

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

ACC

10000/109/1142
(VOL. IV)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

0/109/1142
-IV)

ITALIAN ARMY POLICY
MAY-DEC. 1945

1274

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

396

~~CSO~~ ~~14/12~~

Pre see 395 for info: important and interesting

18/12

397

~~CSO~~ ~~14/12~~

See, file has been held up because it has been
with Ex. Gen. & C.C. for the past 5 days.

11/12

163

(380)

CSP Re see 384 for info. DB 31.2
CSP Re see 387 & 388 for info. DB 31.2

391

OFFICE OF THE G. O. C.
MILITARY MISSION TO THE ITALIAN ARMY

Thursday 4 Dec.

Dear Maurice,

(390) I would like
attached (if you agree with
it) signed by Chief
Commissioner & sent
off today, in view of
its urgency

Yours ever
Langley Browning

162

(390) I would like
attached (if you agree with
it) signed by Chief
Commissioner & sent
off today, in view of
its urgency

Yours ever
Langley Browning

| Signed for C.C.

WZ

392

2-5-50 P.O. 1-12

Pse see 390 - info only

2034612

WZ

WZ

Ex-Low

372-3

Per sec draft for info.

26/11

GO's / Land Forces (MICA)

I think we should reply to 273 so you

agree draft opposite - pending letter

NS (27/11)

376

Executive Commissioner

We got a separate signal from AFHQ
(EX 54297 dated 24 Nov) & replied,

copy to you, that a full appreciation
was being sent soonest by Chief
Commissioner. I think you need
send no further signal which
could only give a partial view.
Let AFHQ have all the facts &
factors in full.

372

362

Executive Commissioner

We got a separate signal from AFHQ
(EX 54297 dated 24 Nov) & replied.

copy to you, that a full appreciation
was being sent soonest by Chief
Commissioner. I think you need

send no further signal which
could only give a partial view.

Let AFHQ have all the facts &
factors in full.

d.B.

28 Nov

377

250.

When in the copy - 9 then add even if 161

25/11

383

Ex. Com.

you. min 377 - pl. see P. 382

29/11 153

Free
29/11

785017

D/E. ~~17/11~~ 365
364
Pse see 364 for info. ~~transmission to Encl.~~
C80
17/11
10/11

367
C80 Pse see 366 for info
17/11
10/11

MS/21/11

368
17/11

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

160

Exec Comm.

339

Page 1 for your information. I have discussed the matter with Colonel Pindley and he is arranging with the IFW Division for that division to come under command; the division will remain, however, on our WE for the time being until MIA have had time to look into the position further.

T-140 25/10.

340

Chief Commissioner.

Folio 338.

Attached is submitted for your signature ^{approval} information ^{OCT 25 NECD} 1045

At last!

F.C.

Dr 23/11

OK 15/9

352

Ex Comm. Fol. 344-351 for info. Approval of Cys still required. *Encl 31/10*

353

P.A. R/L the last directive for the Air Force Sub Com.

E.C.

At last!

NS (23/12)

011159
JMD352

Ev Com- Tol. 344-351 for info. Approval of Cgs
still required. Enr 31/10

PA. B. of the last director for the Air Force Sub Com.

NS (2/12)

354

Sir,

At 95 in attached file.

p. 2

158

PA. Please be typed. I will then discuss
with GOC, Land Force.

NS (3/12)

267

Ex. Comm. P. 331-332 for inform.

1-10/10
8/10

CSO Discuss Alex Lou's meeting & then
leave with me to submit to C.C.
DK/EPK

Chic(Commissioner)

332

Done, see 3350

For information. I will send copy to Econ
Sec. & ask their views re Econ rsuffly problems

OCT 10 REPT
1225

DK/9/10

333

Exec. Comm.

Noted

Quo ce

11/10

Chas. (Olmiscova)

For information.

See: each their vass in EOC vs. fly problems

OCT 10 REPT
1225

12/9/6*

(333)

Exec. Comm.

Noted

11/10

2nd cc

(334)

CSO

Adm as

(337)

See 335

12/1/6*

Ex-Com.

CSO-

Ref. min ³³⁵ 6. At 4:30^{PM} is reply ~~to~~ Ex. Sec.,
Previous and fuller communication of
Ex Sec. to ~~in~~ file referred to is in file
8251 at folio 303. Said letter was
sent to AFHQ at folio 309.

18/10

12/1/6*

157

321

Ex. Com. Your min. 319. - my apologies.
 Memoirs at 320 the Aide Memoire

File
 3/10.

322
 Aide Memoire speaks of
 "today" but it is updated. 1500
 5/10
 Exec. 1500
 3/10

Chief Commissioner.

approval
 use.
 information

VP's meeting on 3/10 at which Gen
 Browning asked for representation to be made to P.M.
3/10

323

CSO

Gen Browning is amended the

Aide memoir which should be

approval
use.

VP's memo attached is submitted for your signature information

Please see VP's meeting on 3/18 at which Gen
Brownie asked for representation to be made to P.M.
D.R. C.H.A.

323

CSD

Gen Brownie is amended to

Article memo in which should be

in this file

D.R. C.H.A.

156

Revised 12/10

326

CSD. Folio 324 is the information referred
to in min. 323.

Folio 325 brings it up to date, giving
information obtained by phone this date 155

Emet 12/10

785017

314.

Ex-Com.

P313 - Would the C.S. be good enough to
to knode together the heads of Finance and
War Minister - does the P.M.?

Final

27/9.
P.S. 315 has just come in from Africa who leave
the hardness of the "hock" to C.S. judgement.

Ugenda

(316)

G.O.C. Land Force Sub Com.

As he intrincks the other day (V.P. meeting)
Chie) Commission is prepared to speak to you
wiz. On 314 you recommend action by C.S.
10.11 you please prefer for C.S. Aid. Memoir from
which he can speak to subsequently leave with

H.P.M.

Mr (3875)

Ex Com.

318

G.O.C. Land Force Sub Com.

As he indicated the other day (VPI meeting)
Chm) Commission is prepared to speak to you
wrt. On 3/34 you recommended action by C.C.
Will you please inform for C.C. Aide Memoir from
which he can speak to subsequently learn with

WR (385)

W.P.M.

318

Ex Com.

England are three copies of Aide Memoir as requested.
This has been supplied by Col Fildes, R/S MIA

Trans 2/10.

HHG/June 1/10

HHG

2/10 154

3/9

C.S.O.

Will you convert the interdepartmental memo
into an Aide Memoir as requested above in 3/6

WR (21x)

clerk

P. 1-5- lets have them in the
main file. Ex. Com. has already seen them.
copy to this draft directive.

FW
25/10.

Ex. Com.

10.

Letter at 9 ~~for signature~~, ~~James~~ drafted by NATH

submitted for signature of CC
2 - you will remember that this was
recommended at your meeting of 22/10.

FW
25/10.

Chief Commissioner.

Approval
Attached is submitted for your signature
information

FW
25/10

OCT 27 1950
1733

25/10.
Chief Commissioner.

approval
Attached is submitted for your signature
information

26/10

17/10

Chief Commissioner.

approval
Attached is submitted for your signature
information

152

Amended as agreed
15/10/10

15

15/10/10

Be seen f 14 for info

151

15/10/10

SUBJECT : Handover of the Italian Army to the Italian Government

LIND FORCES SUB COM, A.C. (MML)

G/7

11 Dec 45

TO : See Distn below

Ref MML Directive No. 1 (G/7 of 8 Nov 45) subject: Handover of the Italian Army to the Italian Government.

Para III 7. will be amended as follows:

Under (a) amend:

Ten Independent Regiments each of 2,500 men for ten territorial regions on mainland

25,000

to read:

Ten Independent Regiments each of 2,250 men for ten territorial regions on mainland

22,500

Amend: Total 40,000 to read:

37,500

Under (e) amend:

Training and Reinforcements Total

10,000

to read:

Training and Reinforcements Total

12,500

ABC/abc

Amended for

Major General MML
MML 65

DEC 12 1945

260

399

3251

to read:

Ten Independent Regiments each of 2,250 men for ten territorial regions on mainland

Amend: Total 40,000 to read:

Under (e) amend:

Training and Reinforcements Total

to read:

Training and Reinforcements Total

090/000

DISTRIBUTION:

Ministry of War

Chief Commissioner A.C.

Executive Commissioner L. O.

Navy Sub Commission A.C.

Air Forces Sub Commission L.C.

Cond 4 BLU (with copy of Directive No. 1)

2

[illegible]

1. **Introduction**
 2. **Method**
 3. **Results**
 4. **Discussion**
 5. **Conclusion**
 6. **References**
 7. **Appendix**
 8. **Notes**
 9. **Tables**
 10. **Figures**
 11. **Tables**
 12. **Figures**
 13. **Tables**
 14. **Figures**
 15. **Tables**
 16. **Figures**
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Figure 1

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Dr. B. L. & M.

Amundson, Jr.

Attest
per Major General Galt
M. H. L. 65

150

References

Dep Cond

0.07 2.06

0044/03 (Rev. 0)

OFFICE

10

三

DEPT.

cm/min) 0.500

(BENTLEY) INC.

DELL

THE

Wax Diary (Two)

File: G/5/7

Spare: (Twenty)

2. 22. 30

44-661-362

(CONT'D)

8251 + 1 \$6
EXEC Comm

398

FX55644
DEC. 061731A

G/5061
DEC. 070900A
ROUTINE

AFHQ FROM G(3D) CMF
MMIA INFO ALCON

RESTRICTED

DEC 7 1945

RESTRICTED.

Reference your G/3/1 of 1 December. Revised strengths of 22,500 for 10 indep regts and 12,500 for TRG and REPTS Agreed.

AC DIST

ACTION : LAND FORCES SC 2
INFO : CHIEF COMMISSIONER
EXEC COMMISSIONER 2
FILE 2
FLOAT

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
DEC 1945

A. C.

Seen by Capt B & CSO

149

see M2

PA
10/12

(CAPT B)

~~SECRET~~

814

8251

Ex Com

/kda

(395)

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~: OTH: SAC, MT
: Initials: *gwp*
: Date 3 Dec 1945
: 3 December 1945

AC 091.711 GGT-0

DEC 5 1945

SUBJECT: Directive to the Commander, Land Forces Sub Commission, AC(IMIA)

THRU: Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, APO 394

TO: Commander, Land Forces Sub Commission, AC(IMIA)

INTRODUCTION.

1. It is the policy of the United States and British Governments that the Italian Army shall be brought, in the shortest possible time, to a high state of efficiency. The task which will be required of the Italian Army is:-

- (a) to maintain the authority of the Italian Government,
- (b) to be available to go to the assistance of the civil authority for the maintenance of law and order,
- (c) to act as a deterrent to foreign aggression across the frontiers of ITALY.

To implement this policy, an Allied Military Mission to the Italian Army (IMIA) has been incorporated within the existing Land Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission.

DUTIES.

2. Your duties as the Commander, Land Forces Sub-Commission, AC(IMIA) will therefore be twofold:-

- (a) As Commander of the Land Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, you will be responsible to the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission. You will advise him on all matters of military policy, including any alterations to the authorized ceiling, and those which raise political issues or which affect the other armed forces.

- (b) As Commander of the Allied Military Mission to the Italian Army (IMIA) you will be responsible to the Supreme Allied Commander

- (1) for giving advice and assistance, in accordance with Allied policy, to the Italian Ministry of War and subordinate Italian HQ's on the formation, organization, training, and

~~SECRET~~

(CAPT B)

See 442,

~~SECRET~~

Ltr, AFHQ, file AG 091.711 GGT-O,
dtd 3 Dec 45, (Cont'd)

administration of the Italian Army within the approved ceiling. Your responsibilities in these respects will be limited to advice and assistance only; all necessary executive work must remain the responsibility of Italian authorities concerned. The Italian Government normally will be expected to accept your advice. If it should feel unable to do so you will refer the matter to AFHQ.

- (2) for giving advice to AFHQ on such Italian Army matters as come within the scope of paragraph 2(b)(1) above, and, should the occasion arise, on the employment of any Italian units or formations under Allied Command.

3. In both these capacities, it will be your duty to convey to the Minister of War in appropriate form all Allied policy or instructions concerning the Italian Army and to advise and assist him in such detail as you consider necessary as regards the implementation of this policy or these instructions.

4. As Commander, Land Forces Sub-Commission, AG you will be responsible for keeping the Chief Commissioner, AG informed of all relevant business undertaken in your capacity as Commander of the Allied Military Mission to the Italian Army (AMIA).

5. The term 'Italian Army' includes the Carabinieri, except where the operational functions of the latter, and their instruction in purely civil police duties, are concerned. Such matters are the responsibility of the Italian Ministry of the Interior and of the Public Safety Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission.

ORGANIZATION OF AMIA.

6. To enable you to carry out the objects of your Mission you will be provided with a suitable staff of British and U. S. officers, ORs and T. These will be organized into:-

(a) Military Mission to the Italian Army (also functioning as Land Forces Sub-Commission).

(b) British liaison units for attachment to Italian Army formations and training establishments.

7. At the present time no termination can be foreseen to the period during which the services of the Land Forces Sub-Commission, AG(AMIA), will be required. You will, however, keep

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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ACTION

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(394)

Mr. AFHQ, file AG 1.711 GGT-0,
 dtd 3 Dec 45. (Cont'd)

constantly under review the numbers of British and U. S. officers, ORs and W required to carry out your tasks efficiently and make such recommendations for progressive decrease as may be possible.

8. British liaison units are placed under your command and you are authorized to exercise the disciplinary, financial and administrative powers of a COC District in respect of the personnel and stores of those units. For this purpose the Military Mission to the Italian Army will be your HQs.

9. You will make it clear to all personnel under your command that they are to take no part in Italian political activities of any kind. Lack of impartiality may gravely impair Allied-Italian understanding, and will, in any case, render the individuals concerned incapable of carrying out properly the duties entrusted to them.

ORGANIZATION OF THE ITALIAN ARMY.

10. As far as possible the Italian Army will be organized, equipped, commanded and administered on lines generally similar to those employed in the British Army. This policy is subject to such modification as may be dictated by:-

(a) Nature of the tasks which the Italian Army are intended to carry out.

(b) Nature and amount of the equipment which the British and U. S. Governments have undertaken to provide.

(c) National characteristics of the Italian Military system.

With reference to (c) above, it is not the intention to interfere with or modify the Italian system in regard to honours and awards and the "stat civil" of military personnel except insofar as it is necessary to bring them in line with other changes in the organization. It may, however, be necessary to advise the Italian Government to modify the present system of promotion, selection of officers, pay and allowances, financial responsibility, discipline and military law, so that these shall not hamper the efficient reorganization of the Italian Army.

11. The ceiling of the Italian Army will be decided from time to time by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the advice of AFHQ based on the recommendations of the Allied Commission. The order of battle of the Italian Army within this ceiling will be decided from time to time by AFHQ based on your recommendations. Detailed requirements within the above order of battle will be

147

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Ltr, AFHQ, file AG 091.711 GCT-0,
dtd 3 Dec 45. (Cont'd)

worked out as a matter of urgency by the Italian Government, as advised by Land Forces Sub-Commission, AC(MMA) and reported to AFHQ.

TRAINING.

12. The training of the Italian Army will be the responsibility of the Italian Ministry of War, but will be carried out under your advice and supervision. You should ensure that that it conforms generally with British training policy and that British methods and standards are adopted as far as is practicable. The principal British staff officer for training at AFHQ will keep you informed of current British training policy and methods.

ADMINISTRATION.

13. The approved policy regarding the administration, including maintenance and supply, of the Italian Army, is shown in letter, this headquarters, AG 091.711 GSD-0 of 2 November 1945, paragraphs 10 - 13 inclusive. Any alteration to these arrangements will be notified to you from time to time.

14. You will be responsible for screening the demands of the Italian Ministry of War for such equipment and supplies as continue to be found from Allied Military sources. You will also exercise supervisory control over the use of such materials.

15. You will ensure that copies of all establishments and equipment tables drawn up by the Italian Ministry of War on your advice, are forwarded to AFHQ for information.

16. You will assist the Italian Ministry of War to introduce into the Italian Army a system of unit accounting and individual responsibility for stores, similar to that in the British Army.

17. You will be advised of the financial agreements under which the provision of any equipment or supplies is undertaken by the British and United States Governments.

18. These instructions supersede those given in AFHQ letter AG 091.112/079 GCT-0 of 25 October 1944.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JORGAN:

C. W. Christensen
C. W. CHRISTENSEN
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
See reverse side

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(393)

Ltr, AFHQ, file AG-091.711 -0,
 dtd 3 Dec 45. (Cont'd)

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2 - AG
- 2 - Land Forces Sub-Commission
- 2 - HQ 2 District
- 2 - HQ 3 District
- 2 - JCS
- 2 - AFCS
- 1 - G-1 AFHQ
- 1 - G-2 AFHQ
- 10 - G-3 AFHQ
- 2 - G (CD)
- 1 - G-3 AFHQ
- 1 - G-4 AFHQ
- 2 - Log Plans AFHQ
- 1 - G-1
- 1 - G (E)
- 1 - G (Joint)
- 1 - DTI
- 1 - Engineers
- 1 - Medical
- 1 - S & T
- 1 - Ord (A)
- 1 - Ord (E)
- 1 - Signals
- 1 - Provost
- 1 - Director of Labour
- 1 - Director of Works
- 1 - G-4 (P & Tn)
- 16 - Sources
- 2 - AG Records

CONFIDENTIAL

146

~~SECRET~~

SECRET & IMMEDIATE.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Chief Commissioner

Ref: 8251/390/EC.

4. December 1945.

SUBJECT: Distribution of Italian Armed Forces.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
Attn: Chief of Staff.

In continuation of my 8251/EC of 28 Nov 45 and the discussion with Brigadier YATES on the above subject in my office, ROME, on 3 Dec 45:

1. General BROWNING saw Signor JACINI, the War Minister, personally immediately after the discussion, as agreed.

2. Signor JACINI accepted the following:

- (a) that the three (Combat) Infantry Divisions in the MILAN, TURIN and GENOA areas respectively should remain there;
- (b) that, particularly in view of the accommodation aspect, FOLGORE Division should move to an area SOUTH of the APPENNINES. He requested that it should be as near the PO Valley as possible;
- (c) that FRIULI Division should remain roughly in the same area as at present, after the necessary adjustments to enable Allied troops to relieve FRIULI of guard duties. Signor JACINI accepted this on condition that the Independent Regiment of BOLZANO Region was located in BOLZANO area. This Regiment has:

505 Bn at BOLZANO with one company at MERANO,
508 Bn at TRENTO with one company at VERONA,
514 Bn moving to BRESSANONE area.

Signor JACINI would like the Independent Regiment HQ moved to BOLZANO and the three Battalions located at BOLZANO, MERANO and BRESSANONE respectively. He assumes that the whole three battalions will be relieved of guard duties by Allied troops. He wishes the existing FRIULI units in TRENTO to remain, particularly bearing in mind the "symbolic" and political reasons in that important area, an aspect which he stressed generally throughout the discussion.

