

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

ACC

10000/109/1183
(VOL. I)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

10000/109/1183
(VOL. I)

ITALIAN AIR FORCE POLICY
JAN. - NOV. 1945

102

Chief Commissioner.

2607

Attached is submitted for your ^{approval} ~~signature~~ _{information}

par 2 folio 4

7/11
info

There appears to be no sound reason for not informing
the Italian Govt of the interim policy
No objection - as amended *W. C. 2*

103

2606

Thanks to
C.S. 1/15
29/11

To A.E. S/E.

See mem ¹⁰² 3 for transmission approval
on folio ¹⁰⁰ 4 and please return file.

19/11

W. C. 2
Off. Ex. Comm.

— FILE CLOSED —

87

Executive Commissioner.

Ref. folio 84. My recommendation is that the Directive can be downgraded below "Secret", but that it should not be shown to the Italian Air Ministry, since I think that it would be tactless to show them in print that they have no control over their own Air Force, although, of course, they know this perfectly well. I feel also that if it were given to the Air Ministry it might leak into the Press with undesirable results.

7/9/45.

USO.

Chief Commissioner.

P 84.

Attached is submitted for your approval decision signature information

I agree with minute 87 above.

2605

82

Executive Commissioner:

The Chief Commissioner approves the request that the Directive for Air Forces Sub-Commission be downgraded. While he is in agreement with minutes 87 and 88, he believes a copy of the document could be shown (not given) to the Air Ministry having first obtained a pledge of secrecy with particular emphasis that absolutely no disclosure be made to the press.

10 Sept 45

L. H. STEARNS
Major, A.G.D.

7/9/45.

CSO.

88

Chief Commissioner.

P 874.

Attached is submitted for your signature
approval decision.
information

9 agree with minute 87 above.

2605

89

Executive Commissioner:

The Chief Commissioner approves the request that the Directive for Air Forces Sub-Commission be downgraded. While he is in agreement with minutes 87 and 88, he believes a copy of the documents could be shown (not given) to the Air Ministry having first obtained a pledge of secrecy with particular emphasis that absolutely no disclosure be made to the press.

13 Sept 45.

L. W. STEARNS
L. W. STEARNS

Major, A.G.D.
Staff Officer to CC

2604

90

Air Force Sub-Commission

For action as directed in minute 87

17/9/45

91

Staff Officer to C.S.

The substance of minute 87 has been referred to the Sub-Commission M.A.A.C. for final decision.

Noted. L. W. Stearns 1736
17 SEP 45
11/9/45

Executive Commission

76. 65-71 per information

17/7 MS (16/7)

EF
C-80.

P.S.O.

76.

78 for information.

2 Aug 45

N. P. 1867 Sam Pond

P.S.O. Executive Commission

79.

For your info, new directions for Air Force Sub Com at 78.

30 Aug 45

MS 1867 3/10

EF 30/8

Chief Commissioner.

81.

Attached is submitted for your ~~signature~~ ^{approval} information

2602

MS 31/8

26.

P.S.O.

75 for information.

2 Aug 45

M. P. T. 6/27 San Paul

79

~~Executives Commission~~

For your info, new directions for Air Force Sub Com at 78.

30 Aug 45

M. P. T. 6/27

30/8

94

Chief Commissioner.

Approval
Attached is submitted for your signature
information

2602

M. P. T. 6/27

94

cc has been over copy - 1A. 6/27.

85

Executives Commission
84 for decision

6/27

C.S.O. 84 for recommendation

7/26/45

785017

65.

TC: C30 to Executive Comm'r:

Decision taken at MAJF not to put into effect the drastic reductions proposed removers the sending of 63a unnecessary, and 64 has been substituted.

declassified

J. A. QUAYLE

Major, R. A.

Staff officer to CC

19 APR 45

Si 20/4.

24/4 noted. 7

Box 72

Mr. Picken

6671 is handwritten letter

the reference letter. We don't

have handwritten letter

on our file

Si 17/7.

43

C.S.O.

42 noted of future comparison.

41 recommended — will enter therein
informed to and accompanying draft

Ex. 72

Mr. Pickin

4471 is handwritten letter
 the reference letter. We don't
 have handwritten letter
 on our file. 5/12/77.

43

C-50.

42 noted of future comparison.
 41 mentioned — with entire 2641
 informed the and accompanying draft
 40 and 69 respectively.

14 May 45.

cc.

52

TO: AOC, Air Forces

To see Folio 58 - Does this letter in any way alter your recommendations at folio 57?

Please draft letter to PM for CC's signature as per para 3 folio 58.

3 April 45

L. V. STEARNS
L. V. STEARNS
Major, AGD

61

To: Executive Commissioner.

Your minute 59. The letter from A.F.H.Q. at folio 58 does not alter my view that the destruction of the obsolescent aircraft may well cause an entire collapse in the morale and efficiency of the Italian Air Force.

2. At folio 60 is a draft letter to P.M. for C.C.'s signature, but this of course does not represent my views.

3. I still feel that we should hold out for the storage, for the few remaining months of the war, of the obsolescent aircraft. Incidentally these are not warlike aircraft, and are of no fighting value.

W. A. B. Bowen-Buescarlet

Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission, Rome.
3rd April, 1945.

W. A. B. BOWEN-BUESCARLET,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

62

TO: AOC, Air Forces S/C

Draft at folio 60 approved as amended. Will you please put up in final form for Chief Commissioner's signature as soon as possible.

It is understood from telephone conversation AOC - Stearns that the directive as noted in your last sentence of the draft had been transmitted through the Minister of Air to the Prime Minister.

The Executive Commissioner wishes to discuss this matter with the Chief Commissioner this afternoon at approximately 1600 hours.

3 Apr.

Seen, per.

L. V. STEARNS

Your minute 59. The letter from A.F.H.Q. at folio 58 does not alter my view that the destruction of the obsolescent aircraft may well cause an entire collapse in the morale and efficiency of the Italian Air Force.

2. At folio 60 is a draft letter to P.M. for C.C.'s signature, but this of course does not represent my views.

3. I still feel that we should hold out for the storage, for the few remaining months of the war, of the obsolescent aircraft. Incidentally these are not warlike aircraft, and are of no fighting value.

Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission, Rome.
3rd April, 1945.

W.A.B. BOWEN-BUSCARLET

W.A.B. BOWEN-BUSCARLET,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

62

TO: AOC, Air Forces S/C

Draft at folio 60 approved as amended. Will you please put up in final form for Chief Commissioner's signature as soon as possible.

It is understood from telephone conversation AOC - Sterns that the directive as noted in your last sentence of the draft has been transmitted through the Minister of Air to the Prime Minister.

The Executive Commissioner wishes to discuss this matter with the Chief Commissioner this afternoon at approximately 1600 hours.

3 Apr.

See W.A.B. 3/4/45

L.V. STERN
L. V. STERN
Major, AOC

63.

Chief Commissioner:

Attached letter was prepared in accordance with the instructions from AFHQ in reply to our request for information on which to reply to the Prime Minister. However, it does not satisfy anyone and since it involves a matter of major policy and may well be regarded by the Italians as a prejudgement of Italian post war aviation, you may wish to make further representations, or to approach the matter on the political side.

4/4/45

See letter at 64

N. E. F.

24Ex. Com

To see folio 23. Air Vice-Marshal Bowen-Buscarlet's letter to the Italian Air Ministry - pointing out the Ministry's new responsibilities under the "New Deal".

25.

2 Mar.

Chief Commissioners

CC 6/12
MAR 3 RECD

To see f 23. Inaccurate but in country
Shoulder has been submitted to go in draft

first.

MS (2/13)

Free Commission

Daguer

PA 1/23

24

TO:

Staff Officer to Executive Commissioner

9 March 1945

At Folio 46 and 47 is a plea from Bonomi against the threatened reduction in the Italian Air Force. The Prime Minister encloses two letters, one from the Minister for Air to himself (folio 43) and one from the Chief of the Air Staff to AVN Rosen Buscarlet.

The AVN requested ~~that~~, when we forwarded these letters to Chief of Staff AFHQ for a decision, that we include his summary addressed to MAAP which is at folio 50.

Unless the Executive Commissioner feels that a merely dispassionate

2099

To sec f 23. Innocuous but in country
should have been submitted to you in draft

first. ¹⁸
Dec 1944
M. S. (2/13)

Pap 43

51

TO: Staff Officer to Executive Commissioner 9 March 1945

At Folio 46 and 47 is a plea from Bonomi against the threatened reduction in the Italian Air Force. The Prime Minister encloses two letters, one from the Minister for Air to himself (folio 43) and one from the Chief of the Air Staff to AVM Bowen Huscroft.

The AVM requested ~~that~~, when we forwarded these letters to Chief of Staff AFHQ for a decision, that we include his summary addressed to MAAP which is at folio 50.

2399

Unless the Executive Commissioner feels that a merely dispassionate presentation of the case is insufficient, I submit a draft for his approval.

(Bonomi's letter has been acknowledged but the acknowledgment is not yet on the file.)

how i. c. 4512

8/9/13.

JA Crocker 93
J. L. Crocker

53

Issue. MS 9/13.

may Tellet

1-6 is a letter from AM Sir John Slattery to
Cot J.A. F.

See specially paras 3.5.6.7, 96 T 11.

There are two copies of this letter & I recommend
one shd. go to CE which is marked for a
separate file for this purpose.

Ed

18 Jan 45

2

Noted *WD*

23

cc

2nd copy in Air Force SC file AME/R/S.1/AM
also noted in summary by day 6 and
returned to Air Force SC on 23 Jan 45.

2333

16

Exec. Com.

Re-filer 9 - You may not have seen this. *Ed* 22 Feb.

Seen by Ex. Com. *Ed* 23

2397

19

Air Force SC

Re-filer 18 - Will you please take appropriate
action. *Ed* 26 Feb.

Separate file for this purpose.

18 Jan 45

Noted

23

16

Exec. Com.

Re-folio 9 - You may not have seen this. *Feb 22 Feb.*

Seen by Ex. Com. *Feb 24*

2397

19

Air Force Spc

Re-folio 18 - Will you please take appropriate action. *Feb 26 Feb.*

20.

C. J. S.
Quinton

You him 19. Noted, thank you.

W.B.
AVM.
26/2.

*23 entry - Air Force Spc file Nov 18/5.1/45
also with - some by long bones with
attached to Air Force Spc - 23 Jan 45.*

2397

FROM: AIR FC'S SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: M.A.A.C. SECRETARIAT.

DATE: 15TH NOVEMBER, 1945.

REF: AFSC/46/AIR.

CONFIDENTIAL.

NOV 24 1945

INTERIM POLICY FOR THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

With reference to previous correspondence on the matter of allowing the interim policy for the Italian Air Force to be forwarded to the Italian Air Ministry, I have to inform you that the Chief Commissioner, in his capacity of Deputy to SACRED as President of the Allied Commission, has no objection to the interim policy dated the 23rd September, 1945, being forwarded to the Italian Air Ministry, provided the following amendments are made:-

- (a) Paragraph 3a - delete the second and third sentences, i.e. from "The Courier Services to the South" to "persons requiring transport on Government service".
- (b) Paragraph 3c - insert the word "hitherto" after "Aircraft" in the sub-heading, thus making it read "Aircraft hitherto allotted by the Allies".
- (c) Paragraph 3f and g - add at the end of each paragraph the words "and subsequent letters".
- (d) Paragraph 4c - delete the last sentence namely "A decision concerning future intakes at the Italian Air Force Cadet College will be communicated separately".
- (e) Paragraph 5 - delete entirely, as we are not in a position to say what the Italian Air Force will be comprised of.
- (f) Paragraph 6 - line two delete the words "as soon as you are ready". Lines three and four delete "representatives of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee" and insert the words "the Italian Air Ministry". Lines four and five to be amended to read "The following subjects are recommended for discussion" (deleting the words "as part of a proposed agenda").
- (g) Paragraph 6a - first line delete "without going much into detail".
- (h) Paragraph 6d - substitute words "Aircraft Holding Unit" for the words "Air Stores Park" in two places.

the interim policy for the Italian Air Force to be forwarded to the Italian Air Ministry, I have to inform you that the Chief Commissioner, in his capacity of Deputy to SACRED as President of the Allied Commission, has no objection to the interim policy dated the 23rd September, 1945, being forwarded to the Italian Air Ministry, provided the following amendments are made:-

- (a) Paragraph 3a - delete the second and third sentences, i.e. from "The Courier Services to the South" to "persons requiring transport on Government service".
- (b) Paragraph 3c - insert the word "hitherto" after "Aircraft" in the sub-heading, thus making it read "Aircraft hitherto allotted by the Allies".
- (c) Paragraph 3f and g - add at the end of each paragraph the words "and subsequent letters".
- (d) Paragraph 4c - delete the last sentence namely "A decision concerning future intakes at the Italian Air Force Cadet College will be communicated separately".
- (e) Paragraph 5 - delete entirely, as we are not in a position to say what the Italian Air Force will be comprised of.
- (f) Paragraph 6 - line two delete the words "as soon as you are ready". Lines three and four delete "representatives of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee" and insert the words "the Italian Air Ministry". Lines four and five to be amended to read "The following subjects are recommended for discussion" (deleting the words "as part of a proposed agenda").
- (g) Paragraph 6a - first line delete "without going such into detail".
- (h) Paragraph 6d - substitute words "Aircraft Holding Unit" for the words "Air Stores Park" in two places.

2. It is requested that you will inform the Allied Commission whether or not it is intended that the interim policy for the Italian Air Force as amended above may be forwarded to the Italian Air Ministry, either in the form of a directive from A.F.H.Q. or in the form of a letter from the Air Forces Sub-Commission to the Italian Air Ministry.

2046

I.E. RHOE,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

1/24/46
(over 2)

785017

8501 *by Ex Com*

NOV 2 REGD

~~2-2-16-00~~

100
4

From:- Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, Rome.

To:- Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.

Date:- 2nd November, 1945.

Ref:- AFSC/46/Air.

CONFIDENTIAL.

NOV 5 1945

Interim Policy for Italian Air Force.

With reference to our conversation as to whether or not it would be policy to send a copy of the Interim Policy for the Italian Air Force to the Italian Air Ministry, I have again been through it and find that very few alterations are required and I cannot see that any offence can be taken by the Italians. As a matter of fact, I myself drafted the Interim Policy at the beginning of July and ultimately after some pressure we obtained the authorized version from A.F.H.Q. on the 25th September.

2. Attached is a copy of A.F.H.Q. letter. In the script I have made pencil amendments in order to bring the directive up to date and I have also made a few marginal notes for your information.

3. I would be glad to know whether you have any objections as to sending the directive to the Italian Air Ministry from this office (not from A.F.H.Q. owing to alterations), providing I persuade Caserta to change their mind to allow the Italian Air Force to know what they are supposed to be doing which I have been keen to do ever since the war ended and for which purpose I originally wrote the draft. With your support, I think it will give me a greater likelihood of being able to inform the Italian Air Ministry of the Interim Policy.

I. E. Brodie

I. E. BRODIE,
AIR VICE MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

42-107

2595

(CAPT BRAYBROOK)

CONFIDENTIAL.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS.

AG 091.711/231 SACS-O

23 September, 1945.

Subject: Interim Policy for Italian Air Force.

Thru: Chief Commissioner,
Allied Commission, APO 394.

To: Air Vice Marshal I.E. BROCK, CBE.
Air Forces Sub-Commission
Allied Commission.

PART I. POLICY.

1. Without prejudice to the provisions of the peace terms, the following interim policy in respect of the Italian Air Force is to be adopted. In stipulating the interim policy, i.e., the policy to be adopted between the cessation of hostilities in Europe and the announcement of the peace terms of Italy, the assistance given by Italy in the later stages of the war against Germany has been taken into consideration. It had been the intention of the Allies to ground the whole of the Italian Air Force, except for essential Air Transport Services and Air/Sea Rescue; that policy has, however, been considerably modified in favour of the Italian Air Force.

2. The underlying principle to be adopted is to allow Italian air crew to keep in flying practice and in doing so to make the best use of the flying they will be permitted to do.

