

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND

No.

785017

ACC

10000/109/1169

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND

No.

785017

0000/109/1169

PRESS RELEASES & FILMS, ITALIAN ARMY
JAN. 1945 - MAR. 1946

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

CSIO 1-10-61
26-
p 25 for info. seen by G. am.
HJ 15/13

1969

- 14 -

TO: Maj. Talbot

1. Unquestionably this P.W.B. report is an opinionated essay rather than a summary of press comment on the specific subject.
2. To save time and achieve the same result I suggest the Chief Commissioner might address his protest directly to Mr. Russell Barnes, Director of P.W.B. in Italy.
3. With reference to General Browning's para 3, I don't see how you can suppress a document that has been in circulation since March 2. To ask all who received copies to return them would only direct more attention to the report.
4. I fully agree with General Browning's para 9.

AB
G. STEPHART BROWN
D. HBB

29 Mar 45

15.
15

H/Salerno *I think before we so any further we should show the file to CC - in particular para 1 of Mr Barnes' memo 14 above.*

30/3

16.

APR 2 1945
REC'D 47468

29 Mar 45

D. H. B.

15.

15

H/Exline

I think before we so any
further we should show the
file to CC & in particular
para 1 of Mr. Brown's
memo to above.

5/30/3

16.

APR 2 1968
REC'D 183 + 1968
CC

Chief Commissioner:

General Browning addressed us on 16 March regarding the
publication of 2, dated 2 March. ~~Supplement~~ is of course
impracticable. Alternative action, if you approve, is the
attached letter.

2/8/45

7

N. E. F.

19.


Ex. Com

To see folio 18 reply to CC's letter of 17. 20.

17/4 CC to me 18. Then to me

Browning to note. JWS CC

18/4

16 Apr. 

2

cos

To see 1. There discussed
with John W. and suggest
an appropriate time to
do this would be when
we see the Pres in the
new directive.

3 27/1 28/1
CC is against the proposition

5

Noted.

John W. Han 28.1.45. 28.1.45.

12

H/SxLine

Pl see 10. Also " addressed

C.C. is against the proposition MS 2/7/61

5

Noted.

John W. Hampton
29.1.45. MS 2/7/61

12

R/S. Lane

Pl see re. Also it addressed

to C.C.

21 18/3

1967

13

PRO

you comments would be appreciated.

24/3.

Exhibit No. 1
etc

8271 41

Ex Com. 25

772/

9761 51 80W

JJCM V JJKO.
FROM COUNTESS AIS TRIESTE.

FOR GENERAL RELEASE.

CHARGES PROFFERED AGAINST TRIESTE COMMUNIST PAPER "LAVORATORE".
TRIESTE MARCH 14 (UNT).

THE ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED HERE THAT THIS AFTERNOON
A SUMMONS WAS SERVED ON THE RESPONSIBLE EDITOR OF THE TRIESTE
COMMUNIST PAPER "LAVORATORE", CHARGING HIM WITH VIOLATION OF
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT PROCLAMATION NUMBER ONE (NO.1) THE
CHARGES ARE IN CONNECTION WITH ARTICLES PUBLISHED BY THE PAPER.

WHILE THE CITY RETURNED TO NORMAL, AN OFFICIAL STATEMENT STILL
KIND'S THE SITUATION AS "TENSE". COLONEL H.P.P. ROBERTSON, ACTING
JUNIOR CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER THIS MORNING MET TWO LEADING MEMBERS
OF THE STRIKE COMMITTEE, TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION. THE COMMUNIQUE
ADDS THAT THE CONVERSATION "WAS CONDUCTED IN A CORDIAL ATMOSPHERE".

WAP 434.

1966

(CSO)

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APC 394

PUBLIC RELATIONS BRANCH

375/21/2RB

12 JUN 1945

Press Release - For Release 10 June 1945

Re-created out of the confusion and chaos of 18 months ago, a brand-new, efficient and compact Italian Army has arisen which has made invaluable contributions to the Allied war effort both in support of military lines of communications and in the final assault on the Nazi lines in Italy, the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission said today in a special report.