145

(b) that, particularly in view of the accommodation aspect, FOLGORE Division should move to an area SOUTH of the APENNINES. He requested that it should be as near the PO Valley as possible:

(c) that FRIULI Division should remain roughly in the same area as at present, after the necessary adjustments to enable Allied troops to relieve FRIULI of guard duties. Signor JACINI accepted this on condition that the Independent Regiment of BOLZANO Region was located in BOLZANO area. This Regiment has:

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- 514 Bn moving to BRESSANONE area.

Signor JACINI would like the Independent Regiment HQ moved to BOLZANO and the three Battalions located at BOLZANO, MERANO and BRESSANONE respectively. He assumes that the whole three battalions will be relieved of guard duties by Allied troops. ¹⁴⁵ He wishes the existing FRIULI units in TRENTO to remain, particularly bearing in mind the "symbolic" and political reasons in that important area, an aspect which he stressed generally throughout the discussion with General BROWNING.

3. In view of the above, which appears reasonable and suitable to AFHQ views, it is suggested that:

- (a) 3 District be ordered to make a recon and plan immediately in conjunction with Ministry of War through Land Forces Sub-Commission AC (MILA) in order to allot suitable accommodation to FOLGORE as in para 2(b) above, the necessity of finding a swift and reasonable solution even at the expense of closing up Allied troops being stressed.
- (b) 2 District be instructed to adjust locations of FRIULI and the BOLZANO Independent Regt as far as possible in accordance with para 2(c) above, in conjunction with General NEGRONI, Commanding BOLZANO Territorial Region through No.4 B.L.U. accredited to General NEGRONI's HQ.

see 7391

(CAPT O)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SECRET

Subject:- Distribution of Italian Armed Forces.

Land Forces Sub-Commission, AG
(M.M.I.A.)

G/10
4 December 1945

Headquarters, ALLIED COMMISSION
(for Executive Commissioner)

1. Reference discussion this morning on above, herewith DRAFT of letter which it is suggested that Chief Commissioner should send to A.F.H.Q.
2. As agreed by Chief Commissioner I phoned Brig. YATES and gave him the gist of attached draft at 1800 hrs today.
3. He was very satisfied at the outcome and agreed:-
 - (a) in principle with para 2 of attached.
 - (b) that I should thus inform Minister of War, pending receipt of the A.F.H.Q. order - which I have done.

d. Bromberg
Major General.

8251-47
387
SUBJECT: Organization of Interim Italian Army

LAND FORCES SUB COM, A.C. (LIMA)

G/3/4

1 Dec 45

DEC 3 1945

TO : AFHQ

356A

1. Para 7 of your letter AG 091.744 C(8D)-0 dated 2 Nov 45 specifies the general layout within the total ceiling of 140,000; and para 8 states that "no alteration to the general layout will be made without the consent of AFHQ".

2. You will remember that my original estimate of 140,000, subdivided into the framework now approved, was made at comparatively short notice and without time to examine and work out details involving a large number of relevant factors.

3. (a) We have now, in conjunction with the Ministry of War, completed a preliminary study of the whole question in all its aspects.

(b) The results work out remarkably closely to our original estimate.

(c) We find that we can follow the "framework" exactly except that we require only 22,500 (instead of 25,000) personnel for the "Gen Independent Regts" and 12,500 (instead of 10,000) for "Inf and Rfts".

(d) The two differences, you will note, cancel each other out, leaving the total ceiling of 140,000 unaffected.

4. I therefore request your authy for this alteration, in order that I may put the whole organisational project in detail on paper.

5. I should be grateful for an early reply.

Living

relevant factors.

3. (a) We have now, in conjunction with the Ministry of War, completed a preliminary study of the whole question in all its aspects.
- (b) The results work out remarkably closely to our original estimate.
- (c) We find that we can follow the "framework" exactly except that we require only 22,500 (instead of 25,000) personnel for the "Ten Independent Regts" and 12,500 (instead of 10,000) for "Trg and Rfts".
- (d) The two differences, you will note, cancel each other out, leaving the total ceiling of 140,000 unaffected.
4. I therefore request your authy for this alteration, in order that I may put the whole organisational project in detail on paper.
5. I should be grateful for an early reply.

LB/abc

Copy to : HQ Allied Commission.

Internal: SD/94

Major General
H M I A

D. Grooming 143

see M 388
F 398

Spencer
(part 2)

SUBJECT:- Italian Army Movement.

Land Forces Sub-Commission A.C.,
M.M.I.A.
R O M E
Q.005

30 November 1945

TO : Ministry of War.

Reference is made to Directive No. 1 forwarded under G/7 of 8 Nov 45.

1. The Italian Government is now responsible for arranging the movement of Italian Army Units, personnel and stores except as indicated below. It will place bids for movement on the Allied military authorities only when transportation facilities are directly controlled by those authorities.

2. As regards rail movement, the War Ministry will make arrangements direct with Italian State Railways (ISR) for the movement of Units, personnel and stores, informing the Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMLA) and Transportation Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, as required.

3. The Allied military authorities will continue as at present to arrange the movement of personnel and units which remain in the US-ITI or BR-ITI category and their reinforcements, and of Units which are under the operational command of GHQ. They will also be responsible for movement of stores which are supplied through US or British Service channels.

4. Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMLA) will deal directly with GHQ on movement matters affecting the Allied Military Authorities.

Movements by rail will be made by direct contact by Ufficio Trasporti with ISR.

Shipping movements will be arranged by MMLA in contact with the appropriate Allied authority.

Road movements will be the responsibility of the Ufficio Trasporti (road schedules, etc.)

Movement by Air. Application will be made by the Ufficio Trasporti to MMLA who will obtain Air bookings through Transportation Office, Allied Commission. Only extremely urgent moves will be effected by air.

(All)

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stores, informing the Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMLA) and Transportation Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, as required.

3. The Allied military authorities will continue as at present to arrange the movement of personnel and units which remain in the US-ITI or BR-ITI category and their reinforcements, and of Units which are under the operational command of GHQ. They will also be responsible for movement of stores which are supplied through US or British Service channels.

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Movement by Air. Application will be made by the Ufficio Trasporti to MMLA who will obtain air bookings through Transportation Office, Allied Commission. Only extremely urgent moves will be effected by air.

(All concerned are notified that questions concerning this subject should be addressed to MMLA, Q 1, Room 36, 7th Floor Tel. No. 478103).

W. H. M. L. G. 4. 6. 50

Major General,
I. I. A.

Copy to:- All BU's
Chief Commissioner, A.C.
Executive Commissioner A.C.
Navy Sub-Commission A.C.
Air Forces Sub-Commission A.C.
"F" BL & TU

Internal: C of S X
Col A/Q SI (Three)
G (Five) Med
A (Four) FIVE
RE

see M 388

(copy 2)

8251

SECRET.

CONFIDENTIAL 384

EXTRACT FROM THE MINUTES OF SACMED'S CONFERENCE
(9th Meeting) held at AFHQ on 22 November 1945.

MINUTE No. 8.

"8. DIRECTIVE TO COMMANDER, MILITARY MISSION ITALIAN ARMY.

(Paper No. SAC (45) 24).

THE CONFERENCE had before them a draft directive to Commander, Land Forces Sub-Commission, dealing with his functions in his capacity as Commander, Military Mission to the Italian Army.

MAJOR GENERAL WARD asked the representative of the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, to state what functions the Land Forces Sub-Commission now retained, apart from its role as a military mission, and whether it could soon become a normal military mission directly under AFHQ.

BRIGADIER LUSH said that it was the duty of the Commander of the Land Forces Sub-Commission to advise the Chief Commissioner on military matters. Moreover, in view of the armistice terms the legality of MMIA was dependent on its status as a Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission. A military mission, independent of the Allied Commission was not, therefore, at present practicable. The Chief Commissioner would prefer the directive to be redrafted so as to make clear the dual role of the Commander, MMIA, and to cover his functions as Commander, Land Forces Sub-Commission. The directive to the Air Forces Sub-Commission had been prepared in this manner.

BRIGADIER GENERAL HAMLEN agreed that the legality of the military mission was dependent on its status as the Land Forces Sub-Commission.

THE CONFERENCE then discussed detailed amendments of the directive.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Chief of Staff to revise the directive circulated under paper No. SAC (45) 24 in accordance with the request of the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, and in the light of the above discussion.

141

""

See M.385

Ex.Com's Distbn - 29. Nov. 45.

Copy to: File 8251/ECY
Land Forces S/C (MMIA) - copy of paper
No. SAC (45) 24 mentioned above has
already been passed to you by this office.

8251 + 1.5

Ex. Comm 382.

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9/4476

281057 1055 A

IMPORTANT

MMIA

AFHQ ALCOM DISTWO DISTENSE

NOV 29 1945

~~SECRET~~

372

373

REFERENCE YOUR FX 54297 AND FX 54298 BOTH DATED 24. VIEWS
OF DISTWO, ALCOM AND ITALIAN MINISTRY OF WAR HAVE BEEN OBTAINED
AND COORDINATED. AS REQUIRED BY LAST SENTENCE OF FX 54297, DETAILED
APPRECIATION UNDER SIGNATURE CHIEF COMMISSIONER
A E C O M FOLLOWS SOONEST

372

AS DISTRIBUTION

INFO ACT: SO TO CC

INFO CHIEF COMMISSIONER

XX COM. 2

FOLAD

FOLAD 334

CAS 140

FILE

28 NOV 1945

See hr. 383.

~~SECRET~~

(CAPT C) ANB 20/4

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED COMMISSION
OFFICE OF CHIEF COMMISSIONER

Ref: 6251/EC.

28. November 1945

SUBJECT: Distribution of Italian Armed Forces

TO : AFHQ (for Chief of Staff)

1. HISTORY

(a) AFHQ have been considering the disposition of the Italian Armed Forces, with particular reference to the Infantry (Combat) Divisions and bearing in mind that, with the hand-over of the Northern Territories, the Italian Government will be responsible for and at liberty to decide on a suitable distribution of those Forces, and therefore must consider now the ultimate disposition of the various formations and units.

(b) The subject was raised in verbal discussion between Brigadier YATES and Major General BROWNING/Brigadier LUSH recently, the latest verbal instructions from AFHQ being in a telephone conversation, summarized at Appendix "A" and in AFHQ signals FX 54297 dated 24 November and FX 54298 dated 25 November.

(c) As a result of this, Colonel PIDSLEY (representing Land Forces Sub Commission, AC) flew to MILAN on Saturday, 24 November with Executive Commissioner, Allied Commission and discussed the whole matter with GOC 2 District, returning to ROME on Sunday, 25 November.

(d) Despite the resignation of the Italian Government, the matter was discussed at a conference with Signor JACINI, still functioning as Minister of War, on 26 November, by Brigadier LUSH and General BROWNING.

(e) The following represents the views of the Allied Commission and the reactions thereto of the Italian Government as stated by Signor JACINI.

(b) The subject Brigadier YATES and Major General Browning, recently, the latest verbal instructions from AFHQ being in a telephone conversation, summarized at Appendix "A" and in AFHQ signals FX 54297 dated 24 November and FX 54298 dated 25 November.

(c) As a result of this, Colonel PIDSLEY (representing Land Forces Sub Commission, AC) flew to MILAN on Saturday, 24 November with Executive Commissioner, Allied Commission and discussed the whole matter with GOC 2 District, re-turning to ROME on Sunday, 25 November.

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(e) The following represents the views of the Allied Commission and the reactions thereto of the Italian Government as stated by Signor JACINI.

139

POLITICAL FACTORS

2.

(a) The Eastern frontier is the responsibility of the Allies through 13 Corps.

(b) BOLZANO province is to be handed back to Italian control. The Italians therefore must be permitted to retain troops there. Both frontier problems and a difficult security situation are involved.

(c) The remainder of the frontier westwards will also be an Italian responsibility. The withdrawal of British troops from the French frontier introduces a delicate situation. To avoid incidents, it is advisable that no major move of Italian troops to that frontier should be made, though limited patrol movement is necessary to avoid French infiltration.

(d) The internal security question will be dealt with by Italian troops in the following order of employment:

- (i) CC.RR
- (ii) CC.RR mobile columns
- (iii) Independent Regiments (see also Para 3(a) below)
- (iv) Combat Divisions.

The main function of Combat Divisions therefore is frontier defence and only in cases of extreme urgency should they be used for internal security.

(e) The resignation of the present Italian Government on 24 November, complicates the issue, in that no authoritative Italian body can be consulted.

(f) When the Northern territories are handed back to the Italians the responsibility for frontier defence and internal law and order will rest with the Italian Government, subject to SAC's over-riding control. Possible future development being unforeseeable, the Italian Government cannot be expected to bind themselves in advance to a fixed distribution of their available Forces, though they have agreed NOT to move Infantry Divisions for reasons of comfort and prestige only.

MILITARY FACTORS

(a) Excluding services and headquarters and training installations, the following FIGHTING TROOPS are available:-

- (i) Five Infantry Divisions (FRIULI, CREMONA, LEGNANO, FOLGORE, MANTOVA). These are equipped to scale with British equipment and are up to WF as follows:-

Total Division.	9,000
Each Infantry Regiment.....	2,700
Each Infantry Battalion.....	770
Artillery Regiment.....	1,500

For present locations see Appendix "B".

- (ii) Ten independent regiments (Inf) of HQ and three battalions with WE:-

Total Regiment.....	2,500
---------------------	-------

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Total Division	9,000
Each Infantry Regiment	2,700
Each Infantry Battalion	770
Artillery Regiment	1,500

For present locations see Appendix "B".

(ii) Ten independent regiments (Inf) of HQ and three battalions with WE:-

Total Regiment	2,500
Each Battalion	800

One Regiment per Territorial Region equipped with Italian equipment and NOT up to scale.

Regiments are not fully constituted yet (see Appx "B") but Battalions are up to WE.

(iii) Three IS Divisions of two Brigades each of two Regiments of two Battalions. Vide Appendix "B", SABAUDA and AOSTA IS Divisions in SICILY are at 90% of WE, while CALABRIA IS Division in SARDINIA is approximately at 80% of WE viz:-

Total IS Division	5,000
Each Brigade	2,200
Each Regiment	1,000
Each Battalion	530

They are equipped with Italian equipment and NOT up to scale.

(b) A large part of the Infantry Divisions and Independent Regiments are employed on guarding dumps and installations, and are widely dispersed. Supervision and training to any major extent is thus not possible at present. The present state of training is low in consequence, and further because there has been a heavy change-over of personnel due to:-

(i) Reduction in strength compared with that at the time of the German surrender.

(ii) Demobilisation of older classes - which is continuing.

(iii) Reduction of BR-ITI and US-ITI service units and transfer of soldiers of military age to formations as above.

The greater part of the older and better trained men and of tradesmen and specialists have been or are about to be released from the Army. Replacements are being trained at the maximum speed. To restore the efficiency of the Army, it is advisable that formations be relieved of their extensive guard duties and concentrated as far as possible in order to undertake controlled and extensive training.

Should, as is desirable for standardisation and other reasons, Independent Regiments and IS Divisions be equipped with British equipment, the necessity for intensive training will be further increased.

(c) AFHQ view is that apart from possible frontier trouble, the probable areas for employment of the strategic reserve are MILAN, TURIN, BOLOGNA and the HEEL of ITALY. They consider that this points to a distribution of three Infantry Divisions NORTH of the APPENNINES and two SOUTH.

(d) Morale, particularly in the Infantry and IS Divisions, is reasonably good at present. Italian officers and men regard service near the frontier as an honour, and would view a move from the frontier southwards as a withdrawal, especially if without Allied or Italian replacement. The War Ministry has similar views from a political and prestige angle.

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Each Infantry Division has a different reliability factor and would react differently to a move southwards. Much would depend on the published reason for the move.

(e) Any move southwards would ease the NORTH ITALY accommodation problem, but might mean that the Allies in 3 District would have to close up and make concessions. Details of actual locations would have to be worked out mutually with 3 District, in order to avoid interference with projected Territorial Training Centres, technical locations of Independent Regiments and other permanent Italian military installations. Climate in the South favours a move in this direction during the winter.

GOC, 2 District from the accommodation point of view would like one Infantry Division at any rate moved south of the APPENNINES. He can let FRIULI stay, with an

adjustment of its area locally. LEGNANO and CREMONA do not interfere - nor does MANTOVA. From 2 District point of view, therefore, a move of FOLGORE SOUTH of the APPENNINES would be adequate as regards the accommodation angle.

On the other hand, 2 District stated that there were large areas which they were not using or from which they were withdrawing Allied troops, and that adequate accommodation for one Italian Division (thus accommodating all five such North of the APPENNINES) might well be found after reconce., particularly in the area MANTOVA - MODENA - PIACENZA. The Italians also consider that this should be possible.

It is understood that AFHQ have ordered FOLGORE to move to the BRESCIA area, the move to be completed by 10 December.

(f) Provided bids for rail-transportation or POL were given Allied priority, there would be no difficulty over a move. Resultant distribution of troops would ease the transportation problem.

(g) Provided seven days notice is given before the move of the first units, no difficulty is anticipated as regards supplies or POL.

4. At the discussion with Signor JACINI on 26 November he stated the Italian Government's views as follows:-

They are entirely in favour of relieving the Infantry Divisions of Guard duties to enable them to train.

Apart from the accommodation angle, there are three sides to the question:

- (a) Military
- (b) Internal political
- (c) International (frontiers).

As regards (a) Italian policy has always been to concentrate their troops in the North, which is far the most important frontier, the rest being sea. This still holds good and the majority of their barracks are there.

As regards (b) Troubles always have come from the highly populated industrial areas of the North, rather than the more sparsely

4. At the discussion with Signor JACINI on 26 November he stated the Italian Government's views as follows:-

They are entirely in favour of relieving the Infantry Divisions of Guard duties to enable them to train.

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- (c) International (frontiers).

As regards (a) Italian policy has always been to concentrate their troops in the North, which is far the most important frontier, the rest being sea. This still holds good and the majority of their barracks are there.

As regards (b) Troubles always have come from the highly populated industrial areas of the North, rather than the more sparsely populated agricultural areas of the South. To hold the PO Valley is to hold ITALY. ROME is well catered for and in any case the key of ROME is MILAN. Southern areas, such as BARI or NAPLES can never be more than a police problem. In any event, Independent Regiments are there as a reserve.

As regards (c) The Eastern frontier is an Allied responsibility. It is essential to have an Infantry Division in the BOLZANO, MILAN and TURIN areas. It is not essential to have an Infantry Division in the GENOA Area, but as MANTOVA Division are stationed there and their accommodation is not wanted by the Allies, they would like to leave MANTOVA in situ to avoid a move.

The fifth Infantry Division (FOLGORE) should be somewhere in the PO Valley if accommodation can be found, which the Italians think is possible (see third Sub-para of 3(e) above). Filing this, FOLGORE should be as close to BOLOGNA as possible.

To sum up, the Italian Government, who will shortly be in operational control of these Divisions would prefer to locate all

APPENDIX "A"

Phone conversation Brig. YATES/Gen BROWNING at 1000 hrs - 23 Nov 4

1. C.G.S., A.F.H.Q. wishes me to see the Italian Government and persuade them to:-

(a) Move FRIULI and FOLGORE out of BOLZANO Area.

(b) Move two Combat Divs South of the APPENNINES.

