

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

ACC

10000/109/143
(VOL. V)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

ITALIAN ARMY POLICY
SEPT. 1945 - MAR. 1946

9/143
(E)

1.2.2.4

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

File closed

See Vol. 6.


785017

SIO:Chief Commissioner

I am sorry that I could not stop action on my letter on f 502 to which I say a satisfactory reply. I do not think great harm has been done & the fact is that the Army is now down to 125,000.

MR/13/3

MAR 14 RECD
0930


511

Action by Land Force Sub Com. MR/15/3

Seen by CSO 16/3

265

513

CSO to Comd.

Letter no 512 for signature, please 

P. 503

P 502.

504

I understand LF Sub Com has received
the reply to 502 Please show it to me

HW/SP

505

A/cso Ex Comm

Ref mem 504 LF S/C state that they
have NOT yet recd. any reply to 502.
They received obtained consent of AFHQ
for release of 1921 class but nothing
yet on general strength policy.

HS. 6/3
ELB 6/3

M. S. 7/3

508

A/cso Ex Comm

folio 507 for signature, please
p 506 ref.

HS. 14/3
26/3

G.O.C.,
Land Forces S/C (MMA).

496.

Since writing the minute at 495 I have received confidentially from the Prime Minister's private secretary the memorandum opposite. It would appear that ideas have changed and I should be grateful for your comments and, in particular, as to whether in the light of this memorandum we should now despatch letter at 494.

11. Feb. 46.

2752
Brigadier,
Acting Chief Commissioner.

Executive Commissioner.

500

1. The Ministry of War memorandum sent to the P.M. does not affect the matter of the proposed temporary drop in strength to 125,000, as the 140,000 shown in Section II of the memorandum includes some 15,000 BR-ITI's and US-ITI's.
2. The rest of the memorandum is a plan for possibilities further ahead and which we are not in a position to discuss yet.
3. I therefore recommend the despatch by you of Folio 494 which I have amended slightly in the light of the Ministry of War memorandum, so as to make everything perfectly clear.

13 Feb. 46

/dgc

501

L. Brownie
May

General Officer Commanding,
Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C. (MMA).

602 Land Forces.

202

140,000 shown in Section II of the memorandum includes some 15,000 BR-141's and US-ITI's.

2. The rest of the memorandum is a plan for possibilities further ahead and which we are not in a position to discuss yet.

3. I therefore recommend the despatch by you of Folio 494 which I have amended slightly in the light of the Ministry of War memorandum, so as to make everything perfectly clear.

*L. Browning
Maj. Gen.*

*General Officer Commanding,
Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C. (AMIA).*

13 Feb. 46.

/ago
(501) ~~494~~

602 Land Forces.

263

I agree to issue of 494 as amended.

*MS/13/2
A/C.C.*

MS

504

A/EXO, MS. 27/2

Ref 502 - I got on to CE while at AFHQ who promised an answer at shortest: have informed Col. Glenister.

MS 27/2

505:

be known.

1 503 for info. MS. 27/2

603. Land Force Sub Com.

492

I refer to you A 017 The Chief

Commissioners consider that the matter should
be referred to AFHQ. Would you draft
a summary of the circumstances leading up
to the correspondence & attach the document
under this. ~~Do you~~ In your last line of
A 017 is Jan's misprint for Feb 1

493

494

Here with suggested draft. I don't think
we should cloud the issue with any
detail. You have already got copies of App A & B of
the date you refer to was 21 Jan
NOT 1 Jan. Sorry.

L. B.

8 Feb.

495

262

H 017 is Taula unprinted for Feb 1

494

493

Here with suggested draft. I don't think
we should round the issue with any
detail. You have already got copies of App. A & B of
the date you refer to was 21 Jan
not 1 Jan. Sorry.

L. B.
8 Feb.

495

262

Minute for File.

The Chief Commissioner discussed the matter raised at 491
with the Prime Minister on 8 February. Dr. de Gasperi had had no
information from the War Minister about these proposals and said
that he would like to discuss it with Brosio. The letter to
AFHQ should therefore be delayed until I can elicit de Gasperi's
reactions to the policy expressed by his Minister which I hope to
do early next week.

9. Feb. 46.

M.S.L.
Brigadier,
Acting Chief Commissioner.

461

11.15.11

See 460 et ante for info
241

488

Executive Committee states to further action
is required at the moment on photos 462-487. 5/12

4/12
S. G. 4

F.C. Demand de Traquen Timor
(1991)
if he is in

This follows so
daily the French-
pattern (vis-a-vis)
expenditures for
The Fr. Army
Duck & Trench

261

261

I.C. (u) This follows so if he is in
daddy The French agreement -
Pattern (vis-a-vis) pls return
Expenditures for
The Fr. Army
Thank & French
RTHQ approval
should be sought.
Also - I will ask

785017

446.

Capt. B

Re. put up appropriate letters implementing

min 444 agree by C.C. at min 445.

Action is also required on 448

T.H. 14/1

448

E.S.O.

Ref min 446 - drafts to MMIA & Edue SP
 herewith submitted. At this stage I have
 not put in the proposal (in min. 444) that
 S/Sgt Hawes might be att. to MMIA but
 I mentioned it to the G. 2 (Tog) who will
 discuss it: first reaction unfavorable.

E.S. 12/1

448

Thanks - drafts appor. Ought not use to
 send a suitable admnt. to 447.

T.H. 14/1

JAN 15 RECD

453

C.S.O. 14/1

Herewith draft as implementing min 448

discuss it: first reaction unfavorable.

ELB 12/1

458

Thanks - draft appod. On flight it we to
send a suitable adm-t. to 447.

1-14/1

JAN 15 RECD

453

CSO 1-14/1

- 1) Herewith draft as implementing mem 448
for approval pie
- 2) Routine letter for signature.

260

ELB 18/1

455

CSO Letter at 454 (ref para (1) min 453) for sig. pie.

ELB 21/1

457

CSO Letter at 456 submitted for signature pie.
Ref conversation this morning.

ELB 24/1

Executive Commissioner.

Ref. your minute 424 Gen. Browning's draft reply at p.425 is submitted for approval. As regards the final paragraph of his p.426 I suggest that we issue the instructions to the Italian Prime Minister.

28 Dec. 45.

O.S.O.

433.

Draft to issue for CCS signature as amended.

Why all the delay?

Ms 29/10/45

see 437

443.

Ex-lam.

P. 442 - your way wish to discuss

with C.C.

Final 4/1

444.

Chief Commissioner.

1. I think you should read General Browning's letter at Page 442. The origin of this course is peculiar as you will see from para 2 and I am at a loss to understand how the Education Sub-Commission came into the matter. Colonel Washbourne has given me no very clear explanation but has definitely sponsored Staff/Sgt. Hauser who, so far as I can make out, is now attached to the Education Sub-Commission.

Ex-Com. P. 442 - you may wish to discuss

with me.

Final
4/1

444.

Chief Commissioner.

1. I think you should read General Browning's letter at Page 442. The origin of this course is peculiar as you will see from para 2 and I am at a loss to understand how the Education Sub-Commission came into the matter. Colonel Washbourne has given me no very clear explanation but has definitely sponsored Staff/Sgt. Hauser who, so far as I can make out, is now attached to the Education Sub-Commission.

259

2. I do not think GOC Land Forces S/C need have any qualms about the continuation of this course although the interest taken by Marchesa Benzoni fills me with some apprehension. The syllabus might be called political but is in no sense party political. The outside lecturers are of high standing, S/Sgt. Hauser, of Jewish origin, I understand is a first class lecturer and I recommend that the course should continue, or at any rate that the Land Forces S/C should not intervene in stopping them.

3. At the same time we must make it perfectly clear that the Education Sub-Commission has no part in them. Colonel Washbourne should be instructed to disassociate himself from the arrangement and the courses and if the Italian Government wish to make advantage of the services of S/Sgt. Hauser, they should deal direct with his Commanding Officer who is GOC, UDR. He might at a pinch be attached to the Land Forces S/C.

4. If you agree I will so inform General Browning.

MSL/JC.

8/1
FL. Daga

JAN 5 1950
0400

MSL
Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

785017

Ex-lm.

419.

E.S.O. Herewith covering letter for signature forwarding MCMIA directive number 2 to Italian Govt. Directive no 1 was forwarded to them on CE's request.

1-11/12 16/12. ERT 15/12 3/9

422

Chief clerk

P. 421 (mod. today) pl. return with Vol IV.

433

Ex-lm.

P. 420 + 421 for info. only at this stage. I will on return take up with L.F.S/C

434

C.S.O.

Gen. Brounne is drafting a reply to final para which is incomprehensible to me. (to him)

DD/22/20

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Office of the Chief Commissioner

APO 394

512.

Ref: B254/512/EO

29 March 1946

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

360 vol IV
1-510.

Enclosed you will find copy of amendment to Directive No. 4 regarding the hand-over of the Italian Army to the Italian Government as published by the Land Forces Subcommittee (LMIA) of the Allied Commission.

The contents of this Directive have already been communicated by the Head of the Land Forces Subcommittee (LMIA) to the Minister of War

Yours very truly,

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Dr. Alcide De Gasperi
The President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
Rome.

257

EXEC. COMM. A.C. (2)

8251.86

MAR 27 1946

510

SUBJECT: Handover of the ITALIAN Army to the ITALIAN Government

LAND FORCES SUB COM, A.O. (MMIA)

G/7

26 Mar 46

To : See Dist. below

Ref MMIA Directive No 1 (G/7 dated 8 Nov 45) subject: Handover of the ITALIAN Army to the ITALIAN Government, and MMIA letter G/7 of 8 Mar 46.

Para III 7(c) will be amended as follows:

Delete : Administration Total 31,000

and

Insert : Administration Total 28,000

506

A. H. M. C. L.
Lt Col

Major General 65
M M I A

ABC/ea

SEE. F-512.

DISTRIBUTION

Ministry of War
Chief Commissioner A.C.
Executive Commissioner A.C. (2) one for Prime Minister
Navy Sub Commission
Air Forces Sub Commission
HQ 2 District (5)
List 'B'

See 512

INTERNAL

Dep Comd
BGS
Col A/Q
G (five)
A (four)
Q (five)
RE
SIGS
ST (three)
MED
REME
War Diary (two)
File: 2561
Spare (twenty)

(CAPT K)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Originator's Reference: F62599

Date/Time of Origin: MAR. 121849A

Message Centre No: H/554

Date Time Rec'd: MAR. 130910

Precedence: OP PRIORITY

FROM: AFHQ SIGNED SACMED CITE FHGCT

TO : ALCOM

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference your letter 8251/502/EC, 15 February.

1. Temporary decrease of interim Italian army to 125000 is authorized. To be accomplished by release of 1921 class simultaneously with March call up.
2. Calculations and projects to continue to be based on 140000.
3. Italian Government should be urged to restore full ceiling strength at soonest practicable date.

AC DIST

ACTION
INFO

~~EX COMM~~ LAND FORCES
CHIEF COMMISSIONER
~~MIA EC~~
FILE

ACTION

CONFIDENTIAL

13 MAR 1946

(CS)

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Office of the Chief Commissioner

APO 394

507

Ref: 3251/507/33

13 March 1946

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Enclosed you will find copy of amendment to Directive No. 1 regarding the hand-over of the Italian Army to the Italian Government as published by the Land Forces Subcommittee (LMIA) of the Allied Commission.

The contents of this Directive have already been communicated by the Head of the Land Forces Subcommittee (LMIA) to the Minister of War.

Yours very truly,

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLIERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Dr. Alcide De Gasperi
The President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
Rome

254

Copy to: Land Forces S/C (LMIA).

8

506

SUBJECT : Handover of the ITALIAN Army to the ITALIAN Government

8251.1

LAND FORCES SUB COM, A.C. (MMIA)

G/7

8 Mar 46

TO : See Distn below

360 Vol II

MAR 11 1946

Ref MMIA Directive No 1 (G/7 dated 8 Nov 45) subject: Handover of the ITALIAN Army to the ITALIAN Government.

Para III 7 will be amended as follows:

1. Delete existing sub-paras (a) and (b) with all detail, and

Substitute:

(a) Local and Mobile Reserves (Combat Tps)

Three Internal Security Divs, two in SICILY and one in SARDINIA

Seven Inf Regts and three ALPINE Regts, one for each Territorial Region on the mainland

90,500

Five Inf Divs

2. Renumber subsequent sub-paras (b), (c), (d) for (c), (d), (e) as at present.

ARCS/abc

for Major General MMIA

DISTRIBUTION:

Ministry of War

INTERNAL:

Seven Inf Regts and three ALPINE Regts,
one for each Territorial Region on the
mainland

90,500

Five Inf Divs

2. Renumber subsequent sub-paras (b), (c), (d) for (c), (d), (e) as at present.

ARCS/abc

DISTRIBUTION:

Ministry of War
Chief Commissioner A.C. ✓
Executive Commissioner A.C. (2) one for Prime Minister.
Navy Sub Commission A.C.
Air Forces Sub Commission A.C.
HQ 2 District (5)

1 HLU
2 "
3 "
4 "
5 "
6 "
7 "
8 "
9 "
10 "
11 "
12 "

See 507.

(See B)

*for Major General GS
M M I A*

INTERNAL:

Dep Comd
EGS
Col A/Q
G (five)
A (four)
Q (Five)
RE
SIGS
ST (three)
Med
REME
War Diary (two)
File: G/3/1
Spare (twenty)

253

8251 85
Subject :- Reorganisation of Indian Italian Army. 503

11
Lieut. Porters Sub Comm. A.C. (MIA)
RMS.

C/6
23 Feb 46.

To :- For Minister.

499
I have received your memorandum No. 204730 dated 20 February, enclosing a proposed new composition for the Italian Army.

I have not yet had time to examine this proposal in detail because, although it was originally prepared by you on 8 Feb. I only received a copy on the 21 Feb.

From a preliminary examination however the composition of this army appears to be basically different from the Italian Army at present allowed and I feel bound to say, from the administrative point of view at any rate, very unusual. I cannot therefore at present agree with or support your proposal.

However I have instructed my staff in conjunction with yours to make a detailed study of the question and after consulting the Chief Commissioner A.C. I will communicate with you further on the matter.

See memo.

Major General,
E. M. I. A.

Copy to :- Chief Commissioner A.C. 

(Capt B)

251
RMS
13

502

Ref: B251/502/EC

15 February 1946

SUBJECT: Strength of Italian Army.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.

1. Paras 7 and 8 of your Directive AS 091.711 9(SD)-0 dated 2 Nov 45 ("Handover of Italian Army to Italian Government") specifies the culling of the Interim Italian Army by categories.

2. When the strength figures of the Italian Army (excl. BR) ITIS and US-ITIS) as at 1 Jan 46 became known, the question of the demobilization of further classes was again considered and Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C. (LSCA) letter A.017 dated 30 Jan 46 was sent to the Minister of War - See Appendix "A".

3. His reply is attached at Appendix "B" and from it can be seen that he:

- (a) agrees that the Italian Army should be kept, as far as possible, up to the figure of 143,000, but
- (b) states that owing to financial stringency and the advisability, under the circumstances, of demobilizing the 1921 Class *pari passu* with the Call-up next March, he is prepared to let the strength of the Interim Army drop temporarily to about 125,000, which, with the 15,000 BR and US-ITI troops, makes a total of about 140,000.

4. Taking everything into account I recommend that:

- (a) our calculations and projects as regards all aspects of the Army continue to be based on the establishment figure of 140,000, until we know the terms of the Peace Treaty;
- (b) we accept a temporary reduction in strength of the Interim Army to about 125,000 as stated by the Minister - the 1921 Class being released as in B(b);
- (c) the 1922 and 1923 Classes be released at some future date, depending on the actual and required strengths of the Army and the decision (to be made later) regarding the July and November intakes.

5. I should be glad of your early approval in order that the necessary instructions may be issued by the War Ministry for the demobilization of the 1921 Class in ample time to ensure smooth action.

250

Copy to: Chief Commissioner
Land Forces (MMIA).

M. S. LUSH
Brigadier,
Acting Chief Commissioner.

Copy to file 8270/EC

22/2/46

C O P Y

APPENDIX "A" to letter 8251/02/00 of Feb 1946.

Subject: Strength of Italian Army.

502A

Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C.
(M.E.I.A.)

A.017
30 January 1946.

To : Minister of War.

1. In connection with the question of demobilization of further classes of the Italian Army, I am directed to refer you to Section III, 7 and 8 of the Allied Commission, Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA) Directive No. 1 issued under my G/7 of 8 Nov 45.
2. That section shows that it is the Allied intention that the Italian Army as an interim measure shall be maintained at a figure not exceeding 140,000. That figure, as you know, was based on what Count CASATI, when Minister of War, considered necessary to enable the Italian Government Army to fulfil its functions. All planning and calculations not only as regards fighting equipment, supplies, etc., but also with respect to redeployment of Allied Forces in ITALY have been and are being made on the basis of that figure.
3. For various reasons, of which you are well aware, it is obviously not possible to keep the strength of the Army at exactly 140,000. Further demobilization of classes however must seriously affect the lay-out and effective strength authorized in para 7 of the Directive referred to above and I must therefore point out that no further classes should be demobilised until it is quite clear that by new intake the interim Italian Army can be maintained at a figure of approximately (but not exceeding) 140,000.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER, ALLIED COMMISSION.

(Sgd) L. BURNING,
Major-General,
G.O.C. Land Forces Sub-Commission, AC.
(M.E.I.A.)

LB/ejo

Copy to: Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.
File G/6.

COPY TRANSLATION.

APPENDIX "B" to letter 8251/2/BC of Feb 1946.

FROM : Ministry of War.
TO : M.M.I.A.

REF : 202790/11
DATE : 3.2.46.

502 B.

SUBJECT: Strength of the Italian Army.

Reference A.017 of 30 Jan 46.

1. I agree that, in view of the state of the country, it is necessary to maintain the strength of the Army as near as possible to the maximum figure permitted of 140,000 men. But consideration must be given to unavoidable financial exigencies which, in all probability (the examination of the budget with the Ministry for the Treasury will commence shortly), will render it impossible to maintain this level for the time being.

2. I consider it advisable to arrange, during March next, and at the same time as the call up of the 1924 Class, for the discharge of 1921 Class which has a long period of service (5 years). Due to their state of mind the troops of the 1921 Class are elements of little use and are a bad example to the others (see the enclosed extract of the report of the Milan Military Terr. Command). It is therefore advisable to return them to civilian life as soon as possible.

With the discharge of these men, the total strength of the Army will be slightly reduced as compared with the maximum permitted, but the Army, however, will certainly gain in efficiency.

3. With the discharge of the 1921 Class and the call up of the 1924 Class recruits it can be estimated that, by the end of March, the strength of the Army will be about 125,000 men (BS-ITIT and US-ITIT units excluded); this strength is considered sufficient for the needs of the country and it is hoped that we shall be able to get from the Treasury, if the financial situation does not worsen, the necessary funds for it.