The sub-commission's report, which summed up the history of the Italian Army's re-organization under joint Italian and Allied leadership, paid tribute both to the tremendous saving in Allied manpower made by Italian service troops and to the valiant battle record of the four combat groups which participated in the fighting with the 8th Army in April.

The strength of the Italian Army was publicly revealed for the first time as consisting of more than 300,000 officers and men. Apart from Combat Groups, thousands of troops were used to guard important installations. The service troops numbered 175,000 and worked directly under Allied Commands. Port labor battalions have broken many records in the unloading of Allied ships. Road

construction units have maintained

1485

assault on the beach lines in Italy, the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission said today in a special report.

The sub-commission's report, which summed up the history of the Italian Army's re-organization under joint Italian and Allied leadership, paid tribute both to the tremendous saving in Allied manpower made by Italian service troops and to the valiant battle record of the four combat groups which participated in the fighting with the 8th Army in April.

The strength of the Italian Army was publicly revealed for the first time as consisting of more than 300,000 officers and men. Apart from Combat Groups, thousands of troops were used to guard important installations. The service troops numbered 175,000 and worked directly under Allied Commands. Port labor battalions have broken many records in the unloading of Allied ships. Road construction units have maintained vital communications under enemy fire to allow armored forces to advance without delay. Mine clearance companies have lifted nearly 600,000 mines.

The Land Forces Sub-Commission, which also has the title of Military Mission to the Italian Army, is headed by Major General Langley Browning (R). It is the agency which from the beginning has been responsible, with the Italian Ministry of War, for re-organizing and re-disciplining the Italian Army. General Browning said in his report:

"Great credit must go to the officers of the Italian War Ministry and General Staff under the good leadership and untiring

PRM
13/6

efforts of R.E. Count Cassin - the War Minister. Many cross-currents have tended to hamper and even divert the re-creation of this truly national army. The task of the Minister of War has been a heavy one. Yet, with true patriotism, he has overcome all difficulties and has undoubtedly succeeded in restoring much of the prestige of the Italian Army in the eyes of the United Nations."

In the new Order of Battle of the Italian Army appear hundreds of Italian units, Combat Groups, Guard Battalions, Service Units, Territorial Headquarters. These units represent Italians from every walk of life, and every part of Italy - hardened soldiers repatriated from the Balkans, Patriots, Grenadiers, Bersaglieri, Alpine Troops, Parachutists, Assault troops - many of whom have seen fighting in the Balkans, in Africa, on the Garigliano, at Cassino, on the Gothic line and in the final assault, whilst others have seen service in Allied Armies in the Ports, on the roads or with their males.

The birth of the new Italian Army goes back to September 8, 1943. A new Italian Army was essential to the smooth-running of, and assistance to, the Allied war effort and for the internal security of both the Allied Armies and the civilian population.

Work of reconstruction was started at once. The Italian Ministry of War and General Staff sought out Generals and staff officers from all quarters in order to set up the vital administrative machinery necessary for the formation of an Army.

The first Italian formation chosen to fight with the Allies was concentrated in Apulia for re-organization and training.

Alpine Troops, Parachutists, Assault troops - many of whom have been fighting in the Balkans, in Africa, on the Garigliano, at Cassino, on the Gothic Line and in the final assault, whilst others have been serving the Allied Armies in the Ports, on the roads or with their aces.

The birth of the new Italian Army goes back to September 8, 1943. A new Italian Army was essential to the smooth-running of, and assistance to, the Allied war effort and for the internal security of both the Allied Armies and the Civilian population.

Work of reconstruction was started at once. The Italian Ministry of War and General Staff sought out Generals and staff officers from all quarters in order to set up the vital administrative machinery necessary for the formation of an Army.

The first Italian formation chosen to fight with the Allies was concentrated in Apulia for re-education and training. Fitted throughout with Italian arms and equipment, this First Motorized Group became known the Corpo Italiano di Liberazione (C.I.L.). Overcoming great difficulties owing to shortage of equipment and arms, the corps was ready for battle by December 1943, when it went into the line under command of the American 5th Army.