2. A.F.H.Q.'s view is as follows:-

(a) The Italians need an efficient Army and we are prepared to give it to them.

(b) The Combat Divisions cannot train and remain efficient if they are doing frontier defence and guarding static dumps. Therefore they must be relieved of those commitments and concentrated for training.

(c) For accommodation reasons in 2 District, it is not possible to retain all five Combat Divisions North of the APPENNINES, as accommodation must be found for incoming non-Italian troops who are to relieve Combat Divisions of at any rate part of their commitments. Therefore two Combat Divisions must be moved South of the APPENNINES. A.F.H.Q. do not insist that it should be the FRIULI or FOLGORE who move South of the APPENNINES, but unless it is those two Divisions who do so, it means that there will be a double move.

(d) In any event, FRIULI and FOLGORE must move out of BOLZANO Area because:-

(1) The area is not suitable for training;

(11) for accommodation reasons they cannot be relieved of their commitments and stay in BOLZANO Area. The Independent Regiment would still remain at BOLZANO.

(e) From the aspect of the strategic reserve, this must be located strategically. The main areas for possible employment of this reserve are MILAN, TURIN, BOLOGNA and the heel of ITALY. Therefore, assessing risks, a proper distribution is three Combat Divisions North of the APPENNINES and two South.

(f) If the Italian Government

the APPENNINES, as accommodation must be found for incoming non-Italian troops who are to relieve Combat Divisions of at any rate part of their commitments. Therefore two Combat Divisions must be moved South of the APPENNINES. A.F.H.Q. do not insist that it should be the FRIULI or FOLGORE who move South of the APPENNINES, but unless it is those two Divisions who do so, it means that there will be a double move.

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(1) The area is not suitable for training;

(11) for accommodation reasons they cannot be relieved of their commitments and stay in BOLZANO Area. The Independent Regiment would still remain at BOLZANO.

(e) From the aspect of the strategic reserve, this must be located strategically. The main areas for possible employment of this reserve are MILAN, TURIN, BOLOGNA and the heel of ITALY. Therefore, assessing risks, a proper distribution is three Combat Divisions North of the APPENNINES and two South.

(f) If the Italian Government wish to keep FRIULI and FOLGORE in BOLZANO area, they are letting political consideration over-ride necessary military ones.

(g) In view of all the above, A.F.H.Q. consider that FRIULI and FOLGORE should be moved out of BOLZANO Area and two Combat Divisions (preferably FRIULI and FOLGORE) should be moved South of the APPENNINES.

3. Brig. YATES agreed that the above moves would be ordered in an order from A.F.H.Q. and that sufficient time would be allowed to enable the Italians to re-arrange their administrative plan.

4. Gen. BROWNING stated that this was all a matter for "Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C." and that therefore it would have to be tackled in full conjunction with Chief Commissioner, A.C.
Brig. YATES agreed.

23 Nov. 45

Signed: L. Browning,
Maj.  n.

379

five Infantry Divisions North of the APPENNINES. But, if pressed, they would agree to moving one SOUTH of the APPENNINES as near BOLOGNA as possible.

5. CONCLUSIONS

- (a) IS Divisions to remain in situ.
- (b) Independent Regiments to remain in projected locations and be constituted up to full WE as soon as possible.
- (c) LEGNANO, CREMONA and MANTOVA to remain in situ.

- (d) Locations of FRIULI to be readjusted locally with 2 District to enable this Division to guard the ALTO ADIGE.

- (e) A recce. to be made forthwith by the War Ministry in conjunction with 2 District to discover whether FOLGORE can be accommodated in the PO Valley.

- (f) A simultaneous recce. to be made forthwith by 3 District in conjunction with the War Ministry to plan for a possible move of FOLGORE South of the APPENNINES in case the recce. as in (e) does not succeed.

- (g) No administrative difficulty over FOLGORE move is anticipated, provided adequate warning and Allied help is given.

- (h) It is advisable to relieve Infantry Divisions and Independent Regiments of guard duties, to enable them to train.

- (i) It is strongly recommended, with full concurrence of GOC Land Forces Sub-Commission, AC (AFIA) that proposals (j) - (f) above be accepted, that the FOLGORE Division be located as near to the PO Valley as possible and that AFHQ:

- (1) Provide AC with the Order of Battle of Allied troops throughout ITALY;
- (11) Give directions as to policy to be adopted as regards frontier defence;

(a) On ITALO-AUSTRIA frontier;

anticipated, provided adequate warning and Allied help is given.

(h) It is advisable to relieve Infantry Divisions and Independent Regiments of guard duties, to enable them to train.

(i) It is strongly recommended, with full concurrence of GOC Land Forces Sub-Commission, AC (MIA) that proposals (j) - (f) above be accepted, that the POLGORE Division be located as near to the PO Valley as possible and that AFHQ:

(i) Provide AC with the Order of Battle of Allied troops throughout ITALY:

(ii) give directions as to policy to be adopted as regards frontier defence:

(a) On ITALO-AUSTRIA frontier:

(b) on ITALO-FRENCH frontier.

136

Elmer W. Stone

ELMER W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

COPY TO:

US AFHQ.
Land Forces S/C (MIA)
Lombardia Region
Liguria Region
Piemonte Region
Venezia Region
LO NO. 2 District
Executive Commissioner
HQ, NO. 2 DISTRICT
HQ, NO. 3 DISTRICT - 5 -

APPENDIX "B"

LOCATIONS

LEVICO
BASSANO DEL GRAPPA
S. BONIFACIO
TRENTO
LEVICO
various

BRESSANONE
DOBBIACO
BOLZANO
COLLE ISARCO
ORTISEI
VARIOUS

TURIN
ASTI
VERCELLI
CHIERI
CASAL MONFERRATO
VARIOUS

BERGAMO
BERGAMO
SONDRIO
BRESCIA
BERGAMO
VARIOUS

VARAZZE
SAVONA
COMO
PIACENZA
CAIRO MONTENTOTTE
VARIOUS

UNIT

FRIULI Div.

- HQ
- 87 Inf. Regt.
- 88 Inf. Regt.
- 35 Arty. Regt.
- 120 Eng. Bn.
- Services

FOLIORE Div.

- HQ
- Nembo Regt.
- Garibaldi Regt.
- 184 Arty. Regt.
- 184 Eng. Bn.
- Services

CREMONA Div.

- HQ
- 21 Inf. Regt.
- 22 Inf. Regt.
- 7 Arty. Regt.
- 144 Eng. Bn.
- Services

LEGNANO Div.

- HQ
- 68 Inf. Regt.
- 69 Inf. Regt.
- 11 Arty. Regt.
- 51 Eng. Bn.
- Services

MANTOVA Div.

- HQ
- 76 Inf. Regt.
- 114 Inf. Regt.
- 166 Arty. Regt.
- 104 Eng. Bn.
- Services

- 22 Inf. Regt.
- 7 Arty. Regt.
- 144 Eng. Bn.
- Services

LEGNANO Div.

- HQ
- 68 Inf. Regt.
- 69 Inf. Regt.
- 11 Arty. Regt.
- 51 Eng. Bn.
- Services

MANTOVA Div.

- HQ
- 76 Inf. Regt.
- 114 Inf. Regt.
- 166 Arty. Regt.
- 104 Eng. Bn.
- Services

I.S. Regts.

- No 1 I.S. Regt (2 Bns)
- No 2 I.S. Regt (3 Bns)
- No 3 I.S. Regt (3 Bns)
- No 4 I.S. Regt (3 Bns)
- No 5 I.S. Regt (2 Bns)
- No 6 I.S. Regt (3 Bns)
- No 7 I.S. Regt (3 Bns)
- No 8 I.S. Regt (1 Bn)
- No 9 I.S. Regt (3 Bns)
- No 10 I.S. Regt (3 Bns)

VERCELLI
CHIERI
CASAL MONFERRATO
VARIOUS

BERGAMO
BERGAMO
SONDRIO
BRESCIA
BERGAMO
VARIOUS

VARAZZE
SAVONA
COMO
PIACENZA
CAIRO MONTENTOTTE
VARIOUS

TURIN
GENOA
BRESCIA
VERONA
PADUA
MODENA
LUCCA
VITERBO
BARI
NAPOLI

APPENDIX "B"

UNIT

Miscellaneous Guard Bns.

- 513 Guard Bn
- 528 Guard Bn
- 529 Guard Bn
- 515 Guard Bn
- Grenadier Bn

I.S. Divs

SABAUDA Div
AOSTA Div
Calabria Div

LOCATIONS

LATINA
VITERBO
VITERBO
AREZZO
ROME

MESSINA
PALERMO
CAGLIARI

100.132

8251
~~SECRET~~

EXEC Comm

(373)

FX 54298
NOV 241244A

G4299
NOV 251330A
IMPORTANT

AFHQ SIGNED SACRED CITE PHOT

ACTION: ALCON FOR CHIEF COMMISSIONER INFO: MMIA

SECRET.

Reference our FX 54297 of 24 November 45.

Para 1. We are anxious to settle the question of the GRUPPI on the lines suggested in our cable under reference.

Para 2. In the event that service advice does not achieve desired result request you assist by taking up matter with Prime Minister.

DIST

ACTION: S.O. TO CHIEF COMMISSIONER

INFO: EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER (2)
POLAD (A)
POLAD (B)
C.A. SECTION
LAND FORCES S/C (2)
FILE

134

SECRET

See folio 382.

128251

EXECOMM

372

SECRET

EX 54297
NOV 241239A

64298
NOV 251515A
IMPORTANT

AFHQ, SIGNED SACRED CITY PROCT

ACTION: MMIA INFO: TWO DISTRICT THREE DISTRICT ALCON

SECRET.

Reference TWO DISTRICT cable 541/2374 of 20 November and confirming verbal instructions already issued.

Para 1. Relief of Italian Gruppi from guard duties in TWO DISTRICT is being impeded by fact that sufficient accommodation for relieving troops does not exist unless on relief a proportion of Gruppi are moved out of TWO DISTRICT.

Para 2. It is approved policy that Italian Army which we are in process of returning to Italian Govt Control shall be raised to high state of efficiency as rapidly as possible. It will be appreciated that this can not be done as long as it remains largely employed on guard and other static duties not can it be considered as available for internal security duties while so employed. Plans have therefore been made to relieve all Italian troops from guard duties.

Para 3. When returned to Italian Govt Control the five Italian Gruppi will form the Government's Strategic Reserve for Internal Security duties and should therefore be located accordingly.

Para 4. Bearing in mind the areas in which Internal Security operations are possible after the Northern Provinces have been returned to Italian Govt Control it is considered that the Gruppi should be located generally as follows.

- (A) Three Gruppi North of the Apennines.
- (B) Two Gruppi South of the Apennines.

Para 5. You are requested as a matter of urgency to obtain the agreement of the Italian Ministry of War to the general distribution of Gruppi shown in Para 4 above on receipt of which detailed move orders will be issued by this HQ. In the event the Italian Ministry of War does not agree you should forward their reasons and alternative proposals.

HEADQUARTERS
26 NOV 1945

DIST
ACTION: LAND FORCES S/C (2)
INFO: CHIEF COMMISSIONER
EXEC COM (2)
POLAD (A)
POLAD (B)
C.A. SECTION
FILE

Msg Note - Delayed, due to having to be certified.

See Folio 2 133
See folio 382

(CAPT B)

SECRET

1826
IMMEDIATE

OFFICE OF THE G. O. C.
MILITARY MISSION TO THE ITALIAN ARMY

21 Nov 45

(371)

Dear Maurice,

Herewith 2 copies
of what we have just
discussed.

The amendment
I suggest in my para 2
if attached is really
a technical MMA
one, but perhaps you
would put it forward
on my behalf.

Yours

Langley

(370)

Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C.,
(M.M.I.A.)
R O M E.
G/7

21 November 1945.

Subject : Handover of Italian Army to Italian Government.

To : R.Q. A.C. (for Chief Commissioner)

Reference Draft directive on the above (SAC(45) 24 dated 19 Nov 45) to be discussed at SAC's conference tomorrow, I understand - I suggest two amendments.

1. For last sentence in para 1 substitute first sentence in para 6(b) of the Governing Directive AG.091.711.G(SD)-O of 2 Nov.

REASON

This makes the two directives agree.

2. In second sentence of para 11 - delete "detailed".
Add at end of para 11 - "Detailed requirements within the above order of battle will be worked out as a matter of urgency by the Italian Government, as advised by the Land Forces Sub Commission of the Allied Commission (M.M.I.A.) and reported to Allied Force Headquarters".

REASON

The two directives do not agree. In the Governing Directive of 2 Nov, it is clear that Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C. (M.M.I.A.) can work out and decide on details within the framework of the ceiling as specified in para 7 of the Governing Directive, reporting to A.F.H.Q.

In the second Directive, it reads as if Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C. (M.M.I.A.) has to get approval of all details from A.F.H.Q.

This makes the two directives agree.

2. In second sentence of para 11 - delete "detailed".
Add at end of para 11 - "Detailed requirements within the above order of battle will be worked out as a matter of urgency by the Italian Government, as advised by the Land Forces Sub Commission of the Allied Commission (M.M.I.A.) and reported to Allied Force Headquarters".

REASON

The two directives do not agree. In the Governing Directive of 2 Nov, it is clear that Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C. (M.M.I.A.) can work out and decide on details within the framework of the ceiling as specified in para 7 of the Governing Directive, reporting to A.F.H.Q.

In the second Directive, it reads as if Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C. (M.M.I.A.) has to get approval of all details from A.F.H.Q. and are allowed no latitude of decision. This would delay matters which are specifically stated in the Governing Directive to be a matter of urgency. **132**

Note that para. 15 of the second Directive does allow for Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C. (M.M.I.A.) to decide on details as regards Administration.

L. Browning

(L. BROWNING)
Major General,
M. M. I. A.

/LB/age

SECRET

AP 804

367A

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat.

SAC (45) 24.
19th November 1945

3673

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

DIRECTIVE TO COMMANDER, MILITARY MISSION TO THE
ITALIAN ARMY.

1. The attached draft Directive to Commander, Military Mission to the Italian Army, has been prepared as a result of consultation by interested Staff Sections of AFHQ.

2. The Supreme Allied Commander is invited to approve the Directive for issue.

(Sgd) J.G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

Ex.Com. Dist - 21.Nov.

Copy No. 27 - CC
28 - EC
29 - LF S/C.

See 370.

SECRET.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

AFHQ 512

DRAFT.

FILE G-3 AFHQ/126

SUBJECT: Directive to the Commander, Military Mission to the Italian Army.

TO : Commander, Land Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission (MMA).

INTRODUCTION.

1. It is the policy of the US and British Governments that the Italian Army, of such a size as can reasonably be maintained as a charge against the Italian Govt shall be brought, in the shortest possible time, to a high state of efficiency. The task which will be required of the Italian Army is to maintain the authority of the Italian Govt, to be available to go to the assistance of the civil authority for the maintenance of law and order and to act as a deterrent to foreign aggression across the frontiers of ITALY. With this end in view, an Allied Military Mission to the Italian Army (MMA) will be maintained. In order to economize in manpower, the functions of this Military Mission will be exercised by the Land Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, acting in a dual capacity.

2. This directive deals solely with your functions as Commander MMA which will be confined to matters in connection with the formation, organization, training and administration of the Italian Army within the approved ceiling. In other respects, including any alterations to the approved ceiling, you will function as Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission. This HQ letter AG 091.112/079 GCT-0 of 25 Oct 44 refers, and this directive is intended only to amplify the provisions regarding MMA in the light of the reorganization of the Italian Army as set out in this HQ letter AG 091.741 GSD-0 of 2 Nov 45.

3. The term "Italian Army" includes the Carabinieri, except where the operational functions and instructions in purely civil police duties of the Carabinieri are concerned. Such matters are the responsibility of the Italian Ministry of the Interior and of the Public Safety S/C of the AC.

OBJECTS.

4. The objects of your Mission will be:

a. To advise and assist the Italian Ministry of War and subordinate Italian HQs in the formation, organization, training, and administration of the Italian Army within the approved ceiling. Your responsibilities in these respects will be limited to advice and assistance only; all necessary executive work must remain the responsibility of Italian authorities concerned. The Italian Government normally will be expected to accept your advice. If it should feel unable to do so you will refer the matter to AFHQ.

b. To advise AFHQ on such Italian Army matters as come within the scope of sub-para a. above, and, should the occasion arise, on the employment of any Italian units or formations under Allied Command.

079 GCT-O of 25 Oct 44 refers, and this directive is intended only to amplify the provisions regarding MMIA in the light of the reorganisation of the Italian Army as set out in this HQ letter AG 091.741 GSD-O of 2 Nov 45.

3. The term "Italian Army" includes the Carabinieri, except where the operational functions and instructions in purely civil police duties of the Carabinieri are concerned. Such matters are the responsibility of the Italian Ministry of the Interior and of the Public Safety S/C of the AC.

OBJECTS.

4. The objects of your Mission will be:

- a. To advise and assist the Italian Ministry of War and subordinate Italian HQs in the formation, organisation, trg, and adm of the Italian Army within the approved ceiling. Your responsibilities in these respects will be limited to advice and assistance only; all necessary executive work must remain the responsibility of Italian authorities concerned. The Italian Government normally will be expected to accept your advice. If it should feel unable to do so you will refer the matter to AFHQ.
- b. To advise AFHQ on such Italian Army matters as come within the scope of sub-para a. above, and, should the occasion arise, on the employment of any Italian units or formations under Allied Command.

COMMAND.

5. As far as the terms of this directive are concerned you will be directly subordinate as MMIA to AFHQ. In all other respects, as Land Forces S/C of AC, you will be directly subordinate to the AC.

ORGANISATION OF MMIA.

6. To enable you to carry out the objects of your Mission you will be provided with a suitable staff of British and US officers, ORs and EM. These will be organised into:

- (a.) Military Mission to the Italian Army (also functioning as Land Forces S/C).
- (b.) British liaison units for attachment to Italian Army formations and trg establishments.

16. LFSC AL (MMIA)

7. At the present time no termination can be foreseen to the period during which the services of your Mission will be required ~~(by the Italian Govt)~~ / You will, however, keep constantly under review the numbers of British and US officers, ORs and EM required to carry out your objects efficiently and make such recommendations for progressive decrease as may be possible.

367C
8. British Liaison units are placed under your command and you are authorised to exercise disciplinary, financial and administrative powers of a COC a District in respect of the personnel and stores of these units. For this purpose the Military Mission to the Italian Army will be your HQs.

9. You will make it clear to all personnel under your command that they are to take no part in Italian political activities of any kind. Lack of impartiality may gravely impair Allied-Italian understanding, and will, in any case, render the individual or individuals concerned incapable of carrying out properly the duties entrusted to them.

ORGANISATION OF THE ITALIAN ARMY.

10. As far as possible the Italian Army will be organised, equipped, commanded and administered on lines generally similar to those employed in the British Army. This policy is subject to such modification as may be dictated by:

- (a.) Nature of the tasks which the Italian Army are intended to carry out.
- (b.) Nature and amount of the equipment which the British and US Govts have undertaken to provide.
- (c.) National characteristics of the Italian Military system.