3. The provisions of the interim policy are as follows:

a. The Italian Air Force Courier Services. In order to overcome the serious transportation difficulties in Italy, the Italian Air Force will use such aircraft as directed by the Air Forces Sub-Commission on Courier Services. The Courier Services to the South of Rome are primarily for the benefit of Italian officials and persons connected with Government business, and secondly for Allied officials, most of whom would be of the Allied Commission. The Courier Services to the North of Rome are primarily for the benefit of the Allied Commission, secondly for Allied officers of the Allied forces, and thirdly for Italian Government officials and persons requiring transportation on Government service. For these purposes, in addition to transport aircraft of the Italian Air Force, such seaplanes and bombers as are required by the Air Forces Sub-Commission, may be used to reinforce the inadequate number of transport aircraft available.

b. The Italian Seaplanes. will be primarily employed on air/sea rescue services, together with such boats, crews and marine craft as will be made available to the Italian Air Force.

c. Aircraft allotted by the Allies will be on loan. They are in no way to be considered as having been finally handed over to the Italians and indeed the Allies reserve the right to withdraw those allotted at any time. In effect, therefore, the P-39s, the Spitfires and the Baltimore already allotted to the Italian Air Force

1. Without prejudice to the provisions of the peace terms, the following interim policy in respect of the Italian Air Force is to be adopted. In stipulating the interim policy, i.e., the policy to be adopted between the cessation of hostilities in Europe and the announcement of the peace terms of Italy, the assistance given by Italy in the later stages of the war against Germany has been taken into consideration. It had been the intention of the Allies to ground the whole of the Italian Air Force, except for essential Air Transport Services and Air/Sea Rescue; that policy has, however, been considerably modified in favour of the Italian Air Force.
2. The underlying principle to be adopted is to allow Italian air crew to keep in flying practice and in doing so to make the best use of the flying they will be permitted to do.
3. The provisions of the interim policy are as follows:
 - a. The Italian Air Force Courier Services. In order to overcome the serious transportation difficulties in Italy, the Italian Air Force will use such aircraft as directed by the Air Forces Sub-Commission on Courier Services. The Courier Services to the South of Rome are primarily for the benefit of Italian officials and persons connected with Government business, and secondly for Allied officials, most of whom would be of the Allied Commission. The Courier Services to the North of Rome are primarily for the benefit of the Allied Commission, secondly for Allied officers of the Allied forces, and thirdly for Italian Government officials and persons requiring transportation on Government service. For these purposes, in addition to transport aircraft of the Italian Air Force, such seaplanes and bombers as are required by the Air Forces Sub-Commission, may be used to reinforce the inadequate number of transport aircraft available.
 - b. The Italian Seaplanes, will be primarily employed on air/sea rescue services, together with such boats, crews and marine craft as will be made available to the Italian Air Force.
 - c. Aircraft allotted by the Allies will be on loan. They are in no way to be considered as having been finally handed over to the Italians and indeed the Allies reserve the right to withdraw those allotted at any time. In effect, therefore, the P-39s, the Spitfires and the Baltimore already allotted to the Italian Air Force will be loaned to the Italian Air Force but aircraft wastage is unlikely to be replaced; spare parts and components will, however, continue to be supplied to the Italian Air Force under existing arrangements through the Air Force Sub-Commission as required in order to permit of the Allied type aircraft in the Italian Air Force having a useful life; spare parts and components will not, however, be supplied in bulk, but only as required.
 - d. The Allied type Bomber Aircraft (Baltimores) will be converted to passenger carrying aircraft as required by the Air Forces Sub-Commission to augment essential courier services. The two Baltimore Squadrons are, therefore, to be trained and exercised in the transport role; no bombing or air firing practice will be permitted. These aircrew who are not engaged on courier services will be limited to a maximum of 10 hours flying per crew per month; this restriction is imposed, in order, so far as possible, to conserve petrol and oil yet let the aircrews maintain their efficiency in flying and navigation.
 - e. Fighter aircraft, will be concentrated, as far as is practicable, in one place. Fighter pilots will be restricted to a maximum of 6 hours flying per month.

- 92
- f. The air material captured in the North of Italy which is of use in maintaining the existing Italian Air Force, will be handed over to the Italian Air Force as required and at the discretion of the Air Forces Sub-Commission. No matter what the origin of this material, it must not be regarded as the property of the Italian Air Force until such time as authorization from the Air Force-Sub-Commission for its use by the Italian Air Force is given; the immediate detailed policy is laid down in letter AFSC/655/3Q of the 30th June.
- g. The aircraft factories and material in the north will be permitted to complete the manufacture of certain aircraft and a small amount of factory space will be allotted to the Italian Air Force to overhaul aircraft already in use; immediate detailed policy is contained in letter AFSC/829/3MG of the 22 June, 1945.
- h. Equipment Depots. It is the intention that, so far as practicable all air material, whether in the South or North of Italy, will be concentrated in as few depots as possible.
- i. Ab-initio or primary flying training will not be permitted, but refresher flying training may be carried out at the discretion of the Air Forces Sub-Commission.
- j. Ground Courses for Officers and Flying Personnel. Administration and disciplinary training of personnel in the Italian Air Force, especially those in the fighter squadrons, should be started, not only to improve the individual standard but to keep them occupied. Likewise it is desirable that engine handling courses be started in order that the most economical use is made of petrol and oil. Similarly, Flying Control Courses should be started in order to raise the standard of aircraft safety and discipline. All these and any other ground training courses are to be organized and administered by the Italian Air Force without the material assistance of the Allies in personnel, but the Air Forces Sub-Commission will advise the Italian Air Ministry.
- k. On matters of personnel, organization and administration, the Air Forces Sub-Commission will continue to advise the Italian Air Ministry, and will also supervise the Italian Air Force to ensure that the interim policy is complied with. The Air Forces Sub-Commission will also assist the Italian Air Force, as far as is practicable, to ensure a high standard of maintenance and aircraft safety.
- l. Bases and airfields to be used or maintained. When an airfield is de-requisitioned by the Allies, it will normally be turned over to agricultural purposes unless required specifically for use by the Italian Air Force; each airfield will be considered on its individual merits and instructions issued accordingly.
- m. Surplus personnel within the stipulated ceiling (now 31,000) and not essential to the maintenance of the Italian Air Force are to be declared to the Air Forces Sub-Commission in order that they may work directly under the Allies in Italy.
4. a. It is the intention that the Italian Air Force shall be self-supporting in every way, except in petrol and oil and perhaps in the supply of new aircraft, but each branch will be supervised by the Allied authorities in order that international standards may be attained, and that the provisions of the interim policy ^{with} this includes aircraft maintenance, signals organization and meteorological organization.

depots as possible.

1. At-initio or primary flying training will not be permitted, but refresher flying training may be carried out at the discretion of the Air Forces Sub-Commission.

j. Ground Courses for Officers and Flying Personnel. Administration and disciplinary training of personnel in the Italian Air Force, especially those in the fighter squadrons, should be started, not only to improve the individual standard but to keep them occupied. Likewise it is desirable that engine handling courses be started in order that the most economical use is made of petrol and oil. Similarly, Flying Control Courses should be started in order to raise the standard of aircraft safety and discipline. All these and any other ground training courses are to be organized and administered by the Italian Air Force without the material assistance of the Allies in personnel, but the Air Forces Sub-Commission will advise the Italian Air Ministry.

k. On matters of personnel, organization and administration, the Air Forces Sub-Commission will continue to advise the Italian Air Ministry, and will also supervise the Italian Air Force to ensure that the interim policy is complied with. The Air Forces Sub-Commission will also assist the Italian Air Force, as far as is practicable, to ensure a high standard of maintenance and aircraft safety.

l. Bases and airfields to be used or maintained. When an airfield is de-requisitioned by the Allies, it will normally be turned over to agricultural purposes unless required specifically for use by the Italian Air Force; each airfield will be considered on its individual merits and instructions issued accordingly.

m. Surplus personnel within the stipulated ceiling (now 31,000) and not essential to the maintenance of the Italian Air Force are to be declared to the Air Forces Sub-Commission in order that they may work directly under the Allies in Italy.

4. a. It is the intention that the Italian Air Force shall be self-supporting in every way, except in petrol and oil and perhaps in the supply of new aircraft, but each branch will be supervised by the Allied authorities in order that international standards may be attained, and that the provisions of the interim policy ^{with}; this includes aircraft maintenance, signals organization and meteorological organization.

b. No policy as regards the future of the Italian Air Force, nor of Civil Aviation, nor the supply of replacement aircraft can, at this time, be given, but the decisions of the High Allied authorities will be communicated to the Italian Government in due course. A decision concerning future intakes at the Italian Air Force Cadet College will be communicated separately. *Since then*

5. It must be clearly understood that there is no intention, nor likelihood of the strength of the Italian Air Force being in any way increased, and it is reiterated that the above stated policy is without prejudice to the peace terms.

PART II. IMPLICATIONS ARISING FROM THE INTERIM POLICY STATED ABOVE.

6. In order that the policy stated above may be most efficiently and quickly effected, it is desired that, as soon as you are ready, the various implications should be discussed by the Air Forces Sub-Commission with representatives of the Mediterranean

97
Allied Air-Committee. The following subjects are recommended for discussion as part of a proposed agenda:

a. ~~Review of the personnel required~~ Review of the personnel required in the Italian Air Force to man and guard authorized units, bases, and depots, with special reference to:

- (1) The organization of the Air Ministry down to the 20MA AREA TERTIARIA level, with a view to bringing about greater efficiency through cutting down all redundant branches and formations; for example, closing down of Unita Area and re-disposing some of their duties to the Air Ministry and others to 4th ZONA AREA TERTIARIA.
- (2) Formation of a Council at the Air Ministry with a view to coordinating the work of the various branches of the Air Ministry.
- (3) The retirement of surplus Senior Officers; disposal of aircrew personnel who wish to return to civilian life, disposal of air gunners and their training as flight engineers or wireless operators.

b. Review of personnel, and in particular specialists, as it would seem that the strength of the Italian Air Force is larger than required for the commitments above. The basic figure to be taken in this review is the authorized ceiling of 51,000.

c. Closing down of PROSIME O.T.U. as it seems unnecessary any longer to train any more aircrews for Allied type aircraft, there probably being sufficient already trained, and the likelihood of the Allied type aircraft diminishing in numbers through wastage. But there may be a necessity to add increased training facilities on operational type aircraft, and if so this might be best done in the Flying Refresher School at present situated at LEVERANO but moving to LECCE. Consideration should be given to the desirability (if any) of converting some pilots now in Fighter Units to the Air Transport Courier role.

d. Formation of an Air Stores Park in which to place reserve aircraft. With the commitments announced in the interim policy, it would seem that it would be profitable to withdraw a number of aircraft from squadrons and place them in properly organized maintenance units, such as an Air Stores Park. *General Headquarters*

e. Closing down of all redundant workshops and airfields with a view to economizing in personnel, except where it is essential to retain a guard to save buildings from being damaged by civilians. In this connection it may be economical to lease any such buildings to civilians or civilian firms.

f. Salaries and pay of Italian Air Force personnel. Although it is a matter for decision by the Italian Government, without reasonably good pay an efficient force cannot be expected; a small efficient force is of greater national value than a larger underpaid one.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

(2) Formation of a Council at the Air Ministry with a view to coordinating the work of the various branches of the Air Ministry.

(3) The retirement of surplus Senior Officers; disposal of surplus personnel who wish to return to civilian life, disposal of air gunners and their training as flight engineers or wireless operators.

b. Review of personnel, and in particular specialists, as it would seem that the strength of the Italian Air Force is larger than required for the commitments above. The basic figure to be taken in this review is the authorized ceiling of 34,000.

c. Closing down of PROSINAVE O.T.U. as it seems unnecessary any longer to train any more aircrews for Allied type aircraft, there probably being sufficient already trained, and the likelihood of the Allied type aircraft diminishing in numbers through wastage. But there may be a necessity to add increased training facilities on operational type aircraft, and if so this might be best done in the Flying Refresher School at present situated at LEVERNO but moving to LEGGE. Consideration should be given to the desirability (if any) of converting some pilots now in Fighter Units to the Air Transport Courier role.

d. Formation of an Air Stores Park in which to place reserve aircraft. With the commitments announced in the interim policy, it would seem that it would be profitable to withdraw a number of aircraft from squadrons and place them in properly organized maintenance units, such as an Air Stores Park.

e. Closing down of all redundant workshops and airfields with a view to economizing in personnel, except where it is essential to retain a guard to save buildings from being damaged by civilians. In this connection it may be economical to lease any such buildings to civilians or civilian firms.

f. Salaries and pay of Italian Air Forces personnel. Although it is a matter for decision by the Italian Government, without reasonably good pay an efficient force cannot be expected; a small efficient force is of greater national value than a larger underpaid one.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ARTHUR WATSON

(signed) C.M. CHURCHILL
Colonel, AGD 2532
Adjutant General

785017

8501

SECRET

(96)

Confidential

EXTRACT FROM THE MINUTES OF SACRED'S CONFERENCE
(9th Meeting) held at AFHQ on 22 November 1945.

MINUTE No. 2.

"9. POLICY FOR ITALIAN AIR FORCE AND ITALIAN NAVY.

AIR VICE MARSHAL FOGARTY raised the question of the policy for the Italian Air Force which was now mainly grounded. He felt that a review was required with a view to seeing whether a policy, parallel to that agreed for the Italian Army, could be adopted.

CAPTAIN GAMBIER, in reply to a query by the Supreme Allied Commander, said that he did not think there was any need for a change of policy regarding the Italian Navy.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Chief of Staff to issue appropriate terms of reference to the Joint Planning Staff. ***

Mr. Commissioner's Dictation: 29 Nov.

Copy to: File 8004/ED.
File 8501/ED.
Navy Sub-Commission.
Air Forces Sub-Commission.

785017

4890(2)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

8507

EX Commissioner (2)

RHE/VP

AP 750

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

AG 091.711/231 SACS-C

23 September 1945

SUBJECT: Interim Policy for Italian Air Force.

SEP 27 1945

THRU: Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
APO 394TO: Air Vice-Marshal I. K. BRODIE, OBE
Air Forces Sub-Commission
Allied CommissionPART 1. POLICY.

1. Without prejudice to the provisions of the peace terms, the following interim policy in respect of the Italian Air Force is to be adopted. In stipulating the interim policy; i.e., the policy to be adopted between the cessation of hostilities in Europe and the announcement of the peace terms of Italy, the assistance given by Italy in the later stages of the war against Germany has been taken into consideration. It had been the intention of the Allies to ground the whole of the Italian Air Force, except for essential Air Transport Services and Air/Sea Rescue; that policy has, however, been considerably modified in favor of the Italian Air Force.

2. The underlying principle to be adopted is to allow Italian air crew to keep in flying practice and in doing so to make the best use of the flying they will be permitted to do.

3. The provisions of the interim policy are as follows:

a. The Italian Air Force Courier Services. In order to overcome the serious transportation difficulties in Italy, the Italian Air Force will use such aircraft as directed by the Air Forces Sub-Commission on Courier Services. The Courier Services to the South of Rome are primarily for the benefit of Italian officials and persons connected with Government business, and secondly for Allied officials, most of whom would be of the Allied Commission. The Courier Services to the North from Rome are primarily for the benefit of the Allied Commission, secondly for Allied officers of the Allied forces, and thirdly for Italian Government officials and persons requiring transportation on Government service. For these purposes, in addition to transport aircraft of the Italian Air Force, such seaplanes and bombers as are required by the Air Forces Sub-Commission, may be used to reinforce the inadequate number of transport aircraft available.

