesirable from the counter-intelligence viewpoint.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that it would be detrimental to Allied prestige if we were to remove Italian personnel, normally employed by any headquarters, simply because that headquarters was moving into VENEZIA GIULIA. Such personnel would not, however, be employed in AUSTRIA and could therefore be removed from headquarters destined for that country. In reply to a question by the U.S. Political Adviser as to whether this view applied to the use of cooperator companies, he stated that even though it might be necessary to use them in TRIESTE, they should not be moved to AUSTRIA.

GENERAL MCNARNEY stated that the employment of Italians in TRIESTE was analogous to the use of Italians in FRANCE, and since we had found it necessary to use them in the latter country, the precedent so established could be applied to the area of our communications in VENEZIA GIULIA if necessary. He added that he had recently been pressed by the United States Chiefs of Staff to commence redeployment of certain American service troops to the FAR EAST. Lack of sufficient American service units might therefore require the employment of Italians in the occupation of the U.S. zone of AUSTRIA and the development of the L of C into it.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

(a) Reaffirmed the general policy that restraint should be observed in the use of Italian forces in the occupation of VENEZIA GIULIA, and,

(b) Authorized as exceptions to the above policy:

(i) The use of TRIESTE by Italian Naval vessels and the employment of Italian personnel at that port.

(ii) Such other employment of Italian personnel in the immediate area of the Allied L of C into AUSTRIA as might, for military reasons, be unavoidable.

(c) Instructed the Chief Administrative Officer to arrange for British Units, to which Italian personnel were attached, to shed such personnel at a suitable time Before entry into AUSTRIA.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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Copy to: MMIA. by Col. Dare. 19/7. JA.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 183017

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Executive Commissioner

SECRET Confidential

13 April 1945.

Ref/8251/EC.

SUBJECT : Policy - Italian Army.

TO : G - 5 Section,
Allied Force Headquarters.

The attached letter from Land Forces S/C (MMIA) dated 10 April 1945 is forwarded.

For the Chief Commissioner.

J.NEF
Colonel,
Acting Executive Commissioner.

003

Confide...

SUBJECT: Policy - Italian Army. 4251.

Land Forces Sub Com, A.C.
(M.E.I.A.)
File No: G/6
10 April 45.

APR 13 REC'D

TO : AFHQ (2)
through A.C. (1 copy for retention)

I wish to raise the question of the employment of Italian Forces outside ITALY.

1. The immediate problem concerns EIGHTH Army.

2. (a) Today, four Italian Combat Gps (approx 10,000 each) are committed. The fifth moves into the operational area in the next few days.

Presumably these Groups will remain in ITALY for in-ternal security.

(b) This Combat Force has an authorised strength of 50,000 plus a reinforcement holding of 11, 250.

There are in addition: -

(i) The proposed force of five patriot recce battal-ions - ceiling 2,500.

(ii) The proposed GARIBALDI Regt - veterans of the YUGOSLAVIA Campaign - which might well prove a steady-ing influence in ITALY - suggested ceiling 2,700.

3. 44,000 Service Troops in the national categories BR-ITI and US-ITI are also employed in the Army Areas and are directly under command of the Army concerned.

(a) 27,000 of these are BR-ITI.

(i) 11,000 serve EIGHTH Army - including 31 Pioneer

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785217

(b) This Combat Force has an authorised strength of 50,000 plus a reinforcement holding of 11, 250.

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(ii) The proposed GARIBALDI Regt - veterans of the YUGOSLAVIA Campaign - which might well prove a steady--ing influence in ITALY - suggested ceiling 2,700.

3. 44,000 Service Troops in the national categories BR-ITI and US-ITI are also employed in the Army Areas and are directly under command of the Army concerned.

(a) 27,000 of these are BR-ITI.

(i) 11,000 serve EIGHTH Army - including 31 Pioneer Companies (6,700 personnel).

(ii) 16,000 are now under command FIFTH Army (Br Incr), 10,566 of these are authorised for labour.

