

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

ACC

10000/109/1144
(VOL. 6)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

/109/1144
6)

ITALIAN ARMY POLICY
MAR. - NOV. 1946

598.

c. 50 W. J.

Folio 597 for info. please. Para 2 reveals
that out of 35 chains and only 12 thousand
are available !!!

Aut. No.

601

c. 50 W. J.

Reply to folio 597 along the lines of
folio 599 at folio 600 for signature, please

H.L. 1111
Aut. No. 31/10

2099

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

338

785017

Ex 1/10/10

594.

599.

Please see reply to folio 535 at folio 592 and reply to folio 545 at folio 593. No further action is necessary.

193

Aut 6/9
1935

595

580 copy to

Further action is necessary in both. G S should

have copies of letters: ~~592~~ 593 with reference

to 537.

1/10/10

596.

M.M.I.A.

Ref min 595. Have copies of folios

592 & 593 been sent to Sir H. please?

67 537.

188/10/9.

596.

MMIA.

Ref min 595. Have copies of photos
sent to AFHQ. please?

592 & 3 from sent. to AFHQ. please?

Alamut King
Copy
OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DESIGNER

ADJ

C.S.O. 592. Copy not sent to AFHQ. all previous

reference 592. Correspondence on this subject has been between MMIA & AC.
& AFHQ have not been brought into the picture by MMIA.

Reference 593. No trace of copy of this letter sent to MMIA has
been found in this HQ hence no copy sent to AFHQ 337
is doubtful if this need now be done as AFHQ in their
AG 384 681-D of 26 July 46 handed back 808 CS Bu to operational
control of Italian Army.

MMIA,

BGS ~~MMIA~~

13 Sep 46.

Minute 586

Cso Executive Commissioner AC.

Ref min ⁵⁸⁵ : see Land Forces Sub Com's
letter 6/6/11 of 11 July '46

Chairman
" July ^{was}
GEC

Cso. by Comm. 589

Please see folio 588 for your approval

*Auth. 12/17
H.S. 12/17*

590.

Chief Commissioner.

1. You will remember that General Browning wrote on 21 June (Page 557) making recommendations regarding the new War Minister and that a policy directive be given to him by the Italian Government. You approved my reactions to this which were contained in Minute 561, the gist of which I forwarded to the General.

2. He then sent down a record of some remarks made by General Cadorna on Page 567 and you directed that a letter should be put up to SACHED asking whether we were to insist on the Army being kept at 140,000 and, if not, at what size it should be maintained (Your Minute 571). General Browning produced the draft at Page 583 with appendices, to which I made suggested amendments in my Minute 585 and on the draft itself. It seemed to me that the inclusion of his Appendix "C" was irrelevant and I also asked the General to make recommendations as to the minimum size of the Army, naturally thinking that he would attack the matter from the military point of view.

3. The General has now replied at Page 588 in which you will see he insists in para 4 in sending his Appendix "C" stating that he

Chief Commissioner.

1. You will remember that General Browning wrote on 24 June (Page 557) making recommendations regarding the new War Minister and that a policy directive be given to him by the Italian Government. You approved my reactions to this which were contained in Minute 561, the gist of which I forwarded to the General.

2. He then sent down a record of some remarks made by General Cadorna on Page 567 and you directed that a letter should be put up to SACHED asking whether we were to insist on the Army being kept at 140,000 and, if not, at what size it should be maintained (Your Minute 571). General Browning produced the draft at Page 583 with appendices, to which I made suggested amendments in my Minute 585 and on the draft itself. It seemed to me that the inclusion of his Appendix "C" was irrelevant and I also asked the General to make recommendations as to the minimum size of the Army, naturally thinking that he would attack the matter from the military point of view.

3. The General has now replied at Page 588 in which you will see he insists in para 4 in sending his Appendix "C", stating that he cannot give figures as to the minimum size of the Army and asking that this should be discussed with the Italian Government.

4. I think the letter should go with the General's amended para 8 and if we are to include Appendix "C", which I leave to your direction, with a paragraph stating that the General's recommendations will be taken into account when the Prime Minister submits the name of the Minister of War in the new Government.

12. July. 46.

591.

Matter still under discussion with C.C. MC 19/7
NSC 18/12

NSC 236
Baker,
Executive Commissioner.

cc: Lt. Comdr.

16. 584

5114572

By mine

Please see GOC memo

draft at folio 17, for your approval. ^{11/17} ~~11/17~~ 2/7

11/17

GOC Land Force Sub Com

1. I apologise for minute 573. It should have been signed by myself.

2. I have made some further amendments to your draft & have added a final paragraph for which we should make our own recommendation. In this respect are you in a position to fill in the last sentence giving your opinion as to the minimum size of the station Army necessary? I would suggest giving in the lines

to your draft. I then added a final
 which we should make our own recommendation
 to AFHQ.

In this respect are you in a position
 to fill in the last sentence giving your opinion
 as to the minimum size of the Italian Army

necessary: I would suggest give in the line
 necessary: I would suggest give in the line

A para 7 of the AFHQ Dir. of Nov 2, 1945 - i.e.
 showing distribution of between Combat Tps. Sec. Divs
 Command, Admin. etc.

335-7

I suggest omitting Appendix C or reference.

3 I suggest omitting Appendix C or reference of the last
 in the covering letter: also omission of the last

3 paras of Appendix B.

MS/4/7

Recd 6 July 47

۱۲

169

This is an interesting record. Cadorna
 makes a good point - what right have
 the Allies to ^{insist on} maintaining the
 Army ^{up} above the ~~wishes of the~~ .

188/27/8

2. G. 511.

✓ E 3 019

in London

७७

Ref. number. Padornas has no

Specific react.

571

158/276 334

F.C. I think a letter should be only up to SAT - ^(a)are we to inside 140 000, (b) of work.

Ref. number. Cadorna has no

Specific view.

571 158/27/6 334

F.C. I think a letter should be put up to SAC - (a) are we to inside the front be kept up to 144 000, (b) if not, what time or (c) can the Govt reduce it down. 200

CSO

Ask Gen. Browning to do this.

S/M.S.L. 27/6

573

To major for Browning.

333

Would you please comply with mine 506 of folio 2.

Alauckhinsky Capt. 574

Exec. Comr

Ref. minute 517 - Brewster L. Browning Major Gen.

9.17

2108

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

CSO. of Comm. ~~565~~ 565

Letter at 565 for signature please. This is
in accordance with your approval of draft.

CSO. 1/7 565

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

332

Chief Commissioner.

1. I discussed the letter at 557 with Major Barnham who in fact drafted it and who has been one of the mainstays of the Land Forces S/C in his capacity of Liaison Officer with the Italian War Ministry.
2. The two recommendations made by General BROWNING are very natural although his approach is perhaps a little one-sided. It is undoubtedly the policy of the US and UK Governments that the Italian Army shall be brought to a high state of efficiency, but I should hesitate to say that this is the policy of the French and USSR Governments who are co-negotiators in the present peace treaty, and it is asking for the moon to expect that the conditions mentioned in para 3 shall be carried out "as essential and sine qua non, etc".
3. I think that it would ^{not} be politic to extract conditions from the Prime Minister before he considers appointing his Service Ministers, although I do think a hint, and a broad one, could be made that Service Ministers in the new Government should be good administrators rather than politicians.
4. The rest is very much a matter for the Service Sub-Commission or Sub-Section to carry out itself and although I think the ideals are correct and natural, the approach is somewhat impatient.

21. June. 46.

MSA
Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

F.C.

Should not para 3 be amended as indicated? Otherwise I agree with Riv. 561.

25/V1

See - in Riv. 561

cc

4. The rest is very much a matter for the Services, the Commission or Sub-Section to carry out itself and although I think the ideals are correct and natural, the approach is somewhat impatient.

21. June. 46.

77512
Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

562
F.C. Should not para 3 be amended as indicated? Otherwise I agree with Min. 561.

25/VI
See - in sub. 561
cc
M. H. G.

Ex. Com.
[Sin, Please see minute 553, for your approval of 34th
letter at 4.10.55.]

also Ex. Com. - 561 564
Ref min 558 and 561. Draft letter at 566
for your approval, please. Autz 27/6 1946

54-8.

cc: Dr. Lamm.

a letter to the I.A. regarding our
letter at folio 545 for signature please.

AFW cable at 537 re: info. ^{7/6} H.S. 8/6

PA

549.

I will do this orally. Ask Dr. Bonbasse to

speech.

155/10/6

553

cc: Dr. Lamm.

Ref your folio 551. Please see

reply at folio 552. In view of this

will you please approve the draft.

Letter at folio 550 A.

155/10/6

cc: Dr. Lamm.

555

reply at folio 532. In view of this
will you please approve the draft ^{by} _{CSO-872}
letter at folio 550A. *ADT-246*

~~550~~ 558

Chief Commissioner.

Reference your note on p. 550 fle at 558
11.551 & 552 & my additional para to 550A
which I submit for approval.

DD/27/6 330

E.L.

(559)

I agree to 550A with your
added para 5
27/6

Ind ce

Land Force S/C

540

Ref cable at 537. Will you please find out from War Minister why the budget was cut - & what action he has taken, if any. Make of

541

To? A request has above has been sent to the War Minister under our number A010 of 4 and 6 May.

W. P. Doherty
Colonel.
Land Force Sub Commission

7 May 46.

C. S. O.

542

347

There has been some confusion
Action to P. M. 188/75.

7 May 46.

C.S.O.

542.

~~247~~

There has been some confusion

Action to P.H.

187/75.

~~542~~ 543

Land Forces. Sc

At request of the Comd. please draft letter,
to the P.M. for signature of the Chief Commissioner,

re folios 537.

Alameda New York
Office of the Comd.
S.O. 537

10/5/46

544.

C.S.O.

Weinmuth-545 DP

Colonel HQ L.F.S.C.

12 May 46.

Ex Comm 538
Ref Signal at 537. Letter for signature per
mailed by mail.

ACE
M.S. 13/5

539

Chief Commissioner.

Approval
Attached is submitted for your signature
information

On construction from At-100. Please see f.c.
178/13/5.

MAY 14 RECD
0940

21127

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

328

532

Ex. Com.

Sir, Please see Ltr 531 from 600 Land Forces in
reply to your letter of 5/5.

5/5

533

Type difference as amended. MS 3/5

534

Chief Commissioner.

Approval
Attached is submitted for signature
information

MAY 8 1967

Ref 5 on minute under the
MS 3/5

5/5

536

Chief Commissioner.

535

326

12-1-79

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Attached is submitted for signature information

Ref 5 on minute under the

MS 3/5.

OV 6/27

MAY 8 237

536

Chief Commissioner.

538

Attached is submitted for signature information

MS 4/5.

MAY 6 0930

326

325

Exec

536.

Chief Commissioner.

1. In conversation with General Browning the other day and subsequently with the Political Advisers, I raised the question of a difficulty which might arise in the Italian Armed Forces on the question of loyalty in the event of the referendum bringing in a Republic. It is my intention, with your agreement, to discuss this with the Directors of the Service Sub-Commissions but the preliminary discussion on the Italian Army has evoked the attached memorandum from General Browning.
2. The General's chief complaint seems to be that the Minister for War is more of a politician than a Minister. Brosio is, I think, a bad Liberal, and I think we shall have to suffer his lack of stamina for the next month. The question of prevention of interference with the Army, particularly with the recruits, from the Political Parties is one which I think General Browning must take up with the Minister for War. At the same time you can perhaps speak to the Prime Minister en passant without making an issue of the matter.
3. The question of the reduction in strength of the Army mentioned in Paras 5(d) and 5(k) is a matter which I think should again be brought to the notice of the Prime Minister by you, as well as General Browning's contact with the Minister for War. The Prime Minister has I think told you that his intention is not to reduce the Army below 140,000 and the controversy that arose over this question has not been cleared up and the strength is being maintained pretty well at the correct figure, but, as in all countries, the Treasury is bound to make an attempt to reduce expenditure and the armed forces are an obvious target. We could if you thought fit have a letter prepared to the Prime Minister pointing out that 140,000 must be maintained and that the necessary financial economies must be made by reducing the number of civilians and retiring the 5,000 senior regular officers (see 5(d) and (e) of General Browning's memo).
4. The other points raised in General Browning's letter frankly do not impress me. He must go on trying to get the specialists mentioned in 5(f); the re-organisation of the War Ministry is a matter of slow negotiation; he seems to have achieved the re-organisation mentioned in 5(i) and the public relations office in 5(j). He must realise that such matters in this country do take time.
5. I am strongly opposed to any pronouncement by the Government or the Luogotenente on the question of loyalty of the army before the election.

Agree

Don't not so
sure of this

Agree

Will do.

Pls do

Agree
with you

Pls do

Minister has 140,000 and the controversy that arose over this question Army below 140,000 and the controversy that arose over this question has not been cleared up and the strength is being maintained pretty well at the correct figure, but, as in all countries, the Treasury is bound to make an attempt to reduce expenditure and the armed forces are an obvious target. We could if you thought fit have a letter prepared to the Prime Minister pointing out that 140,000 must be maintained and that the necessary financial economies must be made by reducing the number of civilians and retiring the 5,000 senior regular officers (see 5(d) and (e) of General Browning's memo).