This C.I.L., made up of Infantry, Bersaglieri, Alpini, Parachutists and Artillery men, handicapped by poor equipment and lack

23

of modern arms, with very little transport, met the enemy for the first time at Monte Lungo, sustaining heavy casualties. In this action, the C.I.L. gave a good account of itself and won the praise of General Mark W. Clark, then commanding General, 5th Army, who said:

"This action shows the determination of Italian soldiers to liberate their country from German domination, a determination which may well serve as an example to the example to the oppressed peoples of Europe."

After four months in the line, the C.I.L. passed to another command 8th Army and took part in the brilliant action which gained the heights of Monte Larnone on March 31, 1944. After months of patrol work and holding, Pilottrino was captured by the "Heer" paratroopers, sustaining over 300 casualties. Many brilliant actions were to follow before the C.I.L. was pulled out of the line in August, 1944.

Behind the fighting line, the Italian Army was by no means inactive. A far greater number of Italian troops were working and co-operating for the Allied War effort. Labor battalions, road construction units, mine clearance units, signal and line telegraph companies, docks operating companies had been formed and put to work on the maintenance and safe-guarding of the Allied lines of communications.

Italian mule pack transport companies were carrying **19364** and ammunition right forward in the mountainous regions of the

gained the height of Monte Lirone on March 11, 1944. After weeks of bitter work and fighting, Biscione was captured by the "Mambo" parachute units, sustaining over 300 casualties. Many brilliant actions were to follow before the G.I.F. was pulled out of the line in August, 1944.

Behind the fighting line, the Italian Army was by no means inactive. A far greater number of Italian troops were working and co-operating for the Allied War effort. Labor battalions, road construction units, mine clearance units, signal and line telegraph companies, cooks operating companies had been formed and put to work on the maintenance and safe-guarding of the Allied lines of communications.

Italian mule pack transport companies were carrying **150** tons and ammunition right forward in the mountainous regions of the Apennines, where no vehicles could move. Much work had to be carried out under enemy shell fire and many casualties were sustained. Recognition and praise was freely given by Allied commanders employing these units.

At the Ministry of War, hard work and loyal cooperation was being given by the Italian staffs. Difficulties of equipment, transportation and documentation were daily problems. Italian staff procedure had to be changed to conform with Allied procedure and directives. The Italian Territorial lay-out was put into effect as territory was handed over to Italian administration.

- 4 -

Call-ups and recalls to the colors were re-started.

Allied equipment and material, however, were not available to maintain a large Italian fighting force, Allied commitments in Europe and in the Far East being very heavy.

Finally, in response to the strong desire of the Italian nation and the Army for a greater representation of Italian fighting troops in the line, and the successes of the C.I.D. combined with the work of the service units, brought about the decision of the Allies in July, 1944 to form six Italian combat groups to be employed in combat with the Allied armies. British, American and equipment for these groups were made available and Italian and British staffs set to work.

The work of re-equipment, organization, training in British methods and clothing in khaki battle dress was initiated by a relatively small staff of British and Italian personnel. Units were formed, training pamphlets and manuals were translated into Italian, training schools were opened and bi-lingual Italian officers and non-commissioned officers were found, trained and instructed. The vast task entailed was carried out by hard work and loyal cooperation of the Italian staffs and British instructors.

Towards the end of 1944, five months after its formation, the first Italian combat group - the "Granata" - went into the line under the command of the 8th Army, having been completely re-formed, re-equipped and trained in British arms and methods - an achievement of original character and considerable speed.

Italian and British staffs set to work.

The work of re-equipment, organization, training in British methods and clothing in khaki battle dress was initiated by a relatively small staff of British and Italian personnel. Units were formed, training pamphlets and manuals were translated into Italian, training schools were opened and bi-lingual Italian officers and non-commissioned officers were found, trained and instructed. The vast task outlined was carried out by hard work and loyal cooperation of the Italian staffs and British instructors.

Towards the end of 1944, five months after its formation, the first Italian combat group - the "Cremona" - went into the line under the command of the 8th Army, having been completely re-formed, re-equipped and trained in British arms and methods - an achievement of original imagination and considerable speed. Soon other combat groups were ready and by March 2, 1945, four groups were in the line and "CORTINA" had already achieved success in an attack south of Po di Trionfo when over 100 German prisoners were taken. A fifth group - "Mantova" - was about to enter battle when the Germans in Italy surrendered.