CONFIDENTIAL

(Copy 1000)

(Copy No 5 passed for ca files)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONFIDENTIAL

Ltr, AFHQ, AG 091.711/231 SACS-O,
dtd 23 September 1945 (Cont'd)

b. The Italian Seaplanes will be primarily employed on air/sea rescue services, together with such boats, cross and marine craft as will be made available to the Italian Air Force.

c. Aircraft allotted by the Allies will be on loan. They are in no way to be considered as having been finally handed over to the Italians, and indeed the Allies reserve the right to withdraw those allotted at any time. In effect, therefore, the P-39's, the Spitfires and the Baltimores already allotted to the Italian Air Force will be loaned to the Italian Air Force but aircraft wastage is unlikely to be replaced; spare parts and components will, however, continue to be supplied to the Italian Air Force under existing arrangements through the Air Force Sub-Commission as required in order to permit of the Allied type aircraft in the Italian Air Force having a useful life; spare parts and components will not, however, be supplied in bulk, but only as required.

d. The Allied type Bomber Aircraft (Baltimores) will be converted to passenger carrying aircraft as required by the Air Forces Sub-Commission to augment essential courier services. The two Baltimore Squadrons are, therefore, to be trained and exercised in the transport role; no bombing or air firing practice will be permitted. Those aircrew who are not engaged on courier services will be limited to a maximum of 10 hours flying per crew per month; this restriction is imposed, in order, so far as possible, to conserve petrol and oil and yet let the aircrews maintain their efficiency in flying and navigation.

e. Fighter aircraft will be concentrated, as far as is practicable, in one place. Fighter pilots will be restricted to a maximum of 6 hours flying per month.

f. The air material captured in the North of Italy which is of use in maintaining the existing Italian Air Force, will be handed over to the Italian Air Force as required and at the discretion of the Air Forces Sub-Commission. No matter what the origin of this material, it must not be regarded as the property of the Italian Air Force until such time as authorization from the Air Forces Sub-Commission for its use by the Italian Air Force is given; the immediate detailed policy is laid down in letter AFSC/655/EG of the 30th June.

g. The aircraft factories and material in the North will be permitted to complete the manufacture of certain aircraft and a small amount of factory space will be allotted to the Italian Air Force to overhaul aircraft already in use; immediate detailed policy is contained in letter AFSC/829/ENG of the 22d June, 1945.

h. Equipment Depots. It is the intention that, so far as practicable, all air material, whether in the South or North of Italy, will be concentrated in as few depots as possible.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONFIDENTIAL

Ltr, AFHQ, A 91.711/231 SACS-O,
dtd 23 September 1945 (Cont'd)

i. Re-initio or primary flying training will not be permitted, but refresher flying training may be carried out at the discretion of the Air Forces Sub-Commission.

j. Ground Courses for Officers and Flying Personnel. Administrative and disciplinary training of personnel in the Italian Air Force, especially those in the fighter squadrons, should be started, not only to improve the individual standard, but to keep them occupied. Likewise it is desirable that engine handling courses be started in order that the most economical use is made of petrol and oil. Similarly, Flying Control Courses should be started in order to raise the standard of aircraft safety and discipline. All these and any other ground training courses are to be organized and administered by the Italian Air Force without the material assistance of the Allies in personnel, but the Air Forces Sub-Commission will advise the Italian Air Ministry.

k. On matters of personnel, organization and administration, the Air Forces Sub-Commission will continue to advise the Italian Air Ministry, and will also supervise the Italian Air Force to ensure that the interim policy is complied with. The Air Forces Sub-Commission will also assist the Italian Air Force, as far as is practicable, to ensure a high standard of maintenance and aircraft safety.

l. Bases and airfields to be used or maintained. When an airfield is de-requisitioned by the Allies, it will normally be turned over to agricultural purposes, unless required specifically for use by the Italian Air Force; each airfield will be considered on its individual merits and instructions issued accordingly.

m. Surplus personnel within the stipulated ceiling (now 31,000) and not essential to the maintenance of the Italian Air Force are to be declared to the Air Forces Sub-Commission in order that they may work directly under the Allies in Italy.

4. a. It is the intention that the Italian Air Force shall be self-supporting in every way, except in petrol and oil and perhaps in the supply of new aircraft, but each branch will be supervised by the Allied authorities in order that international standards may be attained, and that the provisions of the interim policy be complied with; this includes aircraft maintenance, signals organization and meteorological organization.

b. No policy as regards the future of the Italian Air Force, nor of Civil Aviation, nor the supply of replacement aircraft can, at this time, be given, but the decisions of the High Allied authorities will be communicated to the Italian Government in due course. A decision concerning future intakes at the Italian Air Force Cadet College will be communicated separately.

5. It must be clearly understood that there is no intention, nor likelihood, of the strength of the Italian Air Force being in any way increased, and it is reiterated that the above ~~is not~~ is without prejudice to the peace terms.

2388
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONFIDENTIAL

Ltr, AFHQ, AG 091.711/231 SACS-O,
dtd 23 September 1945 (Cont'd)

PART II. IMPLICATIONS ARISING FROM THE INTERIM POLICY STATED ABOVE.

6. In order that the policy stated above may be most efficiently and quickly effected, it is desired that, as soon as you are ready, the various implications should be discussed by the Air Forces Sub-Commission with representatives of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. The following subjects are recommended for discussion as part of a proposed agenda:

a. Without going much into detail, review of the personnel required in the Italian Air Force to man and guard authorized units, bases, and depots, with special reference to:

- (1) The organization of the Air Ministry down to the ZONA AREA TERRITORIALE level, with a view to bringing about greater efficiency through cutting down all redundant branches and formations; for example, closing down of Units Area and re-disposing some of their duties to the Air Ministry and others to 4th ZONA AREA TERRITORIALE.
- (2) Formation of a Council at the Air Ministry with a view to coordinating the work of the various branches of the Air Ministry.
- (3) The retirement of surplus Senior Officers; disposal of aircrew personnel who wish to return to civilian life; disposal of Air gunners and their training as flight engineers or wireless operators.

b. Review of personnel, and in particular specialists, as it would seem that the strength of the Italian Air Force is larger than required for the commitments above. The basic figure to be taken in this review is the authorized ceiling of 31,000.

c. Closing down of PROSINONE O.T.U. as it seems unnecessary any longer to train any more aircrews for Allied type aircraft, there probably being sufficient already trained, and the likelihood of the Allied type aircraft diminishing in numbers through wastage. But there may be a necessity to add increased training facilities on operational type aircraft, and if so this might be best done in the Flying Refresher School at present situated at LEVERANO but moving to LEGGE. Consideration should be given to the desirability (if any) of converting some pilots now in Fighter Units to the Air Transport Courier role.

d. Formation of an Air Stores Park in which to place reserve aircraft. With the commitments announced in the interim policy, it would seem that it would be profitable to withdraw a number of aircraft from squadrons and place them in properly organized maintenance units, such as an Air Stores Park.

e. Closing down of all redundant workshops and airfields with a view to economy in personnel, except where it is essential to retain a guard to save buildings from being damaged by civilians or civilian fires. It may be economical to lease any such building to civilians or civilian firms.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONFIDENTIALCONFIDENTIAL

785017

CONFIDENTIAL

93

Ltr, AFHQ, A-091.711/231 SACS-O,
 dtd 23 September 1945 (Cont'd)

f. Salaries and pay of Italian Air Force personnel, although it is a matter for decision by the Italian Government, without reasonably good pay an efficient force cannot be expected; a small efficient force is of greater national value than a larger underpaid one.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

W. H. G. G. G. G.
 Colonel, AGD
 Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2 - Addressee
- 4 - Chief Commissioner, ALOCM
- 1 - C/S, AFHQ
- 2 - SACS
- 2 - C-in-C, IED
- 2 - COMNAVIA
- 5 - CG, AAF/ITO
- 5 - C-in-C, RAF/MEDME
- 2 - CAO
- 2 - The Secretaries, Med Allied Air Committee, c/o ALS, RAF/MEDME
- 2 - US POLAD
- 2 - HR RES LHM
- 1 - D/CAO
- 1 - G-1 (A)
- 1 - G-1 (B)
- 1 - G-2
- 1 - G-3
- 1 - G-4 (A)
- 1 - G-5
- 1 - AFHQ Passage Center
- 2 - AG Records
- 1 - AG LID

Ac Dwr
 Act: AIR E/C (1)
 Info: Ex Commissioner (1)
 ECOM SEC (2)

2387

CONFIDENTIALCONFIDENTIAL

785017

4596

RESTRICTED

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 394

Ex Comm (4)

AG 334/111 S. 43-0

18 September 1945

SUBJECT: Directive for Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission

THRU: Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
APO 394

SEP 21 1945

TO: Air Vice Marshall I.E. BRODIE, OBE
Air Forces Sub-Commission
Allied Commission
APO 394Classification of letter this headquarters, file and subject as above,
dated 20 August 1945, is reduced from SECRET to CONFIDENTIAL.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

20 SEP 1945

R. H. FROGE
Major, AGD
Asst Adjutant GeneralNOTED ON
ORIGINAL

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2 - Addressee
- 4 - ALCON
- 1 - C/S AGO
- 2 - SACS
- 2 - C in C Med
- 2 - COMNAVST
- 5 - AAF/AFO
- 5 - AAF/AFDS
- 2 - CAO
- 3 - Secretariat, Fed Allied Air Committee,
C/o AAF, AAF/AFDS
- 2 - US POLAD
- 2 - Br RES AFM
- 1 - D/CAO
- 1 - G-1 (A)
- 1 - G-1 (B)
- 1 - G-2
- 1 - G-3
- 1 - G-4 (A)
- 1 - G-5
- 1 - AFHQ Message Center
- 2 - AG Records

cc: Air 91-127

E. E. DIST

CHIEF Comm
Ex Comm
AMEMBASSY
BR EMBASSY

2586

RESTRICTED

(CSO)

785017

8501
FROM: SENIOR STAFF OFFICER,
AIR FORCE SUB COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION.

TO : CHIEF COMMISSIONER, ALLIED COMMISSION.

DATE: 5TH SEPTEMBER, 1945.

REF : AFSC/303/10rg.

84
78
SEP - 5 1945

SUBJECT: DIRECTIVE FOR A.F.S.C., ALLIED COMMISSION, ITALY.

The A.O.C. has asked that the directive for this Sub Commission be down graded from a SECRET document to allow its distribution to include a copy to the Italian Air Ministry.

I have received verbal approval from A.E.H.Q. through the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee, provided it also receives your approval.

May I be informed of your decision after you have given this request your consideration.


L.E. JARMAN, G/CAPT.
SENIOR STAFF OFFICER.

Q P/AK

see 285.86487

(CSO)

~~SECRET~~

83

Confidential
1 September 1945.

Ref: 8501/83/20.

SUBJECT: Directive for Air Parous Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission.

TO : H.L.D.A. Robinson Esq., C.M.G.,
British Embassy,
Rome.

1. I am enclosing Copy No. 6 of A.W.H.Q. letter AG 534/111
SACB-0 dated 26 August 1945, subject as above, for your information.
2. A copy has been sent to the American Embassy on request.

E. TALBOT

✓
Chief Staff Officer,
to the Executive Commissioner.

Incl: As above.

2583

785017

~~SECRET~~

8501

AP 687

RAS/1ja

78

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

.....
 : ~~SECRET~~ :
 : Auth: SAC :
 : Initials :
 : Date: 28 August 45 :
 : :
 28 August 1945

AUG 30 1945

AG 334/111 SAOS-0

SUBJECT: Directive for Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied
Commission

RECLASSIFIED . CONFIDENTIAL

THRU: Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
APO 394

SEE FORNO. 92

TO: Air Vice-Marshal I. E. BRODIE, OBE
Air Forces Sub-Commission
Allied Commission

29

1. The following instructions supersede the directive which was issued from this headquarters on 6 March 1945, under reference AG 334/111 ISAPG-0.

2. Your duty is to act as an Allied Air Advisor on the Allied Commission and in particular to advise the Chief Commissioner on matters affecting the Italian Air Force. Consequently:

a. As Head of the Air Forces Sub-Commission you will be responsible on technical and administrative air force matters to the Commander-in-Chief, RAF MEDIT, and Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, in committee, hereinafter called the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. That committee to issue you directives setting forth the Allied policy on such air force matters.

b. On matters of policy, such as those which raise political issues or which affect the other services, you will be responsible to the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.

3. The Supreme Allied Commander has decided that, until a final policy is determined either by revision of the armistice terms, or by a peace treaty with ITALY, the Italian Air Force will be permitted to remain within the ceiling which was authorized by the Combined Chiefs of Staff when hostilities against the Germans were continuing. You will receive direction from time to time as to the exact strength at which this air force is to be maintained within that ceiling. All Italian Air Force units will for the present remain unreservedly at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander and authorization for the employment of those units as may be thought fit will be given to you by the Mediterranean Allied Committee on his behalf. In consequence:

2503

79-82

~~SECRET~~

(Steno Paper)

SECRETAFHQ Ltr, AG 334/111 WACS-O,
dated 28 August 1945 (Cont'd)

a. Your primary function is to assist the Italian Air Ministry, Chief of Staff and Italian Air Force authorities generally to run the Italian Air Force as efficiently as possible within the limits of their authorized resources, and of such resources as the Allies may make available to them. You should be quite clear and should make clear to the above mentioned Italian authorities, that the efficiency of the Italian Air Force is their responsibility. Your responsibility is, first, to transmit Allied policy instructions to the Italian Air Ministry and, secondly, to assist that Ministry with advice and with such material resources as may be made available by the Allies. If, in your view, the Italian Air Force authorities are failing in their duty you will make such representations as you may think fit to the Italian Air Ministry or where appropriate to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee, informing the Chief Commissioner as appropriate, including, if necessary, recommendations for the removal of any particular officer or officers.

(c) b. Your function is thus a professional and not a political one. In the event of a change of government in ITALY you will be responsible for advising the Chief Commissioner and the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee in the light of your knowledge and official contacts as a member of the Allied Commission, as to the qualifications from the Air Force point of view of any potential Secretary or Under-Secretary of State. You will reserve the right to approve or reject on the grounds of suitability, the appointment of Commanding Officers and Senior Staff Officers in the Italian Air Force. In doing so, however, you should, as far as possible, ensure that there is nothing in the officer's previous record under the Fascist government that makes him unsuitable for his appointment. You should discourage any political activities on the part of Italian Air Force personnel that may come to your notice. Apart from this it is not your function to concern yourself with the political views of any Italian Air Force personnel unless they obtrude themselves by affecting the efficiency of the Italian Air Force. Neither is it your duty to discover any political activities in which Italian Air Force personnel may be engaged (that is a matter for the Italian Air Force authorities themselves).

(d) c. Thus you and your staff have no political responsibilities but should keep in close touch with, and consult as necessary, any authorities under Allied Force Headquarters whose duty it is to concern themselves with the past and present political activities of any Italian Service personnel.

4. You and your staff, through the Secretariat of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee, will call on the staff branches of RAF/MEDEA and USAF/ATO for advice, assistance and authority where applicable on matters concerning organization, maintenance, supply, training and equipment.

785017

SECRET

AFHQ Ltr, AG 35 111 SACCS-C,
dated 28 August 1945 (Cont'd)

5. Units of the Italian Air Force are equipped with Allied or Italian types of aircraft. The Allied decision on the number, strength and composition of units to be maintained will be conveyed to you, from time to time, by the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. You will also receive from the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee instructions in regard to the maintenance of these units. You will be responsible for ensuring that the Italian Air Ministry does not maintain any units in excess of those authorized.

6. You will submit routine reports on matters affecting the organization, administration and maintenance of the Italian Air Force to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. Special reports by you may be necessary from time to time, such as on matters of organization, administration and maintenance of Italian Air Force units which are affecting their efficiency. No reports are to be made direct to any higher authority other than to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee and the Chief Commissioner. Copies of reports should be rendered in sufficient quantity to ensure adequate distribution to RAF/MEDAF and AAF/MTO.

7. Over and above the requirements of the authorized flying and ancillary units there may be a surplus of trained Italian Air Force manpower within the approved ceiling. You will be responsible for organizing such surplus manpower for the use of the British and American Air Forces in this theater. The decision as to the proportion to be employed by the Italian Air Force and in the British and American Air Forces respectively will be conveyed to you by the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

8. You should ensure that the Intelligence Staff of the Italian Air Ministry make available to you for the information of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee any information that they may obtain and which would be of any value to the Intelligence Staffs of RAF/MEDAF and AAF/MTO.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

W. C. CHRISTENSEN
Colonel, AG
Adjutant General

2582

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2 - Addressee
- 4 - Chief Commissioner, ALCON
- 1 - C/S MTO
- 2 - SACCS
- 2 - C-in-C, MED
- 2 - COMELVINT
- 5 - CG, AAF/MTO
- 5 - C-in-C RAF/MEDAF

(Distribution continued on
reverse side)

EC II 157 - 30 Aug 45

- 3 CHIEF COMM
- 4 EXEC COMM
- 5 AMERICAN EMBASSY
- 6 BRITISH EMBASSY

SECRET

785017

SECRET

AFHQ Ltr, AG 33 111 SACS-O,
dated 28 August 1945 (Cont'd)

5. Units of the Italian Air Force are equipped with Allied or Italian types of aircraft. The Allied decision on the number, strength and composition of units to be maintained will be conveyed to you, from time to time, by the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. You will also receive from the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee instructions in regard to the maintenance of these units. You will be responsible for ensuring that the Italian Air Ministry does not maintain any units in excess of those authorized.