4. The other points raised in General Browning's letter frankly do not impress me. He must go on trying to get the specialists mentioned in 5(f); the re-organisation of the War Ministry is a matter of slow negotiation; he seems to have achieved the re-organisation mentioned in 5(i) and the public relations office in 5(j). He must realise that such matters in this country do take time.

5. I am strongly opposed to any pronouncement by the Government or the Luogotenente on the question of loyalty of the armed forces before the elections. But I do think that a statement should be published both by the Luogotenente and the Prime Minister on the evening of 2nd June, that is, after the polling for the Constituent and the Referendum has taken place. The results will not be known for five days and the statement or proclamation adjuring the armed forces to maintain their loyalty to the nation whatever the nation may elect for its form of constitution and government, should be made at that psychological moment.

6. A further point arises as to whether after the election of the Constituent the Allies should insist on nominations of the Service Ministers and other service appointments being referred to the Supreme Allied Commander. I am discussing this with the Sub-Commissions and will let you have recommendations in a day or two.

324

MSL
Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

529

Discussed with Gen Browning with
with take action

MSL/JC.

30/11

Do do

Disagree with you

if #5

Consult
Del. Adversary
as to timing

This be
shown by
covered by
Constitutional
of Promotive
First The
elections

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

520
N.Y. 2813-
Ex Comm.
Mum endorsed with letter at 520 for ~~your~~ the
info of Ex Comm. please Adv 4x M.H. 14.
7/14/44

2-1-23

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

323

Info of Ex Comm. please see 94 K. 114.
774/114

106

2 1 2 4
Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

A P O 794

Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref. 8251/601/30

1. November 1946

Dear Dott. Cappa,

In acknowledging your letter no. 8252/25372.22.
8/1.2.2. dated 25 October 1946 to Admiral Stone, I am happy to inform
you that the Allied Authorities have no objection to the proposal
to demobilize the 1924-25 classes during November instead of during
December.

The Ministry of War has already approached the Land
Forces Sub-Commission on this matter and he has already been informed
of their agreement.

Yours very truly,

[Signature]
Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

Doctor Paolo Cappa
Undersecretary of State,
Italian Government,
Rome.

Copy to: Land Forces S/C

cc.

322

PR
2nd Nov. 1946

8251 599
Subject: Demobilisation Italian Army

OCT 31 1946

Land Forces Sub Commission A.C.
M.M.I.A.
ROME
AQ. 48
30 Oct. 46

Executive Commissioner HQ A.C.

597
Reference attached letter, the following reply 597
is suggested:- "The proposal contained in your letter 84862/25372.22.8/
1.2.2. to demobilise 1924-25 classes during November instead of during
December is agreed, so far as Allied authorities are concerned. The
Minister of War has already approached the Land Forces Sub Commission on
this matter, and he has already been informed of their agreement."

S. Pickley
Almond

2126

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

320

D. P. Kelly
Cand.

10/1/78

[Handwritten signature]

(Copy X)

8251

597

OCT 30 1946

TRANSLATION

THE UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE
TO THE PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

84862/25372.22.8/1.2.2

Rome, 25 October 1946.

Dear Admiral,

The material impossibility of providing for the supply of winter equipment to the contingents of troops presently under the arms and at the same time to the recruits who will be sent to the various detachments at the end of the next month, makes it indispensable to discharge in advance the personnel of the '24 and '25 classes, on 5 November next and not as formerly foreseen in the second half of December.

Such alteration of the already prepared plan for the alternating contingents causes temporarily a reduction of the employed force of about 35,000 units, which however must practically be reduced to only 12,000, as the remaining are used for sedentary services.

Informing you of the above, I beg you to inform this Presidency of the opinion of the Allied Command in order to enable us to authorize without delay the Ministry of War to begin the operations.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Paolo Cappe

Admiral Ellery W. Stone
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
Rome.

See 8: 599,600

319

314

EC Dist. 30/1/46

Action - Land - Forces S/C

Info - E. C.

(Capt. K.)

11/2/46

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

TRANSLATION

SEP 3 1946

THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

70506/16644.14/19.11

Rome, 29 August 1946.

Dear Admiral,

With reference to your letter No. 8251/EC of 16 May 1946, I can assure you that, according to precise information received from the Ministry of Treasury, the assignment of funds for the services of the 808 Btn C.S. remains unchanged and that the Ministry of War has been enabled to carry out the payments left in suspense.

Cordially yours,

For the President

The Undersecretary of State

/s/ Paolo Cappe

Admiral Ellery W. Stone
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
Rome.

EC DIST - 30 Aug

ACTION - (E.C.
INFO - LAND 318 XES S/C

See M-594, 595, 596 - C.C

[Signature]
(CAPT K)

P.A. 13/9/46
[Signature]

2329

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017



593(A)

Roma, 29 agosto 1946

*Al Presidente
del Consiglio dei Ministri
70506/16644.14/19.11*

Caro Ammiraglio,

facendo riferimento alla Sua lettera
n.8251/EC del 16 maggio scorso, posso assicurarLa che,
in base a precisazioni avute dal Ministero del Tesoro,
lo stanziamento dei fondi per i servizi dell'808 Btg.
C.S. rimane immutato e il Ministero della Guerra è sta-
to posto in grado di riprendere i pagamenti sospesi.

Gradisca le espressioni della mia cordialità

*Per il Presidente
il SOAOS. n. Stato
Paoletti*

316

All'Ammiraglio
Ellery W. STONE
Commissario Capo
della Commissione Alleata

ROMA

8251 ⁹⁶
E.C. 10 handle 592

TRANSLATION

SEP 3 1946

THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

Rome, 29 August 1946.

71766/65213/1.2.2.

Dear Admiral,

(16) The considerations made by you in your letter Nr 8251/535/EC of 6 May 1946 with regard to the reduction of personnel of the Italian Army have induced me to re-examine with the utmost attention, together with the War Minister, this delicate problem. In fact, studies have been predisposed aiming to ascertain what economy in the expenses could be realized in the case of reduction of the army forces to 120.000, 100.000 and 80.000 men respectively. It resulted however that carrying out any of the abovesaid reductions we would sacrifice the defensive efficiency of the armed land forces, without obtaining a proportional advantage for the Budget. It has therefore been decided to maintain the structure of the army on the base of 140.000 men, considering the studies which have been made as a simple possibility to be submitted to the Council of Ministers for a useful clarification in occasion of general discussion of the budgets.

Sharing then the opinion expressed by you in the abovementioned letter, the Ministry of War has also agreed that, instead of weakening any further the contingent of troops, an adequate economy could be more opportunely obtained by a reduction, at the right time, of civilian personnel by at least 75%.

With best regards, believe me

For the President

The Undersecretary to the Presidency

/s/ Avv. Paolo Cappa

Admiral Ellery W. Stone
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
Rome.

M-594 refer.
In M-596

314
E.C. Dist. 31 August

Action EC
INFO: L.F. S/C
CC

P.A. 13/9/46
M.

(Capt K)

Fo.



Roma, 29 agosto 1946

*Il Presidente
del Consiglio dei Ministri**71766/65213/1.2.2.*

Caro Ammiraglio,

le considerazioni da lei esposte con la lettera numero 8251/535/EC del 6 maggio scorso in merito alla riduzione degli effettivi dell'esercito italiano mi hanno portato a riesaminare con tutta attenzione il delicato problema, di concerto col Ministro per la guerra. In effetti erano stati predisposti degli studi intesi ad accertare quale economia di spesa si sarebbe potuta realizzare nell'ipotesi della riduzione della forza dell'esercito a 120.000, a 100.000 e a 80.000 uomini rispettivamente. E' risultato peraltro che l'attuazione di qualunque delle suddette riduzioni sacrificerebbe l'efficienza difensiva delle forze armate terrestri, senza ottenere un proporzionale vantaggio per l'Erario. Si è pertanto deciso di mantenere la struttura dell'esercito sulla base di 140.000 uomini, considerando gli studi effettuati come semplice ipotesi da prospettare al Consiglio dei Ministri per un utile chiarimento in sede di discussione generale dei bilanci.

313.

All'Ammiraglio Ellery W. S T O N E
Commissario Capo della Commissione Alleata
R O M A

Condividendo, poi, l'opinione da Lei espressa nella lettera cui mi riferisco, il Ministero della guerra ha convenuto altresì che, anzichè indebolire ulteriormente il contingente della truppa, una adeguata economia potrebbe più opportunamente essere ottenuta riducendo, a tempo opportuno, il personale civile non di ruolo di almeno il 75 %.

Coi migliori saluti, mi creda

*P. il Preposito
il SS. Stato alla Preposito
Av. Paolo Lappa*

SUBJECT: Policy for the ITALIAN ARMY

LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION, A.C. (MILIA)

G/6/1

11 Jul 46

TO : Exec. Commissioner,
Headquarters,
ALLIED COMMISSION

JUL 1 1946

1. I am replying back to your letter of 1 July ref 8251/EC and to your Minute No 19 on file 8251/EC on the Policy for the ITALIAN ARMY.

2. The letter I sent you on 24 Jun ref G/6, stated the position of the Mission very clearly. Either the ITALIAN political people "play" or they "do not play". There can be no half measures. This is borne out by GADORNIA's own remarks.

I repeat that the "military" people are co-operating well; it is the "political" group that clings to the status quo, that attaches so much importance to the "sovereignty" of the ITALIAN Army and sets its face against the sort of changes and improvements needed to make the Army efficient.

3. For this reason the suggestion contained in the fourth paragraph of your letter of 1 July can never produce results that the Mission is out to achieve. We have seen in practice that measures agreed by the Military Mission and by the competent ITALIAN military authorities as being vital are pigeon-holed by the Minister's office. There is no progress along this road.

4. It seems to me essential that SAC should be informed of the present situation, and it was for this reason that I incorporated in my draft for the C.C. a reference to my letter to you of 24 Jun, which was attached as Appx "C" of the draft. However, if you feel that this is not the right place for it I am quite prepared to send this document, or a communication to the same effect, to the SAC myself, as GCC MILIA.

5. I agree with your suggestion that the latter part of Appx "B" should be omitted.

6. With regard to the size of the Army, I do not consider it...

8251 CONFIDENTIAL

I repeat that the "military" people are co-operating well; it is the "political" group that clings to the status quo, that attaches so much importance to the "sovereignty" of the ITALIAN Army and sets its face against the sort of changes and improvements needed to make the Army efficient.

3. For this reason the suggestion contained in the fourth paragraph of your letter of 4 July can never produce results that the Mission is out to achieve. We have seen in practice that measures agreed by the Military Mission and by the competent ITALIAN military authorities as being vital are pigeon-holed by the Minister's office. There is no progress along this road.

4. It seems to me essential that SAC should be informed of the present situation, and it was for this reason that I incorporated in my draft for the C.O. a reference to my letter to you of 24 Jun, which was attached as Appx "C" of the draft. However, if you feel that this is not the right place for it I am quite prepared to send this document, or a communication to the same effect, to the SAC myself, as GOC MIA.

5. I agree with your suggestion that the latter part of Appx "B" should be omitted.

6. With regard to the size of the Army, I do not consider it desirable at this stage to give an opinion as to how large or small the Army should be, as its size and composition would depend on political and financial rather than military considerations, and could only be arrived at after lengthy official negotiations. What seems to me as being required at this stage is AMHQ authority to start discussions with the War Ministry with a view to submitting proposals to AMHQ for a lower figure if the ITALIANs should so wish. Up to the present we have taken the line, as you know, that the figure of 140,000 did not admit discussion.

7. This letter may not sound very helpful, but I feel I should be doing a disservice if I failed to state the position frankly to you. It may not be easy to persuade the ITALIAN Prime Minister of what has to be done, but it cannot escape anyone who has the interests of the ITALIAN Army at heart that:-

(a) the ITALIAN Army has everything to gain and nothing to lose by fullest co-operation with the Mission;

(b) that the ITALIAN Army is already relying on the BRITISH Army for most of its technical eqpt and is readily accepting advice on matters of organisation, training and administration.

(c) that the presence of a Military Mission which has worked for 2 1/2 years alongside the ITALIAN Army, knows its problems well, and yet is

589.

/2.....

587

-2-

7.(c) (Cont'd)

completely outside local politics gives the ITALIANS a unique opportunity for obtaining the most impartial advice on the reorg of their Army and for keeping such reorg above politics.

8. In conclusion, therefore, I wish to recommend that:-

(a) the letter to SAC be sent as amended by you, but including Appx "C" as originally proposed, and with your para 8 reworded as follows:-

"8. My own recommendations are that we should allow the Land Forces Sub Commission (AC) to discuss the matter with the ITALIAN War Ministry, if and when the latter should so desire, with a view to submitting revised proposals for your approval before implementation."

(b) that the matter raised in my letter of 28 Jun 46 be taken up with the Prime Minister as requested in para 7 of that letter.