4. The discharge of the 1922 and 1923 Classes will follow at such times as it is possible to carry out new call ups in relation to the availabilities of the Regional Training Centres.

(Signed) BROGIO,
War Minister.

COPY TRANSLATION (Extract).

FROM : Milan Military Territorial Command.
TO : Ministry of War.

REF: 03/230

DATE: 18.1.46.

SUBJECT: Morale of the troops.

Another category of discontented men is that of the 1921 Class, to whom premature information, divulged by a misinformed press, has given hope, since October last, of discharge in the near future.

Actually, no measure of this kind has been adopted. This, however, has not prevented the 1921 Class feeling spiritually, already demobilised and forming part, according to the best hypotheses, of that category of disinterested personnel which I have already commented upon.

I have recently had notified to me some cases in disciplinary infraction which are directly derived from the state of mind of these men. I have had carried out, and have carried out personally, rigorous enquiries. Also here I have not uncovered anything exceptionally serious, but a widespread bad-feeling which could assume a more concrete or deprecable form if fostered, as is already being commenced, by parties or tendencies contrary to the military organisations.

Apocryph of this I would quote a recent movement tending to bring amongst us the not uninterested scruples of the "conscientious objectors which exist in the Anglo Saxon nations.

Some unit commanders, questioned by me, declared themselves in favour of putting a stop to this state of affairs by discharging the 1921 Class which is of little use and sets a bad example to the others.

I do not agree with this opinion. The 1921 Class troops represent in the units under my command, a proportion which varies from 15 to 27%. In view of the fact that the units are at present somewhat over strength on war establishment, their discharge would not greatly lessen the efficiency of the units. I calculate, in fact, that on the completion of the operation the units would be left with about 83% of their war establishment; not a serious inconvenience and certainly preferable to that stated above.

(signed) MARRAS,
G.O.C.

Translation.

From : Min of War
Cabinet.

Ref: 204730
Date: 20/2/46

To : Maj. Gen Langley BROWNING, CB, OBE, MC,
Chief of Land Forces Sub-Commission AC(ITALIA).

Subject: Final Organisation of the Italian Army.

Further to urgent request by the President of the Council of Ministers, I have had to, in the space of a few hours, report on the general lines desired by us for the final organisation of the Italian army.

The information had to be forwarded to the Chief of the Allied Commission, Admiral Stone, leaving the following day for London.

Thinking it advisable and dutiful to inform you of the report made, I despatch a copy of the memorandum, drawn up with the agreed opinion of the S.M.R.E., forwarded to the President of the Council.

The Minister.

499A

1.503

1950

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017


Commission, Admiral Stone, leaving
Thinking it advisable and dutiful to inform you of the report
made, I despatch a copy of the memorandum, drawn up with the agreed
opinion of the S.M.R.E., forwarded to the President of the Council.

499A

The Minister.

See 53

246



Ministero della Guerra

GABINETTO

Ufficio II

Roma, 8 febbraio '46

I - LINEE ORIENTATIVE DELLA ORGANIZZAZIONE DEFINITIVA DELL'ESERCITO
DIFENSIVO.

- 1°) Entità : tale da assicurare l'assolvimento del compito di proteggere le frontiere e resistere ad eventuali aggressioni per il tempo necessario a consentire l'intervento di forze alleate;
- 2°) Qualità : elevarla al massimo per poter assolvere il compito suindicato con il minimo delle forze;
- 3°) Reclutamento :
 - 50% circa di personale permanente e di volontari a lunga ferma (ufficiali, sottufficiali e specializzati);
 - 50% rimanente, di leva, a breve ferma (normalmente di un anno), per non abbandonare il principio vigente in Italia dell'obbligo personale e generale al servizio militare e per consentire l'addestramento delle riserve;
- 4°) Costituzione :

- organizzazione centrale di comando (S.M. Generale, organi tecnici ed amministrativi del Ministero G.)	2.000
- organizzazione periferica di comando e di reclutamento (comandi militari territoriali, distretti, depositi)	6.000
- organizzazione di addestramento (scuole per ufficiali e sottufficiali, scuole per specializzati)	15.000
- organizzazione di copertura (difese fisse e mobili alle frontiere, che consentano, utilizzando le preesistenti opere di fortificazione, la vigilanza ed una prima resistenza)	40.000

2) Qualità: elevarla al massimo per poter assolvere il compito suindica-
to con il minimo delle forze;

3°) Reclutamento :

- 50% circa di personale permanente e di volontari a lunga ferma (ufficiali, sottufficiali e specializzati);
- 50% rimanente, di leva, a breve ferma (normalmente di un anno), per non abbandonare il principio vigente in Italia dell'obbligo personale e generale al servizio militare e per consentire l'addestramento delle riserve;

4°) Costituzione :

- organizzazione centrale di comando (S.M. Generale, organi tecnici ed amministrativi del Ministero G.) 2.000
- organizzazione periferica di comando e di reclutamento (comandi militari territoriali, distretti, depositi) 6.000
- organizzazione di addestramento (scuole per ufficiali e sottufficiali, scuole per specializzati) 15.000
- organizzazione di copertura (difese fisse e mobili alle frontiere, che consentano, utilizzando le preesistenti opere di fortificazione, la vigilanza ed una prima resistenza) 40.000
- grandi unità mobili (ad integrazione della copertura per dare continuità al fronte difensivo) 50.000
- riserva generale (4 divisioni motorizzate ed 1 corazzata, reparti di artiglieria di medio calibro e contraerea, battaglioni pontieri, elementi dei servizi) 70.000
- servizi territoriali (stabilimenti sanitari, depositi viveri, depositi materiali vari) 243.000

T o t a l e 196.000

per 7500 r 501

././.

498

Dato il sistema di chiamata per l'aliquota di leva (quadrimestrale) la forza sempre prontamente impiegabile si può ritenere si aggiri intorno ai 150.000 uomini (i rimanenti sono in addestramento).-

La forza sopra indicata rappresenta il minimo indispensabile per consentire all'Esercito Italiano di far fronte ai compiti affidatigli. Ciò però non toglie, che, data l'attuale situazione finanziaria del paese, il Governo Italiano sia costretto a limitare la forza alle armi ad una cifra inferiore ai 196.000 uomini.

II - MOVIMENTI PREVEDIBILI DELLA FORZA DELL'ESERCITO NELL'ANNO 1946

- a) gennaio 1946: consistenza (compresi i reparti BR-ITI ed US-ITI a disposizione degli Alleati)133.000
- b) marzo 1946: diminuzioni per congedamenti della classe 1921 e più anziane e per perdite dovute ad esoneri, malattie ecc. ;;; 33.000
 - aumenti per chiamata classe 1924 (2° e 3° quadrimestre)40.000
 - consistenza a fine marzo 1946140.000
- c) luglio 1946 :
 - diminuzioni per congedamento classe 1922 e per perdite varie 30.000
 - aumenti per chiamata classe 1925 (1° semestre)50.000
 - consistenza fine luglio 1946160.000
- d) novembre 1946 :
 - diminuzioni per congedamento classe 1923 e per perdite varie 30.000
 - aumenti per chiamata classe 1925 (2° semestre)50.000

180.000

- a) gennaio 1946: consistenza (compresi i reparti BR-ITI ed US-ITI a disposizione degli Alleati) 133.000
- b) marzo 1946: diminuzioni per congedamenti della classe 1921 e più anziane e per perdite dovute ad esoneri, malattie ecc. ;;; 33.000
- aumenti per chiamata classe 1924 (2° e 3° quadrimestre) 40.000
- consistenza a fine marzo 1946 140.000
- c) luglio 1946 :
- diminuzioni per congedamento classe 1922 e per perdite varie 30.000
- aumenti per chiamata classe 1925 (1° semestre) 50.000
- consistenza fine luglio 1946 160.000
- d) novembre 1946 :
- diminuzioni per congedamento classe 1923 e per perdite varie 30.000
- aumenti per chiamata classe 1925 (2° semestre) 50.000
- consistenza a fine novembre 1946 180.000

III - CONCLUSIONE

Come appare dalle cifre sopra indicate, nell'insieme la forza complessiva tende a salire oltre i 140.000 uomini dell'esercito di transizione verso i 196.000 uomini previsti per l'esercizio difensivo necessario.

././.

497

- 3 -

Per rimanere entro i limiti stabiliti per l'esercizio di transizio
ne ed in quelli presumibilmente inferiori imposti da esigenze di
bilancio, si adotterebbero, occorrendo, una più rigorosa selezione
fisica nelle chiamate ed una maggiore larghezza di esoneri.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

242

DRAFT

DRAFT

HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION
A.P.O. 394
Office of the Chief Commissioner

Ref :

February 1946

SUBJECT : Strength of Italian Army.

TO : ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS.

1. Paras 7 and 8 of your Directive AG 091.711 G(SD)-0 dated 2 Nov 45 ("Handover of Italian Army to Italian Government") specifies the ceiling of the Interim Italian Army, by categories.

2. When the strength figures of the Italian Army (excl. BR-ITIS and US-ITIS) as at 1 Jan. became known, the question of the demobilization of further classes was again considered and Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C. (M.M.I.A.) letter A.017 dated 30 Jan was sent to the Minister of War - see Appendix "A".

3. His reply is attached at Appendix "B" and from it can be seen that he :-

- (a) agrees that the Italian Army should be kept, as far as possible, up to the figure of 140,000, but
 - (b) states that owing to financial stringency and the advisability, under the circumstances, of demobilizing the 1921 Class pari passu with the Call-up next March, he is prepared to let the strength of the Army drop temporarily to about 125,000, which with the 15,000 BR and US troops makes a total of about 140,000.
- Taking everything into account, I recommend that :-

- (a) our calculations and projects as regards all aspects of the army continue to be based on the establishment figure of 140,000; unless we know the terms of the peace treaty of the Italian Army.
 - (b) we accept a temporary reduction in strength to about 125,000, as stated by the Minister - the 1921 Class being released as in 2 (b); actual and revised
 - (c) the 1922 and 1923 Classes be released at some future date, depending on the strength of the Army and the expediency (some 40,000) of the Call-up to train new intake, decision to be made later regarding the July and November intakes.
- I should be glad of your early approval in order that the

(a) agrees with the figure of 140,000, but possible, up to the figure of 140,000, but

(b) states that owing to financial stringency and the advisability, under the circumstances, of demobilizing the 1921 Class pari passu with the Call-up next March, he is prepared to let the strength of the Army drop temporarily to about 125,000, which will be 15,000 G2 and G3 - this drops makes a total of about 140,000.

Taking everything into account, I recommend that :-

- 4.
- (a) our calculations and projects as regards all aspects of the army continue to be based on the establishment figure of 140,000; until we have the terms of the peace treaty of the interim Army.
- (b) we accept a temporary reduction in strength to about 125,000, as stated by the Minister - the 1921 Class being released as in 2 (b); *actual and revised*
- (c) the 1922 and 1923 Classes be released at some future date, depending on the strengths of the Army and the capacity ~~to~~ *to be made* ~~of the Army to train new intake.~~ *decision to be made* ~~of the Army to train new intake.~~ *decision to be made* ~~of the Army to train new intake.~~ *decision to be made*
5. I should be glad of your early approval in order that the necessary instructions may be issued by the War Ministry for the demobilization of the 1921 class in ample time to ensure smooth action.

LB/c

ELLERY W. STONE. 241
Rear Admiral, USNR.
Chief Commissioner.

See Mr. HQ3. HQ5 7501.
Copy to: Land Force 5/c

SUBJECT: Strength of Italian Army.

Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C.,
(M.M.I.A.) ROME

A017

7 Feb. '46.

TO : Headquarters,
Allied Commission (for Chief Commissioner)

In continuation of my A017 dated 30 Jan. '46 and my discussion with you on the above :-

1. I attach the reply of the Minister of War to my A017 of 30 Jan.

2. You will see that the Minister :

(a) agrees that the Italian Army should be kept, as far as possible, up to the figure of 140,000, but

(b) states that owing to financial stringency and the advisability, under the circumstances, of demobilising the 1921 Class *pari passu* with the Call-up next March, he is prepared to let the strength of the Army drop temporarily to about 125,000.

3. Taking everything into account, I recommend that :-

(a) our calculations and projects as regards all aspects of the Army continue to be based on the establishment figure of 140,000;

(b) we accept a temporary reduction in strength to about 125,000, as stated by the Minister - the 1921 Class being released as in 2 (b);

(c) the 1922 and 1923 Classes be released at some future date, depending on the strength of the Army and the capacity (some 40,000) of the G.A.R. to train new recruits.

FEB 7 - RECD

489

490

1. I attach the reply of the Minister of War to my A017 of 30 Jan.
2. You will see that the Minister :
 - (a) agrees that the Italian Army should be kept, as far as possible, up to the figure of 140,000, but
 - (b) states that owing to financial stringency and the advisability, under the circumstances, of demobilising the 1921 Class pari passu with the Call-up next March, he is prepared to let the strength of the Army drop temporarily to about 125,000.
3. Taking everything into account, I recommend that : -
 - (a) our calculations and projects as regards all aspects of the Army continue to be based on the establishment figure of 140,000;
 - (b) we accept a temporary reduction in strength to about 125,000, as stated by the Minister - the 1921 Class being released as in 2 (b);
 - (c) the 1922 and 1923 Classes be released at some future date, depending on the strength of the Army and the capacity (some 40,000) of the C.A.R.'s to train new intake.
4. I mentioned the possibility of some such step as the above verbally to Major General WARD when he was visiting ROME on 7 Jan. '46.
5. May I have your instructions please?

21 240

L. Browning

Major General,
Land Forces Sub-Commission, AC (MADIA)

See h. 491.2

Copy to: File C/6.

LB/ecc

Subject : Strength of Italian Army.

Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)

A.017 30 Jan. 46.

FEB 5 1946

To : Ministry of War.

1. In connection with the question of demobilization of further classes of the Italian Army, I am directed to refer you to Section III 7 and 8 of the Allied Commission, Land Forces Sub-Commission (M.M.I.A.) Directive No 1 issued under my G/7 of 8 Nov. 45.

2. That section shows that it is the Allied intention that the Italian Army as an interim measure shall be maintained at a figure not exceeding 140,000. The figure, as you knew, was based on what Count CASATI, when Minister of War, considered necessary to enable the Italian Army to fulfil its functions. All planning and calculations not only as regards fighting equipment, supplies, etc., but also with respect to redeployment of Allied Forces in ITALY have been and are being made on the basis of that figure.

3. For various reasons, of which you are well aware, it is obviously not possible to keep the strength of the Army at exactly 140,000. Further demobilization of classes however most seriously affect the layout and effective strength authorized in para 7 of the Directive referred to above and I must therefore point out that no further classes should be demobilized until it is quite clear that by new intake the interim Italian Army can be maintained at a figure of approximately (but not exceeding) 140,000.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER, ALLIED COMMISSION

Italian Army as an interim measure. The figure, as you know, was based on what Count exceeding 140,000. The figure, as you know, was based on what Count CASATI, when Minister of War, considered necessary to enable the Italian Army to fulfill its functions. All planning and calculations not only as regards fighting equipment, supplies, etc., but also with respect to redeployment of Allied Forces in ITALY have been and are being made on the basis of that figure.

3. For various reasons, of which you are well aware, it is obviously not possible to keep the strength of the Army at exactly 140,000. Further demobilization of classes however most seriously affect the layout and effective strength authorized in para 7 of the Directive referred to above and I must therefore point out that no further classes should be demobilized until it is quite clear that by new intake the interim Italian Army can be maintained at a figure of approximately (but not exceeding) 140,000.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER, ALLIED COMMISSION

LB/ejc

Major General.,
G.O.C. Land Forces Sub Commission, AC.
(M.M.I.A.).

239

Copy to : Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.
File G/6.

See 490

8251
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Major General L. Browning, CB., OBE., MC.
Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)

G/6
26 January 1946.

My Dear

Admiral

1. In continuation of my G/6 of 17 Jan., I think I should send you copies of my A.O17 dated 29 Oct. 45 and 26 Jan. 46 attached.

2. No reply has been received from M. of W. to A.O17 dated 29 Oct. 45. But, in the last few days, the subject of demobilization of classes and strength of the Italian Army has arisen afresh. I therefore felt it necessary to send A.O17 dated 26 Jan. 46.

3. As you see, this all means that part of the subject matter of my G/6 letters to you has arisen now from another angle and I have had to take the action shewn, in order to prevent the Italians letting thier army fall to negligible proportions, which would affect Allied policy and commitments.

Yours very sincerely

Langley Browning

Major General.

Rear Admiral ELLERY W. STONE, USNR.
Chief Commissioner,
Headquarters, ALLIED COMMISSION.
R O M E

(Copy to file A.O17)

I think our rights to debate size of the
Army stem from The Armistice of 238
The letter of 26 Jan. should have been
as LF 5/c (rather than AMIA) Tus

PA
5/2
B

8251
SUBJECT : Strength of the Italian Army.

Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C.,
(M.M.I.A.) R O M E.

A.017

26 Jan '46.

TO : Ministry of War.

Reference this HQ letter A 017 dated 29 Oct. '45, para 4.

1. As a result of your letter No. 01/165/Mov dated 22 Jan. '46, a meeting was held at HQ, M.M.I.A. Colonel PIACIANTINI was asked to attend with a view of discussing figures of the future strength of the Italian Army.
2. M.M.I.A. as a Liaison Mission, is a channel of communication between AFHQ and the Ministry of War, charged with giving technical advice on the administration of an army of 140,000. This was the figure put forward by Count CASATI when Minister for War, as being necessary for ITALY to maintain. The Allies agreed to this figure and have always worked on it as a basis. It follows therefore that any serious deficiency in this number, of anything but a very temporary nature, might affect the Allies' policy in regard to ITALY.

3. (a) At a meeting held this morning Colonel PIACIANTINI produced a copy of a letter addressed by SMRE to the Minister for War showing the recommendations of SMRE as to the fall in strength below 140,000 which should be allowed to take place in the early part of 1946. These figures show, that disregarding administrative services, those employed at the Ministry of War and other HQs, etc., SMRE are considering the possibility of a decrease in fighting strength of 25,000 instead of 20,000 during the coming summer.

(b) Some discussion followed as to the accuracy of the figure, M.M.I.A. being of the opinion that a truer figure would be 15,000. It was agreed, however, that regardless of M.M.I.A. pessimism or SMRE optimism, a force of 25,000 fighting men does not in fact constitute an adequate operational army in the present situation.

4. It follows, therefore, that it is for the Ministry of War and the Italian Government, as a matter of urgency, to come to a decision and make their recommendations to the Allies on two major issues :-

- (a) Is the Army to be allowed to fall below 140,000; if so, to what overall minimum figure and for what reason?

3. At a meeting addressed by SMRE to the Ministry of War, a copy of a letter addressed by SMRE to the Ministry of War, that recommendations of SMRE as to the fall in strength below 140,000 which are shown, that be allowed to take place in the early part of 1946. These figures show, that dis regarding administrative services, those employed at the Ministry of War and other HQs, etc., SMRE are considering the possibility of a decrease in fighting strength of 25,000 instead of 90,000 during the coming summer.