During the last great assault of the Allies in Italy, the Italian Combat Groups - CREMONA, PRATO, EMILIA, and FIORENTINE - all played their part. The "PRATO" sustained 500 casualties in the attack on Bologna - units of the "LIGURIA" were amongst

22

the first to enter the city. The "CHIEF", for example, pursued the enemy across the R. SANTO, and won the praise of the Commander of the 5th British Corps who said:

"You and your Group have admirably carried out operations assigned to you and your officers and men have shown great courage and zeal during the recent fighting."

In addition to the praise given by the Commanding Generals of 15th Army Group and of the 5th and 8th Armies, the Supreme Allied Commander himself, Field Marshal Alexander, under whose over-all command the more than 300,000 Italian soldiers operated, has always been the first to appreciate the good work of the Italian Army, and has said so publicly on many occasions, the report concludes.

EXCERPT FOR PUBLICATION BY FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER

Distribution B and C.

1963

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Ref: 8271/21/50.

20 April 1945.

SUBJECT: Press Releases.

TO : GOC, Land Forces Sub-Com (MFA).

1. Reference your letter LMR/114 of 24.Mar.45 addressed to Political Adviser (Br) and this office letter 8271/16/50 of 3.Apr.45 addressed to PNB, copy to you.
2. Herewith for your information copy of reply received from the Acting Deputy Director of PNB to our letter under reference.

/30.

My Thomas
Chief Staff Officer,
to the Executive Commissioner.

Copy to: P.R. Branch.
Pol Adv (Br).

1967

20/4

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
INFORMATION AND CENSORSHIP SECTION
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH
ITALIAN THEATRE HEADQUARTERS
P.W.B. UNIT No. 12 U.S.A.P.O. 512

To: Chief Commissioner, AS ✓
Copy to: P.W.B. Unit
Major Greenleaf for P.W.B.
From: Mr. Bedford
Date: 15th April 1945

cc 1245-
APR 16 1945

APR 16 1945

1. I have received your 3291/16/45 of 15th April concerning the publication "Landed Forces" prepared by the Press Censoring Bureau of the Liberated Italy.
2. I much regret that this report was ever issued and I was in complete agreement with the conclusion of your political advisers and of the Landed Forces Subcommittee that it is not an objective summary of press comment. It is in fact a treatise in which the individual views of the author are illustrated by selected passages from the press of one tendency. Even if all the press reviews from left papers in the week in question had in fact expressed such sentiments and other papers had in fact ignored the question I should consider that the summary was misleading.
3. The P.W.B. has been directed not to issue any political summary in the service of P.W. It is, therefore, necessary to issue instructions as suggested in para 3 of your letter. Any reports concerning the Italian army will be submitted to your political advisers in the normal way for clearance before distribution.
4. I have addressed a copy of this letter to Major Greenleaf for the attention of those members of the staff of the P.W.B. who are still employed in other parts of P.W.B.
5. I would express my regret that this review should ever have been issued. I do not think after the present delay that it is useful to issue a formal denial. I think that those organisations which are using these reviews for intelligence purposes will already have realised the errors in that in question. I would, however, point out that the review was not a press release and did not circulate to people engaged in preparing material for Allied or Italian correspondents.

CONFIDENTIAL

Assistant Deputy Director, P.W.B. 1961

See Min. # 1920.2 1961

Ref. 8271/16/EC

3 April 1949

SUBJECT: Press Releases

TO : Mr. RUSSELL BARNES,
Director, PWS in Italy, APO 512.

1. The Allied Commission has received and read with considerable dismay a publication entitled "ARMED FORCES" which was issued on 2 March 1949 by the Press Reading Bureau, AFHQ, IIS, PWS Unit No. 2, APO 512.

2. This document has been carefully reviewed by my political advisors and the Land Forces Sub-Commission. It is their conclusion, in which I concur, that it is an opinionated essay rather than an objective summary of press comments on the specific subject. Its tone is set by the second sentence of paragraph g. While it is realized that you in no way intentionally support such opinionated writing, I must, in fairness to the Italian Army situation as it actually exists, call this matter to your attention.