LB/CMB/sc

d. Browning
Major General
M M I A

2 1 3 6

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

310

d. Browning

Major General
M M I A

IE/CUE/CS

21-3-78

DRAFT

583

TO : S.A.C. -----

1. A question of importance concerning the size and efficiency of the ITALIAN Army has been represented to me by G.O.C. Land Forces Sub Commission, *And is submitted for your consideration. And in this context the following is submitted to you today.*

2. The Allied policy on the ITALIAN Army is set out in AFHQ Directives:

- AG 091.711 G(SD)-0 of 2 November 45,
- AG 091.711 GCT-0 of 3 December 45,

of which the relevant parts are extracted for convenience at Appendix "A", dealing with:-

- (a) efficiency of the ITALIAN Army
 - (b) limitation of size and org of the ITALIAN Army
 - (c) terms of ref of the Allied Military Mission to the ITALIAN Army.
3. The results of the application of this policy and the general situation today are dealt with in *an exposition* ~~in a letter~~ which the G.O.C. Land Forces Sub Commission recently prepared for Field Marshal MONTGOMERY. I am attaching at Appendix "B" a copy of the conclusions arrived at by Maj Gen BROWNING in this talk, *supplied* together with a covering letter I had from him on the same subject (Appendix "C"). *Done*
4. The Chief of Staff of the ITALIAN Army, Gen CADORNA, dealt with the same matter in a recent conversation with an officer of the Military Mission, and his remarks which are very much to the point, are reproduced at Appendix "D".
5. It is clear from these documents that a restatement of the Allied

3. The results of the application of this policy and the general situation today are dealt with in ^{an exposition} ~~an exhibit~~ which the G.O.C. Land Forces Sub Commission recently prepared for Field Marshal MONTGOMERY. I am attaching at Appendix "B" a copy of the conclusions arrived at by Maj Gen BROWNING in this talk, ^{prepared} ~~together~~ with a covering letter I had from him on the same subject (Appendix "C").
4. The Chief of Staff of the ITALIAN Army, Gen CADORNA, dealt with the same matter in a recent conversation with an officer of the Military Mission, and his remarks which are very much to the point, are reproduced at Appendix "D".
5. It is clear from these documents that a restatement of the Allied policy on the ITALIAN Army will have to be made to the ITALIAN Gov't ^{and I} propose to take the matter up with the new Head of the Gov't as soon as circumstances permit, incl the question of the choice of a suitable War Minister and the other recommendations made by the G.O.C. Land Forces Sub Commission.
6. (a) Arising out of this is the question of the size of the Army. The figure of 140,000 was originally put fwd by the then War Minister, Count CASATI, as being the minimum indispensable to the country for maintaining internal law and order plus a token force for frontier protection.
- (b) The internal situation is now much more settled, and the elections having taken place without serious disorders, it is quite likely that ^{the ITALIAN War Ministry will now prefer, in view of the scarcity of} ~~the ITALIAN War Ministry will now prefer, in view of the scarcity of~~ ^{from the policies of the left will now be in a} ~~from the policies of the left will now be in a~~ ^{position, NOT to implement the whole of the 140,000 permitted.} ~~position, NOT to implement the whole of the 140,000 permitted.~~

7. In consideration of the situation a decision is required (1) as to whether we should continue to insist on the maintenance of the Italian Army at a minimum (and maximum) of 140,000

(2) if ~~the~~ (we are) not (to insist), (as to whether) what minimum figure is to be fixed, or whether the
 (3) if no minimum figure is to be for Italian Govt can be allowed to reduce the Army to any size required by them.

8. My own recommendations are that we should allow the Italian Govt to ~~reduce the~~ determine the figure themselves & that we should accept 307,000 figure lower than 140,000 if they desire. I think that we can rely on the Govt to accept the advice of the Director of the Land Forces Sub Com (in accordance with the executive directive) sufficiently to prevent the figure being reduced too much. In this respect the GOZ Land Forces Sub Com is of opinion that ~~concerns~~ the needs of the country, having regard to its ^{financial} economic situation, can be met with a force consisting of - - - - -

[to be filled in by GOZ Land Forces Sub Com]

- 582
- (c) ~~It is recommended that~~ Gen CADORNA, representing the ITALIAN military point of view would definitely prefer a smaller and more efficient force; the G.O.C. Land Forces Sub Commission has also recommended that the ITALIAN Gov't cut their suit according to their cloth in the interests of the Army's efficiency.
- (d) The AFHQ Directive governing the size of the ITALIAN Army (AG 091.711 G(SD)-0 of 2 Nov 45) has been interpreted quite literally hitherto, and it has been insisted on that the ITALIANS maintain their Army exactly as laid down by the Allies (vide para (b) of Appendix "A"), except for such alterations within the ceiling approved by AFHQ from time to time.

7. In consideration of the situation which has now arisen I should like to know

- (a) whether we are to continue to insist that the ITALIAN Army be kept up to 140,000?
- (b) If not, what size?
- (c) Can the ITALIAN Gov't reduce the Army to any size it desires?

or

ELLERY W. STONE
USNR
Chief Commissioner..

2141

kept up to 140,000?
(b) If not, what size?
(c) Can the ITALIAN Gov't reduce the Army to any size it desires?

ELLERY W. STONE
USNR
Chief Commissioner...
ALLIED COMMISSION...

Appendix "A" to MMTA letter
dated July 1946

ALLIED POLICY ON THE ITALIAN ARMY

(a) Efficiency of the ITALIAN ARMY (AFHQ Directive of 3 Dec 45
AG 091.711 GCT-0)

Para 1:

1. It is the policy of the United States and British Governments that the ITALIAN Army shall be brought, in the shortest possible time, to a high state of efficiency.

(b) Limitation of size and org of the ITALIAN ARMY. (AFHQ Directive of 2 Nov 45
AG 091.711 G(SD)-0)

Para 7:

7. Organization. During the interim period until the peace treaty becomes operative the ITALIAN Army under the control of the ITALIAN Government will consist of not more than 140,000 personnel and will be organized on the following lines:

(a)	Local and Mobile Reserves (Combat Tps)	
	Three Internal Security Divs, two in SICILY and one in SARDINIA	
	Seven Inf Regts and three ALPINE Regts, one for each Territorial Region on the mainland	90,500
	Five Inf Divs	
(b)	<u>Command</u>	
	Ministry of War and Territorial Region Headquarters	Total..... 9,000
(c)	<u>Administration</u>	Total..... 28,000
(d)	Training and Reinforcements	Total..... 12,500

(a) Local and Mobile Reserves (Combat Tps)

Three Internal Security Divs, two in SICILY and one in SARDINIA

Seven Inf Regts and three ALPINE Regts, one for each Territorial Region on the mainland

90,500

Five Inf Divs

(b) Command

Ministry of War and Territorial Region Headquarters

Total..... 9,000

(c) Administration

Total..... 28,000

(d) Training and Reinforcements

Total..... 12,500

305,000

Para 8:

No alteration to the general lay-out shown above will be made by the ITALIAN Government without the consent of Allied Force Headquarters. Detailed requirements within the above framework will, however, be worked out as a matter of urgency by the ITALIAN Government, as advised by the Land Forces Sub Commission of the Allied Commission (MMIA) and reported to Allied Force Headquarters.

(c) Terms of ref of the Allied Military Mission to the ITALIAN Army (AFHQ Directive of 2 Nov 45 - AG 091.711 G(SD)-O)Para 6(a):6. Military Mission

a. An Allied Military Mission will be provided to advise and assist

580
ALLIED POLICY ON THE ITALIAN ARMY (Cont'd)

(c) (Cont'd)

the ITALIAN Government in the organisation, training and administration of the ITALIAN Army and Carabinieri and to obtain and transmit to superior authority such information as is required. The ITALIAN Government will normally accept the advice of this Mission. If it should find itself unable to do so, the matter will be referred to Allied Force Headquarters by the Allied Military Mission. The Mission will also be responsible for screening those demands for supplies and equipment which continue to be met from Allied military sources, and will exercise supervisory control over the use of such materials.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785617

304

579
B
Appendix A to Land Forces
Sub-Section 10 (MIA) Letter
S/G dated 20 July

SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL

EXTRACT

3. CONCLUSIONS

In 1943-44, the ITALIAN Army touched the bottom of the downward curve, but since then it has definitely started on the long and arduous climb back to normality and greater efficiency despite major crises over manpower, finances etc. There are keen and good officers on the ITALIAN General Staff, and given a chance they will rebuild something good and worthwhile.

I consider, however, the fulfilment of the following conditions a sine qua non for a reliable and efficient ITALIAN Army:-

- (i) Reorganisation of the ITALIAN War Ministry including the elimination of undue political interference in Army matters, and the org of proper staff branches similar to those of the British and American Armies;
- (ii) The recognition and acceptance by the ITALIAN Government that the ITALIAN Army, however small, needs to be encouraged and brought to a high state of efficiency, and that the Army must have whatever funds the country can afford for this purpose; and the corollary;
- (iii) that the size of the Army be related to the amount of funds available, i.e. cutting their suit according to their cloth, and not first fixing the size of the Army and then trying to run it on pauper lines with whatever funds the Government chooses to allow;
- (iv) the elimination at an early date of surplus and inefficient officers and NCOs, and the creation of a proper cadet college on modern lines;
- (v) the introduction of better terms of service, pay and promotion for all ranks with a view to:

- eliminating some of the graft and dishonesty (the result of poor terms of service) which has always been the rule, and
- attracting good types and providing an incentive to do well in an Army career i.e. associated

that the Army must have whatever funds the country can afford for this purpose; and the corollary:

(iii) that the size of the Army be related to the amount of funds available, i.e. cutting their suit according to their cloth, and not first fixing the size of the Army and then trying to run it on paper lines with whatever funds the Government chooses to allow;

(iv) the elimination at an early date of surplus and inefficient officers and NCOs, and the creation of a proper cadet college on modern lines;

(v) the introduction of better terms of service, pay and promotion for all ranks with a view to:

- eliminating some of the graft and dishonesty (the result of poor terms of service) which has always been the rule, and
- stereotyping good types and providing an incentive to do well in an Army career - i.e. accelerated promotion for those who deserve it;

(vi) the introduction of a 3 - 5 year term of service for a proportion of the tradesmen and Gns.

(vii) An early decision by the Allies on the question of the supply of Allied arms, men and AFVs for the future.

(viii) The continuance, if possible, in some form of Allied technical assistance and supervision, possibly bound up with and conditional on the provision of Allied weapons of war.

[In this talk I have only been able to touch on certain major aspects of this vast and fascinating problem of the evolution of a new Italian Army practically from scratch. I hope I have not given too gloomy a picture. The Italian Army is and always will be below Allied standards. But I have great hopes for the future. The new Army is shaping well and stands a good chance of being better than ever before. Working and fighting alongside the Allies the ITALIANS have learned some valuable lessons.

...../2

578

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

I feel the way to judge them is not so much by their past showing, as by what they are capable of if properly trained, equipped and led. They have achieved much out of chaos in the short space of two years, and will achieve much more providing they continue to receive help and guidance and understanding from the Allies - both British and American.

which brings me to my last point. ITALY has a population of 45 millions, a great reserve of manpower, occupying a vital strategic point on our Mediterranean communications, and a position this side of the iron curtain. As was shown at the elections, the majority of ITALIANS are looking towards the West. They have been encouraged in this by our realistic attitude since the Armistice, by our trying to forget the past and looking to the future. As I see it it must pay us to continue this policy. It must pay us to assist the new Republican ITALY in whatever way we can. By supplying her with our surplus weapons of war, for instance, even though we should receive little or nothing in exchange, we should ensure continuity of Allied friendship and influence with the ITALIAN Army and indirectly with the ITALIAN nation. This would also enable the ITALIAN Government to devote to reconstruction of the country those resources which would otherwise have to go to the manufacture of armaments. I am sure the ITALIANS would appreciate this. They are unlikely to forget that CAMBRIDGE's course was true in this last war.

British and American sympathy just now - practical sympathy - is all important. Mr. Catullo says that - he gives twice what stays quickly. ITALY is on the boundary between EAST and WEST, and I am very certain that as an Allied investment, ITALY and the ITALIAN ARMY are capable of yielding a valuable dividend.

302

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

any and indirectly with the ITALIAN nation. We would also enable the ITALIAN Government to devote to reconstruction of the country those resources which would otherwise have to go to the manufacture of armaments. I am sure the ITALIANS would appreciate this. They are unlikely to forget that CARBONALI's career came true in this last war.

British and American sympathy just now - practical sympathy - is all important. We cut out cito det - he gives twice who gives quickly. ITALY is on the boundary between EAST and WEST, and I am very certain that as an Allied investment, ITALY and the ITALIAN ARMY are capable of yielding a valuable dividend.

100

302

CONFIDENTIAL

20 June 1986

CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix C to Annex 571
 Lyle-Comm-De (new)
 By dated 21 July 45

9/6

Major General L. BROOKING, CB, CBE, MC

Land Forces Sub-Comm, A.C. (M.H.I.A.),

R O M E.

21 June 1945

Dear Lush

1. You will have seen a copy of the talk I prepared for Field Marshal BOWEN. His visit has now been cancelled and the talk is off. Nevertheless, the conclusions on pages 17-19 of my script (attached as Appendix 'A' for convenience) still hold good, and it is on this subject that I am writing to you today.