(b) Some discussion followed as to the accuracy of this figure, M.M.I.A. being of the opinion that a truer figure would be 15,000. It was agreed, however, that regardless of M.M.I.A. pessimism or SMRE optimism, a force of 25,000 fighting men does not in fact constitute an adequate operational army in the present situation.

4. It follows, therefore, that it is for the Ministry of War and the Italian Government, as a matter of urgency, to come to a decision and make their recommendations to the Allies on two major issues:-

- (a) Is the Army to be allowed to fall below 140,000; if so, to what overall minimum figure and for what reason?
- (b) Is the Army to be kept up to 140,000 and if so, by what means, In this connection there appear to be only two alternatives,
 - (i) to retain the services of the 1921 and 1922 Classes until sufficient men are called up to replace them.
 - (ii) to demobilize the 1921 and 1922 Classes and increase the size of the call-up in March to make up the strength to 140,000.

If the latter remedy were adopted the C.A.Rs. being unable to take more than 40,000 recruits, the surplus call up over 40,000 would have to be posted direct to fighting units and trained there - a most undesirable proceeding and the contrary to the whole agreed conception of training recruits via C.A.R.s.

/Sheet 2.

195
- 2 -
5. Will you please therefore examine this whole question and make your recommendations to M.M.I.A. at the earliest possible moment. In the meantime the G.O.C. cannot accept that, until a decision has been made, any indication or undertaking should be made either to the Territorial Commanders or to the men concerned, by any method, that the 1921 and 1922 Classes might be demobilized in the near future.

W. PIDSLEY, Colonel
for Major General,
M.M.I.A.

AHG/ecc.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

236

AHG/ecc.

825/818 UNCLASSIFIED

Subject:- Discharge - 1920, 21 and 22 classes.

Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C.
(M.M.I.A.) R O M E.

A 017

29 Oct 45.

TO : MINISTRY OF WAR

1. The views expressed in your letter 23644/MOE/1 dated 19 Oct 45 have been carefully considered.

Whilst your desire to demobilize the 1921 and 22 classes is fully appreciated, the strength of the Army vis a vis its operational role, and the maximum number of recruits who can be trained at any one time must be considered.

2. The Allied Chiefs of Staff agreed to an Interim Italian Army of 140,000; if the 1921 and 1922 classes are demobilized by January 1st. the strength of the Army will fall to 72,000 by that date (apart, of course, from 30,000 for US-ITI and BR-ITI services). The call-up of 40,000 men in February as suggested by you does not solve the problem since in the first place the training establishments being set up can only cater for an intake of 10,000 in any one month, and secondly, the introduction of 40,000 untrained men does not increase the operational value of the Army.

3. It is considered by LAMIA that in order to maintain the Army at a strength of approximately 140,000 the 1921, 1922, 1923 and 1924 classes should only be demobilized as and when replacements have been called up and are under training. Bearing in mind that training facilities will only allow a monthly intake of 10,000, demobilization would work out as follows:-

<u>INTAKE</u>		<u>DEMOBILIZATION</u>
Jan 15 - Feb 15	10,000	
Feb 15 - Mar 15	10,000	
Mar 15 - Apr 15	10,000	 1921 March/April
Apr 15 - May 15	10,000	
May 15 - Jun 15	10,000	
Jun 15 - Jul 15	10,000	 1922 July/August
Jul 15 - Aug 15	10,000	
Aug 15 - Sep 15	10,000	
Sep 15 - Oct 15	10,000	 1923 October/November
Oct 15 - Nov 15	10,000	
Nov 15 - Dec 15	10,000	 1924 December

The dates shown above for demobilization are "latest" dates and are like ly to be brought forward.

training establishments being set up can only cater for an intake of 10,000 in any one month, and secondly, the introduction of 40,000 untrained men does not increase the operational value of the Army.

3. It is considered by MIA that in order to maintain the Army at a strength of approximately 140,000 the 1921, 1922, 1923 and 1924 classes should only be demobilized as and when replacements have been called up and are under training. Bearing in mind that training facilities will only allow a monthly intake of 10,000, demobilization would work out as follows:-

<u>INTAKE</u>		<u>DEMOBILIZATION</u>	
Jan 15 - Feb 15	10,000	...	1921 March/April
Feb 15 - Mar 15	10,000	...	...
Mar 15 - Apr 15	10,000	...	...
Apr 15 - May 15	10,000	...	...
May 15 - Jun 15	10,000	...	...
Jun 15 - Jul 15	10,000	...	1922 July/August
Jul 15 - Aug 15	10,000	...	...
Aug 15 - Sep 15	10,000	...	...
Sep 15 - Oct 15	10,000	...	1923 October/November
Oct 15 - Nov 15	10,000	...	...
Nov 15 - Dec 15	10,000	...	1924 December

The dates shown above for demobilization are "latest" dates and are likely to be brought forward as and when the figures for 30,000 BR-ITI and US-ITI services are reduced.

4. It is realised that the views stated in para 3 above are contrary to those held by you, furthermore, it is appreciated that the whole question of demobilisation affecting as it does a large number of people is an important one and a matter upon which the Ministry of War feels strongly.

If after due consideration you feel unable to accept the delay we suggest in the demobilisation of the classes 1921 and 1922 inclusive, and you are prepared to allow the strength of the Army to fall considerably ²³⁵ lower than 140,000 will you please state your case.

Bearing in mind that the intake cannot exceed 10,000 a month and that very shortly responsibility for internal security and the operational role of the Army will pass to you, your letter should show quite clearly to what figure the Italian Government are prepared to recommend the strength of the Army under Italian Command should fall.

483

- 2 -

It may become necessary to refer the matter to higher authority since having authorized an army of 140,000 it will be for higher authority to say what reduction in this strength can be accepted, even as a temporary measure.

A.H. GILLMORE, Lt.Col.
for Major General,
M.M.I.A.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

234

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Major General L. Browning, CB., OBE., MC.
Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)

G/6

17 January 1946.

My Dear Admiral

1. I have again discussed this matter with my staff - ref. your memo of 12 Jan.

2. We think it is not possible to make "minimum changes". The whole problem is a big matter of principle i.e. the higher control within the War Ministry. The actual sections would remain much the same but be re-shuffled under a different chain of command.

3. The whole question would need considerable exploration with the Italian authorities and in the process we would have to get a great deal more detailed information about our own set-up, as regards system and procedure. So, at the moment, we can only produce a rough "cockshy" as to the sort of organization we envisage. Appx. "C" gives this rough "cockshy".

4. My impression is that the senior officials at the War Ministry (except CADORNA) are rather frightened at the idea of embarking on discussion of a major change, either because of the potential political repercussions or because they do not like to change something they understand, even though this may be inefficient or because they are not clear how it will affect themselves personally. I feel they are trying to "stall" till after the elections and Peace Treaty, when they could more firmly say "No"! Nevertheless and even because of the above, I think we should start our exploratory discussions now. We have already suggested a "Mixed Committee" to examine the problem but have not had any firm reaction to this yet.

5. Finally - in all this I have only mentioned the army aspect. Presumably, if there is to be any major re-organization of the War Ministry, that will have to be considered in relation to the Navy and Air Ministries, which will be much smaller organizations. But I think the thing is to examine the War Ministry re-organization first and then see how the result would affect the other two services.

Yours Very Sincerely

Agall

Not necessarily

4. My impression is that the senior officials at the War Ministry (except CADORNA) are rather frightened at the idea of embarking on discussion of a major change, either because of the potential political repercussions or because they do not like to change something they understand, even though this may be inefficient or because they are not clear how it will affect themselves personally. I feel they are trying to "stall" till after the elections and Peace Treaty, when they could more firmly say "No"! Nevertheless and even because of the above, I think we should start our exploratory discussions now. We have already suggested a "Mixed Committee" to examine the problem but have not had any firm reaction to this yet.

Agall

5. Finally - in all this I have only mentioned the army aspect. Presumably, if there is to be any major re-organization of the War Ministry, that will have to be considered in relation to the Navy and Air Ministries, which will be much smaller organizations. But I think the thing is to examine the War Ministry re-organization first and then see how the result would affect the other two services.

Not necessarily

Yours

*Very sincerely
Langley Browning*

Major General.

LB/c

Rear Admiral ELLERY W. STONE, USNR.
Chief Commissioner,
ALLIED COMMISSION.

Dec 187 233

W

481

Gen. Browning - With a few
minor exceptions, this is an
excellent paper. But before
discussing it, I suggest you
make a chart (with mini-
mum changes from the present
set-up) of what you feel
the organization of the War
Ministry should be. I don't
want the ideal, but the mini-
mum changes necessary to
secure a reasonably working
outfit.

Enc
cc

See 483

232

12/1

8

8251
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Major General L. Browning, CB., OBE., MC.
Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)

C/6
11 January 1946.

My Dear

Admiral

(478)

1. Appendix "B" attached gives a survey of the Reorganization of the Italian Army and the fundamental questions of policy underlying this under the new conditions brought about by :-

(a) the handover of the Italian Army on 1 Jan 46

(b) the finance aspect for the future

and which must be settled.

2. (a) I foresee this coming to a head shortly and I think we must tackle it now. (479)

(b) I am not sure of the correct way to do this, but I suggest that I should send Appendix "B" to BROGIO with a covering letter as at Appendix "A"; and that, after my discussion with BROGIO (see para 5 of Appendix "A") I should report his reactions to you, when perhaps you could raise it officially with DE GASPERI.

3. May I have your instructions please ?

Yours

Very sincerely
Langley Browning

Major General,
M.M.I.A.

LB/cc

must tackle it now.

(b) I am not sure of the correct way to do this, but I suggest that I should send Appendix "B" to BROGIO with a covering letter as at Appendix "A"; and that, after my discussion with BROGIO (see para 5 of Appendix "A") I should report his reactions to you, when perhaps you could raise it officially with DE GASPERI.

3. May I have your instructions please?

LB/cc

Rear Admiral ELLERY W. STONE
Chief Commissioner,
Allied Commission.

Yours

Very sincerely
Langley Browning

Major General,
M.M.I.A.

LB 281

231

DRAFT

Appendix "A" to MIA
letter 1/6 dated
January 1946.

479

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Major General L. Browning, CB., OBE., MC.
Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C.
(M.L.I.A.)

G/6
January 1946.

My Dear

1. Now that your army has been handed back to you and is crystalizing out in terms of the 140,000 authorized by the Allies, it seems to me that the fundamental question of the attitude of the Italian Government to its new Army requires to be made quite definite and clear.
2. This matter inevitably is bound to come to a head sooner or later from the aspect of finance.
3. It includes not only the question of the conditions of service and size of your future army, but also the matter as to whether military or political considerations are to be paramount as regards the organization of the War Ministry.
4. I feel that the time has come to face these problems squarely as they affect the whole future of the Army.
5. I send you privately herewith our Appreciation of the problems. I should be grateful if you would examine this Appreciation and then I could come and see you at an early date to discuss privately the problems more fully and see what action should be taken.

Yours

2. This matter inevitably is bound to come to a head sooner or later from the aspect of finance.

3. It includes not only the question of the conditions of service and size of your future army, but also the matter as to whether military or political considerations are to be paramount as regards the organization of the War Ministry.

4. I feel that the time has come to face these problems squarely as they affect the whole future of the Army.

5. I send you privately herewith our Appreciation of the problems. I should be grateful if you would examine this Appreciation and then I could come and see you at an early date to discuss privately the problems more fully and see what action should be taken.

Yours

LB/cc

Major General,
M.M.I.A.

Signor BROGIO
Minister of War
The War Ministry
R O M E.

230

Appendix "B" to NATO
letter G/6 dated
January 1946.

REORGANISATION OF THE ITALIAN ARMY
Appreciation of the Situation at 1 Jan 46

1. PREMISE

It is the stated wish of the US and British Govts that an Italian Army shall be brought to a high state of efficiency in the shortest possible time. (Vide Land Forces Sub Commission's Directive No. 2 of 7 Dec 45, para 1).

2. OBJECT

The objects of this paper are:-

- (a) To draw attention to certain major obstacles that stand in the way of bringing about the above policy; and
- (b) To suggest a course of action to be taken by the ALLIES to clarify the position.

3. INER ON THE REORGANISATION ACHIEVED TO DATE

- (a) From the time of the Armistice in Sep 43 until the ALLIED Victory in Apr 45 changes in the Italian Army org were made for operational necessity only :-

- (i) reorg of units for service under ALLIED Comd, US-III and BR-III units and the Combat Gps,
- (ii) Limited reorg of Italian Territorial Hqs, services, and some units, all of which contributed indirectly to

1880

(b) To suggest a course of action to be taken by the ALLIED to clarify the position.

3. ITEM ON THE REORGANIZATION ACHIEVED TO DATE

(a) From the time of the Armistice in Sep 43 until the ALLIED Victory in Apr 45 changes in the Italian Army org were made for operational necessity only :-

- (i) reorg of units for service under ALLIED Comd, US-ITI and BR-ITI units and the Combat Gps,
- (ii) limited reorg of Italian Territorial HQs, services, and some units, all of which contributed indirectly to the ALLIED War Effort,

(iii) replacement of very inefficient or non-cooperating offrs 229

Reorg was thus cut down to a minimum to avoid disrupting the hastily improvised War Ministry and General Staff, and was confined almost entirely to units in the field.

...../2

-2-

3. (Continued)

- (b) Since the end of hostilities in ITALY, conversations have been in progress between KMLA and the Italian War Ministry and General Staff (SIRE) with regard to the planning of an interim Italian Army, along the general lines desired by the ALLIES. The subjects discussed have included:-
- (i) revision of all WEs to secure economy of man power within the ceilings laid down by the ALLIES, with the object of meeting the new conditions brought about by the gradual withdrawal of ALLIED troops;
- (ii) org of the Central Army Schools based on CESSANO and of the Territorial Training Centres scattered throughout the country; trig the instructors for these Schools and I.T.Os, and elaborating the syllabi and methods of instruction for the various courses;
- (iii) planning the proportion of regulars and conscripts for the interim Army, man power problems, requirements of specialists and new offers, a call-up in 1946; elimination of surplus regular offers and WCOs; accelerated promotion for outstanding personnel; retirement of the inefficient; acceleration and revision of army judicial procedure; welfare services;

try the instructors for these Schools and I.T.Cs, and elaborating the syllabi and methods of instruction for the various courses;

(iii) planning the proportion of regulars and conscripts for the interim Army, man power problems, requirements of specialists and new offrs, a call-up in 1946; elimination of surplus regular offrs and NCOs; accelerated promotion for outstanding personnel; retirement of the inefficient; acceleration and revision of army judicial procedure; welfare services;

(iv) barracks and other buildings needed for the interim Army; vehicles and armament; POL, dumps and other items from ALLIED sources; reorg of tpt and wkspcs.

228

(c) These negotiations are proceeding as quickly as possible with the ultimate object of reorganising the Italian Army "on lines generally similar to those employed in the British Army" - as laid down in the Land Forces Sub Commission's Directive No 2, para 5 (a)(i), copy of which is in the hands of the Italian War Ministry. The difficulties being encountered which are retarding or obstructing this reorg can be grouped under three headings:-

...../3

476
-3-

3 (c) (Continued)

- (i) traditional and psychological difficulties;
- (ii) financial and economic difficulties;
- (iii) political difficulties.

4. OVERRIDING POLITICAL FACTORS AFFECTING THE REORG OF THE ITALIAN ARMY

(a) Before examining the "difficulties" in detail, it is necessary to ask oneself what is the policy of the Italian Govt towards its ARMY. In it:-

- (i) to org as soon as possible a small, efficient force, with modern eqpt and well trained, loyal personnel, capable of being a positive factor of known value in the reconstruction of the Country ?

or is it :-

- (ii) to regard the Army as a necessary evil, with little concern for its efficiency?, or does the policy go even further (assuming the Italian Govt considers its own Army as a negligible factor in international relations for the time being) and purposely limit the effectiveness of the Army for political reasons ?

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- (b) It is little use the ALLIES laying down a policy for the Ita 227 War Ministry which calls for an Army of a given size, to be brought to a high state of efficiency at an early date, if the Italian Govt has not understood what this entails, or is unwilling or unable to maintain such an Army. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Italian Govt can prevent the implementation of the ALLIED policy in either or both of two ways:-

...../4

4 (b) (Continued)

- 475
- (i) by refusing or being unable to provide the necessary funds, so that the Army is either below strength, or inefficient or both;
- (ii) by so restricting the power of the Italian General Staff that the internal policy and technical preparedness of the Army is governed by political rather than military considerations.
- (c) There is a further political factor which influences the situation at the present time. Despite considerable efforts on the part of the Military Mission and also of the Army authorities to eradicate politics from the Army, the Army is largely still loyal to its ancient Monarchist traditions. As such, it perhaps is regarded with disfavor by parties of the left. Consequently, any attempt by the War Minister to strengthen the hand of the General Staff or to improve efficiency by asking for an increase in the Army vote might meet with a hostile reception from a coalition government as at present constituted.

5. DIFFICULTIES TO BE OVERCOME IN THE REORG OF THE INTERIM ITALIAN ARMY

- (a) Traditional and Psychological difficulties

Has it?

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Has it?

5. DIFFICULTIES TO BE OVERCOME IN THE REORG OF THE INTERIM ITALIAN ARMY

(a) Traditional and Psychological difficulties

Difficulties encountered under this heading are today much

less serious than they were even a short time ago. 226

It was natural enough at the start that Italian Officers and ORs should have strong ties with the traditions of their service and should to some degree resent the loss of sovereignty of their Army.

No matter how antiquated or out of date some particular system or tradition, there was a natural conservative disinclination to part with it, apart from the aspect of amour propre.

The improvement in the situation has been brought about

gradually in two ways :-

...../5

5 (a)(Continued)

- 5 -

(i) the good work done by ALLIED officers in support of the Italian Army since Sep 43, and the disinterested and friendly way in which this help has been given, have more than satisfied the Italians that the ALLIES really are out to help them. The result is that the Italians are more prepared now to accept ALLIED advice, even if it does mean abandoning some of their long cherished traditions;

(ii) the policy of the War Ministry and SMRE of selecting for key posts the most efficient personnel and officers with liberal ideas has done much to improve things. Altogether it can be said that so far as the General Staff is concerned there is little to complain about under this heading, although there is still some resistance in the other branches of the War Ministry.

(b) Financial and Economic Difficulties

(i) Hitherto there have affected persons rather than things. In fact, with the emergency financial arrangements in force up to 31 Dec 45 expenditure

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(b) Financial and Economic Difficulties

(i) Hitherto these have affected persons rather than things. In fact, with the emergency financial arrangements in force up to 31 Dec 45 expenditure within reason on stores, eqpt, barracks etc was automatically approved by the Treasury.

224
Thus there have been no difficulties on the material side.

On the other hand changes in the basic rates of pay, allowances and pensions have been subject to Treasury approval all along, and little has been achieved by the War Ministry in this direction.