3. It will be appreciated if in the future PWS will consult with Land Forces Sub-Commission (LSC) of this Commission prior to the issuance of any documents on the Italian Army; technical and operational accuracy would thus be assured.

W. W. Stone

WILLIAM W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Copy to: 2-5 AFHQ

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

Acting President
Exec. Commissioner
Land Forces S/C
PRO
CC Files

1960

827/ 5/ 0 11
MAR 28 1945

Chief Commissioner

I attach the objectionable PWB report which I mentioned to you last night, together with General Browning's comments. Actually I understand from PRO that the PWB Press Reading Bureau is to be abolished or greatly restricted in its output. However, I think this is such a flagrant case that it would nevertheless be worth while writing to the Chief of Staff at Allied Force Headquarters drawing his attention to it.

H. Hopson

27.3.45

Political Adviser (BR)

1954

8271. (10)
SUBJECT: Press Release

Lead Forces Sub Com. A.C.
(M.I.A.)
INT/11,
24 March 45

MAR 25 1945

TO : Political Adviser (Br.)

1. I think this is a thoroughly bad, mischievous and misleading document.

2. It plays up to what interested parties and opposition newspapers are stating for their own political ends.

3. It gives no credit to the Army authorities for their loyal and excellent work and cooperation, which has resulted in such a very considerable aid to the war effort.

4. It is obviously compiled by someone who has no military knowledge and no conception of the difficulties and existing state of affairs. For example, because a rabble appears and demands to be taken into the Army, that is no reason why it should be. Men have to be enlisted through authorized channels and authorized procedure within the ceiling laid down by the Allies. It is the volunteers own fault if they now suddenly come forward in a choking flood, when for months they would not do so. The Ministry of War and MIA have to plan ahead for call-ups and we cannot throw the machinery completely out of gear because a number of Italians suddenly change their mind.

5. Gen AzzI was rightly removed from the Army because he failed lamentably in his duty as a soldier by publicly babbling in politics. Yet he is quoted as a sort of authority.

6. The whole tone of this dangerous comment is completely subversive and undermining of the prestige and authority of the Italian Military authorities, who are doing their duty (in my opinion nobly and conscientiously) in spite of the innumerable and conflicting press criticisms and cross-currents. I have been at pains to build up this essential prestige and authority, which would be higher but for the political activities of certain elements of the press.

7. Finally, I would point out that in this document there is not

4. It is obviously compiled by someone who has no military knowledge and no conception of the difficulties and existing state of affairs. For example, because a name appears and demands to be taken into the army, that is no reason why it should be. Men have to be enlisted through authorized channels and authorized procedure within the calling laid down by the Allies. It is the volunteers own fault if they now suddenly come forward in a choking flood, when for months they would not do so. The Ministry of War and MIA have to plan ahead for call-ups and so cannot throw the machinery completely out of gear because a number of Italians suddenly change their mind.

5. Gen AZZI was rightly removed from the Army because he failed lamentably in his duty as a soldier by publicly dabbling in politics. Yet he is quoted as a sort of authority.

6. The whole tone of this dangerous comment is completely subversive and undermining of the prestige and authority of the Italian military authorities, who are doing their duty (in my opinion nobly and conscientiously) in spite of the innumerable and conflicting press criticisms and cross-currents. I have been at pains to build up this essential prestige and authority, which would be higher but for the political activities of certain elements of the press.

7. Finally, I would point out that in this document there is not one word of reference to the many eulogies, particularly recently the Italian Army by many high-ranking Allied officers from Field Marshal Alexander downwards.

8. I would like the document to be suppressed immediately and completely, and I urge that no other like it ever be produced again.

9. If documents on the Italian Army are to be issued in future, I urge that MIA be consulted first. We are independent, neutral and fair, and are perhaps the only organization in a position to present the proper and the truthful picture.

Am 61
d. Brown

Major General
R.A.I.A.

cgl.

Allied Force Headquarters
 PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH
 Italian Theatre Headquarters
 P. B. Unit No. 12 U. S. A. P. O. 512
 =====

 Press Reading Bureau

2 March, 1945

ARMED FORCES
 =====

a. The response to the military draft and the recruitment of volunteers.