With reference to (a) above, it is not the intention to interfere with or modify the Italian system in regard to honors and awards and the "etat civil" of military personnel except in-so-far as it is necessary to bring them in line with other changes in the organisation. It may, however, be necessary to advise the Italian Govt to modify the present system of promotion, selection of officers, pay and allowances, financial responsibility, discipline and military law, so that these shall not hamper the efficient reorganisation of the Italian Army.

11. The ceiling of the Italian Army will be decided from time to time by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the advice of AFHQ based on the recommendations of the Allied Commission. The ceiling order of battle of the Italian Army within this ceiling will be decided from time to time by AFHQ based on your recommendations. Delayed requirements within the above order of battle will be worked out as a matter of urgency by the Italian Government, as advised by I.F.S. (G) and reported to AFHQ.

12. The training policy for the Italian Army will be decided from time to time by the Italian Ministry of War, but will be carried out under your advice and supervision. You should ensure that it conforms generally with British training policy and that British methods and standards are adopted as far as practicable is practicable. The principal British staff officer for trg at AFHQ will keep you informed of current British trg policy and methods.

ADMINISTRATION.

13. The approved policy regarding the adm, including maintenance and supply, of the Italian Army, is shown in this HQ letter AG 091.711 GSD-0 of 2 Nov 45, paras 10-13 incl. Any alteration to these arrangements will be submitted to

or military personnel. It may, however, be necessary to advise with other changes in the organisation. It may, however, be necessary to advise the Italian Govt to modify the present system of promotion, selection of officers, pay and allowances, financial responsibility, discipline and military law, so that these shall not hamper the efficient reorganisation of the Italian Army.

11. The ceiling of the Italian Army will be decided from time to time by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the advice of AFHQ based on the recommendations of the Allied Commission. The detailed order of battle of the Italian Army within this ceiling will be decided from time to time by AFHQ based on your recommendations. Detailed requirements within the above order of battle will be worked out as a matter of urgency by the Italian General, as advised by L.F.S. (G), and reported to AFHQ.

12. The training policy for the Italian Army will be left entirely to the Italian Ministry of War, but will be carried out under your advice and supervision. You should ensure that it conforms generally with British training policy and that British methods and standards are adopted as far as feasible is practicable. The Principal British staff officer for trg at AFHQ will keep you informed of current British trg policy and methods.

ADMINISTRATION.

13. The approved policy regarding the adm, including maintenance and supply, of the Italian Army, is shown in this HQ letter AG 091.711 GSD-0 of 2 Nov 45, paras 10 - 13 incl. Any alteration to these arrangements will be revised to you from time to time.

14. You will be responsible for screening the demands of the Italian Ministry of War for such equipment and supplies as continue to be found from Allied Military sources. You also will exercise supervisory control over the use of such materials.

15. You will ensure that copies of all establishments and equipment tables drawn up by the Italian Ministry of War on your advice, are forwarded to AFHQ for information, and you will assist the Italian Ministry of War to introduce into the Italian Army a system of unit accounting and individual responsibility for stores, similar to that in the British Army.

16. You will be advised of the financial agreements under which the provision of any equipment or supplies is undertaken by the British and US Govts.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN:

C.W. CHRISTENSEN,
Colonel, AGC,
Adjutant General.

1834
Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Appx 'C' to MMIA letter
G/6 dated 17 Jan 1945

Minister

Secretary

Under Secretary

Chief of Staff

Deputy Chief of Staff

Director General

Director of
Operations Design

Director

Assistant Director

Heads of Services or
Inspectors (as app-
osed to Staff)

8254

366

SECRET

SUBJECT : Italian Army - Provision of personnel

LAND FORCES SUB COL, A.C.
(M.M.I.A.) R.O.M.S.
A 010/5
15 NOV 15

360

NOV 16 1945

TO : Ministry of War.

1. Reference is made to MMIA G/7 of 8 November giving the arrangements to be made for the handover of the Italian Army to the control of the Italian Government, and for its future organization, training and administration. The object of this letter is to clarify the implications of that directive with regard to the provision of personnel.
2. As from 2359 hrs, 14 November 1945 the Ministry of War will be entirely responsible, through its own channels, for all matters connected with the posting of reinforcements to Italian units. In particular :
 - (a) No personnel deficiency or strength returns are required by MMIA from the Ministry of War, or from individual depots or formations. All personnel returns hitherto made to MMIA are therefore cancelled, except the monthly "Italian Army Strength State (including Order of Battle)" which will continue to be provided by the Ministry of War (see SD/92/3 of 8 Nov.). MMIA may, however, require information from time to time on specific matters vide MMIA G/7 of 8 Nov para 5 (b).
 - (b) The Ministry of War will make arrangements to obtain from formations such returns as it considers necessary in order to maintain units to strength, dispose of surplus personnel, etc. Such returns will be made through Italian channels of communication (see MMIA G/7 of 8 Nov para 10 (a)). If it is temporarily necessary to use Allied channels, this may be done by making appropriate arrangements with the nearest L O or B L U for the information required by the Ministry of War to be passed to them via MMIA. MMIA will, however, take no executive action.
 - (c) No further bids for rail movements of personnel will be made through MMIA. The Ministry of War will deal directly with the Italian State

(a) The Ministry of War, or from individual depots or formations. personnel returns hitherto made to MMIA are therefore cancelled, except the monthly "Italian Army Strength State (including Order of Battle)" which will continue to be provided by the Ministry of War (see SD/92/3 of 8 Nov.). MMIA may, however, require information from time to time on specific matters vide MMIA G/7 of 8 Nov para 5 (b).

(b) The Ministry of War will make arrangements to obtain from formations such returns as it considers necessary in order to maintain units to strength, dispose of surplus personnel, etc. Such returns will be made through Italian channels of communication (see MMIA G/7 of 8 Nov para 10 (a)). If it is temporarily necessary to use Allied channels, this may be done by making appropriate arrangements with the nearest L O or B L U for the information required by the Ministry of War to be passed to them via MMIA. MMIA will, however, take no executive action.

(c) No further bids for rail movements of personnel will be made through MMIA. The Ministry of War will deal directly with the Italian State Railways.

3. The War Ministry will be responsible for keeping the Interim Italian Army and CC.RR. up to its approved strength plus US-ITI and ER-ITI Services. US-ITI ER-ITI Service Units will have priority on available manpower. The temporary provision whereby ER-ITI units could hold 20 % surplus to W.E. is cancelled.

4. The Ministry of War will be responsible for analysing the future availability of specialist personnel and anticipating deficiencies by arms and trades so that appropriate training arrangements may be made.

See W. 364

See W. 364

For Major General M.M.I.A.

maf.

(CAPT M.M.I.A.)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

COPY TO : A.F.H.Q.
C.G. HTOUSA
C.G. AAFSC/ATO
C.G. PBS
C.O. PENSOUTH
XIII CORPS
2 DISTRICT
3 DISTRICT
C.G. RAC
Executive Commissioner A.C.
G1 BR A.C.
H.Q. Train Guard Control
'F' BTU IRTG
BR Cadre 807 Transit Camp
BR Cadre 802 Reorganisation Centre
All MMLA LO's

INTERNAL : C (SD) (2)
C (Trg)
Q
Mov.

1838

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

G (Trg)
Q
Mov.

ISE

Subject: Administration of H.M.I.A.



To: A.P.H.O.

7001 Persons and Commission, A.C.

(H.M.I.A.)

H.M.I.A.

A.C.

8 Nov 1945

NOV 10 1945

1. The present temporarily devised arrangements under which H.M.I.A. as a unit is administered, jointly by H.M.I.A., partly by A.C. and partly direct by H.M.I.A., results in considerable duplication and inefficiency. In addition the H.M.I.A. 1,000 and H.M.I.A. 1,000 whose personnel (as part of H.M.I.A.) are frequently intermingled with H.M.I.A. in work partly under the administrative control of the various sub areas in which they find themselves from time to time.

2. It would seem that the present arrangements, when H.M.I.A. and the H.M.I.A. are being reorganized and when the functions of H.M.I.A. are being revised, is an opportunity not to be missed to define clearly principles under which this somewhat casual organization should be administered.

3. Relative factors are as follows:-

- (a) H.M.I.A. is composed by a major General and includes a high percentage of senior officers
- (b) H.M.I.A. has authority and resources for functional orders direct from H.M.I.A.
- (c) H.M.I.A. consists of 10 officers and 150 G.I.s of H.M.I.A. in total and of 15 officers and 152 G.I.s with H.M.I.A. in addition
- (d) H.M.I.A. as unit is administered by and has certain functional responsibilities (such as feeding) with A.C.
- (e) The following administrative matters are already dealt with dis-

2. It would seem that the present manual, when E.M.I.A. and the E.L.I.A. are being reorganized and when the functions of E.M.I.A. are being revised, is an opportunity to define clearly principles under which this new-
stat manual organization should be administered.

3. Relative systems are as follows:

- (a) E.M.I.A. is commanded by a Major General and includes a high percentage of senior officers
- (b) E.M.I.A. derives its authority and receives its financial orders directly from A.C.F.
- (c) E.M.I.A. consists of 10 officers and 150 G.I.s at A.C.F. in total and of 65 officers and 152 G.I.s in outstations
- (d) E.M.I.A. is under the command of a Major General and receives its financial orders directly from A.C.F.
- (e) The following administrative matters are already dealt with directly from A.C.F.:

- (1) All E.M.I.A. matters
- (2) E.M.I.A. for military operations
- (3) E.M.I.A. domestic transport
- (4) General orders for British soldiers

126
126

(f) Personnel services questions are dealt with directly through E.M.I.A. but matters of A.C.F. or by Headquarters or its branches in the case of foreign units and officers and questions direct with A.C.F. in the correct period being by no means clear.

Confusion therefore results in each instance as:

- Belongs and different
- Leave - 1 day etc.
- Compensation to personnel
- Medical
- Quarters and
- Canteen.

It is due to the fact that:

(a) E.M.I.A. officers and G.I.s in NCM are working alongside A.C.F. and cannot see necessary their orders from A.C.F. direct very much more clearly.

W.D. 1/11

(NOT RECORDED)

B/W 20/11 for E.C. all
7 Dec 47
See M. 365
See by 1/11

#6 363

- (b) S.M.I., personnel are frequently changed between units and assignments and this causes various different authorities while their S.M.I. matters may be still outstanding, and
- (c) Cases occur where personnel receive orders from areas or similar commands contrary to those issued by S.M.I., some by reason of the time lag in the circulation of amendments in matters where current regulations are frequently changing. These circumstances create an anomaly, discontent and other difficulties the solution of which comprises much time and thought which should be put to better use.

5. In these circumstances it is recommended that S.M.I., including the S.M.I. should be administered directly by A.P.S.C. for all S.M.I. matters; all personnel service matters and all matters of general administration; and through S.M.I.C. or other appropriate local executive for local questions such as training, transportation and matters of purely local administration. Your early decision in this matter for submission to all concerned would be appreciated.

L. Browning

Major General,
S.M.I.

Copy to : A.O.
R.A.O.

1-8-4-2

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

L. Browning

Major General,
U.S. Army

125

Copy to : A.G. ✓
S.A.G.

/s/

8251-56

362

CG 901

9 November 1945

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

amended to 360 NOV 9 1945

Enclosed you will find copy of Directive No. 1 regarding the hand-over of the Italian Army to the Italian Government as published by the Land Forces Subcommittee (LAFMA) of the Allied Commission.

The contents of this Directive have already been communicated by the Head of the Land Forces Subcommittee (LAFMA) to the Minister of War.

Yours very truly,

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Professor Ferruccio Parri
The President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
Rome

cc - Exec Comm. ✓

123

124

(CAPT GRAYBROOK)

805 10711

82518
ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

5 November 1945

NOV 7 1945

Brigadier Maurice Lush
Executive Commissioner
Headquarters, Allied Commission

Dear Maurice:

On Saturday last you showed me a paper containing the minutes of a meeting held by G(SD) GHQ CMF on the Handover of the Italian Army and Carabinieri to the Italian Government. Its file number was HSD/424. Its date was 27 October 1945.

In order that there should be no uncertainty about action to be taken by ALCOM on papers bearing a national headline (MTOUSA or GHQ CMF) as distinguished from an AFHQ headline the following remarks may be helpful. As ALCOM is an integrated allied headquarters, the Commission as such is subject only to the orders of AFHQ. The national individuals are however administered and supplied as individuals by their national agencies. AFHQ is a small integrated headquarters. It lacks many of the sections required to do all its functions. It has no G-4(Q) Section except the coordinating office of the CAO. It has no G-3(Organization) (Q(SD)) office. In order to get certain detailed work done and certain investigations made AFHQ directs various national staff and service divisions from time to time to perform these functions. The results of their work are passed to AFHQ for final decision and for the issuance of the necessary instructions under an AFHQ headline. It is quite possible that the interim activities may become known to the Allied Commission or that ALCOM may be requested to participate in these preliminary matters. Such was the situation in the subject minutes.

If through error instructions are issued affecting the operations of ALCOM, under a national headline which do not specifically state that they are issued in compliance with instructions from AFHQ, you are requested to query their authority to AFHQ. It is not unlikely that due to the recent reorganization of AFHQ and to the high percentage of new officers, in HQ MTOUSA, GHQ CMF and AFHQ that errors will creep in. If you will call them to our attention, it will assist in their early elimination.

123
A. L. HAMBLIN
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5.

65-20/11

Dated 17/11

14/11

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Office of the Chief Commissioner

APO 394

Ref: 8251/356/EC.

6 November 1945.

SUBJECT: Handover of Italian Army to the
Italian Government.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
Attn: G-5 Section.

1. I have read the minutes of a meeting held to discuss the turnover of the Italian Army and CC.RR to the Italian Government, sent to me by GHQ, CMF.

2. I refer to para 6. I note therein the formation of an Allied Military Mission and the statement that the Italian Government will normally accept the advice of this Mission. I presume that no such statement will be included in any directive sent to me for neither is it in my power to give effect to the directive nor is it in consonance with FAN 487.

3. I would suggest that for the sake of consistency the directive prepared by AFHQ, discussed at SACMED's Conference, and thereafter issued to the Air Forces Sub-Commission, should be followed in any directive prepared for the Land Forces Sub-Commission. The Air Forces Sub-Commission meets the service and political aspects of its functions admirably and could, and I submit should be, equally applied to the Land Forces Sub-Commission in the new conditions. Paras 2 and 3(a) are especially applicable.

W. W. Stone

W. W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

SECRET and IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL
ALLIED COMMISSION

LAND FORCES SUB-COMMISSION (MILIA)

C / 7

8 Nov 45

DIRECTIVE No. 1

NOV 8 1945

HANDOVER OF THE ITALIAN ARMY TO THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

I. GENERAL

See 4366

1. Approval has now been given by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the interim policy to be adopted towards the Italian Armed Forces pending a final settlement by peace treaty. The Supreme Allied Commander therefore directs that the following arrangements be made for the handover of the Italian Army to the control of the Italian Government and for its future organization, *See 388*
training and administration.

II.

HANDOVER OF ITALIAN ARMY TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT CONTROL.

2. Transfer of Units. With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, units of the Italian Army that are now in the ITI-ITI category together with the five BR-ITI combat groups and their support units and 10,000 Carabinieri now held in BR-ITI category will be transferred to the control of the Italian Government. Allied commanders will have no powers of command over such units except as stated in paragraph 5, below.

3. Future of US-ITI and BR-ITI Units.

(a) US-ITI and BR-ITI units less the five BR-ITI combat groups referred to above will continue to be employed in accordance with existing arrangements as long as they are needed by the Allied military authorities. Such units will remain under the operational command of Allied Force Headquarters. The numbers employed will gradually be reduced to NIL. It is estimated that in the case of US-ITI personnel, this at present will be reached in approximately February 1946 and in the case of BR-ITI personnel in approximately June, 1946. When no longer needed by the Allied military authorities, US-ITI and BR-ITI personnel of units will be offered to the Italian Government.

(b) Administration and maintenance of US-ITI and BR-ITI Service Units, and the Italian Navy and Air Force will be in accordance with paragraph 10, below.

units of the Italian Army that are now in the BR-ITI category, together with the five BR-ITI combat groups and their support units and 10,000 Carabinieri now held in BR-ITI category will be transferred to the control of the Italian Government. Allied commanders will have no powers of command over such units except as stated in paragraph 5, below.

3. Future of US-ITI and BR-ITI Units.

(a) US-ITI and BR-ITI units less the five BR-ITI combat groups referred to above will continue to be employed in accordance with existing arrangements as long as they are needed by the Allied military authorities. Such units will remain under the operational command of Allied Force Headquarters. The numbers employed will gradually be reduced to zero. It is expected that in the case of US-ITI personnel, this rate will be reached in approximately February 1946 and in the case of BR-ITI personnel in approximately June, 1946. When no longer needed by the Allied military authorities, US-ITI and BR-ITI personnel of units will be offered to the Italian Government.

(b) Administration and maintenance of US-ITI and BR-ITI Service Units, and the Italian Navy and Air Force will be in accordance with paragraph 10, below.

4. Future of the Carabinieri. Control of the Carabinieri will be the responsibility of the Italian Government subject to the supervision and overriding authority of AIC in those areas which remain outside the jurisdiction of the Italian Government. Strength will not exceed 5,000 which will be maintained to any ceiling figure agreed for the Italian Army. The Carabinieri will be used for civilian security purposes only and will not be responsible for military security.

5. Reservations.

(c) The Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater reserves the right to assume command at any time of the whole or any part of the Italian Army located in the theater, and to delegate his authority to command formations and units of the Italian Army to any Allied commander whom he may direct.

see F.362

Copy 6: French Rep. w/m.

...../2

(b) The Italian Government will furnish to the Supreme Allied Commander such information regarding the strength, organization, training, movements, administration, real estate, stocks of material and equipment, and other matters concerning the Italian Army as may be required from time to time.

(c) Italian troops in territory not handed back to the Italian Government, and 808 CS Battalion although included in the ceiling set out in paragraph 7 below, will remain under operational command of Allied Force Headquarters for the time being.

6. Military Mission.

(a) An Allied Military Mission will be provided to advise and assist the Italian Government in the organization, training and administration of the Italian Army and Carabinieri and to obtain and transmit to superior authority such information as is required. The Italian Government will normally accept the advice of this Mission. If it should find itself unable to do so, the matter will be referred to Allied Force Headquarters by the Allied Military Mission. The Mission will also be responsible for screening those demands for supplies and equipment which continue to be not from Allied military sources, and will exercise supervisory control over the use of such materials.

(b) The Allied Military Mission will for the present be the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (IMLA).

III. FUTURE ORGANISATION, TRAINING AND ADMINISTRATION.

7. Organisation. During the interim period until the peace treaty becomes operative the Italian Army under control of the Italian Government will consist of not more than 140,000 personnel and will be organized on the following lines:

(a) Local Reserves.

Three Internal Security Divisions each of 5,000 men, two in SICILY and one in SARDINIA.....	15,000
Ten Independent Regiments each of 2,500 men for ten territorial regions on mainland.....	25,000

plus 506
are 15

III. FUTURE ORGANISATION, TRAINING AND ADMINISTRATION.

7. Organisation. During the interim period until the peace treaty becomes operative the Italian Army under control of the Italian Government will consist of not more than 140,000 personnel and will be organised on the following lines:

(a) Local Reserves.