(ii) As from 1 Jan 46 the emergency financial arrangements no longer apply, and the War Ministry can be expected from then on to have just the same difficulty over its expenditure on "things" as it has had up to the present over pay and allowances.

...../6

- 6 -

5. (Continued)

(c) Instances of the Effects of Financial and Economic Difficulties

(i) About 1,000 general offrs and cols, surplus to the requirements of the future Italian Army, have to be retired.

This is a measure that has been hanging fire for close on a year, entirely on account of the impossibility of obtaining Treasury approval to the War Ministry's proposals for pensions and financial settlement. The new War Minister has now succeeded in forcing the issue, but throughout very many months all these senior offrs have been hanging around, aggravating an already acute personnel situation and lowering the morale of the whole Army.

(ii) Italian civil servants are among the hardest hit by the present economic crisis, and the pay of Italian offrs is graded on the civil service scale. Their pay is to-day wholly inadequate to maintain the standard of living required of an offr.

It is said, for instance, that the pay of the Head Usher at the War Ministry is more than that of the Chief of Staff of the Army. The result of all this is that an offr (particularly if married, and with a family) has to be

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It is said, for instance, that the pay of the Head Usher at the War Ministry is more than that of the Chief of Staff of the Army. The result of all this is that an officer (particularly if married, and with a family) has to be posted to a town or district where there is some room for him; either a house of his own or an apartment belonging to relatives or friends which he can use rent free or at a reduced rate. In any case, it is impossible for him to maintain himself in one place and his family somewhere else.

The restrictions thus placed on the work of the ^{Second} AS Branch can well be imagined. While appreciating the need for avoiding inflation, it must be pointed out that the dishonesty and graft which has been rather a byword in the Italian Army of the past decade is being perpetuated by the present conditions, as many officers just cannot live on their pay alone.

Unfalsified

5 (c) (Continued)

(iii)

The present intentions are that the Interim Army shall be raised and maintained on conscript lines, with a framework of regular offrs, NCOs and specialists. The higher the proportion of regulars, the more efficient the Army will be. SIRE naturally agree with this. They have stated that they would like to have the proportion 50-50.

The minimum number of regulars they estimate approx that they must have to make the thing work is about 35,000, consisting of Offrs and Senior NCOs for HQs and Units, instructors and Org Cadres for the Central Schools and T.P.Cs, and the more highly specialised tradesmen for all purposes, since the 12-month conscript cannot be sufficiently well-trained in that time.

In point of fact all they have today is 20,000 between regular offrs and NCOs - the rump of the regulars of the old Army - and not much prospect of recruiting the 15,000 deficit.

Conditions for Offrs and NCOs are too low to attract newcomers, and tradesmen's rates offer no inducement when compared with comparable civilian grades.

To overcome the shortage of tradesmen a revised scale of rates of pay has been drawn up, more in keeping with civilian

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To overcome the shortage of tradesmen a revised scale of rates of pay has been drawn up, more in keeping with civilian conditions (taking everything into account), and the plan is to recruit during 1946 10,000 volunteers for a five year ²²² with the colours.

From advanced information it is already known that the Treasury does NOT intend to agree with the proposed new rates.

(iv) in just the same way it is considered that it will NOT be possible with present conditions to attract the right type of young man for regular commission or as a regular NCO. Because of their difficulties over pay and the poor prospects for the future, many of the junior ranks of regular offrs are even seeking to leave the Army to find emp in civilian life.

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- 8 -

5. (Continued)

(d) Political Difficulties

(1) The org within the Italian War Ministry would lead one to believe that Italian politicians have a phobia of concentrating too much power in the hands of the military.

The present org of the War Ministry and SIRE is incompatible with the ALLIED conception of efficiency, nor is it considered possible that an efficient Army can be organized on such a foundation.

At Appx "A" is a diagram of the org of the War Ministry and SIRE.

At Appx "B" is a translation of parts of the decree law which lays down the responsibilities and duties of the Chief of the Army Staff.

(ii) Explanatory Notes of War Ministry Org(see Appx "A").

Since June 1944 the Minister for War has been a civilian. He is advised and briefed in the first instance by his "Capo di Gabinetto"(Colonel) who has a staff of about 50 offrs to assist him. Although the function of the Gabinetto is normally to act as a liaison unit for the Minister and interpret the advice rendered by the Chief of Staff and Military Under Secretary, in actual fact it frequently goes far beyond these limits.

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Another function of the Gabinetto is to maintain liaison between the War Ministry and the other Ministries and Govt Departments, and with political and religious authorities of every sort. It must follow, therefore, that the advice rendered to the Minister by the Gabinetto is inevitably coloured by political considerations. Bearing in mind that the Capo di Gabinetto is the right hand man of the Minister, his influence can be considered just as important as that of the Chief of the Army Staff or of the Mil, Under Secretary.

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5 (a) (ii) (Continued)

In addition to these advisory duties, the Gabinetto is also the principal (G1) Staff Branch of the War Ministry.

The Chief of the Army Staff is the technical adviser of the War Minister on all G (G2 and G3) matters. He is also responsible for certain aspects of Q (G4) planning and advises the War Minister on the appointment of General Offrs. The Chief of the Army Staff has direct access to the Minister, but all written comms from the General Staff reach the Minister through the "Gabinetto"

The Military Under Secretary is responsible to the Minister for the Service Directorates, including the MS Branch. He also has direct access to the Minister and here again written comms go through the Gabinetto. This is a political appointment and stands or falls with a change of Govt. The present appointment is usually filled by a general offr. The present incumbent is an expert on Army ests and org, and a former lecturer to the Italian and Swiss Staff Colleges. Consequently he has a finger in every pie and a say in most things that concern the General Staff, as well as controlling his own service branches.

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The Civil Under Secretary has special responsibilities connected with the civilian staffs, welfare etc, and has no important bearing on the issue.

(e) The Effect of the present War Ministry Org on the Working of the Italian Army

(i) the War Minister is dependent for advice on Army matters on three separate sources :-

The Head of the Gabinetto
The Chief of the Army Staff
The Mil Under Secretary

These sources may all render the same advice, or they may all render different advice... and the civilian non-technical Minister has to decide which is right!

...../10

469
- 10 -

5. (e)(Continued)

- (ii) The Chief of the Army Staff, who with his staff branches is supposed to represent the highest technical military authority in the country, submits his recommendations through the Gabinetto. Here a group of cols and lt-cols under the Capo di Gabinetto has the power of holding up, and vetting the recommendations of the Chief of Staff, and interpreting them to the Minister according to their own way of thinking.
- (iii) The same thing happens to the recommendations of the Mil Under Secretary.
- (iv) Valuable time is lost while the "Gabinetto" deliberates on the already finished proposals submitted by the Army Staff and Services, and makes its own recommendations to the Minister. The net result is an extremely slow, ultra bureaucratic procedure which makes for anything but efficiency, and is definitely retarding the reorganization of the Italian Army.
- (v) There ought to be a supreme military head for coordinating the main staff branches. Logically this should be the Chief of the Army Staff, who would be responsible for representing objectively to the civilian Minister the paramount interests

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- (v) There ought to be a supreme military head for coordinating the main staff branches. Logically this should be the Chief of the Army Staff, who would be responsible for representing objectively to the civilian Minister the paramount interests of the Army and all that concerns its efficiency and welfare, ²¹⁹ having the civilian Minister to state the case of the Army to the Govt. and the Govt's policy to the Army.
- (vi) Instead of which there are three separate heads :-
A head representing G-Q Branches
A head representing A Branch
A head representing Services
and top level coordination has to be done through the civilian Minister. The effect is that each of these major divisions tends to be a water tight compartment, with the loss of that feeling of close cooperation which ought to exist if they were all one "family" under a single military head.

468
5. (e)(Continued)

- 11 -

(vii) The task of MILA in advising on the reorganization of the Italian Army is enormously complicated by this system. Instead of being able to go to the Chief of the Army Staff (acting for the Minister) for a discussion or decision on any proposal of a technical military nature (and the Chief of Staff is surely the person best qualified for this task), the Mission has to approach three different authorities according to the subject, and as these matters frequently overlap and two or more authorities are involved, the ball is passed backwards and forwards, and a decision only arrived at in God's good time. If it were simply a case of giving orders, that could be done through the Minister, but as the "national characteristics of the Italian military system" have to be considered in every proposed change (vide Land Forces Sub-Commission's Directive No 2 para 5(a)(i)), the negotiations with the competent technical authorities frequently lead to the unavoidable procrastination mentioned above.

(viii) This survey would be incomplete without a particular mention of the way in which "A" (G1) matters are handled at the War Ministry. It has been stated at 5(c) (ii) above that these

the Italian Military system" have to be considered in every proposed change (vide Land Forces Sub-Commission's Directive No 2 para 5(a)(i)), the negotiations with the competent technical authorities frequently lead to the unavoidable procrastination mentioned above.

(viii) This survey would be incomplete without a particular mention of the way in which "A" (G1) matters are handled at the War Ministry. It has been stated at 5(c) (ii) above that these matters are included among the duties of the Gabinetto. There is in addition the IS Branch (for officers up to ~~218~~col) and the "Other Ranks" Branch both under the Mil Under Secretary, and the General Staff also has a small IS Branch for officers who have attended the Staff College.

Thus "A" matters are dealt with by all three of the major divisions in the War Ministry, and there is no general officer or director responsible for these things, which are perhaps the most neglected in the Italian Army.

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- 12 -

6. CONCLUSIONS

- 467
- (a) A highly efficient Italian Army at an early date, as is the expressed wish of the U.S. and British Governments, will NOT be possible without the unqualified agreement and support of the Italian Government.
- (b) Having calculated on a per capita basis the cost of maintaining an Italian Army at the high state of efficiency required by the ALLIES, it is necessary to find out what size Army the Italian Government can afford (or is willing to afford) in the present economic circumstances of the country.
- The figure (excl CC.RR) may be 140,000, or it may be less. It may well be that something will have to be sacrificed, either the efficiency of the Army or the size of the Army.
- All our calculations have been based on the figure of 140,000 after my talk with Count CASATI on the instructions of Chief Commissioner A.C. in Sep. last. This figure can still be retained as the War Establishment, the Peace Establishment being the figure the Italian Government can afford. This raises the point as to whether the Allies are prepared for ITALY to have an Army of less than 140,000, as they wish ITALY to be strong enough militarily to compete with any foreseeable emergency; or alternatively whether they wish to insist on a minimum figure, which again might raise the question as to how this is to be paid for.

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- (c) A high state of efficiency can NOT be achieved at an early date, or possibly at all, if the Italians are going to allow political considerations to interfere in the reorganization programme. Here again it will have to be decided whether the Italian Government is prepared to sacrifice political safeguards, or whether the ALLIES are agreeable to accept a lower standard of efficiency.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS.

In consideration of the fact that successive Italian War Ministers have been unable or unwilling to overcome the obstacles discussed in this paper, it is recommended that the whole problem be raised by the ALLIES with the Head of the Italian Government, with a view to obtaining a declaration of Italian policy on the following points :-

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466

- 13 -


7.(Continued) -

- (a) Is it the wish of the Italian Government to have "a highly efficient Italian Army in the shortest possible time" ?
- (b) Are they prepared to vote the necessary funds, and if so, up to what amount ?
- (c) Are they prepared to allow the War Minister a free hand in the re-organization of the Army (with particular reference to the War Ministry and S.M.R.E.) without any reservations of a political nature ?

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REORGANIZATION OF THE ITALIAN ARMY - Appreciation of the Situation

ORGANIZATION OF WAR MINISTRY AND SMR




* The Civil Under-Secretary has been omitted as having no bearing on the m

Appendix 'A'

ITALIAN ARMY - Appreciation of the Situation as at 1 JAN 1946.

ORGANIZATION OF WAR MINISTRY AND SMRE



omitted as having no bearing on the military aspect of the problem.

464
Appendix 'B'

THE REORGANISATION OF THE ITALIAN ARMY

Appreciation of the Situation at 1 Jan 1946

Extract of Decree Law No 69 of 6 Feb 1927, being the current authority for the powers and responsibilities of the Chief of the Army Staff.

Article 2

The post of Chief of Staff of the Army may be filled by a general officer of the Army chosen from among the Generals (or designate Generals), Lt Gens or Maj Gens.

He is appointed by Royal Decree on the advice of the Cabinet.

The Chief of Staff of the Army, head of the "Corps of the General Staff" is in peace time the highest technical adviser of the Minister for War, and, under the control of the Minister himself, directs planning and advance arrangements necessary in the preparation for war.

Article 3

The Chief of Staff of the Army is charged with the inspection of the troops, services and schools of the Army, on behalf of the Minister, to whom he reports his findings.

On the basis of the general directives laid down by the Chief of the Supreme General Staff for the employment of the Army in conjunction with the Navy and Air Force he decides:

- (a) the basic principles which will govern the preparation of the Army for War and, during peace time, informs the authorities concerned on behalf of the Minister of the general policy for the organization of the country for war and for assigning the duties of the commands of higher arms during the period of mobilization, concentration and the commencement of operations;
- (b) the war establishment of the Army and the principles on which plans and executive orders shall be based for mobilizing the troops, advance disposition of stores and org of the services;
- (c) the promotion to the rank of Major General of the

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- (b) the war establishment of the Army and the principles on which plans and executive orders shall be based for mobilizing the troops, advance disposition of stores and org of the services;
- (c) he proposes to the Minister the employment of gen officers for the operational Army.

214

Article 4

The following are more specifically included in the responsibilities of the Chief of Staff of the Army:

- (a) the preparation of plans for the war time org of the country and for operations of war that may ensue;
- (b) the preparation and distribution of plans for wartime firms, mobilization, concentration of the Army and the creation and org of the services;
- (c) advance arrangements with the help of the authorities concerned for the protection of lines of comm and the measures to be taken if they are cut, and for coastal and A/A observation and defence;

.....2/

- 2 -

- (d) the investigation of matters concerned with the trg of the Army;
- (e) the preparation of tactical regulations, as well as historical military plans and publications;
- (f) the planning of policy for recruitment and for the ests and org of the Army and Territorial regions;
- (g) plans and policy affecting the org and functioning of the services in peace time;
- (h) plans and proposals for the recruiting and emp of offrs of the General Staff and for their emp in time of war.

The Chief of Staff of the Army submits to the War Minister each year the project for the exercises to be carried out under the direction of the Corps Comds (divisional camp and exercises of higher frms).

He also prepares and submits to the Minister plans for the big annual exercises, with tps and cadres, including combined exercises between Army, Navy and Air Force, so long as the participation of the fleet or air force does not represent more than the contribution needed for ops of the land forces. In this case the Chief of Staff of the Army will first make the necessary arrangements with the Chiefs of Staff of the forces concerned.

The Minister for War will arrange for the supreme direction of these exercises, making the Chief of the General Staff or another gen offr responsible.

Article 5

In connection with the responsibilities covered by Articles 3 and 4 above the Chief of Staff of the Army will formulate and present to the Minister for War such proposals as may concern laws, regulations or that may affect the Army vote in any way.

He has to be consulted by the Minister on principal matters affecting appointments of general officers, and on questions of policy concerning promotion, conditions and discipline of the cadres of the Army.

Article 6

The Chief of Staff of the

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Article 6

The Chief of Staff of the Army must be kept informed of the political and military situation in the colonies and must be called upon to give his opinion on the more important aspects of the org of colonial tps and of the def of the colonies.

213

He must also be kept infd of and consulted on mil ops in the colonies which for their importance require the intervention of units or vehs of the Army, or where such intervention can be foreseen.

The above infm will be conveyed to him by the Minister concerned through the Minister for War.

Article 7

Whenever the Govt or Minister for War convenes special commissions to examine matters affecting the preparedness of the nation for war, the Chief of Staff of the Army will be on the commission.

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462

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The Chief of Staff of the Army sits in an advisory capacity with the Executive Committee of the Supreme Defence Commission.

Article 8.

The Chief of Staff of the Army has at his disposal for the execution of his duties the officers of the Corps of the "General Staff".

He deals direct with:

- generals designate;
- lt gens;
- inspectors of the different arms;
- with those other mil and civil authorities with whom he has to be in touch in carrying out his duties.




The Chief of Staff of the Army, in exercising his powers, also deals direct with the Chiefs of Staff of the Navy and Air Force.

Article 9.


The Staff College and other schools and military academies are placed under the supreme direction of the Chief of Staff of the Army for policy and for coordination of their studies and exercises, and the Military Geographical Institute for policy on the work done there.

MAPS AND CHARTS TOO LARGE TO FILM
ON ONE EXPOSURE ARE FILMED CLOCKWISE
BEGINNING IN THE UPPER LEFT CORNER,
LEFT TO RIGHT, AND TOP TO BOTTOM.

SEE DIAGRAMS BELOW.



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

Deputy Chief of Staff (General)

Operations and Intelligence

D.C.

Director of Intelligence

Director of Organisation

Information

Security

Counter-
Intelligence

Organisation

Records

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

TENTATIVE SUGGESTION FOR ORGANISATION
OF ITALIAN WAR MINISTRY

MINISTER FOR WAR (Civilian)

Secretary for War (Civilian)

Civil Under Secretary
(Finance)

Civil Under Secretary
(Public Relations)

Chief of the
Army Staff

Director of Organisation
and Training

D.G. of Officers Bureau
(All officer matters)

Director of Training

Central Schools and C.A.R.s Higher Training Unit Training

Inspectors

Infantry, Artillery Engineers Signals Technical
Mechanical
Training and
Motorisation

Recruitings
Mobilisation

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

ORGANISATION
STRY

(Civilian)

(Civilian)

Civil Under Secretary
(Public Relations)

D.G. of Officers Bureau
(All officer matters)

D.G. of Personnel

Director of Manpower

Recruitings

Allocation
posting

Demobilisation

Mobilisation

Personnel
selection

Demobilisation

Records

Director of Personal Service

Discipline, Ceremonial,
Complaints

Leave, Privileges,
Welfare

Tribunals
CCRR

Welfare

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Deputy Chief of Staff (Administration)

D.G. Medical Services

D.G. of Mater

Director of Provisions

Pay, Accounts,
Claims

Pay
Pensions

Medical
Hygiene
Dental
Veterinary

Food, Forage,
Fuel
Commissariat

Ammunition, Cloth-
ing, General Stores
Arty, Ordnance
Stores

Mechanical
Equipment
Mechan-
isation

2017

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

D.G. of Material Resources

Director of Maintenance

Accommodation
Buildings
Genio
Services

Movements
Railings
Transportation

Mechanical
Repair
Mechanical
Engineers

Mechanical
Equipment
Mechanisation

Di
Weap

2018

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

*8.
CPT Hauser in Commission
(Attended War Academy)*

8251 56

462

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Education Subcommission
APO 394

ED/CWA/CC

ED/96/3.0/AC

25 January, 1946

Jan 26 1946

SUBJECT : Lectures by Staff Sgt. Hauser.

TO : Ministry of War,
(Attention General Liogai).

1. Your letter of 18 January to Prof. Riccardo Hauser requests that he give three or four lectures on Democratic culture at Mansiana.

