

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

ACC

10000/109/1141
(VOL. III)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 185017

ITALIAN ARMY POLICY
JUNE-SEPT. 1945

09/1141
II)

785017

308.

Capt White

P1 follows up on 307 with

hand full S/C.

S. 12/9

310

Ref. folio 307
S/C gave data to Brig Grafty-Smith 19/9
S/C spoke to Capt Highland who will follow up and ad-
vice. Will keep you posted.
Emad 21/9

CSD

Thank you S. 22/9.

Hand advised to letter
after return to Cyprus news
made 4. 11. 19
Lanc 10 11. 11. 19

785017

87

Franklin 22/9.

to letter
back to
Loving
of
the
H.
and
for

297.

Cyo. Please see folio 296 and draft of suggested action
DSK 6/9

298

Remanded.

6/9

Ex. Comm.

298.

Letter submitted for C.C.'s signature please.
DSK 7/9

299

7/9.

~~299~~
300

Chief Commissioner.

Attached is submitted for your signature
~~information~~

MLG

77

Salerno

304

Ref. is made to folio 287. - All folio 304 is Com L2's

Chief Commissioner.

Attached is submitted for your signature
information

300

77

WLG

Salvador

304

Ref. is made to folio 287. - At folio 302 is Enamlet's
report on St. Army Supply Responsibility for Enamlet's info. 76

It seems to me that the para 1 306 / 308
302 indicated here a distinct 306 308
in the clothing of CCAR problem.

Sent to G. S. 306 308 14/9 (See 309)
WLG

100-74

281

Chief Commissioner.

280

Attached is submitted for your signature/information/approval.

1 20/8

cc 1200
AUG 20 1978

2

1

2

75

A/Ex-Comm

288

Folio 287 to 282 for your information
20/8/23/8

24/8 11 Oct. 8. 290
287 am → 17/8/27/8

①

293

25/8.

292

Ex-Comm has
this in hand.

They will report
action taken
and progress
thereon.

7

25/8.

292

Emilee has
the in hand.
They will report
action taken
and progress
thereon.

C80

7

NOTED

B. on 11/9 MW/278

251

Exhibit

76 Dec 254

25/8. MW 30/8

297.

C80: Please refer to 296. Draft letter to P.M. is being typed
P.M. 5/19

74

101

785017

209 266

Cision Ex. Comm.

208 for infm.
265

M. Pasby s/c

9 Aug 45

S. 7/8. W. J. P.

3/4
pa. inf.

Chief Commissioner.

274

Attached is submitted for your signature/information/approval.

Regret delay in submission

Ms 16/8.

AUG 16 RECD
O 2 1130

73

276.

Executive Commissioner.

The attached draft at 275 of a letter to the Prime Minister is submitted for approval.

R. S. K.

18 Aug. 45.

Ms 16/8.

AUG 16 11 30
C.D.

73

276.

Executive Commissioner.

The attached draft at 275 of a letter to the Prime Minister is submitted for approval.

RSK.

18 Aug. 45.

278.

Executive Commissioner

Please see folio 277 for information

RSK:10/3

279.

10/8 Nov. 7

A/Sx Com has approved, as amended, draft at 275.

O/Sx Com.
18 Aug

281.

A/Executive Commissioner.

Letter at 280 is attached for signature of Chief Commissioner.

18 Aug. 45.

finf.

72

Ex luv

At 2002 ²⁵⁹ is San Bernardino letter
in Manila by Philippine Army. I think
repet that this letter was temporarily
unlooked since it was filed as
the "man" file underneath the
by "Maintenance by the Philippine Army
Paper" upon which Confidential Staff
action was taken. I will keep it
this for the time being as the
Separate file. Ex 1/8.

2002 261

VPETS

Ex luv

action' been taken. Will keep it
this for the time being as this
separate file. E. 1/8.

~~261~~

VPETS

Econ Sec.

To sec ²⁵⁷ 200. C.C. has read

71

132/418

~~205~~ 261

To: Executive Commissioner.
Noted and returned.

WMB

Econ Sec
6 August 45

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

ARA/san

~~Confidential~~

809

Ref: 8251/308/10

20 September 1945

SUBJECT: Supply Responsibility Italian Army

TO : G-5 Section, Allied Force Headquarters

303

1. Enclosed for your information is a copy of a report submitted by this Headquarters, Economic Section, to the Chief Commissioner with respect to supply responsibility Italian Army.

✓ A. E. ARNOLDY,
Chief Staff Officer
to Executive Commissioner

1 Encl: Copy of ltr ES - 100/1/ES of 11 Sep 45

(BU noted 170 307)
11/2/45
9

TOP SECRET

785017

8251-3636
TOP SECRET

EX COMMISSIONER

Copy No 3

F HQ/17
SEPT 17/1941AF/803
SEPT 18/1941A

ROSTIER

FROM: AMHQ SIGNED SIGNED CITE ROSTIER
TO: ACTION: ALPHA**Confidential****TOP SECRET.**

1. Information has been received by this Headquarters that the Italian Government propose reductions in the pay of the army and that discontent is likely to result.
2. In view of the important role of the Italian Army in maintaining internal security during the coming winter SIGNED views with concern any measure which may lead to a reduction in its efficiency during so critical a period.
3. Information is desired as to the extent of the proposed reductions together with your views as to the necessity for them and their effect on the efficiency of the army.
4. If you consider such a step appropriate you should inform the Italian Government of SIGNED's views as set forth in para 2 above.

DIST

Copy number 1 ACTION: LAND FORCES SC *

1	2
3	4
5	6
7	8
9	0

INFO: CHIEF COMMISSIONER
JEL COMMISSIONER (2)
POLAD (A)
POLAD (B)
GA SEC
FILE**TOP SECRET**(COPY ON "Public Security" FILE
3636/44)

(CSO)

SEP 69 312
KIV

TOP SECRET 8251

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
ECONOMIC SECTION

Copy #1
TOP SECRET

13 SEP 1945

11 Sept. 1945

Tel: 267

Ref: TS-100/B/ES

SUBJECT: Italian Army Supply Responsibility

TO : Chief Commissioner
(Thru: Executive Commissioner)

Attached is report with respect to supply responsibility
Italian Army.

302
E. B. McKINLEY
Brigadier General, USA
Acting Vice President

1 Incl:
m/a

(Capt Arnold)
TOP SECRET
(1 copy spare)

TOP SECRET
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
ECONOMIC SECTION

Confidential CB02

Ref. TS - 100/B/ES

11 September 1945

SUBJECT : Supply Responsibility Italian Army
TO : Chief Commissioner

1. Reference FX 37481 dated 22 August 1945 (NAF 1059, TOP SECRET).
SACMED plan for Italian Army.

2. Problem presented:

How is the supply of the "interim force" Italian army to be accomplished and what are the responsibilities of the Allied Commission with respect thereto.

3. Factors bearing on the Problem:

a The SACMED proposed plan, FAN 1059, provides for the following:

- (1) The supply responsibility is for the Italian government.
- (2) The channels of supply will be the same as those now used for the civilian economy.
- (3) Appropriate Allied agencies, i.e., AC through Food, Industry, Commerce, WMB, Land Forces S/C's, and petroleum authorities will support the Italian government.

b There are adequate means for the immediate support of the Italian Army because:

- (1) Land Forces S/C has stocks of food in reserve to last for two months.
- (2) Land Forces S/C has control of enough clothing and materials for the army for one year.
- (3) Food import programs provide sufficient reserves to loan the army the required foods if other sources do not meet requirements.
- (4) POL is covered by petroleum authorities.
- (5) Motor vehicles are becoming available through the priority MMIA has on ex Italian military vehicles.
- (6) British and American military stocks may be drawn upon to cover the lag between requisition and receipt of stocks.

67

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

301

2 - Supply Responsibility Italian Army

c The further assurance of adequate supply will be provided by requisitions to be submitted upon approval of the plan.

4. The adequacy of tires and tubes for the Italian army is the least clear supply item at the moment, but with the opening of the tire industry, any difficulty with these items should diminish.

5. Summary

In summary, it is to be expected that the Italian government will be able to discharge its supply responsibilities to the interim force without interruption.

Confidential

Charles W. Walton
CHARLES W. WALTON
Colonel
Chief, Supply Division

cc:
Executive Commissioner
MMIA
Production Division ~~As~~ Industry S/C
Food S/C
Commerce S/C
Requisition Branch

TOP SECRET

299

Ref: 8251/299/EC.

September 1945.

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am now able to answer your letter of 1 August 1945, Number 567, regarding the increase in the interim strength of the Italian Army.

The Supreme Allied Commander, bearing in mind the tasks which the Italian Army is likely to be called upon to perform and taking into account the resources of the Italian Government and their ability to train and maintain an Army, is unable to accept a figure of more than 140,000.

I must, therefore, inform you that at this time, it is not possible to increase the interim strength of the Italian Army above 140,000. This figure excludes, of course, an approved total of 65,000 CC.MR.

Yours very truly,

 Henry W. Stone

HENRY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Professor Ferruccio Parri
President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
Rome.

Copy to: Land Forces Sub-Commission (LSFSA)

65 64

[Handwritten signature]
18/9

8251
SECRET

3303

Ex Com

(H51)
296

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

Confidential

4 September 1945

G-5: 091.711-1 (Italy)

SUBJECT: Italian Army.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission, APO 394

SEP - 5 1945

4 SEP 1945

Ref your 8251/273/EC of 16 August 1945.

1. The question of the size of the Italian army was most carefully investigated and considered by this Headquarters before the despatch of NAF 1051 of 3 August 45 to the Combined Chiefs of Staff recommending a figure of 140,000 personnel for the Italian army together with a further 65,000 for the Carabinieri.

2. Bearing in mind the tasks which the Italian army were likely to be called upon to perform and taking into account the resources of the Italian Government and their ability to train and maintain an army, the Supreme Allied Commander was unable to accept a figure of more than 140,000.

3. It is not therefore proposed to recommend any further increase at this time.

4. You are authorized to convey such of the above information to the Italian Government as you deem necessary.

A. L. Hamblen
A. L. HAMBLÉN
Brigadier General, GSC
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

EC DIST - 8 SEP 45

L.F. S/C.

64

SECRET

(NAT KENSLEY)

SECRET.

Confidential ^{29/04} _{AB}

Extract from the Minutes of SACMED's Conference (4th Meeting) - 24. Aug.

MINUTE No. 3.

3. INTERIM POLICY FOR ITALIAN ARMED FORCES.

(Previous reference SAC (45) 3rd Meeting, Minute 4). ^{27/2A}

MAJOR GENERAL LEMNITZER reported that in order to provide the basis for the ten internal security brigades, the formation of which was to be the first step in the reorganisation of the Italian Army, six Italian Guard Battalions would be turned over to Italian government control by 25 August. By 20 September this number would be increased to eleven battalions. It was considered that no further releases of guard battalions would then be possible unless they were replaced by Allied troops or unless guard commitments were reduced. This aspect was under further examination.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above report.

~~SECRET~~
SECRET

Ltr, AFHQ, AG 091.711/051 GCT-0,
dated 24 August 1945 (Cont'd)

DISTRIBUTION:

- 3 - En addressee
- 1 - HQ BTA
- 1 - Number 1 District
- 1 - GHQ 2d Echelon
- 1 - SACS
- 1 - CAO
- 1 - G-1 (B)
- 1 - G-2
- 1 - G-3 (Org-4)
- 1 - G-3 AMO
- 1 - DMT
- 1 - Log Plans
- 1 - G-4 (B)
- 1 - G-4 (M&Tn)
- 1 - Q (M&Int)
- 1 - Q (AE)
- 1 - G-5
- 1 - HQ RAC
- 1 - Engr (B)
- 1 - Svy (B)
- 1 - Tn (Main) Rome
- 1 - Tn (B)
- 1 - Sigs (B)
- 1 - HQ INF
- 1 - DOT
- 1 - ST for ACC
- 1 - Mod (B)
- 1 - Ord (B)
- 1 - REME
- 1 - FM (B)
- 1 - DV & RS
- 1 - Lab (B)
- 1 - D Salvage
- 1 - Army Fire Service (B)
- 15 - G-3 (AMO) (Spare)
- 2 - AG Records
- 1 - AG M&D

SECRET

8251 4

292

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Economic Section
INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TOP SECRET

LDD/sc

24 August 1945

Tel. 267

Ref. TS-100/B/ES

SUBJECT: Supply Responsibility Italian Army

TO : Col. C. W. Walton
Chief Supply Division

Confidential AUG 28 1945

1. Reference is made to FX37481 of 23 August 1945, same being NAF 1059 TOP SECRET, above subject.

2. In line with conversation of Col. Densmore with Col. Walton this morning, the Chief Commissioner directs that Economic Section review carefully NAF 1059 and determine just what AC's responsibility will be in connection with supplying of the Italian Army, and to submit a report setting forth what action is being taken to insure the proper supply to the Italian Army, after its reversion to the Administration and supply jurisdiction to the Italian Government.