Three Internal Security Divisions each of 5,000 men, two in SICILY and one in SARDINIA..... 15,000
Ten Independent Regiments each of 2,500 men for ten territorial regions on mainland..... 25,000
Total..... 40,000
37,500.

120

(b) Mobile Reserves.

Five combat groups and supporting troops

Total..... 50,000

(b) (c) Command.

Ministry of War and Territorial Region Headquarters

Total..... 9,000

(c) (d) Administration.

Total..... 31,000

(d) (e) Training and Reinforcements.

Total..... 12,500
140,000

...../3

- 3 -

8. No alteration to the general lay-out shown above will be made by the Italian Government without the consent of Allied Force Headquarters. Detailed requirements within the above framework will, however, be worked out as a matter of urgency by the Italian Government, as advised by the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (MMIA) and reported to Allied Force Headquarters.

9. Training. The training of the Italian Army will be the responsibility of the Italian Government as advised by the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (MMIA).

10. Administration,

(a) With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, the Italian Government will assume responsibility for the administration of the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7 above, and of the Carabinieri. Administrative units required will be formed from within the authorized ceiling so that the Italian Army is self-administering and no longer dependent on Allied base and lines of communication units.

(b) Italian Navy and Italian Air Force personnel will continue to be administered and maintained as at present, through Italian service channels.

(c) BR-ITI personnel in diluted British units will continue to be administered and maintained as at present. BR-ITI Army Service units will continue to be administered and maintained through Italian service channels, except in respect of the provision of rations. With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, responsibility for provision and issue of rations will be as follows:

- (1) The British portion of the ration only will be issued to such units through British service channels.
- (2) The Italian portion of the ration will be issued direct to units through Italian administrative channels.
- (d) US-ITI Service units will be administered and maintained through US service channels.

11. Maintenance and Provisioning.

(a) With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, the Italian Government will assume responsibility for the maintenance of the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7 above, and of the Carabinieri.

(b) Procurement in respect of food, clothing, medical stores, etc.

(c) BR-ITI personnel in diluted British units will continue to be administered and maintained as at present. BR-ITI Army Service units will continue to be administered and maintained through Italian service channels, except in respect of the provision of rations. With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, responsibility for provision and issue of rations will be as follows:

- (1) The British portion of the ration only will be issued to such units through British service channels.
- (2) The Italian portion of the ration will be issued direct to units through Italian administrative channels.
- (d) US-ITI Service units will be administered and maintained through US service channels.

11. Maintenance and Provisioning.

(a) With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, the Italian Government will assume responsibility for the maintenance of the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7 above, and of the Carabinieri.

(b) Procurement in respect of food, clothing, medical stores, warlike and non-warlike equipment will be effected from the following sources and the following priorities subject to any subsequent instructions which may be issued regarding the standardisation of equipment of the Italian Army and of the Carabinieri.

- (1) From indigenous Italian resources including captured material (except German weapons) and such local manufactures as may be authorised by Allied Force Headquarters.
- (2) By purchases from appropriate US and UK surplus disposal agencies in ITALY of stocks which are available to those disposal agencies.
- (3) Through the Italian Government import programme.

(c) As the procurement procedure outlined in paragraph 11(b) above will take time before it becomes fully operative, particularly in respect of requirements included in the Italian Government import programme, the following procedure will apply to those requirements which cannot be met from the sources set out in paragraph 11(b) above:

...../4

- 4 -

- (1) Such requirements may be loaned from US and British military stocks as a temporary expedient up to 1 January 1946. In addition, certain food may be sold or loaned to the Italian Government in accordance with paragraph 13(c) below.
- (2) Thereafter, these items will be returnable to the US and British on demand or they may be transferred to the Italian Government through US and British disposals organisations in accordance with established procedure.
- (d) With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, the Italian Government will continue to be responsible for meeting the POL and coal requirements of the Italian Army and Carabinieri ~~from~~ ^{from} civil stocks and by means of the Italian Government import programme.

12. Warlike Equipment and Spares. All arms, vehicles and other warlike equipment of US and British origin (including lend-lease) in possession of those units being used to make up the Italian Army of 140,000 and in possession of the Carabinieri as may be surplus to US and British requirements together with up to one years maintenance and spare parts for arms, vehicles and other equipment so provided as may be surplus to US and British requirements will be disposed of to the Italian Government. Appropriate scales of ammunition of various natures will also be transferred and authorised expenditure replenished from Allied sources. In the case of vehicles and warlike equipment available to US and British disposal organisations, disposal to the Italian Government will be effected through the respective US and British disposals organisations in accordance with established procedures, but with priorities requested for its sale to the Italian Government. In the case of lethal British warlike equipment, transfer will be made direct by the military.

13. Food Supply.

- (a) Subsistence will continue to be furnished by the US and British Army based on actual strengths of the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7, above, and of the Carabinieri until 30 November 1945. US responsibility will not exceed 124,000 and British responsibility will not exceed 81,000.
- (b) Subsistence for the Italian Army, including the Carabinieri, will be the responsibility of the Italian Government with effect from 1 December 1945. Its sources for provisioning are as set out in paragraph 11, above.
- (c) The US and British surplus disposal agencies will be requested to give the Italian Government priority in providing subsistence for the Italian Army from such supplies as may be declared surplus by the US and British military authorities. This undertaking is limited to the extent of the surplus declared by the authorities.

disposed of to the Italian Government. Appropriate stocks of ammunition of various natures will also be transferred and authorized expenditure replenished from Allied sources. In the case of vehicles and warlike equipment available to US and British disposal organizations, disposal to the Italian Government will be effected through the respective US and British disposals organizations in accordance with established procedures, but with priorities requested for its sale to the Italian Government. In the case of lethal British warlike equipment, transfer will be made direct by the military.

13. Food Supply.

(a) Subsistence will continue to be furnished by the US and British Army based on actual strengths of the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7, above, and of the Carabinieri until 30 November 1945. US responsibility will not exceed 124,000 and British responsibility will not exceed 81,000.

(b) Subsistence for the Italian Army, including the Carabinieri, will be the responsibility of the Italian Government with effect from 1 December 1945. Its sources for provisioning are as set out in paragraph 11, above.

(c) The US and British surplus disposal agencies will be requested to give the Italian Government priority in providing subsistence for the Italian Army from such supplies as may be declared surplus by the US and British military authorities. This priority is limited to items now being furnished in the ITI-ITI ration or equivalent British scale and in quantities not in excess of that required for the actual strength and in no event in excess of 205,000, beginning with the date of the request and ending 1 May 1946.

118

14. Clothing and Individual/Personal Equipment.

(a) All previous directives pertaining to transfer of clothing, individual/personal equipment and salvage to the Italian Army through MIAA are rescinded.

(b) Purchase of any surpluses of non-warlike stores is as authorized in paragraph 11(b)(2) above.

15. Medical Stores. Medical Stores of Allied origin which are held in Italian depots or by Italian units at the date of this letter will remain in Italian possession.

...../5

16. Accounting.

(a) Financial arrangements consequent upon the above policy regarding supply remain to be settled. In the meantime, records will be maintained of all transfers made to the Italian Government from military stocks and accounting procedures in sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) below will apply.

(b) Accounting for Allied military supplies issued to the Italian Government in bulk for the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7 above, and for the Carabinieri, Italian Navy and Air Force will follow present established procedures for the ITI-ITI category.

(c) Accounting for Allied military supplies issued from British and US depots direct to BR-ITI and US-ITI units will follow established procedures of the British and US Forces. Issues from US military stocks, other than disposals through AMIC, will be through MMIA (US Contingent) who will maintain adequate records.

L. Browning

Major-General,
Director,
Land Forces Sub Commission (MMIA)

fd

DISTRIBUTION:

MINISTRY OF WAR
- Chief Commissioner A.C.
- Exec Commissioner A.C.
- Navy Sub Commission A.C.
- Air Forces Sub-Commissioner A.C.
Senior MMIA LO c/o MMIA LO NW ITALY MILAN
MMIA LO NW ITALY MILAN
" " c/o 201 Sub Area
" " c/o 86 Area
" " c/o Signal Office GENOA

pd

Major-General,
Director,
Land Forces Sub-Commission (MILIA).

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MMIA LO NW ITALY MILAN

" " c/o 201 Sub Area

" " c/o 86 Area

" " c/o Signal Office GENOA

" " TURIN c/o 7 ACR.

" " NW ITALY MILAN (attention Capt FOX)

" " BOLZANO 60 Sub Area c/o 68 Arty Regt

" " SICILY

" " 4th Floor Provincia Buildings NAPLES

" " c/o Liaison Sec PES

" " c/o FLORENCE CITY Comd

" " c/o 3 District

" " c/o 54 Area

Comd 50 BLU

" 51 "

" 52 "

" 53 "

" 56 "

" " BL & TU

INTERNAL : C of S

Col A/Q

G { Five }

A { Four }

Q { Five }

RE

Z

ST (Three)

Med

REME

War Diary (Two)

File : G/7

Spare (Twenty)

117

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

SECRET

AF 789

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

AG 091.711 G(SD)-0

REC'D

MFA/wp

.....
 : **SECRET** :
 : Auth: SAC, MT :
 : Initials: *MT* :
 : Date: 2 Nov 1945 :
 : :
 2 November 1945

SUBJECT: Handover of Italian Army to Italian Government.

NOV 10 1945

TO: Chief Commissioner
 Allied Commission
 APO 394
 FOR: Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA) (5)

I. GENERAL.

1. Approval has now been given by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the interim policy to be adopted towards the Italian Armed Forces pending a final settlement by peace treaty. You will therefore inform the Italian Government that the following arrangements will be made for the handover of the Italian Army to their control and for its future organization, training and administration.

II. HANDOVER OF ITALIAN ARMY TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT CONTROL.

2. Transfer of Units. With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, units of the Italian Army that are now in the ITI-ITI category together with the five BR-ITI combat groups and their support units and 10,000 Carabinieri now held in BR-ITI category will be transferred to the control of the Italian Government. Allied commanders will have no powers of command over such units except as stated in paragraph 5, below.

3. Future of US-ITI and BR-ITI Units.

a. US-ITI and BR-ITI units less the five BR-ITI combat groups referred to above will continue to be employed in accordance with existing arrangements as long as they are needed by the Allied military authorities. Such units will remain under the operational command of Allied Force Headquarters. The numbers employed will gradually be reduced to NIL. It is estimated that in the case of US-ITI personnel, this stage will be reached in approximately February 1946 and in the case of BR-ITI personnel in approximately June 1946. When no longer needed by the Allied military authorities, US-ITI and BR-ITI personnel or units will be offered to the Italian Government.

b. Administration and maintenance of US-ITI and BR-ITI Service Units, and the Italian Navy and Air Force will be in accordance with paragraph 10, below.

116

SECRET**SECRET**

SECRET

Ltr, AFHQ, AG 091.711 G(SD)-0,
dtd 2 November 45 (Cont'd)

4. Future of the Carabinieri. Control of the Carabinieri will be the responsibility of the Italian Government subject to the supervision and overriding authority of AMG in those areas which remain outside the jurisdiction of the Italian Government. Strength will not exceed 65,000 which will be additional to any ceiling figure agreed for the Italian Army. The Carabinieri will be used for civilian security purposes only and will not be responsible for military security.

5. Reservations.

a. The Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater reserves the right to assume command at any time of the whole or any part of the Italian Army located in the theater, and to delegate his authority to command formations and units of the Italian Army to any Allied commander whom he may direct.

b. The Italian Government will furnish to the Supreme Allied Commander such information regarding the strength, organization, training, movements, administration, real estate, stocks of material and equipment, and other matters concerning the Italian Army as may be required from time to time.

c. Italian troops in territory not handed back to the Italian Government, and 808 CS Battalion although included in the ceiling set out in paragraph 7 below, will remain under operational command of Allied Force Headquarters for the time being.

6. Military Mission.

a. An Allied Military Mission will be provided to advise and assist the Italian Government in the organization, training and administration of the Italian Army and Carabinieri and to obtain and transmit to superior authority such information as is required. The Italian Government will normally accept the advice of this Mission. If it should find itself unable to do so, the matter will be referred to Allied Force Headquarters by the Allied Military Mission. The Mission will also be responsible for screening those demands for supplies and equipment which continue to be met from Allied military sources, and will exercise supervisory control over the use of such materials.

b. The Allied Military Mission will for the present be the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (MMIA). A revised directive to the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (MMIA) will shortly be issued.

III. FUTURE ORGANIZATION, TRAINING AND ADMINISTRATION.

7. Organization. During the interim period until the peace treaty becomes operative the Italian Army under control of the Italian Government will consist of not more than 140,000 personnel and will be organized on the following lines:

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Ltr, AFHQ, AG 091.711 (SD)-0,
 dtd 2 November 45 (Cont'd)

a. Local Reserves.

Three Internal Security Divisions each of 5,000 men,
 two in SICILY and one in SARDINIA 15,000.

Ten Independent Regiments each of 2,500 men for ten
 territorial regions on mainland 25,000.

Total 40,000.

b. Mobile Reserves.

Five combat groups and supporting troops.

Total 50,000.

c. Command.

Ministry of War and Territorial Region

Headquarters Total 9,000.

d. Administration. Total 31,000.

e. Training and Reinforcements.

Total 10,000.

140,000.

8. No alteration to the general layout shown above will be made by the Italian Government without the consent of Allied Force Headquarters. Detailed requirements within the above framework will, however, be worked out as a matter of urgency by the Italian Government, as advised by the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (MMIA) and reported to Allied Force Headquarters.

9. Training. The training of the Italian Army will be the responsibility of the Italian Government as advised by the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (MMIA).

10. Administration.

a. With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, the Italian Government will assume responsibility for the administration of the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7 above, and of the Carabinieri. Administrative units required will be formed from within the authorized ceiling so that the Italian Army is self-administering and no longer dependent on Allied base and lines of communication units.

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Ltr, AFHQ, AG 091.711 G(SD)-0,
dtd 2 November 45 (Cont'd)

b. Italian Navy and Italian Air Force personnel will continue to be administered and maintained as at present, through Italian service channels.

c. BRI-ITI personnel in diluted British units will continue to be administered and maintained as at present. BRI-ITI Army Service units will continue to be administered and maintained through Italian service channels, except in respect of the provision of rations. With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, responsibility for provision and issue of rations will be as follows:

- (1) The British portion of the ration only will be issued to such units through British service channels.
- (2) The Italian portion of the ration will be issued direct to units through Italian administrative channels.

d. US-ITI Service Units will be administered and maintained through US service channels.

11. Maintenance and Provisioning.

a. With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, the Italian Government will assume responsibility for the maintenance of the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7 above, and of the Carabinieri.

b. Procurement in respect of food, clothing, medical stores, warlike and non-warlike equipment will be effected from the following sources and in the following priorities subject to any subsequent instructions which may be issued regarding the standardization of equipment of the Italian Army and of the Carabinieri:

- (1) From indigenous Italian resources including captured material (except German weapons) and such local manufactures as may be authorized by Allied Force Headquarters.
- (2) By purchases from appropriate US and UK surplus disposal agencies in ITALY of stocks which are available to those disposal agencies.
- (3) Through the Italian Government import program.

c. As the procurement procedure outlined in paragraph 11 b above, will take time before it becomes fully operative, particularly in respect of requirements included in the Italian Government import program, the following procedure will apply to those requirements which cannot be met from the sources set out in paragraph 11 b, above:

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Ltr, AFHQ, AG 091.711 (SD)-0,
dtd 2 November 45 (Cont'd)

- (1) Such requirements may be loaned from US and British military stocks as a temporary expedient up to 1 January 1946. In addition, certain food may be sold or loaned to the Italian Government in accordance with paragraph 13 c, below.
- (2) Thereafter, these items will be returnable to the US and British on demand or they may be transferred to the Italian Government through US and British disposals organizations in accordance with established procedures.

d. With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, the Italian Government will continue to be responsible for meeting the POL and Coal requirements of the Italian Army and Carabinieri from civil stocks and by means of the Italian Government import program.

12. Warlike Equipment and Spares. All arms, vehicles and other warlike equipment of US and British origin (including lend-lease) in possession of these units being used to make up the Italian Army of 140,000 and in possession of the Carabinieri as may be surplus to US and British requirements together with up to one years maintenance and spare parts for arms, vehicles and other equipment so provided as may be surplus to the US and British requirements will be disposed of to the Italian Government. Appropriate scales of ammunition of various natures will also be transferred and authorized expenditure replenished from Allied sources. In the case of vehicles and warlike equipment available to US and British disposal organizations, disposal to the Italian Government will be effected through the respective US and British disposals organizations in accordance with established procedures, but with priorities requested for its sale to the Italian Government. In the case of lethal British warlike equipment, transfer will be made direct by the military.

13. Food Supply.

a. Subsistence will continue to be furnished by the US and British Army based on actual strengths of the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7 above, and of the Carabinieri until 30 November 1945. US responsibility will not exceed 124,000 and British responsibility will not exceed 81,000.

b. Subsistence for the Italian Army, including the Carabinieri, will be the responsibility of the Italian Government with effect from 1 December 1945. Its sources for provisioning are as set out in paragraph 11, above.

c. The US and British surplus disposal agencies will be requested to give the Italian Government priority in providing subsistence for the Italian Army from such supplies as may be declared surplus by the US and British military authorities. This priority is limited to items now being furnished in the ITI-ITI ration or equivalent British scale and in quantities not in excess of that required for the actual strength and in no event in excess of 205,000, beginning with the date of the request and ending 1 May 1946.

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Ltr, AFHQ, AG 091.711 G(SD)-0,
dtd 2 November 45 (Cont'd)

14. Clothing and Individual/Personal Equipment.

a. All previous directives pertaining to transfer of clothing, individual/personal equipment and salvage to the Italian Army through MMIA are rescinded.

b. Purchase of any surpluses of non-warlike stores is as authorized in paragraph 11 b (2), above.

15. Medical Stores. Medical Stores of Allied origin which are held in Italian depots or by Italian units at the date of this letter will remain in Italian possession.