2. Since nothing has been said to the contrary, I take it that it is still the policy of the US and BRITISH Governments that the ITALIAN Army (or such as since as can reasonably be maintained by the ITALIAN Government) shall be brought to a high state of efficiency in the shortest possible time (vide A7ER Directive AG. 091.741 503-0 of 3 Dec 45 para 1). This is the basic directive for the work of the Military Mission.

The Allies further expect that the action of the Mission will normally be accepted by the Italian Government (vide A7ER Directive AG. 091.741 5(10)-0 of 2 Nov 45 para 6).

3. If the Military Mission is to accomplish the task it has been set by GCS it is essential that the conditions 1 - VIII I have set out in my conclusions as a sine qua non for a reliable and efficient ITALIAN Army are all fulfilled. The last two of these conditions are dependent on the Allies, but the first six are the responsibility of the ITALIAN Government.

4. Hitherto the ITALIAN War Ministry has always accepted our advice on purely military matters, but these particular outstanding questions all have a political or financial angle, which precludes a decision or action by the War Minister alone.

5. During the past two years I have had to deal with four different War Ministers, the first a soldier and the last three civilians. There has been little or no continuity in the direction of ITALIAN Army affairs on the ITALIAN side and successive Ministers have been far more concerned with the political scene

the Allies further expect that the advice of the Italian Government (vide AMHQ Directive AC.091.741 G(DD)-O of 2 Nov 45 para 5).

3. If the military mission is to accomplish the task it has been set by OCS it is essential that the conditions 1 - VIII I have set out in my conclusions as a sine qua non for a reliable and efficient ITALIAN Army are all fulfilled. The last two of these conditions are dependent on the Allies, but the first six are the responsibility of the ITALIAN Government.

4. Hitherto the ITALIAN War Ministry has always accepted our advice on purely military matters, but these particular outstanding questions all have a political or financial angle, which precludes a decision or action by the War Minister alone.

301

5. During the past two years I have had to deal with four different War Ministers, the first a soldier and the last three civilians. There has been little or no continuity in the direction of ITALIAN Army affairs on the ITALIAN side and successive Ministers have been far more concerned with the political scene than with the efficiency and welfare of the ITALIAN Army.

6. We have now come to a new cross-roads with the forthcoming appointment of yet another War Minister (the fifth since the Armistice) but this time with an elected Government. This gives us the opportunity to crystallize the policy of the ITALIAN Government as regards the Army and put things right. If the Allied policy is still as in para 2 above, I suggest the whole question should be discussed with the Head of the ITALIAN Government before the new War Minister is appointed and an assurance obtained that the ITALIAN Government recognizes the situation and is prepared to do what is necessary to set the Army on its feet. Otherwise, as I say, the policy of the OCS can NOT be fulfilled.

7. Now seems to me the psychological moment for such action, and I therefore recommend:-

See 587

...../2

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

7. (cont)

- (a) that the new War Minister be someone of outstanding organizing ability, whose interests are pre-eminently in the Army and RAF in politics;
- (b) that he be given a policy directive by the ITALIAN Government to cover the specific points I have mentioned in my conclusions.

Yours

sincerely

L. B.

Brigadier M. S. LUEL, CB, CBE, MC,
Executive Commissioner,
HQ Allied Commission.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

300

Brigadier M. S. LUEL, CB, CBE, MC,
Executive Commission,
HQ Allied Commission.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Appendix 'D' to 515
 Land Forces Sub-Comm
 AC (MMA) letter
 G/6 dated July 46

as folio 1 of this
 file (8251/EC)

2953

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

299

2156

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

CONFIDENTIAL

568

DO/2

From: - Major General L. BROWNING, CB, CBE, MC.

LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION, A.C. (MIA)

26 June 1946

Dear

LUSH

On the same day as I sent you my letter of 21 Jun, ref G/6, - though after it had been written -, my liaison officer had a routine meeting with Gen CADORNA, at which the future of the ITALIAN Army was discussed.

I am sending you at Appx "A" a copy of Maj RAUMANN's report of the conversation, as CADORNA's remarks have much in common with my own conclusions. In view of CADORNA's frankness, would you please consider the report as very confidential.

Yours

Sincerely

Langley Browning

Brigadier M.S. LUSH, CB, CBE, MC,
Executive Commissioner,
ALLIED COMMISSION

/cc

see M 298
567-572

567
CONFIDENTIAL

Liaison with War Ministry (a SMRE)

21 June 46

Gen CADORNA

The Chief of the Army Staff prefaced his remarks by saying that the Italian Army and the Military Mission are now up against a brick wall, and without the necessary decisions and agreements on the highest levels he considered that no further progress was possible.

He did not know what the terms of reference of the Military Mission would be hereafter, but the position certainly needed clarifying.

He, Cadorna, had been in the Allied Commission supervising the disarmament of the German Army after the previous war, and knew what was done then. MILA on the other hand seemed to have the task of preventing the Italian Army from falling below 140,000 ~~men~~. This did not make sense to him.

The Italian Govt might well ask on what grounds the Allies can compel the Italians to maintain an Army of a given size. If there is a place for ITALY in the Allied scheme of things, the Italian Govt will need to be persuaded of the Allied interest by some tangible evidence in the form of material help, expert, loans etc.

To try and impose a decision of this sort, on the political people or persuade them willy nilly of the need for an efficient Army, just won't work, according to Cadorna, as with the double reins of financial and political control in their hands they can stultify any Allied decisions or intentions regarding their Army.

Between military men, Cadorna continued, it is always possible to come to a clear-cut understanding, but the political people have ways of their own of procrastination and evasive action which will defeat anything they have set their minds against.

Cadorna stated that he considered the reorg of the War Ministry most urgent and vital. That part of the Italian Army in the field which had been under Allied command had in effect been administered by the Allies while under their command. With the handing back of these units to the Italian Govt the administration had passed to the Italian central authorities, whose org and outlook dated back to pre-Allied days. It was useless for the Mission to try and reorg the Italian Army through the medium of the existing central org, as the political people could or would obstruct the Mission's work at will.

In fact, with things as they are now it was his opinion that the good accomplished by the Allies in the field would rapidly be undone and the whole Army revert to type. Cadorna continued to

people or persuade them. With the double Army, just won't work, according to Cadorna, as with the double reins of financial and political control in their hands they can stultify any Allied decisions or intentions regarding their Army.

Between military men, Cadorna continued, it is always possible to come to a clear-cut understanding, but the political people have ways of their own of premeditation and evasive action which will defeat anything they have set their minds against.

Cadorna stated that he considered the reorg of the War Ministry most urgent and vital. That part of the Italian Army in the field which had been under Allied command had in effect been administered by the Allies while under their command. With the handing back of these units to the Italian Govt the administration had passed to the Italian central authorities, whose org and outlook dated back to pre-Allied days. It was useless for the Mission to try and reorg the Italian Army through the medium of the existing central org, as the political people could or would obstruct the Mission's work at will.

In fact, with things as they are now it was his opinion that the good accomplished by the Allies in the field would rapidly be undone and the whole Army revert to type. Cadorna continued to say that he had been convinced all along of the need for a definite agreement about the Italian Army on the highest political-foreign office level. Until this is achieved nothing can be settled.

He said the officers on his staff were good chaps and very keen, but he had had to remind them at times to keep things in the right proportions, and not become over-involved in discussions with them as to whether the 6 pr guns should be in the Inf Bn or in the Div Arty, when the vital issues affecting the future of the whole Army and its very existence were still undecided.

Cadorna reiterated his view that the Italian Army ought to be cut right down to whatever size the Italian Govt could afford, with the emphasis on better quality of the cadres and higher standard of training. It was of little importance to Italy today, and for some years to come he thought, whether the Italian Army was 140,000 or very much less.

If necessary, he would keep only the training cadres in being!

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

SECRET

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Ref.: 3251/23

1 July 1946

I have discussed your letter No. 6/6 of 21 June on the subject of the future of the ITALIAN army with the Chief Commissioner.

We both agree with your two recommendations as it is undoubtedly the policy of the U.S. and U.K. Governments that the ITALIAN army shall be brought to a high state of efficiency, but I should hesitate to say that this is the policy of the French and USSR Governments who are co-negotiators in the present peace treaty, and I think it is perhaps going too far to expect that the conditions mentioned in paragraph 3 shall be carried out "as essential and *non* que non, etc".

I think that it would not be politic to extract conditions from the Prime Minister before he considers appointing his Service Ministers, although I do think a hint, and a broad one, could be made that Service Ministers in the new Government should be good administrators rather than politicians.

The rest is very much a matter for your Service Sub-Commission to carry out itself and the Chief Commissioner realises that it will be a laborious process.

The Chief Commissioner will, however, bear all this in mind when the question of appointment of Service Ministers in the new Government is raised.

M. S. LUSH

Major General L. Browning C.B., O.B.E., M.C.,
Lead Forces Sub-Commission A.C., (AMIA).
Reas.

296

see 1956/4/565

see 19588

PA 2/2

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Office of the Chief Commissioner

APO 334 794

Ref: 8251/556/PO.

28 June 1946.

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

The release from the Army during the months of July and August of the 1922 and 1923 classes is going to have a serious effect on the efficiency of the Italian Army in that the Army will lose a dangerously high proportion of its NCO's and Specialists.

The War Ministry has been fully alive to this and prepared a scheme eight months ago for retaining 10,000 of these key personnel as long service volunteers.

In order to secure the necessary volunteers an adequate rate of pay is essential in order to make service in the Army sufficiently attractive.

The War Ministry's proposals, which provide rates varying from L.20 to L.80 per day according to the nature of the service, call for an additional annual expenditure of 160 million lire, which the Treasury have up till now been unable to approve.

If the Italian Army is to remain after July at a reasonable state of efficiency, I consider it essential that Treasury approval for the new rates of pay for volunteer long service specialists and NCO's be given immediately, and I am therefore writing to you to ask if you will kindly intervene in the matter.

I understand that the Italian Air Force is faced with the same problem but on a very much smaller scale. The problem does not arise with the Italian Navy.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Dr. Alcide de Gasperi,
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government,
ROME.

Copy to: Chief Commissioner
Land Force S/c
Air Force S/c

295

295

PA 28
205

9/6

Major General L. BROWNING, CB, OBE, MC

Land Forces Sub-Comm, A.C. (M.M.I.A.),

R O M E.

2/ June 1945

Dear *Lush*

1. You will have seen a copy of the talk I prepared for Field Marshal MONTGOMERY. His visit has now been cancelled and the talk is off. Nevertheless, the conclusions on pages 17-19 of my script (attached as Appendix 'A' for convenience) still hold good, and it is on this subject that I am writing to you today.

2. Since nothing has been said to the contrary, I take it that it is still the policy of the US and BRITISH Governments that the ITALIAN Army (of such as size as can reasonably be maintained by the ITALIAN Government) shall be brought to a high state of efficiency in the shortest possible time (vide AFHQ Directive AG. 091.711 GCT-0 of 3 Dec 45 para 1). This is the basic directive for the work of the Military Mission.

The Allies further expect that the advice of the Mission will normally be accepted by the Italian Government (vide AFHQ Directive AG. 091.711 G(SD)-0 of 2 Nov 45 para 6).

3. If the Military Mission is to accomplish the task it has been set by CCS it is essential that the conditions 1 - VIII I have set out in my conclusions as a sine qua non for a reliable and efficient ITALIAN Army are all fulfilled. The last two of these conditions are dependent on the Allies, but the first six are the responsibility of the ITALIAN Government.

4. Hitherto the ITALIAN War Ministry has always accepted our advice on purely military matters, but these particular outstanding questions all have a political or financial angle, which precludes a decision or action by the War Minister alone.

5. During the past two years I have had to deal with four different War Ministers, the first a soldier and the last three civilians. There has been little or no continuity in the direction of ITALIAN Army affairs on the ITALIAN side and successive Ministers have been far more concerned with the political scene

The Allies further expect that the advice of the Mission will normally be accepted by the Italian Government (vide AFHQ Directive AG.091.711 G(SD)-0 of 2 Nov 45 para 6).

3. If the Military Mission is to accomplish the task it has been set by CCS it is essential that the conditions 1 - VIII I have set out in my conclusions as a sine qua non for a reliable and efficient ITALIAN Army are all fulfilled. The last two of these conditions are dependent on the Allies, but the first six are the responsibility of the ITALIAN Government.

4. Hitherto the ITALIAN War Ministry has always accepted our advice on purely military matters, but these particular outstanding questions all have a political or financial angle, which precludes a decision or action by the War Minister alone.

5. During the past two years I have had to deal with four different War Ministers, the first a soldier and the last three civilians. There has been little or no continuity in the direction of ITALIAN Army affairs on the ITALIAN side and successive Ministers have been far more concerned with the political scene than with the efficiency and welfare of the ITALIAN Army. 294

6. We have now come to a new cross-roads with the forthcoming appointment of yet another War Minister (the fifth since the Armistice) but this time with an elected Government. This gives us the opportunity to crystallize the policy of the ITALIAN Government as regards the Army and put things right. If the Allied policy is still as in para 2 above, I suggest the whole question should be discussed with the Head of the ITALIAN Government before the new War Minister is appointed and an assurance obtained that the ITALIAN Government recognises the situation and is prepared to do what is necessary to set the Army on its feet. Otherwise, as I say, the policy of the CCS can NOT be fulfilled.

