

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

ACC

10000/109/1153
(VOL. II)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

10000/109/1153
(VOL. II)

SUPPLY OF ITALIAN ARMED FORCES
DEC. 1945 - MAY 1946

- 203 -

Executive Commissioner:

please
This signed appears to concern the Army only and no reference whatever is made to the Navy except perhaps in Paragraph 11 where "Armed Forces" are mentioned. Paragraphs 5 (b), 5 (c) and especially paragraph 11 have to a certain extent served the purpose of Folio 181.

Whamur.

REAR ADMIRAL,
CHIEF, NAVY SUB COMMISSION.

29th May, 1946.

204

to Comm;
ess. Ref main 199 re folio 197. please
see mains nos 201, 2+3 from etc 3 Service

Sub. Comm.

205
301 *W.L. 3115*

205
two of them has taken 14 days to reply.

No further action. *W.L. 3115*

Wham:

REAR ADMIRAL,
CHIEF, NAVY SUB COMMISSION.

29th May, 1946.

204

to Comm:
ess. Ref minus 199 re folio 197. please
see minus nos 201, 2 + 3 from etc 3 Services

Sub. Comm.

205
305
H. 3115

Two of them have been 14 days to reply.

No further action.

WV 3115

file closed 31
WV 3115

1089

C.S.O.

195

In a case like this I should expect you to
consult Land Force & perhaps the Navy and
& obtain their views before submitting to me. Please

do so.

78/14/5

200

To Land Force

may the Ex Com please have your

views on folio 197

Alamshirsky

Office Ex Com, 14/5

C.S.O.

Office of Ex. Com.

201.

are as follows:

Views on 197-6-5 (in [redacted] [redacted]) are as follows:
This is a pamphlet of the signal sent to AGWAR as
a result of our conference recently with G.H.Q. It is not
directly attributable to your letter of folio 181 which deals
more particularly with supplies (? ration) whereas 197 deals
with weapons, equipment & vehicles.
We are well satisfied with the contents of 197 but
it is almost too late to achieve its object. We
are [redacted] the reply.

To hand Jones & Co

200

may the Ex Comm please have your

views on folio 197

Alauddin

Office of Ex. Comm. 14/5

C.50.

Office of Ex. Comm.

201.

Views on 197-6-5 (in [redacted] [redacted]) are as follows:

This is a pamphlet of the signal sent to AGWAR as a result of our conference recently with G.H.Q. It is not directly attributable to your letter of folio 181 which deals more particularly with supplies (? ration) whereas 197 deals with weapons, equipment & vehicles.

We are well satisfied with the contents of 197 but consider it is almost too late to achieve its object. We can now only await (a perhaps earlier) the reply.

S. P. D. [redacted]

Colonel. HQ.

Land Forces S.E.

15 May.

202.

Office of Ex. Comm.

1088

In agreement with [redacted] in 201. Have nothing further to

add.

Shah. [redacted]

S.E.O. A.F.S.C.

18/4 Reference Minute 176 - Please see
Minute 179 -

182
Cofy to C & T Service Sub Com. 76 CAC 207
AFHQ Doc of 184
183
C. S. Economic Seal
187
184

V.P. Lem Sec.

Ref 186. Will you please take necessary
action on form 3.4. - ~~under this~~
H.L. 27/4

189
Spec Com.
29/4 In reference to 186, please see 188 attached
Service Sub Com. Sec
H.L. 215.
H.L. 215.
188
C. S. G. WEBSTER, Jr.
Lt. Col., FA
Chief, Staff Officer.

191
CSO: Folio 190 for your information
DSJ 715

198
1087
to Coman.
See 1 197 in reply to you 181.
I will let Service S/C's, Lansing, &
V.C. have copies if you wish. H.L. 1915

A/C.C.
 2-20-46 - Forwarded for information, *File 174*
 Please always send the bottom *MS 464*
MS 464

reference

MS 464

No	Date	To	REMARKS	From
10	April 1946	Executive Commissioner	<i>175</i> Transmitted herewith is the Prime Minister reply to our letter, asking him to inform us on the provisions his Government is making to supply the Armed Forces. I had overlooked this letter which you asked about in the meeting this morning. <i>Charles W. Walton</i> CHARLES W. WALTON Colonel AC Acting Vice President <i>176</i> Thank you. We should follow up the work of this committee <i>Food DC MS 10/4 177</i>	Economic Section
				1086

10 April 1946	Executive Commissioner	REMARKS # 175	From Economic Section
Transmitted herewith is the Prime Minister reply to our letter, asking him to inform us on the provisions his Government is making to supply the Armed Forces. I had overlooked this letter which you asked about in the meeting this morning. Charles W. Walton CHARLES W. WALTON Colonel AG Acting Vice President # 176 Thank you. We should follow up the work of this committee Food & C # 177 10/14 1086 Please comply with minutes 174 pages asking for further information			

A/V.P. Have of Gen. E. Gullo, President of the Food & C. I. R. (opened to us de l'agence et on a le la proposition a l'ensemble report a l'agence

HAC 11/4.

Ex Comm.

151

Mr. Summons, Mr. Wesley Jones with rep. of American Commercial Union, Mr. Halford, Major Nelson of MIA, the Hall of Army S/C, Wing Commander Walker of AFSC will be at Ex C's office at 1500 hrs tomorrow.

Ref your m 144.

ELLB 12/13 J.L. 14/13

169

C.S.O. Jalis 168 passed to young for information.
SP sep.

170:

Ex Comm.

168 is in reply to your 158
J.L. 2/14

171

Acting Vice President,
Economic Section.

I am not clear how AFHQ have seen the notes verbatim mentioned on Page 168 and unless we have clear evidence that they have the documents before them, I think it would be as well to send them a very short representation.

3. April. 46.

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

172

A/C.C.

C.S.O. Folio 168 processed & given for information.
 SP exp.

170.

to Comm.

1 168 is in reply to your 158.
 M.S. 1/4

171

Acting Vice President,
 Economic Section.

I am not clear how AFHQ have seen the notes verbatim mentioned on Page 168 and unless we have clear evidence that they have the documents before them, I think it would be as well to send them a very short representation.

3. April. 46.

Brigadier,
 Executive Commissioner.

172

A/C.C.
~~Representation~~

1) A proposed letter to G F H & is attached.

2) You may recall Mr. Livingston's statement from his files showing that G F H & had seen the U.S. note and stated "no comment" or words to that effect.

3) Later Col. Blair told me that he had discussed the notes at G F H &.

M.S. 1/4 C.S.O.
 11-2-46
 M.S. 1/4

785017

Bl.

Letter to issue as amended by X & X on
attached pencil draft. MS (11/2)

Issue. MS (11/2)

11/2

Chief Commissioner.

11/1

inclusion
Attached is submitted for your approval
signature

1083

Signa ~~repatched~~
11/3

MAR 1 REC
0900

to Commissioner
145
148
147
Please see Tolson 145, 146 & 147.

Letter from Lord Tress 9/2 at 143 & 144
was forwarded to F. S. for action. They
will contact the Food Ministry for concrete
evidence of their intention to release
Lord Pitt the 11/2/46. When if they have trouble which

staff
9/3/46
11/2/46

1082

Chief Commissioner.

141

Attached is submitted for your approval
information
signature

1083

MAR 1 1946
0900Liquor *dispatched*
P.B.

M/L

1082

145

La Comma

C.S.O. Please see letters 141 + 147.

Letter from Lord Force of at 143 + 144
was forwarded to F.S. for action. They
will contact the Food Ministry for concrete
evidence of their intention to release
food for the Italian Army. However if they have trouble (which
is indicated in F.S. 143) the F.S. will ask for a meeting of
all concerned to resolve the problem.

sketch
9/3/46
11/3/46

S.A.H. M.L. 12/13

11/3/46

149

C.S.O. This is a very extraordinary state of affairs.
We have, apparently, a whole division about the maintenance
of the Italian Army as priority for the same sent straight
to the U. G. by both Embassies without so much as
reference to us.

Arrange meeting between Com. Comandante, Padoa,
Lancia Sub Com. on Friday 1000 hrs 11/3/46

Minute ~~2004~~
128.

TO: Executive Commissioner

1. Reference your Minute # 1 and attached letter from M.M.I.A., 2/1-117 of 4 Feb 46.

2. The Economic Section has the following comments to make thereon:

a. We cannot confirm the fears expressed by Land Forces S/C that the Prime Minister's letter of 1 Feb 46 indicates that the Italian Government will not place sufficient amounts of flour to repay loans made by Allied Military Authorities to meet February requirements, or that the Italian Government will not hand over directly to the Army the entire 19,500 tons of flour upon its arrival in Italy.

(1) This flour was procured originally as part of the overall Italian Supply Program, having in mind the needs of the Italian Army.

(2) Nor is the 19,500 tons in addition to the Civil Import Program. COM 374 informs that of the total IT flour originally procured, 19,500 tons would be diverted from the civilian supply program to cover six months basic requirements of the Army. This is confirmed specifically by CCAC in COM 379 of 1 Feb 46 (copy attached).

(3) The P.M.'s statement in the last paragraph, therefore, is warranted. It is not an indication of refusal to comply with repayment of loans made by Allied Authorities. In fact repayment of the amounts necessary is specifically promised. Nor does the statement indicate that the 19,500 tons will not be set aside for meeting the Army's repayments. It is rather a reminder (the opportunity for which was seized by the P.M. at this time) that an encroachment upon the Italian Government civilian program will result.

b. It is agreed by this Section that the Italian Government has been deficient in the discharge of its responsibility for subsistence maintenance of the Army. The problem of procurement for all three forces from indigenous stocks as well as by importation, was discussed in the letter TS/100/B/23 of 31 Jan 46. (Copy attached)

3. The following action on this matter is recommended by Economic Section:-

a. The details of the physical hand over to the Ministry of War of the IT flour (19,500 tons) upon arrival in Italy should be handled within the Italian Govt.

b. We should make clear to the Italian Govt. the fact (finally confirmed by COM 379) that 19,500 tons of flour has been procured for the Armed Forces, and say we assume the Govt. is taking appropriate steps to have this quantity made available, out of receipts of IT flour, to the Ministry of War. (If M.M.I.A. so desire, they can get the Ministry of War to make enough noise within the Italian Govt. to make sure the appropriate steps are in fact taken). A letter along these lines is opposite, for signature of the Chief Commissioner.

c. If the conference outlined in TS/100/B/23 of 31 Jan 46 is called, the

785017

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c. If the conference outlined in TS/100/P/ES of 31 Jan 46 is called, the responsibility of the Italian Govt. on this matter should be emphasized and the necessity for the creation and execution of an energetic, coordinated plan for procurement should again be urged upon the representatives of the Italian Govt.

7 Feb 46

129

G.O.C. Land Forces Sub Com

Harley Cleveland
 HARLEY CLEVELAND
 Acting Vice President
 Economic Section

1081

Do you agree with above minutes & issue of letter submitted by Econ. Sec.? If not could you discuss with Econ Sec & myself 11/2/46

MINUTE

Exec Sec.

Do you confirm the fears Miami Press Sub Com.
Please reply today or suggest action

11/8/62

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1080

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Executive Commissioner.

114E

^{114E 102A}
'Letter at p. 1 is submitted for approval and signature of Chief
Commissioner.

25 Jan. 46.

See 102A. spot 2/1/46

H.S.
25/1

CSO.

(3)

Chief Commissioner.

Attached is submitted for your ~~approval~~ signature information

114 B.
485

NR 761

1019

F.O. Subject should be "Food" or "Rations" -
not "Future." Has this been coordinated with
Col. Walton? Believe Govt must take local
action - permitting PANCA to replace. See memo
ma last VP's meeting - 23/II/46

Jan 29 Rnd
1515
1020

UN 28 RECD

112.

Lac. Com.

I think you will wish to see 104 & 110.

H.A. 26/11

11/27/11

115

C50 Folios 113 & 114 for info.

Maj Nelson L.F. 15/c has contacted the cc's Liaison Officer to have the confirmation requested in Par 2 Folio 114 included in reply to cc's letter at Folio 110.

SPH
31/1/41

117.

Lac Com. 113A, 114 & 116 for info. H.A. 2/2.

118.

G.O.C. Land Force Sub Com.

(Lt Gen. Browning.)

Low 113A. was directed to G.O.C. C.F.E.

The provision of supplies to Indian Army JUBA

col a policy matter which should emanate from

Land Force Sub Commission report dated.

Lac

Officer to have the confirmation requested in Par 2, Feb 11/41
included in reply to cc's letter at Folio 110

SPH
31/1/41

to Com.

117.

113A, 114 & 116 for info. H.S. 2/12.

G.O.C. Land Forces Sub Com.

(Lt Gen. Browning.)

Low 113A was directed to G.H.Q. C.M.F.

The provision of supplies to Indian Army 10/8/41

(a) a policy matter which should emanate from

Land Forces Sub Commissioning and H.Q.

(b) should go over your signature for C.S.

(c) is an Allied concern which should go to A.F.H.Q.
and G.H.Q.

I recommend the utmost regard to procedure in these

matter

H.S. 4/12

See
Folio
123.

* 105

CSO

Be see ¹⁰⁴ ~~98~~ in reply to your 91. do you
wish to discuss it with ee?

11

106.

CSO
18/1

Capt. B

Chambers. P.R. return earliest with
letter referred to at X 2 folio 24 103

107

Free
- 10/1

Note

Leon at present discussing situation with
V.P. Leon. draft letter with him. Will check
again shortly.

B.V. 24/1

CSO
21/1

108.

CSO

Ref mine ²¹⁰⁷ 106₁: Mr Cleveland has not yet
decided on what level he would want
the discussions. Shall we contingency
wait?

CSO
24/1

109 III

CSO

Here is the letter (at 110, 109) referred to in
minute 106: reply from fort. has to be awaited

CSO 25/1

8255
ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

C.A.O. Office

CAO/228/1

MEMORANDUM FOR : HQ, AC (for Brig. Lush)

SUBJECT : INTERA Priority

MAY 11 1946

Reference your 8255/176/EC of 13 Apr 46.

1. This matter has been under careful consideration at this HQ and it is felt that the following paraphrase of a signal despatched on 7 May 46, and addressed, as you suggested, to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, will serve as a reply to the above quoted letter:-

" Subject equipment and maintenance of interim Italian Army.

1. I understand your policy with regard to the interim Italian Army is to be that the Italian Government should control and maintain a small but efficient army including Carabinieri.

2. In accordance with FAN 621 control of the Italian Army passed to the Italian Government on 15 November 45 and your policy in paragraph 7 to 9 of that cable was then implemented.

3. Since the handover was effected there has been a marked deterioration in the efficiency of the Italian Army largely because it is NOT obtaining the equipment vehicles and spares required. Marked lack of determination on the part of the Italian Government to make Italian Army efficient is also apparent: this although everything possible has been done by this Headquarters to impress the importance of a well equipped and trained Italian Army without appearing to dictate to the Italians.

4. The 5 Gruppi were originally equipped completely with British weapons equipment and vehicles. Review of British and US surpluses in January showed that US surpluses of weapons were NOT sufficient to meet requirements of whole Italian army. Therefore in order to attain some degree of standardisation our policy has been to equip:

(A) Carabinieri Civil Police and similar armed bodies from indigenous resources in so far as that source permits.

(B) Remainder of the Italian Army with British weapons and equipment other than vehicles.

1076

5. Policy in paragraphs 7 and 8 of FAN 621 has NOT proved effective for following reasons:-

(a) (Your paragraph 7 A) provides a very limited source of

785017

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(A) Carabinieri Civil Police and similar armed bodies from indigenous resources in so far as that source permits.

(B) Remainder of the Italian Army with British weapons and equipment other than vehicles.

1076

5. Policy in paragraphs 7 and 8 of PAN 621 has NOT proved effective for following reasons:-

(a) (Your paragraph 7 A) provides a very limited source of supply. Equipment is largely inferior obsolete and of such variety that little standardisation is possible.

(b) (Your paragraph 7 B) would theoretically provide nearly all requirements. The Italian Government however diverts very little of the surpluses declared through disposal agencies to War Ministry because of priority of civil rehabilitation requirements. Large numbers of vehicles have been made available to Italian Government from British and US surpluses but few have been diverted to the Army. US vehicle declarations are complete on present surpluses making 8000 new available for sale to the Italian Government. Sufficient British vehicles of reasonable classification will soon be declared surplus and should cover the essential needs of the Italian Army.

(c) (Your paragraph 7 C) in practice provides a negligible source of supply owing to the fact that supplies imported for

(rehabilitation)

See Min. 198-201-20

(CSO)

SECRET

rehabilitation of the country by United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration can NOT be used for military equipment or supplies.