3. It is thought that these facts can best be determined by a meeting with Food Sub-Commission, Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA), Italian Ministry of War and Italian Ministry of Alimentation.

4. Report for signature of Acting Vice President, Economic Section, to Chief Commissioner is requested.

FOR THE ACTING VICE PRESIDENT:

L. D. DENSMORE
Colonel, FA

302

TOP SECRET

(COPY)

BU 6/9 mr.

(See M. 293)
61

RESTRICTED

FX 3821A
AUG 250957B

F/3262
AUG 251435B

ROUTINE

FROM: AFHQ, SIGNED SACRED CITE NEGOT
TO: 5 ARMY INFO MMIA, ALCON

AUG 25 1945

RESTRICTED.

Your 7911 dated 24 August refers.

Our para 1 FX 37317 dated 21 August states that 6 Guard Regiment, 511, 512 Guard Battalions will pass to under control Italian War Ministry effective 1200 hours 25 August, current.

DIS

INFO-ACTION: CA SEC
" " Land Forces
INFO: Ex Commissioner 2
Pub Safety SO
File 2
Float

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
25 AUG 1945

60

PA

26/8

10

(S/Com Procy)

827 9
RESTRICTED

7911
AUG 240800

W/5071
AUG 241915
ROUTINE

From: 5 ARMY.

AUG 24 1945

To: ADHQ, INFO TO ITALIA, AISCON

RESTRICTED.

(273)
Circad 5031, dated 11 August refers. Urad RI 37317, cite REOT, dated 21 August, reverts 511 and 512 Italian guard battalions to Italian War Ministry command. Request that the 6 Italian guard regimental Headquarters be relieved from under 5 ARMY control concurrently with 511 and 512 guard battalions.

DISTRIBUTION:

Info-Action, CA Sec
Land Forces
Info, Chief Commissioner
Int Comm 2
Sub Safety
File 2
Gloss

See 590

RESTRICTED

RECEIVED

24 AUG 1945

1. C. 11/1

(S/emo 1001) 11/11

825105 E x COMMISSIONER
INCOMING MESSAGE 287

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Copy No 1

Originator's Reference: FX 37481
Date/Time of Origin: AUG 221830B

Message Centre No: F/4976
Date Time Rec'd: AUG 231530B
Precedence: PRIORITY

FROM SIGNED ALEXANDER CITE FHOAG

AUG 23 1945

TO : ACTION AMSSO FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF, AGWAR FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF,
INFO ALCOM, MMIA

TOP SECRET.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Confidential~~

This is NAF 1059 and is further to NAF 1051.

1. At the present time supplies and equipment for the Italian Army are provided largely from US and British military sources. Also the Italian Army is dependent partly on Allied administrative and supply services in ITALY for its administration though under current policy this dependence is progressively decreasing.

2. Italian Army of 140000. If operational control of the Italian Army of 140000 is vested in the Italian Government it is desirable that the maximum degree of administrative control should be assumed by them at the same time. In any event the Italian Government should assume full administrative and supply responsibility as early as practicable in order to relieve Allied military resources of the commitment. Also if the Italian Government undertakes this responsibility while Allied resources still remain in the theatre the means will be available to remedy any serious difficulty which may arise during the early stages of the Italian Government's responsibility.

3. The proposed Army of 140000 includes a due proportion of administrative troops. Allowing for the use by the Italian Army of civilian operated facilities such as railways, workshops, etc, this Army can be made self supporting in respect of administrative services and from the end of September need not be dependent on administrative assistance from Allied units for its logistical support.

4. Carabinieri of 65000. The administration and supply of the 65000 Carabinieri

(NAT KEMMURY)
(S/cons Presby)

~~TOP SECRET~~

(Sam - 17 291)

(BO for link)

58

TOP SECRET

(EX 37481 cont'd)

286
- 2 -
Confidential

is already largely the responsibility of the Italian Government which they exercise through the ITI ITI administrative organisation of the Italian Army. The basic elements of the Carabinieri ration are however a US and British military provision and some small assistance is provided by the US and British in respect of clothing. It is at present proposed subject to such alteration as may be approved as a result of the investigation of the Allied Police Mission referred to in para 7 of NAF 1051 that the Carabinieri should continue to be administered by the Italian Army.

5. Provision of maintenance and equipment for Army and Carabinieri of total strength 205000. Food, clothing, warlike and non warlike equipment should be furnished as follows:

A. From indigenous Italian resources including captured material and local manufacture. Raw materials for this purpose should be procured in the Italian Government import programme.

B. By purchase from military stocks in ITALY which have been declared surplus by the US or British disposals organisations. It is considered that the Italian Government, in respect of items required for the Italian Army, should be accorded an equal priority with UNRRA in the procurement of these supplies.

C. Items not obtainable as in A and B above should be procured as finished products in the Italian Government import programme.

D. As the prevention of disorders in ITALY will largely depend on the efficient functioning of the Italian Army and Carabinieri it is essential that there should be no breakdowns in their administration caused by shortages or uncertainties in the arrival of their maintenance requirements. These requirements should therefore, be accorded the necessary degree of priority by the furnishing agencies.

56 57
TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET
- 3 -

285

(FX 37481 cont'd)

Confidential

To distinguish these requirements from those destined for the civil population they should be procured by separate indent in the Italian Government import programme.

6. Recommendations regarding the main items of supply for the Army and Carabinieri are as follows:

A. Rations. Allowing for the full use of indigenous supplies the following annual tonnages will have to be imported in addition to the import requirements for the civil population: Flour 35070 dried vegetables 4680 sugar 2340 pepper 12 coffee 1170.

B. Petrol. Petrol requirements will be included in the Italian national programme with effect from October programming for January requirements.

C. Clothing. Requirements of raw materials to enable an initial issue and 1 years maintenance to be provided for the Army of 140000 and the Carabinieri of 65000 are as follows: Shoddy 2100 metric tons cotton 320 metric tons virgin wool 3080 metric tons leather finished 750 metric tons. It is considered that the above quantities can be allocated from the present planned import programme provided this programme is met.

D. Equipment. Following general policy is proposed:

(1) All vehicles and equipment of British and US origin (including Lend Lease) now in possession of the Italian combat forces (GRUPPI and certain other units) should be retained with these forces and handed over to the Italian Government in accordance with procedure to be established. In respect of US equipment in possession of British ITI combat units this has already been recommended in MPOUSA signal to Joint Chiefs of Staff F 92580 dated 13 June 45. It is proposed to hand over at the same time 6 months maintenance parts for vehicles and equipments

56 55

TOP SECRET

(FX 37481 cont'd)

TOP SECRET

Confidential

284

supplied from Allied military sources.

(2) Requirements for non warlike equipments should be provided in accordance with para 5 above. It is proposed to place all nonwarlike stores including such items as are at present an Allied military supply responsibility, in this category as soon as is practicable.

(3) Owing to the present inability of the Italian Government to manufacture warlike items, requirements should continue for some time to be provided from Allied sources.

(4) Maintenance requirements for tyres and tubes for all vehicles, or raw materials for their manufacture, should be included on the Italian Government import programme. The situation regarding tyres and tubes is critical and supply on these items, or the necessary raw materials, must be forthcoming if the Italian Army is to function without Allied assistance.

7. The above proposals place the provisioning and maintenance and equipment for the Italian Army of 140000 and the Carabinieri of 65000 in channels similar to those used in respect of the provisioning for the Italian civil economy. They are only feasible if the latter provision is functioning efficiently and an adequate and steady flow of supplies to ITALY can be assured. Concern has been expressed on this matter in para 2 of NAF 1051 and in NAF 1054.

8. When the transfer of operational and administrative control takes place the administrative functions of the Allied Military Mission to the Italian Army in respect of the Italian Army of 140000 will be largely of an advisory and liaison nature. They will however continue to screen those demands which continue to be met from Allied military stocks and exercise supervisory control of the use of such materials.

TOP SECRET

55

TOP SECRET

283

(EX 37481 cont'd)

Confidential

9. Summary of recommendations is as follows:

A. It is proposed, subject to the proviso in sub para C below, to transfer administrative control of the Italian Army of 140000 and of the 65000 Carabinieri to the Italian Government at the same time as the transfer of operational control takes place.

B. If the supply policy outlined in paras 5 and 6 of this cable is approved it is proposed that the Italian Government should provision on their own account, commencing with their programme to be submitted in October, for all supplies, FOL, clothing and equipment (including raw materials for the local production of same) which cannot be procured locally. Furnishing agencies should take into account declared surpluses of British and US military stocks in the theatre and include them in the allocation of sources from which the Italian Government programme is to be met.

C. Until requirements submitted in the Italian Government import programme can be made available to the Italian Government and a steady flow of these requirements has been established the US and British must continue to meet from US and British military stocks such requirements of the Italian Army and Carabinieri as cannot be provided from Italian Government sources. The transfer of present Allied military responsibility for providing maintenance and equipment items will be of necessity be gradual and will take place by items of supply depending on the time required to establish a pipeline of supply in respect of the various items. In the case of warlike equipment it is appreciated that responsibility for its provision may have to remain a military commitment for a considerable time. Requirements

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Confidential 82
53

(FX 37481 cont'd)

of items which continue to be provided from military stocks will be screened, as at present, by the Allied Military Mission to the Italian Army which will exercise such supervision as is necessary to ensure that they are economically used.

10. In the case of those diminishing Italian forces who continue to be employed in relief of US and British manpower (para 5 of NAF 1051 refers) it is proposed to make no change in existing provisioning arrangements.

11. It is requested that the policy outlined above be approved. In the meantime necessary preparations are being made here to facilitate the handover of administrative control of the Army and Carabinieri to the Italian Government.

DIST

Copy No	2	INFO-ACTION: Ex Commissioner	2
"	3	INFO: Chief Commissioner	
"	4	CA Sec	
"	5	Econ Sec	
"	6	L. Forces	
"	7	File	

53

TOP SECRET

Ref: 2851/280/EC.

20 August 1945.

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have received your letter of 1 August 1945, number 567, regarding the increase in strength of the Italian Army, and I have submitted the letter to the appropriate authority with my recommendation that it be given sympathetic consideration.

I hope to be able to advise you soon of the action taken.

Yours very truly,

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE,
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Professor Ferruccio Parri,
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government,
R O M E .

52
PA
11/29

SECRETEX 36237
AUG 17 1104BF/4164
AUG 17 1610B
URGENT

AUG 18 1945

From: FREEDOM SIGNED SAGARD CITE NEGOT
To: ACTION 5TH ARMY INFO DISTWO, ALCOMCONFIDENTIAL
1945**SECRET.**

Reference your 777L.

1. Presume from your para 1 that allegations regarding conduct of the FOLGORE GRUPPO which have reached this headquarters are substantially true. Such a state of unsatisfactory discipline will not be tolerated it is agreed that mutual relief of FRIULI and FOLGORE is undesirable. In view of para 1 of our EX 32362 no useful purpose would be served in replacing FOLGORE GRUPPO by Allied troops at this time, since Italian troops would have to reassume responsibility in September.

2. All Italian GRUPPI are to be included in a force of 140000 which will be handed back to Italian Government in September. As stated in para 1 of our EX32362 it is the policy of this headquarters to make this force of 140000 as efficient as possible.