6. You will submit routine reports on matters affecting the organization, administration and maintenance of the Italian Air Force to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. Special reports by you may be necessary from time to time, such as on matters of organization, administration and maintenance of Italian Air Force units which are affecting their efficiency. No reports are to be made direct to any higher authority other than to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee and the Chief Commissioner. Copies of reports should be rendered in sufficient quantity to ensure adequate distribution to RAF/MEHQ and AF/ATO.

7. Over and above the requirements of the authorized flying and ancillary units there may be a surplus of trained Italian Air Force manpower within the approved ceiling. You will be responsible for organizing such surplus manpower for the use of the British and American Air Forces in this theater. The decision as to the proportion to be employed by the Italian Air Force and in the British and American Air Forces respectively will be conveyed to you by the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

8. You should ensure that the Intelligence Staff of the Italian Air Ministry make available to you for the information of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee any information that they may obtain and which would be of any value to the Intelligence Staffs of RAF/MEHQ and AF/ATO.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

Christie
C. V. CHRISTIE
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

2582

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2 - Addressee
- 4 - Chief Commissioner, AFHQ
- 1 - C/S ATO
- 2 - SACS
- 2 - C-in-C, MED
- 2 - COMNAVST
- 5 - CC, AF/ATO
- 5 - C-in-C RAF/MEHQ

(Distribution continued on
reverse side)

EC Hist - 30 Aug 45

- 3 CHIEF Comm
- 4 EXEC Comm
- 5 AMERICAN EMBASSY
- 6 BRITISH EMBASSY

SECRET

SECRET

AFHQ Ltr, AG 334/111 SACS-0,
dated 28 August 1945 (Cont'd)

DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)

- 2 - CAO
- 2 - The Secretaries, Mediterranean Allied Air
Committee, c/o ALS, RAF, MEDRES
- 2 - US POL/D
- 2 - BR RES MIN
- 1 - D/CAO
- 1 - G-1 (A)
- 1 - G-1 (H)
- 1 - G-2
- 1 - G-3
- 1 - G-4 (A)
- 1 - G-5
- 1 - AFHQ Message Center
- 2 - AG Records
- 1 - AG M & D

SECRET
SECRET

MINUTE 6.

6. DIRECTIVE FOR AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION.

(Paper No. SAC (45) 14.) 77B

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper attaching a revised draft directive for the Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission.

AIR MARSHAL GARROD said that the Head of the Air Forces Sub-Commission had previously been responsible in certain respects to the Mediterranean Allied Air Commander-in-Chief and now that this appointment was terminated it was proposed that the Sub-Commission should be responsible to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

MAJOR GENERAL LEHMITZER disagreed with the statement contained in the draft that the Head of the Air Forces Sub-Commission was the representative of the British and US Air Forces on the Allied Commission. The position was that the whole of the Allied Commission had the task of representing the Supreme Allied Commander.

PEAR ADMIRAL STONE pointed out that the position of the Heads of the three services sub-commissions of the Allied Commission was analogous to that of the Head of a technical service, such as the Signal Corps, with an Army. The sub-commissions were responsible for advising him but also dealt with their own technical superiors.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER disagreed with certain portions of the draft directive, which he considered to imply that the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee was empowered to make major Allied policy decisions affecting the Air Forces Sub-Commission. Such policies would inevitably be promulgated through the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Supreme Allied Commander. The latter had, however, delegated to the Air Commander-in-Chief in the past, and would delegate to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee in the future, the task of the technical supervision of the Air Forces Sub-Commission. General Molloy also considered that the statement, that the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee could authorize use of Italian Air Force units as they thought fit, required redrafting, as the Committee could only perform this function within the general policy determined by the Supreme Allied Commander. He also questioned the implication in the proposed draft directive that the Italian Air Force would remain indefinitely under Allied control. The policy of turning over the Italian Army to the Italian government had already been recommended by the Supreme Allied Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and General Molloy considered that a start in the same direction might shortly be necessary in regard to the Italian Air Force.

AIR MARSHAL GARROD, referring to the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander's last remark, said the difficulty was that nobody knew what size or type of air force would be permitted to ITALY by the Peace Treaty. There were indications that it

the Mediterranean Air Commander-in-Chief and now that this appointment was terminated it was proposed that the Sub-Commission should be responsible to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

MAJOR GENERAL LEIGHTONER disagreed with the statement contained in the draft that the Head of the Air Forces Sub-Commission was the representative of the British and US Air Forces on the Allied Commission. The position was that the whole of the Allied Commission had the task of representing the Supreme Allied Commander.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE pointed out that the position of the Heads of the three service sub-commissions of the Allied Commission was analogous to that of the Head of a technical service, such as the Signal Corps, with an Army. The sub-commissions were responsible for advising him but also dealt with their own technical superiors.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER disagreed with certain portions of the draft directive, which he considered to imply that the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee was empowered to make major Allied policy decisions affecting the Air Forces Sub-Commission. Such policies would inevitably be promulgated through the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Supreme Allied Commander. The latter had, however, delegated to the Air Commander-in-Chief in the past, and would delegate to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee in the future, the task of the technical supervision of the Air Forces Sub-Commission. General McMarney also considered that the statement, that the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee could authorize use of Italian Air Force units as they thought fit, required redrafting, as the Committee could only perform this function within the general policy determined by the Supreme Allied Commander. He also questioned the implication in the proposed draft directive that the Italian Air Force would remain indefinitely under Allied control. The policy of turning over the Italian Army to the Italian government had already been recommended by the Supreme Allied Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and General McMarney considered that a start in the same direction might shortly be necessary in regard to the Italian Air Force.

2081

AIR MARSHAL GAREOD, referring to the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander's last remark, said the difficulty was that nobody knew what size or type of air force would be permitted to ITALY by the Peace Treaty. There were indications that the present Italian Air Force was larger than the limit which was likely to be finally imposed. Consequently, the handover of the Italian Air Force to the Italian government might give rise to difficulties at a later stage. However, the Italian Air Ministry was assuming increasing administrative control. Referring to the portions of the draft directive dealing with the channels of responsibility of the Head of the Air Forces Sub-Commission, he said it ought to be made clearer that, while on service matters the sub-commission would deal with Mediterranean Allied Air Committee, on other broader matters it was responsible to the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Secretary to redraft, in the light of the above discussion, the directive circulated under paper No. SAC (45) 14 and, after obtaining the necessary Air Force concurrence, to submit the revised draft to him for his approval.

785017

SECRET.

COPY.

773

ALLIED FORCES HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat.

AP 655

SAC (45) 1/
21st August 1945.

SECRET.
Copy No. 32.

Confidential

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

DIRECTIVE FOR AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION.

Note by Secretary.

1. On the dissolution of Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces into its two national components, it has become necessary to revise the existing directive for the Air Forces Sub Commission, Allied Commission.
2. The draft directive at Appendix 'A' has therefore been prepared by Commander-in-Chief, RAD MIDDLE in conjunction with Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theatre of Operations, and has received the concurrence of the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.
3. The Supreme Allied Commander is requested to approve this directive for despatch.

(Sgd) J.G. SWENHAM
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

Ex. Com's List - 22 Aug.
Copy No. 31 - C. Com.
Copy No. 32 - Ex. Com.
Copy No. 33 - Air Force S/C.

See 77A
2580

SECRET.APPENDIX "A".DRAFT.

SUBJECT: Directive for Air Forces Sub Commission, Allied Commission.

TO : Air Vice Marshal I.E. Brodie, CBE,
Air Forces Sub Commission, Allied Commission.

FROM : Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.

1. The following instructions supersede and cancel the directive which was issued from this HQ on 6th March 1945, under reference AC 134/111 ISAFS-0.

2. a. As representative of the British and U.S. Air Forces you will be responsible to the Commander-in-Chief, RAF MESE, and Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theatre of Operations in Committee, hereinafter called the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

b. Your duty is to represent the U.S. and British Air Forces on the Allied Commission and to advise the Chief Commissioner on matters affecting the Italian Air Force.

3. a. The Italian Air Force has been permitted to remain at a ceiling laid down by the Combined Chiefs of Staff until a final policy regarding the future of the Italian Air Force is decided either by a revision of the Armistice Terms or a Peace Treaty with Italy.

b. Your primary function, in general, is to assist the Italian Air Ministry, Chief of Staff and Italian Air Force authorities generally to run the Italian Air Force as efficiently as possible within the limits of their authorised resources, and of such resources as the Allies may make available to them in accordance with the policy laid down by the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. You should be quite clear, and should make clear to the above mentioned Italian authorities, that the efficiency of the Italian Air Force is their responsibility. Your responsibility is, first, to transmit to the Italian Air Ministry the policy instructions of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee, and secondly, to assist the Italian Air Ministry with advice and with such material resources as may be made available by the Allies. If, in your view, the Italian Air Force authorities are failing in their duty, you will make such representations as you may think fit to the Italian Air Ministry or where appropriate to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee, informing the Chief Commissioner as appropriate, including, if necessary, recommendations for the removal of any particular officer or officers.

4. a. Your function is thus a professional and not a political one. In the event of a change of Government in Italy you will be responsible for advising the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee in the light of your knowledge and official contacts as a member of the Allied Commission, as to the qualifications from the Air Force point of view of any potential Secretary or Under-Secretary of State. You will reserve the right to approve or reject on the grounds of suitability, the appointment of Commanding Officers and Senior Staff Officers in the Italian Air Force. In doing so, however, you should, as far as possible, ensure that there is nothing in an officer's

b. Your duty is to represent the U.S. and British Air Forces on the Allied Commission and to advise the Chief Commissioner on matters affecting the Italian Air Force.

3. a. The Italian Air Force has been permitted to remain at a ceiling laid down by the Combined Chiefs of Staff until a final policy regarding the future of the Italian Air Force is decided either by a revision of the Armistice Terms or a Peace Treaty with Italy.

b. Your primary function, in general, is to assist the Italian Air Ministry, Chief of Staff and Italian Air Force authorities generally to run the Italian Air Force as efficiently as possible within the limits of their authorized resources, and of such resources as the Allies may make available to them in accordance with the policy laid down by the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. You should be quite clear, and should make clear to the above mentioned Italian authorities, that the efficiency of the Italian Air Force is their responsibility. Your responsibility is, first, to transmit to the Italian Air Ministry the policy instructions of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee, and secondly, to assist the Italian Air Ministry with advice and with such material resources as may be made available by the Allies. If, in your view, the Italian Air Force authorities are failing in their duty, you will make such representations as you may think fit to the Italian Air Ministry or where appropriate to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee, informing the Chief Commissioner as appropriate, including, if necessary, recommendations for the removal of any particular officer or officers.

4. a. Your function is thus a professional and not a political one. In the event of a change of government in Italy you will be responsible for advising the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee in the light of your knowledge and official contacts as a member of the Allied Commission, as to the qualifications from the Air Force point of view of any potential Secretary or Under-Secretary of State. You will reserve the right to approve or reject on the grounds of suitability, the appointment of Commanding Officers and Senior Staff Officers in the Italian Air Force. In doing so, however, you should, as far as possible, ensure that there is nothing in the officer's previous record under the Fascist government that makes him unsuitable for his appointment. You should discourage any political activities on the part of Italian Air Force personnel that may come to your notice. Apart from this it is not your function to concern yourself with the political views of any Italian Air Force personnel unless they obtrude themselves by affecting the efficiency of the Italian Air Force. Neither is it your duty to discover any political activities in which Italian Air Force personnel may be engaged (that is a matter for the Italian Air Force authorities themselves).

b. Thus you and your staff have no political responsibilities but should keep in close touch with, and consult as necessary, any authorities under Allied Force Headquarters whose duty it is to concern themselves with the past and present political activities of any Italian Service personnel.

5. You and your staff, through the Secretariat of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee will call on the staff branches of MAP/AFM and AAF/AFMO for advice, assistance and authority where applicable on matters concerning organization, maintenance, supply, training and equipment.

-2-

6. Units of the Italian Air Force are equipped with Allied or Italian types of aircraft. The decision on the number, strength and composition of units to be maintained is one for the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. Maintenance of these units will be regulated by instructions from the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.
7. You will be responsible for ensuring that the Italian Air Ministry does not maintain any units in excess of those authorized. All the Italian Air Force units will be unreservedly at the disposal of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee who will authorize them to be used as they consider fit.
8. You will submit routine reports on matters affecting the organization, administration and maintenance of the Italian Air Force to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. Special reports by you may be necessary from time to time, such as on matters of organization, administration and maintenance of Italian Air Force units which are affecting their efficiency. No reports are to be made direct to any higher authority other than to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee and the Chief Commissioner, for information, and on matters which are his direct concern. The Mediterranean Allied Air Committee will be responsible for determining any wider distribution which may be necessary. Copies of reports should be rendered in sufficient quantity to ensure adequate distribution to MAP/MEHQ and MAP/AFHQ.
9. Over and above the requirements of the authorized flying and ancillary units there may be a surplus of trained Italian Air Force manpower within the approved ceiling. You will be responsible for organizing such surplus manpower for the use of the British and American Air Forces in the Theatre. The decision as to the proportion to be employed by the Italian Air Force and in the British and American Air Forces respectively rests with the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.
10. You should ensure that the Intelligence Staff of the Italian Air Ministry make available to you for the information of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee any information that they may obtain and which would be of any value to the Intelligence Staffs of MAP/MEHQ and MAP/AFHQ.

By Command of Field Marshal ALEXANDER:

G.N. CHRISTENSEN
COLONEL, AIR,
ADJUTANT GENERAL.

2078

CONFIDENTIAL

AUG 1 RECD (75)

8501

31 July 1945

AUG 1 1945

SUBJECT: Directive for Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission.

TO : Commander-in-Chief, RAF MedWe,
CG, AAF/ETO

1. With the dissolution of MAAF as an Allied Headquarters, the existing directive to Air Vice-Marshal Bowen-Busfield, Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission (AG 334/111 IS&PS-0 dated 6 March 1945) has become out of date.
2. It is desired that RAF MedWe and AAF/ETO jointly, and in consultation with Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, draft a revised directive to the Air Forces Sub-Commission.
3. In addition to outlining the functions and responsibilities of the Air Forces Sub-Commission, the directive will set forth clearly the procedures, channels of communication and such other items as are considered necessary for the efficient operation and smooth functioning of the Air Forces Sub-Commission as an agency of the Allied Commission and of Allied Force Headquarters.
4. The revised directive will then be submitted through this office to the Supreme Allied Commander for his approval.

CDO [signature] 7/18
L. L. Lennitzer
L. L. LENNITZER
Major General, U.S.C.
Deputy Chief of Staff

Copy to:

Chief Commissioner,
Allied Commission.

Also Junes S/C. (in May, Keenan see M.76)

CONFIDENTIAL

(S/C Com Prosr)

MA 7/18

785017

8506 8501

76

14 July 1945.

JUL 15 1945

MEMORANDUM TO: Director, Air Forces Sub-Commission.

SUBJECT: Italian Air Force Interim Policy.

70

1. Your letter of 9 July 1945, file AFSC/46/ATR, submitting a proposed letter to the Italian Government for the approval of M.A.A.F., refers.
2. Before any final letter is sent to the Italian Government, I should like to have it submitted to me for approval.
3. In the meantime, will you inform me whether some of the proposals contained in the draft letter, such as paragraph 2 thereof, are the result of a directive or other instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

15/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Copy to: Executive Commissioner

g/k Puby
seen
22/7.

see MIT2 73874

34
18/7.
Noted
22/7
19/7

(250)

FROM : AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME

TO : HEADQUARTERS, M.A.A.F. C.M.F. (A.L.S.)
COPY : CHIEF COMMISSIONER, H.Q. A.C.