(d), Direct transfer from SACMED to Italian Military authorities of lethal warlike equipment only has been effected in accordance with paragraph 8 your FAX 621.

6. In order to provide standardisation of equipment both warlike and non-warlike and because there are sufficient British stores on hand it has been decided that equipment for the Italian Army normally should come from British sources. Any equipment required from US sources can be handled within the present US channels for disposal.

7. It is now apparent that the only method of achieving desired result is for direct transfer from British military authorities to the Italian War Ministry of all warlike and non-warlike equipment and vehicles (excluding maintenance) surplus to Allied Military requirements which are required by the Italian Army as approved by SACMED or his successors. In anticipation of your approval we are now proceeding to make initial issues on loan under military arrangements without channeling through British disposal agencies pending agreement between British and Italian Governments of method of financial settlement.

8. Maintenance for vehicles including tyres is required up to end of 1947 approximately when Italian Government anticipates sufficient production from Italian sources to re-equip Army with indigenous transport. Further maintenance for other equipment probably required indefinitely. Further supply of all above maintenance by direct transfer is now impracticable owing to threat of shutdown. However quantities of spares will be transferred to the Italian Government through normal disposal channels. Resulting scaling will be small and unbalanced. Propose therefore to impress on Italian Government the necessity for demanding the continuance of maintenance from Ally supplying equipment. This maintenance can NOT however be handled by Allied Military installations in Allied Force Headquarters territory.

9. Financial considerations are presently firm from the US viewpoint. Additional representation will be made on the part of the General Headquarters Central Mediterranean Forces directly to the War Office concerning British financial procedure.

10. Based on experience of the past 5 months when the Italian Government has been responsible for the control of its Army I request:-

(a) Your approval of paragraph 4 above.

(b) Your approval that in the interest of standardisation weapons and ammunition be British supply and other equipment and vehicles (for the remainder of the Army)

1075

7. It is now apparent that the only method of achieving desired result is for direct transfer from British military authorities to the Italian War Ministry of all warlike and non-warlike equipment and vehicles (excluding maintenance) surplus to Allied Military requirements which are required by the Italian Army as approved by SACMED or his successors. In anticipation of your approval we are now proceeding to make initial issues on loan under military arrangements without channeling through British disposal agencies pending agreement between British and Italian Governments of method of financial settlement.

8. Maintenance for vehicles including tyres is required up to end of 1947 approximately when Italian Government anticipates sufficient production from Italian sources to re-equip Army with indigenous transport. Maintenance for other equipment probably required indefinitely. Further supply of all above maintenance by direct transfer is now impracticable owing to Theater rundown. However quantities of spares will be transferred to the Italian Government through normal disposal channels. Resulting scaling will be small and unbalanced. Propose therefore to impress on Italian Government the necessity for demanding the continuance of maintenance from Ally supplying equipment. This maintenance can NOT however be handled by Allied Military installations in Allied Force Headquarters territory.

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10. Based on experience of the past 5 months when the Italian Government has been responsible for the control of its Army I request:-

- 1075
- (a) Your approval of paragraph 4 above.
 - (b) Your approval that in the interest of standardisation weapons and ammunition be British supply and other equipment and vehicles (for the remainder of the Army) including all spares be of British supply so far as British surpluses permit.
 - (c) Your confirmation be given to paragraph 7 above.
 - (d) Your approval to paragraph 8 above.

11. I most strongly urge that the US and British Governments be informed of the necessity of forming and maintaining an effective Italian Force as a prerequisite to both internal security and security of the Italian frontier. In the case of food, clothing, medical supplies, petrol, oil and lubricants steps must be taken to ensure that the requirements of the Italian Government for its Armed Forces are met by producer countries."

2. The signal paraphrased above was also addressed to the British Chiefs of Staff for information.

195
ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

C.A.O. Office

SECRET

-3-

3. You will be kept informed of any subsequent developments in this matter.

10 May 46

ATH/SM

A. J. McMurtrie
Major

A. J. McMURTRIE,

Major.

for CAO.

1074

CONFIDENTIALG.I.C., C.M.P.3159/Q27 May 46SUBJECT: Equipment for Italian
Interim ArmyTO: ORD Directorate (5 copies)MAY 9 1946

Reference ASD/31/3 of 29 Mar 46, Minute 2.

1. Approval is now given by para 7 of AFHQ signal MAP 1135 (not to all) for the issue forthwith of the balance of weapons and equipment required by the Italian Interim Army.

2. These issues will be made direct from British Depots to the Italian Army under arrangements to be agreed by Ordnance Directorate with MIA direct.

3. The issues will officially be regarded as 'on loan' but the normal Ord procedure of issues will NOT be followed. Instead the vouchering will be as for issues to the Italian Army prior to 14 Nov 45. Previous issues made 'on loan' are governed by this policy, and outstanding vouchers will be amended accordingly. Items concerned are listed in Appendix 'A' to this letter. Copies of lists attached to bundles of vouchers in accordance with normal repayment procedure should be forwarded to this HQ for Financial Adviser (M).

4. The equipment now to be issued is detailed at Appendix 'B' to this letter. Normal maintenance will not be sealed, but major items only will be issued.

5. It is emphasized that issues are to be made from surpluses i.e. not at the expense of the British, S. African or Greek Armies. However issues will be made if necessary from stocks which would otherwise be returned to UK vide para 4 of War Office letter (AE) 5/373 of 28 Feb 46.

W.D.A. CLARE
W.D.A. CLARE, Lieut-Colonel,
for Brigadier,
DQM.

JW2/AG

Copy to: G(SD)
G(TF)Land Forces Sub Commission (MIA)
- HQ Allied Commission RAC

1073

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W.D.A. CLARE

W.D.A. CLARE, Lieut-Colonel,
for Brigadier,
DQMC.

JUE/AG

1073

Copy to: G(SD)
G(TFG)
RAC
RA
Inf
RE
Slgs (B)

Land Forces Sub Commission (AMTA)
Hq Allied Commission RMC

G2(B)
G1(C)
RA (B)
RMC

QUD
(cont)

CONFIDENTIALAPPENDIX 'A' TO 8159/11 DATED
MAY 46

AUTHORITIES DETAILING ITEMS ISSUED TO ITALIAN
INTERIM ARMY 'ON LOAN' WHICH ARE NO LONGER
SUBJECT TO ORD 'ON LOAN' PROCEDURE

<u>GRQ letter reference</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Equipments</u>	<u>Remarks</u>	<u>Release Note No. 8850</u>
8159	8 Feb 46	Weapons for Cars	Ex ARC	
EX 603.2(Sig)	8 Feb 46	Staghounds and Daimler Scout Cars		
8159	12 Feb 46	Weapons for Inf Bn		
8159	15 Feb 46	Arty Tractors and Sights Dial		
ESD/81/3/A	26 Feb 46	Armd OPS Qty 2		
8159	4 Mar 46	Web Eqpt for Cars		
ESD/81/3B	3 Apr 46	25 pr Eqpts w/o Muzzle brakes Qty 2		
ESD/81/3A	9 Apr 46	Appx A Inf and arty weapons		

Appx B sig
eqpt already
issued, as
amended by
ESD/81/3B
of 19 Apr 46

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX 'B' TO 8159/01 DATED MAY 46

EQUIPMENT NOW AUTHORIZED TO BE ISSUED
DIRECT TO ITALIAN INTERIM ARMY

Letter Ref:	Date	Equipment	Remarks
Mail letter 81 054	21 Feb 46	Appendix 'C' Coln 9 Vols	To be provided from surpluses especially those at 13 Veh Pk (Ord letter DOS/3/21/3 of 2 May 46 refers)
GR letter 8159	12 Mar 46	Appendix 'A' Coln (e) Weapons	Excl L.2 in MM. Pigs awarded by ESD/31/3 of 6 May 46.
GR letter 117/3 (3d Branch)	22 Mar 46	Balance of requirement in appx 'A' 'B' and 'C' not shown as available ex British School of Artillery.	Excl Predictors, Height and Range finders, and RLDAR code ESD/81/34 of 3 Apr 46, 29 Apr 46 and War Office signal 18810 GS(41) of 1 May 46 refer.
8159	20 Apr 46	Tools as available	ESD/81/38 of 5 Apr 46 refers.
ESD/81/38	9 Apr 46	Med Arty Engt incl tractors	8159/0 of 18 Apr 46 refers.
ESD/81/38	29 Apr 46	Para 2 60 Port-ees Type B	NOT on loan
ESD/81/34	30 Apr 46	Sig Engt	8159 of 2 May 46 refers as amended by ESD/81/34 of 4 May 46.
ESD/81/34	6 May 46	Tyres and Tubes	As available from recent War Office Global Surplus

INCOMING MESSAGE

Originator's Reference WOL 38153 Message Centre H/2597
 Date Time of Origin: May 022226 Z Date Time Rec'd: MAY 031200
 Precedence: ROUTINE

MAY 7 1946

FROM: WAR CCS CITE CCAC
 TO: ROME AREA AFHQ TROOPERS ALLIED COMMISSION FOR CLAC INFO: PHQ
 FOR PHQEG WAR OFFICE FOR SLAO SECRETARIAT.

UNCLASSIFIED.

This is COM 425.

1. On the basis of MOC 537 we have arranged for the Italian Technical Delegation here to submit requirements and receive allocation advices from the combined Committees after April 15 before turning over to the Delegation your Armed Force requirements for meat for presentation to CFB, clarification is needed. Since COM 379 stated we would not present meat and fish requirement for December 1945 to June 1946 unless advised to the contrary, and since we did not hear until receipt of MOC 547 that presentation of requirement was desired, it is impractical now to submit requirement to CFB for the December 1945 - June 1946. Without unusually strong justification. Cable urgently and in absence of advice from you within 10 days we will assume that the commitment for the Arms Force for the period June to December 1946 of 3650 tons presented in MOC 531 is total desired.
2. MOC 547 purporting to give strength of Armed Force does not mention Carabinieri. Are they included in Army figure query if

14049 r 6255

190

UNCLASSIFIED.

This is COM 425.

1. On the basis of MOC 537 we have arranged for the Italian Technical Delegation here to submit requirements and receive allocation advices from the combined Committees after April 15 before turning over to the Delegation your Armed Force requirements for presentation to CFB, clarification is needed. Since COM 379 stated we would not present meat and fish requirement for December 1945 to June 1946 unless advised to the contrary, and since we did not hear until receipt of MOC 547 that presentation of requirement was desired, it is impractical now to submit requirement to CFB for the December 1945 - June 1946. Without unusually strong justification. Cable urgently and in absence of advice from you within 10 days we will assume that the commitment for the Armed Force for the period June to December 1946 of 3650 tons presented in MOC 531 is total desired.
2. MOC 547 purporting to give strength of Armed Force does not mention Carabinieri. Are they included in Army figure query if not, what is strength query. JAS 65, 1007 1079
3. Unable to understand why MOC Airgram 149 did not include any quantity of sugar. Advise if it is desired to present requirement to CFB.
4. We have received Mocs 547 through 553 and in accordance with policy referred to in para 1, these cables are being transmitted to the Delegation for Sub Commissioner to CFB or other appropriate action. Delegation will advise Italian Government direct concerning CFBs decision in each case echols.

HEADQUARTERS

6 MAY 1946

AC DIST on 7th 185

558 (2nd 27)

(1007 K)

see 10/19/1

785017

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
FOOD & AGRICULTURE BRANCH

VRAC/16

Ref. 43-4/TA

29 April 1946

SUBJECT : Feeding of the Italian Armed Forces

TO : G-5 AFHQ

APR 29 1946

Reference I-1 dated 24 April 1946.

1. The Minister of Agriculture and Forestry is the official charged with the responsibility of provisioning the Italian Armed Forces and it would appear from his letter that he is fully alive to his responsibilities and that necessary action has been taken by him and his Committee to ensure the future maintenance of the Army, Carabinieri, Air Force and Navy.

V.R.A. COWPER
Lt. Colonel

Director, Food & Agriculture Branch

Spoke G. & A. S/C
who will send
Copies to Service S/C's.
J.S. 2/5.

1069

see 17189

8/100

A
2/5

6370 *8255* *91* *186*
ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

Ex Comm.
APR 25 1946

Ref: I-1

24 April 1946

SUBJECT: Feeding of the Italian Armed Forces.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission, APO 394. *194*

1. Reference your letter 8255/184/EC dated 20 April 1946. *181*

2. The provisioning of supplies has been the subject of considerable correspondence between our respective Headquarters, especially in regard to 'Feeding of the Italian Navy' (see your TS/100/B/33 of 28 February 1946, AFHQ letter I-1 of 25 March 1946 and, your letter 8255/176/EC dated 13 April 1946).

182 3. From the Minister of Agriculture and Forests' letter dated 12 April 1946, it would now appear that satisfactory arrangements have been planned for the purchasing of all foodstuffs for each branch of the Italian Forces, i.e., Army, Carabinieri, Air Force and Navy.

4. Will you please confirm?

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN:

V. F. Penley. H.C.F.
A. L. HAMBLIN,
Brigadier General, GSC,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5.

Incl: Copy Minister of Agriculture & Forests' letter, as in para 3.

Copies to: CAO, AFHQ w/o incl.
DST, GHQ, CMF w/incl.
Q, GHQ, CMF, w/incl.
Navy Sub-Commission, HQ, Allied Commission, APO 394 w/o incl.
(Land Forces Sub-Commission,
HQ, Allied Commission, APO 394, w/o incl.
(Air Forces Sub-Commission,
HQ, Allied Commission, APO 394, w/o incl.

1068

1187-7183

OUTGOING MESSAGE
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

FROM : HQ ALCOM
TO : AGWAR FOR CCS FOR CCAC FOR CLAC WAROF (LONDON)
FOR SLAO SECRETARIAT APHQ THEG

Ref. No. 2517

UNCLASSIFIED

APR 16 1946

This is MOC 547.

Reference COM 420 - Subject is requirements for Italian Armed Forces.

1. MOC 531 was in answer to a specific query raised in COM 379 as to whether the Italian Government could use fish from Spain for the Armed Forces stop - Complete requirements for last six months of 1946 were submitted in MOC Airgram 149 dated 29 March - stop - Requirement figures in MOC 415 should be used as a monthly basis for first six months of 1946 - stop -

2. The ration strength being entered for is as follows :
Army 205,000, Navy 58,000, Air Force 31,000, - stop -
These figures should not be confused with the authorized ceiling.

Precedence : ROUTINE

Office of origin : Economic Section

Tel. No. 489-081 Ext. 550

Originator's signature : Charles W. Walton, Colonel, AG
Acting Vice President

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION DIRECTION:

Econ. Sec 12

CSO 6

Supply Opns V.C./Udine 6

Advance Copies to :
Commerce Br: 2

1067

185

armed Forces.

1. MOC 531 was in answer to a specific query raised in COM 379 as to whether the Italian Government could use funds from Spain for the Armed Forces stop - Complete requirements for last six months of 1945 were submitted in MOC Airgram 149 dated 29 March - stop - Requirement figures in MOC 415 should be used as a monthly basis for first six months of 1946 - stop -

2. The ration strength being entered for is as follows :
ARMY 205,000, Navy 53,000, Air Force 31,000, - stop -
These figures should not be confused with the authorized ceiling.

Precedence : ROUTINE

Office of origin : Economic Section

Tel. No. 489-081 Ext. 550

Originator's signature : Charles W. Walton, Colonel, AG
Acting Vice President

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION DIRECTION:

Econ Sec 12

CSO 6

Supply Opns V.C/Udina 6

Advance Copies to :

Commerce Br: 2

Finance Br:

Food & Agric. Br: 2

Ind & Util Br:

In Br: 2

INFO:

Chief Commissioner

Exec Commissioner 2

CC BR EMB

CS US EMB

UNRA: Bureau of R & D 6

File

1067

(244.57)

Handwritten notes and signatures at the bottom right of the page.

785017

Ref: 5255/1BA/DC.

20 April 1946.

SUBJECT: Feeding of the Italian Armed Forces.

TO : G-5 Section, AFHQ.

The attached translation of a letter dated 12 April 1946 from The Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, Italian Government, to A/Vice President, Economic Section is sent to you for information.

/s/ N.W. HIND SMITH
MAT
Brigadier,
Acting Chief Commissioner.

Incl.

Copy to:

C.A.O., AFHQ.
Navy Sub-Commission, AG.
Land Forces Sub-Commission (L.F.A.), AG.
Air Forces Sub-Commission, AG.