3. The Supreme Allied Commander directs that you take action urgently in conjunction with MMIA, to raise the standard of discipline in FOLGORE GRUPPO and forward any further comments or recommendations regarding the question to this headquarters.

ACTION Copy 585/EC

SECRET

51
DIST
INFO-ACTION: Land Forces
INFO-ACTION: CA Sec
INFO: Chief Commissioner
Ex Commissioner 2
Pub Safety
File 2
Fleet

see M271

(Mr Kensley)

DRAFT.

My dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I have received your letter of 1 August 1945, number 567,
regarding the increase in strength of the Italian Army, ~~and I regret~~
~~the delay in acknowledging it.~~ *the appropriate*

and have submitted the letter to higher authority with my
recommendation that it be given sympathetic consideration. *I hope to*
be able to advise you soon of the action taken.
Yours very truly,

ELERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

OK 2

Professor Ferruccio Parri,
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government,
R O M E .

see M 276
50

SECRET

(274)

~~Confidential~~

Ref: 3251/273/83.

16 August 1945.

SUBJECT: Italian Army.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
Attn: G-5 Section.

1. At SACRED's Conference of 2nd August I gave notice that the Italian Prime Minister had declared his intention to request an increase of 20,000 in the size of the interim Italian Army, bringing the total to 160,000.

2. I have now received his official request which I attach. (271)

3. Although there appears to be some difference in the minds of the Prime Minister and his Minister of War as to the disposal and functions of these extra troops, I recommend that the proposal be given sympathetic consideration particularly as the total number is still considerably less than the strength of the Italian Army as proposed in the British draft treaty proposals.

4. As in any case imports of food, etc., into Italy will have to be increased to meet the needs of the interim army of 140,000, the additional strength will make no appreciable difference in this respect.

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLEERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief Commissioner

Copy to Land Forces Sub-Com (MMIA).

39 F294
50
y
g
H

8251
SECRET

Exec Comm
(273)

5831
ADG 111947

Confidential

W/3659

AUG 12 2000

ROUTINE

AUG 13 1945

From: 5 ARMY

To: AFHQ RPT TWO DIST, ALLIED COMMISSION, MMIA

SECRET.

265.
Para 1. Reference AFHQ EX 32362 August 5th and confirming conversation your representatives into HACKETT.

Para 2. 6 Italian Regiment composed 511 and 512 Italian Guard Battalions are available without replacements.

Para 3. 512 Battalion will be assembled in FLORENCE by 15th August. Regimental HQ and 511 assemble same area soon thereafter. Request necessary instructions relieving units from attachment 5 ARMY and ordering movement.

Para 4. Believe TWO DIST may desire 511 Battalion in view eventual take over PEG corridor they will communicate desires direct to AFHQ.

HEADQUARTERS
13 AUG 1945

DIST
INFO ACTION C A SEC
LAND FORCES
CHIEF COMMISSIONER
EXEC COMMISSIONER 2
PUB SAFETY
FILE 2
PLANT

SECRET

(Mr. Kensley)

PAPSKup

Subject: Additional Troops, Interim Army

Land Forces
Sub Commission, AC (MMIA)
Rome
SD/38/2

August 1945

To : Executive Commissioner, ALCOM

AUG 11 1945

1. The figure of 140,000 troops (excluding CC.RR) was the recommendation of the former Minister for War, Count Casati, based on the following:

a. War Ministry contemplated a change in the organization, armament, and equipment, of two of the present Combat Groups into two Alpine Divisions.

b. The total of 140,000 troops (excluding CC.RR) was the maximum number the Italian Government would be able to support.

2. It is not believed that two divisions in addition to the 140,000 now recommended will be necessary, nor is it believed that two additional divisions can be supported by the Italian Government.

Clayton P. Kerr
CLAYTON P. KERR, Colonel
for Major General
Land Forces
Sub Commission, AC (MMIA)

CPK/lak

INTERNAL

File SD/38/2
File G/6

See 274

47

PC - Italian Army future

Mr 20/8

272A

Extract from the Minutes of SACMED's Conference (3rd Meeting) - 9.Aug.45

MINUTE No.4.

4. INTERIM POLICY FOR FUTURE OF ITALIAN ARMED FORCES.

(Previous reference SAC (45) 2nd Meeting, Minute 8).

MAJOR GENERAL LEMNITZER reported that instructions had been sent to MMIA directing them to proceed with the reorganisation of the Italian Armed Forces within the present ceilings, pending final approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, of the policy recommended by the Supreme Allied Commander.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above report.

9th August 1945.

JG.

Lu 296A

Translation

The President of the Council of Ministers

567

Rome, I - 8 - 1945

Original at 270A.

To confirm the verbal request already made to you, I express the opinion that the effectives of the transition army granted to Italy by the Allies ought to be increased of two large units.

As I have already told you verbally, this request is chiefly made because of the requirements of public order especially during the next elections and the electoral campaign which will take place before them.

The units which are at present available do not appear to be sufficient to have them scattered as they should in all the provinces of the Peninsula.

I beg you, my dear Admiral, to support this request; thanking you in advance, I remain,

Yours very truly,

A. Ferruccio Parri

Admiral Ellery W. Stone
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
Rome

trans. e/c

neg. u. 32
cc 1616

(270)

Lu 273

✓ 280

296 ✓ 299

Translation

170
10 REGIS.
CC 1616

Original at 2706

P.S. The Minister of War agrees and thinks that an increase of the regular effectives is still to be wished for; he does not consider it advisable to employ the army for the maintenance of public order. I agree with him, but I think that in our conditions, an increase of the available military forces is an important and supplementary element of security, especially if it is possible to free the army from the ancient classes and make it homogeneous.

Of course, instead of two large supplementary units, it would be better to dispose of a number of carabinieri if not equivalent, at least important.

s. Ferruccio Parri

trans. e/c

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*Il Presidente
del Consiglio dei Ministri*

Roma, 1-8-1945

567

A conferma della richiesta verbale già rivolta, esprimo l'avviso che gli effettivi dell'esercito di transizione concessi all'Italia dagli Alleati dovrebbero essere aumentati di due grandi unità.

Come Le ho già esposto verbalmente, questa richiesta nasce principalmente dalla considerazione delle necessità di ordine pubblico quali possono verificarsi soprattutto in occasione delle future consultazioni elettorali e della campagna elettorale che le precederà.

Le unità attualmente disponibili non sembrano sufficienti per una armonica dislocazione in tutte le regioni della Penisola.

Al sig. Ammiraglio
Ellery W. STONE
Capo della Commissione Alleata

R O M A

REGIS.
16/6
cc
270A

./.

Lu 271

43299



*Il Presidente
del Consiglio dei Ministri*

- 2 -

2708

*Io La prego, Signor Ammiraglio, di voler interporre a
favore della domanda che Le rivolgo il suo autorevole inte
ressamento. Glie ne esprimo sin d'ora il mio ringraziamento.*

Mi abbia con molta considerazione, suo

Tommio Romi

*P.S. - Il Ministro della Guerra è d'accordo, nel senso
che ritiene sempre desiderabile un aumento negli
effettivi regolari; egli non crede che sia opportuno
l'impiego dell'esercito ai fini dell'ordine pubblico. Io
concordo con lui, ma ritengo che nelle nostre condizioni⁴²
un aumento delle forze militari disponibili sia sempre
un'importante riserva supplementare, soprattutto*

si riuscirà a liberare l'esercito dalle loro
ansie e si potrà renderlo omogeneo.

Naturalmente sarebbe preferibile disporre in
luogo di due nuove grandi unità supplementari
di un numero di monicarabinieri se non equivalente
notevoli.

Temmo Lani

SECRET.

8257 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTRACT from the Minutes of SACRED's
Conference (2nd Meeting) - 2 Aug.

MINUTE No. 8.

8. INTERIM POLICY FOR FUTURE OF ITALIAN ARMED FORCES.
(JPS Study No. P/306 (Final).)

In cc's this

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper examining the requirements for Italian armed forces in the interim period until the peace conference, and recommending that the Italian Army should be organised as a force of 140,000 men plus 65,000 Carabinieri, that the present arrangements in respect of the Italian Navy should not be changed and that a separate investigation should be carried out in regard to the Italian Air Force. The paper further attached a draft cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff requesting approval of this policy.

MR. KIRK expressed the view that everything possible should be done to develop the Italian Army, as the future preservation of law and order would depend largely on the development of that force. In relation to this, the development of the Carabinieri was less important, as the Italian people had greater respect for the Army than the Carabinieri.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE, referring to the current policy that the province of Bolzano should remain under Allied Military Government indefinitely, stated that after careful consideration, he had now recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be requested to approve the return of this province to the Italian Government on September 30th. He requested therefore that the draft signal now under discussion should be worded so as to avoid prejudicing this decision. He also thought that the statement in the draft signal, to the effect that the Carabinieri were corrupt and inefficient was too strong. With regard to the size of the interim Italian Army, Signor PARRI had informed him that it was the intention of the Italian Government to request an increase of 20,000, making a total of 160,000. He had suggested to the Italian Prime Minister that he discuss this matter with the Ministry of War, after which, if it were still believed desirable the Government could make a definite recommendation to the Allied authorities.

GENERAL McNARNEY said that he agreed with the military recommendations of the proposed signal but he considered that the last paragraph of the signal should be revised so as to recapitulate the points on which the Supreme Allied Commander was requesting decisions.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM expressed himself as being in agreement with the paragraph of the draft signal referring to the size and employment of the Italian Navy. He believed, however, that the signal should be revised to reflect the recommendation.

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272A

-2-

Confidential

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF reported that a separate meeting was being held that afternoon to determine administrative responsibilities in regard to the Italian Army and that separate recommendations would be submitted on this matter.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

- (a) Instructed the Deputy Chief of Staff to revise the draft signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff circulated under JPS Study No. P/306 (Final) in accordance with the above discussion, and to submit the revised draft to him for his approval. %
- (b) Directed that Commanding General, AAF/MTO and AOC-in-C RafMedMe should:-
 - (1) Cause a further investigation to be made regarding the strength, within the agreed ceiling, at which it was desirable to retain the Italian Air Force until the Peace Treaty.
 - (2) In conjunction with the Chief Administrative Officer, examine what responsibilities in regard to the administration of the Italian Air Force can legitimately be transferred to the Italian Governmentand report accordingly.

% Dispatched as NAF 1-51 (MC OUT 604) of 3 August 45

Done ok 255.

40

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

the Italian Government

and report accordingly.

§ Dispatched as NAF 1-51 (MC OUT 604) of 3 August 45

Done at 7:55

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82511 EXEC COM
SECRET

GO 891
AUG 091545

F/3292
AUG 100950
PRIORITY

DISTANCE

52 AREA, 54 AREA, 56 AREA, 227 ITALIAN ARM DIV, INFO AFHQ (03 GDS AMO) 61 AREA, 211 3RD AREA, 66 AA BDE (PENNSYLVANIA PIRATE BGS) ROME AREA (03 BR) ROMA (ROME PIRATE PIRATE)

AUG 10 1945

SECRET.

Intention is to withdraw all Itali an GDS Bns not later than 30 September. Availability of replacements not yet known.

For 56 AREA. Ref my GO 792 of 01 August not to all you will be prepared to release 506 GDS Bn by 15 August after arrival of 2 additional Polish GDS Coys.

For AFHQ. Ref para 3 of your EX 32362 of 5 August. Request disposal instrs for 506 GDS Bn.

For 227 Div. Ensure that 506 GDS Bn is brought up to str immediately with good quality rfts.