2. Since the Education Subcommission is soon to cease its functions, permission to use Sgt. Hauser's services must be obtained from the South African Command which will have full responsibility for Sgt. Hauser's work in connection with the Italian Army. Any future requests for Sgt. Hauser's services should therefore be addressed to

Officer Commanding UDF
South African Legation, Rome.

3. Your request of 18 January has been referred to the above address and has been approved by South African Command.

4. The Education Subcommission is glad to lend Sgt. Hauser's services to the South African Command so that he may give the lectures you request. He is therefore free to accept your invitation.

CARLETON W. WASHBURN
Lt. Col., A. U. S.
Director of Education

210
200

26/1
26/1

PA
26/1
200

2019

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

2850

8251

51

Ex Commr

460

SUBJECT: Handover - Italian Army.

Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C.,
(M.M.I.A.) R O M E

A 010/3

23 Jan. '46.

TO : Allied Commission.

JAN 24 1946

1. The attached copy of AFHQ letter to Land Forces Sub-Commission, together with this HQ instructions to the Ministry of War are forwarded for your information.

458

459

Att. Gillmore L. Col

Major General,
M.M.I.A.

24 JAN 1946

AHG/eco

See M.461.

209

LA
25/1
A

(COPY 0)

2020

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

8251

459 A.C.

SUBJECT: Handover - Italian Army.

Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.O.,
(N.M.I.A.) ROME

A 010/3

23 Jan. '46.

TO : Ministry of War.

1. In order to ensure the smooth functioning of Allied Security machinery, and in view of the specialized nature of their work, changes in personnel of SOE CE Ia will not normally be made. Should any change be necessary for any reason, the case giving full reasons for the proposal, should be referred to MIA in time to allow for reference to AFHQ.

2. In cases where replacements are required for reasons outside human control, personnel may be posted tentatively subject to reconsideration by AFHQ.

Major General

Major General,
N.M.I.A.

Copy to: A.F.H.Q. (Vide your GSI/20/7/46 of 10 Jan. '46)

458

207
208

AM/eco.

9

C O P Y

8251 / CONFIDENTIAL 458

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
APO 512 U.S. ARMY

GBI/RC/7/46

10 January 1946

SUBJECT: Handover - Italian Army

TO : Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C.,
(M.M.I.A.) ROME

Reference your letter A/010/3 dated 5 January 1946.

1. The matter has been fully considered by this HQ and while it is agreed that the administration of 808 CS Bn is now the responsibility of the Italian Government, it is felt that since the Bn still remains under the operational command of AFHQ, no personnel should be transferred or posted without prior consultation with AFHQ.
2. This is in fact essential to ensure the smooth functioning of the Allied Security machinery, in view of the specialist character of the duties which personnel of 808 CS Bn perform throughout ITALY.
3. It is therefore requested that steps be taken to ensure that the agreement made between Marshall MESSE and Colonel HILL-DILLON remains operative.

(Signed) C.R. TUFF,
Colonel G.S.,
D/A. C. of S., G-2.

207

Ref: 8251/456/EC

January 1946

SUBJECT: Location of Italian Armed Forces.

TO : Presidency of the Council of Ministers.

1. For your records I inform you that the following regarding the location of Italian Armed Forces has been decided by the Supreme Allied Commander. The Ministry of War has already been supplied with this information.
2. Since the role of the Gruppi should be to act as a mobile reserve in the hands of the Italian Government, they should remain free from any commitments in the areas in which they are located and, pending a situation requiring their employment, should devote themselves to training.
3. The main concentration of Italian mobile troops should be in the PO Valley but the actual location of the Gruppi is a matter for the Italian Government to decide but in making this decision you should give due weight to the availability of training facilities.
4. Considerable Allied Forces have been relieving the Gruppi on guard duties in the North of Italy, and other Allied Forces necessarily have to be located there: therefore, the actual location of the Gruppi for the time being must in addition to training requirements be determined very largely by the availability of remaining accommodation.
5. As a result of careful investigation, it appears that a maximum of four Gruppi can be located for the time being North of the Appennines.

E. H. McCLEARY

Brigadier

Executive Commissioner

see M457

205

206

456

PH

Ref: 8251/454/80

21 January 1946

Dear

In the absence of Brigadier Lush I am writing to thank you for your letter of the 7th January enclosing General Cadorna's appreciation of the Courses held at Florence and Rome.

I have passed copies of the letter on to Education Sub-Commission and to Land Forces Sub-Commission, who are also interested.

I hope that the courses may be able to continue.

[Signature]
Chief Staff Officer
to Executive Commissioner

Major General F. Theron, CBE, DSO, MC,
Official Representative of the Govt of
the Union of South Africa,
c/o British Embassy,
ROME.

205
205

[Handwritten signature]

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref: 8251/452/EC

19 January 1946

Reference 8251/418/EC and 8251/427/EC of 21 and 27 December, 1945.

Enclosed are copies of Amendments to Land Forces S/C (MMIA)
Directive No.2.

Destroy Appendices 'C', 'D' and 'F' substituting attached.

F. G. McCLEARY
Brigadier
Executive Commissioner

The Secretary to the President of
the Council of Ministers.

Copy to: Land Forces S/C (MMIA).

203

1A
21/1
A

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

456

Ref: 8251/455/EC

15 January 1946

SUBJECT: Citizenship Courses, Italian Army

TO : C.A. Section (for Education S/O)

Reference Land Forces S/O (MMIA) letter C/TRG/45 dated 29 December 1945 to Chief Commissioner, copy to Education S/O.

While the Chief Commissioner approves that these courses should continue he wishes that it be quite clear that Education S/O are in no way associated with them. May action, therefore, please be taken to inform the Italian Government of this fact and further to inform them that, if they wish to continue to take advantage of the service of S/Sgt Hauser, they should deal direct with his Commanding Officer, who is G.O.C., U.D.F.

F. H. McCLEARY

Brigadier
Executive Commissioner

Copy to: Land Forces S/O (MMIA).

2203

PA
16/1
28

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

450

Ref: 8251/454/EO

January 1946

SUBJECT: Citizenship, Italian Army

TO : Land Forces S/O, (LMIIA)

Ref your G/TRG/45 dated 29 December 1945 to Chief Commissioner.

1. The Chief Commissioner is of the opinion that these courses in no way compromise Land Forces S/O (LMIIA) with regard to para 9 of AFHQ Directive AL-091.711 GGT-O of 3 December 1945.

395 2. It is considered that the courses may well be permitted to continue, but it must be made clear that Education S/O has no part in them. Instructions to that effect are being issued.

3. If the Italian Government wish to take advantage of the Services of S/Sgt. Hauser they should deal direct with Commanding Officer, who is G.O.C., U.D.F.

4. Enclosed, as App. "A", is a copy of a D.O. letter from Major General Theron to Brigadier Lush, forwarding a letter (on this subject) from General Cadorna (App. "B").

447

446

FH McCherry

Brigadier
Executive Commissioner

Copy to: C.A. Section (for Education S/O).

202

203

12-11-46

SOUTH AFRICAN
LEGATION, ~~ROME~~



8251
SUID-AFRIKAANSE
GESANTSKAP ~~OME~~

The Official Representative of the Govt. of the Union of South Africa,
C/o The British Embassy,

ROME.

7th. January, 1946.

JAN 9 1946

My dear Maurice,

Reference our conversation on Thursday night, I send you herewith
// a copy of a letter I have had from General Cadorna, and which I am also
sending to the Rt. Hon. J.H. Hofmeyr, our Deputy Prime Minister and Minister
of Education, who is interested in the development of cultural relations
with Italy.

Signor Brosio again spoke to me at Sir Richard Nosworthy's reception
and said he hoped that the course would continue. Would you please also show
this to Colonel Washburn.

Kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

David Hewitt

Brigadier M.S. Lush, CB, CBE, MC,
The Executive Commissioner,
The Allied Commission,
ROME.

sending to the Rt. Hon. J.H. Hofmeyr, our Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Education, who is interested in the development of cultural relations with Italy.

Signor Brosio again spoke to me at Sir Richard Nosworthy's reception and said he hoped that the course would continue. Would you please also show this to Colonel Washburn.

Kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

Paul Hens.

Brigadier M.S. Lush, CB, CEE, MC,
The Executive Commissioner,
The Allied Commission,
ROME.

Appendix "A"

*See 459 & 454
F. 456*

201

TRANSLATION

Appendix "B"

Chief of the General Staff
of the Royal Italian Army

Rome 31st December 1945

Mr. General,

With reference to the conversation which took place between us, I am pleased to express to you my satisfaction for the good results obtained by the two courses on "Democratic Culture" held at Florence and Rome respectively.

During a recent visit made to the lecture held in Rome, I have been able, personally, to appreciate the method followed and the profits gained by the pupils.

To you, Mr. General, and to all your collaborators who with capability and enthusiasm have allowed the formation of a first group of Italian instructors for the democratic education of soldiers to which I attribute a particular importance, my most heartfelt thanks.

(Signed) General A. Cadorna

To the Major-General Frank Theron,
South African Minister,
South African Embassy,
Via Romagna,
Rome.

See F. 454 & 455

Subject: Citizenship courses, Italian Army.

Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C.,
(M.M.I.A.)
ROME.

G/TRC/15 29 December, 1945.

To: H.Q., A.C. (for Chief Commissioner) ✓

JAN 3 1946

1. (a) I wish to consult you on the above, in view of para 9 A.F.H.Q. Directive to me AG.091.711 GCT-o of 3 Dec 45.
- (b) That para 9 expressly forbids me and my staff to take any part in Italian political activities (which, of course, we have never done) and I wish to be quite sure that I am keeping within the terms of my charter as regards these "citizenship" courses, the history of which is as below.

2. In September last, as a result of a private arrangement made between Count JACINI (the then Minister of War) and Major General THERON, Comd. SOUTH AFRICAN forces in ITALY, a course on "citizenship" was held at FLORENCE, at which a number of Italian army officers and N.C.O.'s attended. Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C. (M.M.I.A.) were not consulted.

3. As a result of the demobilization of most of the SOUTH AFRICAN instructors the matter came into the hands of Colonel C.W. WASHBOURNE, Education Sub Commission A.C., who coopted the services of S/Sgt E. HAUSER, an instructor on the FLORENCE course.

4. Colonel WASHBOURNE then came and saw me, in November, and explained generally what was happening. I approved in principle to such courses as part of our man-management and welfare teaching for the Italian Army. I did not see the actual syllabus.

5. (a) Recently I saw the revised syllabus of the course (attached as Appx. "A") which ends on 10 Jan 46. It appeared to me to be beyond what I understood was intended and to have possibly dangerous implications.

(b) I accordingly at once discussed the course with Brig. LUSH and Col. WASHBOURNE. The latter assured me that the course was completely objective and that Italian parties would not be allowed to take part in it.

AFRICAN forces in ITALY, a number of which a number of Italian army officers and N.C.O.'s attended, Sub Commission, A.C. (M.M.I.A.) were not consulted.

3. As a result of the demoralization of the instructors the matter came into the hands of Colonel C. W. WASHBURN, S/Sgt R. HAUSER, Education Sub Commission A.C., who coopted the services of an instructor on the FLORENCE course.

an instructor on the subject.

4. Colonel WASHBOURNE then came and saw me, in November, and explained generally what was happening. I approved in principle to such courses as part of our man-management and welfare teaching for the Italian Army. I did not see the actual syllabus.

5. (a) Recently I saw the revised syllabus of the course (attached as Appx. "A") which ends on 10 Jan 46. It appeared to me to be beyond what I understood was intended and to have possibly dangerous implications.

(b) I accordingly at once discussed the course with Brig. LUSH and Col. WASHBOURNE. The latter assured me that the course was completely objective and that Italian party politics are rigidly excluded. He urged the continuance of the course.

(c) I also send my GSO I (Training) to attend certain discussions at the course, to go into the whole matter and report early to me. His report is at Appx. "B". Brig. LUSH approved my course of action.

(d) I may say also that another of my officers (Major PEAK) informs me that the course is run on similar lines to a British one he recently attended at PERUGIA.

(e) I am informed that the Italian War Ministry are very pleased with the course and intend using the personnel who have attended, as instructors on the "Man-Management" courses at CIESANO; also that they consider that they have enough of these now and require no further courses.

(f) Moreover a certain MARCHESA BENZONI has organized a committee on adult education and democratic citizenship, on which all parties are officially represented. She has been in close touch with Colonel WASHBURN over this course and has informed me that her committee are strongly in favour of it. There thus appears to be no likelihood of a political "come-back" or press campaign against it.

See M. 443.4¹ / 6.

(98)

441

6. The crux appears to be not WHAT is taught or discussed but HOW this is done. Nevertheless, from what I have said above, this appears to be a genuine non-party political course; and obviously there might be repercussions if the existing course were stopped half-way, particularly as it was started by the SOUTH AFRICANS and several eminent personalities are already connected with and approve of it.

7. I would therefore suggest that :-

(a) the existing course be completed under the existing A.C. / Ministry of War arrangements and no further courses be held under Allied auspices.

(b) in due course forward for your comment or approval from the political angle the subjects the Ministry of War wish to include in their "man-management" course at CESANO.

8. Do you agree please ?

d. Brown

Major General,
M.M.I.A.

2033

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

198

L. Browning

Major General,
M.M.I.A.

Copy to : Education Sub Commission, A.C.

/ago

785017

REVISED SYLLABUS FOR COURSE IN
DEMOCRATIC CULTURE

Wed 5	Tests	Opening Address What is Democracy	Definitions
Thur 6	} Development of Man How our Mind Works	How to Hold a Discussion	How our Mind Works Development of Man
Fri 7		How to give a Lecture	Rise of Money Development of State
Sat 8	} British Democracy	News Reviews News Reviews	Wall Newspapers-Visual Aids
Mon 10		Basic Economics	Mocktrials, Braintrusts, Printed Matter
Tue 11	} Democracy in Other European Countries	Basic Economics	Basic Economics
Wed 12		Report on use of today	Professional Guidance and Education
Thur 13	} Why Mussolini Came to Power Why Mussolini Came to Power	Psychology of Nazism and Fascism Psychology of Nazism and Fascism	Why Hitler Came to Power Why Hitler Came to Power
Fri 14		Security Against Dictators Situation Today Under Democracy	What to do with Germany
Sat 15	ITALIAN ECONOMICS		

L'Italia di Domani

Fame e Democrazia
(livelli di vita)197 Stiovismo Centro Nazion-
alismoPianificazione dell'econ-
omia mondialeSistemi Economici degli S.U. dell'U.S.S.R.
e del regno unitoSicurezza Sociale
in diff. paesi

Il nuovo mondo delle donne

Relazione dei Comitati

Il S.A. ed i suoi
Problemi democratici

Discussioni sulla lega

Relazione dei Comitati

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

Appendix 'A' to NMIA
letter G/Trg/15
Dated 29 Dec 45

440

ED SYLLABUS FOR COURSE IN
DEMOCRATIC CULTURE

	Definitions	Adult Education	Definitions Adult Education
acy			
Discussion	How our Mind Works Development of Man	Forming of Syndicates	Justice as basis of Democracy
Lecture	Rise of Money Development of State	Hunger and indilence as Enemies of Democracy	Development of Ethien Development of Man
	Wall Newspapers-Visual Aids	Dialogue - British and American Democracies compared	
oa	Mocktrials, Braintrusts, Printed Matter	Period of Mistakes after last War Period of Mistakes after last War	
cs	Basic Economics	Report on USA of today	Criticism of Course
se of today	Professional Guidance and Education	Weakness of Democracy	Man Management
f Naziam and Fascism	Why Hitler Came to Power Why Hitler Came to Bower	Prevention of Nazism and Fascism Prevention of Nazism and Fascism	
f Nazism and Fascism			
oday	What to do with Germany	Problem of Re-Education	

ITALIAN ECONOMICS

BRAINTRUST ON ITALIAN ECONOMICS

nomici degli S.U. dell'U.S.S.R.

egno unito
ociale
aesi
ondo delle donne

ei Comitati

Il S.A. ed i suoi
Problemi democratici
Discussioni sulla lega
Relazione dei Comitati

Lo Stato contro l'impresa privata

Immigrazione ed Addestramento
Professionale
Cura del soldato

Cartello di cervello per affari
Militari soltanto

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

- 2 -

Riepilogo Della Materia
svolta durante il corso

La crisi dei nostri tempi
(dibattito)

Opera Futura

IL CORSO HA TERMINE IL 12 GENNAIO P.V.

2032
Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

- 2 -

Continued Appendix 'A' to
MMLA letter G/Trg/15
Dated 29 Dec 45

etri tempi

Opera Futura

439

CORSO HA TERMINE IL 12 GENNAIO P.V.

438
Appendix "B" to MIA
Letter G/Trg/15 dated
29 December 1945.

G/Trg/15
27 Dec. 45

8251
SUBJECT :- Course in Democratic Culture

NOTE FOR G.O.C.

1. I have visited The Democratic Culture Course now running in ROME.
2. From what I have seen and heard personally the course is not political, and MIA can in no sense be said to be dabbling in politics. The course is really a course in Citizenship and as such no political discussion is held other than for the purpose of examining the motive behind any parties views and programme. Certainly no propaganda of any party appears to be allowed under the present programme, which is supervised by a British NCO.

3. Major FEAH who has also attended Lectures shares my opinion.
4. Prominent Allied and Italian Lecturers include:-

General THERON
Sig. BROSIO
General LIUZZI
etc.

5. The Italians of all parties are anxious that the course should continue.

c/o

Signed: W.L. Medlam.

Lt Col.
G.S.

vised by a British NCO.

3. Major FRAK who has also attended Lectures shares my opinion.

4. Prominent Allied and Italian Lecturers include:-

General THERON
Sig. BROSIO
General LIUZZI
etc.

5. The Italians of all parties are anxious that the course should
continue.

c/o

Signed: W.L. Medlam.

Lt Col.
G.S.

195

SECRET.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Chief Commissioner
+++++

Ref: 8251/EC.

31. December 1945.

SUBJECT: Location of Italian Armed Forces.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.

1. (a) I am in receipt of your AG.091.711/1044 D-0 dated 15 Dec 45.
(b) The agreed subject matter of your paras 1-5 has already been conveyed to the War Ministry verbally, during the discussions over the last fortnight.
(c) It will now be communicated officially on paper to the Italian Government.
2. Reference your para 6, I was aware of the situation in this respect. Para 3(b) and 5(h) of my letter 8251/EC dated 28 Nov 45 was merely inserted as a relevant factor in the problem.
3. Reference your para 7, the recommendations in para 5 of my letter 8251/EC dated 28 Nov 45, were reached as the result of the combined factors enumerated in paras 2, 3 and 4 of my letter, to which I have nothing to add. Would you let me know of any point on which you need clarification.
4. I may say that this whole matter was fully discussed in my office ROME at a conference between Brigadier YATES, Major General BROWNING, my Executive Commissioner and myself on 3 Dec 45, when all aspects of the question were ventilated and I understood complete agreement was reached.