DATE : 9TH JULY 1945

REF : AFSC/1.6/AIR

CONFIDENTIAL

ITALIAN AIR FORCE INTERIM POLICY

65-69
With reference to the conversation between AIR VICE-MARSHAL BAKER,
AIR VICE MARSHAL BRODIE and GROUP CAPTAIN REID at CASERTA on the 5th July,
the attached draft of a letter which it is proposed to send to the Italian
Air Ministry is forwarded for approval.

I. B. BRODIE
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

DRAFT.

SECRET

MEMO H.Q. M.A.A.P. G.M.F. FOR AIRMANAL,
CHIEF COMMISSIONER, H.Q. A.C.ITALIAN AIR FORCE INTERIM POLICY.PART I - POLICY.

1. Without prejudice to the provisions of the peace terms, the following interim policy in respect of the Italian Air Force is to be adopted. In stipulating the interim policy, i.e. the policy to be adopted between the cessation of hostilities in Europe and the announcement of the peace terms of Italy, the assistance given by Italy in the latter stages of the war against Germany has been taken into consideration. It had been the intention of the Allies to grant the whole of the Italian Air Force, except for essential air transport purposes and air/sea rescue; that policy has, however, been considerably modified in favour of the Italian Air Force.

2. The underlying principle to be adopted is to allow Italian aircraft to keep in flying practices (rather than to become mere efficient in war-like exercises,) and in doing so to make the best use of the flying they will be permitted to do.

3. The provisions of the interim policy are as follows:-

- (1) Italian Air Force Courier Services. In order to overcome the serious transportation difficulties in Italy, the I.A.F. will use such aircraft as directed by the Air Forces Sub-Commission on Courier Services. The Courier Services to the South^{of Rome} are primarily for the benefit of Italian officials and persons connected with Government business, and security for Allied officials.

1. Without prejudice to the provisions of the peace treaty, the following interim policy in respect of the Italian Air Force is to be adopted. In stipulating the interim policy, i.e. the policy to be adopted between the cessation of hostilities in Europe and the announcement of the peace terms of Italy, the assistance given by Italy in the latter stages of the war against Germany has been taken into consideration. It had been the intention of the Allies to grant the whole of the Italian Air Force, except for essential air transport purposes and air/sea rescue; that policy has, however, been considerably modified in favour of the Italian Air Force.
2. The underlying principle to be adopted is to allow Italian aircraft to keep in flying practice (rather than to become mere efficient in war-like exercises,) and in doing so to make the best use of the flying they will be permitted to do.
3. The provisions of the interim policy are as follows:-
 - (a) Italian Air Force Courier Services. In order to overcome the serious transportation difficulties in Italy, the I.A.F. will use such aircraft as directed by the Air Forces Sub-Commission on Courier Services. The Courier Services to the South/are ^{Of Rome} primarily for the benefit of Italian officials and persons connected with Government business, and especially for Allied officials, most of whom would be of the Allied Commission. The Courier Services to the North from Rome are primarily for the benefit of the Allied Commission, especially for Allied Officers of the Allied Forces, and thirdly for Italian Government officials and persons requiring transportation on Government service. For these purposes, in addition to transport aircraft of the I.A.F., such seaplanes and bombers as are required by the Air Forces Sub-Commission may be used to reinforce the inadequate number of transport aircraft available.
 - (ii) The Italian Seaplanes will be primarily employed on air/sea rescue

68
servives, together with such boat crews and marine craft as will be made available to the I.A.F.

(iii) Allied type aircraft will be allotted as required by the Allies on loan. They are in no way to be considered as having been finally handed over to the Italians, and indeed the Allies reserve the right to withdraw those allotted at any time. In effect, therefore, the P.39's, the Spitfires and the Mustangs already allotted to the Italian Air Force will be loaned to the I.A.F., but aircraft wreckage will not be replaced; ^{British} spare parts and components will, however, continue to be supplied to the Italian Air Force under existing arrangements through the A.F.S.C. as required in order to permit of the Allied type aircraft in the I.A.F. having a useful life; spare parts and components will not, however, be supplied in bulk, but only as required.

(iv) The Allied type Bomber Aircraft (Mustangs) will be converted to passenger carrying aircraft as required by the A.F.S.C. to augment essential courier services. The two Mustang squadrons are, therefore, to be trained and employed in the transport role; no bombing or air firing practice will be permitted. Those aircraft who are not engaged on courier services will be limited to a maximum of six hours flying per crew per month; this restriction is imposed, in order, so far as possible, to conserve petrol and oil and yet let the aircraft maintain their efficiency in flying and navigation.

(v) Italian fighter aircraft will be concentrated, so far as is practicable, in one place, and will be permitted to maintain a reasonable state of training in flying and air firing; each pilot will be restricted to a maximum of six hours flying per month.

(vi) The air material centered in the North of Italy shall be of use

Force will be loaned to the I.A.F., but aircraft engines will not be replaced; spare parts and components will, however, continue to be supplied to the Italian Air Force under existing arrangements through the A.F.S.C. as required in order to permit of the Allied type aircraft in the I.A.F. having a useful life; spare parts and components will not, however, be supplied in bulk, but only as required.

(iv) The Allied type Bomber Aircraft (Baltimore) will be converted to passenger carrying aircraft as required by the A.F.S.C. to augment essential courier services. The two Baltimore squadrons are, therefore, to be trained and employed in the transport role; no bombing or air firing practices will be permitted. Those aircraft who are not engaged on courier services will be limited to a maximum of six hours flying per week per month; this restriction is imposed, in order, as far as possible, to conserve petrol and oil and yet let the aircraft maintain their efficiency in flying and navigation.

(v) Italian fighter aircraft will be concentrated, so far as is practicable, in one place, and will be permitted to maintain a reasonable state of training in flying and air firing; each pilot will be restricted to a maximum of six hours flying per month.

(vi) The Air material captured in the North of Italy which is of use in maintaining the existing Italian Air Force, will be handed over to the I.A.F. as required and at the discretion of the A.F.S.C. No matter what the origin of this material, it must not be regarded as the property of the I.A.F. until such time as authorization from the A.F.S.C. for its use by the I.A.F. is given; the immediate detailed policy is laid down in letter AWC/65/89 of the 30th June.

(vii) The aircraft factories and material in the North will be permitted to complete the manufacture of certain aircraft and a small

-3-

67

most of factory courses will be allotted to the Italian Air Force to overhaul aircraft already in use; immediate detailed policy is contained in letter AMSC/ACG/STW of the 22nd June, 1945.

(viii) Reconversion Points. It is the intention that, so far as possible, all air material, whether in the North or South of Italy, will be concentrated in as few depots as possible.

(ix) Airfield Flying Training will not be permitted, but refresher flying training may be carried out at the discretion of the A.P.S.C.

(x) Ground Courses for Technicians and Flying Personnel. Administrative and disciplinary training of personnel in the I.A.P. especially those in the fighter squadrons, should be started, not only to improve the individual standard, but to keep them occupied. Likewise it is desirable that engine handling courses be started in order that the most economical use is made of petrol and oil. Similarly Flying Control courses should be started in order to raise the standard of aircraft safety and discipline. All these courses are to be organized and administered by the Italian Air Force without the material assistance of the Allies in personnel, but the A.P.S.C. will advise the Italian Air Ministry.

(xi) On matters of personnel, organization and administration, the Air Forces Sub-Commission will continue to advise the Italian Air Ministry, and will also supervise the Italian Air Force to ensure that the interim policy is complied with. The A.P.S.C. will also ensure the Italian Air Force, as far as is practicable, to ensure a high standard of maintenance and aircraft safety.

(xii) Runways and airfields to be used or maintained. When an airfield is derelict by the Allies, it will normally be turned over to

2072

(x) General Courses for Personnel and Flying Personnel

Administrative and disciplinary training of personnel in the I.A.F. especially those in the fighter squadrons, should be started, not only to improve the individual standard, but to keep them occupied. Likewise it is desirable that engine handling courses be started in order that the most economical use is made of petrol and oil. Similarly Flying Control courses should be started in order to raise the standard of aircraft safety and discipline. All these courses are to be organized and administered by the Italian Air Force without the material assistance of the Allies in personnel, but the A.P.S.C. will advise the Italian Air Ministry.

(xi) On matters of personnel, organization and administration, the Air Forces Sub-Committee will continue to advise the Italian Air Ministry, and will also supervise the Italian Air Force to ensure that the interim policy is complied with. The A.P.S.C. will also assist the Italian Air Force, so far as is practicable, to ensure a high standard of maintenance and aircraft safety.

(xii) Engines and airfields to be used or maintained When an airfield is decontaminated by the Allies, it will normally be turned over to agricultural purposes, unless required specifically for use by the Italian Air Force; such airfields will be considered on its individual merits and instructions issued accordingly.

(xiii) Surplus personnel within the stipulated ceiling (now 51,000) and not essential to the maintenance of the I.A.F. are to be declared to the A.P.S.C. in order that they may work directly under the Allies in ^{overseas} and so help in the war against Japan.

It is the intention that the Italian Air Force shall be self-sustaining in every way, except perhaps in the supply of new aircraft, but each

in Petrol & Oil. 6

785017

(x) Ground Courses for Personnel and Flying Personnel

Administrative and disciplinary training of personnel in the L.A.P., especially those in the flight squadrons, should be started, not only to improve the individual standard, but to keep them occupied. Likewise it is desirable that engine handling courses be started in order that the most economical use is made of petrol and oil. Similarly Flying Control courses should be started in order to raise the standard of aircraft safety and discipline. All these courses are to be organized and administered by the Italian Air Force without the material assistance of the Allies in personnel, but the A.F.S.C. will advise the Italian Air Ministry.

(xi) On matters of personnel, administration and administration, the Air Forces Sub-Commission will continue to advise the Italian Air Ministry, and will also supervise the Italian Air Force to ensure that the interior policy is complied with. The A.F.S.C. will also assist the Italian Air Force, so far as is practicable, to ensure a high standard of maintenance and aircraft safety.

(xii) Personnel and aircraft to be used or maintained. When an aircraft is declassified by the Allies, it will normally be turned over to agricultural purposes, unless required specifically for use by the Italian Air Force; each aircraft will be considered on its individual merits and instructions issued accordingly.

(xiii) Personnel personnel within the stipulated ceiling (now 34,000) and not committed to the maintenance of the L.A.P., are to be declared to the A.F.S.C. in order that they may work directly under the Allies in Italy and possibly overseas and so help in the war against Japan.

It is the intention that the Italian Air Force shall be self-supporting in every way, except perhaps in the supply of new aircraft, but each

is T2 vol 6 O.I. 6

66
 Branch will be reviewed by the Allied authorities, in order that International standards may be attained, and that the provisions of the interim policy be complied with; this includes aircraft maintenance, signals organization and meteorological organization.

(ii) No policy as regards the future of the Italian Air Force, nor of Civil Aviation, nor the supply of replacement aircraft can, at this time, be given, but as soon as possible the decisions of the High Allied Authorities will be communicated to the Italian Government. A decision concerning future intakes at the I.A.F. Cadet College will be communicated later.

5. It must be clearly understood that there is no intention, nor likelihood, of the strength of the Italian Air Force being in any way increased, and it is reiterated that the above stated policy is without prejudice to the peace terms.

PART II - INFORMATION ARISING FROM THE INTERIM POLICY STATED ABOVE.

6. In order that the policy stated above may be most efficiently and quickly effected, it is requested that you will inform the Director of the A.F.S.C. as soon as you are ready to discuss the various implications. In order that decisions may best be made, it is proposed that an agenda be prepared before the conference, and that you will notify the A.F.S.C. of any important items which you wish to raise.

7. The following subjects will be discussed, and will form part of the proposed agenda:

(1) Without going much into detail, review of the personnel required in the Italian Air Force to man and guard authorized units, bases, and depots, with special reference to -

Students at the I.A.F. Cadet College will be commensurate later.

5. It must be clearly understood that there is no intention, nor likelihood, of the strength of the Italian Air Force being in any way increased, and it is reiterated that the above stated policy is without prejudice to the same terms.

PART II - EXPLANATIONS ARISING FROM THE IMMEDIATE POLICY STATED ABOVE.

6. In order that the policy stated above may be most efficiently and quickly effected, it is requested that you will inform the Director of the A.F.S.C. as soon as you are ready to discuss the various implications. In order that decisions may best be made, it is proposed that an agenda be prepared before the conference, and that you will notify the A.F.S.C. of any important items which you wish to raise.

7. The following subjects will be discussed, and will form part of the proposed agenda:

(1) Without going much into detail, review of the personnel required in the Italian Air Force to man and guard authorized units, bases, and depots, with special reference to -

2571

- (a) ~~reduction~~ of the organization at the Air Ministry down to the S.A.F. level, with a view to bringing about greater efficiency through cutting down all redundant branches and functions; for example, closing down of United Aeronautics and reassigning some of their duties to the Air Ministry and others to the S.A.F.;
- (b) formation of a Council at the Air Ministry with a view to co-ordinating the work of the various branches of the Air Ministry;
- (c) the retirement of surplus Senior Officers; disposal of surplus personnel who wish to return to civilian life; disposal of air garrars

and their training as flight engineers wireless operators.

(11) Review of personnel, and in particular specialists, with a view to forming companies to work for the Allied Air Forces in the Mediterranean theatre, as it would seem that the strength of the Italian Air Force is larger than required for the commitments above. The basic figure to be taken in this review is the authorized ceiling of 34,000.

(12) Closing down of REPAIRS C.F.U., as it seems unnecessary any longer to train any more aircrews for Allied type aircraft, there probably being sufficient already trained, and the likelihood of the Allied type aircraft diminishing in numbers through wastage. But there may be a necessity to add increased training facilities on operational type aircraft, and if so this might be best done in the Flying Refresher School at present situated at LIVERPOOL but moving to LEXON. Consideration should be given to the desirability (if any) of converting some pilots now in Fighter Units to the Air Transport Courier role.

(13) Formation of an Air Stores Park in which to place reserve aircraft. With the commitments announced in the interim policy, it would seem that it would be profitable to withdraw a number of aircraft from squadrons and place them in properly organized maintenance units, such as an Air Stores Park.

(14) Closing down of all redundant workshops and airfields with a view to economising in personnel, except where it is essential to retain a guard to some buildings from being damaged by civilians. In this connection it may be considered to lease any such buildings to civilians or civilian firms.

(15) Although it is a matter for decision by the Italian Government, salaries and pay of Italian Air Force personnel. Without reasonably good pay an efficient force cannot be expected; a small efficient force is of greater national value than a larger underpaid one.

redundant already trained, and the likelihood of the Allied type aircraft diminishing in numbers through wastage. But there may be a necessity to add increased training facilities on operational type aircraft, and if so this might be best done in the Flying Refresher School at present situated at LUXEMBOURG but moving to LUXEMBOURG. Consideration should be given to the desirability (if any) of converting some pilots now in Fighter Units to the Air Transport Carrier role.

(iv) Formation of an Air Stores Park in which to place reserve aircraft. With the commitments announced in the interim policy, it would seem that it would be profitable to withdraw a number of aircraft from squadrons and place them in properly organized maintenance units, such as an Air Stores Park.

(v) Closing down of all redundant workshops and airfields with a view to economizing in personnel, except where it is essential to retain a guard to save buildings from being damaged by civilians. In this connection it may be considered to lease any such buildings to civilians or civilian firms.

(vi) Although it is a matter for decision by the Italian Government, salaries and pay of Italian Air Force personnel. Without reasonably good pay an efficient force cannot be expected; a small efficient force is of greater national value than a larger underpaid one.

(vii) Discuss advantages and disadvantages of enlistment on a voluntary, as opposed to, a conscription basis.

Air Forces Sub-Committee,
Allied Commission, Rome.
Date: 9th July, 1945.
Ref: AFSC/45/AFR.

785017

64

WES/hjp

8501/63/23

19 April 1945

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

In my letter CC 8503 of 8 March 1945 I informed you that I was passing on to the Allied military authorities your plea against the reduction of the Italian Air Forces.

I am glad to be able to tell you that I have just heard that a decision has been taken whereby the reduction is substantially modified. Details will of course be transmitted to the Air Ministry by the Air Forces Sub-Commission and I feel sure that they will prove satisfactory to your Government.