There is hardly any reference in the Press to the results achieved by the draft and the recruitment of volunteers. The Communist papers of the various provinces are the best sources for news on this subject, as the Communist party favoured the formation of a great Italian army of liberation.

All in all, it may be assumed that the call-up of eleven classes in January had very good results. One must bear in mind that this call-up was opposed by many of the opposition papers, which reasoned that the text of the armistice had not been published and that the young men had a right to know what they were fighting for. Other reasons for opposition were the usual argument that the army formations are still prevalently monarchical and reactionary and that therefore the young recruits would have served the cause of the monarchy more than that of Italy. Apart from the opposition expressed by these papers, there is a natural diffidence in Italy towards the call-up. One must bear the fact in mind that many of these young men have been serving for years, that many of them were able to join their families only after the 4th September, because of the general disorganisation and take up their profession again. There is a wide-spread hostility to war in many circles, as it is believed that it will fail.

There is hardly any reference in the Press to the results achieved by the draft and the recruitment of volunteers. The Communist papers of the various provinces are the best sources for news on this subject, as the Communist party favoured the formation of a Great Italian army of liberation.

All in all, it may be assumed that the call-up of eleven classes in January had very good results. One must bear in mind that this call-up was opposed by many of the opposition papers, which reasoned that the text of the armistice had not been published and that the young men had a right to know what they were fighting for. Other reasons for opposition were the usual argument that the army formations are still prevalently monarchical and reactionary and that therefore the young recruits would have served the cause of the monarchy more than that of Italy. Apart from the opposition expressed by these papers, there is a natural diffidence in Italy towards the call-up. One must bear this in mind that many of these young men have been serving for years, that many of them were able to join their families only after the 14th September, because of the general disorganisation and take up their profession again. There is a wide-spread hostility to war in many circles, as it is believed that it will fail to bring about any change in Italy's political situation. One must consider besides that the separatist movement in Sicily has carried out a campaign of agitation against the call-up, maintaining that Sicily must not interfere in Italian affairs, but only aim at achieving the independence of the island.

No particulars have yet been given on the total results of the call-up, but numerous communiqués were issued on the partial results. According to a communiqué issued by the Italian Commission, 13,000 men answered the call-up in Calabria instead of 10,000 as had been foreseen. According to a communiqué issued by the Presidency of the Council, the response to the call-up equally proved superior to what had been foreseen. In the provinces of Palermo, Messina and Catania the response was 80 - 75 and 70%

- 2 -

response of what had been expected. Right from the first days thousands of young men entered the Bianchi barracks in Rome and were subsequently sent out to Naples.

According to Il VOCE (a left wing paper published in Naples) of February 28, "the response to the call-up and the recruitment of volunteers has been extremely impressive and is now assuming such proportions that it is forcing those organization set up to deal with it to a severe test. They had not expected a similar popular plebiscite." 2,000 new recruits had left Lucania as from March 1. The call-up has met with great success in the provinces of Calabria, Umbria, Marche and Tuscany.

The most encouraging factor and a proof of the new spirit prevalent in Italy is the number of volunteers enlisting in the various recruiting centers. This has been encouraged by the propaganda of many left-wing papers, the "Day of the Partisan and the Soldier", the arrival of many partisans from the North, who made it clear that the war had to be given priority over all other things.

There are thousands of young men, not only isolated cases, who try to leave for the front by all possible means, also when they see themselves actively by hostile Italian military authorities. Naturally the majority of the volunteers are partisans. The division "Potente" which took part in the fighting for the liberation of Florence and which numbers 5,000 partisans, has enlisted en masse in the army.

This is what the partisans did in Siena as also many of the brigades in the Marche Province.

News of large numbers of partisans joining the Army comes from Ancona and also from all the other zones which have been longest under German occupation.

In addition to the partisans, thousands of volunteers throughout all liberated Italy are offering the selves for service. It is interesting to note some figures which come from Sicily which showed the region which was most diffident in supporting the principle of participating in the war against nazi-

partisans in the war against nazi-

and the Soldier", the arrival of many partisans from the North, who made it clear that the war had to be given priority over all other things.

There are thousands of young men, not only isolated cases, who try to leave for the front by all possible means, also when they see themselves actively by hostile Italian military authorities. Naturally the majority of the volunteers are partisans. The division "Eletante" which took part in the fighting for the liberation of Florence and which numbers 5,000 partisans, has enlisted en masse in the army.