OFFICE OF THE PROSTATE COMMISSIONER
V.A.O. 207
NEEDHAMVILLE FIELD COMMISSION

1066

see MB3

PA 22
R.

785017

Translation

182

7. Minister
of Agriculture and Forests.

Rome, 12 April 1946

Dear Colonel,

with reference to your telephone call, I can give you full assurance on the regularity of the supply of foodstuffs to the Armed Forces.

The Food Bodies, following the decisions made at the last meeting of the Committee, have prepared a plan for purchasing the foodstuffs, and the plan has already been passed, for action, to the Sacerdoti mission. In the meantime, supplies are drawn from stocks earmarked for the civilian population or authorizing direct purchases on the free market. I have been assured that up to now no difficulties in the supply have arisen.

Yours very sincerely

Sgd. Fausto Gullo

See in 183

See 7-186

1065

NS 18/4
(130)

785017

188

Ref. : 8255/176/80

13. April 1946

SUBJECT: UNRRA Priority

TO : G-5, AFHQ

173 + 174

1. I wish to invite your attention to two almost identical notes verbatim which were sent to the Italian Government by the United States and British Embassies on procurement by the Italian Government for its Armed Forces. In the notes the subordinate position of the Italian Government vis-a-vis UNRRA is clearly defined.

2. I feel some concern about the subordination of the Italian Government procurement because of the previous difficulties which have occurred when the Italian Government has undertaken to provide rations for the Army. In general their ability to provision for their Army has been delayed by difficulties in procurement and transportation, as well as the non-availability of supplies in the countries of source. These difficulties have been further enhanced by the non-availability for Armed Forces of such supplies as those shipped by FEA/UNRRA, lacking special arrangements for repayment. You will recall that advances have been made to the Italian Government from Allied Military stocks.

3. The notes, stating the views of the two Governments, stipulate that supply must be accomplished from:

- (a) indigenous sources;
- (b) Allied surpluses;
- (c) Italian Government purchases abroad with that Government's foreign credits.

4. I anticipate no priority difficulty with supply from indigenous sources.

1064

5. With respect to Allied Military surpluses, it is to be noted that while this source is listed prominently as available to the Italian Government, the reliability of the source is reduced by the higher priority assigned to UNRRA. It is believed that the Italian Government, in its procurement for the Armed Forces, should have an equal, if not a higher priority position than UNRRA in procuring from Army surpluses. This belief is supported by the necessity for an efficient and effective military establishment to maintain peace and order in the country, which are prerequisites to UNRRA operations.

6. The assignment of an over-riding priority to UNRRA for the procurement of imported supplies might have unfortunate effects. UNRRA is

9

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- 2 -

180

doubtless a dominant factor in the markets of the supplying countries, as well as in the use of transport facilities. With such a priority there is the possibility that procurement agents of UNRRA, in the supplying countries, might assert their priorities to such an extent that the ability of the Italian Government to procure would be prejudiced.

7. Insofar as the Italian Mission of UNRRA is concerned I do not anticipate any difficulties, because that Mission is fully cognizant of the Italian needs and well aware of the necessity for leaving the Italian Government free to procure for the segments of the population for which its funds are not eligible.

8. In view of the considerations above, I suggest submission of a recommendation to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that they represent to the two Governments the desirability of placing the Italian Government on a higher priority in its procurement of supplies for the Armed Forces.

M. S. LUSH
HS07 S W

Brigadier
Acting Chief Commissioner

Encls. (2)
Copies of notes verbale from
U. S. and British Embassies

CC: Land Forces S/C
Air Forces S/C
Navy S/C
V/C Supply Opns. Branch
U. S. Embassy
Attn.: Commercial Attache
British Embassy
Attn.: Commercial Attache
UNRRA

1063

COPY

COPY

British Embassy,

Rome.

N.V. 6.
2/12/45.O.D.

NOTE VERBALE

His Majesty's Embassy present their compliments to the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs and have the honour, under instructions, to communicate the views of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom on certain points related to the maintenance of the Italian Armed Forces:-

- (1). Italian military requirements should, as far as possible, be provided from indigenous Italian resources.
- (2). All imports, including tyres and tubes, should be purchased by the Italian Government through their own resources in accordance with existing arrangements for supplies outside the basic programme.
- (3). UNRRA supplies may not be used by the Italian Army.
- (4). Italian military requirements should be subordinate to UNRRA for the disposal of surplus property in Italy.
- (5). The maximum use should be made of Allied Army surpluses to meet the requirements of the Italian Army.
- (6). Requirements for Italy sponsored by UNRRA must have priority over requirements for the military forces.
- (7). Supplies in Category A. of the civilian import programme should not be used for military purposes except where the Allied Commission believes it impracticable to establish a separate line of supply for specific items outside that programme.
- (8). No specific additional tonnages should be included in the Category A programme for Italian military requirements.
- (9). No assurance can be given as to the flow of military supplies.

8th January, 1946,

The Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Palazzo Chigi,
Rome.

COPY

COPY

174

(Note Verbale sent by American Embassy).

V.O. No. 358.

NOTE VERBALE

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, under instructions from the State Department at Washington, has the honor to communicate the views of the United States Government with regard to the following questions related to the maintenance of the Italian Armed Forces:

- (a) Priority as between Italian Army and UNRRA in obtaining surplus property;
- (b) Priority as between Italian military requirements and civilian requirements in Italian import program;
- (c) Question of assurances to be given concerning furnishing of supplies in the civil import program;
- (d) Whether specific additional tonnage shall be included in civil import program for military purposes;
- (e) Whether tire and tube equipment can be supplied through civilian import program.

On these questions, the views of the United States Government are as follows:-

1. We agree that Italian military requirements should, in first instance, be taken from Italian indigenous resources, and secondly, from surplus United States and United Kingdom stocks in Italy.
2. UNRRA should have priority over Italian military requirements in the disposal of surplus property in Italy.
3. Items including tires and tube requirements which cannot be supplied locally or from surplus should be purchased by Italian Government through its available foreign resources. Italian Government should determine relative priority of military and civilian requirements in making purchases.
4. UNRRA supplies cannot be used for military purposes.
5. Supplies in category A, civilian import program, should not (repeat not) be used for military purposes except where Allied Commission believes it impracticable to establish separate line of supply for specific items outside that program. No specific additional tonnages should be included in category A program for Italian military requirements.

RCS. January 4, 1946
CAL:ds

To the
Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Rome.

785017

TRANSLATION

8255

EC

173

61195/52199/1.2.2

Rome, 30 March 1946

The President of the
Council of Ministers

APR 2 1946

Dear Admiral,

I am very much concerned with the problems you and
Brigadier Lush raised as to the supplying of the Italian Armed
Forces, and the need for the Ministry of War to refund the loans
received from the Allies, to secure the normal provisions for the
Army.

These problems have been faced, and are now being studied by
the Food Commission of the Intergovernmental Committee for the Re-
construction. We hope they will soon be solved in a satisfactory
manner. In view of the scarcity of our national resources, Secordati
has been asked to intensify the action of the mission he is heading
in America, in order to obtain necessary help for Italy.

I will send you further information on this matter.

With my greetings,

/s/ De Gasperi.

To Admiral Elery F. STONE
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission

- ROME -

for Mr. 2.3.

EC 3 Apr 46
1069
Action Econ Sec (v)
Info CC
66
Lans. Jones

4/4,
(MA) H

10/4

785017

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169

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
ECONOMIC SECTION

Ref: ES/8.01x208

30 March 1946

SUBJECT: Feeding of Italian Armed Forces.

MAR 30 1946

TO : Brig. M. S. Lush - Executive Commissioner

145.146

1. It has been learned from MMIA, Colonel Kerr that AFHQ has taken cognizance of the notes verbale on the overriding priority of UNRRA versus Italian Government procurement for the Armed Forces. According to Col. Kerr AFHQ is to make representation to the CCS opposing the arrangement.

2. After further discussion with the Service Sub - Commission it was unanimously agreed that representations to AFHQ at this time would serve no useful purpose.

145.146

3. It is therefore recommended that no further action be taken at this time on the notes verbale.

Charles W. Walton
CHARLES W. WALTON
Colonel AC
Acting Vice President

Copy to: Land Forces S/C AC.
Navy S/C AC.
Air Force S/C AC.

1059

see 169.71-72
476

g
SR 2/3
(Maj H & Capt X)

785017

8255

AD

167

43-4/FA

29 March 1946

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

MAR 29 1946

The responsibility for feeding the Royal Italian Navy and Air Force is at present being undertaken by S & T Branch, G.H.Q. The responsibility will cease as from June 1st 1946 when it will fall to your Government to undertake this task. The needs of the Army have already been undertaken by your Government.

Attached is a table showing the requirements of the three Services, the Navy and Air Force for seven months from June 1st and the Army from 1st April to 31st December 1946. All requirements include an increment of 10% for wastage plus a two months reserve.

May I be informed, please, that you are satisfied that sufficient indigenous resources are earmarked to meet the needs of the Armed Forces and that necessary provision action has been taken to ensure that imported supplies purchased out of Italian credits will be forthcoming to satisfy their demands not obtainable locally.

Very truly yours

Copy to: G. Linn.

G. Linn. ✓

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Approved

V.R.A. COWPER
Lt. Colonel

Director, Food & Agric. Branch

Dr. Alcide de Gasperi,
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government,

ROME

SR

H/3.

(MOJ 4 - CAPT K)

166

(A)

MAINTENANCE OF ITALIAN ARMED FORCES TO 31 DECEMBER 1946

{ Based on monthly Maintenance plus 10% for wastage and two months reserve)

(In Metric Tons)

COMMODITY (B)	Italian ARMY (205,000 men)	Italian AIR FORCE (31,000 men)	Italian NAVY (58,000 men)	TOTAL
Flour for Bread	31.552	3.304	7.483	42.944
Pasta or Flour for Pasta	6.424	773	1,497	8,744
Rice or Flour in lieu of rice	2.158	258	499	2,915
Sugar	1,894	258	499	2,651
Pulses	3,789	516	997	5,302
Coffee	1,224	161	250	1,639
Preserved Meat & Fish	5,683	838	1,497	8,018
Pepper	10.4	1.3	2.5	14.2
Olive Oil/Lard	2,079	253	482	2,819

(A) From 1 June 1946 for Air Force and Navy and 1 April 1946 for the Army
except for these items already supplied to a later date ¹⁹⁵⁷ follows:

Sugar - already provided to 1 May
Pulses - " " " "

Pasta or Flour for Pasta	6.424	773	1.457	2.744
Rice or Flour in lieu of rice	2.158	258	499	2.915
Sugar	1.894	258	499	2.651
Pulses	3.789	516	997	5.302
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Pepper	10.4	1.3	2.5	14.2
Olive Oil/Lard	2.079	258	482	2.819

(A) From 1 June 1946 for Air Force and Navy and 1 April 1946 for the Army except for those items already supplied to a later date ¹⁰⁵⁷ follows:

Sugar	-	already provided to 1 May
Pulses	-	" " " "
Meat & Fish	-	" " " "
Coffee	-	" " " 20 April

(B) Commodities that can be provided from local resources (such as wine, salt, nuts, fresh fruit, vegetables, cheese and tomato paste) are excluded. In these foods Italy is either self sufficient or has a surplus.

SECRET.

EXTRACT FROM THE MINUTES OF SACMED'S CONFERENCE
HELD AT AFHQ ON 16th MARCH 1946.
3rd MEETING.

MINUTE No. 2.

"2. FEEDING OF THE ITALIAN NAVY AND AIR FORCE.

(Previous reference SAC (46) 2nd Meeting, Minute 4).

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF, Chief Administrative Officer, raised the question of the date by which the Italian Government were to assume responsibility for the feeding of the Italian Navy and the Italian Air Force. At the meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference, SAC (46) 2nd Meeting, held on the 14th February, the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER directed that 31st March be fixed as the latest date by which the Italian Government should assume their responsibility for the feeding of the Italian Navy and the Italian Air Force.

The Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, had written to AFHQ in regard to this decision; in view of the very serious Italian food situation he hoped that some less drastic action might be adopted.

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF went on to say that he had put forward a suggestion that two months supply in bulk should immediately be transferred from British Depots to Italian Depots. This would provide for subsistence of the Italian Navy and the Italian Air Force, except for a very small US commitment which he understood Headquarters MTOUSA would have no difficulty in meeting, until 31st May 46. This proposal was, he understood, acceptable to the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, and would enable the Italian Navy and Italian Air Force to be fed until 31st May 46 without increasing the strain on the resources of food of the Italian Government.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE confirmed that this suggestion was acceptable.

on

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF went on to say that he considered that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be informed that after 31st May 46, GHQ COMF would be unable any longer to meet the commitment of feeding the Italian Navy and the Italian Air Force and asked for their approval to the transfer of responsibility for this commitment to the Italian Government with effect from the 1st June 46.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

- (a) Approved the telegram at Appendix "B" to the paper CAO/228/1 of the 14th March 46,
- (b) Directed that this telegram be despatched to the Combined Chiefs of Staff (Despatched as NAF 1123). "

Ex. Commissioner's Distribution - 27. Mar. 46

1056

Navy Sub-Commission
Air Forces Sub-Commission
Economic Section
File 8255/EC.

4049 a SSS
164
OUTGOING MESSAGE
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

FROM : HQ ALCOM

18 MARCH 1946

TO : AGWAR FOR CCS FOR CCAC FOR CLAC WAROF (LONDON)
FOR SLAO SECRETARIAT AFHQ PHGES

Ref. No. 1929

UNCLASSIFIED

This is WOC 531.

Reference COM 379. Food requirements for interim Army and Carabinieri.

1. Italian Government state that the 3,000 tons canned fish which is expected from Spain has already been promised to Cooperatives for distribution to Special Classes urgently in need of such food.
2. Any alteration in this plan would lead to unnecessary political complications.
3. Total quantity of canned fish/meat for 6 months ending 31 December for Italian Armed Forces including Navy and Air Force is 5,250 tons, in the ratio of two sevenths fish to five sevenths meat.
4. Request therefore that these amounts be asked for from Combined Food Board.

Precedence : ROUTINE

Office of origin : Economic Section

Tel.No. 489-381 Ext. 550

Originator's signature : Charles W. Walton, Colonel, AC
Acting Vice President

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION DIRECTION :

Econ Sec 18

CSO 6

Supply Group

ADVANCE COPIES TO :

Commerce SC 2

Finance SC 2

1U55

785017

Reference COM 379. Food requirements for interim Army and Carabinieri.

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2. Any alteration in this plan would lead to unnecessary political complications.
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4. Request therefore that these amounts be asked for from Combined Food Board.

Precedence : ROUTINE

Office of origin : Economic Section

Tel.No. 489-384 Ext. 550

Originator's signature : Charles W. Walton, Colonel, AG
Acting Vice President

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION DIRECTION :

Econ Sec 18

CSO 6

Supply Group

Program Br.

Requisition Br. 10

INFO :

Chief Commissioner

Ex Commissioner 2

CC BR EMB

CA US EMB

M.M.I.A.

High Commissioner for Food - Rome
File

ADVANCE COPIES TO :

Commerce SC 2

Finance SC 2

Food & Agric SC 2

Ind Utilities SC 2

Coal Div 2

Tn SC 2

1055

See on 4049.

163

Ref: B255/163/EC.

20 March 1946.

SUBJECT: Rations for the Italian Army.

TO : Land Forces Sub-Commission (M.M.I.A.)

144

Reference your Q/1-122 dated 1 March 46.

This matter was referred to Economic Section, and
forwarded herewith is copy of their reply 43-4/PA dated 18 March 46.

162

N. W. HIND-SMITH

Chief Staff Officer,
To the Executive Commissioner.

Incl.

1054

PA 20
21

8255 AR

162

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

ECONOMIC SECTION

VRAC/lg

18 March 1946

Ref. 43-4/FA

SUBJECT : Rations for the Italian Army

TO : Executive Commissioner

Reference Q/1-122 dated 1 March 1946 from Land Forces Sub-Commission.

1. After further discussions with the High Commissioner for Food it appears that difficulties have arisen in the procurement of rations for the Italian Army because of the lack of liaison of procurement agencies of the Ministry of War with that Commissioner.

2. For the procurement of indigenous items it appears necessary in all cases for the Ministry of War to issue tenders and receive bids from contractors. When the items under procurement are blocked food items, a clearance from the High Commissioner for Food is necessary. When the items are not blocked, as in the case of cheese, the procurement should be made in the open market.

3. With particular reference to cheese referred to in Q/35/6 dated 24 Feb 46 from HQ 3 British Liaison Unit the difficulties complained of should not have arisen at all as cheese is now a free item and it is merely a matter for the Italian Military Supply Agencies to make the necessary arrangements for purchase as no allocation of any sort from the Italian Government is necessary.