BEAL
10 AUG 1945

INFO ACTION C & SEC
INFO LAND FORCES-50
CHIEF COMMISSIONER
EXEC COMMISSIONER 39
PUB SAFETY 50
FILE 2
FLOAT 38

SECRET

{MAJ M
S/CDR P} DP

8251
Ev. Comm. (265)
SECRET

FX 32362
AUG 051404B

HEADQUARTERS
Confidential
AUG 1945

P/2795
AUG 050845B
IMMEDIATE

AFHQ SIGNED SACKED CITE PHCOT

5 ARMY, DISTONE, DISTWO, DISTTHREE, 13 CORPS. INFO: ALCOM, MFA, MTOUSA PW COMMAND
AUG 5 1945

SECRET

1. It has been decided that when Italian Govt assumes responsibility for civil administration of ITALY less VENEZIA GIULIA and other special areas certain forces will have to be handed over to them at same time to enable them to maintain law and order in areas for which they will be responsible. This handover will take place by 30 September. At present authority of Italian Govt rests on presence of Allied troops. It is obviously in Allied interests that Italian armed forces handed back to control of Italian Govt should be as efficient as possible so that Allied intervention is no longer needed.

2. Part of proposed force of 140,000 to be handed back consists of ten internal security brigades (one for each region of mainland). Owing to impracticability of forming new Italian units and desirability for maintaining such Esprit de Corps as exists the bulk of these brigades must be provided by the 27 Italian Guard Battalions now employed by the Allies.

3. It is proposed therefore to release initially Italian Guard Battalions as under by 15 August. In view of their future role the best available must be selected/ 5 ARMY ONE DISTONE TWO DISTWO ONE DISTTHREE 1 13 CORPS 2.

38

- 1 -

SECRET

see A 266
PA 91

1 COR P) MP
translating to inform back

SECRET

- 2 -

Confidential ¹²⁶⁴

4. It is also proposed to release the remaining Guard Bns as soon as possible thereafter and at latest by 30 September. Plans for progressive release must therefore be prepared now.

5. A representative from this Hq will visit addressees not before 7 August to discuss the effect of the above proposals and in particular (A) the present employment of Guard Battalions (B) how commitments can be cut down (C) the suggested program for progressive release, (D) what troops if any will be required to replace Italian Guard Battalions when released.

Dist

Info-Action - C.A. Section
Land Forces

Info - Chief Commissioner
Exec Comar 2
P Safety
File 2
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SECRET

SECRET

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✓

Ex. Comm
(263)

FX 32355
AUG 051359B

P/2769
AUG 052100B
IMMEDIATE

AFHQ SIGNED SACRED SITE PHGCT
MEMO INFO ALOOM

Confidential

AUG 6 1945

SECRET

Ref this Hq signal NAF1051 of 3rd August 45.

1. You will proceed as a matter of urgency with the reorganization of the Italian Army on the lines of para 8 of the above signal. In particular this will include the formation of 10 internal security brigades. To assist in this an immediate investigation is being made by this Hq as to availability and date of release of Italian guard battalions now employed by Allied Forces.

2. Existing arrangements regarding the maintenance of the Italian Army will at present remain unchanged.

Dist

Action - Land Forces SC 2
Info - Chief Commissioner
Exec Commr 2
CA Sec
Secn Sec
Air SC
Navy SC
File

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HEADQUARTERS
6 AUG 1945

SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

A (S/land Policy) P^a NIP

H.Q., A.C. 980

~~Confidential~~

Subject: Morale and loyalty of the Italian Army.

Ex. Comm.

Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C.
 (M.N.I.A.)
 R O M E
 A/052

20 July 45.

To: A.F.H.Q. (3).

JUL 28 1945

1. I have of course discussed the above subject continuously with the Minister of War and everything possible has been done to improve matters. I again discussed the whole question with him to-day, and he is in general agreement with my views. I also discussed it with Major General NARIS when I visited him on tour the other day, as he is particularly concerned.

2. The attached letter from General UTILLI bears on the subject. Although there is undoubtedly a great deal in what UTILLI says, both the Minister and I are of the opinion that he is also establishing an alibi. Recently he asked if he could be posted elsewhere as he had a long spell of commanding a Combat Group. He and his Group have done very well (in fact he is the best Gruppo Commander of the best Gruppo) but being a shrewd person, he foresees trouble in the future and is not anxious to get mixed up in the quelling of internal disorder and political matters generally. He prefers to get out of the lime light with his laurels still untarnished. Nevertheless, his attitude and feelings are symptomatic no doubt of all the Gruppi and the Italian Army generally, and as such, must be taken note of.

3. I feel that if the Combat Groups or the Italian Army generally are called upon to intervene in serious civil disorder, they may do so unwillingly, particularly if ordered by an Allied Commander. Some will be loyal and obey orders, but some may not. Much will depend on the occasion. For instance, if it is a question of hooliganism I feel that the soldiers would play their part and would be welcomed by the people in doing so. If, on the other hand, it was a question of hunger riots, the action of the soldiers would not be so certain.

4. My other reaction to General UTILLI's letter is, that if he is doubtful about the action of his soldiers, he (and his officers) should do everything in their power to explain to the latter what their duty is, and to maintain and increase discipline.

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Minister and I are (of the opinion that he is). Recently he asked if he could be posted elsewhere as he had a long spell of commanding a Combat Group. He and his Group have done very well (in fact he is the best Gruppo Commander of the future and is not anxious to get mixed up in the quelling of internal disorder and political matters generally. He prefers to get out of the lime light with his laurels still untarnished. Nevertheless, his attitude and feelings are symptomatic no doubt of all the Gruppi and the Italian Army generally, and as such, must be taken note of.

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4. My other reaction to General UNTIL's letter is, that if he is doubtful about the action of his soldiers, he (and his officers) should do everything in their power to explain to the latter what their duty is, and to maintain and increase discipline instead of rather throwing up his hands like Pontius Pilate saying "I cannot be held responsible".

5. (a) As you know, I and the War Minister have always insisted that the Army is above party; that soldiers are entitled to have their own political opinions, but that they are the servants of the Government in power, whatever it is; and that they must obey the orders of that Government, even in the distasteful conditions of quelling internal disorder. This has been put out to the Army through a special order of the day by the War Ministry, through the columns of "La Patria", by word of mouth through Commanders etc.

(b) Despite this, the Italian, being what he is and politically minded with the remembrance of the past few years still vivid in his mind, I fear is far from being as disciplined as should be the case and certainly by Allied standards. I think one has to accept this fundamental fact which no amount of exhortation or short-term effort can alter very much.

(c) I again impressed on the Minister to-day that all Commanders must do everything in their power to improve the morale and

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Confidential

(c) Contd.

the loyalty of their men by personal talk and effort on the lines mentioned above.

- 5.
6. (a) I think that morale will be increased if and when we are able to demobilise more and more of the older classes. As you know, many of these have been under arms for years and are thoroughly "browned off". We have made a start with this demobilisation. We have authorised the demobilisation of 1914 Classes but as soon as possible we should demobilise the 1915, 1916, 1917 etc. classes. There are of course, at this moment, many difficulties in the way of doing this. It is inopportune to have a call-up at present for political and supply reasons, apart from the fact that such young men would be untrained. Allied interests must come first. The Italian Army is in a state of flux; US-ITI and BR-ITI are being disbanded and of these the 1914 Class is being demobilised while those still liable to military service are being transferred to other existing units in need of reinforcements. Here, however, a time-lag comes in. First we have to get the information, then we have to put in bids for transportation (by sea means fully filled) three weeks ahead, and the result is that certain remaining units are pro-tem short of personnel. Moreover, the rate of income from these disbanded units has not proved as rapid as we understood would be the case. Add to this the inherent lack of experience and slowness of the newly formed Italian Military machine, and it is clear what a formidable problem this rearrangement of personnel and the demobilisation of older classes is.

- (b) From the latest figures at our disposal (though these are inevitably a week or two out of date) we estimate that we have enough soldiers in toto on hand to make units up to strength and meet Allied needs, though, for the reasons given above, these soldiers are not all in the right place. We think that the situation is clearing and that it would be possible to demobilise the 1915 Class in August and still meet Allied needs. Unless this is announced now, I fear a possible land slide in morale. Men will just desert in large numbers and we may be in much the same position as regards total numbers by the end of August as if we had authorised the demobilisation of the 1915 Class. Britain, America, in fact all other nations have given their soldiers some idea of what is likely to happen as regards demobilisation. The Italian soldier has not been told and it must affect his morale.

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- (c) Of course, the situation in Italy is quite different from anywhere else and embraces many nebulous factors of time, space, Allied policy as regards disbandment of units, etc. Yet I urge that we make a start in telling the Italian Army what we hope to do as regards demobilisation. I feel that it should be announced now that it is our intention to demobilise the 1915 Class in August and the other Classes progressively after that. In August we can say whether we can demobilise the 1916 Class in September, and so on. I know that this means that, in the reshuffle and with all the difficulties and time-lag mentioned above, we will be incurring the possibility of some units being temporarily short of men because the Italian Army is not all in the right place and desertion is rife. I think we should accept this and that it will pay us to do so. We shall gain in the long run, and perhaps not even lose as regards the short-term result. I therefore request that you will authorise me to announce this to the War Minister forthwith. He is holding a Conference of all his senior Generals in Rome on 9th and 10th August, when all these matters will be explained to them members present and discussed. I would particularly like your approval before that Conference.

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Confidential

Page 3.

7. There is a bigger side to all this question which I feel I must state. It is a matter beyond my purview and I understand that it has been represented on the highest level. It is the matter of the retention of Allied Troops in this country. The next year will be a critical one for Italy. It will be the opportunity for subversive forces to reduce Italy to chaos and prevent the gradual rebirth of a new Italian Army as the handmaid of the Government for the maintenance of law and order. This might necessitate Allied re-entry with troops into Italy to settle an Italian ELAS situation. The value of the presence of Allied troops during this period thus cannot be over-estimated. The fact that they are there cannot fail to have an indirect moderating influence on the whole situation. The Italians realise this and wish for the retention most fervently. Lack of shipping for the evacuation of Allied troops may solve this matter, but if all Allied troops are withdrawn from Italy it will make the problem of re-constituting the Italian Army, both morally and technically, infinitely more difficult.

8. I must now mention the C.C.R.R. They are the first line of defence for the maintenance of law and order. They are starting to live down the past and get on their feet again. Under normal circumstances the C.C.R.R. could handle most situations, thus avoiding the necessity for intervention by the military. It would therefore seem the primary consideration as regards law and order, that the C.C.R.R. should have priority over the rest of the Italian Army (for the C.C.R.R. are the senior Regt in the Italian Army) as regards such matters as clothing, boots, equipment, transport, etc., instead of being on an exact par. I should like a ruling on this matter as soon as possible as it is indirectly a major factor bearing on the morale of the Army.

9. Internal security, is of course bound up with the morale and the physical presence of troops, whether the latter are used or not. For this reason the sooner you can authorise the "Interim Decree" of 205,000 (incl. 65,000 C.C.R.R.) proposed in H.Q. AC 8251/180/EC dated 7 July, the better. Since constituted this will provide for an Internal Security Brigade in such region (excluding Sicily which already has enough troops) and the effect cannot but be salutary.

10. I feel it my duty to put the above before you. The existing situa-

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10. I feel it my duty to put the above before you. The existing situation is the result of factors beyond my, or in fact anyone else's, control; and I think that we must take things realistically as they are and do our best to compete accordingly.

Major General,
M.H.I.A.

Copy to : H.Q. A.C. ←
C.O.C. 2 District (ref. conversation).
C.O.C. 3 District.
G/3 file
A/016.

/agc

286
Confidential

TRANSLATION.

Subject : Public Order.

H.Q. LECENINO Gruppo di Combattimento.
01/2472
21 July 45.

HQ 59 Area (through 52 B.L.U.)

The first spiritual reactions to the warning by me to units to hold themselves in readiness along with their other duties for the maintenance of Public Order, confirm in the most evident and significant way the opinions which I expressed personally to Brigadier MATHEWS in our conversation on 16 Jul 45.

Amongst the men there is a strong discontent over this subject and the officers express grave misgivings as to the way in which the troops themselves may act in the case of public disorder.

Men of all political colours have been gathered together in the Combat Groups - these men have found a common aim in the fight for the liberation of their country. For this ideal they have faithfully done their duty in brotherly concord and have closely collaborated with each other, but now that this aim has been achieved they are of the opinion that they should be released from military duties - as only a small minority of them are in the classes at present bound to serve. The desire for release is even stronger when their military obligations involve a duty towards which - during the present political disorganization of the country - they feel the strongest repugnance.