7. Now seems to me the psychological moment for such action, and I therefore recommend:-

See in 5589

7.561

...../2

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

7. (cont)

- (a) that the new War Minister be someone of outstanding organising ability, whose interests are pre-dominantly in the Army and NOT in politics;
- (b) that he be given a policy directive by the ITALIAN Government to cover the specific points I have mentioned in my conclusions.

Yours Sincerely

Langley Browning

Brigadier M. S. LUSH, CB, CHE, MC,
 Executive Commissioner,
 HQ Allied Commission.

2 1 6 4

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Langley Browning

Brigadier M. S. LUSH, CE, CEE, MC,
Executive Commissioner,
HQ Allied Commission.

293

EXTRACT8. CONCLUSIONS

In 1943-44 the ITALIAN Army touched the bottom of the downward curve, but since then it has definitely started on the long and arduous climb back to normality and greater efficiency despite major crises over man-power, finance etc. There are keen and good officers on the ITALIAN General Staff, and given a chance they will rebuild something good and worthwhile.

I consider, however, the fulfillment of the following conditions a sine qua non for a reliable and efficient ITALIAN Army:-

(i) Reorganisation of the ITALIAN War Ministry including the elimination of undue political interference in Army matters, and the org of proper staff branches similar to those of the British and American Armies;

(ii) The recognition and acceptance by the ITALIAN Government that the ITALIAN Army, however small, needs to be encouraged and brought to a high state of efficiency, and that the Army must have whatever funds the country can afford for this purpose; and the corollary:

(iii) that the size of the Army be related to the amount of funds available, i.e. cutting their suit according to their cloth, and NOT first fixing the size of the Army and then trying to run it on pauper lines with whatever funds the Government chooses to allow;

(iv) the elimination at an early date of surplus and inefficient officers and NCOs, and the creation of a proper cadet college on modern lines;

(v) the introduction of better terms of service, pay and promotion for all ranks with a view to:

- eliminating some of the graft and dishonesty (the result of poor terms of service) which has always been the rule, and
- attracting good types and providing an incentive to do well in an Army career - i.e. accelerated promotion for those who deserve it.

Appendix 'A' to Land Forces
Sub-Committee, AC (MIA) letter
G/6 dated 2/ Jun 46

292

ment that the ITALIAN Army, however small, needs to be encouraged and brought to a high state of efficiency, and that the Army must have whatever funds the country can afford for this purpose; and the corollary:

(iii) that the size of the Army be related to the amount of funds available, i.e. cutting their suit according to their cloth, and NOT first fixing the size of the Army and then trying to run it on pauper lines with whatever funds the Government chooses to allow;

(iv) the elimination at an early date of surplus and inefficient officers and NCOs, and the creation of a proper cadet college on modern lines;

(v) the introduction of better terms of service, pay and promotion for all ranks with a view to:

- eliminating some of the graft and dishonesty (292 the result of poor terms of service) which has always been the rule, and
- attracting good types and providing an incentive to do well in an Army career - i.e. accelerated promotion for those who deserve it;

(vi) the introduction of a 5 - 5 year term of service for a proportion of the tradesmen and ORs.

(vii) An early decision by the Allies on the question of the supply of Allied arms, amm and AFVs for the future.

(viii) The continuance, if possible, in some form of Allied technical assistance and supervision, possibly bound up with and conditional on the provision of Allied weapons of war.

In this talk I have only been able to touch on certain major aspects of this vast and fascinating problem of the evolution of a new ITALIAN Army practically from scratch. I hope I have not given too gloomy a picture. The ITALIAN Army is and always will be below Allied standards. But I have great hopes for the future. The new Army is shaping well and stands a good chance of being better than ever before. Working and fighting alongside the ALLIES the ITALIANS have learned some valuable lessons.

SECRET

- 2 -

I feel the way to judge them is NOT so much by their past showing, as by what they are capable of if properly trained, equipped and led. They have achieved much out of chaos in the short space of two years, and will achieve much more providing they continue to receive help and guidance and understanding from the Allies - both British and American.

Which brings me to my last point. ITALY has a population of 45 millions, a great reserve of man-power, occupying a vital strategic point on our Mediterranean communications, and a bastion this side of the iron curtain. As was shown at the elections, the majority of ITALIANS are looking towards the West. They have been encouraged in this by our realistic attitude since the Armistice, by our trying to forget the past and looking to the future. As I see it it must pay us to continue this policy. It must pay us to assist the new Republican ITALY in whatever way we can. By supplying her with our surplus weapons of war, for instance, even though we should receive little or nothing in exchange, we should ensure continuity of Allied friendship and influence with the ITALIAN Army and indirectly with the ITALIAN nation. This would also enable the ITALIAN Government to devote to reconstruction of the country those resources which would otherwise have to go to the manufacture of armaments. I am sure the ITALIANS would appreciate this. They are unlikely to forget that GARIBALDI's curse came true in this last war.

British and American sympathy just now - practical sympathy - is all important. Bis dat qui cito dat - he gives twice who gives quickly. ITALY is on the boundary between EAST and WEST, and I am very certain that as an Allied investment, ITALY and the ITALIAN ARMY are capable of yielding a valuable dividend.

290

enable the ITALIAN Government to devote to reconstruction of the country those resources which would otherwise have to go to the manufacture of armaments. I am sure the ITALIANS would appreciate this. They are unlikely to forget that CARIBALDI's curse came true in this last war.

British and American sympathy just now - practical sympathy - is all important. Bis dat qui cito dat - he gives twice who gives quickly. ITALY is on the boundary between EAST and WEST, and I am very certain that as an Allied investment, ITALY and the ITALIAN ARMY are capable of yielding a valuable dividend.

290

20 June 1946

8251
Subject : Specialists for Italian Army

Land Forces Sub-Comm. A.C.
(M.M.I.A.) ROME.

A 016

20 Jun. '46.

JUN 20 1946

To : Executive Commissioner,
HQ Allied Commission.

551
Ref. your 8251/EC dated 17 June '46.

1. The Navy Sub-Commission have no conscripts to speak of and will not therefore ask for any additional expenditure.
2. The Air Force Sub-Commission on the other hand state that the Italian Air Force are lacking specialists in the same way as the Army and will have to apply for the retention of Specialists on some special terms, but in view of the small size of the Air Force, numbers and expense will not be large.
3. To be in a position to function properly the Army must retain these Specialists and I would like the Prime Minister approached in the matter as soon as possible whether or not it is thought to be creating a precedent.

See in SS 3-5. Also
John SSb.
D. Browning
Major General,
M.M.I.A.

289

af
(CPT K) /as

2170

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

8251

file
551

Ref: 8251/EO.

17 June 1946.

SUBJECT: Specialists for Italian Army.

TO : GOC, Land Forces S/C (MIA).

550

I refer to your letter A 046 of 13 June 1946.

1. A normal Treasury official would be nervous of the precedent to be set up by the Ministry of War proposals via a via the other Armed Services.

2. It would strengthen the Chief Commissioner's letter if he could add that this will not set up such a precedent because the other services are not in the same situation. Could you, after consultation with other Service Sub-Commissioner, draft such an additional paragraph.

550A returned

M S LUSH

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

ML/39.

See F-552

288 287

PA 20
b
no.

OK

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Big haul
Do you care?
WWS
CC

17/VI

8251

Major General L. BROWNING, CB, OBE, MC.
Land Forces Sub-Commission A.C.,
(M.N.I.A.) R O M E

A 016

13 June 1946.

JUN 15 RECD

550

Dear Admiral,

The enclosed draft letter which I would like you to send to the Prime Minister speaks for itself.

It is no exaggeration to say that unless an adequate number of NCOs and specialists of the 1922 and 1923 classes can be induced to remain in the army, the efficiency of the Italian Army will drop to a point which would make it unable to undertake active operations in any form. In view of the short time available in which to publish the new terms and canvas and obtain the necessary volunteers before they are due for release, prompt action by the Prime Minister and Treasury is essential,

Yours *Very Sincerely*

Langley Browning

The Chief Commissioner,
HQ, Allied Commission.

/go.

See 551-552
in 553-555
folio 116

287

File 547

Ref. : 8254/547/MG.

June 1946.

My Dear Mr Prime Minister,

With reference to my letter No. 8257/40 dated 16 May on the subject of the financing of 803 CE Battalion.

I would appreciate the assurance requested in the fourth paragraph of that letter at your earliest convenience.

Yours Very Truly,

NA sent. Dr. Bombassei will
communicate verbally
18/6.

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

Dector Alcide De Gasperi,
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government,
Rome.

Copy to:- Land Forces S/C
Chief Commissioner

see 11548, 549

286

PA. 18/6

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

~~7239~~ 8251
SUBJECT: MMLA Directive No. 2 (G/7 dated 7 Dec 45)

C. Brown
Ex. Comm.
Poland (A)
(13)
C. A. Lee
Kum Lee

~~546~~
546

LAND FORCES SUB CON, A.C. (MMLA)

G/7

17 May 46

TO : Distribution below

MAY 18 1946

Amendment No. 5 to MMLA Directive No. 2.

1. Appendix "E" - DELETE para 7 and substitute:

"COURT MARTIAL and COURTS OF INQUIRY matters will be referred direct to local Area HQ, copy to HQ MMLA - Courts of Inquiry however regarding loss or damage to stores, vehicles etc held on charge of this HQ will continue to be referred to HQ MMLA"

2. Appendix "F" - after para 9 - ADD new sub para 9 (a) as under:

"Marriage Applications"

- 9 (a) Applications for permission to marry will NOT be referred to HQ MMLA except for information - Procedure as outlined in Marriage Regulations CMF issued as Appendix "A" to GRO 258/46 will be followed with particular reference to para 5!

3. Appendix "F" para 10 - DELETE sub para (a).

4. Appendix "F" para 10 - re-letter remaining paras (a) and (b) respectively.

Amended.

285

Major General,
M. M. I. A.

/jw

DISTRIBUTION:

- 9/ seen by (5/20/46)
List "A" (less Serials 9, 10, 11, 18, 19)
List "B" (2 copies)
List "C" (6 copies to Serial 1)

PT 15
3
GRP

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394

~~SECRET~~ 545

Ref: 8251/20

16 May 1946

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am informed that the Minister of Finance has directed the Minister of War to reduce the budget of 808 OS Battalion from 6,000,000 to 2,000,000 per month.

I am directed to remind you that under the terms of the handover of the Italian Army to the control of the Italian Government 808 OS Battalion was retained under the operational control of the Supreme Allied Commander.

In view of the adverse effect on the efficiency of the Battalion, which such a reduction in its budget would have, I am to request that you take immediate steps to have the direction of the Minister of Finance suspended pending further consideration of this question.

Please furnish an assurance that in the meantime the budget will remain at its present figure of 6,000,000 lire.

I am further to inform you that the Supreme Allied Commander will be prepared to consider any proposals which the Italian Government may care to submit for the reduction of expenditure on the Battalion, and to ask that you submit any such proposals without delay.

Yours very truly,

[Sgd] KILBURN W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Doctor Alcide De Gasperi,
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government,
Rome.

284

See 547
copy to: Land Forces S/C.
to Commissioner.

~~SECRET~~

8251

8252

Ev Comm 337

CIPHER

F 65515

N/ 2508

301705 B

MAY 1 0900

CONFIDENTIAL

IMPORTANT

AFHQ, SIGNED SAGMED
ALCOM ROME.

HEADQUARTERS
1 MAY 1946

MAY 1 1946

~~SECRET~~

THIS HQ HAS BEEN INFORMED THAT THE ITALIAN MINISTER OF FINANCE HAS DIRECTED THE MINISTER OF WAR TO REDUCE THE BUDGET OF 808 GS BATTALION FROM 6000000 TO 2000000 LIRE PER MONTH. PLEASE BRING THIS MATTER TO THE ATTENTION OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND REMIND HIM THAT UNDER THE TERMS OF THE HANDOVER OF THE ITALIAN ARMY TO THE CONTROL OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT 808 GS BATTALION WAS RETAINED UNDER SAGMED'S OPERATIONAL CONTROL. IN VIEW OF THE ADVERSE AFFECT ON THE EFFICIENCY OF THE BATTALION WHICH SUCH A REDUCTION IN ITS BUDGET IS BOUND TO HAVE YOU SHOULD REQUEST THE PRIME MINISTER TO TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS TO HAVE THE DIRECTION OF THE MINISTER OF FINANCE SUSPENDED PENDING REFERENCE TO THIS HQ. AND TO FURNISH AN ASSURANCE THAT IN THE MEANTIME THE BUDGET WILL REMAIN AT ITS PRESENT FIGURE OF 6000000 LIRE. AT THE SAME TIME IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR THAT THIS HQ WILL BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER ANY PROPOSALS WHICH THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT MAY CARE TO SUBMIT FOR THE REDUCTION OF EXPENDITURE ON THE BATTALION. AN EARLY REPORT ON THE PRIME MINISTERS REACTIONS TO YOUR APPROACH IS REQUESTED.