4. It is recommended that M.M.I.A. take such steps as they deem appropriate to ensure that the necessary action is taken by the Ministry of War for purchase of required items.

1 spare

See 163

(has H-5)

161

-2-

5. However, On 13 March the whole question was very thoroughly discussed and an assurance was given by the Office of the High Commissioner for Food that in future every facility would be given to the Italian Army for the supply of feedstuffs.

Charles W. Walton
CHARLES W. WALTON
Colonel, A.C.
Acting Vice President

1052

785017

INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Originator's Reference: M 63008

Date/Time of Origin: 18 MAR 1945

Message Centre No: 4/841

Date Time Rec'd: 18 MAR 1945

Precedence: IMMEDIATE

FROM: AIR, SIGNED SARGENT

TO: ACTION AGAR WASHINGTON FOR GUIDED CHIEFS OF STAFF - CAPTAIN OFFICERS WHITEHALL
FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET.

THIS IS NOT 1123, SUBJECT IS SUBSTANCE OF ITALIAN NAVY AND AIR FORCE.

1. UNDER JAN 365 THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ITALIAN NAVY WAS MADE A BRITISH COMMITMENT, PRESENT STRENGTH IS APPROXIMATELY 58 THOUSAND.

2. UNDER JAN 391 THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE WAS MADE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE NATION UNDER WHOSE COMMAND ITALIAN AIR FORCE WAS WORKING, PRESENT STRENGTH UNDER BRITISH COMMAND IS APPROXIMATELY 28,500 PRESENT STRENGTH UNDER UNITED STATES COMMAND IS APPROX 4,000.

3. COMMENTS IN PARA 1 AND 2 ABOVE ARE THEREFORE EXCLUSIVELY BRITISH, BEING TO REDDON IN BRITISH MATTER AND POLICY OF CLEARING OUT OF SOUTHERN ITALY IT HAS BECOME IMPRACTICABLE FOR BRITISH TO CONTINUE TO PROVIDE RATIONS FOR THE ITALIAN NAVY AND AIR FORCE.

1051

4. THEREFORE IN DECEMBER 1945 IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE POLICY APPROVED FOR THE ITALIAN ARMY IN JAN 621 I DIRECTED THAT THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE ASKED TO STATE THE EARLIEST DATE BEFORE 21 MARCH 46 ON WHICH THEY COULD ASSUME THIS RESPONSIBILITY

5. THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT NOW STATE THAT THEY CONSIDER IT EXTREMELY UNLIKELY THAT THEY

785017

Message Centre No: H/331
Date Time Rec'd: 18 MAR 1945
Precedence: IMMEDIATE

SECRET

TOP SECRET

Date/Time of Origin: 18 MAR 1945
FROM: AIR STAFF
TO: ACTION AGENT WASHINGTON FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF - COMBINED OFFICES WHITEHALL
FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

TOP SECRET.

THIS IS REF 1123. SUBJECT IS SUBSISTANCE OF ITALIAN NAVY AND AIR FORCE.

1. UNDER PAR 965 THE SUBSISTANCE OF THE ITALIAN NAVY WAS MADE A BRITISH COMBINED. PRESENT STRENGTH IS APPROXIMATELY 53 THOUSAND.

2. UNDER PAR 991 THE SUBSISTANCE OF THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE WAS MADE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE BRITISH UNDER WHOSE COMMAND ITALIAN AIR FORCE WAS WORKING. PRESENT STRENGTH UNDER BRITISH COMMAND IS APPROXIMATELY 28,500 PRESENT STRENGTH UNDER UNITED STATES COMMAND IS APPROX 4,000.

3. COMMENTS IN PARA 1 AND 2 ABOVE ARE THEREFORE PRIMARILY BRITISH. Owing to REDUCTION IN BRITISH MANPOWER AND POLICY OF CLOSING OUT OF SOUTHERN ITALY IT HAS BECOME IMPRACTICABLE FOR BRITISH TO CONTINUE TO PROVIDE RATIONS FOR THE ITALIAN NAVY AND AIR FORCE.

1051

4. THEREFORE IN DECEMBER 1945 IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE POLICY APPROVED FOR THE ITALIAN ARMY IN PAR 621 I DIRECTED THAT THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE ASKED TO STATE THE EARLIEST DATE BEFORE 21 MARCH 46 ON WHICH THEY COULD ASSUME THIS RESPONSIBILITY. 5. THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT HAS STATED THAT THEY CONSIDER IT EXTREMELY UNLIKELY THAT THEY WILL BE ABLE TO SECURE FOOD FOR THE ITALIAN NAVY AND AIR FORCE IN VIEW OF THE VERY SERIOUS FOOD SITUATION IN ITALY AND THE FAILURE OF UGBRA TO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT IMPORTS FOR THE COUNTRY AS A WHOLE AND I AM BEING PRESSED TO CONTINUE TO PROVIDE SUBSISTANCE.

TOP SECRET

Ref. Sec 17.50.

1943.

1 page

785017

INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Originator's Reference:

MESSAGE 2 Message Centre No: 8/8A1

Date/Time of Origin:

Date Time Rec'd:

FROM:

Precedence:

TO :

6. AS A TEMPORARY EXPEDIENT I AM ARRANGING FOR THE BULK TRANSFER FROM BRITISH DEPOTS TO ITALIAN DEPOTS OF RATIONS TO PROVIDE FOR THE SUBSISTANCE OF THE ITALIAN NAVY AND THE BRITISH SHARE OF THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE UNTIL 31 MAY NEXT MAY 46. MAINTENANCE OF THE UNITED STATES SHARE OF THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE WILL CONTINUE AS AT PRESENT.

7. MANY BRITISH SUPPLY DEPOTS WILL HAVE CLOSED BY 31 MAY AND SUBSISTANCE OF THE ITALIAN NAVY AND AIR FORCE AFTER THIS DATE WILL ON THE BRITISH SIDE BECOME IMPRACTICABLE.

8. I THEREFORE REQUEST-AM

A. KNOW EARLY APPROVAL TO THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT ASSUMING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SUBSISTANCE OF THE ITALIAN NAVY AND AIR FORCE WITH EFFECT FROM 1 JUNE 46.
B. THAT INSTRUCTIONS BE FORWARDED REGARDING THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT'S CHANNEL FOR PROVISIONING TO ENSURE THAT THERE IS NO BREAKDOWN IN THE SUPPLY PROGRAMME FOR THEIR ARMED FORCES.

THIS MESSAGE IS PRESUMABLY FOR INFORMATION FOR ALCOM BUT THERE WAS NO MENTION OF IT IN THE MESSAGE.

AC 101 050

Date	Time	Rec'd:
11/11/11	11:11	11:11

Precedence:

FROM:

OF

6. AS A TEMPORARY EXPEDIENT I AM ARRANGING FOR THE BULK TRANSFER FROM BRITISH
 HEROES TO ITALIAN HEROES OF RATIONS TO PROVIDE FOR THE SUBSISTANCE OF THE
 ITALIAN NAVY AND THE BRITISH SHARE OF THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE UNTIL 31 MAY
 NEXT MAY 16. MAINTENANCE OF THE UNITED STATES SHARE OF THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE
 WILL CONTINUE AS AT PRESENT.

7. MANY BRITISH SUPPLY DEPOSITS WILL HAVE CLOSED BY 31 MAY AND ASSISTANCE OF THE
ITALIAN NAVY AND AIR FORCE AFTER THIS DATE WILL ON THE BRITISH SIDE BECOME
IMPRACTICABLE.

8. I THEREBY REQUEST-SEE

A. YOUR EARLY APPROVAL TO THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT ASSUMING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE
SUSTENANCE OF THE ITALIAN NAVY AND AIR FORCE WITH EFFECT FROM 1 JUNE 46.
B. THAT INSTRUCTIONS RE FORWARDED REGARDING THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENTS CHANNEL FOR
PROVISIONING TO ENSURE THAT THERE IS NO BREAKDOWN IN THE SUPPLY PROGRAMME FOR
THEIR ARMED FORCES.

THIS MESSAGE IS PRESUMABLY FOR ALCON BUT THERE WAS NO
MENTION OF IT IN THE MESSAGE.

CIPHER TELEGRAM

CIPHER TELEGRAM
This message will not be distributed outside British or U.S. Government Departments or Headquarters or transmitted even in Cipher **ONP**, need not be re-encrypted. (Messages marked).

INFO 40TH: BLC COM 2
INFO: CHIEF CENTISE OVER
NAVY
~~D-2-1000~~ AIR
EDON 2
HLE
SKEDTON

7059

785017

File

(158)

MC

Ref: 8255/M.

18 March 1946.

SUBJECT: Peeding of the Italian Armed Forces.

TO : VP Economic Section.

145 + 146

1. I enclose copies of two almost identical notes verbale which were presented to Ministry of Foreign Affairs in January. No copy was sent to Allied Commission.

2. In view of the responsibility now assumed by the Italian Government in respect of the Italian Army and shortly to be assumed in respect of the other Armed Services, I would ask you to discuss the notes with representatives of the Service Sub-Commissions and draft a representation to AFHQ if you consider one necessary.

B/U 25/3

Noted 1/3

M. S. Lusk

Brigadier,
Executive Commission.

Copy to: Land Forces S/O (WHIA)
Navy S/O
Air Forces S/O

1049

PA. 19/3

Allied Commission of 157
 (27-29)

五、四、三、二、一

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
C.A.O. OFFICE

MAR 15 1946

CAO/229/1.

MEMORANDUM for : Chief of Staff.

Subj: Subsistence of the Italian Navy and
Italian Air Force. 

1. Reference SAC's direction on Item 4 of the Minutes of SAC's Meeting held on 14 Feb 46. Allied Commission's reply is at Appendix 'A'.

5. a temporary expedient I am prepared to transfer immediately two months supply in bulk from British depots to Italian depots. This will provide for the subsistence of the Italian Navy and Italian Air Force except for a very small U.S. commitment which I understand WFOUSA will have no difficulty in meeting until 31 May 46.

By this date we hope on the British side to have closed most of our supply depots in Southern ITALY, and it will not be possible to provide the Italian Government with further assistance in meeting this commitment. The subeistence of the Italian Navy and Italian Air Force is primarily a British commitment in accordance with OCS Directive. I consider that we should inform OCS that we can no longer meet this commitment and ask them for their approval to the transfer of responsibility for this commitment to the Italian Government w.c.f. 1 Jun 46.

If you agree to the above, I attach for your approval at Appendix 'B' a draft HAF cable requesting:-

205 approval to the Italian Government assuming responsibility for the subsistence for the Italian Navy and Air Force w.e.f. 1 Jun 46.

b. CCS instructions regarding the Italian Government's checkel for provisioning to ensure that there is no breakdown in the supply programs for the Italian Armed Forces.

SUBJECT

Subsistence of the Italian Navy and
Italian Air Force.

1. Reference SAC's direction on Item 4 of the Minutes of SAC's Meeting held on 14 Feb 46. Allied Commission's reply is at Appendix 'A'.
2. As a temporary expedient I am prepared to transfer immediately two months supply in bulk from British depots to Italian depots. This will provide for the subsistence of the Italian Navy and Italian Air Force except for a very small U.S. commitment which I understand MTOUSA will have no difficulty in meeting until 31 May 46.
3. If this date we hope on the British side to have closed most of our supply depots in Southern ITALY, and it will not be possible to provide the Italian Government with further assistance in meeting this commitment. The subsistence of the Italian Navy and Italian Air Force is primarily a British commitment in accordance with OCS Directive. I consider that we should inform OCS that we can no longer meet this commitment and ask them for their approval to the transfer of responsibility for this commitment to the Italian Government w.e.f. 1 Jun 46.

4. If you agree to the above, I attach for your approval at Appendix 'B' a draft MAF cable requesting:-

a. OCS approval to the Italian Government assuming responsibility for the subsistence for the Italian Navy and Air Force w.e.f. 1 Jun 46.

b. OCS instructions regarding the Italian Government's channel for provisioning to ensure that there is no breakdown in the supply programme for the Italian Armed Forces.

5. MLO with SACMED has seen this Staff Study and has stated that, while he considers that the proposals would probably be likely to receive the concurrence of C-in-C Med, he is unable to give this concurrence without reference to him in view of the close personal interest which C-in-C Med takes in this matter. Further, he states that he understands that C-in-C Med is likely to raise this matter at the SACMED Conference on 16 Mar 46.

CONCURRENCES:

Air HQ ITALY

G-3

G-4

G-5

G-6

Action - Ex. C

INFO - C. Com's / NAVY

AIR FORCE SEC.

ECON SEC.

A. C. DUFF,
Major-General,
Chief Administrative Officer.

14 Mar 46.

C O P Y

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
A P C 394

Appendix "A".

Ref: TS/100/B/ES.

28 February 1946.

SUBJECT: Feeding of the Italian Navy.

TO : G-5 Section, AFHQ.

1. I refer to my letter TS/100/B/ES dated 7 February 1946 and to the decision made at SACRED's Conference that as from 1 April 1946 the responsibility for feeding the Italian Navy must be assumed by the Italian Government.

2. In view of the very serious food situation in this country and the failure of UNRRA to provide sufficient imports for the country as a whole, I must point out that it is extremely unlikely that the Italian Government will be able to procure to feed the Navy.

3. If, as was expressed at SACRED's Conference, the difficulty of continuing supply from British sources is due to lack of manpower, then I would suggest that consideration be given to the substitution of British RASC staff by Italian naval maintenance staff who, I am advised, would be capable of assisting if not taking over entirely, the work of distribution.

4. If, on the other hand, shortage of British rations is the underlying reason for the decision, then I would suggest that consideration be given to rationing the Italian Navy, at any rate for two or three months, from the surplus stocks of U.S. rations which I understand are now available in this country.

5. A further suggestion has been made that bulk commodities should be issued to the Italian Government from British sources, a proposal which I should be glad to explore.

6. I feel bound to ask for consideration to be given to these points in view of the responsibility for maintenance of the Italian Services which has been assumed and, I submit, must continue to be assumed, by SACRED.

SUBJECT: Feeding of the Italian Navy.

TO : G-5 Section, AFHQ.

1. I refer to my letter IS/100/E/ES dated 7 February 1946 and to the decision made at SACMED's Conference that as from 1 April 1946 the responsibility for feeding the Italian Navy must be assumed by the Italian Government.
2. In view of the very serious food situation in this country and the failure of UNRRA to provide sufficient imports for the country as a whole, I must point out that it is extremely unlikely that the Italian Government will be able to procure to feed the Navy.
3. If, as was expressed at SACMED's Conference, the difficulty of continuing supply from British sources is due to lack of manpower, then I would suggest that consideration be given to the substitution of British PASO staff by Italian naval maintenance staff who, I am advised, would be capable of assisting if not taking over entirely, the work of distribution.
4. If, on the other hand, shortage of British rations is the underlying reason for the decision, then I would suggest that consideration be given to rationing the Italian Navy, at any rate for two or three months, from the surplus stocks of U.S. rations which I understand are now available in this country.
5. A further suggestion has been made that bulk commodities should be issued to the Italian Government from British sources, a proposal which I should be glad to explore.
6. I feel bound to ask for consideration to be given to these points in view of the responsibility for maintenance of the Italian Services which has been assumed and, I submit, must continue to be assumed, by SACMED.

SIGNED. ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner.

DRAFT

APPENDIX "B".

TO : Agree for CCS
Cabinet Offices Whitehall

INFO : ALOOM.

This is RAF

Subject is subsistence of Italian Navy and Italian Air Force.

ONE Under EAM 365 the subsistence of the Italian Navy was made a British commitment. Present strength is approximately 58,000. Under EAM 391 the subsistence of the Italian Air Force was made the responsibility of the nation under whose command Italian Air Force was working. Present strength under British command is approximately 28,500 and present strength under US command is approximately 4,000.

TWO Commitments in paras ONE and TWO above are therefore primarily British. Owing to rundown in British manpower and policy of closing out of Southern ITALY it has become impracticable for British to continue to provide rations for the Italian Navy and Air Force.

THREE Therefore in December 1945 in accordance with the policy approved for the Italian Army in EAM 621 I directed that the Italian Government should be asked to state the earliest date before 31 March 46 on which they could assume this responsibility.