It can be said that this feeling is common to all without exception. **32.** But the problem becomes even more serious due to the presence in the Gruppo of many men who openly belong to extremist parties.

I feel it my duty to bring up this matter once again because I believe it deserves the most serious examination by the Allied authorities and

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I feel it my duty to bring up this matter once again because I believe it deserves the most serious examination by the Allied authorities and also event ually by the Italian Government. If blood should flow as a result of the exigencies of internal order, this could have serious repercussions amongst which I want to stress particularly the irreparable fracture of the bonds which are being laboriously re-quest between the Army and the Nation.

(Signed) UMBERTO UTILLI.
G.O.C.

/dgo

DRAFT CAMH

This is MAP

and is further to my MAP 1051

One

At the present time supplies and equipment for the Italian Army are provided largely from US and British military sources. Also the Italian Army is dependent partly on the Allied administrative services in ITALY for its maintenance though under current policy this dependence is progressively decreasing.

Two

Italian Army of 140,000. If operational control of the Italian Army of 140,000 is vested in the Italian Government it is desirable that the maximum degree of administrative control should be assumed by them at the same time. In any event the Italian Government should assume full administrative responsibility as early as practicable in order to relieve Allied military resources of the commitment. Also if the Italian Government undertakes this responsibility while Allied resources still remain in the theatre the means will be available to remedy any serious difficulty which may arise during the early stages of the Italian Government's responsibility.

Three

The proposed army of 140,000 includes a due proportion of administrative troops. Allowing for the use by the Italian Army of civilian operated facilities such as railways, workshops, etc, this army can be made self supporting in respect of administrative services and from the end of September will not be dependent on assistance from Allied administrative units for its logistical support.

Four

Carabinieri of 65,000. The administration of the 65,000 Carabinieri is

266
Draft only

responsibility while Allied resources still remain in the theatre the means will be available to remedy any serious difficulty which may arise during the early stages of the Italian Government's responsibility.

The proposed army of 140,000 includes a due proportion of administrative troops. Allowing for the use by the Italian Army of civilian operated facilities such as railways, workshops, etc, this army can be made self supporting in respect of administrative services and from the end of September will not be dependent on assistance from Allied administrative units for its logistical support.

Carabinieri of 65,000. The administration of the 65,000 Carabinieri is already largely the responsibility of the Italian Government which they exercise through the Iti Iti administrative organization of the Italian Army. The basic elements of the Carabinieri ration are however a US military provision and some small assistance is provided by the US and British in respect of clothing. It is proposed that subject to such alteration as may be approved as a result of the investigation of the Allied Police Mission referred to in para 7 of MAP 1094, the Carabinieri should continue to be administered by the Italian Army.

Provision of maintenance and equipment for Army and Carabinieri of total strength 205,000. Food, clothing, warlike and non warlike equipment should be furnished as follows:

1. From indigenous Italian resources including captured material and local manufacture. Raw materials for this purpose to be procured in the Italian Government import programme.

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7 Aug.

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b. By purchase from military stocks in ITALY which have been declared surplus by the US or British Disposals organizations. It is considered that the Italian Government, in respect of items required for the Italian Army, should be accorded an equal priority with UNRRA in the procurement of these supplies.

c. Items not obtainable as in a, and b, above should be procured as finished products in the Italian Government import programme.

d. As the prevention of disorders in ITALY will largely depend on the efficient functioning of the Italian Army and Carabinieri it is essential that there should be no breakdown in their administration caused by shortages or uncertainties in the arrival of their maintenance requirements. These requirements should, therefore, be accorded the necessary degree of priority by the furnishing agencies. To distinguish these requirements from those destined for the civil population they should be procured by separate indent in the Italian Government import programme.

Recommendations regarding the main items of supply for the Army and

Carabinieri are as follows:-

e. Rations. Allowing for the full use of indigenous supplies the following annual tonnages will have to be imported in addition to the import requirements for the civil population:-

30

Flour	25,000
dried vegetables	4,700

S12

population they should be processed by separate indent in the Italian Government import programme.

Recommendations regarding the main items of supply for the Army and Carabinieri are as follows:-

- a. Rations. Allowing for the full use of indigenous supplies the following annual tonnages will have to be imported in addition to the import requirements for the civil population:-

30

flour	25,000
dried vegetables	4,700
sugar	2,300
pepper	12
coffee	1,200

- b. Petrol. Petrol requirements will be included in the Italian national programme with effect from October programming for January requirements.

- c. Clothing. Requirements of raw materials to enable an initial issue and one year's maintenance to be provided for the Army of 140,000 and the Carabinieri of 65,000 are as follows:-

shoddy	2,100 metric tons
cotton	320 "
virgin wool	3,000 "
leather finished	750 "

It is considered that the above quantities can be allocated from the present planned import programme provided this programme is met.

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- 3 -

d. Equipment. Following general policy is proposed:

i. All vehicles and equipment of British and US origin (including lend lease) now in possession of the Italian combat forces (Gruppi and certain other units) should be retained with these forces and handed over to the Italian Government in accordance with standard procedure. In respect of US equipment in possession of British Iti combat units this has already been recommended in MURBA signal Y 92580 dated 13 June 45. It is proposed to hand over at the same time 6 months maintenance parts for vehicles and equipments supplied from Allied military sources.

ii. Requirements for non warlike equipments should be provided in accordance with para 5 above. It is proposed to place all non warlike stores, including such items as are at present an Allied military supply responsibility, in this category as soon as is practicable.

iii. Owing to the present inability of the Italian Government to manufacture warlike items, requirements should continue for some time to be provided from Allied sources.

iv. Maintenance requirements for tyres and tubes for all vehicles, or new materials for their manufacture, should be included in

the Italian Government import programme. *The Italian Government import programme. It is proposed to place in this category all items which are not warlike in nature but which are essential for the maintenance of the Italian Army.*

Seven.

The above proposals place the provisioning of maintenance and equipment for the Italian Army of 140,000 and the Carabinieri of 65,000 in the class

soon as is practicable.

iii. Owing to the present inability of the Italian Government to manufacture warlike items, requirements should continue for some time to be provided from Allied sources.

iv. Maintenance requirements for tyres and tubes for all vehicles, or raw materials for their manufacture, should be included in

the Italian Government import programme. The Italian Government has indicated that it will be able to supply the above proposals place the provisioning of maintenance and equipment

Seven.

for the Italian Army of 140,000 and the Carabinieri of 55,000 in the same channels as provisioning for the Italian civil economy. They are only feasible if the latter provisioning is functioning efficiently and an adequate and a steady flow of supplies to ITALY can be assured. General has been expressed on this matter in MAP

Eight

When the transfer of operational and administrative control takes place the administrative functions of the land forces will be largely of the Allied Commission in respect of the Italian Army of 140,000 will be largely of an advisory and liaison nature. They will however continue to screen these demands which continue to be met from Allied military stocks and supplies the use of such materials.

MINA

Summary of recommendations is as follows:

1. It is proposed to transfer administrative control of the Italian Army of 140,000 and of the 65,000 Carabinieri to the Italian Government at the same time as the transfer of operational control takes place.
2. If the supply policy outlined in paras 5 and 6 of this cable is approved it is proposed that the Italian Government should provide on their own account commencing with their October import programme for all supplies, POW, clothing and equipment (including raw materials for the local production of same) which cannot be procured locally. Furnishing agencies should take into account declared surpluses of British and US military stocks in the theatre and include them in the allocation of sources from which the Italian Government programme is to be met.
3. Until requirements submitted in the Italian Government import programme can be made available to the Italian Government and a steady flow of these requirements has been established, the US and British must continue to meet from US and British military stocks such requirements of the Italian Army and Carabinieri as cannot be provided from Italian Government sources. The transfer of present Allied military responsibility for providing maintenance and equipment items will of necessity be gradual and will take place by items of supply depending on the time required to establish a pipeline of supply in respect of the various items. In the case of

program can be made available to the Italian Government and a steady flow of these requirements has been established, the US and British must continue to meet from US and British military stocks such requirements of the Italian Army and Carabinieri as cannot be provided from Italian Government sources. The transfer of present Allied military responsibility for providing maintenance equipment items will of necessity be gradual and will take place by items of supply depending on the time required to establish a pipeline of supply in respect of the various items. In the case of warlike equipment it is appreciated that responsibility for its provision may have to remain a military commitment for a considerable time. Requirements of items which continue to be provided from military stocks will be ^{the Allied Military} ~~be~~ ^{continued} ~~as at present~~, by USA who will exercise such supervision as is necessary to ensure that they are economically used.

Ten. In the case of these Italian Forces who continue to be employed in relief of US and British manpower (para 5 of MAP 1051 refers) it is ^{not} ~~not~~ proposed to make ~~any~~ change in existing administrative arrangements.

Eleven It is requested that the policy outlined above be approved. In the meantime necessary preparations are being made here to facilitate the handover of administrative control of the Army and Carabinieri to the Italian Government.

INCOMING MESSAGE

AUG 3 1945

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Copy No. 1

Originator's Reference: FX 31519

Message Centre No: F/2438

Date/Time of Origin: AUG 030001

Date Time Rec'd: AUG 031130

Precedence: PRIORITY

FROM SIGNED ALEXANDER CITE PHDSC

TO : AGWAR FOR OCS AND AMSSO FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF INFO ALCOM AND MMIA

TOP SECRET.

TOP SECRET Confidential

(This is NAF 1051)

1. I have had under consideration the interim policy which, pending final settlement by the peace treaty, should be adopted towards the Italian Armed Forces in the light of our intention to hand over to the Italian Government by 30 September responsibility for Civil Administration of all ITALY less VENEZIA GIULIA and any other special areas which may be retained under AMG.

2. Internal situation in ITALY.

a. With a poor harvest and a general shortage of raw materials, especially coal, the economic situation in ITALY is deteriorating and the position is not likely to improve. This will cause labour disturbance and internal unrest which is already beginning. Such unrest would be aggravated by failure to introduce adequate civil supplies into ITALY, and in this connection the existing uncertainty regarding future procurement of such supplies is causing me grave concern.

b. The authority of the Italian Government at present largely rests on the presence of Allied troops which are being steadily reduced. If we are to avoid having to interfere in order to maintain law and order in ITALY the Italian Government must be given adequate forces whose efficiency must be increased as much as possible.

3. Italian Navy.

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The proposal to turn over further responsibility for Civil Administration to the Italian Government does not have any bearing on the size and employment of the Italian Navy. Further, the Italian Navy is employed in accordance with CCS paper 515/1 of 19 March 1944. This arrangement should continue. Measures are already in force whereby the Italian Ministry of Marine has a large say in the employment of small Italian warships after obtaining the approval of the appropriate Allied Naval authorities.

4. Italian Air Force.

There will for some time be a need for the Italian Air Force to assist the Allied forces. It is at present providing useful internal air communications and it also provides manpower for service duties. The turn over of further territory to the Italian Government is not a major consideration in regard to the size and employment of the Italian Air Force and it is therefore proposed that the present agreed ceiling of 34000 be retained. The strength within this ceiling is, however, being kept under constant review.

5. Allied requirements for Italian Army Units.

In order to save Allied manpower there will for some time continue to be an Allied requirement for the employment in ITALY of certain Italian Army Units. These requirements amount to:

- A. 106000 British in service units in direct support of British 26. This will be reduced to 59000 by end of September with further reduction thereafter.
- B. 83000 Units in service units in direct support of UNITED STATES Army. This will be reduced to 30000 by end of August with further reduction thereafter.
- C. 18000 Iti-Itis in guard units on Allied installations and in other miscellaneous units. These will gradually be reduced as dumps and

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Page 3

installations are eaten up or closed down.

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Confidential

6. Requirements of Italian Government for land forces.

The Armed Forces which it is considered will be required by the Italian Government in order to assume responsibility for Civil Administration of metropolitan ITALY, less the special areas remaining under AMG, are stated at paragraphs 7 and 8 below. These requirements for the maintenance of law and order can be summarised as:

- a. An efficient and adequate police force deployed over the whole country.
- b. Local army reserves in each territorial region in order to back up the police force in quelling local disturbances.
- c. A general army reserve strategically located in order to undertake suppression of major uprisings.
- d. Command and administrative machinery.