ENTER TELEGRAM

Not to be distributed outside Government Departments or committed even in Cipher without approval. (Messages marked O.T.P. need not be paraphrased)

AC DIST
ACTION: ~~PLEASE~~ LAND FORCES

INFO: CHIEF COMMISSIONER

EX COMMISSIONER

ECON SEC

L FORCES

FOIA D A

B

~~SECRET~~

M 538-544

97545

283

SKELTON

(CAPT K)

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Office of the Chief Commissioner

APO 394

Ref: 8251/535/EG.

6 May 1946.

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

As you know, the strength of the interim Italian Army was fixed by the Allies at 140,000, exclusive of 75,000 Carabinieri.

This figure of 140,000 was determined after discussion with the then War Minister GARATI as representing the minimum Italian needs, both for internal security and defence of the frontiers under existing circumstances.

I need hardly say that it is as much to the interest of Italy as for the Allies that the Italian Army should be maintained at approximately that figure. Allowing for the inevitable overhead non-combatant troops (such as Ministry of War, Territorial Region Headquarters, administrative troops, etc) required to direct the Army and the large number of recruits under training at any moment, the potential fighting troops are the minimum necessary to achieve the object in view. Any reduction in the total strength must fall on these potential fighting troops.

It is therefore with some disquiet that I am informed by my Land Forces Sub-Commission that the War Ministry have been asked by the Cabinet to consider a possible reduction of the strength of the Army from 140,000 to 100,000, or even 80,000.

The reason for this, I understand, is financial. I fully appreciate the necessity of exercising economy. Yet I must point out that there are some 55,000 civilians in the Ministry of War of which the great majority is completely redundant to the Army needs but who are costed against the Army budget.

I must therefore make clear to you that while appreciating your financial difficulties, the Allies cannot consider a reduction of the Army strength below approximately 140,000 while there is this large number of redundant civilians carried on the Army budget.

I shall be glad to have your remarks on the above at an early date on this important matter.

Very truly yours,

Copy to: C. Comr.
Land Forces
Sub-Com (Ref your
G/6/1 dated 2 May)

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief Commissioner

Dr. Alcide de Gasperi,
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government,
Rome.

282 28

8251-81
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 LAND FORCES SUB COM, A.C. (MIA)

G/6/1

2 May 46

MAY 3 1946

TO : H.Q. A.C. (for Executive Commissioner)

Ref your 8251/527/EC dated 30 April :-

1. I will take up at once personally and orally with the Minister of War, the matter of political interference in the Army. At the same time I am very glad to know that the Chief Commissioner will discuss the matter with the P.M. on the highest level. This undoubtedly in fact will be more effective than any action of mine with EROSIO.
2. Herewith at Appx "A" a suggested letter for the Chief Commissioner to send to the Prime Minister as regards possible ITALIAN ideas to reduce the strength of the Army.
3. I agree that big negotiations proceed slowly with the ITALIAN Gov't, particularly at this critical political period. I felt however that I should keep you informed of our difficulties in "getting a move on".
4. I agree, after your remarks, as regards the psychological timing of any announcement by the Government or the Luogotenente on the matter of the loyalty of the armed Forces. I do however suggest that the actual phrasing of the announcement(s) be considered carefully now so that these will be ready, after due consideration, for issue when the moment arrives.
5. As regards nomination of the Service Ministers, I will reply on receipt of your communication which has not yet reached me.

A. Brown

Major General
 M M I A

3. I agree that big negotiations proceed slowly with the ITALIAN Gov't, particularly at this critical political period. I felt however that I should keep you informed of our difficulties in "getting a move on".

4. I agree, after your remarks, as regards the psychological timing of any announcement by the Government or the Luogotenente on the matter of the loyalty of the armed Forces. I do however suggest that the actual phrasing of the announcement(s) be considered carefully now so that these will be ready, after due consideration, for issue when the moment arrives.

5. As regards nomination of the Service Ministers, I will reply on receipt of your communication which has not yet reached me.

LE/cc

L. Brown

Major General
M M I A

See M. 532-3-4-6

4535

281

8
(CART K)

SECRET

Appx "A" to MIA letter
C/6/1 dated 2 May 46

SUBJECT : Strength of the ITALIAN Army

My dear Mr Prime Minister,

1. As you know, the strength of the interim ITALIAN Army was fixed by the Allies at 140,000, exclusive of 75,000 Carabinieri.

2. This figure of 140,000 was ^{definitely} decided on after discussion with the then War Minister Count CASATI as representing the minimum ITALIAN needs, both for internal security and defence of the frontiers under existing circumstances.

3. I need hardly say that it is as much to the interest of ITALY as for the ALLIES that the ITALIAN Army should be maintained at approximately that figure. Allowing for the inevitable over head ^{non-combatant numbers} (such as Ministry of War, Territorial Region HQ's, Administrative troops etc) to direct the Army and the large number of recruits under training at any moment, the potential fighting troops are the minimum necessary to achieve the object in view. Any reduction in the total strength must fall on these potential fighting troops.

4. (a) It is therefore with some disquiet that I am informed by my Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C., that the War Ministry have been asked by the Cabinet to consider a possible reduction of the strength of the Army from 140,000 to 100,000 or even 80,000.

(b) The reason for this, I understand, is financial. Yet I must point out that there are some 55,000 civilians of which the ^{great} majority are completely redundant to the Army needs but ^{also} are costed against the Army Budget and when, I understand, it is considered necessary to retain for political reasons,

5. I must therefore make clear to you that, while appreciating your financial difficulties, the ALLIES cannot countenance or consider a reduction of the Army strength below approximately 140,000 while there is this large number of redundant civilians carried on the Army Budget.

6. I shall be glad to have your remarks on the subject as I consider the matter of great importance.

that figure. Allowing for the inevitable over head non-coexisting members troops
(such as Ministry of War, Territorial Region HQ's, Administrative troops
etc), to direct the Army and the large number of recruits under training at
any moment, the potential fighting troops are the minimum necessary to
achieve the object in view. Any reduction in the total strength must fall
on these potential fighting troops.

4. (a) It is therefore with some disquiet that I am informed by my
Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C., that the War Ministry have been
asked by the Cabinet to consider a possible reduction of the
strength of the Army from 140,000 to 100,000 or even 80,000.
9 fully of force the necessity of maintaining
(b) The reason for this, I understand, is financial. Yet I
must point out that there are some 55,000 civilians of which the great
majority are completely redundant to the Army needs but who have
costed against the Army Budget and whom, I understand, it is
considered necessary to retain for political reasons.

5. I must therefore make clear to you that, while appreciating your
financial difficulties, the ALLIES cannot countenance or consider a reduction
of the Army strength below approximately 140,000 while there is this large
number of redundant civilians carried on the Army Budget.

6. I shall be glad to have your remarks on the above at an early date,
as I consider the matter a most important and urgent one.

in this important matter Yours sincerely,

280

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL 528
30 April 1946

Ref: 8251/527/EC.

525

I have studied your letter G/6 of 25 April on the political influences in the Italian Army and have discussed it briefly with the Chief Commissioner.

The question of prevention of political interference in the Army and particularly as regards recruits is one which the Admiral would like you to take up with the Minister for War himself. I would suggest that an oral communication would be better than anything in writing. At the same time the Admiral will speak to the Prime Minister without making an issue of the matter at that level.

With regard to the reduction in strength of the Army mentioned in paras 5(d) and (k), the Chief Commissioner agrees that this should again be brought to the notice of the Prime Minister in addition to any communication that you may make to the Minister for War. You will remember that De Gasperi has told the Admiral that it is not his intention to reduce the Army below 140,000 but as in most countries the Treasury is bound to make an attempt to reduce expenditure and the armed forces are an obvious target. The Admiral agrees that we should write a letter to the Prime Minister saying that the figure of 140,000 must be maintained and that the necessary financial economies should be made by reducing the number of civilians and retiring the 5,000 senior regular officers (see your paras 5(d) and (e) rather than by reducing the effective strength of the Army. Would you be good enough to have such a letter prepared.

With regards to points 5(f), (i), (j), it seems that you have achieved, after slow negotiations, two points and that you are on the way to acquiring the specialists. As in most matters connected with the Italian Government these negotiations do take a great deal of time and I would say that there is nothing further to be done except to be thankful for what can be achieved.

As I told you verbally I am opposed to any announcement by the Government or the Luogotenente on the loyalty of the Armed Forces before the elections but I do think a statement should be published on the evening of 2nd June, that is, after the polling for the Costituente and the Referendum has taken place. This is the psychological moment to address such a declaration to the people. The Political Advisers are in agreement with this but I suggest that no action be taken until we are a little nearer to the date and can sense public opinion more clearly.

279

-1-

See h. 529
Y. 531

-2-

527

I have already asked you to give your comments on the question of nomination of the Service Ministers. The Chief Commissioner takes the view that this should be covered by considerations of the Armistice revision and not by the elections. Nevertheless, I think the point will have to be cleared up.

I should be grateful for a meeting with yourself and the Directors of the other Service Sub-Commissions and if you would be good enough to name a time I will try and arrange for the others to be present.

M. S. LUSH

Major-General L. Browning, CB, CBE, MC,
General Officer Commanding,
Land Force Sub-Commission (MIA),
HQ. ALLIED COMMISSION.

MSL/JG.

278

SUBJECT : Political Influences in the ITALIAN Army

Major General L. BROWNING
LAND FORCES SUB COM, A.C. (MIA)

G/6

25

Apr 46

APR 29 1946

My dear *Lush*

1. I understood from you when we talked a few days ago, that you are going to discuss this week the whole question of the possible attitude of the ITALIAN Army after the elections on June 2nd. Meanwhile, in advance of the above, I feel I should bring the following to your notice.
2. We had a very good call-up. All worked very smoothly and efficiently. We got a good type and the recruits were very pleased and even amazed at the good "show" that had been laid on for them at the C.A.Rs. - very different to what happened in the pre-war days. The whole business appears to show that the recruits had been little affected by the press campaign in certain cases against the call-up.
3. (a) Despite all this, disturbances and unrest have been reported from the C.A.Rs at PESARO, MOIENA, GOMO, ERESCLIA and SIENA.
The complaints of the recruits are on one or more of the following grounds:
inadequate rations
too long hours of work
poor quality of certain items of kit
inefficiency of the work of the mil districts
unfair selection at the mil districts.
(b) Specific incidents or mass refusals to obey orders have been got under control, but a state of general unrest persists at PESARO, where the Territorial Comd has considered it prudent NOT to issue rifles to the recruits. The situation at MOIENA appears to be not much better.

The origin of the trouble is in every case ascribed to political influences outside the barracks and to the

CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
535

3. what happened in the pre-war days. The whole business appears to show that the recruits had been little affected by the press campaign in certain cases against the call-up.

(a) Despite all this, disturbances and unrest have been reported from the C.A.Rs at PESARO, MODENA, BRESCIA and SIENA. The complaints of the recruits are on one or more of the following grounds:

inadequate rations
too long hours of work
poor quality of certain items of kit
inefficiency of the work of the mil districts
unfair selection at the mil districts.

(b) Specific incidents or mass refusals to obey orders have been got under control, but a state of general unrest persists at PESARO, where the Territorial Comd has considered it prudent NOT to issue rifles to the recruits. The situation at MODENA appears to be not much better.

The origin of the trouble is in every case ascribed to political influences outside the barracks and to the recruits being "got 277 when off duty in the local town.

(c) The recruits at PESARO are mostly from EMILIA which is reputedly the worst hot bed of communism in the country, and unfortunately the CO of the C.A.R. there has no reputation as a disciplinarian. The UDITE recruits at MODENA have no doubt come under the influence of trouble makers in that town. The general opinion seems to be that the incidents are politically inspired and a concerted effort. In several cases the trouble coincided with - or immediately followed the victory of the left wing parties in the local elections.

(d) It seems to be generally felt that the War Minister is NOT taking anything like a firm enough line within the Government and positively insisting that the "hands off the Army" policy be respected by all parties.

It has been pointed out that the Naval Minister is an Admiral (and has been since the Armistice) and quite independent of party ties. He can thump the table and disregard party considerations, with the result that the Navy is reputed to be incomparably better off than the Army today in this and many others respects.

BROGIO's time is very largely taken up with the affairs of the Liberal Party and he is strongly reproached with doing practically nothing to remedy what is considered as potentially a very serious position.

/2....