Very truly yours,

To/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Seen by Maj Stone

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi
President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
Rome

cc: Base Comm'r
Air Forces S/O
CC Files

By Nundus 23/4
H2564
H2564

(DISPATCHED 20/4/45

20/4
H2564
H2564

DRAFT.

FOR SIGNATURE OF CHIEF COMMISSIONER.

My dear Mr. Prime Minister,

Further to my letter CC.8503 of 8th March 1945, I have now received a reply to your plea against the reduction of the Italian Air Force, from Allied Force Headquarters.

2. You will realize that, at the present time, no discussions can be entered into with regard to the size of the post-war Italian Air Force. For the remainder of the war in Europe the Air Force must be organized so that, having regard to the limited availability of Allied aircraft and equipment, it is best able to make an effective contribution to the prosecution of the war against Germany.

3. In order to do this it must be organized into a small and efficient force, and no elements must be left in it which do not contribute directly to our war effort against the enemy. Nor must there be any waste of Allied or Italian equipment, material or manpower to any other end. In the view of Allied Force Headquarters this end will best be achieved by following the directive given by the Air Commander-in-Chief, which has been transmitted to your Ministry for this.

Newen sent

2068

785017

SECRETALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Chief of Staff**Confidential**

31 March 1945.

APR 2 1945

SUBJECT: Reduction of the Italian Air Force.


TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission.

1. Reference is made to your memorandum 8501/54/20 dated 10 March 1945, in which you request directions as to the reply to be made to Signor Bonomi's letter on the subject of the reduction of the Italian Air Force.

2. As you will be aware, HQ MAAF have now replied direct to the Air Force Sub-Commission in regard to the technical points raised by the Italian Air Force Authorities.

3. It is, therefore, felt that your reply to Signor Bonomi should take the line that no discussions can at present be entered into with regard to the size of the post-war Italian Air Force. In the meantime that force must be organized so that, having regard to the limited availability of Allied aircraft and equipment, it is best able to make an effective contribution to the prosecution of the war against Germany. This end will be achieved by reorganizing it into a small efficient force, as the Air Commander-in-Chief has directed.

By command of Field Marshal ALEXANDER:

W. D. MOROAN
Lieutenant General,
Chief of Staff.

(But see)

2567

1 apart held

SECRET

3341

785017

APR 2 1945

FROM: 1 FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, 850
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: ADMIRAL HILARY W. STONE,
CHIEF COMMISSIONER,
HEAD-QUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION,
ROME.

DATE: 2ND APRIL, 1945.

REF: AFSC/23/AIR.

SECRET.

APR 2 1945

You will remember that I passed you copies of the correspondence with reference to the reduction of the Italian Air Force under the reference number AFSC/23/AIR, my last letter to you being dated the 8th March.

2. At long last I have received a reply from H.Q. M.A.A.F., a copy of which is attached to this letter.

3. On the 21st March I visited M.A.A.F., and had a conversation with the A.O.C-in-C and the Chief of Staff about this question, and they led me to suppose that the storage of the obsolescent aircraft would be agreed to. As you will see from paragraph 3 (ii) of the M.A.A.F. letter, this is not the case. Unfortunately I had had a conversation with Mr. Macmillan just before my visit to Caserta and on my return I sent him a note which gave him to understand that I was more-or-less satisfied with what I had got out of them.

4. This is very far from being the case. The decisions in paragraph 3 (i), (iii) and (iv) do not cause me any uneasiness, but I am still very strongly opposed to the destruction of the obsolescent aircraft.

5. I feel that this decision at such a late stage in the war leaves us open to a charge of breach of faith. We have always told the Italians that whatever they did to help us would count in their favour. My view is that according to their lights the Italian Air Force has put up a very good show, and to have this bitter blow aimed at them at the eleventh hour is carrying things too far.

6. It may well be that it is our policy to leave them without any aircraft at all, but I feel that this is a decision which can never be taken except at the Peace Conference table. If, however, this decision has been arrived at, I think we should be honest about it and come into the open and tell them so.

7. I gather that you will be receiving some very strong arguments from the Prime Minister, and the matter has certainly now reached a stage at which I am powerless, and it will have to be carried on at a higher level.

Confidential

COPY.

From: Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, C.M.F.

To: Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, Rome.

Date: 28th March, 1945.

Ref: MAAP/4200/ALM.

CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET

1. Reference is made to your letter AFSC/23/AIR dated 8th March, 1945, together with the letters of the Italian Minister for Air and the Italian Chief of the Air Staff. The C-in-C has given full consideration to the views expressed in your letter and has asked me to inform you that he fully realises, and appreciates, that your task in keeping up the morale of the Italian Air Force, and in attempting to satisfy the aspirations of General Aimeone Cat is both a difficult and delicate one.
2. It is felt that the burden of the complaint of the Italian Air Force Authorities is one which would naturally arise from existing conditions. As you are aware there is no policy for the provision of a post-war Italian Air Force, and meanwhile, Italy is allowed such an Air Force as will make as effective a contribution to the war effort as possible.
3. However, you will agree that existing difficulties in supply of aircraft and equipment, together with deficiencies of trained personnel ready to take their place in operational units, makes it difficult at this stage of the war, fully to meet the requests enumerated in your letter. We have gone as far as we possibly can, and the decisions on these are as follows:-

(i) Para 12 (a).

There is no objection to the number plates of the Macchi Squadrons being retained at the training centre or centres to which those aircraft are withdrawn, provided that the minimum manpower is absorbed in the maintenance of the aircraft.

(ii) Para 12 (b).

The storage of obsolescent aircraft cannot be agreed to, as the rate of deterioration would be too rapid without proper maintenance. These aircraft must therefore be reduced to produce.

(iii) Para 15 (a).

It is not possible to provide Spitfire Vs for the re-equipment of Italian Squadrons as there are prior claims on any such aircraft that may be thrown up in the future.

(iv) Para 15 (b).

A Conference is being held today at Headquarters, Balkan Air Force

Italian Air Force, and in attempting to satisfy the aspirations of General Almonso Cat is both a difficult and delicate one.

2. It is felt that the burden of the complaint of the Italian Air Force Authorities is one which would naturally arise from existing conditions. As you are aware there is no policy for the provision of a post-war Italian Air Force, and meanwhile, Italy is allowed such an Air Force as will make an effective contribution to the war effort as possible.

3. However, you will agree that existing difficulties in supply of aircraft and equipment, together with deficiencies of trained personnel ready to take their place in operational units, makes it difficult at this stage of the war, fully to meet the requests enumerated in your letter. We have gone as far as we possibly can, and the decisions on these are as follows:-

(I) Para 12 (a).

There is no objection to the number planes of the Macchi Squadrons being retained at the training centre or centres to which those aircraft are withdrawn, provided that the minimum manpower is absorbed in the maintenance of the aircraft.

(ii) Para 12 (b).

The storage of obsolescent aircraft cannot be agreed to, as the rate of deterioration would be too rapid without proper maintenance. These aircraft must therefore be reduced to produce.

(iii) Para 15 (a).

It is not possible to provide Spitfire Vs for the re-equipment of Italian Squadrons as there are prior claims on any such aircraft that may be thrown up in the future.

(iv) Para 15 (b).

A Conference is being held today at Headquarters, Balkan Air Force to discuss the re-arming of No. 9 Squadron. Under the recommendations of this conference have been submitted to the C-in-C for his consideration, no ruling can be laid down at this stage.

(Sgt) P.J. Fogarty,
Air Vice-Marshal,
Air Officer i/c Administration,
Mediterranean Allied Air
Forces.

Copy to:-
A.O.A. - C-in-C/RAF, MEUSE.
A.P.H.Q. (S.G.S.).

785017

SECRET

Confidential (57)

Ref: 3508/34/20.

10 March 1945.

Subject: Reduction of the Italian Air Force.

To: Allied Forces Headquarters, 120 512
(Attention: Chief of Staff)

1. There are forwarded herewith the following documents received today from Prime Minister Bonomi:

- a. Letter from Sig. Bonomi to Admiral Stone, dated 8 March 1945.
- b. Letter from Minister for Air to Prime Minister Bonomi, Ref. 1638, 6 March 1945.
- c. Letter from Italian Chief of the Air Staff to Air Vice Marshal Bowen Fuscolet, ref. 910542/34/5, 6 March 1945.

There is also forwarded a copy of Air Vice Marshal Bowen Fuscolet's letter to Headquarters containing his own views and recommendations.

2. Instructions on which to base a reply to Sig. Bonomi's letter are requested.

3. Receipt of the Prime Minister's letter has been acknowledged with the statement that the matter has been referred to higher authorities.

57 M. S. LUSH

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

4. Incls:
as in para. 1 above.

see index 58

236
Lush
DU
15/3

785017

DRAFT

March 1945

SUBJECT: Reduction of the Italian Air Force

TO : Allied Force Headquarters, APO 512
(Attention: Chief of Staff)

1. There is forwarded herewith the following documents received today from Prime Minister Bonomi:

a. Letter from Sig. Bonomi to Admiral Stone, dated 8 March 1945.

b. Letter from Minister for Air to Prime Minister Bonomi, Ref. 163R, 6 March 1945.

c. Letter from Italian Chief of the Air Staff to Air Vice Marshal Bowen Buscarlet, Ref. 010649/3g/U, 6 March 1945.

There is also forwarded a copy of Air Vice Marshal Bowen Buscarlet's letter to Headquarters HAAF containing his own summing up and recommendations.

2. ~~It is requested that I be given~~ Instructions on which to base a reply to Sig. Bonomi's letter, *as requested.*

3. Receipt of the Prime Minister's letter has been acknowledged with the statement that the matter has been referred to higher authorities.

4 Incls:
as in para 1 above

TWL
ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief Commissioner
LusL
2562

785017

52

JAW/nd

CG 8503

8 March 1945

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have received your letter of today's date.

I shall pass on your plea against the reduction of the Italian Air Forces to the Allied military authorities, and I will inform you of their reply as soon as I receive it.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi
President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
Rome

cc: Executive Commissioner —
Air Forces Sub-Commission
Chief Commissioner's Files

See 64 2560

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: HEADQUARTERS,
M.A.A.F. C.M.F.

COPY: CHIEF COMMISSIONER, H.Q. ALLIED COMMISSION.

DATE: 6TH MARCH, 1945.

REF: AFSC/23/AIR.

50

See 57 23 Confidential

With reference to this Sub-Commission's letter AFSC/23/AIR of the 27th February, 1945, addressed to General Aimeo Cat, Chief of Italian Air Staff, copies of which were forwarded to your Headquarters, and to the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.

2. A reply from General Aimeo Cat has now been received, and a literal translation of this is attached as Appendix "A" to this letter. The General's letter is written in the usual flowery Italian manner, and I feel that I should attempt to put the Italian point of view to you as clearly as possible, as I see it. Through my constant contact with them I feel that I appreciate their angle, and can explain it in English better than any translation of an Italian letter can do.

3. They know they have lost the war and at the time of the Armistice they would have had no complaint if the Allies had insisted on complete disarmament of the I.A.F. Since, however, the Allies have allowed them to share in the fight against Germany, even if only as co-belligerents, they feel that they are entitled to some recognition. They point out, and no one can deny them this, that they have almost achieved miracles in the reconstruction of their aircraft from salvage and by improvisation, and they feel that this too must be taken into consideration. They point out that what they have done has been achieved in face of inadequate food and pay, and poor clothing and accommodation.

4. The tangible recognition which they want is:-

(a) To be allowed to fight on the Italian front

and (b) To have further Allied types given to them to replace their own worn out aircraft.

5. With the typical Italian inability to take a practical point of view, they pay no consideration to the facts as given by Sir John Slessor to General Aimeo Cat, and repeated to him and other I.A.F. officers by me on many occasions: that the Macchi is no longer an operational type, that airfields to accommodate them on the Italian front do not exist, and that we simply have no Allied types of aircraft with which to re-equip them. The General's reference in paragraph 3 of his letter to the "meeting held at LXXX" is a typical example of his point of view. The meeting was, in fact, a chance conversation which occurred during one of my visits of inspection to the operational units. It took place in the office of the Italian Officer Commanding the Bomber/Transport Wing. The Italian themselves had national

2. A reply from General Aime Cat has now been received, and a literal translation of this is attached as Appendix "A" to this letter. The General's letter is written in the usual flowery Italian manner, and I feel that I should attempt to put the Italian point of view to you as clearly as possible, as I see it. Through my constant contact with them I feel that I appreciate their angle, and can explain it in English better than any translation of an Italian letter can do.
3. They know they have lost the war and at the time of the Armistice they would have had no complaint if the Allies had insisted on complete disarmament of the I.A.F. Since, however, the Allies have allowed them to share in the fight against Germany, even if only as co-belligerents, they feel that they are entitled to some recognition. They point out, and no one can deny them this, that they have almost achieved miracles in the reconstruction of their aircraft from salvage and by improvisation, and they feel that this too must be taken into consideration. They point out that what they have done has been achieved in face of inadequate food and pay, and poor clothing and accommodation.
4. The tangible recognition which they want is:-
 - (a) To be allowed to fight on the Italian front
 - (b) To have further Allied types given to them to replace their own worn out aircraft.
5. With the typical Italian inability to take a practical point of view, they pay no consideration to the facts as given by Sir John Slessor to General Aime Cat, and repeated to him and other I.A.F. officers by me on many occasions: that the Macchi is no longer an operational type, that airfields to accommodate them on the Italian front do not exist, and that we simply have no Allied types of aircraft with which to re-equip them. The General's reference in paragraph 3 of his letter to the "meeting held at LEONE" is a typical example of his point of view. The meeting was, in fact, a chance conversation which occurred during one of my visits of inspection to the operational units. It took place in the office of the Italian Officer Commanding the Bomber/Transport Wing. The Italians themselves had noticed the re-armament of No. 205 Group, and inferred that Wellington aircraft would be thrown up. There was some discussion as to how quickly Italian crews could become operational on Wellingtons, and D.C.3's were also mentioned. I was at some pains to point out that any type of aircraft which could be absorbed by G.I.I.'s would be very unlikely to become available, and that the Wellington was a type particularly suited to the G.I.I.'s. This seems to have been construed into some sort of promise that the I.A.F. would be given Wellingtons.
6. I feel that it will with difficulty be possible to explain to the Italian pilots that we cannot let them fight on the Italian front, and that further re-armament with Allied types, is literally impossible. I believe that this could be put over without causing any considerable loss of morale. I would, however, call particular attention to a belief which was, at one time, current in the Italian Air Force, and is now current again. This is that, having promised Italy that whatever she can do in aid of the Allies

259

-2-

will count in her favour at the Peace Conference the Allies are deliberately restricting a line of aircraft and materials, so as to keep the Italian effort down to a minimum. This rumour started at the time when difficulties as regards the supply of ground equipment and spares slowed down the re-armament with Airacobras and Bantams. It has now resurrected itself over our most recent proposals.

6. Having realised that there can be no question of fighting on the Italian Front, and no question of any further re-arming with Allied types, the I.A.F. is asked to survive the double blow of the relegation of the Macchis to training, and the breaking up of their surplus and obsolete aircraft which cannot be devoted to the immediate war effort.

7. Logically there can be no case for the retention of either the Macchis or the obsolete aircraft, if the furtherance of the war against Germany is the only consideration. The Macchis are no longer a first line aircraft, and the obsolete aircraft are far beyond economical maintenance. The Italian pilot, however, cannot see it from this point of view, and, having done his best according to his lights, now finds the greater part of what little remains of his Air Force being irrevocably taken away from him. This may be difficult to understand from our point of view, but it must be appreciated that Italians have a totally different mental outlook, and place a far greater value on sentiment. Added to this I know that they feel that they are being unfairly treated.

8. General Almondo Cat feels that the morale of the I.A.F. will be unable to survive these blows, and that nothing that he can do can avert a complete collapse. This would, very naturally, have serious political repercussions, and the matter has now been raised to the political plane, by a letter from the Air Minister to the President of the Council of Ministers (M.E. BONCHI), a translation of which is attached.

9. I do not feel that the General is exaggerating unduly when he warns us of a probable collapse of the I.A.F. The aircrews are exceedingly temperamental, and as stated above are highly sensitive to real or imaginary loss of prestige. Added to this is the fact that our instructions must inevitably mean the retirement of a number of pilots, if not of other aircrews.