7. The present establishment of the Carabinieri is 65000. This force is inefficient by Allied standards. It is not however considered that any overall alteration to its establishment is necessary. The remedy lies in increasing its efficiency rather than its numbers. For the purpose an Allied Police Commission should be provided urgently to reorganize and train the Carabinieri.

8. It is considered that the Italian Government should be allowed an army of 140000 made up as follows:

<u>Type of troops</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Local reserves	40000	Organized into 10 internal security brigades each of 2500 men for 10 territorial regions on mainland and 2 IS Divs in SICILY and 1 in SARDINIA each of 5000 men
Mobile reserves	50000	5 combat grps and Garibaldi Regt
Command	9000	Min of War and territorial region HQS
Administration	31000	None
Training and reinforcements	10000	None
Total 140000		

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Confidential ²⁴⁸

9. The Italian Army has never been an effective force but as in the case of the Carabinieri we should rely on increasing the efficiency of a small force which can be maintained by the Italians themselves rather than allow them a larger interim army. The existing ALLIED MILITARY MISSION to the Italian Army must therefore be strengthened in quality and charged with supervising the reorganization of the Italian Army and assisting in its operational and administrative training.

10. ~~Operational~~ and administrative control of the force in para 8 should be assumed by the Italian Government at the time the remaining northern provinces ¹²⁵¹ less special areas are handed over, I.E. by 30 September.

11. Administration.

Recommendations regarding administrative arrangements for the forces to be handed over to the Italian Government will be the subject of a separate communication.

12. I urgently request that you approve:

- a. The policy in para 2 B
- b. My proposals regarding the Italian Navy and Air Force in paras 3 and 4.
- c. My proposal to hand over control of an army of 140000 men organized as in para 8 to the Italian Govt about 30 September.
- d. The provision of an Allied Police Mission as indicated in para 7 ²³ and details in regard to which will be the subject of separate signal.

13. In view of the urgency of the matter and of the fact that my proposals regarding the interim Italian Army are well within the ceiling at present authorized, I am proceeding to reorganize this army forthwith on the lines of para 8. The handover of this force to the Italian Government will of course await your approval.

M/C note:

L FORCES S/C received a copy direct.

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(247)

POINTS TO RAISE AT AFTER MEETING ON "PLAN FOR THE

ADMINISTRATION OF THE ITALIAN ARMY.

1. Discussions must take place on the basis of an Army of 205,000 to include the CC.RR.

2. Para 5. General Browning stated that MMIA would not be in a position to hand over control of the Italian Army until 30th September. As the Italian Government cannot govern without an effective Army it was ^{Stefano} proposed that the handback of territory ^{must be} should be postponed until 30th September.

3. Para 8.

(a) ST Transport. MMIA will have sufficient vehicles but the problem will be tyres. Service requirements will have to come from allotments made to the Italian Government for civil purposes. The point to be raised with the CCS that the tyre requirements for all the Italian Services should be found from the civil requirements, such requirements to be included in the civilian requisition programmes. CC.RR requirements for transport and tyres to be included in those of the Italian Army.

(e) Petrol. The requirements of all the Italian services should be programmed in addition to the civilian requirements, It was agreed that service requirements could be imported

the problem will be tyres. Service requirements will have to come from allotments made to the Italian Government for civil purposes. The point to be raised with the CCS is that the tyre requirements for all the Italian Services should be found from the civil requirements, such requirements to be included in the civilian requisition programmes. CC.RR requirements for transport and tyres to be included in those of the Italian Army.

23

(e) Petrol. The requirements of all the Italian services should be programmed in addition to the civilian requirements, It was agreed that service requirements could be imported with the civilian requirements, but it was not agreed that they could be deducted from present civilian allocations.

4. Para 12. Our recommendation should be that the Italian Government cannot feed the Italian Army until the arrival of imports. 30th September was suggested as a date but in this event, the arrival of the imports must be guaranteed for that date. The Italian Army should not be called upon to use ~~any~~ their reserve food stocks ~~in~~ during any interim period between the date on which the Allied Forces cease responsibility for their provision and the arrival of imports.

5. Para 13(a). The following points to be raised:

(a) Is MMTA in a position to reassume control?

-2-

(b) Does the re-assumption of administrative control mean the re-assumption of operational control?

(c) Does this mean the re-assumption of military government? Para 13(a)(11). See Planning Paper.

6. Para 19. Do the provisions of para 18(b) apply to the Italian Air Force (Para 19)?

7. Para 20. Subject to qualifications in para 1(b). In para (a) the words "frontiers of Italy" to read "Northern frontiers of Italy".

8. Para 21. ~~Reduction of BR/ITI units to be undertaken up by British forces. Priority in transport required for this purpose.~~

8. Para 21. Rapid reduction of BR/ITI forces required: also more rapid release of ITI/ITI Guard Bns by British forces. Priority in transport required for redistribution of Italian troops.

9. Para 23(b). Delete the word "civil" in line 5.

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in transport required for redistribution of Italian troops.

- 9. Para 23(b). Delete the word "civil" in line 5.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Economic Section

MEMORANDUM:

1 August 1945

TO : Executive Commissioner

The following additional information with reference to the food import requirements for the Italian Interim Force is furnished below:

<u>Item</u>	<u>Estimated Total</u> <u>Requirements</u> <u>by Non-Producers</u>	<u>Imports Required</u> <u>to Meet</u> <u>Deficiencies</u>	<u>Additional Amounts</u> <u>Required for</u> <u>Italian Army</u>
	(Short tons per annum)		
Flour (or equiva- lent wheat)	3,442,681	1,071,011	35,074
Dry Vegetables	329,828	185,025	4,676
Sugar	205,853	143,260	2,338
Pepper	-	-	12
Coffee	3,081	3,081	1,169

Charles W. Walcott
CHARLES W. WALCOTT
Colonel
Chief, Supply Division

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Economic Section

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1 August 1945

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Pepper	-	-	12
Coffee	3,081	3,081	1,169

(Short tons per annum)

Charles W. Walton
CHARLES W. WALTON
Colonel
Chief, Supply Division

(244)

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

1 Aug 45

TO: Executive Commissioner.

I give below the latest figures for Carabinieri transport requirements based on a 65,000 ceiling:

T I P O A U T O M E Z Z I	quantita occorrente	Quantita esistente	Differenza in meno
Autovetture	1026	438	588
Autocarri leggeri	1310	114	1196
Autocarri pesanti	288	15	273
Autopompe	27	-	27
Autofurgoncini	48	19	29
Motocarrozze	156	20	136
Motociclette biposto	13,664	836	12828
Motocarrelli e mototricicli	120	15	105
Motocicli	932	-	932
Autocamioncini	12	-	12

NOTE: POL 65/205 of 7375 metric tons per month = 2045 tons.

B. D. Benham
for G.R. UPJOIN, Brig., 20601
VP CA Section.

TOP SECRET 8251
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
ECONOMIC SECTION

Copy #1

243

Confidential

AUG 1 1945

Ref: TS-100/B/Es

/ August 1945

SUBJECT : Comments on Log Plan 120/6 "Plan for the Administration of the Italian Army"

TO : Chief Commissioner

217

1. Reference your 8251/217/EC, 30 July 1945.

2. The Log Plan for the Administration of the Italian Army has been studied in the Economic Section. Prior to its receipt, computations have been made to determine the ability of the Italian Economy to support an "interim force" and the CCRR at the following strengths:

Italian Army	140,000
CCRR	65,000
TOTAL	205,000

The computations did not include:

Italian Navy
Italian Air Force

Because of the indefinite information on these two components, computations of their requirements can not be made at this time, but a supply plan for the whole Italian military establishment should include provisions for them.

3. Noted in the LOG Plan (See paragraph 9.a) is the provision for retention of Allied equipment, and so forth, now in the hands of Italian units. This provision, for at least part of the initial requirements, will tend to reduce requirements as computed by the Economic Section. However, in view of the uncertain status of the retained equipment, it is suggested that the figures from the Economic Section remain in effect.

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2 - Comments on Log Plan 120/6 "Plan for the Administration of the Italian Army"

4. Rations. (See paragraph 9.b)

Confidential

It is suggested that additional imports of certain rationed items be introduced to avoid impairment of the civilian ration scale.

5. Clothing. (See paragraph 9.c)

Present civilian programs provide for textiles not only for Italian use, but for limited export, hence it is evident that the Italian Economy, including Program Imports, can support the military requirements for textiles. Leather, both indigenous and that envisaged for the import programs, should provide the required boots.

6. Petrol. (See paragraph 9.d)

It is not entirely clear to the Economic Section that the Petrol for the military forces is included in the civilian requirements. Suggest that PETSEC review this point.

7. Date of termination - provision for maintenance. (See paragraph 12)

While the existing programs call for material sufficient to support the military forces, it should be born in mind that receipts of supplies on the programs may be considerably delayed by factors over which AC has no control. Such delays would cause corresponding delay in the transfer of responsibility.

8. Additional Import Requirements. (See Appendix D)

Further study of the import requirements has caused revisions, hence, Appendix D should be re-written. A revised Appendix D is presented herewith.


Charles W. Walton
E. E. MCKINLEY *C.W.W.*
Brigadier General, USA
Acting ~~President~~ President
CHARLES W. WALTON
Col
Chief, Supply Division

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Confidential 241

Minute 3

3 30/7/ MMIA
45

1. Attached are the requirements of the "interim force of 140,000 plus the 65,000 CORR. These requirements have been computed on the new wastage rates submitted to this office by your minute 2 of 27 July 1945 and which amends Appendix "B" of your TS/Q/3 of 15 June 1945 as follows:

Blouses	15%	Shirts	23%
Trousers	15%	Caps	10%
Boots	25%	Overcoats	5%
Pullovers	10%	Socks	33 1/3 %
Vests	15%	Belts waist	5%
Drawers	15%	Blankets	10%

2. POL requirements are computed by the designation of the additional CORR as administrative troops, whose consumption per man per day is 1 gal.

SGD EBM
E. B. MCKINLEY
Brigadier General, USA
Acting Vice President

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TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

No. 2.

Confidential

No.	Date	To	Remarks
2.	27/7/45	Econ. Section AC	1. It is pointed out that the schedules of winter monthly wastage rates were based on practical experience of the endurance of the Allied Salvage articles which have been available for issue. These rates are obviously high if new material is to be made available. Revised figures as under based on British wastage rates have been added to incl 2 in red ink.

Blouses	15%	Shirts	23%
Trousers	15%	Caps	10%
Boots	25%	Overcoats	5%
Pullovers	10%	Socks	33 1/3 %
Vests	15%	Belts waist	5%
Drawers	15%	Blankets	10%

2. It is observed that the estimate now furnished does not include the 65,000 CORR and that if the overall picture of the interim Italian Army is to be seen the figures given at para 3 (a) would require to be substituted by those furnished in para 1 of the Memo of 17 July from Supply Div.
These were as follows :-

	Tons per Annum		
	Italian Army (140,000)	Carabinieri (65,000)	Total
Flour	25,000	11,600	36,600
Dried Vegetables	2,800	1,300	4,100
Sugar	1,600	742	2,342
Pepper	8	4	12
Coffee	800	400	1,200

(s) R. A. Curties

R. A. CURTIES Lt.Col.
for Major General.
M. M. I. A.

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TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
ECONOMIC SECTION
MINUTE

TOP SECRET

Confidential 134

Italian Economy Support of an Interim Force of Italian Army

1

MEMO

1. Forwarded herewith is a report to the Chief Commissioner on the requirements to support an interim force of the Italian Army. Your attention is especially invited to para's 3 h and g.

The requirements for raw materials and coal for the production of clothing and shoes appear to be essentially high. This resulted from the use of MIA schedules for consumption. Request that these schedules be reviewed and that Economic Section be advised of any changes therein.

5. The requirements for TOL, based on man power, were objected to by JETEC. In case your knowledge of the quantities and types of vehicles becomes more definitive, request that the Economic Section be advised.