-2-

524

4. (a) As you know, I have always taken the line with the War Ministry that the Army is "above party" and actually an official Ministry of War order to this effect has been issued to all Commanders and there has been a strong effort to keep politics out of the Army.
5. (b) It seems to me that now, in order to stop what I mention in para 3 above, we must go higher - up to an ITALIAN Government level.
- To elaborate the above, I mention the following:-
- (a) I feel that the ITALIAN Government is NOT behind nor supporting the ITALIAN Army along the lines of ARHQ policy.
Specifically it is NOT persuaded of the need for 140,000 men, and is not prepared to vote sufficient funds to enable an Army of this size to be brought to a high state of efficiency.
The general impression is that the Government is NOT at all interested in the Army.
- (b) The present War Minister is a senior member of the Liberal Party and very largely taken up with the affairs of his Party and politics generally. He has NOT the time to champion the pressing needs and interests of the Army in the way that is required. Nor is he inclined to do so in view of the forthcoming elections.
- (c) The Government has failed to make it clear that the Army is the instrument and servant of the country, and independent of Party or political interests. Consequently, anyone can publicly libel the Army and Army personnel without any fear of consequences, and any political party can "get at" the top with impunity and attempt to seduce them from their duty and allegiance to their officers. The consequences of this may be seen at the elections.
- (d) Instead of the Army being reorganised on the basis of military considerations and requirements, political interests are paramount. The proposed Army vote of 60 billion lire covers expenditure on :-
- | |
|----------------------------|
| 140,000 military personnel |
| 75,000 Carabinieri |
| 55,000 Civilians |
- The vast majority of the civilians are completely redundant to the needs of the present-day ITALIAN Army, but instead of dismissing the civilians, the War Minister is now considering reducing the military personnel to 100,000 or even 80,000.
- (e) It is nearly a year that the problem of surplus regular officers has to be settled by the Government.

276

political interests. Consequently, anyone can publicly label the Army and Army personnel without any fear of consequences, and any political party can "get at" the top with impunity and attempt to seduce them from their duty and allegiance to their officers. The consequences of this may be seen at the elections.

(d) Instead of the Army being reorganised on the basis of military considerations and requirements, political interests are paramount. The proposed Army vote of 60 billion lire covers expenditure on :-

140,000 military personnel
75,000 Carabinieri
55,000 Civilians

The vast majority of the civilians are completely redundant to the needs of the present-day ITALIAN Army, but instead of dismissing the civilians, the War Minister is now considering reducing the military personnel to 100,000 or even 80,000.

276

(e) It is nearly a year that the problem of surplus regular officers has to be settled by the Government. There are 5,000 Senior regular officers (and many VC's besides) who must be retired, but the Government is incapable of taking the necessary decision. The consequences to the Army are well known, but in the meantime the political repercussions are postponed.

(f) In order to maintain the technical services of the Army up to strength at least 10,000 specialists with appropriate rates of pay are urgently needed. ~~SEET~~ have been pressing for special rates of pay for at least six months, without any results to date. The total cost in twelve months is only 100 million lire.

(g) Reorganisation of the War Ministry has been pressed for by the Mission continuously, but only this month has the Minister agreed to consider the subject. At the best it will be many months before anything is accomplished. Meantime the ridiculous organisation of the present War Ministry continues to muddle along and to achieve little in a very long time.

For instance, there is no Adjutant General and no 'A' Branch as such. Personnel matters are notoriously the worst catered for in the ITALIAN Army, with consequences that are well known.

/3....

-3-

533

(h) The Chief of the Army Staff is in continual ~~rend~~ with the War Minister and the General Staff and the rest of the War Ministry are becoming akin to two hostile camps.

While the technical staff at the War Ministry always welcomes the advice and assistance of MIA, and collaborates loyally, the political faction in the War Ministry is resentful of the Mission's activities on the score of "loss of ITALIAN sovereignty".

(i) The Mission strongly recommended the Minister last autumn the reorg of the MI Directorate. It has taken 4 - 5 months to secure a decision, which should not have taken more than two weeks at the outside.

(j) We have long been pressing for the institution of a Public Relations Branch at the Ministry of War, to propagand or defend the Army. At long last one is being started, we having actually thought out and chosen ourselves a suitable head for it.

(k) Finally, as regards financial matters, the Minister has himself spoken to CCRBINO and the Head of the Gov't about Army finances. BROSCIO hopes to be able to secure agreement to the expenditure for repairs to Central Schools etc, and for the special rates of pay for the 10,000 specialists. But hitherto the Treasury has only agreed to think about it.

Major obstacles are anticipated over the Army vote, which has to be agreed by the Cabinet before the elections, and for which the War Ministry has submitted a proposal for 60 billion lire.

BROSCIO said that with the Navy and Air Force the proposed expenditure on the Armed Forces represented 25% of the estimated total national expenditure. There was considerable opposition within the Government and he had to study ways and means of reducing the Army figures. He had accordingly given instructions to SIRE to prepare a revised estimate for an Army of 100,000, though he knew this meant falling below the figure desired by the ALLIES. This fact would be his trump card for securing Cabinet approval for the present figure, but if the Government absolutely refused he did not know what could be done about it.

(Subsequently it has been learned from PIACENTINI that two fresh estimates were on the stocks:-

Army of 100,000	=	saving of about 4½ billions.
Army of 80,000	=	" " " 8 "

Once the ceiling falls below 100,000 it becomes necessary to get rid of part of the permanent cadres, hence the disproportionately greater saving on the lower figure. One gathers that SIRE are quite horrified at the suggestion implied in the new estimates, particularly the lower figure, but are powerless to do anything about it as it is on a whole political plane.

275

has submitted a proposal for 80 billion lire.
BRUSIO said that with the Navy and Air Force the proposed expenditure on the Armed Forces represented 25% of the estimated total national expenditure. There was considerable opposition within the Government and he had to study ways and means of reducing the Army figures. He had accordingly given instructions to SMRE to prepare a revised estimate for an Army of 100,000, though he knew this meant falling below the figure desired by the ALLIES. This fact would be his trump card for securing Cabinet approval for the present figure, but if the Government absolutely refused he did not know what could be done about it.
(Subsequently it has been learned from PLACENTINI that two fresh estimates were on the stocks:-

Army of 100,000 = saving of about 4½ billions.
Army of 80,000 = " " " 8 "

Once the ceiling falls below 100,000 it becomes necessary to get rid of part of the permanent cadres, hence the disproportionately greater saving on the lower figure. One gathers that SMRE are quite horrified at the suggestion implied in the new estimates, particularly the lower figure, but are powerless to do anything about it as it is on a wholly political plane).

These are all indications of what is hindering progress and the attitude of the War Minister and the Government itself to these matters.

6. (a) It is a somewhat disturbing situation. Technically, we are really getting the Army properly organised and on its peace time feet. But this is all effort from below and the whole business is being and will continue to be stultified by lack of backing from the ITALIAN Government itself.
- (b) This is all bound up with the matter of the possible attitude of the Army after the elections. Prince UBERTO has already stated publicly that he will accept the will of the people. Perhaps it would be inadvisable for him to elaborate this and say that if the people vote for a Republic, the Royal Carabinieri, Army etc, must serve that equally faithfully, though such a statement by him might well be a good election trump card for the Monarchy. In any event, I suggest that a firm and sincere statement of policy by the ITALIAN Government in respect of the Army should be announced before the elections and given the widest publicity - such a statement to include inter alia the fact that the Government intends to have a good Army (incl CGRR) and will back it; that the Army is the servant of the state, irrespective of the party in power or the form of the constitution, and must act accordingly; and that party politics affecting

/4....

822

the Army both internally and externally will not be tolerated.

7. I have tried to represent above the "atmosphere" of the business in high places as I see it, and having such a political tinge I feel I must put it to you for the consideration of the Chief Commissioner.

Yours

Sincerely

Langley Browning

Brigadier M.S. LUSH, CB, CBE, MC.
Executive Commissioner,
A.C.

274

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785617

274

3251/81
520
Ex Comm.

UNCLAS

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN FORCE

G(SD)

USD/C1/3

27 Mar 46

APR 1 1946

Tele : FREEDOM 254

SUBJECT : AFHQ Conference on Equipment for
ITALIAN Interim Army - 18 Mar 46.

Land Forces Sub Commission AG MILA (4)
Allied Commission

SACE

G-3 AFHQ

G-5 AFHQ

C40

Q GHQ

G-4 MTOUSA

Ord GHQ

PA GHQ

1. Minutes of the Conference held on 18 Mar 46 are attached.

2. ACTION is required as follows :

MILA - Mins. 15 and 16

F.A. (Brit) }
G-5 AFHQ } - Min. 17

G(SD) GHQ - Mins. 11 and 19

Q GHQ - Min. 16

21921

Q GHQ
G-4 MTOUSA
Ond GHQ
PA GHQ

1. Minutes of the Conference held on 16 Mar 46 are attached.

2. ACTION is required as follows:

- | | | |
|-------------|---|-----------------|
| MMIA | - | Mins. 15 and 16 |
| F.A. (Brdt) | } | - Min. 17 |
| G-5 AFHQ | | |
| G(SD) GHQ | - | Mins. 11 and 19 |
| Q GHQ | - | Min. 16 |

273

W. H. McLeod

W. H. McLEOD,
Major General,
Chief of Staff.

MAIL/15

125
for Mr. McLeod

PA. J. H. G.

AB
(1007 X)

ESD/81/3

MINUTES OF A CONFERENCE HELD AT ATHQ AT 1115 HRS
ON MONDAY 18 MARCH 1946 ON THE PROVISION OF
EQUIPMENT FOR THE ITALIAN EXERCISES

Chairman

Brigadier ANDERSON

G(ED) GHQ CMF

Present

Colonel AER	Colonel AER	Colonel AER	Colonel AER
Colonel PIDSLEY	Colonel PIDSLEY	Colonel PIDSLEY	Colonel PIDSLEY
Lt-Col SOUTHBY	Lt-Col SOUTHBY	Lt-Col SOUTHBY	Lt-Col SOUTHBY
Lt-Col ALBERT	Lt-Col ALBERT	Lt-Col ALBERT	Lt-Col ALBERT
Lt-Col GUTHRIE	Lt-Col GUTHRIE	Lt-Col GUTHRIE	Lt-Col GUTHRIE
Brigadier YATES	Brigadier YATES	Brigadier YATES	Brigadier YATES
Lt-Col HENNETT	Lt-Col HENNETT	Lt-Col HENNETT	Lt-Col HENNETT
Lt-Col TROUNSON	Lt-Col TROUNSON	Lt-Col TROUNSON	Lt-Col TROUNSON
Major SUTCLIFFE	Major SUTCLIFFE	Major SUTCLIFFE	Major SUTCLIFFE
Lt-Col STAPLETON	Lt-Col STAPLETON	Lt-Col STAPLETON	Lt-Col STAPLETON
Colonel ROBERTSON	Colonel ROBERTSON	Colonel ROBERTSON	Colonel ROBERTSON
Lt-Col RALPHS	Lt-Col RALPHS	Lt-Col RALPHS	Lt-Col RALPHS
Major PROUDFOOT	Major PROUDFOOT	Major PROUDFOOT	Major PROUDFOOT
Colonel LAWLEY	Colonel LAWLEY	Colonel LAWLEY	Colonel LAWLEY
Lt-Col RALPHS	Lt-Col RALPHS	Lt-Col RALPHS	Lt-Col RALPHS
Lt-Col CORLETT	Lt-Col CORLETT	Lt-Col CORLETT	Lt-Col CORLETT
Lt-Col MUSSON	Lt-Col MUSSON	Lt-Col MUSSON	Lt-Col MUSSON
Major INGLIS	Major INGLIS	Major INGLIS	Major INGLIS
G(ED) GHQ	G(ED) GHQ	G(ED) GHQ	G(ED) GHQ

Secretary

Major INGLIS

G(ED) GHQ

1.

The Chairman said that the object of the conference was to reach a definite conclusion on the policy to be recommended to the Combined Chiefs of Staff regarding the provision of equipment for the ITALIAN Interim Army, together with methods recommended for implementing that policy.

The Chairman said that progress had so far been very slow.

Major
STUDENT

Secretary

Log 10000
 10000 Branch G10
 10000 Branch G10
 10000 Branch G10
 G-4 MTOUSA
 G-4 MTOUSA
 Crd Branch G10
 Financial Advl
 G(ED) G10

STYLING

The Chairman said that the object of the conference was to reach a definite conclusion on the policy to be recommended to the Combined Chiefs of Staff regarding the provision of equipment for the ITALIAN Interim Army, together with methods recommended for implementing that policy.

2. The Chairman said that the program was proposed to deal with the main outline of the problem and details to be dealt with at a later conference.

3. A/C of 3 G-3 AFHQ outlined how SIC's interest in the efficiency
into the operational picture. SIC is capable of:-
Army lies in seeing that it is capable of:-

- (a) ensuring internal security
- (b) acting as a deterrent to any unfriendly neighbours
- (c) defending ITALY'S frontiers, with Allied help.

十一

- 2 -

4. The Chairman then read relevant passages from various important documents in order to ensure that the general background to the problem was known.

5. The Chairman read extracts from the Combined Chiefs of Staff's directive to SAC authorising the handing over of the ITALIAN Armed Forces under Allied Command to the ITALIAN Government (JAN 624 of 29 Sep 45) which states:-

"Food, clothing, warlike and non-warlike equipment will be furnished in the following priorities:-

- (A) From indigenous ITALIAN resources, including captured material (except GERMAN weapons) and local manufacture.
- (B) By purchase from appropriate U.S. and U.K. surplus disposal agencies in ITALY, stocks which are available to the disposal agencies.
- (C) Through the ITALIAN Government import programme.

Sale of warlike equipment available to authorised surplus disposal agencies to the ITALIAN Armed Forces of the types and quantities of equipment that are normally used for internal security purposes, is authorised for transfer as approved by SACRED or his successors. In the case of lethal BRITISH warlike equipment transfer will be made only under military arrangements. Requirements that can NOT be met from the sources listed above, should be loaned from U.S. and BRITISH military stocks as a temporary expedient up to 1 Jan 46. Thereafter these items are to be returned on demand or transferred through surplus agencies.