16. Accounting.

a. Financial arrangements consequent upon the above policy regarding supply remain to be settled. In the meantime, records will be maintained of all transfers made to the Italian Government from military stocks and accounting procedures in sub-paragraphs b and c below, will apply.

b. Accounting for Allied military supplies issued to the Italian Government in bulk for the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7 above, and for the Carabinieri, Italian Navy and Air Force will follow present established procedures for the ITI-ITI category.

c. Accounting for Allied military supplies issued from British and US depots direct to BRI-ITI and US-ITI units will follow established procedures of the British and US forces. Issues from US military stocks, other than disposals through ANLC, will be through MMIA (US Contingent) who will maintain adequate records.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN:

C. W. Christenberry
C. W. CHRISTENBERRY
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

(See Next Page)

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Ltr, AFHQ, AG 091.711 (SD)-0,
dtd 2 November 45 (Cont'd)

DISTRIBUTION:

- 5 - Addressee
- 5 - GOC, XIII Corps
- 5 - GOC, Number 2 District
- 5 - GOC, Number 3 District
- 5 - CG, Peninsular Base Section
- 5 - CG, Rome Area Allied Command
- 5 - British Ministry of Supply
- 5 - ANLC
- 5 - C-in-C Mediterranean
- 5 - Air HQ RAF, Italy
- 1 - SACS
- 1 - CAO
- 1 - G-2
- 1 - Signals
- 1 - PWB
- 1 - G-3, AFHQ
- 1 - Pot Sec
- 1 - G-5
- 1 - USPOLAD
- 1 - BR RES MIN
- 1 - CG, MTOUSA
- 1 - G-1 (A)
- 1 - Surgeon (A)
- 1 - Fiscal Director
- 1 - G-3, MTOUSA
- 1 - Engr (A)
- 1 - G-4 (A)
- 2 - QM
- 1 - Ord (A)
- 1 - TPN (A)
- 1 - CGS, GHQ CMF
- 1 - Dep Mil Sec
- 1 - Liaison, GHQ CMF
- 1 - Financial Adviser
- 1 - "A"
- 1 - GHQ 2d Echelon
- 1 - Medical, GHQ CMF
- 1 - Pay, GHQ CMF
- 1 - GS(I), GHQ CMF
- 10 - G(SD), GHQ CMF
- 1 - RE, GHQ CMF
- 1 - Signals, GHQ CMF
- 1 - Log Plans
- 1 - Q (Maint)
- 1 - S&T
- 1 - Postal, GHQ CMF
- 1 - Labour
- 1 - Claims & Hirings
- 1 - Q (AE)

- 1 - Ord, GHQ CMF
- 1 - REIME
- 1 - Q (MOV)
- 2 - TPN, GHQ CMF
- 1 - Civil Affairs, GHQ CMF
- 2 - AG Records
- 1 - AG M&D

113

SECRET

Ref: 8231/83.

29 October, 1945.

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

In spite of my conversation with you on 14 October it appears that the Army Pay question has not yet been settled, nor, so far as I am aware, has any meeting on this subject taken place between the Ministers for War and Treasury.

You will appreciate the fact that this question has been under discussion for well over a month. On 29 September the Ministry for War was given, by letter, the views of the Supreme Allied Commander which were "that the matter be taken up again with the Treasury Minister with a view to obtaining an early favourable agreement." This letter went on to request that immediate action be taken to contradict disquieting rumours.

It appears that no agreement has been reached on this matter. In the meantime rumours and uncertainty as to the future persist among Army personnel with the inevitable result that there is a serious lowering of morale.

The Supreme Allied Commander has taken a personal interest in this matter and I should therefore be grateful if you could ensure that an early solution of the problem could be effected.

Very truly yours,

ELLERY W. STONE

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Professor Ferruccio Torri,
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government,
Rome.

Copy to: Land Forces S/C

B/u 10/1112

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CONFIDENTIAL
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CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN FORCES

427/05H

OCT 29 1945

Minutes of a Meeting held at AFHQ on Thursday, 25 Oct 45 to discuss the Handover of Italian Army and Carabinieri to the Italian Government.

Chairman: Brig. J. D' A. ANDERSON

CS 2 (CS)

Present. Representatives from the following :

HQ Allied Commission
Land Forces Sub Commission AC (AMIA)
Financial Adviser
Fiscal Director
G-1(A)
G-2 AFHQ
G-3 MTO
G-4(A)
Log Plans

Secretary : Major S. H. MILNES

(9)

1. The Chairman opened the Meeting by stating that its object was to finalise the draft of the directive to HQ Allied Commission regarding the handover of the Italian Army and Carabinieri to the Italian Government.

2. The Meeting then proceeded to consider the draft.

Present. Representatives from the following:

HQ Allied Commission
Land Forces Sub Commission AC (AMIA)
Financial Adviser
Fiscal Director

G-1(A)
'A'

G-2
G-3 AFHQ

G-3 MTO

G-4(A)

Log Plans

Secretary: Major S.H. MILNES

Q(Maint)

Q(AE)

G-4(Mov & Trn)

G-5

DST

Medical (L)

Ord(A)

Ord(L)

Pet Sec

QM

G(SD)

1. The Chairman opened the Meeting by stating that its object was to finalise the draft of the directive to HQ Allied Commission regarding the handover of the Italian Army and Carabinieri to the Italian Government.

2. The Meeting then proceeded to consider the draft.

3. Attached is the final proposed directive, as agreed by the Meeting, to be submitted to the Chief of Staff for approval.

111

DISTRIBUTION

HQ Allied Commission
Land Forces Sub Commission
AC(AMIA)

British Ministry of Supply
ANLC

Financial Adviser
Fiscal Director

G-1(A)
'A'

G-2 AFHQ

G-3 MTO

G-4(A)

QM

Log Plans

Q(Maint)

Q(AE)

G-4(Mov&Trn)

G-5

DST

Ord(A)

Ord(L)

Medical(L)

Pet Sec

S.H. Milnes

S.H. MILNES,

Major, G(SD),

Secretary.

350

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT : Handover of Italian Army to Italian Government

TO : Headquarters Allied Commission for ITALY

COPY TO : Land Forces Sub Commission, Allied Commission (MILA).

GENERAL

1. Approval has now been given by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the interim policy to be adopted towards the Italian Armed Forces pending a final settlement by peace treaty. You will therefore inform the Italian Government that the following arrangements will be made for the handover of the Italian Army to their control and for its future organisation, training and administration.

HANDOVER OF ITALIAN ARMY TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT CONTROL.

2. Transfer of Units

With effect from 2400 hrs 14 Nov 45 units of the Italian

Army that are now in the ITI-ITI category together with the five DR-ITI combat groups and their support units and 10,000 Carabinieri now held in DR-ITI Category will be transferred to the control of the Italian Government. Allied Commanders will have no powers of command over such units except as stated in paragraph 5 below.

3. Future of US-ITI and DR-ITI Units.

4. US-ITI and DR-ITI Units less the five DR-ITI combat groups referred to above will continue to be employed in accordance

and for its future organization.

HANDOVER OF ITALIAN ARMY TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT CONTROL.

2. Transfer of Units

With effect from 2400 hrs 14 Nov 45 units of the Italian

Army that are now in the ITI-ITI category together with the five BR-ITI

combat groups and their support units and 10,000 Carabinieri now held in BR-ITI Category will be transferred to the control of the Italian Government.

Allied Commanders will have no powers of command over such units except as stated in paragraph 5 below.

3. Future of US-ITI and BR-ITI Units.

4. US-ITI and BR-ITI Units less the five BR-ITI combat

groups referred to above will continue to be employed in accordance with existing arrangements as long as they are needed by the Allied

Military authorities. Such units will remain under the operational

command of Allied Force Headquarters. The numbers employed will

gradually be reduced to NIL. It is estimated that in the case of US-ITI

personnel, this stage will be reached in approximately February 1946 and

in the case of BR-ITI personnel in approximately June 1946. When no

longer needed by the Allied Military authorities, US-ITI and BR-ITI

personnel or units will be offered to the Italian Government.

B. Administration and maintenance of US-ITI and BR-ITI Service

Units, and the Italian Navy and Air Force will be in accordance with

paragraph 10 below.

12.....

4. Future of the Carabinieri

Control of the Carabinieri will be the responsibility of the Italian Government subject to the supervision and overriding authority of AMG in those areas which remain outside the jurisdiction of the Italian Government. Strength will not exceed 65,000 which will be additional to any ceiling figure agreed for the Italian Army. The Carabinieri will be used for civilian security purposes only and will not be responsible for military security.

5. Reservations.

A. The Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean theatre reserves the right to assume command at any time of the whole or any part of the Italian Army located in the theatre, and to delegate his authority to command formations and units of the Italian Army to any Allied Commander whom he may direct.

B. The Italian Government will furnish to the Supreme Allied Commander such information regarding the strength, organisation, training, movements, administration, real estate, stocks of material and equipment, and other matters concerning the Italian Army as may be required from time to time.

C. Italian troops in territory not handed back to the Italian Government, and 808 GS Battalion although included in the ceiling set out in paragraph 7 below will remain under operational command of Allied

any Allied Commander whom he may direct.

B. The Italian Government will furnish to the Supreme Allied Commander such information regarding the strength, organization, training, movements, administration, real estate, stocks of material and equipment, and other matters concerning the Italian Army as may be required from time to time.

C. Italian troops in territory not handed back to the Italian Government, and 808 CS Battalion although included in the ceiling set out in paragraph 7 below will remain under operational command of Allied Force Headquarters for the time being.

109

6. Military Mission.

A. An Allied Military Mission will be provided to advise and assist the Italian Government in the organization, training and administration of the Italian Army, and to obtain and transmit to superior authority such information as is required. The Italian Government will normally accept the advice of this Mission. If it should find itself unable to do so, the matter will be referred to JCHQ by the Allied Military Mission for decision. The Mission will also be responsible for screening those demands for supplies and equipment which continue to be met from Allied military sources, and will exercise supervisory control over the use of such materials.

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348

B. The Allied Military Mission will for the present be the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (ALC). A revised directive to the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (ALC) will shortly be issued.

FUTURE ORGANISATION, TRAINING AND ADMINISTRATION.

7. Organisation.

During the interim period until the peace treaty becomes operative the Italian Army under control of the Italian Government will consist of not more than 140,000 personnel and will be organised on the following lines:-

A. Local Reserves

Three Internal Security Divisions each of 5,000 men,
two in SICILY and one in SARDINIA 15,000.
Ten Independent Regiments each of 2,500 men for ten
territorial regions on mainland 25,000
Total 40,000

B. Mobile Reserves

Five combat groups and supporting Troops
Total 50,000

C. Command

Ministry of War and Territorial Region
Headquarters
Total 9,000

Three Internal Security Divisions each

two in SICILY and one in SARDINIA 15,000.
Ten Independent Regiments each of 2,500 men for ten
territorial regions on mainland 25,000
Total 40,000

D. Mobile Reserves

Five combat groups and supporting Troops

Total 50,000

C. Command

Ministry of War and Territorial Region

Headquarters
Total 9,000

D. Administration
Total 32,000 07

E. Training and Reinforcements

Total 10,000

140,000

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8. No alteration to the general layout shown above will be made by the Italian Government without the consent of Allied Force Headquarters. Detailed requirements within the above framework will however be worked out as a matter of urgency by the Italian Government, as advised by the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (ALMIA) and reported to

ALHQ.

/4

347

9. Training

The Training of the Italian Army will be the responsibility of the Italian Government as advised by the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (AMLC).

10. Administration

A. With effect from 2400 hrs 14 Nov 45 the Italian Government will assume responsibility for the administration of the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7 above, and of the Carabinieri. Administrative units required will be formed from within the authorized ceiling so that the Italian Army is self-administering and no longer dependent on Allied base and lines of communication units.

B. Italian Navy and Italian Air Force personnel will continue to be administered and maintained as at present, through Italian Service Channels.

C. BRI-ITI personnel in diluted British units will continue to be administered and maintained as at present. BRI-ITI Army Service units will continue to be administered and maintained through Italian service channels except in respect of the provision of rations. With effect from 2400 hrs 14 Nov 45 rations will be issued to such units through British Service channels, the Italian portion of the ration being furnished in bulk to the DST by the Italian Government.

D. US-ITI Service Units will be administered and maintained through US Service Channels.

11. Maintenance and Provisioning

Channels.

C. BRI-ITI personnel in diluted British units will continue to be administered and maintained as at present. BRI-ITI Army Service units will continue to be administered and maintained through Italian service channels except in respect of the provision of rations. With effect from 2400 hrs 14 Nov 45 rations will be issued to such units through British Service channels, the Italian portion of the ration being furnished in bulk to the DST by the Italian Government.

D. US-ITI Service Units will be administered and maintained through US Service Channels.

11. Maintenance and Provisioning

A. With effect from 2400 hrs 14 Nov 45 the Italian Government will assume responsibility for the maintenance of the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7 above, and of the Carabinieri.

B. Procurement in respect of food, clothing, medical stores, warlike and non-warlike equipment will be effected from the following sources and in the following priorities subject to any subsequent instructions which may be issued regarding the standardisation of equipment of the Italian Army and of the Carabinieri :-

i. From indigenous Italian resources including captured material (except German weapons) and such local manufactures as may be authorised by AFHQ.

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- 5 -

346

ii. By purchases from appropriate US and UK surplus disposal agencies in ITALY of stocks which are available to those disposal agencies.

iii. Through the Italian Government import programme.

C. As the procurement procedure outlined in paragraph 11 B above, will take time before it becomes fully operative particularly in respect of requirements included in the Italian Government import programme the following procedure will apply to those requirements which cannot be met from the sources set out in paragraph 11 B above.

i. Such requirements may be loaned from US and British military stocks as a temporary expedient up to 1 January 1946. In addition certain food may be sold or loaned to the Italian Government in accordance with paragraph 13 C below.

ii. Thereafter these items will be returnable to the US and British on demand or they may be transferred to the Italian Government through US and British disposals organisations in accordance with established procedure.

D. With effect from 2400 hrs 14 Nov 45 the Italian Government will continue to be responsible for meeting the POL and Col requirements of the Italian Army and Carabinieri from civil stocks and by means of the Italian Government import programme.

12. Warlike Equipment and Spares.

All arms, vehicles and other warlike equipment of US and British origin (including Lend-Lease) in possession of those units being used to make up the Italian Army of 140,000 and in possession of the Carabinieri as

British on demand or they may be transferred to the Italian Government through US and British disposals organisations in accordance with established procedures.

D. With effect from 24.00 hrs 14 Nov 45 the Italian Government will continue to be responsible for meeting the POL and Coal requirements of the Italian Army and Carabinieri from civil stocks and by means of the Italian Government import programme.

12. Warlike Equipment and Spares.

All arms, vehicles and other warlike equipment of US and British origin (including Lend-Lease) in possession of those units being used to make up the Italian Army of 140,000 and in possession of the Carabinieri as may be surplus to US and British requirements together with up to one year's maintenance and spare parts for arms, vehicles and other equipment so provided as may be surplus to the US and British requirements will be disposed of to the Italian Government. Appropriate scales of arm of various natures will also be transferred and authorised expenditure replenished from Allied sources. In the case of vehicles and warlike equipment available to US and British disposal organisations, disposal to the Italian Government will be effected through the respective US and British disposals organisations in accordance with established procedures, but with priorities requested for its sale to the Italian Government. In the case of lethal British warlike equipment, transfer will be made direct by the military.

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345

13. Food Supply.

A. Subsistence will continue to be furnished by the US and British Army based on actual strengths of the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7 above and of the Carabinieri until 30 Nov 45. US responsibility will not exceed 124,000 and British responsibility will not exceed 34,000.

B. Subsistence for the Italian Army including the Carabinieri will be the responsibility of the Italian Government with effect from 1 Dec 45.

C. Its sources for provisioning are as set out in paragraph 14 above.

The US and British surplus disposal agencies will be requested to give the Italian Government priority in providing subsistence for the Italian Army from such supplies as may be declared surplus by the US and British Military authorities. This priority is limited to items now being furnished in the ITI-ITI ration or equivalent British scale and in quantities not in excess of that required for the actual strength and in no event in excess of 205,000, beginning with the date of the request and ending 1 May 46.

14. Clothing and Individual/Personal Equipment.

All previous directives pertaining to transfer of clothing, individual/personal equipment and salvage to the Italian Army through APL are rescinded.

B. Purchase of any surpluses of non-warlike stores in as authorized in paragraph 14 (b) (ii) above.

15. Medical Stores.

Medical Stores of Allied origin which are held in Italian Depots

not in excess of that required for the actual strength and in no event in excess of 205,000, beginning with the date of the request and ending 1 May 46

14. Clothing and Individual/Personal Equipment.

.. All previous directives pertaining to transfer of clothing, individual/personal equipment and salvage to the Italian Army through MIL are rescinded.

B. Purchase of any surpluses of non-warlike stores is as authorized in paragraph 11 (b) (ii) above.

15. Medical Stores.

Medical Stores of Allied origin which are held in Italian Depots or by Italian Units at the date of this letter will remain in Italian possession

16. Accounting.

a. Financial arrangements consequent upon the above policy regarding supply remain to be settled. In the meantime, records will be maintained of all transfers made to the Italian Government from military stocks and accounting procedures in the sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) below will apply.

b. Accounting for Allied military supplies issued to the Italian Government in bulk for the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7 above and for the Carabinieri, Italian Navy and Air Force will follow present established procedures for the ITI-ITI category.

17.....

c. Accounting for Allied military supplies issued from British and US depots direct to BRL-ITI and US-ITI units will follow established procedures of the British and US forces.

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

HQ 13 Corps
HQ 2 District
HQ 3 District
CG Peninsula Base Section
CG ROME Area Allied Command.
British Ministry of Supply
ANLC.

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

SACS.
C&O
CGS
Dep Mil Sec
Liaison
Financial Adviser
G-1 (A)
G-2
G-3 (A)
G-4 (A)
G-5
O2E
Surgeon (A)
Surgeon (B)

Physical Director
DEIC
G-2
PWB
G-3 (AMHQ)
G-3 AMO
G(SD)
Engrs
Signals
C-4(A)
Log Plans

(2)
Q(Maint)
S & T
Pot Sec
Postal (B)
Labour
Claims & Hirings
Q(LD)
Ord
Ord(B)

(2)
Q(MOV)
TW(A)
TW(B)
C-5
C-in-C 10d
Air HQ RAF ITA
CG ATOLUL
US POLAD
Resmin
REME

INTEGRAL DISTRIBUTION

SACG.
 CIO
 CGS
 Dep Mil Soc
 Liaison
 Financial Adviser
 C-1 (A)
 111
 C2E
 Surgeon (A)
 Surgeon (B)

Fiscal Director
 DFC
 G-2
 RAB
 G-3 (ATHQ)
 G-3 MTO
 G(SD)
 Engrs
 Signals
 G-4(A)
 Log Plans

(2)

Q(M)	Q(MOV)
Q(Maint)	TN(A)
S & T	TI(B)
Ret Sec	C-5
Postal (B)	C-in-C Ind
Labour	Air HQ RPT ITA
Claims & Hearings	CG MTCUSA
Q(AE)	US POLAD
Ord()	Resmin
Ord(B)	REME

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

Subject: Draft Letter.

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Land Forces Sub-Comm A. C.,
(M.M.I.A.) R O M E

A 025

24 Oct. 45.

OCT 25 1945

To : Brigadier LUSH; CE, OEE, MC,
Executive Commissioner,
Allied Commission.

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16

1. Attached is a suggested draft for a letter to the
Prime Minister as requested.

2. This draft has been approved by the G.O.C.

McGillmire Li lot

Fa Major General,
M.M.I.A.

AHG/ecc.