Ellery W. Stone
ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

194

Copy to: G-5, AFHQ
Land Forces S/C (RMA)

No.2 District
No.3 District

2041

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

1925.

8251

EX-COMM 112 436

SUBJECT : MMIA Directive No.2 (G/7 dated 7 Dec 45).

LAND FORCES SUB COM, A.C. (MMIA).

G/7.

28 Dec 45.

TO : Distrn below.

Amendment No.4 to MMIA Directive No.2.

DEC 31 1945

1. The attached Appx 'P' will be added to MMIA Directive No.2.
2. ACK.

ARCS/ljb

Done. J.P. 1

Amended 11/2

for Major General. *6.10.46*
M.M.I.A.

Distribution

- List 'A' (less Serials 9, 10, 11, 18, 19).
- List 'B' (2 copies)
- List 'C' (6 copies to Ser 1)

EC Distr is 417

DC DIST
CC
EC
POLADS A9B
CA SEC
ECON SEC.

193

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

"COURT MARTIAL and COURTS OF INQUIRY matters will be referred direct to local Area HQ, copy to HQ MMIA - Courts of Inquiry however regarding loss or damage to stores, vehicles etc held on charge of this HQ will continue to be referred to HQ MMIA".

Appendix 'I' to MIA Directive No. 2
(G/7 dated Dec 7 1945)

OBJECT

1. The correct method of dealing with personnel services questions concerning BLU personnel is as follows.

PERSONNEL

2. Officers : (a) All postings, appointments, changes of employment, confidential reports, applications for interviews (e.g. with M.S.) and applications for courses will be dealt with through HQ MIA.

(b) Normal routine documentation such as A.F.W3010A will be sent direct to GHQ, 2nd Echelon by units with copies to HQ MIA. In the case of A.F.W3008 HQ MIA need not be included on the distribution list.

3. Other Ranks: (a) All postings and documentation will be done direct to GHQ, 2nd Echelon in the normal manner. Any particular difficulties that arise can be referred to HQ MIA.

(b) HQ MIA will be kept fully informed as to OR strength. See instructions contained in HQ MIA letter A 374 dated 20 Dec 45.

RELEASE - PYTHON

4. (a) Release : Documentation of all ranks will be dealt with by BLUs direct with the local Administrative HQ

(b) Python : BLUs deal direct with GHQ 2nd Echelon.

LEAVE

5. LIAP : (a) Vacancies for all ranks will be applied for by BLUs to the local Administrative HQ - see instructions contained in HQ MIA letter A/388/I dated 20 Dec 45.

(b) BLUs will apply to HQ MIA for

HQ MMIA. In the case of A.F.W3008 HQ MMIA need not be included on the distribution list.

3. Other Ranks: (a) All postings and documentation will be done direct to CHQ, 2nd Echelon in the normal manner. Any particular difficulties that arise can be referred to HQ MMIA.
- (b) HQ MMIA will be kept fully informed as to OR strength. See instructions contained in HQ MMIA letter A 374 dated 20 Dec 45.

RELEASE - PYTHON

4. (a) Release : Documentation of all ranks will be dealt with by BLUs direct with the local Administrative HQ

(b) Python : BLUs deal direct with CHQ 2nd Echelon.

LEAVE

5. LIAP : (a) Vacancies for all ranks will be applied for by BLUs to the local Administrative HQ - see instructions contained in HQ MMIA letter A/388/I dated 20 Dec 45.

(b) BLUs will apply to HQ MMIA for permission to send officers on LIAP before applying for vacancies for them.

LEAVE other than LIAP.

6. Any queries on local leave or applications for leave to countries other than UK will be made to HQ MMIA. 192

Local leave in accordance with current regs may be granted by OC BLU without reference to HQ MMIA except leave for OC a BLU which should be referred to MMIA giving name of proposed substitute.

DISCIPLINE

7. COURTS MARTIAL and COURTS OF INQUIRY matters will be dealt with by HQ MMIA. BLUs are reminded that the G.O.C., MMIA has powers of a District Commander.

.....2/

2045

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

"Marriage Applications

- 9 (a) Applications for permission to marry will NOT be referred to HQ NMIA except for information - Procedure as outlined in Marriage Regulations CMF issued as Appendix "A" to GRO 258/46 will be followed with particular reference to para 5".

2045

434

FINANCE

- 8. (a) AUDIT BOARDS will be held quarterly in accordance with KR 85 (b) and the papers forwarded to HQ MIA for approval.
- (b) OFFICERS' personal matters - to be dealt with in accordance with GROS 1129 and 1130 dated 12 Oct 45.

FAMILIES TO CMF

- 9. Applications for the families of British officers and ORs to come to CMF will be made through local Adm HQ.

GENERAL

- 10. The following matters will be referred to HQ MIA:-

- (A) (1) Honours and Awards.
- (B) (1) Repatriation.

- 11. Matters referred to in the above paragraphs are dealt with at HQ MIA as follows:-

A.A.G.
(phone No. 478702)

D.A.A.G.
(phone No. 489081
Ext. 533)

S.C. M.
(phone No. 489081
Ext. 524)

- (a) OFFICERS (1) Postings and Appointments.
(2) Confidential Reports
(3) Interviews
(4) Financial matters
(5) Courses - Staff College etc.
- (b) O.Rs General Policy
- (c) Discipline (1) Courts Martial
- (a) C.E. (1) Strengths
(2) Postings
- (b) Release (1) Officers
(2) ORs
- (c) LIAP (queries)
- (d) PYTHON (queries)

HQ MIA as follows:-

A.A.C.
(phone No. 478702)

D.A.A.C.
(phone No. 489081
Ext. 533)

S.C.A.
(phone No. 489081
Ext. 524)

- (a) OFFICERS
 - (1) Postings and Appointments.
 - (2) Confidential Reports
 - (3) Interviews
 - (4) Financial matters
 - (5) Courses - Staff College etc.
- (b) O.Rs General Policy
- (c) Discipline
 - (1) Courts Martial
 - (2) Courts of Inquiry
- (d) Finance - Audit Boards
- (e) Honours and Awards
- (f) Visits

- (a) O.R.
 - (1) Strengthening
 - (2) Postings
- (b) Release
 - (1) Officers
 - (2) ORs
- (c) LILP (queries)
- (d) PYTHON (queries)
- (e) Leave
- (f) Staff Lists
- (g) Families to CMF
- (h) Marriages
- (i) Repatriation.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Ref: 8251/427/EO

27 December 1945

418
The Executive Commissioner presents his compliments,
and requests that the first paragraph of the Chief Commissioner's
letter 8251/418/EO dated 21 December be amended to read as follows:

Enclosed you will find copy of Directive No. 2 regarding
Instructions to British Liaison Units attached to Italian Territorial
Commands as published by the Land Forces S/C (MMIA) of the Allied
Commission.

[Signature]
Brigadier
Executive Commissioner

The Secretary to the President of
the Council of Ministers.

Copy to: Land Forces S/C (MMIA).

See P. 452
190

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 7850171709
SUBJECT: MMIA Directive No 2 (G/7 dated 7 Dec)8251 Pl.

E.O. CONFIRM

430

LAND FORCES SUB COM. A.C. (MMIA)

G/7

21 Dec 45

DEC 26 1945

Amendment No 2 to MMIA Directive No 2

CANCEL whole Appx 'C' and INSERT new Appx 'C' att herewith.

417

Amended
by
M.M.I.A. H. L. M. I. A.
Major General, L. C. M. I. A. G. S.

ARCS/jw

DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION : List 'B' (less Serial 12)

Info : List 'C'
12 BLU

List 'A' (less Serials 9, 10, 11, 18 & 19)

EC DIST - 17 Jan
as List 417.

22 DEC 1945

189

(S/SJT T)

129
Revised Appx 'C' to MMIA
Directive No 2 (C/7 dated 7 Dec 45)

Ref Para 3 (b)

1. "B" Type BLUs will be affiliated to 'A' Type BLU's for adm matters as under:

A
No. 1 (TURIN)

No. 3 (MILAN)

No. 4 (BOLZANO)

No. 7 (FLORENCE)

(MMIA HQ)

No. 10 (NAPLES)

No. 2 (GENOA)

No. 5 (UDINE)

No. 6 (BOLOGNA)

No. 8 (ROME)

No. 9 (BARI) and

No. 11 (PALERMO)

2. As C 'A' Type BLUs will at their discretion attach their REME and/or RASC officers to 'B' Type BLUs, and will alter these attachments from time to time as necessity arises.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

1444

HQ AC (6)

8251

EX. CONTROL
1428

SUBJECT : Directive No 2 (G/7 dated 7 Dec 45).

LAND FORCES SUP COM, A.C. (MMIA)

G/7

24 Dec 45

DEC 27 1945

417
Amendment No 3

CANCEL whole Appx 'D' and
SUBSTITUTE new Appx 'D' att herewith.
Please ACK on att ACK slip.

ARCS/abc

Amended
[Signature]
Major General
MMIA
WLC
GS

DISTRIBUTION:

List 'A' (less Serials 9, 10, 11, 18 & 19)
List 'B'
List 'C'

LC DIST - 17 Jan

As 417

187

Revised Apox 'D' to MIA Directive
No 2 (C/7 dated 7 December 1945)

ANNEXURE NO 3.

The following reports are required by HQ MIA from all BLUs on 7th and 21st of each month, and as at 1st and 15th of each month.

A consolidated Progress Report, subdivided into C (para 5(b)(iii) refers), A and Q headings, and on 7th of each month ONLY with the following types att:

A. Location Statement of A and B Type BLUs, also of all ITALIAN tps in the Territorial Comd to which BLU are att, down to and incl bns or equivalent units. Only the Designations of Units as shown in the Order of Battle for the ITALIAN Army will be used in Location Statements for ITALIAN tps. (para 5(a)(v) refers).

B. Staff Lists of BLUs (para 3(b) refers).

C. Staff Lists of ITALIAN ofrs of rank of LT COL and above with Territorial Comd HQ, Divs, Regts and Trg Ests. (para 5 (d) (iii) refers).

D. Return of BR MT. Proforma as under. (para 3 (b) refers).

PROFORMA

Serial No.	Vehicle Type	Ref No.	Efficient (E)	Local Repair (LR)	Beyond Local Repair (BLR)	Remarks
1	etc	...	...	..	..	...
2						

used in Location Statements for ITALIAN tps. (para 5(a)(v) refers).

B. Staff Lists of BLUs (para 5(b) refers).

C. Staff Lists of ITALIAN offers of rank of 13 COL and above with Territorial Comd HQ, Divs, Regts and Trg Bstis. (para 5 (d) (iii) refers).

D. Return of BR MT. Proforma as under. (para 3 (b) refers).

PROFORMA

Serial No.	Vehicle Type	Ref No.	Efficient Repair (E)	Local Repair (LR)	Beyond Local Repair (BLR)	Remarks
1	etc	...	...	..	..	...
2						
3						
etc						186

Certified above vehicles are held on charge, that their condition is as stated and that I.D. 442 and I.D. 406 have been inspected and found correct.

Signed.....
Unit.....

19...

SECRET

SUBJECT: Location of Italian Armed Forces

Land Forces Sub-Commission, AG
(M.M.I.A.)

20 December 1945

Headquarters, ALLIED COMMISSION.
(for Executive Commissioner)

DEC 21 1945

Ref A.F.H.Q. letter AG.091.711/10440-0 dated 15 Dec:-

1. Herewith suggested DRAFT for Chief Commissioner's signature.
2. (a) I am at a loss to understand the meaning of their para 7.
(b) The matter was obviously one for a combined appreciation, not a purely military one.
(c) All the factors are set out accordingly in your letter (8231/EC of 28 Nov.)
(d) We agreed it all with Brig. YATES, which their paras 4-5 confirm.
(e) I cannot see that there is any more to be said.
3. Will you issue instructions to the Italian Prime Minister in accordance with the A.F.H.Q. letter or will you instruct me to do so to the War Minister?

L. Browning

(d) We agreed it all with Brig. Yates, which their paras 1-5 confirm.

(e) I cannot see that there is any more to be said.

3. Will you issue instructions to the Italian Prime Minister in accordance with the A.F.H.Q. letter or will you instruct me to do so to the War Minister?

421.

L. Browning

Major General,
M.M.I.A.

LB/os

see 7437.7456

185

(550)

R A P T

SECRET.

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED COMMISSION
OFFICE OF CHIEF COMMISSIONER

Ref : 8251/EC

December, 1945.

SUBJECT : Location of Italian Armed Forces.

TO : A.F.H.Q.

421.

1. (a) I am in receipt of your AG.091.711/1044 D-0 dated 15 Dec.
(b) The agreed subject matter of your paras 1-5 has already been conveyed to the War Ministry verbally, during the discussions over the last fortnight.
(c) It will now be communicated officially on paper to the Italian Government.
2. Ref your para 6, I was aware of the situation in this respect. Para 3(b) and 5(h) of my letter 8251/EC dated 28 Nov. was merely inserted as a relevant factor in the problem.
3. Ref your para 7, the recommendations in para 5 of my letter 8251/EC dated 28 Nov., were reached as the result of the combined factors enumerated in paras 2, 3 and 4 of my letter, to which I have nothing to add. ~~though if clarification of any particular aspect is desired, I should of course be glad to express the view of the Allied Commission.~~
4. ~~Would you let me know if any point in which you need clarification.~~ I may say that this whole matter was fully discussed in my office RCME at a conference between Brig. YATES, Maj. Gener BROWNING, my Executive Commissioner and myself on 3 Dec., when all aspects of the question were ventilated and I understood complete agreement was reached.

27 a 433

Para 3(b) and 5(h) of my letter 8251/EC dated 28 Nov. was as a relevant factor in the problem.

3. Ref your para 7, the recommendations in para 5 of my letter 8251/EC dated 28 Nov., were reached as the result of the combined factors enumerated in paras 2, 3 and 4 of my letter, to which I have nothing to add, though if clarification of any particular aspect is desired, I should be glad to express the view of the Allied Commission. *should you let me know of any point in which you need clarification.*

4. I may say that this whole matter was fully discussed in my office at a conference between Brig. YATES, Maj. Gener BROWNING, my Executive Commissioner and myself on 3 Dec., when all aspects of the question were ventilated and I understood complete agreement was reached.

ELIERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner.

184

Copy to : G-5, A.F.HQ.
Land Forces S/C (LMTA)
Lombardia Region
Liguria Region
Piemonte Region
Venezia Region
LO No. 2 District
Executive Commissioner
H.Q. No. 2 District
H.Q. No. 3 District

Together with copy of
A.F.H.Q. letter
AG 091.711/1044 C-0
dated 15 December 1945.

1448
SECRET

8251

Ex. Comm.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

SECRET
By Authority of
SACAT

421

Initials _____

Date December 1945

AG 091.711/1044 C-0

9 to 17 Dec
to Brig L.

DEC 17 1945

SUBJECT: Location of Italian Armed Forces

TO: Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
APO 394

381, V.H. 4

1. Reference is made to your letters 8251/EC of 28 November and 8251/390/EC of 4 December.

2. The role of the Gruppi, when returned to Italian Government control, should be to act as a mobile reserve in the hands of the Italian Government. As such, they should remain free from any commitments in the areas in which they are located, and, pending a situation requiring their employment, should devote themselves to training.

3. It is agreed that when the Northern provinces are handed over, the main concentration of Italian mobile troops should be in the PO VALLEY. On taking over the Northern provinces, the actual location of the Gruppi will be a matter for the Italian Government to decide, but in making this decision they should give due weight to the availability of training facilities.

4. Considerable Allied Forces are now relieving the Gruppi on guard duties in the North of ITALY and other Allied Forces necessarily have to be located there; therefore, the actual location of the Gruppi for the time being must in addition to training requirements be determined very largely by the availability of remaining accommodations.

5. As a result of careful investigation, it appears that a maximum of four Gruppi can be located for the time being North of the Apennines. It is suggested that, in order to meet the wishes of the Italian Government as far as possible regarding detailed locations, your representative should maintain close liaison with Headquarters 2 and 3 District.

6. It would appear from your letters quoted above that you are not fully aware that it has been the Supreme Allied Commander's policy for some time to relieve all Italian Gruppi and Independent Regiments from guard duties. The relief of the Gruppi is now in progress and has only been delayed by the fact that insufficient accommodations are available for the relieving troops. This has necessitated the removal of one Gruppo to accommodations South of the APENNINES. The relief of all Independent Regiments

See 426
See M. 423, 424, 425.

SECRET

1831

1 page up

SECRET

Ltr, AFHQ, AG 091.711/1044 C-O,
dated 15 December 1945 (Cont'd)

except for two battalions in UDINE and NAPLES respectively, was completed on 21 November.

7. You are requested to bring the provisions of this letter to the attention of the Italian Government and to forward to this Headquarters a copy of the military appreciation on which the recommendations by Commander Land Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, shown in paragraph 5 of your letter 8251/EC of 28 November, were based.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN:

Edmund R. Shugart
EDMUND R. SHUGART
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

Copy Furnished:

- 1 - Land Forces Sub-Commission, AC (MMA)
- 1 - 2 District
- 1 - 3 District

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

418

Ref: 8251/418/C

21 December 1945

My dear Mr. Prime Minister,

Enclosed you will find copy of Directive No. 2 regarding the hand-over of the Italian Army to the Italian Government as published by the Land Forces Sub-Commission (LSCA) of the Allied Commissions.

The contents of this Directive have already been communicated by the Head of the Land Forces Sub-Commission (LSCA) to the Minister of War.

Yours very truly,

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Dr. Alcide De Gasperi
President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
Rome

See in 2419.
7431 r 452

copy to: L.F. S/C (MMIA).

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT : MATA Directive No 2

LAND FORCES SUB COM, A.C. (MATA)

G/7

7 Dec 45

TO : DISTN as below:

MS

BY G/7 dated 16 Nov 45 as amended herewith, effective from 6 Dec 45,

ACK slip for G/7 of 16 Nov 45 also attached, which please sign and return to this HQ.

ARCS/abc

DISTRIBUTION:

CC No 1 BLU (two)
" " 2 BLU "
" " 3 BLU "
" " 4 BLU "
" " 5 BLU "
" " 6 BLU "
" " 7 BLU "
" " 8 BLU "
" " 9 BLU "
" " 10 BLU "
" " 11 BLU "
CC "F" BL & TU

Copies to : HQ AC (six copies)
ATIG
15 Corps
2 District
3 "
Ministry of War

for Major General
M M I A
G-2

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

OC No 1 BLU (two)
" " 2 BLU "
" " 3 BLU "
" " 4 BLU "
" " 5 BLU "
" " 6 BLU "
" " 7 BLU "
" " 8 BLU "
" " 9 BLU "
" " 10 BLU "
" " 11 BLU "
OC "P" BL & TU

Copies to : HQ AC (six copies)
AFHQ
15 Corps
2 District
3 "
Ministry of War

Internal : PL to GOC
G of S
Col ES
Col 4/4
"Q"
"L" (Three)
"Q" (Five)
War Diary (Two)

Base Comm List:
Navy
Air Force
Polad
Polad
Kean
G.A. Sub
Kod Cont.