SGD EBM.

H. B. McKinley
Brigadier General, USA
Acting Vice President

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Appendix "A" to MIA ltr
13/0/3 dated 15 June 45.SUPPLY OF RATIONS

Confidential (23)

1. Following represent requirements by items, for a thirty (30) day period based on a strength of 10,000 and calculated on the approved scale for Italian Armed Forces:-

Requirements 10,000 x 30 = 300,000 rations.

Part I - Component now supplied by Allies.

<u>Commodity</u>	<u>Scale</u>	<u>Amount (Lbs)</u>
Flour	15 oz.	281,250
Veg. Dried	2 oz.	37,500
Meat/Fish (Pres.)	3 oz.	56,250
Cheese	1 oz.	18,750
Sugar	1 oz.	18,750
Macaroni	3 oz.	56,250
Rice	1 oz.	18,750
Veg. Dehyd.	1 oz.	18,750
Catsup	$\frac{1}{2}$ oz.	9,375
Coffee	$\frac{1}{2}$ oz.	9,375
Pepper	$\frac{1}{200}$ oz.	93.75

Part II - Component now supplied by Italians.

Fruit, Fresh	4 oz.	75,000
Veg. Fresh	8 oz.	150,000
Oil, Olive	1 oz.	18,750
Nuts w/o shells	$1\frac{1}{2}$ oz.	28,125
or Nuts w/shells	3 oz.	56,250
Salt	24 grams	15,873 lbs
Wine	$\frac{1}{2}$ litre	150,000 litres
(1) Matches	40 matches per week	16,000 boxes
Soap	300 grams	6,613.8 lbs.
(2) Cigarettes	5 cigs	1,500,000 cigs.

NOTES

- (1) Boxes of 100 matches (Italian).
- (2) Calculation does not include additional amount of cigarettes issued to Combat Groups, "Army Area" troops and Reinforcement Training Camp, Italian Combat Forces, Casano. Approximately 28% increase would be required to meet additional issue of five (5) cigarettes.

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Appendix "B" to
TS/O/3 dated 5/5/54

		CLOTHING STOCK ESTIMATE AT 1 SEPTEMBER 1945					TOTAL Estimate
Items	Scale	Combat Winter Wastage per Month	Combat Winter Monthly Requirements for 10,000	Estimated Stock now Repaired and Available on 1 September	Estimated Stock NOT repaired but which will be ready by 1 September	clothing avail on 1 Sep 45 for "Interim" Ital Excl BR-ITI & Service Units.	
Blouses	45% 1	33 1/2 %	3333	85,000	3,512	88,512	
Trousers	45% 1	33 1/2 %	3333	65,000	23,551	88,551	
Boots	25% 1	50 %	5000	100,000	185,121	285,121	
Pullovers or sweaters	20% 1	20 %	2000	31,929	-	31,929	
Vests	15% 2	33 1/2 %	6666	-	-	-	
Drawers	15% 2	33 1/2 %	6666	150,973	5,820	156,793	
Shirts	23% 2	33 1/2 %	6666	80,000	22,322	102,322	
Caps	10% 1	10 %	1000	50,000	452	50,452	
Overcoats	5% 1	5 %	500	79,236	2,576	81,812	
Socks	33 1/2% 3	33 1/2 %	10000	10,000	52,363	62,363	
Belted Waist	5% 1	5 %	500	20,815	-	20,815	
Blankets	10% 2	10 %	2000	63,000	750	63,750	

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

TOP SECRET

Appendix "B" to NMIA Ltr.
TS/2/3 dated 5 June 45.

WEARING STOCK ESTIMATE AT 1 SEPTEMBER 1945

Combat Inter Monthly Requirements for 10,000	Estimated Stock now Repaired and Available on 1 September	Estimated Stock NOT repaired but which will be ready by 1 September	TOTAL Estimate of clothing available on 1 Sep 45 for "Interim" Italian Army Excl BR-ITI and US-ITI Service Units.
3333	85,000	3,512	88,512
3333	65,000	23,551	88,551
5000	100,000	185,121	285,121
2000	31,929	"	31,929
6666	-	-	-
6666	150,973	5,820	156,793
6666	80,000	22,322	102,322
1000	50,000	1,52	50,452
500	79,236	2,576	81,812
10000	10,000	52,363	62,363
500	20,815	-	20,815
2000	63,000	750	63,750

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Confidential ^{Copy #2}

Subject: Relaxation of Control of Italian Army.

Land Forces Sub Comm. A.C.
(M. M. I. A.) ROME
TS/O/3

15 June 1945

To: HQ A.C. for Economic Section.

1. Reference your Memorandum CWV/SC dated 9 June 45. I attach as appendix "A" and "B" certain figures which will be of assistance in your calculations to assess the maintenance requirements of the Italian Army. It is assumed that the U.S. and Br will continue to maintain as now such US-IFI and BR-IFI service troops as are retained.

2. Appendix "A" RATIONS.

Calculated on the basis of 30 days requirements for 10,000 men. Stocks are kept low and the Italian Government will need to produce almost a full month's supply during the first month.

3. Appendix "B" CLOTHING.

The amount of clothing required is dependent on the wastage rate. The wastage rates given are those found approximately correct for combat conditions in winter when the clothing is issued in an already part-worn condition. It is considered that this wastage rate will be much less in the peace conditions of the "Interim" Italian Army. The stock estimated to be available on 1 September is shown as accurately as possible. No account has been taken of certain clothing stocks provided by Br Ord specifically for BR-ITIS.

4. TRANSPORT - P.O.L.

The proportion of M.T. and Horse-drawn transport to be used is not known, but the Italian Army would only be able to maintain a force of, say, 140,000 men if the Italian Army M.T. now being used by Allied Armies, civilians, AMG, etc. is returned to the Army.

A method (Br) sometimes used in estimating P.O.L. consumption is that of 1 gal per man per day in war and 1/4 in peace.

It is suggested that a mixed force of semi-Combat Troops and Base Troops as is envisaged might be calculated on a basis of semi-combat troops at 1/2 gal per man per day and Adv. troops at 1/4 gal per man per day.

INCL #3

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Requirements would then be -

for every 10,000 Combat Troops
for every 10,000 Adm. Troops

150,000 Br gals per month.
75,000 Br gals per month.

FJM/le

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²¹⁸
Major General,
M. M. I. A.

11

30

TOP SECRET

TS-106

cto
Ex. Comm (L'let Talbot)
forwarded - we spoke

1 Aug.

CAS

8251
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APO 394

MEMORANDUM

234
1/8/45
AUG 1 1945

SUBJECT : Plan for Administration of the Italian Army.
TO : Civil Affairs Section. (215)

Reference Log.P. 120/6 dated 29 July 1945
and 8251/217/EC dated 30 July 1945.

1. The plan, so far as Public Safety Sub-Commission is concerned, is agreed in principle.

2. Carabinieri are dealt with in para 16 a, b and c. The proposals therein for future administration being consistent with proposals for the Italian Army are not objectionable to this Sub-Commission.

3. It is significant from a P.S. point of view that comparison the future army strength of 140000 there will be a CC.RR Force of 65000 by which it is concluded that this form of police will have an important role to play. It will mean a very close liaison between what is left of P.S. Sub-Commission and IMIA.

4. Shortage of clothing, equipment and transport has always been a serious matter and even at this date the CC.RR are not properly clothed or equipped and there are indications that given the material they will go ahead and make a good job.

5. Transport. The CC.RR will require to be more mobile than ever on the hand over and transport must be a No. 1 priority. The position at present is deplorable.

6. Exception is taken to the phrase "in practice" in the last sentence of para 16 b. It should read "in theory".

no action
necessary
1 August 1945

John W. Chapman
JOHN W. CHAPMAN
Colonel, J.A.G.D.
Director.

From : Air Forces Sub Commission, Rome
 To : Executive Commissioner
 Date : 1st August 1945
 Ref : AFSC/366/ORG

AUG 1 1945

TOP SECRET
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PLAN FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ITALIAN ARMY
(ITALIAN AIR FORCE)

Replying to your letter ref. 8251/220/EC. of the 31st July, the Air Forces Sub Commission has no comments to make on the Plan for the Administration of the Italian Army and agrees in principle with the draft planning paper.

Some detailed comments and a small correction of Appendix 'A' are shown as follows : -

Page 3., para (9).

Italian Air Force.

1. It should be noted that the breakdown of the Italian Air Force ceiling figure between BR/ITI and US/ITI is as follows :

	Ceiling Strength.	Category BR/ITI
(a) Italian Air Force. (Operational)	22000	BR/ITI
(b) I.A.F. personnel serving with R.A.F. units. (Non operational duties)	2500	BR/ITI
(c) I.A.F. personnel serving with U.S.A.A.F. units. (Non operational duties)	6500	US/ITI

Note. In the case of para (b) above, there is a temporary

1754

Italian Air Force.

1. It should be noted that the breakdown of the Italian Air Force ceiling figure between BR/ITI and US/ITI is as follows :

	Ceiling Strength.	Category BR/ITI
(a) Italian Air Force. (Operational)	22000	
(b) I.A.F. personnel serving with R.A.F. units. (Non operational duties)	2500	BR/ITI
(c) I.A.F. personnel serving with U.S.A.A.F. units. (Non operational duties)	6500	US/ITI

Note.

In the case of para (b) above, there is a temporary increase of 3000 to cover the entry of ex-P.O.W. Companies, as from July 1st 1945.

2. Para (9), 4th line - "Balance 22500 BR/ITI" should read "Balance 22000 BR/ITI, plus 3000 ex P.O.W. Companies".

no action

[Signature]

L.E. JARMAN, G/Cpt,
Air Vice-Marshal,
Air Officer Commanding.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Confidential

NSC/3115
31 July 1945

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FIRST ENDORSEMENT On

Exec. Com. AC Top Secret
ltr Ref. 8251/220/EC of
31 July 1945.

AUG 1 1945

From: Navy Sub-Commission, Hq. Allied Commission.
To: Executive Commissioner, Hq. Allied Commission.
Via: Director Air Forces Sub-Commission.
Subject: Plan For the Administration of the Italian Army.
Enclosure: (A) Copy of Report "Status of Personnel of the Royal Italian Navy as of 20 June 1945".

1. The basic correspondence together with copy No. 26 of Allied Force Headquarters "Plan For the Administration of the Italian Army" of 29 July 1945, is forwarded herewith with particular reference to paragraph 4 thereof which requires comments to the Executive Commissioner by Wednesday, 1 August, 1945 1200 hrs.

2. The Navy Sub-Commission, Allied Commission concurs generally in the comments contained in paragraph 18 of the plan with reference to the Italian Navy and in the conclusions made in paragraph 26 as follows:

"26. Italian Navy

Rations and clothing for the Italian Navy should be provided by the Italian Government and this responsibility should be transferred to the Italian Government at the same time as the similar responsibility for these items for the 'interim' Italian Army is transferred."

3. The provisions of paragraph 3 of appendix A to the plan, with reference to the maintenance responsibilities for the Italian Navy, are substantially correct except that under the provisions of Combined Chiefs of Staff Secret Directive C.C.S. 515/1 of 19 March 1944, the repair, maintenance and supply of the Italian Navy is a United Kingdom responsibility. The provision of rations is a British Army commitment, for the reason that the British Army is responsible for the supply of rations to the British Navy in forward areas where Naval victualling is not practicable. No directives are available indicating that the British Army is responsible for the provision of clothing to the Italian Navy. In fact clothing is provided from

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NSC/3115

31 July 1945

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FIRST ENDORSEMENT On
Exec.Com.AC Top Secret
ltr Ref. 8251/220/EC of
31 July 1945.

Subject: Plan For the Administration of the Italian Army.

(Cont.)

the United Kingdom through the Royal Navy. In addition Naval stores and equipment are supplied from the United Kingdom to the Italian Navy.

4. The Italian Ministry of Marine has already been informed verbally that consideration should be given to plans for the assumption of responsibility by the Italian Navy for the supply of rations and clothing through Italian Governmental sources by 31 December 1945.