346
101

DRAFT LETTER

EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER TO PRIME MINISTER

3440

1. In spite of my conversation with you on 11 Oct it appears that the Army Pay question has not yet been settled, nor, so far as I am aware, has any meeting on this subject taken place between the Minister for War and Treasury.
2. You will appreciate the fact that this question has been under discussion for well over a month. On the 29 Sep the Ministry of War was given, by letter, the views of the Supreme Allied Commander which were "that the matter be taken up again with the Treasury Minister with a view to obtaining an early and favourable agreement." This letter went on to request that immediate action be taken to contradict disquieting rumours.
3. That no agreement will be reached until such time as a meeting between the Minister for War and Treasury takes place, is apparent. In the meantime, rumours and uncertainty as to the future, persist amongst Army personnel, with the inevitable result that there is a serious lowering of morale.

the matter be taken up again with the Treasury Minister with a view to obtaining an early and favourable agreement." This letter went on to request that immediate action be taken to contradict disquieting rumours.

3. That no agreement will be reached until such time as a meeting between the Minister for War and Treasury takes place, is apparent. In the meantime, rumours and uncertainty as to the future, persist amongst Army personnel, with the inevitable result that there is a serious lowering of morale.

4. ^{on 24/10} I must insist, therefore, that a meeting between the two Ministers takes place with a view to reaching agreement on this matter which has been outstanding too long.

see 356E

1 page copy

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN FORCES

SECRET

SUBJECT : Handover of Italian Army and Carabinieri
to the Italian Government.

TO : All Concerned. 344 G-D.

Herewith revised draft of proposed directive to HQ Allied
Commission regarding the handover of the Italian Army and Carabinieri
to the Italian Government.

A meeting will be held in 'A' Branch (late G-1(B)) Conference
Room, GHQ, on Thursday 25 Oct 45 at 1430 hrs to finalise this paper. Dis-
trib BGS (AD).

Addressees are requested to be represented at the meeting.

SHM/je/G(SD)

24 OCT 1945

W. A. Anderson
for M.D. DMD
Major General
Chief of General Staff

DISTRIBUTION

HQ Allied Commission ✓
Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C. (LMFA)
British Ministry of Supply
A.N.L.C.
Financial Adviser
Fiscal Director
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'A'
G-2
G-3 (AFHQ)
G-3 AMC
G-4 (A)
QM
Log Plans

Q(int)
C(AE)
G-4 (Mov & Tr)
G-5
DST
Ord (A)
Ord (B)
Medical (B)
Pot Sec

~~SECRET~~

DRAFT

SUBJECT : Handover of Italian Army to Italian Government.

TO : Headquarters Allied Commission for Italy for Land
copy to: LAND. Forces Sub Commission, Allied Commission (MAIL).

GENERAL.

1. Approval has now been given by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the interim policy to be adopted towards the Italian Armed Forces pending a final settlement by peace treaty. You will therefore inform the Italian Government that the following arrangements will be made for the handover of the Italian Army to their control and for its future organisation, training and administration.

HANDOVER OF ITALIAN ARMY TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT CONTROL.

2. Transfer of Units

With effect from 14 days after date of this letter units of the Italian Army that are now in the ITI-ITI category together with the five BR-ITI combat groups and their support units will be transferred to the control of the Italian Government. Allied Commanders will have no powers of command over such units except as stated in paragraph 5 below.

3. Future of US-ITI and BR-ITI Units.

4. US-ITI and BR-ITI Units less the five BR-ITI combat groups referred to above will continue to be employed in accordance

98

2. Transfer of Units

With effect from 14 days after date of this letter units of the Italian Army that are now in the ITI-ITI category together with the five BR-ITI combat groups and their support units will be transferred to the control of the Italian Government. Allied Commanders will have no powers of command over such units except as stated in paragraph 5 below.

3. Future of US-ITI and BR-ITI Units.

4. US-ITI and BR-ITI Units less the five BR-ITI combat groups referred to above will continue to be employed in accordance with existing arrangements as long as they are needed by the Allied Military authorities. Such units will remain under the operational command of Allied Force Headquarters. The numbers employed will gradually be reduced to NIL. It is estimated that in the case of US-ITI personnel, this stage will be reached in approximately February 1946 and in the case of BR-ITI personnel in approximately June 1946. When no ^{personnel or} longer needed by the Allied Military authorities, US-ITI and BR-ITI units will be offered to the Italian Government. If not required, they will be disbanded; ~~personnel thus refused and not required as reinforcements for~~ remaining US and BR-ITI units will be available to the Italian Government.

.../2.
SECRET

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

B. No change will be made in the present system of administration and maintenance of US-ITI and ER-ITI Service Units, and the Italian Navy and Air Force.

4. Future of the Carabinieri.

The Carabinieri will be the responsibility of the Italian Government in all respects. Strength will not exceed 65,000 which will be additional to any ceiling figure agreed for the Italian Army. The Carabinieri will be used for civilian security purposes only and will not be responsible for military security.

5. Reservations.

A. The Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean theatre reserves the right to assume command at any time of the whole or any part of the Italian Army located in the theatre, and to delegate his authority to command formations and units of the Italian Army to any Allied Commander whom he may direct.

B. The Italian Government will furnish such information regarding the strength, organization, training, reliability, movements, administration, real estate, stocks of material and equipment, and other

matters concerning the Italian Army as may be required from time to time. *although included in the ceiling set out in para 4 below*

C. 808 Civil Security Detachment will remain under operational command of Allied Force Headquarters for the time being, (~~as part of the force in para 7 below~~).

reserves the right to assume command at any time of the whole or any part of the Italian Army located in the theatre, and to delegate his authority to command formations and units of the Italian Army to any Allied Commander whom he may direct.

B. The Italian Government will furnish such information regarding the strength, organization, training, reliability, movements, administration, real estate, stocks of material and equipment, and other

matters concerning the Italian Army as may be required from time to time, *although included in the ceiling set out in para 7 below*

C. 808 Civil Security Battalion, will remain under operational command of Allied Force Headquarters for the time being, (~~as part of the force in para 7 below~~).

6. Military Mission.

A. An Allied Military Mission will be provided to advise and assist the Italian Government in the organization, training and administration of the Italian Army, and to obtain and transmit to superior authority such information as is required. The Italian Government will normally accept the advice of this Mission. If it should find itself unable to do so, the matter will be referred to AFHQ for decision as to the action to be taken. The Mission will also be responsible for screening those demands for supplies and equipment which continue to be met from Allied military sources, and will exercise supervisory control over the use of such materials.

~~SECRET~~

344 E

B. The Military Mission will be provided by the present Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (MLIA). A revised directive to the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (MLIA) will shortly be issued.

FUTURE ORGANISATION, TRAINING AND ADMINISTRATION.

7. Organisation.

During the interim period until the peace treaty becomes operative the Italian Army under control of the Italian Government will consist of not more than 140,000 personnel and will be organised on the following lines :-

A. Local Reserves.

Three Internal Security Divisions each of 5,000 men, two in SICILY and one in SARDINIA.....15,000.
Ten Independent Regiments each of 2,500 men for ten territorial regions on mainland..... 25,000
Total..... 40,000

B. Mobile Reserves.

Five combat groups and supporting Troops
Total..... 50,000

C. Command.

Ministry of War and Territorial Region
Headquarters Total..... 9,000

two in SICILY and one in SARDINIA.....15,000.
 Ten Independent Regiments each of 2,500 men for ten
 territorial regions on mainland..... 25,000
 Total..... 40,000

B. Mobile Reserves.

Five combat groups and supporting Troops

Total..... 50,000

C. Command.

Ministry of War and Territorial Region

Total..... 9,000

Headquarters

Total..... 31,000

D. Administration.

E. Training and Reinforcements Total..... 10,000

140,000

97

8. No alteration to the general layout shown above will be made by the Italian Government without the consent of Allied Force Headquarters. Detailed requirements within the framework will however be worked out by the Italian Government, as advised by the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (LAFIA), and repeated as quickly as ^{above} ~~possible~~ ^{possible} to AFHQ.

9. Training.

The Training ~~policy for~~ ^{of} the Italian Army ~~outlined in paragraph~~ ^{the responsibility of} ~~above~~ will be laid down by the Italian Government as advised by

.../4

through Italian Service Channels. BR-ITIs in diluted British units will continue to be administered and maintained as at present. Any additional personnel required by the Italian Army above the ceiling authorised in paragraph 7 above to fulfil this commitment will be requested through MILA to AFHQ. If considered justified, it may be possible to allow some personnel against the BR-ITI ceiling to supplement Italian Army depots. These personnel will be withdrawn in proportion to the decrease in numbers of BR-ITI Service Troops.

(c) US-ITI Service Units will continue to be administered and maintained as at present through US Service Channels.

11. Maintenance and Provisioning.

A. With effect from 14 days after the issue of this letter the Italian Government will assume responsibility for the maintenance of the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7 above, and of the Carabinieri.

B. Procurement in respect of food, clothing, medical stores, warlike and non-warlike equipment will be effected from the following sources and in the following priorities subject to any subsequent instructions which may be issued regarding the standardisation of equipment of the Italian Army and of the Carabinieri :-

i. From indigenous Italian resources including captured material (except German weapons) and local manufacture.

ii. By purchases from appropriate US and UK surplus disposal

agencies in Italy of stocks which are available to these disposal agencies.

iii. Through the Italian Government Import Programme.

- 4 -

the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (MLA).

10. Administration.

(a) With effect from 14 days after the issue of this letter the Italian Government will assume responsibility for the administration of the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7 above, and of the Carabinieri. Administrative units required will be formed from within the authorised ceiling so that the Italian Army is self-administering and no longer dependent on Allied base and lines of communication units.

(b) BR-ITI Service Units and the Italian Navy and Italian Air Force will continue to be administered and maintained as at present, through Italian Service Channels. BR-ITIs in diluted British units will continue to be administered and maintained as at present. Any additional personnel required by the Italian Army above the ceiling authorised in paragraph 7 above to fulfil this commitment will be requested through MLA to AMHQ. If considered justified, it may be possible to allow some personnel against the BR-ITI ceiling to supplement Italian Army depots. Those personnel will be withdrawn in proportion to the decrease in numbers of BR-ITI Service Troops.

(c) US-ITI Service Units will continue to be administered and maintained as at present through US Service Channels.

- 5 -

2
344 F

C. As the procurement procedure outlined in paragraph 11 B above, will take time before it becomes fully operative particularly in respect of requirements included in the Italian Government import programme the following procedure will apply to those requirements which cannot be met from the sources set out in paragraph 11 B above.

i. Such requirements except food and clothing will be loaned from US and British military stocks as a temporary expedient up to 1 January 1946. The procedure for transfer of food is given in paragraph 13 below.

ii. Thereafter these items will be returnable to the US and British on demand or they may be transferred to the Italian Government through US and British disposals organisations in accordance with established procedure.

D. With effect from 14 days after the issue of this letter the Italian Government will be responsible for meeting the POL and Coal requirements of the Italian Army and Carabinieri from civil stocks and by means of the Italian Government import programme.

12. Warlike Equipment and Spares.

All arms, vehicles and other warlike equipment of US and British origin (including Lend-Lease) in possession of those units being used to make up the Italian Army of 140,000 and in possession of the Carabinieri as may be surplus to US and British requirements

established procedure.

D. With effect from 14 days after the issue of this letter the Italian Government will be responsible for meeting the POL and Coal requirements of the Italian army and Carabinieri from civil stocks and by means of the Italian Government import programme.

12. Warlike Equipment and Spares.

All arms, vehicles and other warlike equipment of US and British origin (including Lend-Lease) in possession of those units being used to make up the Italian Army of 140,000 and in possession of the Carabinieri as may be surplus to US and British requirements together with up to one years maintenance and spare parts for arms, vehicles and other equipment so provided as may be surplus to the US and British requirements will be disposed of to the Italian Government.

Appropriate scales of arm of various natures will also be transferred and authorised expenditure replenished from Allied sources. In the case of vehicles and warlike equipment available to US and British disposal organisations, disposal will be effected through the respective US and British disposals organisations, in accordance with established procedures. In the case of lethal British warlike equipment, transfer will be made direct by the military.

....6

- '6 -

13. Food Supply.

A. Subsistence will continue to be furnished by the US and British Army based on actual strengths of the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7 above and of the Carabinieri until 30 Nov 45. US responsibility will not exceed 124,000 and British responsibility will not exceed 81,000.

B. Subsistence for the Italian Army including the Carabinieri will be the responsibility of the Italian Government with effect from

1 Dec 45. Its sources for provisioning are as set out in paragraph 11 above.

22

C. The US and British surplus disposal agencies will give the Italian Government priority in providing subsistence for the Italian Army from such supplies as may be declared surplus by the US and British military authorities. This priority is limited to items now being furnished in the ITI-IMI ration or equivalent British scale and in quantities not in excess of that required to ~~substitute~~ ^{for the} actual strength and in no event in excess of 205,000, beginning with the date of the request and ending 1 May 46.

14. Clothing and Individual/Personal Equipment.

A. All previous directives pertaining to transfer of clothing, individual/personal equipment and salvage to the Italian Army through MMIA are rescinded.

B. Purchase of any surpluses of non-warlike stores is as authorized in paragraph 11 (b) (ii) above.

C. The US and British surplus disposal agencies will give the Italian Government priority in providing subsistence for the Italian Army from such supplies as may be declared surplus by the US and British military authorities. This priority is limited to items now being furnished in the ITI-ITI ration or equivalent British scale and in quantities not in excess of that required to ~~substitute~~ ^{for} the actual strength and in no event in excess of 205,000, beginning with the date of the request and ending 1 May 46.

14. Clothing and Individual/Personal Equipment.

A. All previous directives pertaining to transfer of clothing, individual/personal equipment and salvage to the Italian Army through MIA are rescinded.

B. Purchase of any surpluses of non-warlike stores is as authorized in paragraph 11 (b) (ii) above.

15. Medical Stores.

Medical Stores of Allied origin which are held in Italian Depots or by Italian Units at the date of this letter will remain in Italian possession.

.../7

16.

Accounting.

- a. Financial arrangements consequent upon the above policy regarding supply remain to be settled. In the meantime, records will be maintained of all transfers made to the Italian Government from military stocks and accounting procedures in the sub-paras (b) and (c) below will apply.
- b. Accounting for Allied military supplies issued to the Italian Government in bulk for the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7 above and for the Carabinieri will follow present established procedure for the ITI-ITI category.
- c. Accounting for Allied military supplies issued to ER-ITI and US-ITI units will follow present established procedure for these categories.

c. Accounting for allied military supplies issued to BR-ITI
and US-ITI units will follow present established procedure for these
categories.

CONFIDENTIAL

8257
ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

CF/ES

(343)

AP-776

AG 303.6 GCT-O

19 October 1945

SUBJECT: Use of Italian Army

TO: Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
ATO 394

3

1. Reference Letter this headquarters, file AG 091.711/115 SAC-O, dated 10 July 1945, subject as above.

2. Paragraph 6 of referenced letter is rescinded, and the following is substituted therefor:

"6. Italian Prisoners of War

a. Effective 25 October 1945, such Allied Responsibilities as exist in the reception and disposal of repatriated Italian prisoners of war will rest with IMA, which will thereafter deal directly with the Italian Ministry of War in these matters.

b. Effective on the above date, Allied Commission will transfer to IMA the personnel, with the necessary records and equipment, of the Italian prisoners of War Division, which now functions under Allied Commission.

c. Prior to the above date, Allied Commission will complete arrangements with IMA for the feeding of repatriated Italian P/W from civilian ration stocks prior to re-enlistment or demobilization."

BY COMMAND OF THE ACTING SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Robert H. Berry
C. H. CRISTERBERRY
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

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(Seen on 9007/EC)

RA 24/10

94

CONFIDENTIAL

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref: 8251/EC.

24 October 1945.

AIDE-MAJOR FOR COL. F. PDESLEY, DSO.

TURNOVER OF ITALIAN ARMY.

1. It is essential that the turnover of the Italian Army for operational purposes should not take place before the turnover of the Northern Regions. It would be impolitic, if not impossible, for the Italian Government to have control of the Italian Army in territory over which it has no jurisdiction.
2. Similarly, the turnover of the Italian Army for administrative purposes should not be before the turnover of the Northern Regions. In this connection it would be wiser to postpone the turnover for maintenance and provisioning reasons to January 1st as directed in Para 9 FAN 621 dated 29 September 1945.
3. Consideration must be given as to whether units of the Italian Army are to be maintained in Provinces left under AIG, eg., UFFINE and possibly BOLZANO. VENEZIA GIULIA is not affected because the only Italian units there are BR/ITI units.
4. In connection with Para 4 of the Draft Directive and the strength of the Carabinieri, it must be noted that the Prime Minister has forwarded a strong appeal for the strength of the Carabinieri to be raised by 10,000 making the ceiling of the CC.RR. 75,000.

5. (See para 6 A)

Would prefer to broaden the scope of the Military Mission for screening as expressed in the last sentence of the cited para, changing it to read, "from Allied sources", instead of "from Allied military sources". The suggestion is made to insure that the Military Mission screen all demands before they are put before Allied agencies.

6. (See para 11 C i)

Would strike out "food and clothing" as exceptions to the provisions of the paragraph. This would permit loans from US and British military stocks of food and clothing to 1 January 1946.

4. In connection with para 4 of the Draft Directive and the strength of the Carabinieri, it must be noted that the Prime Minister has forwarded a strong appeal for the strength of the Carabinieri to be raised by 10,000 making the ceiling of the CC.RR. 75,000.

5. (See para 6 A)

Would prefer to broaden the scope of the Military Mission for screening as expressed in the last sentence of the cited para, changing it to read, "from Allied sources", instead of "from Allied military sources". The suggestion is made to insure that the Military Mission screen all demands before they are put before Allied agencies.

6. (See para 11 C 1)

Would strike out "food and clothing" as exceptions to the provisions of the paragraph. This would permit loans from US and British military stocks of food and clothing to 1 January 1946.

7. (See para 13 B)

93
The date, 1 December 1945, on which the Italian government would assume the responsibility for provisioning for its Army and Carabinieri, should be changed to read, "1 January 1946". This is essential because of the nearness of 1 December 1945. It is noted in the CCS message # 71683, 29 September 1945, that the following is provided: "requirements that can not be met from sources listed above, should be loaned from US and British military stocks as a temporary expedient up to 1 January 1946."

8. Requisitions to cover requirements for foodstuffs to meet the established ration scale for the Italian Armed forces (except for foodstuffs available from indigenous sources) are being prepared. It is not envisaged that ~~these~~ food stuffs could be available for distribution to Italian Armed forces before 1 January 1946.

Handed to Col. Lindsay for discussion at AFHQ

by Ex. Com on 24/10.

25/10.

PA 29/10.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Economic Section

Ref.

24 October 1945

MEMORANDUM:

SUBJECT : Notes on Draft of Directive for Hand-over of Italian Army
and Carabinieri to the Italian Government

TO : Vice President
Civil Affairs Section

1. (See para 6 A)

Would prefer to broaden the scope of the Military Mission for screening as expressed in the last sentence of the cited para, changing it to read, "from Allied sources", instead of "from Allied military sources". The suggestion is made to insure that the Military Mission screen all demands before they are put before Allied agencies.

2. (See para 11 C 1)

Would strike out "food and clothing" as exceptions to the provisions of the paragraph. This would permit loans from US and British military stocks of food and clothing to 1 January 1946.