(Capt. 'B')

180
see 418, 428.

2063

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Att to MIA letter
6/7 and 7 Dec 45

AMENDMENT No. 1
to
DIRECTIVE No. 2

INSTRUCTIONS TO BRITISH LIAISON UNITS
ATTACHED TO
ITALIAN MILITARY COMMANDS

- (a) Delete page 1 and insert new page 1 attached.
- (b) Page 2, para 3(a), 2nd line:
for "DIVISIONAL Comd" read "DISTRICT Comd".
- (c) Amend "D"
under "G" add sub-para (g) as follows, and renumber remaining sub-para (h), (e) and (f):
"(c) On 7th and 21st of each month and on 1st and 15th, a fortnightly Report in triplicate on points of general interest (as previously sent as IO letter from Comds of old Elys to GOC). This IO letter 637 of 5 Dec 45 refers."

*Amended by
J.P.N.*

2004

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

415

SUBJECT : MMIA Directive No. 2.

UNCLASSIFIED

LAND FORCES SUB COM. A.C. (MMIA)

G/7

16 Nov 45

TO : All Addressees of Directive No.2

Herewith MMIA Directive No.2. The instructions contained in this Directive will not be implemented until receipt by signal of further orders from this HQ.

for Major General, M. M. I. A.
for Major General, M. M. I. A.

ARCS/jw
16 Nov 45.

See F. 419

UNCLASSIFIED

ALLIED COMMISSION

LAND FORCES SUB COM, A.C. (ALL)

C / 7

7 Dec 45

DIRECTIVE No. 2

INSTRUCTIONS TO BRITISH LIAISON UNITS
ATTACHED TO
ITALIAN TERRITORIAL COMMANDS

INTRODUCTION

1. It is the wish of the United States and British Governments that an Italian Army, of such a size as can reasonably be maintained by the Italian Government shall be brought, in the shortest possible time, to a high state of efficiency. The task which will be required of the Italian Army is:-

- (a) to maintain the authority of the Italian Government.
- (b) to be available to go to the assistance of the civil authority for the maintenance of law and order.
- (c) to act as a deterrent to foreign aggression across the frontiers of ITALY.

Until the terms of the Peace Treaty are made known, this Italian Army, for the purpose of these instructions, is to be organised, trained and administered in accordance with ALLIA Directive No. 1 of 8 Nov 45, entitled "Handover of the Italian Army to the Italian Government".

- 2. (a) The Land Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission is the channel of communication between Allied authorities and the Italian War Ministry; it also functions as the Military Mission to the Italian Army (ALL).
- (b) As ALL (dealing directly with AFHQ) its responsibility is confined to matters in connection with the organisation, training and administration of the Italian Army within the approved ceiling.
- (c) In other respects, including alterations to the approved ceiling, economic, political and civil affairs, questions connected with demobilisation, demilitarisation, civil security and ex-army material and personnel (including ex-prisoners of war), its responsibility is as the Land Forces Sub-Commission, directly subordinate to Allied

- (a) to maintain the authority of the Italian Government.
- (b) to be available to go to the assistance of the civil authority for the maintenance of law and order.
- (c) to act as a deterrent to foreign aggression across the frontiers of Italy.

Until the terms of the Peace Treaty are made known, this Italian Army, for the purpose of these instructions, is to be organized, trained and administered in accordance with MEIA Directive No. 1 of 8 Nov 45, entitled "Handover of the Italian Army to the Italian Government".

2. (a) The Land Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission is the channel of communication between Allied authorities and the Italian War Ministry; it also functions as the Military Mission to the Italian Army (MEIA).
- (b) As MEIA (dealing directly with AFHQ) its responsibility is confined to matters in connection with the organization, training and administration of the Italian Army within the approved ceiling.
- (c) In other respects, including alterations to the approved ceiling, economic, political and civil affairs, questions connected with demobilisation, demilitarisation, civil security and ex-army material and personnel (including ex-prisoners of war), its responsibility is as the Land Forces Sub Commission, directly subordinate to Allied Commission.

ORGANISATION OF MEIA

3. (a) HQ MEIA is composed of British and US personnel and is organized in accordance with the attached chart (Appx "A").
- (b) British Liaison Units (BLUs) are organized in accordance with the approved War Establishments (see Appx "B"), as Type 'A' or 'B', one of either type being attached to each Italian Territorial Region HQ depending on the size and responsibility of the region. Type 'A' BLUs, which include officers of services, will, from time to time, be required to assist Type 'B' BLUs in administrative matters for which purpose an affiliation plan will be made by HQ MEIA (see Appx "C"). Staff lists and British vehicle returns of BLUs will be sent to MEIA monthly as detailed in Appx "D".

.....1782

- 2 -

- 413
- (c) A special BLU (known as 'F' BLU) is attached to the Training Centre at CESANO for duty with the training group of units which are controlled directly by the War Ministry.
 - (d) All BLUs will come directly under HQ MMIA for all matters except such local administrative questions as must necessarily be handled by local administrative headquarters. MS matters will be referred direct to HQ MMIA and are handled there by an officer specially appointed for the purpose.
 - (e) Disciplinary, financial and administrative powers of a ~~Detachment~~ Commander are vested in Commander MMIA. Similarly, powers of a Detachment Commander are vested in Lt-Colonels in charge of 'A' Type BLUs and 'F' BLU. These powers extend over any 'E' Type BLU affiliated to them.

OBJECTS

- 4. (a) The object of MMIA is to advise and assist the Italian Ministry of War and subordinate headquarters on the organisation, training and administration of the Italian Army within the approved ceiling. Responsibilities in this respect are limited to advice and assistance only; all necessary executive work must be the responsibility of the Italian authorities concerned.
- (b) The particular object of BLUs will be to give similar advice and assistance to the Italian HQ to which they are attached. The Italian Commander will normally be expected to accept this advice; if he should feel unable to do so, the OC BLU will refer the matter to HQ MMIA. BLUs are therefore in effect miniature missions to their respective Territorial Headquarters, taking their policy and direction from HQ MMIA.
- (c) The senior officer of each BLU will make it clear to all personnel under his command that they are to take no part in Italian political activities of any kind. Lack of impartiality may gravely impair Allied - Italian understanding, and will, in any case, render the individual or individuals concerned incapable of carrying out properly the duties entrusted to them.

DUTIES OF BRITISH LIAISON UNITS5. POLICY

Allied policy on all questions coming within the scope of these instructions will be as follows:

necessary executive work must be the responsibility of the Italian authorities concerned.

- (b) The particular object of BLUs will be to give similar advice and assistance to the Italian HQ to which they are attached. The Italian Commander will normally be expected to accept this advice; if he should feel unable to do so, the OC BLU will refer the matter to HQ MMLA. BLUs are therefore in effect miniature missions to their respective Territorial Headquarters, taking their policy and direction from HQ MMLA.
- (c) The senior officer of each BLU will make it clear to all personnel under his command that they are to take no part in Italian political activities of any kind. Lack of impartiality may gravely impair Allied - Italian understanding, and will, in any case, render the individual or individuals concerned incapable of carrying out properly the duties entrusted to them.

DUTIES OF BRITISH LIAISON UNITS

5. POLICY

Allied policy on all questions coming within the scope of these instructions will be made known to BLUs by HQ MMLA; it will be the duty of BLUs concerned to pass this to Italian Headquarters concerned in appropriate form, supplementing it with such details as are considered requisite. Principal matters with which BLUs will have to deal are classified under the following headings:-

(a) ORGANISATION

Responsibility of CAC BLUs, as regards organisation of HQs, formations and units within the Territorial Command to which they are attached is as follows:-

- (1) As far as possible the Italian Army is being organised and commanded on lines generally similar to those employed in the British Army. This policy is subject to such modification as may be dictated by:

.../sheet 177

- 3 -

- the nature of the tasks which the Italian Army are intended to carry out,
- the nature and amount of the equipment which the British and US Governments have undertaken to provide,
- the national characteristics of the Italian military system.

(ii) OSC BLUs will see that all units in their area of responsibility are in fact organised in accordance with the official WE issued by the Italian Ministry of War after agreement with this HQ. They will bring to the notice of the Territorial Command any cases in which official WE are modified or disregarded. They will use their discretion as to whether such modifications are within the spirit of the WE, and they will advise the Territorial Command accordingly. If their advice is not accepted, they will inform this HQ.

(iii) Bearing in mind the characteristics of the Italian Military system, OSC BLUs will at all times offer to the Territorial Command advice on the organisation and efficient running of HQs and establishments.

(iv) OSC BLUs will submit to HQ MMIA for consideration with the Ministry of War, any recommendations they may have to make on the subject of Staff Duties with particular reference to the smooth and speedy disposal of business by means of decentralising responsibility to junior officers, eliminating redundant links in the chain of command and of supply, logical distribution of Staff Duties, and simple office procedure.

(v) OSC BLUs will render location statements as at Appx. 'D'.

(b) INTELLIGENCE

The responsibilities of OSC BLUs as regards Intelligence are as follows:-

(i) The Italian authorities are required to furnish information regarding the strength, organisation, training, movements, administration, real estate, and stocks of material and equipment held by the Italian Army.

(ii) OSC BLUs will collate, for transmission to the

system, OSC BLUs will at all times offer to the Territorial Command advice on the organisation and efficient running of HQs and establishments.

- (iv) OSC BLUs will submit to HQ MMIA for consideration with the Ministry of War, any recommendations they may have to make on the subject of Staff Duties with particular reference to the smooth and speedy disposal of business by means of decentralising responsibility to junior officers, eliminating redundant links in the chain of command and of supply, logical distribution of Staff Duties, and simple office procedure.

- (v) OSC BLUs will render location statements as at Appx. 'D'.

(b) INTELLIGENCE

The responsibilities of OSC BLUs as regards Intelligence are as follows:-

- (i) The Italian authorities are required to furnish information regarding the strength, organisation, training, movements, administration, real estate, and stocks of material and equipment held by the Italian Army.

- (ii) OSC BLUs will collate, for transmission to this HQ when requested, such information of this nature as originates in the Territorial Command to which they are attached.

- (iii) In order that this information may be presented in the form best serving both Allied and Italian interests, and may be studied in the proper context of local conditions, OSC BLUs will keep their fingers upon the pulse of local feeling, both civilian and military, and will submit to this HQ a monthly Intelligence Report (see Appx. 'D'). This monthly Intelligence Report will be prepared with the collaboration of the Italian Territorial Command staff, and may be submitted in draft for the views of the Italian Territorial Command.

- (iv) In the Report, OSC BLUs will stress appreciated future trends rather than past events, details of which are only required if of outstanding importance or as factors in their appreciation.

(v) As far as it concerns military efficiency and relations with the Italian population, BLUs will study the morale of all ranks with whom they come into contact. They will include this as a heading in their monthly Intelligence Report. They will as far as possible detail the factors affecting morale and will include the Italian reaction at all levels to these factors.

(c) TRAINING

(i) The training policy for the Italian Army is being laid down by the Ministry of War, and will be carried out under Allied advice and supervision.

(ii) In the case of establishments such as the CESANO Training Centre, the Ministry of War deals direct with the establishment concerned.

(iii) For formations under Territorial Commands the commander is responsible that Ministry of War policy is implemented in the form of Training Directives and exercises arranged and carried out locally and general executive control.

(iv) Territorial Training Centres will receive the syllabus and programme laid down by the Ministry of War. OSC BLUs will ensure that this programme is followed.

(v) British arms and equipment at present constitute a large proportion of the armament of the Italian Army. OSC BLUs will ensure generally that British methods and standards are adopted as far as is practicable.

(vi) OSC BLUs will offer advice and assistance to Italian Commanders on all forms of training and will, after the training methods have been decided, supervise as far as they are able the implementation of them on the ground.

(vii) OSC BLUs will be prepared to report on current Italian training practice with a view to enabling this HQ adequately to advise the Ministry of War with regard to training policy.

(d) ADMINISTRATION

(i) Personnel

Administration of all personnel forming part of the Interim Army of 140,000, and of the CC RR of 65,000 is the responsibility of the Italian Government. The necessary

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- (v) British arms and equipment at present constitute a large proportion of the armament of the Italian Army. OsC BLUs will ensure generally that British methods and standards are adopted as far as is practicable.
- (vi) OsC BLUs will offer advice and assistance to Italian Commanders on all forms of training and will, after the training methods have been decided, supervise as far as they are able the implementation of them on the ground.
- (vii) OsC BLUs will be prepared to report on current Italian training practice with a view to enabling this HQ adequately to advise the Ministry of War with regard to training policy.

(a) ADMINISTRATION

(i) Personnel

Administration of all personnel forming part of the Interim Army of 140,000, and of the CC RR of 65,000 is the responsibility of the Italian Government. The necessary Administrative Units are being formed within the authorised ceiling. Instructions for intakes and demobilisation are issued by the Ministry of War on the advice of MMIA. The authorised ceiling will not be exceeded nor will the strength of approved units be allowed to fall seriously short of their WE. BLUs will examine Italian Unit Strength Returns from time to time, reporting to MMIA any serious fluctuations in strength or shortage of specialist personnel.

(ii) Personal Services

Terms of service, pay, allowances, promotion, postings, discharges and leave are all matters for decision by the Ministry of War. MMIA is being kept informed by the Ministry of all decrees and changes of procedure in respect of these matters. Such information as becomes available

410
 will be made known from time to time to BLUs who will be responsible for bringing to the notice of Italian HQs concerned, any serious breaches of regulations and for informing HQ MMIA if such matters are not reasonably adjusted.

Italian Army personnel will be subject to Italian Military Law which will be administered by Italian officers in accordance with the Italian Code. Any undue delay in the administration of justice will be reported by BLUs to HQ MMIA.

A welfare establishment will be included in the establishment of each Territorial Command. Advice of BLUs will be given freely on matters of welfare to Territorial and unit commanders.

(iii) Officers

The selection, appointment, posting, promotion and dismissal of officers are functions of the Italian Ministry of War. Regulations in these matters are being revised by the Ministry of War and will be made known to BLUs as soon as available. Meanwhile, OSC BLUs will watch these matters closely and discuss frankly and openly with Italian Commanders concerned any changes of appointment of senior officers, disciplinary action or preferment which, in their opinion, appear to be on the one hand necessary or on the other detrimental to the interests of the Service, and if necessary, advise them on the Allied view of their proposals. Any difficulties or failure to reach reasonable agreement will be reported by OSC BLUs to HQ MMIA for direction.

OSC BLUs will keep in their offices, up-to-date Staff Lists of Italian officers of the rank of Lt-Colonel and above with Territorial HQs, Divisions, Inf Regiments, and Training Centres, and will forward copies of current staff lists to MMIA as detailed in App 'D'.
Advice on Administrative Matters

(iv)

Should MMIA at any time advise the Ministry of War on any important administrative matters, the fact that such advice has been given will be notified to BLUs. Similarly, any unforeseen or extraordinary ruling, interpretation or advice given by a BLU Commander will be made known to HQ MMIA.

preference which, in their opinion, appear to be on the one hand necessary or on the other detrimental to the interests of the Service, and if necessary, advise them on the Allied view of their proposals. Any difficulties or failure to reach reasonable agreement will be reported by OSC BLUs to HQ MMIA for direction.

OSC BLUs will keep in their offices, up-to-date Staff Lists of Italian officers of the rank of Lt-Colonel and above with Territorial HQs, Divisions, Inf Regiments, and Training Centres, and will forward copies of current staff lists to MMIA as detailed in App 'D'.
Advice on Administrative Matters

(iv)

Should MMIA at any time advise the Ministry of War on any important administrative matters, the fact that such advice has been given will be notified to BLUs. Similarly, any unenforced or extraordinary ruling, interpretation or advice given by a BLU Commander will be made known to HQ MMIA.

(v) Accommodation

OSC BLUs will give active advice and assistance to Italian headquarters on accommodation questions generally and particularly in the matter of the return to the Italian Army of War Ministry property occupied by the Allies, in accordance with current Allied instructions (at present AFHQ Administrative Memorandum No. 48 of 2 Nov 45). For this purpose, direct contact will be made with local Allied Headquarters concerned; only in case of difficulty or in cases involving authorities under the Allied Commission will the matter be referred to HQ MMIA. The general allocation of accommodation within the Territorial Command is a matter for Territorial Commanders; the advice of BLUs will be valuable as concerning the probability of the Italian needs clashing with those of the Allies.

174

.../sheet 5

(vi) Transport

Vehicles in use by the Italian Army are partly of Allied origin and partly of Italian. BLUs will exercise supervisory control over the use of the former. BLUs will continually impress on Italian authorities the need for good organization and of economy in the use of MT and POL. A Director of Repairs is at Territorial Headquarters and responsible for the supervision of the Repair Unit. Spare parts are obtained from stores controlled by War Ministry. In the case of Allied vehicles, resort will frequently have to be made to cannibalisation.

Local tpt needs are provided by the Adm Tpt Coy which should be given first priority in maint, as on it depends the daily housekeeping of the Army.

A Light Wagon has been provided for each Adm Tpt Coy. The Veh Parks for efficient vehs and non-runners awaiting repair are an important link in the system and will require constant attention and supervision. Release of vehs from efficient Veh Parks is controlled by the War Ministry NOT by Terr. HQ.

(vii) Transportation

The Italian Government is now responsible for arranging rail movement of Italian Army troops and stores direct with the Italian State Railways. A directive on methods and priority is being issued by HQ MML.

(viii) Supplies

System of supply is as laid down in MML Directive No. 1. The Italian Army must take its share of the Nation's food, resources. Local purchase by the Commissariato Directorate at each Territorial Command will play an important part in the procurement of foodstuffs. The ration scale will probably vary and that in local use will be ascertained by the BLUs for the information of MML. Advice and assistance on matters of distribution and cookery should be freely given to Territorial Commanders. Further particulars as to the maintenance of BR-ITI and US-ITI Service troops are given at Appx. 'E'.

Osc BLUs will be responsible through their own or affiliated supply officers for:-

(c) Technical advice on the receipt, storage and issues

rail movement of Italian Army troops and stores direct with the Italian State Railways. A directive on methods and priority is being issued by HQ MMIL.

(viii) Supplies

System of supply is as laid down in MMIL Directive No.1. The Italian Army must take its share of the Nation's food, resources. Local purchase by the Commissariato Directorate at each Territorial Command will play an important part in the procurement of foodstuffs. The ration scale will probably vary and that in local use will be ascertained by the BLUs for the information of MMIL. Advice and assistance on matters of distribution and cookery should be freely given to Territorial Commanders. Further particulars as to the maintenance of ER-ITI and US-ITI Service troops are given at Appx. 'E'.