10. The General himself has expressed his feelings to me by saying that he cannot see why even the risk of the collapse of the I.A.F. should be taken at this stage, when, we all hope, there are only a few more months of war in Europe left.

11. Except for the suggestion to store the obsolete aircraft, made in paragraph 6 of the General's letter, he has nothing to propose of a constructive nature. I have, however, had several discussions with him, and the following represents his line of thought.

12. (a) Instead of simply relegating the Macchis to training, could they not retain their entity as squadrons and be used as a pool from which to draw pilots to replace casualties and tired pilots in the first line squadrons. The manpower absorbed to maintain them would be little in excess of that needed to maintain them as training aircraft in the C.F.U. The pool could be located at the C.F.U.

785017

pilot, however, cannot see it from this point of view, and, having done his best according to his lights, now finds the greater part of what little remains of his Air Force being irrevocably taken away from him. This may be difficult to understand from our point of view, but it must be appreciated that Italians have a totally different mental outlook, and place a far greater value on sentiment. Added to this I know that they feel that they are being unfairly treated.

8. General Almon Oat feels that the morale of the I.A.F. will be unable to survive these blows, and that nothing that he can do can avert a complete collapse. This would, very naturally, have serious political repercussions, and the matter has now been raised to the political plane, by a letter from the Air Minister to the President of the Council of Ministers (M.E. BONCHI), a translation of which is attached.

9. I do not feel that the General is exaggerating unduly when he warns us of a probable collapse of the I.A.F. The aircrews are exceedingly temperamental, and as stated above are highly sensitive to real or imaginary loss of prestige. Added to this is the fact that our instructions must inevitably mean the retirement of a number of pilots, if not of other aircrew.

10. The General himself has expressed his feelings to us by saying that he cannot see why even the risk of the collapse of the I.A.F. should be taken at this stage, when, we all hope, there are only a few more months of war in Europe left.

11. Except for the suggestion to store the obsolete aircraft, made in paragraph 6 of the General's letter, he has nothing to propose of a constructive nature. I have, however, had several discussions with him, and the following represents his line of thought.

12. (a) Instead of simply relegating the Macchis to training, could they not retain their entity as squadrons and be used as a pool from which to draw pilots to replace casualties and tired pilots in the first line squadrons. The manpower absorbed to maintain them would be little in excess of that needed to maintain them as training aircraft in the O.T.U. The pool could be located at the O.T.U.

(b) That the varied and obsolete aircraft, of no use to the immediate war effort, should be stored until the end of the war. They will thus have something to fall back on when the war is over.

13. I should like to recommend that we agree to the proposals at 12 (a) and (b) above. As regards (b) the material saved by the reduction of the aircraft to produce would be of practically no value to the war effort. I consider that we should, however, insist on the reduction to produce for spares of all aircraft of types which we are to retain in service and which are beyond economical repair. I suggest that the remaining obsolete aircraft should be inhibited and stored. As regards place of storage I suggest PALARA, which is adequate in size and of little agricultural value. It is, moreover, well out of the way, there are no Italian units in the neighbourhood, and a small guard would suffice to safeguard them from pilferage. Several I.A.F. units are in

Continued /3....

-3-

the immediate vicinity and it would be easy to ensure that no clandestine work or flying took place on these aircraft.

14. I consider that this represents the minimum possible concessions that we can make to avert a probable collapse. The position would be made far more secure if we could grant some further small concessions.

15. I would therefore suggest that consideration be given to the following:-

(a) No. 9 Squadron is in complete existence, with all its pilots and maintenance personnel. Airfield space for it exists at MUOVA. Would it be possible:-

(1) To re-equip it with some obsolete mark of Spitfire, or if that is not possible

(11) To allow it to come into the line. The war being at the stage it is, I feel that our resources of Airacobras should suffice to see three squadrons through to the end.

(b) That we consider the re-arming of the dying Cant 1007 squadron with Baltimore. The Baltimore Wing has, I submit, proved its worth, and the Cant 1007 crews are all fully operational and very experienced. I believe that there is a large number of Baltimores in reserve, for which there are few operational commitments. The drawback of this proposal is that the airfield at FROBISHER, which would be required for training the squadron is not yet fit for flying. The granting of this concession might well have the effect of speeding up the work at FROBISHER, as well as being a real tonic to morale.

16. As the General states in paragraph 2 of his letter, he is perfectly in accord with our wish to transform the I.A.F. into a small and efficient Air Force, and during recent transactions he has shown practically that he is sincere in this. It is not felt that our agreement to any of the proposals set out in paragraphs 12 and 14 above would be contrary to the aim of a small efficient Force.

W. A. B. B. B. B. B.

W. A. B. B. B. B. B.
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

(1) To re-equip it with some obsolete mark of Spitfire, or if that is not possible

(ii) To allow it to come into the line. The war being at the stage it is, I feel that our resources of Airacobras should suffice to see three squadrons through to the end.

(b) That we consider the re-arming of the dying Cant 1007 squadron with Baltimore. The Baltimore Wing has, I submit, proved its worth, and the Cant 1007 crews are all fully operational and very experienced. I believe that there is a large number of Baltimores in reserve, for which there are few operational commitments. The drawback of this proposal is that the Airfield at FROBISHER, which would be required for training the squadron is not yet fit for flying. The granting of this concession might well have the effect of speeding up the work at FROBISHER, as well as being a real tonic to morale.

16. As the General states in paragraph 2 of his letter, he is perfectly in accord with our wish to transform the I.A.F. into a small and efficient Air Force, and during recent transactions he has shown practically that he is sincere in this. It is not felt that our agreement to any of the proposals set out in paragraphs 12 and 14, above would be contrary to the aim of a small efficient force.

W.A.B. Bunsell

W.A.B. BUNSELL,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

2057

TO THE PRESIDENT
OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

8 March 1945

MAR 8 1945

Dear Admiral,

The events of the last few days have prevented me from talking to you about a matter of high importance.

It is the question of the menaced reduction of the Italian Air Force, which has already been very much reduced. Should this menace come true, not only this would mean a moral blow for the Air Force troops, but also a humiliation for the Italian spirit, which loves its Air Force and is confident in its contribution to the war that is being fought.

I appeal to your friendship asking you to bring the enclosed reports to the attention of Allied Authorities. They contain a clear explanation of the reasons that advise, rather, an increase of the Italian Air Force.

Yours,

signed Ivanoe Bonomi.

transl. CC's LO

2556

Il Presidente
del Consiglio dei Ministri

8 marzo 1945

(46)

Caro Ammiraglio,

Gli avvenimenti
di questi giorni mi hanno im-
pedito di parlarle di un
argomento di alta importanza.

Le trattative della minaccia
di diminuire l'aviazione
italiana, già fortemente
ridotta. Se la minaccia si
verificasse non solo si pro-
durrebbe un colosso morale

negli aviatori, ma si morti;
liberere ancora lo spirito
italiano che ama la sua 45
aviazione e confida nel suo
apporto alle guerre che si
combette.

Io faccio appello alla sua
amicizia perche voglia portare
a conoscenza della Commissione
Alata questi rapporti che le
miro e dove sono chiaramente
sinteggiate le ragioni che
consigliano invece di incre-
mentare l'aviazione italiana.

Cordialmente

2551
Franco Bonomi

*Ministero delle Corporazioni*IL SEGRETARIO PARTICOLARE
DI S. E. IL MINISTRO

44

Major Quayle

Here are the translations of
Aimone Cato and Bonomi's letters.
The former has been translated
literally only & we have not yet
had time to put it into plain
English! However I think it will serve.

If I may suggest it - I shall be
sending the C.C. a copy of my covering
letter to MAAF, forwarding the two
letters, and it might be a good thing
if he sent a copy of this to AFHQ 2553
along with the letters. B.B.

TRANSLATION.

FROM: M.L. DOCTOR L. CASPAROTTO,
MIR FOR AIR.

TO: M.L. IVANOV BOMEL,
PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS.

REF NO: 16ER.

DATE: 6TH MARCH 1945.

My dear President,

I enclose herewith a copy of a letter that the Chief of Italian Air Staff has today forwarded to the Air Vice-Marshal in reply to a grave communication received from him.

From the document in question it is seen that, in accordance with orders given to the A.V-M, and submitted by him to the Chief of Air Staff, the Italian Air Force is to be reduced so that it will be comprised of 124 Italian aircraft (fighters, light bombers and transport) and 80 (or perhaps 122) Allied aircraft, and even these without any assurance that they will be used in combat.

Now I believe that our Air Force cannot stand this fierce blow, that blow would not only constitute a notable diminution to the contribution which Italy is prepared to make for the common cause, but it would mean that the pilots would be continuing to fight without any hope of the Italian Air Force surviving the war. The pilots, although they may be revolted by the thought that they are bombing Italian territory and cities, are proud and happy to attack on any soil, and preferably on Italian, German troops in combat or in retreat. But if the fighters are reduced to a minimum, what outlet can our pilots' ardent desire to fight have?

During my recent visit to the units in AGLIA, living in close contact with them I learned that they ask for nothing more than to fight and to fight as audaciously and fiercely as possible, no matter what the risk, in the belief that their efforts will be recognized, and that they and Italy will be assured of a place, even though a modest one, in a future Air Force. Consequently, this problem passes from the technical plans to the political one, and it is necessary that the voices of our Government go out and reaches the high authorities who are able to take definite decisions.

Apart from the aforementioned reasons of a military character, it is unnecessary for me to point out to you the grave repercussions which this unexpected blow to our Air Force would have on the public opinion of our country. Not only would the authority of our Government be diminished, but the dignity of the country would be struck, and the faithful trust which it has in the United Nations would be diminished. I call your particular attention to this point.

You know better than I do that Italy is united in its sympathy for the great British Nation to whom it owes gratitude for the stand which it

From the document in question it is seen that, in accordance with orders given to the A.V.M., and submitted by him to the Chief of Air Staff, the Italian Air Force is to be reduced so that it will be comprised of 121 Italian aircraft (fighters, light bombers and transport) and 89 (or perhaps 122) Allied aircraft, and even these without any assurance that they will be used in combat.

Now I believe that our Air Force cannot stand this fierce blow, that blow would not only constitute a notable diminution to the contribution which Italy is prepared to make for the common cause, but it would mean that the pilots would be continuing to fight without any hope of the Italian Air Force surviving the war. The pilots, although they may be revolted by the thought that they are bombing Italian territory and cities, are proud and happy to attack an enemy, and preferably an Italian, German troops in combat or in retreat. But if the fighters are reduced to a minimum, what outlet can our pilots ardent desire to fight have?

During my recent visit to the units in RUSSIA, living in close contact with them I learned that they ask for nothing more than to fight and to fight us undauntedly and fiercely as possible, no matter what the risk, in the belief that their efforts will be recognized, and that they and Italy will be assured of a place, even though a modest one, in a future Air Force. Consequently, this problem passes from the technical plane to the political one, and it is necessary that the voice of our Government goes out and reaches the high authorities who are able to take definite decisions.

Apart from the aforementioned reasons of a military character, it is unnecessary for me to point out to you the grave repercussions which this unexpected blow to our Air Force would have on the public opinion of our country. Not only would the authority of our Government be diminished, but the dignity of the country would be struck, and the faithful trust which it has in the United Nations would be diminished. I call your particular attention to this point.

You know better than I do that Italy is united in its sympathy for the great British Nation to whom it owes gratitude for the stand which it took during the risorgimento, and for the help received during the war of 1915/1918. Italy has borne the Allies devastating bombardments without protest. I myself in August 1943 witnessed the destruction of my home and also of a large part of MILAN, and I never heard a voice of resentment; all the hatred of the people was directed only against Mussolini and Hitler. I can only say therefore, that in this moment when victory is in sight you should convey to London the expression of our wish for a recognition which will permit us to participate with renewed war-like spirit in the last phases of the war.

I have placed my re-occupations sincerely in front of you before the demoralising news reaches the country. confident in your immediate intervention.

Believe me,
Yours devotedly,

L. GASPARIOTTO.

P. 2.

-2-

(42)

With reference to the asterisk, I would remind you with what satisfaction we received the news of the statement made by Mr. Churchill in the House of Commons on the 24th May 1944 - "The loyal Italian Air Force has fought as well that I am making special efforts to equal it with modern planes of British make".

RC 14 6.3.45

(141)

Caro Presidente,

ti compiego copia della lettera che il Capo di Stato Maggiore della R.A. ha oggi spedito al V.Maresciallo dell'Aria B. Buscariet, in risposta ad una grave comunicazione da lui ricevuta.

Dal documento rilevasi che, secondo gli ordini dati al V.Maresciallo e da questi trasmessi al nostro Capo di Stato Maggiore, l'Aviazione italiana si ridurrebbe ad avere a sua disposizione soltanto 121 apparecchi italiani (fra caccia, bombardamento leggero e trasporto) e 80 (o forse 122) apparecchi alleati, e anche questo senza che ci sia data la sicurezza circa il mantenimento della linea.

Ora io penso che l'Aviazione nostra non possa sopportare questo fiero colpo che, non solo costituirebbe una diminuzione notevole dello sforzo bellico che l'Italia si prepara a fare a profitto della causa comune, ma costringerebbe gli aviatori a continuare a combattere senza la speranza che l'Arma aerea italiana sopravviva alla guerra. Essi, se possono avere ripugnanza a bombardare città e terre italiane, sono orgogliosi e felici di mitragliare su qualunque suolo, e preferibilmente sul suolo italiano, truppe tedesche in combattimento o in ritirata, ma ridotta al minimo la caccia, quale sfogo può avere il loro ardente desiderio di combattere?

Nella mia recente visita agli equipaggi della Puglia, vivendo a stretto contatto con loro, ho appreso come essi non domandino altro che di battersi, e di battersi più fortemente ed audacemente che sia possibile, a costo di qualsiasi rischio, nella fiducia che i loro sforzi siano riconosciuti e sia assicurata ad essi e all'Italia un

ti compiego copia della lettera che il Capo di Stato Maggiore della R.A. ha oggi spedito al V. Maresciallo dell'Aria B. Buscariet, in risposta ad una grave comunicazione da lui ricevuta.

Dal documento rilevasi che, secondo gli ordini dati al V. Maresciallo e da questi trasmessi al nostro Capo di Stato Maggiore, l'Aviazione italiana si ridurrebbe ad avere a sua disposizione soltanto 121 apparecchi italiani (fra caccia, bombardamento leggero e trasporto) e 80 (o forse 123) apparecchi alleati, e anche questo senza che ci sia data la sicurezza circa il mantenimento della linea.

Ora io penso che l'Aviazione nostra non possa sopportare questo fiero colpo che, non solo costituirebbe una diminuzione notevole dello sforzo bellico che l'Italia si prepara a fare a profitto della causa comune, ma costringerebbe gli aviatori a continuare a combattere senza la speranza che l'Arma aerea italiana sopravviva alla guerra. Essi, se possono avere ripugnanza a bombardare città e terre italiane, sono orgogliosi e felici di mitragliare su qualunque suolo, e preferibilmente sul suolo italiano, truppe tedesche in combattimento o in ritirata, ma ridotta al minimo la caccia, quale sfogo può avere il loro ardente desiderio di combattere?

Nella mia recente visita agli equipaggi della Puglia, vivendo a stretto contatto con loro, ho appreso come essi non domandino altro che di battersi, e di battersi più fortemente ed audacemente che sia possibile, a costo di qualsiasi rischio, nella fiducia che i loro sforzi siano riconosciuti e sia assicurata ad essi e all'Italia un posto, sia pur modesto, nell'Arma aerea futura. Di conseguenza, il problema va trasferito dal campo tecnico a quello politico ed è necessario che la parola del nostro Governo arrivi più lontano presso le Alte Autorità che possono prendere risoluzioni definitive.

: 2 :

40

A parte le ragioni suaccennate di carattere militare, non ho bisogno di farti presente la grave ripercussione che questo inaspettato colpo alla nostra Arma Aerea produrrebbe sulla opinione pubblica del nostro paese, in quanto che non tanto ne resterebbe diminuita l'Autorità del Governo, ma ne resterebbe colpita la dignità del Paese e diminuita l'aspettazione fiduciosa che esso ha nelle Nazioni Unite. Su questo punto richiamo la tua particolare attenzione.