FOUR The Italian Government now state that they consider it extremely unlikely that they will be able to procure food for the Italian Navy and Air Force in view of the very serious food situation in ITALY and the failure of UNRRA to provide sufficient imports for the country as a whole and I am being pressed to continue

FIVE

1046

TWO

British commitment. Present strength is approximately 56,000. Under PAN 591 the subsistence of the Italian Air Force was made the responsibility of the nation under whose command Italian Air Force was working. Present strength under British command is approximately 28,500 and present strength under US command is approximately 4,000.

THREE

Commitments in paras ONE and TWO above are therefore primarily British. Owing to rundown in British manpower and policy of closing out of Southern ITALY it has become impracticable for British to continue to provide rations for the Italian Navy and Air Force.

FOUR

Therefore in December 1945 in accordance with the policy approved for the Italian Army in PAN 621 I directed that the Italian Government should be asked to state the earliest date before 31 March 46 on which they could assume this responsibility.

FIVE

The Italian Government now state that they consider it extremely unlikely that they will be able to procure food for the Italian Navy and Air Force in view of the very serious food situation in ITALY and the failure of UNRRA to provide sufficient imports for the country as a whole and I am being pressed to continue to provide subsistence.

SIX

As a temporary expedient I am arranging for the bulk transfer from British depots to Italian depots of rations to provide for the subsistence of the Italian Navy and the British share of the Italian Air Force until 31 May 46. Maintenance of the US share of the Italian Air Force will continue as at present.

SEVEN / OVER

154

Ref: 8255/150/NS.

14 March 1946.

SUBJECT: Supplies for Italian Armed Forces.

TO : Mr. Sidney Simonds,
Counsellor (Commercial),
British Embassy,
ROME.

147

1. Thank you for your memo 2/65/46.CD of 7 March 46.
2. I think an early meeting is very desirable, if only to achieve an arrangement by which the Allied Governments' views on the maintenance of the Italian Armed Forces, which is a very close concern of the Soviet Sub-Commissions of the Allied Commission, are communicated to the Allied Commission if not prior to, at any rate, simultaneously with notification to the Italian Government.
3. Can you discuss on Friday, 15 March, at 1500 hrs?

M. S. LUSH

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

1045

Ref: TS/100/B/EE.

SUBJECT: Feeding of the Italian Armed Forces.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
Attn: G-5 Section.4 March 1946.

Further to my letter TS/100/B/ES dated 28 February, I append below extracts from the Monthly Reports for December and January from the Food & Agriculture Sub-Commissions:

1. Food & Agriculture S/C Monthly Report - December 1945.

14. Maintenance of Italian Army and Air Force. Further, slow progress has been made in the negotiations dealing with the Italian Government's assumption of responsibility for maintenance of the Italian Army as from 1 December and the proposed assumption of responsibility for maintenance of the Italian Navy and Air Force as from 1 March 1946. The chief difficulty continues to be the Italian Government's reluctance to recognise the fact that it must sooner or later be entirely responsible for the maintenance of its own armed forces. However, the Ministry of Reconstruction Mission in Washington to purchase out of US funds quantities of imported foodstuffs required for the maintenance of the Italian Army as from 1 December. A request was also made to GIAC by AG for the former's assistance to be given to the Italian Mission in the matter of procurement. The present position appears to be as follows:

- (a) the Italian Government has at last accepted the fact that it must provide somehow for the maintenance of the Army;
- (b) until the supplies to be purchased as mentioned above actually arrive in Italy, requirements of the Army are being met partly out of existing stocks of imported civil supplies and partly out of existing stocks of surplus military supplies, both cases on a replacement-in-kind basis;
- (c) maintenance of the Army to the end of January is almost entirely assured; but the outlook for February is still uncertain since to date Allied Military Authorities have not agreed to make available any supplies out of surplus stocks for that month;

EU 13

785017

Further to my letter TS/100/3/23 dated 28 February, I append below extracts from the Monthly Reports for December and January from the Food & Agriculture Sub-Committee:

1. Food & Agriculture 3/C Monthly Report - December 1945.

14. Maintenance of Italian Army and Air Force. Further, slow progress has been made in the negotiations dealing with the Italian Government's assumption of responsibility for maintenance of the Italian Army as from 1 December and the proposed assumption of responsibility for maintenance of the Italian Navy and Air Force as from 1 March 1946. The chief difficulty continues to be the Italian Government's reluctance to recognize the fact that it must sooner or later be entirely responsible for the maintenance of its own armed forces. However, the Ministry of Reconstruction ultimately sent in December instructions to the Italian Bidding Mission in Washington to purchase out of IT funds quantities of imported foodstuffs required for the maintenance of the Italian Army as from 1 December. A request was also made to GIAC by AO for the former's assistance to be given to the Italian Mission in the matter of procurement. The present position appears to be as follows:

(a) the Italian Government has at least accepted the fact that it must provide somehow for the maintenance of the Army;

(b) until the supplies to be purchased as mentioned above actually arrive in Italy, requirements of the Army are being met partly out of existing stocks of imported civil supplies and partly out of existing stocks of surplus military supplies, ^{10/13} both cases on a replacement-in-kind basis,

(c) maintenance of the Army to the end of January is almost entirely assured; but the outlook for February is still uncertain since to date Allied Military Authorities have not agreed to make available any supplies out of surplus stocks for that month;

(d) the Italian Government still maintains that it is not in a position to accept responsibility for maintaining the Navy and the Air Force, and on the question of finance generally is appealing to AO to provide other ways and means of financing the purchases required than the use of IT dollar credits in the US.

2. Food & Agriculture 3/C Monthly Report - January 1946.

10. Maintenance of Italian Armed Forces. Although this matter has been under almost constant discussion by the various parties concerned, little real progress seems to have been made during January apart from the receipt of information that 19,000 tons of flour, purchased by the Italian Govt out of IT funds, and to be loaded in February, has been earmarked for the maintenance of the Italian Army. From this quantity, however, those loans of flour which have been made from military stocks in Italy will have to be repaid. Imports of other miscellaneous commodities must

-2-

also be arranged by the Italian Government to repay US and British Army for loans made from military stocks for use in December 1945, and January and February 1946, and to make good such quantities of civil supplies imported under the FEA Interim Program as have been used for Italian Army maintenance in the same months. This matter was referred to at some length in para 14 of the monthly report for December."

For the Chief Commissioner:

M. S. LUSH

MSL/JL

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

Copy to: Chief Commissioner
Navy Sub-Com
Air Forces Sub-Com
Land Forces Sub-Com (HQA)
Econ Sec (for Food & Agric S/C)

1042

TELEPHONE:—
ROME 43.951.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
ROME.

2/65/46.CD.

7th March, 1946.

MAR 8 1946

To: Brigadier M.S. Lush, Executive Commissioner, Headquarters
Allied Commission, Rome.

From: Mr. Sidney Simmonds, Counsellor (Commercial).

Subject: Supplies for Italian Armed Forces.

Please refer to your letter 8255/EC of the 20th February
on the above subject.

.....
.....
2. The translation of the note verbale from this Embassy was
not enclosed in your letter. I am enclosing, however, a copy of
the Note Verbale as despatched from this Embassy, together with
a copy of the note which the American Embassy despatched to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the same subject on the 4th
January. In case of discrepancy between the two notes I would
suggest that you take the text of the American Embassy's note
as being the more authentic, since it was based on direct
instructions from the State Department. Our note was prepared
from telegrams from the British Embassy in Washington reporting
instructions which, according to that Embassy, were being sent
to the American Embassy in Rome by the State Department.

3. If, after studying the two notes, you feel that there would
be advantage in discussing the matter further, I am at your
disposal and would suggest that a representative of the American
Embassy should be invited to join in the discussion.

Sidney Simmonds.

1041

(mas H)

9/3/46

see 17148.149.
J 158

R.V. 6.

2/12/46.OD.

British Embassy,

Rome.

STANDARD NOTE

His Majesty's Embassy present their compliments to the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs and have the honour, under instructions, to communicate the views of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom on certain points related to the maintenance of the Italian Armed Forces:-

- (1). Italian military requirements should, as far as possible, be provided from indigenous Italian resources.
- (2). All imports, including tyres and tubes, should be purchased by the Italian Government through their own resources in accordance with existing arrangements for supplies outside the basic programme.
- (3). United supplies may not be used by the Italian Army.
- (4). Italian military requirements should be subordinate to UNRRA for the disposal of surplus property in Italy.
- (5). The maximum use should be made of Allied Army surpluses to meet the requirements of the Italian Army.
- (6). Requirements for Italy sponsored by UNRRA must have priority over requirements for the military forces.
- (7). Supplies in Category A. of the civilian import programme should not be used for military purposes except where the Allied Commission believes it impracticable to establish a separate line of supply for specific items outside that programme.
- (8). No specific additional tonnage should be included in the Category A programme for Italian military requirements.
- (9). No assurance can be given as to the flow of military supplies.

146

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and have the honor, under instructions, to communicate the views of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom on certain points related to the maintenance of the Italian Armed Forces.

- (1). Italian military requirements should, as far as possible, be provided from indigenous Italian resources.
- (2). All imports, including tyres and tubes, should be purchased by the Italian Government through their own resources in accordance with existing arrangements for supplies outside the basic programme.
- (3). Allied supplies may not be used by the Italian Army.
- (4). Italian military requirements should be subordinate to those for the disposal of surplus property in Italy.
- (5). The maximum use should be made of Allied Army surpluses to meet the requirements of the Italian Army.
- (6). Requirements for Italy sponsored by UNRRA must have priority over requirements for the military forces.
- (7). Supplies in Category A of the civilian import programme should not be used for military purposes except where the Allied Commission believes it impracticable to establish a separate line of supply for specific items outside that programme.
- (8). No specific additional tonnage should be included in the Category A programme for Italian military requirements.
- (9). No assurance can be given as to the flow of military supplies.

5th January, 1946.

The Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Palazzo Chigi,
Rome.

COPY (Nota Verbale sent by American Embassy).

F.O. No. 358.

NOTA VERBALE

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, under instructions from the State Department at Washington, has the honor to communicate the views of the United States Government with regard to the following questions related to the maintenance of the Italian Armed Forces:

- (A) Priority as between Italian Army and UNRRA in obtaining surplus property;
- (B) Priority as between Italian military requirements and civilian requirements in Italian import program;
- (C) Question of assurances to be given concerning furnishing of supplies in the civil import program;
- (D) Whether specific additional tonnage shall be included in civil import program for military purposes;
- (E) Whether tire and tube equipment can be supplied through civilian import program.

On these questions, the views of the United States Government are as follows:-

1. We agree that Italian military requirements should, in first instance, be taken from Italian indigenous resources, and secondly, from surplus United States and United Kingdom stocks in Italy.
2. UNRRA should have priority over Italian military requirements in the disposal of surplus property in Italy.
3. Items including tires and tube requirements which cannot be supplied locally or from surplus should be purchased by Italian Government through its available foreign resources. Italian Government should determine relative priority of military and civilian requirements in making its purchases.
4. UNRRA supplies cannot be used for military purposes.
5. Supplies in category A, civilian import program, should not (repeat not) be used for military purposes except where Allied Commission believes it impracticable to establish separate line of supply for specific items outside that program. No specific additional tonnages should be included in category A program for Italian military requirements.

ROME. January 4, 1946.

CAL:ds.

- (B) Priority as between Italian military requirements and civilian requirements in Italian import program;
- (C) Question of assurances to be given concerning furnishing of supplies in the civil import program;
- (D) Whether specific additional tonnage shall be included in civil import program for military purposes;
- (E) Whether tire and tube equipment can be supplied through civilian import program.

On these questions, the views of the United States Government are as follows:-

1. We agree that Italian military requirements should, in first instance, be taken from Italian indigenous resources, and secondly, from surplus United States and United Kingdom stocks in Italy.
2. UNRRA should have priority over Italian military requirements in the disposal of surplus property in Italy.
3. Items including tires and tube requirements which cannot be supplied locally or from surplus should be purchased by Italian Government through its available foreign resources. Italian Government should determine relative priority of military and civilian requirements in making its purchases.
4. UNRRA supplies cannot be used for military purposes.
5. Supplies in category A, civilian import program, should not (repeat not) be used for military purposes except where Allied Commission believes it impracticable to establish separate line of supply for specific items outside that program. No specific additional tonnages should be included in category A program for Italian military requirements.

ROME. January 4, 1946.

CAL:ds.

To the
Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Rome.

SUBJECT: Rations for Italian Army.

U R G E N T

LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION
(M.M.I.A.) ROME
Q/1-122
1 March 46

TO: Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission,

rec MAR 5 1946

In continuation of my letter Q/1-117. 4 Feb 46 above subject.

1. Attention is invited to attached copy of letter from 3 BLU regarding release of cheese from indigenous resources, as an example of difficulties reported to be general throughout Italy, which places the Army in a dangerous position as regards subsistence.
2. Your letters to the President of the Council, file TS/100/E/12 dated 31 January and 12 Feb 1946, suggesting action by the Government have produced no results so far as is known.
3. It is urgently requested that representations be made to the Government to produce a satisfactory solution.

134 *137*
Yd L. Orsini
Major General
M.M.I.A.

CPK/r1

Incl: Ltr. HQ 3 BLU, Q/35/6/ata 24 Feb 46.

See 6/7
1037

Original to Econ Sec for ACTION.

Page 73

(MAR 11) *SPK* *11/3/46*

COPY

SUBJECT: Supplies ex Italian Indigenous Resources.

143
R. 3 British Liaison Unit
Tel: 152965 Ext 10

Q 35/6
--- 24 Feb 46

R. MALIA (ST)

1. Ref your ST/292 of 16 Feb 46 and my Q 35/6 of 24 Jan 46.

2. There still appears to be a distinct lack of desire on the part of the responsible bodies to come to grips with the question of release of cheese to the Italian Army. Previously it was thought that the Provincial and Regional authorities were entirely to blame, but it now appears that this attitude of non-cooperation has spread to both the Direzione Generale dell'Alimentazione Rome and Commissariato Interregionale dell'Alimentazione, Milan.

3. On the 21 Feb, a meeting was held in the offices of Inter-regionale dell'Alimentazione, Milan, at which Major GE was present. Professor RONCHI (Direzione Generale Alimentazione for Rationed Items, Rome) Dr. SOLDANI and Dr. Grassi (Commissariato Alimentazione, MILANO) were also present. The subject at issue was the release of 760 tons of cheese to the Italian Army for the months of Jan, Feb, Mar and Apr. Maj GE insisted that authy was given for the release of this cheese, that names of firms were supplied and that details of distribution be given.

4. Prof. RONCHI from Rome, who should have been in a position to take action in this matter, resorted to procrastination. He at first stated that he was in MILAN to appoint two new public officers, and that the matter of cheese must be discussed in ROME. When GE insisted he said he must have time to study the question, and said he would have an answer on the next day. No decision, however, was forthcoming on the 22 and a meeting on the 26 Feb was suggested.

5. It is obvious that these officials want to avoid making a decision at all costs. To state that release was impossible would severely jeopardise their position in Rome with the Food Ministry, to attempt to effect release would test their powers of authority over SEPRAL and the producers to the utmost, an issue which they wish to avoid at all costs. It is apparent that this authority is in name only. Even the SEPRAL cannot control release of cheese. Direttore Ufficio Formaggio, SEPRAL, Parma have informed Maj. GE that they do not know exactly where the cheese is in their province nor to whom it belongs. The only solution, they state, is to hold a census. They know that producers are selling cheese to contractors without authority. When Maj. GE told Prof. RONCHI of this he was astonished and could not believe it.

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6. To investigate this matter fully and clarify the position with all its ramifications would be a considerable task. It is however apparent that:

- (a) The authorities wish to avoid making a decision.
- (b) There is no adequate control.
- (c) The matter should be taken up on a high level with the Food Ministry.

Maj. G3 has not had an enviable task in attempting to sort out this matter and the lack of success is not due to his efforts but to circumstances far beyond his control.

7. It appears that if the authorities in ROME will not play, it is useless to make an example of the satellites. It is hoped that this appreciation may be of some assistance. The matter is too deep rooted for any satisfactory solution to be reached up here.

/s/ A.H. WITSER
Capt.
RASC

785017

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Office of the Chief Commissioner

APO 394

141

Ref: TS/100/B/ES.

21 February 1946.

SUBJECT: Feeding of the Italian Navy.

TO : G-5 Section, AFHQ.