You should note the financial arrangements consequent upon this policy remain to be settled."

6. The Chairman read extracts from AMIG policy directive to the Chief Commissioner Allied Commission (AMIG letter AG.091.7112(3D)-0 of 2 Nov 45) which states:-

Sale of warlike equipment available to authorized surplus disposal agencies to the ITALIAN Armed Forces of the types and quantities of equipment that are normally used for internal security purposes, is authorized for transfer as approved by SACRED or his successors. In the case of lethal BRITISH warlike equipment transfer will be made only under military arrangements. Requirements that can NOT be met from the sources listed above, should be loaned from U.S. and BRITISH military stocks as a temporary expedient up to 1 Jan 46. Thereafter these items are to be returned on demand or transferred through surplus agencies.

You should note the financial arrangements consequent upon this policy remain to be settled."

The Chairman read extracts from AMHQ policy directive to the Chief Commissioner Allied Commission (AMHQ letter AG.091.7110(3D)-0 of 2 Nov 45) which states:-

" Warlike Equipment and Spares

All arms, vehicles and other warlike equipment of U.S. and BRITISH origin (including lend/lease) in possession of those units being used to make up the ITALIAN Army of 140,000 and in possession of the Carabinieri, as may be surplus to U.S. and BRITISH requirements, together with up to one years maintenance and spare parts for arms, vehicles and other equipment so provided as may be surplus to the U.S. and BRITISH requirements, will be disposed of to the ITALIAN Government.

Appropriate scales of ammunition of various natures will also be transferred and authorized expenditure replenished from Allied sources.

/In the.....

- 3 -

In the case of vehicles and warlike equipment available to U.S. and BRITISH disposal organisations, disposal to the ITALIAN Government will be effected through the respective U.S. and BRITISH disposals organisations in accordance with established procedure, but with priorities requested for its sale to the ITALIAN Government. In the case of lethal BRITISH warlike equipment, transfer will be made direct by the military."

The Chairman read extracts from AMHQ policy directive to the Commander Land Forces Sub Commission, LC (MIL) (reference AMHQ letter LG 094.741 GCT-0 of 3 Dec 45) which states:-

" It is the policy of the United States and British Governments that the ITALIAN Army shall be brought, in the shortest possible time, to a high state of efficiency."

The Chairman read extracts from the Minutes of a meeting held at GHQ by 'Q' Branch GHQ on 11 Dec 45 to discuss, in the main, provision of maintenance for the BRITISH equipment handed over to the ITALIAN Army (ref GHQ/6453/5/2(L) dated 13 Dec 45).

The Chairman read extracts from a letter from GHQ to CG MCQUEEN putting forward certain proposals regarding provision of equipment to the ITALIAN Army (reference GHQ letter GHQ/81/3B of 18 Jan 46) which states:-

- "(a) That the Order of Battle and Staff Equipment Tables proposed by MILA (their reference SD/109 of 5 Dec 45) were agreed in principle by GHQ.
- (b) That provision of equipment for the GREEK Army was a BRITISH commitment of higher priority than for the ITALIAN Army.
- (c) That it was proposed, in the interests of standardisation, to recommend to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that only the Carabinieri should be equipped from indigenous resources.
- (d) That it was considered by GHQ that the third source supply mentioned in the Combined Chiefs of Staff's

at GHQ by 1st Branch GHQ on 11 Dec 45 to discuss, in the main, provision of maintenance for the BRITISH equipment handed over to the ITALIAN Army (ref GHQ/6453/6/2(12) dated 13 Dec 45).

The Chairman read extracts from a letter from GHQ to CC MTOUSA putting forward certain proposals regarding provision of equipment to the ITALIAN Army (reference GHQ letter GHQ/81/32 of 18 Jan 46) which states:-

- "(a) That the Order of Battle and Staff Equipment Tables proposed by MILA (their reference SD/109 of 5 Dec 45) were agreed in principle by GHQ.
- (b) That provision of equipment for the GREEK Army was a BRITISH commitment of higher priority than for the ITALIAN Army.
- (c) That it was proposed, in the interests of standardisation, to recommend to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that only the Carabinieri should be equipped from indigenous resources.
- (d) That it was considered by GHQ that the third source 270 supply mentioned in the Combined Chiefs of Staff's directive, i.e., the ITALIAN Government import programme, was not a practicable proposition in view of the delay that would be involved and the urgency for equipping the Army as soon as possible, and that it was proposed to recommend that material not found from BRITISH or AMERICAN surpluses be provided from some other source.
- (e) That provision of one year's maintenance and spares from surpluses would of course have to be supplied by the ally providing the particular equipment.
- (f) That certain equipment could not be provided from BRITISH surpluses."

CC MTOUSA was asked for agreement on the general policy and for details of the equipment that could be provided from U.S. surpluses.

/10.....

10.

The Chairman read extracts from CG MTOUSA's reply to the foregoing letter (reference D-568 of 9 Feb 46) which states:-

- "(a) That it was agreed that the proposed standardisation was desirable.
- (b) That the bulk of the military type items required had been shipped out of the theatre and the bulk of the civilian type items had been declared to the AMERICAN Disposal Agency (ODIC).
- (c) That CG MTOUSA is not authorised to make sales of surplus equipment and that the ITALIAN Government could obtain AMERICAN surpluses of civilian type items by submitting requirements to the ODIC in ROME."

11.

The Chairman then read extracts from a Staff Study for the Chief of Staff AFHQ, reference G-3 letter WSD/84/38, which had been agreed by

G-3 AFHQ
CAO AFHQ
G-5 AFHQ
1st GHQ
G-4 MTOUSA

but which had not yet been put before the Chief of Staff.

(It was agreed later that this study should go forward to the Chief of Staff AFHQ.)

12.

The Chairman stressed the point made to Chief of Staff AFHQ by the Commander Land Forces Sub Commission, reference his letter SC/054 of 5 Mar 46, namely that:-

" It would appear that some other source (than the three mentioned in the original directive), such as BRITISH reserves or extra theatre surpluses should be tapped if an effective ITALIAN Army is to be equipped as ordered."

13.

The Vehicle situation was discussed at some length.

CAO AFHQ
G-5 AFHQ
G-1 AFHQ
G-4 AFHQ

Chief of Staff

but which had not yet been put before the Chief of Staff.

(It was agreed later that this study should go forward to the Chief of Staff AFHQ.)

12.

The Chairman stressed the point made to Chief of Staff AFHQ by the Commander Land Forces Sub Commission, reference his letter 82/054 of 5 Mar 46, namely that:-

" It would appear that some other source (than the three mentioned in the original directive), such as BRITISH reserves or extra theatre surpluses should be tapped if an active ITALIAN Army is to be equipped as ordered."

269

The Vehicle situation was discussed at some length.

The Vehicle situation was stressing the deplorable situation that

13.

(a) Col 1/2 MAFIA in stressing the deplorable situation that now exists, said:-

(i) Regarding Load Carriers only - of a total entitlement of approx 12,000 approx 1,000 are held, of which about 2,500 are in such a condition that they should be considered as written off, thus making total required 8,500. To meet this during the remainder of 1946 it was estimated that ITALIAN repair facilities would allow approx 1,200 to be repaired provided spares were available and that approx 2,100 might be received from ITALIAN industry, leaving 5,300 to come from Allied surpluses.

(ii) It is estimated that the reorganisation of the ITALIAN motor industry will begin to produce vehicles for the Army during the latter half of 1947 and it can be assumed that by the end of 1947 the ITALIAN Army transport will be entirely supported by ITALIAN industry.

/(b).....

- 5 -

(b) Deputy Commander MIA stressed and it was agreed by all present, that the vehicles should be provided as far as possible from BRITISH sources because of :-

- (i) the desirability of achieving maximum standardisation of types
- (ii) the financial problems involved in the purchase of AMERICAN vehicles (which have to be paid for in cash).
- (c) ORD representative said that, as a very rough estimate, subject to alteration when details were available, after other priorities had been met, about 35,000 load carriers of mixed types and classifications with approx six months mixed spares would be declared surplus on the close down of GLF, and that they would all be runners although not Class I.

(d) The Chairman said that he thought that the ITALIAN Government would be unwilling to buy a lot of old vehicles.

(e) Col A/Q MIA said that they wanted to buy the minimum to last them until the end of 1947 when they hoped to be self supporting in vehicles.

(f) ORD representative said that there were not sufficient vehicle spares in the theatre to cover up to the end of 1947 and that as a very rough estimate (again subject to alteration when details were forthcoming) about six months maintenance and spares were likely to be available. The position might be better than this when the details were known.

ORD representative agreed that "maintenance and spares" for MT covered major assemblies and tyres and inner tubes, but that major assemblies, particularly engine assemblies, were in fact not available and that tyres and tubes were subject to global control and were excluded from the original Combined Chiefs of Staffs' directive.

Col A/Q MIA said the question of tyres was very important as it was obviously no good providing vehicles and spares unless spares included tyres. The tyre position of the vehicles at present held by the ITALIAN Army was critical.

(e) Col A. J. MIA said that they wanted to get the vehicles out of the end of 1947 when they bought to self supporting in vehicles.

- (f) QED representative said that there were not sufficient vehicle spares in the theatre to cover up to the end of 1947 and that as a very rough estimate (again subject to alteration when details were forthcoming) about six months maintenance and spares were likely to be available. The position might be better than this when the details were known.
- QED representative agreed that "maintenance and spares" for MT covered major assemblies and tyres and inner tubes, but that major assemblies, particularly engine assemblies, were in fact not available and that tyres and tubes were subject to global control and were excluded from the original Combined Chiefs of Staff's directive.

Col A/Q MIA said the question of tyres was very important as it was obviously no good providing vehicles and spares unless spares included tyres. The tyre position of the vehicles at present held by the ITALIAN Army was critical.

- (g) Deputy Commander MIA said he did not think the ITALIANS would take vehicles with only six months spares even if it was only a paper transaction. He said that there must be many hundreds of tons of spares for the various vehicles concerned somewhere in the world and surely there must be some way of getting these spares into the hands of the ITALIAN Army. Surely they could come in on the import programme and be paid for. He considered that this point must be put to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The Chairman agreed

- (h) The Chairman said that the really important point was that it seemed that the bulk of the vehicles could be produced and could be maintained until the end of this year and that he did not think that it was in the power of the ITALIAN Government to object to this course.
- (i) Deputy Commander MIA said that it was essential that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should specifically state what was to be done and what the source of supply was to be.

/14.....

- 6 -

14. It was agreed that the indigenous source of supply was impracticable and that the import source of supply was in practice useless.

Deputy Commander MIA said that there was at the moment an ITALIAN Mission in WASHINGTON, with cash, unable to buy for the ITALIAN Army because UNRRA had priority. They definitely would buy spare parts for vehicles if they were allowed to do so.

15. Certain points on the Agenda submitted by MIA were then taken.

Col A/Q MIA said that the War Ministry was now considering the future long-term reorganisation of the Army. He said it was likely that they might then require certain items not authorised at present, such as tanks and med arty. It would be a mistake to destroy surplus equipment which might later be required for supply to the ITALIANS.

Col A/Q MIA said that he would write to AMHQ on this subject.

16. There was some discussion as to what exactly constituted "lethal warlike equipment" authorised for direct transfer to the Army.

Col A/Q MIA said that whatever the legal interpretation was, the following items should be transferred direct.

- (i) Weapons
- (ii) 'A' Vehicles (to be interpreted particularly to cover all vehicles which it was unlikely that the ITALIAN Government would be allowed to manufacture.)
- (iii) All instruments required for fire direction and control.
- (iv) Wireless sets.
- (v) Maintenance and spares for all the above.

The Chairman said that this point would be examined and a suggested ruling put up to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for approval.

D/DPM, GHQ undertook to examine this point.

287

There was some discussion as to what exactly constituted "lethal warlike equipment" authorized for direct transfer to the Army.

Col A/Q MIA said that whatever the legal interpretation was, the following items should be transferred direct.

- (i) Weapons
- (ii) 'A' Vehicles (to be interpreted particularly to cover all vehicles which it was unlikely that the ITALIAN Government would be allowed to manufacture.)
- (iii) All instruments required for fire direction and control.
- (iv) Wireless sets.
- (v) Maintenance and spares for all the above.

The Chairman said that this point would be examined and a suggested ruling put up to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for approval.

D/DOMG, GHQ undertook to examine this point.

Col A/Q MIA said that he would submit a list of all equipment which he considered should be transferred direct.

Financial Advisor said that so far as he knew there was no development in arriving at a definite financial agreement and that at the moment the only records that were kept were of equipment actually transferred (these records are kept by the Allied Commission and not by MIA) and that no values were shown on these records.

Col A/Q MIA said that this was a very important point and must be settled, because the War Ministry had to know what financial load they were incurring.

It was pointed out that this is solely a BRITISH problem and does not arise in the case of U.S. material.

It was agreed that the Financial Adviser and reps of G-5 AFHQ would look into the question and summon a small Financial Conference later.

/ All present.....