(iii) There are 14 BR-ITI Pack Transport Companies serv--ing in the Army Areas - each 500 strong - a total of 7,000 Muleteers.

(b) The remaining 17,000 are US-ITI and are under command FIFTH Army. The Engineer Combat Group for example has an authorised strength of 1362. There are 15 Pack Transport Companies each on a T/O of 400 all ranks, a total of 6,000 Italian soldiers.

(See folio 131 - 160A)

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(c) There are in addition a proportion of hospital [illegible] installations some of which are in the ITI-ITI Category. These however, except for the Guard Bns, are under command of the Army for local Adm only.

4. I do not know how EIGHTH Army would be affected operationally if the Italian Service Troops did not accompany it across the border into AUSTRIA.

5. The international aspect is of importance. If Italian Forces, co-belligerents, cross the border and assist in conquering and occupying enemy country a political handle might be given to the Italian Government. If it is essential that Italian manpower be made available to the Allies outside Italian borders it may be considered desirable to take the risk of greater demands being made by ITALY at the Peace Treaty, the general outline of which may of course have already been arranged.

6. (a) The size and composition of the Italian Army after the war is a further factor. The date by which the new Army is to be implemented is the governing factor, and whether Italian Soldiers could remain operating outside ITALY at that time.

(b) Control of the Army will no doubt be handed over to the Italian Government again, but the question remains whether we or ITALY should maintain a large number of Italian Soldiers outside the country - perhaps for some time.

7. As this matter is imminent I would greatly appreciate an early answer.

L. Browning

Major General
M. M. I. A.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat.

SAC (P) (45) 21
9th April 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE (POLITICAL).

EMPLOYMENT OF ITALIAN FORCES IN OCCUPATION OF VENEZIA GIULIA.

Note by Secretary.

1. The policy of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in regard to Allied Military Government of VENEZIA GIULIA has been requested in NAF 872 to which a reply is awaited.

2. Meanwhile, in order that detailed planning may proceed, it is believed desirable that the Supreme Allied Commander should state his policy regarding the use of Italian forces in the occupation of the area.

3. In discussion at SAC (P) (44) 32nd Meeting, Minute 10, and SAC (P) (44) 33rd Meeting, Minute 7, it was considered that restraint should be observed in the use of Italian carabinieri or troops for policing the area. Special police should be recruited locally, but, due to difficulties inherent in the situation, and the importance of the area as an L of C to AUSTRIA, Allied garrison troops would probably have to be supplementally employed on a relatively large scale. The basic administrative pattern was to be as elsewhere in ITALY, except that the introduction of Italian officials from outside was to be avoided.

4. However, Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, has now requested a decision on the following specific matters:

(a) The advisability of permitting Italian escort vessels to visit TRIESTE.

(b) The basing at TRIESTE of Italian corvettes to supply electric power, for which task these vessels are particularly suited. (Note: The alternative to the use of the corvettes for power

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4. However, Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, has now requested a decision on the following specific matters:

(a) The advisability of permitting Italian escort vessels to visit TRIESTE.

(b) The basing at TRIESTE of Italian corvettes to supply electric power, for which task these vessels are particularly suited. (Note: The alternative to the use of the corvettes for power supply duties would be the employment of submarines. It is, however, improbable that any British submarines will be available, although French or Italian vessels could be detailed if such a step were considered politically desirable).

(c) Whether personnel of Number One Italian Cooperator Company would be permitted to enter TRIESTE for work with Officer-in-charge, Works. (Note: These would be in substitution for the Royal Marine Engineer Company recently withdrawn from the theatre, and failure to use these would prejudice the work of the port).

5. The Supreme Allied Commander is therefore requested to: 00100

(a) Reaffirm that the general policy outlined at paragraph 3 above is, in the absence of further instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, to form the basis of plans for the occupation of VENEZIA GIULIA.

(b) Authorise, as exceptions to the above policy, the use of TRIESTE by Italian naval vessels and the employment of Italian personnel at that port as suggested by Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, at paras 4(a), (b) and (c) above.

(Sgd) J.G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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