This is what the partisans did in Sicily as also many of the brigades in the Marche Province.

News of large numbers of partisans joining the Army comes from Ancona and also from all the other zones which have been longest under German occupation.

In addition to the partisans, thousands of volunteers throughout all liberated Italy are offering the selves for service. It is interesting to note some figures which come from Sicily which seemed

the region which was most diffident in supporting the principle of participating in the war against nazifascism. According to IL VOCE (Naples paper) 500 volunteers left Enna for recruiting centers. The same paper reports the first batch of 400 volunteers from Palermo, 300 from Caltanissetta and 500 from Messina. The Italian Women's Union gives every assistance to the volunteers prior to their departure. There are also other patriotic and combatant organizations.

It should be noted that very often these volunteers succeed in leaving for the front, despite the fact that some officers of an out-moded mentality try to impede them, by discouraging in every possible way. GIOVETTI, NUOVA (Jurnalistic edition of UNITA) of March 11, re-

It is known that the war will end in this manner - the fight against the German occupation is the only way to achieve the liberation of Italy.

- 3 -

ports for instance the incident of several volunteers who arrived in Rome on foot, coming from Gubbio (Umbria). After having made the round of many barracks, and numerous Ministers, pleading in the name of their cause, these volunteers finally found reception in the San Marco Battalion. "It was a hard job," they said, "but we refused to let them, unless we returned as soldiers. It is necessary to leave for the front at whatever the cost, in the name of Italy and her future."

b. Increase in soldier's pay.

Last month the Council of Ministers decided many measures in favour of Italian soldiers. A soldier with more than 40 months service to his credit will receive 19 liras daily (three times the amount of his former pay); a soldier with less than 40 months service will receive 14 liras daily. (Twice the amount of his former pay). Soldiers belonging to combatant units receive a special daily allowance of 45 lire. An improvement of their food, has been decided upon as well.

c. Discussions on army reform.

The opposition papers continue to deal with an army reform, which shall transform the army into a truly national, non political and democratic army.

Measures taken by the Government, which culminated last month in placing the head of the Chief of Staff under the control of the War Ministry, and this month in placing the Information Service under the control of the War Ministry as well, have been generally favourably received; it is pointed out that this step has helped to relieve the General Staff and the Information Service from the arbitrary and excessive power they possessed and which proved so harmful to the army, which had thus become a political organization.

1946

service to his credit will receive 19 liras daily (three times the amount of his former pay); a soldier with less than 40 months service will receive 14 liras daily. (Twice the amount of his former pay). Soldiers belonging to combatant units receive a special daily allowance of 45 liras. An improvement of their food, has been decided upon as well.

c. Discussions on Army Reform.

The opposition papers continue to deal with an army reform, which shall transform the army into a truly national, non political and democratic army.

Measures taken by the Government, which culminated last month in placing the head of the Chief of Staff under the control of the War Ministry, and this month in placing the Information Service under the control of the War Ministry as well, have been generally favourably received; it is pointed out that this step has helped to relieve the General Staff and the Information Service from the arbitrary and excessive power they possessed and which proved so harmful to the army, which had thus become a political organization.

General Armando Diaz, former commander of Italy and the numerous articles published in L'UOMO REPUBBLICANO and ITALIA, insist that should his suggestions, among which the most important is the suspension of the oath of loyalty to the monarchy by officers and soldiers, not be put into practice, the Italian army will never be made into a more democratic organization. Not only will the union between army and people not be able to exist otherwise, but there will always be doubts in the hearts of the Italian people, whether the Italian armed forces are not in the services of the reaction. The incidents in the AVANTI's offices and those outside the Quirinal have given the opposition a new opportunity to assert that separation has not been carried out seriously in the ranks of the army, navy and airforce, that too many of these responsible are still at their posts and that, should things go on in this manner, conditions for a civil war between army and people are being created. The fact that generals and colonels, dis-

by the Yugoslav Government as war criminals, are still at their posts of command in the army - thus impeding the rebirth of complete confidence between soldiers and their superior officers, on the one hand, and army and people on the other - was also severely criticized.