Oso BLUs will be responsible through their own or affiliated supply officers for:-

- (a) Technical advice on the receipt, storage and issues of all foodstuffs in Italian depots and Divisions.
- (b) Liaison between Allied (military and/or civilian organisations) Supply Depots for transfer of stocks to the Italian Army (including advice re Rail movement of supplies).
- (c) Advice concerning maintenance of stocks within their Areas.
- (d) Ensuring that any alteration to the ration scale is brought to the attention of all concerned and that alterations are implemented as instructed.
- (e) Supervisory control over all supplies found from Allied military sources.

(ix) Clothing and Equipment

During the interim period before the National Economy permits a uniform standard of clothing and equipment, it will not be possible to attain homogeneity in all units of the Army. Economy is, therefore, essential. OGC BLUs will be provided with copies of equipment tables issued by the Ministry of War and will advise local authorities and assist them to introduce and maintain a system of unit accounting and individual responsibility for stores, similar to that in the British Army. Further particulars as to the maintenance of ER-III and US-III Service troops are given at Appx. 'I'.

(x) Veterinary and Remount

The utmost use of animal transport in station duties will be rendered essential by the shortage of petrol. OGC BLUs will advise and assist wherever possible in the reorganisation of animal transport.

(xi) Accounting

Transfer of stores from Allied to Italian depots has hitherto been recorded on shipping tickets in accordance with established procedure. Separate instructions will be issued regarding the impending transfer of warlike equipment with the Gruppi, and any other accounting with which BLUs may be concerned.

CARABINIERI

6. The Carabinieri (CC RR) within the authorised ceiling of 65,000 are included in the term "Italian Army" and will be the responsibility of MMIL except for operational functions and training in purely civil police duties. Such matters are the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior and of the Public Safety Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission. OGC BLUs will maintain close touch with CC RR Divisional or Brigade Headquarters concerned.

RELATIONS WITH ALLIED AUTHORITIES

7. (a) As long as any Italian troops are under Allied operational command, at the request of Allied Commanders, OGC BLUs will provide full liaison between the Italian Territorial Command to which BLUs are attached and the Allied HQ concerned.

CARABINIERI

6. The Carabinieri (CC RR) within the authorized ceiling of 65,000 are included in the term "Italian Army" and will be the responsibility of MMLI except for operational functions and training in purely civil police duties. Such matters are the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior and of the Public Safety Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission. OSC BLUs will maintain close touch with CC RR Divisional or Brigade Headquarters concerned.

RELATIONS WITH ALLIED AUTHORITIES

7. (a) As long as any Italian troops are under Allied operational command, at the request of Allied Commanders, OSC BLUs will provide full liaison between the Italian Territorial Command to which BLUs are attached and the Allied HQ concerned.
- (b) OSC BLUs will volunteer to Allied Districts or Areas any information of outstanding importance or urgency on any subjects within their knowledge, copy to MMLI.
- (c) (i) OSC BLUs will NOT be expected to provide for Allied Districts and Areas detailed returns or states of Italian troops within their territory.
- (ii) As long as Italian troops are under operational command of Allied Commanders Italian Territorial Commands must themselves provide, with the assistance of OSC BLUs, such returns or states of all troops, including Inf Divs, within their command, as are required by Allied Commanders.
- (iii) When Allied Commanders cease to have operational command of Italian troops OSC BLUs may continue to keep touch with Allied HQs on all necessary matters of mutual interest to Allied and Italian Commands, but will be required to provide detailed information only to MMLI.

.../ sheet 3

407

ALLIED SERVICE TROOPS

8. BR-IT and US-IT Service units do NOT form part of the Italian Army at disposal of the Italian Government. Particulars regarding their maintenance, which is an Anglo-American commitment, are given at Appx. 'E'.

INTERCOMMUNICATION

9. (a) Correspondence

Written correspondence will be kept to a minimum.

(b) Channels of Communication

Osc BLUs will correspond direct with MMIA on all matters, copies where relevant to interested Allied HQs. On all subjects other than BLU administration and discipline, for which matters 'B' Type BLUs are affiliated to 'A' Type BLUs, Osc 'B' Type BLUs will correspond direct with MMIA on a par with Osc 'A' Type BLUs.

Copies of any necessary direct correspondence with Allied HQs will be sent to MMIA as applicable.

(c) Periodical Returns - see Appx. 'D'

(d) Conferences

Conferences will be held at frequent intervals, probably monthly, and alternately in Rome and a suitable rendezvous in North Italy.

(e) Postal and Signal Addresses

Final designation of new BLUs is awaited from the War Office and will be notified as soon as received.

APPENDICES ATTACHED

10. 'A' - Chart showing Organisation of HQ MMIA.
'B' - War Establishments of 'A' and 'B' Type BLUs.
'C' - Table showing affiliation of 'B' to 'A' Type BLUs, with map of Territorial Commands and Districts (map accompanying action copies only).
'D' - List of Periodical Returns etc. required by MMIA from BLUs.

(d) Conferences

Conferences will be held at frequent intervals, probably monthly, and alternately in ROME and a suitable rendezvous in North Italy.

(e) Postal and Signal Addresses

Final designation of new BLUs is awaited from the War Office and will be notified as soon as received.

APPENDICES ATTACHED

- 10. 'A' - Chart showing Organisation of HQ MIA.
- 'B' - War Establishments of 'A' and 'B' Type BLUs.
- 'C' - Table showing affiliation of 'B' to 'A' Type BLUs, with map of Territorial Commands and Districts (map accompanying action copies only).
- 'D' - List of Periodical Returns etc. required by MIA from BLUs.
- 'E' - Detail of Maintenance of US-ITI and BR-ITI troops.

WP/bd

W Pickery Colonel
for. Major-General,
M. M. I. L.

DISTRIBUTION - see sheet 9

171

DISTRIBUTION:

OC BLU attached:-

No. 1 (TURIN)	Command Italian Army (ex 51 BLU)	(2 copies)
No. 2 (GENOA)	"	"
No. 3 (ATLANT)	"	"
No. 4 (BOLZANO)	"	"
No. 5 (UDINE)	"	"
No. 6 (BOLOGNA)	"	"
No. 7 (FLORENCE)	"	"
No. 8 (ROME)	"	"
No. 9 (BARI)	"	"
No. 10 (NAPLES)	"	"
No. 11 (PALERMO)	"	"

OC 'F' BL & TU (CESANO)

Copies to:-

HQ A.C. (6 copies)

AFHQ
13 Corps
2 District
2 District
Ministry of War

Internal:-

MA to GOC
C of S
Col GS
Col A/Q
'G'
'A' (C)

2082

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785617

"
"
"

No. 10 (NAPLES)
" (ex 56 BLU)

"
"
"

No. 11 (PALERMO)
"

OC 'F' BL & TU (CESANO)

Copies to:-
HQ A.C. (6 copies)
AFHQ
13 Corps
2 District
3 District
Ministry of War

INTERNAL:-
Ma to GUG
C of S
Col GS
Col A/Q
'G'
'A' ()
'Q' ()
War Diary (Two)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

MILITARY MISSION TO THE ITALIAN ARMY

LYOUT

G.O.C. (Maj-Gen)
M.L. (Captain)

Deputy: Colonel (U.S.)

Colonel A/G

GSO I (AD & Intelligence)

Lt Col (U.S.)

GSO II (SD) GSO II (Int)

GSO III

LIAISON OFFICERS

D.L.A.G. (O)
S.C. (O)

S.C. (A)

D.L.A.G. (PS)
S.C. (PS)

ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF

D.L.O.H.G. (SE and clothing)

D.L.J.H.G. (Ord, Med, R.E., V.E.)
S.C.

D.L.O.W.G. (S.C.)

Camp Commandant (Capt)

GSO II (L) (For G.I. & Q Liaison and lower level liaison with Ministry of War)
GSO II (I) (For Traveling Liaison)

TECHNICAL ADVISORS AND INSPECTORS

SO II R. Sigs

ADST

Capt R.A.S.C.
Capt R.S.C.

DADST

ADST
Capt

DADST

ADOS
Capt (US)

ADME

Capt R.E.M.E.


405

Appendix A to JMWV
Directive No. 2 (G/7 of
16 Nov 45).

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

169


(c) U.S. Officers shown thus
(b) Increment Officers shown thus



TECHNICAL ADVISORS AND INSPECTORS

GSO II (L) (For Travelling Lists)
Level Division with

DIVISION OFFICERS



G.O.C. (Maj-gen)
M.L. (Capt-in)
Deputy: Colonel (U.S.)

MILITARY MISSION TO THE ITALY

400
Appendix 'B' to MIA Directive
No. 2 (G/7 dated 6 Nov 45)

Effective date 24 Sept 45

CM/1112/2

RESTRICTED

BRITISH LIAISON UNIT (TYPE 'A')
TO AN ITALIAN TERRITORIAL HQ

WAR ESTABLISHMENT

(1) Personnel

Amdt No.	-
Date	24 Sept 45
Officers	5
ORs	12
Total	17
TCs	2
Vehicles	4
Trailers	-

STAFF

ATTACHED TO GENERAL STAFF

General staff officer, 1st grade 1
General staff officer, 2nd grade 1
Deputy assistant adjutant and quartermaster general 1
Clerks, general duties, R.A.S.C. -
Sergeant 1
Corporal 1
Private 1

SERVICES

Supply and Transport -

Captain, R.A.S.C. 1
Clerk, general duties, R.A.S.C. (lance-Cpl) 1

Ordnance -

Clerks (R.A.S.C. duties) -
Warrant officer, class I 1
Lance-Corporal 1

R.E.M.E. -

Captain, R.E.M.E. 1
Clerk technical, R.E.M.E. (Lance-corporal) 1

ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF

Duty N.C.O. (Sergeant)

Supply and Transport -

Captain, R.A.S.C. 1
 Clerk, General duties, R.A.S.C. (lance-Cpl) 1

Ordnance -

Clerks (R.A.C.C. duties) -
 Warrant officer, class I 1
 Lance-Corporal 1

R.E.M.E. -

Captain, R.E.M.E. 1
 Clerk technical, R.E.M.E. (Lance-corporal) 1

ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF

Duty N.C.O. (Sergeant) 1
 Ration N.C.O. (lance-corporal) 1
 Driver Mechanic (lance-corporal) 1
 Batman-driver 1
 Cook, A.C.C. 1

Total, British Liaison Unit (Type 'A')
 to an Italian Territorial Headquarters

(ii) Transport

Motor-cycles, solo 2
 Cars, 4 x 2, Light utility 3
 Truck, 15 cwt, 4 x 4, GS 1
 Total, Vehicles 4

168

NOTES

1. All officers will be Italian speaking
2. Additional administrative personnel held on Italian Incr.

This establishment when implemented will supersede British
 Liaison Unit to an Italian Territorial Headquarters (CA/1112/1).
 (This establishment was not issued)

(File 544/ORG-3)

(237/2637)

Annex 'B' to MILA Directive
No. 2 (G/7 dated 16 Nov 45)

Effective date 24 Sept 45.

CM/1130/1

BRITISH LIAISON UNIT (TYPE 'B')
TO AN ITALIAN TERRITORIAL HEADQUARTERS

WAR ESTABLISHMENT

(i) Personnel

General staff officer, 2nd grade (a)
Deputy assistant adjutant and
quartermaster-general (a)
Total, officers

Clerks, general duties, R.A.S.C. -
Corporal
Private

Batman-driver
Motor-cyclist

Total, other ranks
Total, all ranks

Civilians -

Batman-driver
Cooks
Mess orderly
General dutymen
Total, civilians

Total, British Liaison unit
(type 'B') to an Italian Territorial
Headquarters (including civilians)

RESTRICTED

Amdt No.	Date	24 Sept 45
Officers		2
O.Rs		4
Civilians		5
Total		11
M. Cs.		1
Vehicles		2
Trailers		-

1
1
2
1
1
1
1
4
6
1
2
1
1
5
11

Clerks, general duties, R.A.S.C. -
Corporal
Private

Batman-driver
Motor-cyclist

Total, other ranks
Total, all ranks

Civilians -

Batman-driver
Cooks
Mess orderly
General dutyman
Total, civilians

Total, British liaison unit
(type 'B') to an Italian Territorial
Headquarters (including civilians)

(ii) Transport

Motor-cycle, solo
Car, 4 x 2, light utility
Truck, 15-cwt, 4 x 4, G.S.
Total, vehicles

(a) Will be Italian speaking.

This establishment will NOT be implemented without A.F.H.Q.
authority.

(File 544/Org-3)

sb 17 Nov 45.

(237/2638)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

Appx "C" to MMIA Directive No 2
(C/7 dated 16 Nov 1945)

Ref Para 3 (b)

"B" Type BLUs will be affiliated to "A" Type BLUs for adm matters as under:

PRESENT

1.	No. 1 (TURIN) Comd (ex 51 BLU)	No. 2 (GENOVA) Comd
	No. 3 (MILAN) Comd (ex 50 BLU)	No. 6 (BOLOGNA) Comd
	No. 4 (BOLZANO) Comd (ex 53 BLU)	No. 9 (BARI) Comd
	No. 5 (UDINE) Comd (ex 52 BLU)	No. 11 (PALERMO) Comd
	No. 10 (NAPLES) Comd (ex 56 BLU)	No. 8 (ROME) Comd
		No. 7 (FLORENCE) Comd

MMIA

2. In order to facilitate supervision of Service Installations and in view of possible re-deployment of Inf Divs, readjustment may be necessary at a later date as follows:

No. 1 (TURIN) Comd (ex 51 BLU)	No. 2 (GENOVA) Comd
No. 3 (MILAN) Comd (ex 50 BLU)	No. 4 (BOLZANO) Comd
No. 6 (BOLOGNA) Comd (ex 53 BLU)	No. 7 (FLORENCE) Comd
No. 5 (UDINE) Comd (ex 52 BLU)	No. 9 (LARI) Comd
No. 10 (NAPLES) Comd (ex 56 BLU)	No. 11 (PALERMO) Comd
	No. 8 (ROME) Comd

MMIA

AMIA

2. In order to facilitate supervision of Service Installations and in view of possible re-deployment of Inf Divs, readjustment may be necessary at a later date as follows :

No. 1 (TURIN) Comd (ex 51 BLU)
No. 3 (MILAN) Comd (ex 50 BLU)
No. 6 (BOLOGNA) Comd (ex 53 BLU)
No. 5 (UDINE) Comd (ex 52 BLU)
No. 10 (NAPLES) Comd (ex 56 BLU)

194A

Map showing Comds and Districts is att.

see 429

166

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

No. 7 (FLORENCE) Comd

No. 2 (GENOVA) Comd

No. 4 (BOLZANO) Comd

No. 7 (FLORENCE) Comd

No. 9 (LARI) Comd

No. 11 (PALERMO) Comd

No. 8 (ROME) Comd

401

Appx "D" to IMLA Directive No. 2
(G/7 dated 16 Nov 1945)

Following periodical Statement, Report, Lists and Return are required by HQ IMLA from all BLUs, all on 7th of each month and as at 1st of each month.

"C" (a) Location Statements of "1" and "2" Type BLUs, also of all ITALIAN troops in the Territorial Comd to which BLUs are attached, down to and including one of equivalent units. (Para 5(a)(v) refers).

(b) Intelligence Report in general terms to cover the previous month. (Para 5(b)(iii) refers).

(c) On 7th inst of each month and as at 1st inst, a *statistical Report in triplicate on vehicle & general interest (as previously sent on 30 Nov 45 from Comd of 1st Div, 1st Gc)* This NO 11-5.37 of 5. Dec refers. *See F.47.*

"A" (d) Staff Lists of BLUs. (Para 3(b) refers).

(e) Staff Lists of ITALIAN officers of rank of Lt Col and above, with Territorial Comd HQ, Divs, Regts and Training Centres. (Para 5(d)(iii) refers).

"Q" (f) Return of BRITISH MT. *Proforma as under.* (Para 3(b) refers). *see F.42*

PROFORMA

Serial No.	Vehicle Type	Reg No.	Efficient Repair (E)	Local Repair (LR)	Beyond Local Repair (ELR)	Remarks
1	etc	...	...	..	..	...
2						
3						

"2"

(f) Return of BRITISH MT. *File 427*
Programs as under. *see file 427*
(Para 3(b))

refers).

PROFORMA:

Serial No.	Vehicle Type	Reg No.	Efficient Repair (E)	Local Repair (LR)	Beyond Local Repair (ELR)	Remarks
1	etc	...	...	..	..	...
2						
3						
etc						

Certified above vehicles are held on charge, that their condition is as stated and that A.B. 412 and A.B. 406 have been inspected and found correct.

Signed 165

Appendix "E" to MMIA
Directive No. 2 (G/7 of 16 Nov 45)

A. Clothing and Equipment (BR-ITI)

1. DEPOTS

Stocks will be held at the main Depots of BARI, NAPLES and FLORENCE, and they will be controlled by MMIA. From the Main Depots stocks will be allotted to:

2. SUB-DEPOTS, of which there will be one with each Adm Div and each Regt Div HQ as under:

227	Adm Div, located at	NAPLES/BARI
231	" "	" MILAN
711	" Regt	" BARI
712	" "	" ANCONA
713	" "	" SALERNO
714	" "	" NAPLES
715	" "	" ROME
716	" "	" FLORENCE
717	" "	" PADUA
718	" "	" MIRA

The Adm Div or Regt Comd is authorized to release from his own Sub-Depot to meet demands from units under comd.

3. Other BR-ITI Stocks

In addition to the main stocks in the BR-ITI Depots (para 1), certain stocks have been frozen for BR-ITIS in ITI-ITI Depots and will be transferred to BR-ITI Depots when needed by "Q" MMIA.

B. Clothing and Equipment (US-ITI)

Clothing and equipment for US-ITIS will continue to be furnished under direct arrangements with QM MTOUSA and QM "employing formation".

C. Rations (BR-ITI and US-ITI)

715 " " " " " ROME
716 " " " " " FLORENCE
717 " " " " " PADUA
718 " " " " " MIRA

The Adm Div or Regt Comd is authorised to release from his own Sub-Depot to meet demands from units under comd.

3. Other BR-ITI Stocks

In addition to the main stocks in the BR-ITI Depots (para 1), certain stocks have been frozen for BR-ITIS in ITI-ITI Depots and will be transferred to BR-ITI Depots when needed by "Q" NMIA.

B. Clothing and Equipment (US-ITI)

Clothing and equipment for US-ITIS will continue to be furnished under direct arrangements with QM MTOUSA and QM "employing formation".

C. Rations (BR-ITI and US-ITI)

US-ITI and BR-ITI Service Units draw Allied components of the existing ration scale for Italian Armed Forces from the nearest US QM Ration Depot (in case of US-ITI) and Br RASC DID (in case of BR-ITI). US Depots will use an American Ration Demand Form and British Depots the standard British Ration Demand Form.

NO NMIA FORM ST/8 WILL BE USE AS HITHERTO.

The Italian component of the ration scale will be drawn from the nearest Italian Army Food Distn Depot on NMIA Form ST/8

D. POL (BR-ITI and US-ITI)

BR-ITI and US-ITI Service units will continue to draw POL from Allied Military sources in accordance with AFHQ AG 463.7 PET-O.

see Appx 'F' at 435.