136

1. I refer to my letter TS/100/B/ES dated 7 February 1946 and to the decision made at SACMED's Conference that as from 1 April 1946 the responsibility for feeding the Italian Navy must be assumed by the Italian Government.
2. In view of the very serious food situation in this country and the failure of UNRRA to provide sufficient imports for the country as a whole, I must point out that it is extremely unlikely that the Italian Government will be able to procure to feed the Navy.
3. If, as was expressed at SACMED's Conference, the difficulty of continuing supply from British sources is due to lack of manpower, then I would suggest that consideration be given to the substitution of British RASC staff by Italian naval maintenance staff who, I am advised, would be capable of assisting if not taking over entirely, the work of distribution.
4. If, on the other hand, shortage of British rations is the underlying reason for the decision, then I would suggest that consideration be given to rationing the Italian Navy, at any rate for two or three months, from the surplus stocks of U.S. rations which I understand are now available in the country.
5. A further suggestion has been made that bulk commodities should be issued to the Italian Government from British sources, a proposal which I should be glad to explore.
6. I feel bound to ask for consideration to be given to these points in view of the responsibility for maintenance of the Italian Services which has been assumed and, I submit, must continue to be assumed, by SACMED.

1035

19/ February 1946

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

cc: Economic Section, AC. (2)
Navy Sub-Commission, AC.

See 153

785017

Ref: 2255/EC

20. February 1946.

SUBJECT: Supplies for Italian Armed Forces.

TO : British Embassy,
Attn: Mr. Simmons,
Commercial Counsellor.

1. The Land Forces Sub-Commission have received from the Ministry of War the attached translation of a note verbale purporting to emanate from the British Embassy. As the note verbale has obviously gone through two translations, I should be most grateful if you could let me have a translation of the original note.

2. My first impression, and certainly the impression of the Land Forces Sub-Commission, on the translation which is before us is that it transgresses a good many of the principles which the Allied Commission has been warmly supporting. For instance, the priority of UNRRA over the Italian military units in respect of stocks outstanding in Italy and Italian requirements for UNRRA having precedence over requirements for the armed forces. Perhaps you would be good enough to let me know in your reply what was the reason for the despatch of this note verbale and if you could let us have an opportunity of discussing H.M.C.'s directions so that we can, if possible, find a coordinated policy.

/Sgd/ h. S. L.

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

MSL/JO.

See 147.

PA
S.M.A.

gretk
21/2/46

B. U.
25/2/46

PA
2/2/46

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

BEST COPY POSSIBLE

OPERATION

Rome, 8 gennaio 1945

IN

12.11

L'AMBASCIATA BRITANNICA
ROMA

R.V. 5

2/12/46.C.D.

OUT

Time 15.00

Date 13.12

NOTA VERBALE

L'Ambasciata di S.M. presenta i propri omaggi al R. Ministero degli Affari Esteri ed ha l'onore secondo istruzioni impartite, di comun. il punto di vista del Governo di S.M. Britannica su certi aspetti c si con le provviste per le Forze Armate Italiane:

1. - Il fabbisogno militare italiano dovrebbe, per quanto possibile coperto dalle risorse locali italiane.
2. - Tutte le importazioni, ivi inclusi i copertoni e le camere c dovrebbero essere acquistate dal Governo Italiano con le pr sorse in conformità agli accordi in vigore circa i rifornim di fuori del programma base.
3. - I rifornimenti dell'UNRRA non possono essere adoperati per l'Eser Italiano.
4. - Le richieste degli enti militari italiani dovrebbero essere subor nate a quelle dell'UNRRA per quanto si riferisce ai residuati in lia.
5. - Si dovrebbe attingere quanto più possibile alla eccedenza della ar te dell'esercito alleato per far fronte alle necessità dell'Esercito Italiano.
6. - Il fabbisogno italiano per il quale l'UNRRA si rende ¹⁰³motrice deve avere precedenza sul fabbisogno per le forze armate.
7. - Rifornimenti di categoria A. del programma per le importazioni e vore dei civili non dovrebbero essere adoperati per scopi milita tranne quando la Commissione Alleata ritenga che non sia possibi istituire un canale di rifornimenti separato per determinati enti al di fuori di detto programma.
8. - Nessun tonnellaggio addizionale dovrebbe essere incluso nella

Translation

Phase

#2 Review

RRhehman

92

NOTA VERBALE

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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8. - Nessun tonnellaggio addizionale dovrebbe essere incluso nella categoria A del programma per far fronte al fabbisogno militare italiano.
9. - Non si possono dare assicurazioni circa l'afflusso di provviste materiali.

P. C. C.
IL TEN. COLONN. COMMISSARIO
f/to (G. Ardizzone)

R. MINISTERO AFFARI ESTERI
Palazzo Chigi ROMA

P. e. c. IL DIRETTORE CAPO DIVISIONE

8255

138A

TOP SECRET.

MAR 5 1946

Extract of Minutes of SAC'S Conference 14 Feb 46.

FUTURE OF THE ITALIAN NAVY.

(Previous reference SAC (46) 1st Meeting, Minute 6).

BRIGADIER LUSH said that a letter had been sent to AFHQ stating that the Allied Commission did not consider that the Italian Government could undertake the feeding of the Italian Navy and Air Force before 31st March. In view of the present food situation he thought there might be great difficulty in doing so even after 31st March. The Chief Commissioner had requested the Prime Minister to form a Committee of the Service Ministries to go into the whole question of feeding the Navy and the Air Force in order to be able to take over this responsibility by 31st March.

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF pressed for the date to be fixed not later than 31st March. He said we were feeding something over 60,000 Italian mouths and that the proportion in relation to British troops was getting steadily larger. The whole burden of doing this was falling on the RASC which was the arm of the service most understaffed and least able to meet it. Already 300 officers had been transferred from other arms of the service to the RASC and at the end of March it would become necessary to defer officers' release in order to feed the Italian Navy and Air Force.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER pointed out that in the case of retentions each individual had to be certified as operationally vital. He could not describe either the Italian Navy or the Italian Air Force as operationally vital.

CAPTAIN GAMBIER agreed.

1033

BRIGADIER LUSH said that the difficulty was that food for the Italian services had to be procured by the Italian economic representative in bidding against UNRRA and Allied military procurement, both of which had higher priorities. At the present moment there was just sufficient to tide over the Italian Army for six months.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that 31st March be fixed as the latest date by which the Italian Government should assume the responsibility for the feeding of the Italian Navy and the Italian Air Force.

TOP SECRET

(MAJ-11)

685586

137

Ref: TE/100/B/ES.

12. February 1946.

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

In further reference to my letters of 31 January 1946 and in reference to your letter of 1 February 1946, all dealing with the question of subsistence for the Armed Forces, I wish to pass the following information to you.

We have now heard from Washington that of the total IT procured flour 19,500 tons have been sent aside for the Italian Army. I attach for your information the message (COM 379 of 1 February 1946) confirming this.

I assume that your Government will take appropriate steps to insure that this quantity is made available, immediately upon arrival of the flour, to the Ministry of War, so that the Minister of War will be able:

- (a) to repay Allied loans;
- (b) to have in his depots sufficient flour to feed the Army for the March-April-May period.

You will, of course, also be interested in the information contained in COM 379 concerning the current request of the Combined Liberated Areas Committee for allocation of six months' basic requirements of sugar and dried vegetables for the Army.

Lastly, I would refer you to the last paragraph of my TE/100/B/ES dated 31 January 1946 and would be glad to know what action is being taken, as I am informed that the supply from indigenous resources is not satisfactory.

Yours very truly,

1032/44

M. S. LUSH

Brigadier,
Acting Chief Commissioner.

Doctor Alcide De Gasperi,
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government,
R O M E.

Copy to: Chief Commissioner
Ex. Commissioner
Land Forces S/C (MIA.
Food & Agric S/C.

Recan Branch.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Office of the Chief Commissioner

APO 394

Ref. TS/100/B/23

7 February 1946

SUBJECT: Food for the Italian Navy

FEB 8 1946

TO : AFHQ, G-5 Section

1. At his conference on 20 December 45, SACMED directed that he should be informed of the earliest date on which the Italian Government could assume the responsibility for the feeding of the Italian Navy before the target date of 31 March 1946.

2. It is apparent that the Italian Government cannot initiate and put into effect a full procurement program for the added subsistence maintenance of this force (now tentatively set at 60,000) before the target date of 31 March 46. This is based upon the following considerations:-

(a) The current world food situation will not allow procurement by separate importation from the main producing countries of the basic items of wheat/flour, fats and possibly other items required by the Navy. Attempts by the Italian Technical Mission to purchase separately (YT funds) subsistence items from these countries for the Italian Army have been unsuccessful.

(b) Use of surplus Allied military stocks to meet this added requirement for the Navy appears impossible in view of your confirmation that US Army flour holdings do not permit loans and British holdings allow loans only for very short periods (your FX 59771 of 31 Jan 46 refers).

(c) Use of indigenous stocks, in view of bad harvests and current shortfalls and shipping difficulties in the civilian programs of FEA and UNRRA, presents a delicate problem of balancing civilian needs with military requirements so as to avoid too great disruption or variance from the established low civilian ration scales. Difficulty of procurement from this source has been illustrated already in the case of the Italian Interim force of 205,000. It is felt that assumption, before March 31, 46, of subsistence maintenance responsibility by the Italian Government for the Navy and attempts in accordance with such responsibility to procure the added amounts of basic food items would place an undesirable strain on this source for the period Feb-Mar 46.

(MAY 11)

See 141

See 1438 6m/8

Ref. TS/100/B/EB

31 January 1948

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:-

In reference to my letter to you of January 24th, I should like to take this opportunity to discuss further the problems of subsistence for the Italian Armed Forces.

As you are aware, the responsibility for subsistence of the Italian Army has rested with your Government since November 1945.

It is now necessary for me to recommend to the Supreme Allied Commander a date on which the responsibility for the feeding of the Italian Navy and the Italian Air Force should revert to the Italian Government.

In connection with this question, it must be pointed out that it is not possible to use FEA or UNRRA supplies for military purposes. For this reason, in the case of food for the Italian Army, your Government instructed its Technical Mission in Washington to procure, from YT credits, certain items on a separate import basis. That commitment, at the time, provided a satisfactory solution and seemed to insure basic procurement for future requirements as well as to insure return of certain advances from Allied military stocks.

However, in view of the current world cereal situation, it appears that procurement by separate importation from the main producing countries of wheat/flour, fats and possibly other basic items, is not a currently feasible method for the discharge of the Italian Government's impending responsibility for the subsistence of the Navy and Air Forces nor for the fulfillment of its present responsibility for maintenance of the Army.

Provision, therefore, for these Armed Forces will have to be met, at least for the present, from indigenous sources, from stocks already purchased with Italian funds (YT) and procurement from countries not under the jurisdiction of the Combined Food Board under arrangements like the recent Spanish agreement.

See 144

see 136

Re

page 2.

I, therefore, request that through your appropriate ministries you consider the procurement of the subsistence items necessary for the maintenance of these forces and inform me of your general plan for this procurement as well as the date your Government will be able to assume the added subsistence responsibility for the Navy and the Air Force. This plan, I assume, would cover a period of a year, at scales and in amounts already forwarded to the Allied Commission as representing the total requirements of these forces.

Upon receipt of this information I shall be able to make my recommendations to the Supreme Allied Commander.

The details of your plan might well be worked out through inter-ministerial contact with parallel sections or agencies of the Allied Commission. If you desire, I shall call together, at an early date, those sections of the Allied Commission that are directly interested in this problem for a meeting with representatives of the appropriate ministries of your Government.

Yours very truly,

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

(signed)

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Doctor Alcide De Gasperi
President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
ROME

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C O P Y

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(EX 59771

G/8361

JAN 301827 A

JAN 310845 A

PRIORITY

AFHQ & GHQ CMF

MMIA

INFO: ALCOM

113A

RESTRICTED.

Your letter C/1-115 of 24 January 46 and subsequent conversation Nelson-Clare.

1. Confirms verbal explanation that US Army flour holdings do not permit loan and British holdings only allow loan for very short period.
2. Any loan now granted for consumption by Italian Army during Feb represents flour required for consumption by British troops during March since no further imports planned until April. Repayment will be required by 23 Feb 46 such repayment to have first priority call on any stocks available to Italian Govt at that date. Request confirmation obtained from Italian Govt in writing that these terms acceptable before offer of assistance confirmed.
3. Subject to para 2 above can loan 2000 tons flour up to 50 per cent of which may be available now at Naples. Regret cannot consider any further loan unless replacement flour known to be available in Italy within 14 days I K ship advised as sailed from country of origin.
4. For information other loans flour to Italian Govt from British Army are (A) Outlay against Mid shift meal 5000 tons. (B) 3000 ¹⁰²⁶ tons for Italian army consumption Jan for which replacement was required by 30 April 46. (signal C 47119 of 15 Dec refers.)
5. For ALCOM and MMIA loans at para 4 above also require urgent repayment.

Ed Lower

130

1. We want :-

(a) guarantee from Dr. Baepien not only that he will repay allied loans (already given) but also that he will turn over the remainder of the 19500 tons to M. of W. without question

(b) St. Port. to ensure availability as well as priority for the procurement of indigenous resources.

2. Amend letter: -

X " So that the Minister of War will be able

(a) to repay Allied loans

(b) to have in his disposal sufficient

money to feed the army

trans (already given) that he will know even the re-

- mainder of the 19500 tons to M. of W. without question

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X "So that the Minister of War will be able
(a) to repay Allied loans
(b) to have in his disposal sufficient
to feed the army 10000
the March - April - May period.

XX "
Lastly, I would refer you to the last
para of my TS/100/R/FS dated
31 January 1946 & would be
glad to know what action is
being taken, especially in the supply of
indigenous resources, in that
factory.

See W.
131

1 B 11 Feb 46

785017

8255 40

(12b)

SUBJECT : Rations for Italian Army.
-----Land Forces Sub Commission A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)
R O M E
Q/1-117

4 February 1946

5 Feb Raid

TO : Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.

1. In continuation of your letter to DE CASPERI dated 31 Jan. and his letter to you dated 1 Feb., with reference to the securing of rations for the Interim Army, I feel that the following points should be brought urgently to the attention of the Italian Government for necessary action, in order to insure the necessary subsistence for the Interim Army.

2. On the handover of the Army to the Government, the Combined Chiefs of Staff specified that the Italian Government would be responsible for the supply of subsistence from indigenous resources. It was well known that certain items would have to come from imports (or be taken from stocks in the country available to civilian requirements and the civilian requirements replenished from imports.) The Italian Government stated that the responsibility would be met by it.

3. a. It is our understanding that the Italian Purchasing Commission in the United States was authorized to purchase from Y.T. funds a six months supply of flour (19500 tons) for the Army, which would be in addition to the civil import program. Cable No COM 374 from CCS to ALCOM Rome, dated 24 Jan. 1946, confirms that this has been done and the flour has been shipped. This 19500 tons will fill the Army needs only until 1 June 1946; so, on arrival, the entire 19500 tons should be given by the Government to the War Ministry so that the War Ministry can pay back to the Allied Armies what has been loaned for December, January and February, and then have on hand in Army depots the necessary amount for the balance of the period i.e. up to 1 June.

b. However, the President of the Council of Ministers in the third paragraph of his letter of 1 February, addressed to you, seems to be of the opinion that the 19500 tons of flour was purchased for civilian use and not especially for the Army. If this is what the Italian Government is going to act on when the flour arrives in the country, the flour will not go to the Army, and the requirements for the Army for March, April and May will not be in Army depots as they should be, and on 1 March

See A 128. 129. 131
130.

Sent 44

the feeding of the Army will continue to be in the same dangerous and unsettled condition as it was on 1 February. (125)

c. It appears that the Italian Government is either (1) not concerned with assuring food in sufficient quantity for the Army, or (2) ~~are~~ convinced that when the time comes the Allies will step in and loan or give the necessary food from Allied military stocks to the Italians. If the Government is not willing to assure food for the Army, then the Allies must either demand that the Government do so even at the expense of the civilian population or reconcile themselves to the fact that the Italians do not want the Army authorized by the Allies and will not support it, in which case the retention of Allied troops in Italy is indicated. The Italian Government is wrong if it believes that the Allied Armies will furnish more food from Allied military stocks, for we have been advised that the United States will not do so and the War Office has taken a very dim view of the loans already made by the British Army.

4. a. The supply of other items of the ration from indigenous resources, which was assured by the Italian Government, and which must be secured from indigenous resources, as there is no import program set up for them, is far from satisfactory. For instance, the supply of cheese, one of the basic items, for the month of December, had not been completed on 29 January.

b. It appears that the Italian Food Ministry makes the allocation to the Army without any regard to availability, and the Army has been unable to actually collect. The result is that the ration is being reduced and the morale of the troops is likewise being reduced. The Italian soldier does not understand all of this business and he feels that his officers are stealing from him or at any rate that he is being penalized by inefficiency in high places, just the same as under the Fascist regime. Maybe this is the feeling that certain elements of the Government desire to foster in the soldiers. It is certain that such a feeling can and would do immeasurable harm to Army morale and might well reduce the units to a dissatisfied, unstable, and mutinous rabble.