5. A copy of a report showing the status of Italian Navy personnel as of 20 June 1945 is forwarded herewith as enclosure (A) for information.

W. Hansen

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REAR ADMIRAL
CHIEF, NAVY SUB-COMMISSION, AC.

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CONFIDENTIAL

STATUS OF PERSONNEL OF THE ROYAL ITALIAN NAVY

as of 20 June 1945.

SUMMARY

Officers:	
Enrolled	5,711
Active Duty	5,303
Enlisted Men:	
Enrolled	67,250
Active Duty	61,667
Total Forces:	
Enrolled	72,961
Active Duty	66,970

OFFICER ENROLLMENT - DISTRIBUTION BY BRANCHES OF THE SERVICE

Branch of Service	In Permanent Effective Status	Recalled in Active Service	TOTAL
Line	1,305	912	2,217
Naval Construction and Engineering	429	338	767
Ordnance and Electrical Engineering	178	65	243
Medical	159	222	381
Supplies and Accounts	166	270	445
Port Direction	226	139	362
Chaplains and Civilian Branches	552	353	905
Army Engineers in Naval Service	45	192	235
Military Police and Coast and Anti-Aircraft Defense	13	139	152
TOTAL	3,971	2,526	6,497

Naval Construction and Engineering	429	338	987
Ordnance and Electrical Engineering	179	65	243
Medical	159	222	381
Supplies and Accounts	156	279	445
Port Direction	226	136	362
Chaplains and Civilian Branches	552	353	905
Army Engineers in Naval Service	43	192	235
Military Police and Coast and Anti-Aircraft Defense	13	139	152
TOTAL	3,071	2,526	5,607
Midshipmen - Royal Naval Academy			297
GRAND TOTAL			5,904
Deduct Officers on Active List without Assignments.			187
			5,717

ENLISTED MEN - DISTRIBUTION BY RATINGS AND CHARACTER OF ENLISTMENT

	Chief Petty Officers	Petty Officers	Other Ratings and Seamen	TOTAL
Voluntary Enlistment	4,032	3,251	11,136	18,419
Conscripted	-	-	15,569	15,569
Reservists Recalled	1,090	2,312	29,960	33,262
TOTAL	5,122	5,563	56,565	67,250

ARMY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

Military Police 575
 Army Engineers 50
 Nurses 68
 Civil Personnel of Naval Academy . . . 236 (militarized)
 Civil Administration Personnel . . . 791 (of which 309 are militarized officials)
 TOTAL 1,720

SHORE STATIONSZONE OF OPERATIONS - FRONT LINE

<u>Duty or Status</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted Men</u>
Reggimento San Marco (Naval Brigade)	169	5,005

TARANTO

<u>Duty or Status</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted Men</u>
Defense (Coast Defense)	136	1,032
Shore Duty	654	7,707
Duty for Allies (unloading ships) (Miscellaneous)	6	1,445
	25	217
Awaiting Orders	66	2,524 *
Convalescing in Hospital	3	472
Awaiting Courts-Martial	-	72
Immobilized by penal action	5	306
At the disposition of the Commission of Inquiry	-	16
TOTAL Number in Active Service	893	14,091
On Leave (Ordinary and Convalescent)	63	2,075

<u>Duty or Status</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted Men</u>
Defense (Coast Defense)	136	1,058
Shore Duty	654	7,707
Duty for Allies (unloading ships)	8	1,445
(Miscellaneous)	28	217
Awaiting Orders	66	2,324 *
Convalescing in Hospital	3	472
Awaiting Courts-Martial	-	72
Immobilized by Penal Action	5	306
At the disposition of the Commission of Inquiry	-	15
TOTAL Number in Active Service	895	14,991
On Leave (Ordinary and Convalescent)	62	2,075
Absconding Deserters	1	1,235
On Call - Awaiting Retirement or Discharge	32	861
TOTAL Force Enrolled	995	19,262

Of which: 859 are on subsistence only,
139 are without clothes,
24 centralized for various destinations.

BRINDISI

<u>Duty or Status</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted Men</u>
Defense (Coast Defense)	35	638
Shore Duty	214	3,180
Duty for Allies (unloading ships)	7	403 *
(Miscellaneous)	10	219 **

BRINDISI (continued)

<u>Duty or Status</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted Men</u>
Awaiting Orders	7	272
Convalescing in Hospital	2	133
Immoblized by Penal Action	-	374
At the disposition of the Commission of Inquiry.	-	43
TOTAL Number in Active Service	275	5,867
On Leave (Ordinary and Convalescent)	13	222
Abseonding Deserters	-	605
On Call - Awaiting Retirement or Discharge	4	-
TOTAL Force Enrolled	292	6,694

* of these; 380 are an unloading company with the Navy Detachment at Civravolo.
26 officers are attached to group unloading Allied steamers or are at the British Naval Base.

** First port Company Bari.

etc of these; 21 are without clothes.
82 are for service disposition of Navy at Brindisi.

NAPLES and SANTA

<u>Duty or Status</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted Men</u>
Defense (Coast Defense)	12	72
Shore Duty	370	3,559
Duty for Allies (unloading ships)	37	288
(Miscellaneous)	-	637
Awaiting Orders	25	-
Convalescing in Hospital	3	140

as First Port Company Earl.

one of these; 21 are without clothes.

82 are for service disposition of Navy at Brindisi.

NAPLES and GAETA

<u>Duty or Status</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted Men</u>
Defense (Coast Defense)	12	72
Shore Duty	370	2,559
Duty for Allies (Unloading Ships)	37	239
(Miscellaneous)	-	327
Awaiting Orders	25	-
Convalescing in Hospital	3	140
Awaiting Courts-Martial	-	9
Immobilized by Penal Action	2	-
At the disposition of the Commission of Inquiry	-	220
TOTAL Number in Active Service	449	3,116
On Leave (Ordinary and Convalescent)	30	374
Absconding Deserters	1	-
On Call - Awaiting Retirement or Discharge	32	-
TOTAL Force Enrolled	512	3,490

CALABRIA

<u>Duty or Status</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted Men</u>
Coast Defense	3	-
Shore Duty	9	253
TOTAL Number in Active Service	12	253
TOTAL Force Enrolled	12	253

SARDINIA

<u>Duty or Status</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted Men</u>
Defense (Anti-Aircraft)	15	405
Defense (Coast Defense)	5	56
Shore Duty	198	3,144
Duty for Allies (Miscellaneous)	-	19
Awaiting Orders	1	90 *
Convalescing in Hospital	-	31
Immobilized by Penal Action	2	174
TOTAL Number in Active Service	222	3,917
On Leave (Ordinary and Convalescent)	7	139
Absconding Deserters	-	572
On Call - Awaiting Retirement or Discharge	5	-
TOTAL Force Enrolled	234	4,128

* Of which, 11 are with subsistence.

Duty for Allies (Miscellaneous)	1	90 *
Awaiting Orders	-	51
Convalescing in Hospital	2	174
Immobilized by penal action	228	3,917
TOTAL Number in Active Service	7	139
On Leave (Ordinary and Convalescent)	-	372
Absconding Deserters	5	-
On Call - Awaiting Retirement or Discharge	234	4,128
TOTAL Force Enrolled		
* Of which; 11 are with subsistence.		

SICILY

<u>Duty or Status</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted Men</u>
Shore Duty	260	2,247
Duty for Allies (Miscellaneous)	-	22
Awaiting Orders	2	-
Convalescing in Hospital	1	3
TOTAL Number in Active Service	263	2,272
On Leave (Ordinary and Convalescent)	19	-
On Call - Awaiting Retirement or Discharge	11	-
TOTAL Force Enrolled	293	2,272

ROME and CIVITA VECCHIA

<u>Duty or Status</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted Men</u>
Shore Duty	673	2,255 *
Awaiting Orders	67	-
Convalescing in Hospital	<u>2</u>	<u>-</u>
TOTAL Number in Active Service	742	2,255
On Leave (Ordinary and Convalescent)	25	-
On Call - Awaiting Retirement or Discharge	<u>85</u>	<u>-</u>
TOTAL Force Enrolled	862	2,255

* Of which; 133 are at Civita Vecchia.

EMILIA, LOMBARDIA and TUSCANY

<u>Duty or Status</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted Men</u>
Shore Duty	174	333 *
Duty for Allies (Miscellaneous)	-	202 **
Awaiting Orders	<u>7</u>	<u>-</u>
TOTAL Number in Active Service	181	535
On Leave (Ordinary and Convalescent)	13	-
On Call - Awaiting Retirement or Discharge	<u>32</u>	<u>-</u>
TOTAL Force Enrolled	226	535

* Of these; 11 are at La Spezia.
 ** Third port Company.

VENETO, ABRUZZI and THE MARCHES

<u>Duty or Status</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted Men</u>
Shore Duty	74	497

Duty for Allies (Miscellaneous)Awaiting Orders

<u>7</u>	<u>535</u>
191	

TOTAL Number in Active ServiceOn Leave (Ordinary and Convalescent)

13	
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On Call - Awaiting Retirement or Discharge

<u>38</u>	<u>535</u>
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TOTAL Force Enrolled

236	2
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* Of these: 11 are at La Spezia.
* Third Port Company.

VENETO, ANROZZI and
THE MARCHESDuty or StatusShore DutyOfficers

74	<u>Enlisted Men</u>
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Duty for Allies (Miscellaneous)Awaiting Orders

-	427
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TOTAL Number in Active Service

120 *	
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On Call - Awaiting Retirement or Discharge

<u>3</u>	<u>607</u>
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TOTAL Force Enrolled

77	
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* Fourth Labor Company - Ancona.

<u>19</u>	<u>607</u>
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ROYAL NAVAL ACADEMY, BRINDISIDuty or StatusShore DutyOfficers

355 *	<u>Enlisted Men</u>
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TOTAL Force Enrolled

211	
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365	211
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* Of which, 69 are Officers and 297 are cadets of the Royal Naval Academy.

ON SEA DUTY

	In Italy		Abroad		Allied Service	
	Officers	Enlis. Men	Officers	Enlis. Men	Officers	Enlis. Men
BATTLESHIPS	172	2,862	70	1,099	-	-
CRUISERS	308	5,163	-	-	-	-
DESTROYERS	168	2,281	-	-	-	-
TORPEDO BOATS and CORVETTES	321	5,181	-	-	-	-
ANTI-SUBMARINE CRAFT	78	770	-	-	-	-
SUBMARINES	182	212	92	654	-	70
ASSAULT UNITS	53	13	-	-	-	-
MINESWEEPERS, PILOT BOAT PATROLS	56	2,160	-	-	-	345
VESSELS in LOCAL SERVICE AND SUBSIDIARIES	153	3,435	-	360	-	358
TOTAL	1,493	22,652	162	2,113	-	773

RECAPITULATION

	Officers	Enlisted Men	TOTAL
On Sea Duty	1,655	25,533	27,193
Anti-Aircraft and Coast Defense	207	2,201	2,408
Shore Duty	2,991	21,376	24,367
Duty for Allies (Unloading Ships)	50	2,140	2,190
(Miscellaneous)	33	1,626	1,659
Reggimento San Marco	169	3,005	3,174
Awaiting Orders	178	3,786	3,964

RECAPITULATION

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted Men</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
TOTAL	1,493	22,683	24,176
On Sea Duty	207	2,201	2,408
Anti-Aircraft and Coast Defense	2,991	21,376	24,367
Shore Duty	50	2,140	2,190
Duty for Allies (unloading ships)	33	1,626	1,659
Miscellaneous	169	3,005	3,174
Regiments San Marco	178	3,796	3,974
Awaiting Orders	11	781	792
Convalescing in Hospital	-	81	81
Awaiting Courts-Martial	9	854	863
Immoblized by Penal Action	-	272	272
At disposition of Commission of Inquiry	5,303	61,667	66,970
TOTAL Number in Active Service	173	2,810	2,983
On Leave (Ordinary and Convalescent)	2	1,912	1,914
Absconding Deserters	227	861	1,088
On Call - Awaiting Retirement or Discharge	5,711	67,250	72,961
TOTAL Forces Enrolled			