Finally the opposition papers believe that operation must be speeded up in the Italian army - the dismissal of 38 generals during the first days of February was stated to be insufficient - that an increasing number of partisans, including those of higher rank, must be incorporated into the army, that the oath of loyalty to the monarchy must be abolished, that all propaganda in favour of the monarchy must cease and that soldiers be treated with the dignity they deserve in return for their sacrifices in so many years of war.

"And this/85st about soon," writes IL MONTANO, "so that the country may at last be able to look to the re-organized army of democratic Italy with trust and confidence."

8271
[initials]

7

11/PRB

15 March 45

FEB 11 1945

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

In reply to your letter regarding the recruiting film which the Propaganda Office of the Presidency of the Council wishes to produce and distribute in Italy, the Allied Commission welcomes this proposal.

The Film Division of PRB, which at the present time both produces and distributes films in Italy, will be glad to work with your Propaganda Office in the preparation of the film and its later distribution. I suggest you have your Propaganda Office get in touch with Mr. George Edman, Chief of P.W.B. in Rome, to arrange this.

Yours very truly,

HENRY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi
The President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
Rome

Distribution:
CC Files (1)
EC Files (1)
PRB Files (1)
Mr. G. Edman, P.W.B.
Land Forces S/C

1955

[Handwritten signature]
PA 11/3

8271

Translation

The President of the Council of Ministers

Rome, February 1945

Dear Admiral,

CHC - 1 XHM

In relation with the recent calls under arms, the propaganda office of the Presidency of the Council intends to make a short film of war propaganda.

The film which should be of about 50 meters, and directed by Dr. Marcello Fusco, aims at showing how in a large city, the symptoms of moral and material rehabilitation mostly manifest themselves by the willingness of the young people to join the regular military formations of the nation.

The conception of the film is therefore above every nationalistic or party ideology.

The pictures will all be taken in Rome, and there will be no reference to the allied military organization and nothing which might interfere with military reserves.

I shall be most grateful, my dear Admiral, if you will allow this film to be made and shown in movie-houses.

I remain,

Truly yours,

S. I. Bonomi

Admiral Henry W. Stone
Chief Commissioner of the
Allied Commission - Rome

EC 1151 - 1 MAR 45

Action: PR 195

INFO: CHIEF COMAR
EXEC COMAR
HQS FORCES SC

e.c.

82710

SECRET.

CAS (H)

Ref: 37/100.

24 January 1945.

JAN 27 1945

SUBJECT: "Off Record" Handout to Allied
and Italian Press.

TO : GOC, Land Forces Sub-Com.

1. The Chief Commissioner has had brought to his notice your letter G/103 of 20 Jan 45. While not wishing to restrict the normal publicity concerning the Italian Army, he does not consider the "off record" handout attached to your letter a suitable document for issue to correspondents nor does he feel that the present time is suitable for a press conference on the subject.

2. The Chief Commissioner directs that any press releases concerning the Italian Army should be made through the HQ, HQ AC, with the exception of operational releases which will follow normal military channels.

MSL/TO.

MSL
Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

Copy to: GOS

RA
MSL

1953

8

8271

CHIEF OF STAFF.

(1)

26th January, 1945.

Chief Commissioner.
(Copy to Chief of Staff).

JAN 28 1945

Mr Macmillan has in mind the issuing to the Press, particularly the Italian Press, of a statement on the limiting factors in the rapid re-organisation of the Italian Army after the conditions in which it found itself after the Armistice.

Reference could be made to the experience of re-arming the French in North Africa, the time taken in training troops in new weapons etc.,

Reference could also be made in general terms to the other great demands on supply of British and American arms and equipment. The Pacific war, Burma, and the continual vast quantities sent to Russia and the latest decision to equip more French Divisions.

Mr Macmillan's idea is that it would do good by explaining the facts to a public who find it difficult to understand why a mass of Italians cannot suddenly take the field against the Germans.

Mr Macmillan wishes me to enquire whether you concur in such a project. If so, arrangements to produce the statement could be put in hand. The best time for, and method of, issuing it could be considered on Mr Macmillan's return.

Personal Assistant

B. J. Macmillan
28/1
S. 28/1