5. In order to clarify the matter it is ~~waged~~ urged that the Italian Government, on the highest level, should be forced to issue necessary instructions, categorically ordering that :-

a. 19500 tons of flour be turned over to the Army immediately on arrival - (the Army to pay back the loans from the Allies from this amount).

1023

b. Subsistence which must come from indigenous resources actually be made physically available to the Army, at

the required time as a matter of first priority.

[Signature]
Colonel

Per Major General
M.M.I.A.

CPK/ml1

1022

See minute 118

123



GOC-

The Executive Commission is not fully informed regarding Folio 113A.

1. The letter did emanate from Lord Fones. However it is a branch letter on details, as the result of a telephone conversation, and not a policy matter. It simply confirms a telephone conversation trying to get a loan from Allied Military Services, which MMIA rightly screens, and handles direct with Rosetta. Were the entire file available to the Ex Comm he would see this.

2. This letter should not go over your signature to the EC. The original policy letter did go over your signature to the Chief Commissioner. Failing to get action on that we hunted around for a loan, which MMIA, not AC, could and did get.

3. This letter does not have reference to any Allied matter. The US would not loan. The British would, therefore it was directed to the British. Many telephone conversations, of which the EC is not familiar, preceded this letter.

1021

4. The utmost regard to procedure has been given. Your original letter to the

PTO

Chief Commissioner was dated 17 Jan. It was whipped around until I personally asked the Chief Commissioner on 22 Jan to take action, telling him that we could get a loan if the Italian Government would guarantee repayment. His letter of 24 Jan was the result. The Italian Government replied on 1 Feb.

Brigadier Rush was not in Rome when this happened. Undoubtedly had he been here we would have experienced no trouble at all.

(K)

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8255-

EC

63

Translation

The President of the Council of Ministers

1 February 1946

Dear Admiral,

113 - *refers*

after hearing the High Commissioner for Alimentation, I am able to assure you that by the 28th of February the Italian Government will give back to the Supreme Allied Command the amount of flour which the said Command is willing to supply, as a loan, for the requirements of the Italian Armed Forces.

The necessary amounts for the restitution will be taken from the supplies which will arrive, in accordance with the Y.T. plan which you mention.

While I express the sincere gratitude of the Italian Government to the Supreme Allied Command for the help they are giving us, I take this opportunity to draw your attention on the fact that the flour supplies foreseen by the Y.T. plan had been reckoned in accordance with the requirements of the civilian population.

Believe me, my dear Admiral,

Sincerely yours,

S. De Gasperi

Admiral Hilary E. Stone
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
Rome

EC Dist - 4 Feb

e/o

Action: Land Forces S/c

Note: Advance copy sent to you by Chief

COMMRs APPROPRIATE ACTION

INFO: Econ Sec (2)

CC

EC

See 137

(COPY 13)

785017

8255

121

Ref. TS/100/B/RS

31 January 1946

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

In reference to my letter to you of January 24th, I should like to take this opportunity to discuss further the problems of subsistence for the Italian Armed Forces.

As you are aware, the responsibility for subsistence of the Italian Army has rested with your Government since November 1945.

It is now necessary for me to recommend to the Supreme Allied Commander a date on which the responsibility for the feeding of the Italian Navy and the Italian Air Force should revert to the Italian Government.

In connection with this question, it must be pointed out that it is not possible to use FEA or UNRRA supplies for military purposes. For this reason, in the case of food for the Italian Army, your Government instructed its Technical Mission in Washington to procure, from YT credits, certain items on a separate import basis. That commitment, at the time, provided a satisfactory solution and seemed to insure basic procurement for future requirements as well as to insure return of certain advances from Allied military stocks.

However, in view of the current world cereal situation, it appears that procurement by separate importation from the main producing countries of wheat/flour, fats and possibly other basic items, is not a currently feasible method for the discharge of the Italian Government's impending responsibility for the subsistence of the Navy and Air Forces nor for the fulfillment of its present responsibility for maintenance of the Army.

Provision, therefore, for these Armed Forces will have to be met, at least for the present, from indigenous sources, from stocks already purchased with Italian funds (YT), and procurement from countries not under the jurisdiction of the Combined Food Board under arrangements like the recent Spanish agreement.

Copy to: to Gen.
to Gen.

See 137

See by BC for 1/2

(COPY 0)

page 2.

120
E/S
File

I, therefore, request that through your appropriate ministries you consider the procurement of the subsistence items necessary for the maintenance of these forces and inform me of your general plan for this procurement as well as the date your Government will be able to assume the added subsistence responsibility for the Navy and the Air Force. This plan, I assume, would cover a period of a year, at scales and in amounts already forwarded to the Allied Commission as representing the total requirements of these forces.

Upon receipt of this information I shall be able to make my recommendations to the Supreme Allied Commander.

The details of your plan might well be worked out through inter-ministerial contact with parallel sections or agencies of the Allied Commission. If you desire, I shall call together, at an early date, those sections of the Allied Commission that are directly interested in this problem for a meeting with representatives of the appropriate ministries of your Government.

Yours very truly,

ELERY W. STONE

ELERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Doctor Alcide De Gasperi
President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
ROME

1016

W.H.
Edward S. Lynde
Supply Group.

KRN
MMIA 28/

Adm
A. F. J. 28/1
NSC 28/1

INCOMING MESSAGE

Originator's Reference: WCL 42964

Message Centre No: G/8557

Date/Time of Origin: 1 Feb 0006Z

Date Time Rec'd: 2 Feb 1100

Precedence:

ROUTINE
FEB 4 1946

FROM: War CCS CITE CCAC

TO: AC for CLAO INFO: AFHQ for FHCED and London area office for War Office for

CLAO Bagretariat.

UNCLASSIFIED.

This is COM 379.

Refer MOC 415. Food requirements for Interim Army and Carabinieri.

1. CLAO (S) requesting allocations for following foodstuffs in M/T: dried vegetables 2160 and S 870. Amounts arrived at by deducting from stated 6 months requirements quantities procured from US. Surplus stock available in the theater (Refer COM 224) PAM TWT. Against MOC 426 CLAO (S) has requested allocation 3000 tons canned fish which Italy expects to procure from Spain under italo/spanish agreement. Can you use the fish when procured to cover those Italian army requirements not satisfied out of United States Army surplus quarry no additional allocation will be requested of combined food board unless advised by you to the contrary.

3. Pepper not RUL nor is it available or United States. Suggest Italian Government do direct procurement on this L. Therefore no action by CLAO (S) is required.

Italian Government is free to buy wherever it wants to or to instruct the Italian technical delegation to purchase in bond here for trans shipment to Italy.

5. No request was made for allocation of flour because of previous Y T flour purch-

119

SLAO Registrar.

UNCLASSIFIED.

This is COM 379.

Refer MOC 415. Food requirements for Interim Army and Carabinieri.

1. CLAC (S) requesting allocations for following foodstuffs in M/T: dried vegetables 2160 and S 870. Amounts arrived at by deducting from stated 6 months requirements quantities procured from US. Surplus stock available in the theater (Refer COM 224) PAA TWT. Against MOC 426 CLAC (S) has requested allocation 3000 tons canned fish which Italy expects to procure from Spain under Italo/Spanish agreement. Can you use the fish when procured to cover those Italian army requirements not satisfied out of United States Army surplus query no additional allocation will be requested of combined food board unless advised by you to the contrary.
3. Pepper not RUL nor is it available at United States. Suggest Italian Government do direct procurement on this I. Therefore no action by CLAC (S) is required. ¹⁰¹² Italian Government is free to buy wherever it wants to or to instruct the Italian technical delegation to purchase in bond here for trans /shipment to Italy.
5. No request was made for allocation of flour because of previous Y T flour purchases. UNRA here has been advised that 19500 M T of Y T purchased 4 has been diverted from civilian supply program to cover MOC 415 requirements. UNRA'S responsibility for civilian feeding required that they make appropriate adjustment in their program to offset this reduction.
6. Due to termination of procurement in United States by Department of State (SEA) under Y T requisitions of February 1 (Refer COM 368), Italian Government should make direct purchase against allocations if and when received for S and pulses.
7. Italian technical Delegation here being advised of contents of this cable.

UNCLASSIFIED
4 FEB 1946

t.o.

(XEROX + NAUT)

SHIRT 2

Message Centre NO: Q/8557

DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION DIRECTION: Econ Section 16

CSO 6

Supply Group

Program ER

Regulation ER 10

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Ind & Util SC 2

Coal Div

IN SC2

INFO:

Chief Commissioner

Exec Commissioner 2

CC ER ERB

CA US ERB

USA Romo

MTW

File

785017

8255 191

116

31 January 1946

FEB 1 1946

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

110

In reference to my letter of 24 January regarding the urgency for procuring February flour requirements for the Italian Army, I have just now received the following information from AFHQ which has a direct bearing on your answer to my original letter.

AFHQ informs us that any loan which may be granted for consumption by the Italian Army during the month of February represents flour which will be required for British troop use during the month of March inasmuch as no further imports are planned until April. Accordingly, it is absolutely essential that full repayment of such flour loan be made by 28 February and that such repayment be given absolute first priority call on any stocks available to the Italian Government on that date. Until written confirmation and agreement to such terms are obtained from the Italian Government, the Allied offer of assistance cannot be confirmed.

Very truly yours,

Is/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

1013

Dr. Alcide de Gasperi
The President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
Rome

See M 117

Copy to:

Exec Com
Col Kerr
Exec Sect

MAR 11 1946
(CDP-5)

785017

8255
Ex Commr

WH

PA 59771

JAN 30 1827 A

C/8361

JAN 31 0845 A

PRIORITY

AFHQ Q GHQ CMF

MSIA

INFO: ALCON

RESTRICTED

JAN 31 1946

RESTRICTED.

113A

Your letter Q/1-115 of 24 January 46 and subsequent conversation Balcon-Clare.

1. Confirm verbal explanation that US Army flour holdings do not permit loan and British holdings only allow loan for very short period.
2. Any loan now granted for consumption by Italian Army during February represents flour required for consumption by British troops during March since no further imports planned until April. Repayment will be required by 28 February 46 such repayment to have first priority call on any stocks available to Italian Govt at that date. Request confirmation obtained from Italian Govt in writing that these terms acceptable before offer of assistance confirmed.
3. Subject to para 2 above can loan 2000 tons flour up to 50 per cent of which may be at once available now at Naples. Regret cannot consider any further loan unless replacement flour known to be available in Italy within 14 days I B ship advised as sailed from country of origin.

RESTRICTED

4. For information other loans flour to Italian Govt from British Army are (A) Outlay against 312 shift meal 5000 tons. (B) 3000 tons for Italian army consumption January for which replacement was required by 30 April 46. (Signal C 47119 of 25 December 45)

Spec
3/1/46

(100) 2

101

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8255
Ex Commr

WH

PA 35771

JAN 30 1827 A

0/8361

JAN 31 0845 A

PRIORITY

AFHQ Q CHQ CMF

MMIA

INFO: ALCON

RESTRICTED

JAN 31 1946

RESTRICTED.

113A

Your letter 2/1-115 of 24 January 46 and subsequent conversation Nelson-Clare.

1. Confirm verbal explanation that US Army flour holdings do not permit loan and British holdings only allow loan for very short period.
2. Any loan now granted for consumption by Italian Army during February represents flour required for consumption by British troops during March since no further imports planned until April. Repayment will be required by 28 February 46 such repayment to have first priority call on any stocks available to Italian Govt at that date. Request confirmation obtained from Italian Govt in writing that these terms acceptable before offer of assistance confirmed.
3. Subject to para 2 above can loan 2000 tons flour up to 50 per cent of which may be at once available now at Naples. Regret cannot consider any further loan unless replacement flour known to be available in Italy within 14 days I B ship advised as sailed from country of origin.
4. For information other loans flour to Italian Govt from British Army are (1) Outlay against Mid shift meal 2000 tons. (2) 3000 tons for Italian army consumption January for which replacement was required by 30 April 46. (Signal G 47119 of 15 December 45)

RESTRICTED

101

SPK
3/1/46
(M92 H)

43

(page 2)

REFERS.

5. For ALCON and MIA loans at para 4 above also require urgent repayment.

AC SENT.

ACTION: L FORCED

INFO: CHIEF COMMISSIONER

BOOK 2

FEED & AGRIE 2

FILE 2

FILE 2

1011

See M.115²11

COMMING
Originator's Reference: M 0892

Date/Time of Origin: JAN 242227

Message Centre: G/8025

Date/Time Rec'd: JAN 251000

Precedence: ROUTINE

FROM: WAR FROM CCS CITE CCAC

TO: ALCOM HOME AFHQ UK BASE SECTION LONDON ALLIED COMMISSION
FOR ACTION FOR ELAC INFO: AFHQ FOR FHGEG AND LONDON AREA
OFFICE FOR WAR OFFICE FOR ELAO SECRETARIAT.

UNCLASSIFIED.

This is COM 374. Refer MOC 451, MOC 469. Wheat and flour for
ITALY

1. Requisition YB-1 was written for 400,000, YB-1A1 substituted for 15,000 S/T of flour for 15,000 M/T of what in YB-1, YB-1A2 added 24,000 M/T of flour and 26,000 M/T of what, YB-1A3 added 67,000 M/T of flour and 50,000 M/T of wheat, YB-1A4 added 47,000 M/T of wheat and YB-138 added 133,000 M/T of wheat. THUS the total amount of wheat requisitioned is 541,000 of wheat, and 106,000 tons of flour. Recently by processing YB-1A5, and YB-158 A1 and cancellation form a shift was made of 91,000 M/T of unshipped flour to YB and 117,045 M/T of wheat from YB to YB account. This transaction however did not alter the total quantities of wheat and flour requisitioned in any respect

2. Previously unreported confirmed sailings wheat ships ex UNITED STATES ports as established by WSL:

Ship number	Ship name	Port	Sailed
209	E.A. PEDEN	NEW YORK	1/5
210	JAS. WEREUX	PORTLAND	1/2 1010
211	BENJ GRIERSON	PORTLAND	1/7
237	LUTHER S. KELLY	PORTLAND	12/17
238	JOEL PALMER	PORTLAND	1/2

This is COM 374. Refer MOC 451, MOC 459. Wheat and flour for

ITALY

1. Requisition YB-1 was written for 400,000, YB-1A1 substituted for 15,000 S/T of flour for 15,000 M/T of wheat in YB-1, YB-1A2 added 24,000 M/T of flour and 26,000 M/T of wheat, YB-1A3 added 67,000 M/T of flour and 50,000 M/T of wheat, YB-1A4 added 47,000 M/T of wheat and YB-1A5 added 133,000 M/T of wheat. THUS the total amount of wheat requisitioned is 644,000 of wheat and 106,000 tons of flour. Recently by processing YB-1A5, and YB-1A6 and cancellation form a shift was made of 91,000 M/T of unshipped flour to YB-1 and 117,045 M/T of wheat from YB-1 to YB account. This transaction however did not alter the total quantities of wheat and flour requisitioned in any respect

2. Previously unreported confirmed sailings wheat ships ex UNITED

STATES ports as established by WSA:

Ship number	Ship name	Port	Sailed
209	E. A. PEDEN	NEW YORK	1/5
210	JAS. T. WEREAUX	PORTLAND	1/2
211	BENJ. GRIERSON	PORTLAND	1/7
237	LUTHER S. KELLY	PORTLAND	12/17
238	JOEL PALMER	PORTLAND	1/2
298	ASA GRAY	PHILADELPHIA	1/5
302	CHAS. B. AYCOCK	ALBANY	1/8
317	ALP. LINDBERG	BALTIMORE	12/31
322	SAMUEL JOHNSON	BALTIMORE	1/5
323	THILANDER C. KNOX	BALTIMORE	1/8
327	THOS. POLLOCK	BOSTON	1/9
306	JOHN COLTHER	PHILADELPHIA	1/12

1/1/5
MOC

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AC DIST

ACTION DIRECTION ECON SEC 13
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(SUPPLY GROUP
(PROGRAM BR.
(REQUISITION BR (03)

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CHIEF COMMISSIONER
EXEC COM 2
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CA US EAF
WSA ROM
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RECEIVED
25 JAN 1946

1009

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785017

(REQUISITION NR (101))

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CHIEF COMMISSIONER
EXEC COM 2
CC BR LMP
CA US KMB
WSA RUMF
NWR
PILL



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114

Ref: 8001/45/EO.

January 1946.

SUBJECT: Future of the Italian Navy.