3. (See para 13 B)

The date, 1 December 1945, on which the Italian government would assume the responsibility for provisioning for its Army and Carabinieri, should be changed to read, "1 January 1946". This is necessary because of the nearness of 1 December 1945. It is noted in the CCS message N 71698, 29 September 1945, that the following is provided: "requirements that can not be met from sources listed above, should be loaned from US and British military stocks as a temporary expedient up to 1 January 1946."

4. Requisitions to cover requirements for foodstuffs to meet the established ration scale for the Italian Armed forces (except for foodstuffs available from indigenous sources) are being prepared. It is not envisaged that these food stuffs could be available for distribution to Italian Armed forces before 1 January 1946.

(S-7-10)
CHARLES W. WALTON

CHARLES W. WALTON
Colonel, Chief, Supply Division
Chief, Supply Division

cc: Food S/C
MIA

Copy handed to MIA 24/10
ME.

CONFIDENTIAL

ALLIED FORCES HEADQUARTERS
AFN 512

KX ^{925/}Comm (2)
DGT/ES

A P 776

19 October 1945

338

AG 383.6 COT-O

SUBJECT: Use of Italian Army

TO: Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
ALO 394

1. Reference: Letter this headquarters, file AG 091.711/115 SAC-O, dated 10 July 1945, subject as above.

2. Paragraph 6 of referenced letter is rescinded, and the following is substituted therefor:

"6. Italian Prisoners of War

a. Effective 25 October 1945, such Allied Responsibilities as exist in the reception and disposal of repatriated Italian prisoners of war will rest with ITHA, which will thereafter deal directly with the Italian Ministry of War in these matters.

b. Effective on the above date, Allied Commission will transfer to ITHA the personnel, with the necessary records and equipment, of the Italian prisoners of War Division, which now functions under Allied Commission.

c. Prior to the above date, Allied Commission will complete arrangements with ITHA for the feeding of repatriated Italian P/W from civilian ration stocks prior to re-enlistment or demobilization."

BY COMMAND OF THE ACTING SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Handwritten notes:
get the Italian copy
THA

20 OCT 1945

Signature: C. C. CHRISTENBERRY
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION: 22/10

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| 1 - Q(AE) | |
| 1 - G-6 | |
| 1 - CAO | |

(c.s.o)

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91
339-340

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Economic Section

Copy #1

336

Ref. 7.00/ES

18 October 1945

OCT 18 1945

SUBJECT : Italian Army Supply Responsibility

TO : Executive Commissioner

335

302
303
94 8251

1. Reference your 8251/3/EC of 13 October 1945 and correspondence attached thereto.

2. Our TS - 100/B/ES of 11 September 1945 further refers. Fan 621 accepted, practically in entirety, the plan proposed by SACMED in Naf 1059 of 23 August 1945. Within the time intervening, it is felt that no further developments have presented themselves to alter the general situation or responsibilities outlined in our above letter.

3. Close contact with MMIA has been and will be maintained by this Section. Upon receipt of the draft of the theatre directive, the matter will be taken up immediately with MMIA and full study made of the proposed supply and economic responsibilities made thereon.

for *Charles W. Waltr*
E. B. MCKINLEY *col. a.c.*
Brigadier General, USA
Acting Vice President

Emu

See my 337
90

Lee (Capt White)

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 374

Office of the Executive Commissioner

~~TOP SECRET~~

334
335

13 October 45.

Ref: 8251/8/MC.

SUBJECT: Italian Army.

TO : Economic Section.

1. Attached is copy of AFHQ letter AG 091.711 COT-O dated 6 October 45, together with copy of signal from Combined Chiefs of Staff, FAN 621 dated 29 September 45.

2. I am directed by the Chief Commissioner to request that you study the enclosures, and let me have your views on the economic and supply problems.

For the Chief Commissioner:

F. M. McCLARY

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

Incls.

See 336

Letter being
prepared
10/10

advise it on
the way 18/10

18/10
hoked Jw.

18/10
Water Rst.
89

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

(329)

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

By Authority
SACMT

Initials LMK

Date October 1945

AG 091.711 GCT-0

8 OCT 1945

SUBJECT: ITALIAN Army - Arrangements for handover to ITALIAN Government
and future organization, training and administration.

TO: Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission for ITALY
APO 394

1. Reference is made to NAF 1051 and 1059.
2. Attached for information is a copy of reply from Combined Chiefs of Staff, under reference FAN 621 dated 29 September 1945.
3. The points raised in this signal are being incorporated in a directive shortly to be issued. You are requested therefore to reserve your comments until receipt of the directive in draft form. It is requested that you will then forward your comments and subsequently attend a meeting which will be held to finalize the draft.

BY COMMAND OF THE ACTING SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

1 Incl
FAN 621, dated 29 Sep 45.

Edmund R. Shugart
EDMUND R. SHUGART
Colonel, AGD
Asst Adjutant General

COPY FURNISHED:
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

88

(1 SPARE COPY LETTER
BUT NOT ENCLOSURE)

~~TOP SECRET~~

AG, M&D, AFHQ

B1109

(cso)

See W/330-387

Filed 292124Z
PRIORITY

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

328

PARAPHRASE UNNECESSARY

AFSC N254/30

INCOMING MESSAGE

8 OCT 1945

BOOK MESSAGE

FROM : AGWAR FROM COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
TO : AFHQ FOR ALEXANDER INFO TO CABINET OFFICES FOR
BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

REF NO THIS MESSAGE: W-71688

29 September 1945.

This is FAN 621.

NAF 1051 and 1059 are references.

1. The Italian Government will be authorized to retain armed forces which are adequate to maintain law and order in areas under its control.
2. Italian Forces which are NOT necessary to maintain law and order but which are essential to aid U.S. or U.K. Forces in the Theater will be returned to civilian status after they are NO longer required by the U.S. or U.K. Forces.
3. Italian Armed Forces required to maintain law and order will be placed under Italian Government control about 30 September 1945 in accordance with your recommendation.
4. The authorized ceiling for the Italian Army will be 140,000. The Army includes local reserves, mobile reserves, Ministry of War, Territorial Region Headquarters, administration and training, and reinforcements. The authorized ceiling for the Carabinieri is 65,000.
5. The Italian Navy and Air Force will continue to be employed in accordance with your recommendations in paragraphs 3 and 4 of NAF 1051. Ceiling of 34,000 for Italian Air Force is approved.
6. NO objection is perceived to establishing temporarily an Allied Police Mission to reorganize and train the Carabinieri. However, specific approval is withheld pending your submission of details as mentioned in paragraph 12D of NAF 1051.
7. Food, clothing, warlike and non-warlike equipment will be furnished in the following priorities:

5. Italian Armed Forces required to be placed under Italian Government control about 30 September 1945 in accordance with your recommendation.

4. The authorized ceiling for the Italian Army will be 140,000. The Army includes local reserves, mobile reserves, Ministry of War, Territorial Region Headquarters, administration and training, and reinforcements. The authorized ceiling for the Carabinieri is 65,000.

5. The Italian Navy and Air Force will continue to be employed in accordance with your recommendations in paragraphs 3 and 4 of NAF 1051. Ceiling of 34,000 for Italian Air Force is approved.

6. NO objection is perceived to establishing temporarily an Allied Police Mission to reorganize and train the Carabinieri. However, specific approval is withheld pending your submission of details as mentioned in paragraph 12D of NAF 1051.

7. Food, clothing, warlike and non-warlike equipment will be furnished in the following priorities:

(A). From indigenous Italian resources, including captured material (except German weapons) and local manufacture.

(B). By purchase from appropriate U.S. and U.K. surplus disposal agencies in ITALY, stocks which are available to the disposal agencies.

(C). through the Italian Government import program.

8. Sale of warlike equipment available to authorized surplus disposal agencies to the Italian Armed Forces of the types and quantities of equipment that are normally used for internal security purposes, is authorized for transfer as approved by SACMED or his successors. In the case of lethal British warlike equipment transfer will be made only under military arrangements.

CONFIDENTIAL /9...

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

(327)

9. Requirements that can NOT be met from the sources listed above, should be loaned from U.S. and British military stocks as a temporary expedient up to 1 January 1946. Thereafter these items are to be returned on demand or transferred through surplus agencies.

10. You should note that the financial arrangements consequent upon this policy remain to be settled.

11. It is NOT within the scope of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to determine policy with respect to the following points:

(A). The question of priority as between the Italian Army and UNRRA (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration) and the priority given to Italian military requirements in the Italian import program.

(B). The question of giving assurances with respect to the flow of military supplies to ITALY through the civil import program.

12. It is NOT within the scope of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to approve the following points raised in your message, NAF 1059:

(A). Paragraph 6A, B and C, namely the question of the specific additional tonnage to be included in the civil import program.

(B). Paragraph 6D(4), the question of meeting tire and tube equipment through the civil import program.

Office

13. You are advised that the U.S. Department of State and the U.K. Foreign are being sent copies of your NAF 1051 and NAF 1059 with the recommendation that they give prompt consideration to the points in these cables covered in paragraphs 11 and 12 above.

NAF 1051 IS EX31519 MC OUT 604 3/8/45 D C/S
NAF 1059 IS EX 37481 MC OUT 6173 22/8/45

ACTION: CAO

INFORMATION: SACS

G-4

G-3

USPOLAD

G-1

Q(AE)

ORD

G-1(B)

Q(MAINT)

PET SEC

G-2

MATH

CI

G-5

C/S MTO

RESMIL

additional tonnage to be included in the

(B). Paragraph 6D(4), the question of meeting tire and tube equipment through the civil import program.

Office

13. You are advised that the U.S. Department of State and the U.K. Foreign are being sent copies of your NAF 1051 and NAF 1059 with the recommendation that they give prompt consideration to the points in these cables covered in paragraphs 11 and 12 above.

NAF 1051 IS FX31519 MC OUT 604 3/8/45 D C/S
NAF 1059 IS FX 37481 MC OUT 6173 22/8/45

ACTION: CAO

INFORMATION: SACS C-1 G-1(B) C-2 C-5
C-4 Q(AE) Q(MAINT) MATH C/S MTO
C-3 ORD PET SEC CM RESIN
USPOLAD

86

PARAPHRASE UNNECESSARY

MC IN 13073 30 Sept 45 TOP SECRET 0639A REF NO W-71688 Jd/F

CONFIDENTIAL

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~318-319~~
325

Record of Telephone Conversation

SUBJECT:- Pay of Italian Army

A 025

Major DORRIS - Lt.Col. SILLI : Ministry of War : 1100 hrs 13 October.

He informed me that the Ministry of Treasury was inclined to grant the 20 lire Special Allowance proposed for all soldiers of the Italian Army, but wished to cut off the 45 lire Combat Allowance from 1 May and not 1 Dec as proposed by the Ministry of War. The Ministry of War was opposing this latter suggestion.

A letter was being sent from the Ministry of War 13 Oct to MMIA with the above information. So far as Lt.Col. SILLI himself knew, the Ministers of War and the Treasury had not yet met in this connection.

W. Gilmour Lt. Col.

PA6

MMIA.

13-10-45

PA
Emul
14/10

PA 17/10

1853 326
Sum 6

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

324 378

Record of conversation Major DOBES - Lt.Col. CABINETTO M of W.

At 11.45 hrs 10 Oct Chief of Cabinet at Wa. Ministry stated that so far as he knew, no meeting had taken place between the Ministers of War and Treasury on the subject of reductions of pay and allowances. He wished MMIA to know, that the M of W had been continually pressing for such a meeting to take place.

See my 326
~~See my 326~~

HRG.
MMIA.

84

REF: 316.

317

From July 1945 onwards Ministry of Treasury were pressing Ministry of War to comply with instructions to stop the grant of Lire 45, Combat Pay, and reduce the daily messing allowance from Lire 20 to Lire 5.

Rumours circulated to the effect that large pay cuts were to be made, and a number of British IOs supported by certain Italian Commanders expressed the view that large scale desertions would result if such a large pay cut was made.

At request of MMIA, the Chief of Cabinet sent a letter dated 7 September explaining the position. In this letter it was stated that Combat Pay and reduction in Messing Allowance would come into effect as from Dec. 1st, but that it had been proposed to the Ministry of Treasury that the pay of all soldiers "wherever located and however employed, should be increased by L. 20 a day and the supplementary messing allowance increased from L. 5 to L. 15 a day.

On 18 September A.F.H.Q. asked ALCOM for details of proposed reductions and stated that SACMED viewed with concern any measure likely to lead to reduction in efficiency of ITALIAN ARMY.

M.M.I.A. in conjunction with ALCOM replied, giving full details of proposals and recommendations, on 22 Sept.

A.F.H.Q. approved recommendations made, expressed SACMED's views that no avoidable action be taken which might affect morale, and left the degree to which such views be pressed to ALCOM.

On 29 Sept. GOC, M.M.I.A. addressed a letter to the Ministry of War giving SACMED's views and requesting that the matter be taken up again with the Treasury Minister with a view

from 1. 5 to 1. 15 a day.

On 18 September A.F.H.Q. asked ALCOM for details of proposed reductions and stated that SACMED viewed with concern any measure likely to lead to reduction in efficiency of ITALIAN ARMY.

M.M.I.A. in conjunction with ALCOM replied, giving full details of proposals and recommendations, on 22 Sept.

A.F.H.Q. approved recommendations made, expressed SACMED's views that no avoidable action be taken which might affect morale, and left the degree to which such views be pressed to ALCOM.

On 29 Sept. GOC, M.M.I.A. addressed a letter to the Ministry of War giving SACMED's views and requesting that the matter be taken up again with the Treasury Minister with a view to obtaining an early and favourable agreement. This letter also requested that immediate action be taken to contradict disquieting rumours.

On 2 Oct Major SALVIONI of the I CLASS OF THE CABINET reported to MMIA that no meeting between the Ministry of War and the Ministry of Treasury had yet taken place, but that a proposal that such a meeting should take place was being made today, and that the meeting would take place this week or next.

M.M.I.A. feels that to meet SACMED's requirements that Ministry of War and Treasury should agree on a just policy and announce it immediately to allay the fears that are growing throughout the Army.

See ref 11
M.M.I.A. 1/12/45

A.A.G.

M.M.I.A.

2 Oct '45

(2 Same Cont)

8257
INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Originator's Reference: FX 46053

Date/Time of Origin: SEP 27 1900A

Message Centre No: F/9261

Date Time Rec'd: SEP 28 0900A

Precedence: ROUTINE

FROM AFHQ SIGNED SACMED CITE FHGEG

SEP 28 1945

TO : ALCOM ROME MMIA ROME

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

You have copy of MMIA paper subject Pay of Italian Army dated 22 Sept and have agreed its recommendation. You are aware of SACMEDS desire that no action be taken if avoidable which would unduly affect morale of Italian troops. The recommendations are approved, ^{THE DECREE} to which you press your views is left to your judgment.

Dist

Action Exec Commr 2
L Forces

Info Chief Commissioner
File 2 Float

PA
Gmud

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
28 SEP 1945

82

(CAP WHITE)

785017

Executive Commissioner A.C.

Pay of Italian Army.

General Browning feels we are not making much progress with this. (312)

I attach an entire copy of our statement to

A.F.H.Q.

I am told that the Finance Minister will not agree to the War Minister's proposal for the extra 20 lire per day per man but that they will work off the 45 lire contract pay from

this would be disastrous.

1. Dec.

General Browning records that the Finance and War Ministers heads should be knocked together - preferably by the Chief Commissioner though the P.M. so that a suitable agreement is reached - and published -

soon.

to arrive in any

will work off

thin would be disastrous.

1. Dec.

General Banning records that the Finance and War Ministers heads should be brought together - preferably by the Chief Commissioner - though the P.M. so that a suitable agreement is reached - and published -

soon.

I should be pleased to assist in any way and know the Minister of the problem

St. Paul's.
Arch. Rd
M.M.A.

27. Sep.

See 11/3/4 + 3/6

(CSO)

4810.

~~SECRET~~ 8231

Ex. Comm (M) 12
~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Pay of Italian Army.

LAND FORCES SUB COM. A.C.
(M.N.I.A.) ROME
A 025

22 Sept 45

SEP 24 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

TO : A.N.H.Q.

COPY TO: ALLIED COMMISSION.

30714

Ref AFHQ signal P 44047 of 17 Sept 45 cite FINERG.

1. Extent of proposed reductions to allowances applicable during hostilities and still in force :-

- (a) abolition of "Combat" pay 46 lire per day for 46,000 troops,
- (b) abolition of "danger" pay 12 lire per day for 49,000 service troops in forward areas,
- (c) abolition of "heavy working" pay 20 lire per day for 20,000 troops in rear areas.

Proposed to replace above by all-round addition of 20 lire per day for 250,000 but this has not yet been approved by Treasury.

2. Financial effect on a basis of 250,000, if proposals agreed.

Combat troops lose 25 lire per day.
Forward service troops lose 12 lire per day
Heavy workers - no change.
Remainder (i.e. 135,000) gain 20 lire per day.
This will cost Treasury about 1 1/4 million lire per day.

3. Psychological effect will inevitably be adverse on combat troops and to a lesser extent on forward service troops, although on grounds of law and equity this action is justified. There is a risk, however, that the very important part of the army (viz the Combat Groups), who have cost a lot to train and equip, may desert or become unreliable, particularly as it is understood that their officers who are similarly affected resent the pro-

(c) abolition of "heavy working" pay 20 lire per day for 20,000 troops in rear areas.

Proposed to replace above by all-round addition of 20 lire per day for 250,000 but this has not yet been approved by Treasury.

2. Financial effect on a basis of 250,000, if proposals agreed.

Combat troops lose 25 lire per day.

Forward service troops lose 12 lire per day

heavy workers - no change.

Remainder (i.e. 135,000) gain 20 lire per day.

This will cost Treasury about 1 1/2 million lire per day.

3. Psychological effect will inevitably be adverse on combat troops and to a lesser extent on forward service troops, although on grounds of law and equity this action is justified. There is a risk, however, that the very important part of the army (viz the Combat Groups), who have cost a lot to train and equip, may desert or become unreliable, particularly as it is understood that their officers who are similarly affected resent the proposed cut. Date selected for cut is 1 Dec 45, which coming just before the Christmas festivities will encourage tendency to desert. On the other hand, only 95,000 out of 250,000 will lose, while 135,000 will gain; and a percentage of the 45,000 Combat troops are new entry who did not fight during the war. Moreover, Italian Navy and Air Forces lost their "Combat" pay in May last.

4. Recommend therefore for your consideration:-

- (a) Treasury be pressed to grant an extra 10 lire per day to soldiers who were present with Combat Groups on 8/5/45 to continue for further three months, possibly costing approx 25 million lire.
- (b) Full explanation of proposals, reasons and decisions to be given to troops through LA PATRIA earliest.

SEE F 315

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

24 SEP 1945

(CAR. WHITE)

- 2 -

5. Serious effect of proposal already discussed with War Minister and SACMEDS views again represented today.

6. Adjustment of messing and other allowances affecting units of all categories but not the soldier's pocket omitted in above summary so as not to confuse the question. Probable effect will be reduction of per capita unit messing grants by 15 lire per day.

7. Agreed by Allied Commission.

THS/22/5.

L. Browning
Major General
M.E.I.A.

CONFIDENTIAL

1920

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

79

Major General
M.H.I.A.

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