TO : G-5, A.F.H.Q.

1. At his conference on 20 December 45 SACMED directed that he should be informed of the earliest date at which the Italian Government could assume the responsibility for the feeding of the Italian Navy before the target date of 31 March 46 and in response to this directive the following information is given.
2. Whether the Italian Government could assume this responsibility before 31 March 46, or even on that date, is dependent upon:
 - a) the ability of the Italian Government to finance this programme, and
 - b) the ability of the Italian Government to procure, ship and deliver these items to the several Naval Depots in Italy.
3. With regard to 2(a) above, for policy reasons, related to the nature of the organization, it is not possible to use UNRRA funds for the purchase of supplies for the Italian Navy. Therefore, in the absence of any other method of financing, XT funds would have to be used for this purpose, as in the case of the Italian Army.
4. In view of recent experience of the difficulty of procurement and shipment, it is improbable that any items would reach this country before 31 March 46. It is emphasized that this date is the earliest that delivery can be expected and then only if procurement can be initiated without delay.
5. Appendix 'A' to this letter gives list of items necessary to be imported for one year's maintenance programme, plus two months reserve, on existing scales, for a force of 60,000. These amounts include a 10% reserve for contingencies. This has been agreed by the High Commissioner for Food and the Navy Sub-Commission, Allied Commission.
6. Although, it is understood, no definite turnover date for subsistence responsibility for the Italian Air Force has yet been established, it should be added here that the situation in regard to responsibility for that force is similar to the Navy.

See him #4849
M. 114 E.F. &

M. 114 E.F. &

ELMER W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

~~SECRET~~~~149~~

114D

Appendix "A" to letter 8001/AS/SS dated January 1945.

	In Metric Tons
Grain.....	21.785
Fats.....	789.300
Preserved Meat.....	2.835
Dried Vegetables.....	2.100
Pepper.....	4.200
Coffee Beans.....	593.500
Sugar.....	921.000
Evaporated Milk.....	210.000

*Not sent
5/11/45*

785017

8255

0 0 P 2

113A

SUBJECT: Flour loan - Italian Interim Army

LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION
A.C. (M. M. I. A.) R O M E
Q/1-115
24 January 1946

TO : Q, GHQ, GMP,

1. The Italian Government in conjunction with Allied Commission has exhaustively investigated the procurement of flour requirements for the Italian Interim Army for February.

2. From sources available, flour can not be procured from :

a. Indigenous resources: Exceedingly poor harvest of Italian grown wheat has made crop lowest harvest yield in 25 years.

b. Import program: Flour being imported into Italy to supplement deficiencies of wheat crop (para 2-a) has been financed by UNRRA and FEA (US) appropriations. Each of these appropriations categorically exclude the provisioning of any national Armed Forces. At present, the imports are behind schedule and existing stocks in Italian warehouses are at a minimum level to meet civilian requirements. A loan from these sources, requisitions for which have not included amounts for the Italian Interim Army, would seriously impair the civilian supply resulting in a reduction of the civil ration.

3. Advice has been received that approximately 14,000 tons of flour/wheat, procured under Italian Government Import Program (exclusive of UNRRA and FEA financed import programs) will arrive in early February. Attention is invited to Appendix 'A', letter from Chief Commissioner Allied Commission to the Prime Minister (Italian Government), that from this imported stock replacement will be made of outstanding loans.

4. On the basis of the above it is requested that 3400 metric tons of flour be loaned to the Italian Government for the Interim Army subject to repayment by 31 March 1946.

5. Italian War Ministry has requested amounts released at locations indicated Appendix 'B'.

6. Repayment of outstanding loans will be effected from February wheat/flour arrivals.

See F.114 117-10

113B

/sgd/ K. ROBERT NELSON, Major
for Major General
M. M. I. A.

KRN/ri

Copy to: OHQ for DST
MPOUSA for G-4
" " Chief QM
HQ A.C. for Chief Commissioner
HQ " " Economic Section
HQ " " Food and Agriculture Sub Commission
Ministry of War (for General PALLORA)

1005

APPENDIX 'A'
Ltr Q/1-115
dated 24 Jan 46

C O P Y

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner

Ref. TS/100/B/MS

APC 394

21 January 1946

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

The urgency for procuring February flour requirements for the Italian Army has had my attention.

I understand this situation is affected by these major factors:

First, from recent information it is understood that attempts to procure wheat/flour for the Italian Armed Forces by your technical Mission in Washington are now understandably meeting with difficulty because of UNRRA domination of the market.

Second, I am informed that Allied military authorities in Italy are unwilling to extend further loans of wheat or flour for the Italian Army, unless firm assurance is given that early repayment in kind can be made.

In view of the current inability of the Mission to procure subsistence items for the Army from abroad, and in view of the urgency of the situation, insofar as procurement of immediate flour requirements for the Italian Army is concerned, I urge that your Government take the steps necessary to assure early repayments to the Allied military authorities of both the February requirements and those amounts previously loaned to the Italian Army.

Although the basic responsibility for the feeding of this force rests with your Government, I should like to suggest that these steps will require one or both of the following immediate commitments:

(a) Procurement from indigenous sources, both for eventual repayment purposes and for the meeting of future military requirements.

(b) The setting aside of sufficient amounts from current wheat arrivals purchased with Italian funds (YF) to cover both an immediate loan for February and past loans to the Italian Army.

785017

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

The urgency for procuring February flour requirements for the Italian Army has had my attention.

I understand this situation is affected by these major factors:

First, from recent information it is understood that attempts to procure wheat/flour for the Italian Armed Forces by your technical Mission in Washington are now understandably meeting with difficulty because of UNRRA domination of the market.

Second, I am informed that Allied military authorities in Italy are unwilling to extend further loans of wheat or flour for the Italian Army, unless firm assurance is given that early repayment in kind can be made.

In view of the current inability of the Mission to procure subsistence items for the Army from abroad, and in view of the urgency of the situation, insofar as procurement of immediate flour requirements for the Italian Army is concerned, I urge that your Government take the steps necessary to assure early repayments to the Allied military authorities of both the February requirements and those amounts previously loaned to the Italian Army.

Although the basic responsibility for the feeding of this force rests with your Government, I should like to suggest that these steps will require one or both of the following immediate commitments:

(a) Procurement from indigenous sources, both for eventual repayment purposes and for the meeting of future military requirements.

(b) The setting aside of sufficient amounts from current wheat arrivals purchased with Italian funds (YT) to cover both an immediate loan for February and past loans to the Army from Allied Military sources.

I have been informed that some 49,000 tons of bulk wheat have arrived under the YT program up to January 22. For arrival at the end of this month under the same program, an additional 14,000 tons are scheduled. Additionally I am informed that the Italian Government procured 90,000 tons of flour from its own (YT) funds. The date of arrival for this is uncertain.

These amounts are sufficient, of course, to cover an immediate commitment for repayment purposes, and to form the base for the assurances necessary for the granting of a loan from military stocks to meet February requirements.

See 121.172

113D
The greater problem of meeting future requirements for this force, as well as for the Navy and Air Force, will be the subject of a subsequent letter. I take this opportunity, however, to urge upon you the necessity for action upon the question of meeting this current need of the Army, and I shall be very grateful if you will advise me in this matter at your earliest convenience.

Yours very truly,

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLEMY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Doctor Alcide De Gasperi
President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
Rome

1003

113E

Appendix 'B' to
ltr Q/1/-115
dated 24 Jan 46.

FLOUR - February Requirements - Italian Interim Army

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>ITALIAN ARMY DEPOT</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
MESTRE (a)	#5 Bulk Food Depot	1300 metric tons
ANCONA (b)	#76 Food Dist. Depot	850 " "
NAPLES	#10 Bulk Food Depot	1150 " "
BARI	#9 " " "	300 " "
		3400 metric tons

(a) If not available at Mestre, release at Bari.

(b) " " " " Ancona, " " Naples.

785017

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Ref. TS/100/B/ES

24 January 1946

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

The urgency for procuring February flour requirements for the Italian Army has had my attention.

I understand this situation is affected by three major factors:

First, from recent information it is understood that attempts to procure wheat/flour for the Italian Armed Forces by your Technical Mission in Washington are now unacceptably meeting with difficulty because of USRA domination of the market.

Second, I am informed that Allied military authorities in Italy are unwilling to extend further loans of wheat or flour for the Italian Army, unless firm assurance is given that early repayment in kind can be made.

In view of the current inability of the Mission to procure substitutes items for the Army from abroad, and in view of the urgency of the situation, insofar as procurement of immediate flour requirements for the Italian Army is concerned, I urge that your Government take the steps necessary to assure early repayment to the Allied military authorities of both the February requirements and those amounts previously loaned to the Italian Army.

Although the basic responsibility for the feeding of this force rests with your Government, I should like to suggest that those steps will require one or both of the following immediate commitments:

(a) Procurement from indigenous sources, both for eventual repayment purposes and for the meeting of future military requirements.

(b) The setting aside of sufficient amounts from current wheat arrivals purchased with Italian Funds (IT) to cover both an immediate loan for February and past loans to the Army from Allied Military sources.

I have been informed that some 10,000 tons of bulk wheat have arrived under the IT program up to January 22. For arrival at the end of this month under the same program, an additional 14,000 tons are scheduled. Additionally I am informed that the Italian Government procured 90,000 tons of flour from its own (IT) funds. The date of arrival for this is uncertain.

These amounts are sufficient, of course, to cover an immediate commitment for repayment purposes, and to form the basis for the assurance necessary for the granting of a loan from Military stocks to meet February requirements.

1001

See 116.

See M.1114/12

(WT 3-NA) 11

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2/1/46

- 2 -

The greater problem of meeting future requirements for this force, as well as for the Navy and Air Force, will be the subject of a subsequent letter. I take this opportunity, however, to urge upon you the necessity for action upon the question of meeting this current need of the Army, and I shall be very grateful if you will advise me in this matter at your earliest convenience.

Yours very truly,

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

signed
ELDERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Contingent

ew

Dottor Alcide De Gasperi
President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
Rome

DIST

CHIEF COMM.

EXEC. COMM. ✓

MMIA

1009

785017

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
ECONOMIC SECTION

43-4/FOOD

19 January 1946

SUBJECT: Maintenance of Italian Navy

TO : Executive Commissioner

1. Reference is 8001/FC of 31 December 1945.
2. Appendix A to this letter gives list of items necessary to be imported for one year's maintenance program, plus two months reserve, on existing scales, for a force of 60,000. These amounts include a 10% reserve for contingencies. This has been agreed by the High Commissioner for Food and the Navy Sub-Commission.
3. Whether the Italian Government could assume this responsibility before 31 Mar 1946, or even on that date, is dependent upon:
 - a) the ability of the Italian Government to finance this program, and
 - b) the ability of the Italian Government to procure ship and deliver these items to the several Naval Depots in Italy.
4. With regard to 3 (a) above, for policy reasons, related to the nature of the organization, it is not possible to use UNRRA funds for the purchase of supplies for the Italian Navy. Therefore, in the absence of any other method of financing, YT funds would have to be used for this purpose, as in the case of the Italian Army.
5. In view of recent experience of the difficulty of procurement and shipment, it is improbable that any items would reach this country before 31 Mar 1946. It is emphasized that this date is the earliest that delivery can be expected and then only if procurement be initiated without delay.

SECRET

page 2

~~147~~
109A

6. Although, it is understood, no definite turn-over date for subsistence responsibility for the Italian Air Force has yet been established, it should be added here that the situation in regard to responsibility for that force is similar to the Navy.

Harlan Cleveland
HARLAN CLEVELAND
Acting Vice President

APPENDIX "A" TO 43-4/FOOD OF 10 JAN. 1946

~~144~~
109e

In Metric Tons

Grain	22,785
Fats	789.3
Preserved Meat	2,835
Dried Vegetables	2,100
Pepper	4.2
Coffee Beans	593.5
Sugar	924
Evaporated Milk	210

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
ECONOMIC SECTION

Ref. TS/100/B/ES

17 January 1946

JAN 17 1946

SUBJECT: Subsistence - Italian Interim Force

TO : Executive Commissioner

1. Reference your 8251/EC of 8 January 1946 requesting the comments of this Section on Land Forces Sub-Commission letter 0/1-113 of 7 January 1946.

2. The following comments are presented:

(a) although no firm information as to specific import procurement and detailed shipping dates, etc., of subsistence items for the Italian Army has been received by this Section, the following is known:

(1) of the 91,500 tons of flour still to be shipped in the Italian Government program (on YF requisitions), 22,000 tons have been procured for use by the Italian Army;

(2) of this total of 91,500 tons, shipments amounting to 40,000 tons are expected to commence late in January for February arrival.

(b) Washington has been asked to furnish more detailed information on the status of this 22,000 tons flour procurement. (see MOC 449 of 16 January 1946, copy attached.)

(c) in the light of the above information, this office recommends that flour requirements for the month of February (and, if possible, March) be made available from military stocks:

(1) neither present indigenous stocks nor imported supplies can furnish this requirement without immediate impairment of the civilian supply;

(2) as is shown above, the Italian Government army-procurement program cannot, as yet, meet the immediate flour requirement for February.

(Capt. B.)

See M. 36597

107. 108. 110.

- 2 -

(d) it is agreed, however, that strong action must be taken in the special import program for the Italian armed forces. In a separate letter it is being proposed that the Chief Commissioner take this matter up with the Prime Minister to form a basis for discussions between Allied Commission and Italian Government's agencies.

Harley Cleveland
HARLEY CLEVELAND
Acting Vice President

Attachment

Distribution:

ISIA
Food & Agriculture E/C
Requisition Branch

U.S. ARMY
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

FROM : 16 January 1946
TO : ACTION GROUP FOR CCS FOR CLAC AND
MAGF (LONDON) FOR COUNCIL OF ALLIED
FOR FROM H. H. H. H.

Ref. No. : 295
Confidential

This is MAG 469.

Subject is status of procurement of flour for Italian Army.

1. Info received here by memo of 22 December 1946 drafted by Luzzatto of 12. to Mr. Henry of 12. that of the 21,500 tons flour still to be shipped in Italian Government program (VT requisition) 23,000 tons have been procured for use by Italian Army.
2. Urgent that we receive positive information that the flour has been procured for Italian Army from VT funds to confirm content of Luzzatto note, and similar telephone indications.
3. Above confirmation urgent to enable Italian Government to give firm assurance to military that repayment in kind for stocks needed for February maintenance of Army can be made from this procurement upon its arrival.

Precedence : Priority
Office of origin : Economic Section Supply Group
Tel. No. : 586
Originator's signature : [Signature]
Colonel H. H.

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION DISCUSSION : [Signature]
(Supply Lt.)
(Program Lt.)
(Requisition Lt.)

This is MOG 469.

Subject is status of procurement of flour for Italian Army.

1. Info received here by memo of 22 December 1946 drafted by Luzzatto of 15. to Mr. Luzzatto of MOG that of the 21,500 tons flour still to be shipped in Italian Government program (YT requisition) 22,000 tons have been procured for use by Italian Army.

2. Urgent that we receive positive information that the flour has been procured for Italian Army from YT funds to confirm content of Luzzatto note, and similar telephone indications.

3. Above confirmation urgent to enable Italian Government to give firm assurance to military that repayment in kind for stocks needed for February maintenance of Army can be made from this procurement upon its arrival.

Precedence

: Priority

Office of origin

: Economic Section Supply Group

Tel. No.

: 586

Originator's signature: Luzzatto, A. LION

Colonel MC

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION DIRECTION

: Action Dec 18

(Supply gr.)
(Program gr.)
(Requisition gr, 10)

ADVANCE COPIES TO

: Commerce SC 2

Finance SC

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In SC 2

INFO

: Chief Commissioner

Exec Comm 2

CC SC 2

CC SC 2

992

785017

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Executive Commissioner

SECRET

145
102A

Ref: 8001/EC.

31 December 1945.

SUBJECT: Future of the Italian Navy.

TO : Acting Vice President,
Economic Section.

1. Below is an extract from SACMED's conference of 20 December 1945 about the feeding of the Italian Navy:

"The Supreme Allied Commander directed that the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, inform the Supreme Allied Commander of the earliest date at which the Italian government could assume the responsibility for the feeding of the Italian Navy before the target date of 31st March 1946."

2. It is understood that this matter has been discussed between you and the Navy Sub-Commission. It would be appreciated if you could let this office have the information requested as soon as possible.

F. H. McCLEARY

Chief Staff Officer,
To Executive Commissioner.

Copy to: Navy S/C.

See F. 109A.

991

BU
8/11

Handwritten signature

Handwritten initials and marks

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