Tu sai meglio di me che l'Italia è tutta concorde nel convergere le sue simpatie sulla grande Nazione Britannica alla quale deve riconoscenza per la parte presa alle vicende del suo Risorgimento e per gli aiuti ricevuti nella guerra del 1915-18; essa ha sopportato bombardamenti devastatori senza protesta; io stesso nell'agosto 1943 ho assistito alla distruzione della mia casa e alla distruzione di una parte della città di MILANO senza che si sia mai levata una voce di risentimento, convergendosi tutti gli odii soltanto contro Mussolini e contro Hitler. Ritengo perciò che nel momento in cui si profila prossima la vittoria, tu possa fare arrivare a Londra la speranza di un trattamento che ci consenta di partecipare con rinnovato spirito bellico alle ultime vicende della guerra.

Ti ho esposto sinceramente le mie preoccupazioni prima che al Paese arrivi la demoralizzante notizia e fido nella tua opera solerte.

Credimi

E. De Gasperi

(*) A questo proposito ricorderai con quanta soddisfazione abbiamo accolto il passo del primo Ministro Churchill al Comuni del 24 maggio 1944: "La reale aviazione italiana ha combattuto così bene che sto facendo sforzi speciali per equipaggiarla con apparecchi perfezionati di fabbricazione britannica".

del nostro paese, in quanto che non tanto ne resterebbe diminuita l'Autorità del Governo, ma ne resterebbe colpita la dignità del Paese e diminuita l'aspettazione fiduciosa che esso ha nelle Nazioni Unite. Su questo punto richiamo la tua particolare attenzione.

Tu sai meglio di me che l'Italia è tutta concorde nel convergere le sue simpatie sulla grande Nazione Britannica alla quale deve riconoscenza per la parte presa alle vicende del suo Risorgimento e per gli aiuti ricevuti nella guerra del 1915-18; essa ha sopportato bombardamenti devastatori senza protesta; lo stesso nell'agosto 1943 ho assistito alla distruzione della mia casa e alla distruzione di una parte della città di MILANO senza che si sia mai levata una voce di risentimento, convergendosi tutti gli odii soltanto contro Mussolini e contro Hitler. Ritengo perciò che nel momento in cui si profila prossima la vittoria, tu possa fare arrivare a Londra la speranza di un trattamento che ci consenta di partecipare con rinnovato spirito bellico alle ultime vicende della guerra.

Ti ho esposto sinceramente le mie preoccupazioni prima che al Paese arrivi la demoralizzante notizia e fido nella tua opera solerte.

Credimi

L. Gasparotto

(*) A questo proposito ricorderai con quanta soddisfazione abbiamo accolto il passo del primo Ministro Churchill ai Comuni del 24 maggio 1944: "La reale aviazione italiana ha conquistato così bene che sto facendo sforzi speciali per equipaggiarla con apparecchi perfezionati da fabbricazione britannica".

A S.E.

Ivanoe BONOMI

Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri

ROMA

2050

TRANSLATION.

TO: H.E. GENERAL M. AIRBORNE CMT,
CHIEF AIR STAFF,
ITALIAN AIR MINISTRY, ROME.

FROM: AIR VICE-MARSHAL W.A.S. NORMAN-MACDONALD,
AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

REF: OM642/sg/t.

DATE: 6TH MARCH, 1945.

Dear Air Vice-Marshal,

1. I have delayed my reply to your letter reference AFSC/23/AIR of the 27th February 1945 for the following reasons:

(a) The gravity of the consequences of the orders you have communicated to me by the instructions of the Commander-in-Chief W.A.S. are such as to necessitate such serious reflection concerning the opportunity and the manner of transmitting these orders to the dependent organizations, and they compel me to examine carefully my own position of responsibility as regards the actual situation of the Force which seems now to have become unsatisfactory and irreparable, and the future situation which appears to be irretrievably compromised.

(b) The immediacy with which it is requested that all the orders be carried out cannot be realized because of a complexity of reasons which must be within the cognizance of W.A.S. and yourself and which are derived from the living conditions and functions of the Force and the actual situation in the country, already several times pointed out by me both verbally and in writing.

On the other hand a brief delay will have no influence on the activities of the combat units and will not influence, for the moment, their efficiency, while a hasty or useless stop could lead to grave consequences for which I do not wish at any cost to assume the responsibility.

I consider therefore that it is indispensable that I frankly lay before you my thoughts on the subject before taking steps to execute the more drastic part of the orders which have reached me, whilst I will certainly put into process of execution the part which concerns the establishment and control of the personnel.

2. I am perfectly in agreement with the C-in-C of W.A.S. and with yourself when you say it is necessary to organize our Air Force in a small but efficient Force that is capable of assisting the Allied Forces in their defeat of the Germans, but I consider that you must agree with us on the injustice and impossibility of forcing the men to fight in order to rout and defeat the enemy, for them to finish up without any of the fruits of victory, no matter how limited and modest there may be. And this is to be our case, since, when the fourteen coming 12 months of fighting against Germany are at an end the Italian Air Force is to be reduced to 80 Allied aircraft for combat, perhaps 22 Allied aircraft for training, and 12 Italian aircraft, demolishing and steering the others, and without hope of occasional specifically foreseen and maintained, and will find itself thus reduced to the

(a) The gravity of the consequences of the orders you have communicated to me by the instructions of the Commander-in-Chief M.A.A.F. are such as to necessitate much serious reflection concerning the opportunity and the manner of transmitting these orders to the dependent organizations, and they compel me to examine carefully my own position of responsibility as regards the actual situation of the Force which seems now to have become unmanageable and insupportable, and the future situation which appears to be irretrievably compromised.

(b) The immediacy with which it is requested that all the orders be carried out cannot be realized because of a complexity of reasons which must be within the cognizance of M.A.A.F. and yourself and which are derived from the living conditions and functions of the Force and the actual situation in the country, already several times pointed out by me both verbally and in writing.

On the other hand a brief delay will have no influence on the activities of the combat units and will not influence, for the moment, their efficiency, while a hasty or useless step could lead to grave consequences for which I do not wish at any cost to assume the responsibility.

I consider therefore that it is indispensable that I frankly lay before you my thoughts on the subject before taking steps to execute the more drastic part of the orders which have reached me, whilst I will certainly put into process of execution the part which concerns the establishment and control of the personnel.

2. I am perfectly in agreement with the C-in-C of M.A.A.F. and with yourself when you say it is necessary to organize our Air Force in a small but efficient Force that is capable of assisting the Allied Forces in their defeat of the Germans, but I consider that you must agree with us on the injustices and impossibility of forcing the men to fight in order to reach and defeat the enemy for them to finish up without any of the fruits of victory, no matter how limited and modest these may be. And this is to be our case, since, when the Germans coming 12 months of fighting against Germany are at an end the Italian Air Force is to be reduced to 80 Allied aircraft for combat, perhaps 22 Allied aircraft for training, and 124 specifically for reconnaissance and storing the others, and without hope of organizations absolutely exclusion of that nearest future for which it has to reconstruct itself, and for which it has lived and fought through a year of sacrifice, bitterness and humiliation, and during which time it has expended all its heart and soul, its energies, that future in the name of which today we can only continue to demand further sacrifices and dedications, and which is the only way one is able to impose order and discipline.

3. This anguishing picture will only be the direct consequence of the actual orders laid down by M.A.A.F. It might be opportune to take a look back at the preceding circumstances. The eventual allocation of Wellington's in substitution for our most damaged bombers, if this was hoped for, was due to no initiative taken by us and it is also necessary to admit that the meeting held at EPCE, not through our initiative, justified us in believing, more than hoping, that something would be done for us in the very near future.

Instead, not only in the no more talk of Wellingtons, but when I pointed out to Sir John Eleaner the necessity that the small new Italian Air Force would have to use Allied material until the rehabilitation of the national industry --

785017

and therefore for many years, -- I received the reply that "it was not known whether it would have the money to purchase Allied aircraft after the war, or whether the Allies would want to give their aerial", as though there did not exist other possibilities of political economy for solving such problems.

The same subject was again brought up a few days later by Sir John Blane in his letter reference number 38, 1076 of the 15th January 1945, in which he informed us that it was his duty to utilize and therefore assist the Italian Air Force in its use in the war now in progress, but that he could give us no information concerning the future fate of our Force, this being something which would be decided when peace came.

Nevertheless, in spite of suffering humiliating bitterness through these replies, there was not yet any reason to lose last hope which now these new orders from M.A.A.F. have shattered.

4. The actual orders are to be enacted immediately and with the full knowledge of the hard blow which will be inflicted "to the hearts of our fighting pilots", and to "many other pilots who, with the storing and demolishing of about 200 aircraft, will no longer have the possibility of flying".

Our pilots feel no particular tenderness for the MACCHI, and if the MACCHIS were substituted by other aircraft, this would very soon be seen.

The pilots have desperately attached themselves to the MACCHIS because of the fear that they would not be given any other aircraft and that the end of the MACCHIS would coincide with first reduction and then the liquidation of the Italian Air Force, for the MACCHI is the most efficient aircraft for combat that we have amongst our wreckage. The pilots deluded themselves with the belief that the MACCHI aircraft piloted by them, would operate on the Italian front and their illusion was not entirely unjustified because there are no similar aircraft on the other side, and also because it would have been possible to adopt Allied markings for them, but a different decision has been taken, and it is our duty to abide by it.

Nevertheless, how can the pilots believe that the disbanding of the few glorious units which have stood up to the National catastrophe and collaborated with the Allies to an extent and under conditions which do not deserve to be forgotten, is to be lapses upon them.

5. The Units which must disappear today, and those which must cease to exist tomorrow when the war is brought to a conclusion, were, after the fatal 8th of September 1943, torn between their sense of military honour and their instinct to fight against the traditional enemy. They rapidly overcame their spiritual crisis and spontaneously arrayed themselves by the side of the Allies. The human efforts with which they gave proof of their efficiency, assembling aircraft and engines from wreckage and scraps which no other Air Force in the world would have had the courage to use for flying, earned for them the respect and consideration of the Allies.

You yourself are aware of and have witnessed what was done at MEDUSA for the D.3.605 engines.

They took part in combat operations, attempting to evade, with full Allied success, and with frequent and unconditional recognition on the part of the Allies, the units of the Allied Nations with M.A.F. I feel it is my duty to forward with this letter a summary of the activities carried out since the 8th September 1943 up to today, this shows the losses undergone amongst them two Commanding Officers at the head of their respective formations, and I must remind you of the recognised effort the Italians have made and achieved to overcome difficulties of every kind, both in the air and on the ground, in order to give the maximum results.

All this they have done.

...the MACHES were substituted by other aircraft, this would very soon be seen.

The pilots have desperately attacked themselves to the MACHES because of the fear that they would not be given any other aircraft and that the end of the MACHES would coincide with first reduction and then the liquidation of the Italian Air Force, for the MACHES is the most efficient aircraft for combat that we have amongst our stockpiles. The pilots deluded themselves with the belief that the MACHES aircraft piloted by them, would operate on the Italian front. And their illusion was not entirely unjustified because there are no similar aircraft on the other side, and also because it would have been possible to adopt Allied markings for them, but a different decision has been taken, and it is our duty to abide by it. Nevertheless, how can the pilots believe that the disbanding of the few glorious units which have stood up to the National catastrophe and collaborated with the Allies to an extent and under conditions which do not deserve to be forgotten, is to be ignored upon them.

5. The units which must disappear today, and those which must come to exist tomorrow when the war is brought to a conclusion, were, after the fated 8th of September 1943, torn between their sense of military honour and their instinct to fight against the traditional enemy. They rapidly overcame their spiritual crisis and spontaneously arrayed themselves by the side of the Allies. The superb human efforts with which they gave proof of their efficiency, assembling aircraft and engines from wrecks and scraps which no other Air Force in the world would have had the courage to use for flying, earned for them the respect and consideration of the Allies.

You yourself are aware of and have witnessed what was done at MURDELL for the D.B. 605 engine. They took part in combat operations, attempting to exult, with full and ample success, and with frequent and unconditional recognition on the part of the Allies, the units of the Allied Nations with A.A.A. I feel it is my duty to forward with this letter a summary of the activities carried out since the 8th September 1943 up to today, this shows the losses undergone amongst them two Commanding Officers at the head of their respective formations, and I must remind you of the recognised effort the Italians have made and achieved to overcome difficulties of every kind, both in the air and on the ground, in order to give the maximum results.

All this they have done under hard and discouraging conditions, such as insufficient food, ridiculously low pay, and a grave lack of clothing and equipment.

You have remarked and lamented on the miserable pay and have asked the Minister for concessions, some of which he has obtained, but a measure still inadequate to our needs because of our impossibility to provide for ourselves.

Your own officers have pointed out the insufficiency of the food in comparison with the amount of the work carried out by the men, and they have proposed compensations for the best workers who work beyond the scheduled hours.

These points have been brought to our attention in order that action be taken, knowing at the same time, that it is quite impossible for us to do anything ourselves as we would wholeheartedly do if we were able.

Since I first took over my present post I have been asking for the same conditions for our fighting pilots as those given to the soldiers of the least favoured of the Allied Nations. I have not obtained my point because this is a problem which must be decided at Washington. If there is no other way, the problem

Continued /3....

-3-

ought therefore to be represented to Washington and let us give the fighters that material or moral base which will put him on the necessary level in keeping with his dignity as a man and a soldier.

Instead no considerable help has been given to fight that sense of desolation and desperation that the personnel have -- and which regrettably the majority of the Italian population also have -- and which will end by giving the fighters the belief that the cause is lost and the sacrifice is in vain.

6. If it is true that our flying material is too much of a burden in proportion to the results it gives and it is no longer to be used, then can it not be replaced as soon as possible even when the war is over, or, let it be stored without demolishing it, if it is all that we can count upon during the long and obscure after-war future.

The efforts which must follow in order to keep in the fighting line, the aircraft to be used, could be made with the consent of the Allies and a little aid from them.

We do beg at least the right to conserve our old wreckage if we cannot have the certificate of other help no matter how modest and limited.

7. I am relied upon -- and you have great faith in my capacity to carry out my task -- to put into execution the demolition and reduction without causing a lowering in the morale and the efficiency of the operational units, and advice and assistance regarding this is offered to me.

In my letter reference number 040104/Ag of the 10th January 1945 I explicitly said how difficult it was for my C.O. no matter what his authority, to sustain the then existing situation by only personally intervening and with words. I said that such intervention, even then, of limited effectiveness would end by becoming more damaging than useful, and I suggested what could be done to improve the situation, also in order to give sufficient authority to myself.

I do not know what objective and efficacious advice can be given to me today in order to help me face the new situation.

The only thing would be to communicate to the Allies the complete and integral truth regarding the future destiny of the Italian Air Force, and to attempt to promote in the personnel a species of ascetic and transcendental state of mind, a procedure so far never attempted on the scale of the fighters of any country.

Since, if the noble human aim of the struggle -- the defense and the rebirth of the country and its institutions -- is to cease to exist, nothing is left to us but the sacrifice for the conquest of an aim beyond this world. This, however, would be an apostolic mission, not one of war. I do not know how and what results any Commander of Armed Forces could resort to these means.

8. It is clear that under such conditions the Air Ministry cannot and must not assume the entire responsibility, which you would attribute to it, for the maintaining of the efficiency of its own Air Force, since not having any material and moral possibility of intervening, it is certain that from now on with an alternative between existence and non-existence it would appear that the result is to be the collapse of the Italian Air Force.

On the other hand, a positive and apologetic attitude would prejudice the solidarity and the discipline of our Forces, fatally contributing to future situations which it is our precise duty to foresee and provide for in order not to make ourselves responsible before the country and the Allies.

9. I regret to have been forced to be so painfully frank, but whatever is destined to happen to me personally it is my sacred duty to safeguard that which I consider to be the just and reasonable interests of the country.

little and from them.
We do beg at least the right to conserve our old weapons if we cannot have the certitude of other help no matter how modest and limited.

7. I am relied upon -- and you have great faith in my capacity to carry out my task -- to put into execution the demolition and reduction without causing a lowering in the morale and the efficiency of the operational units, and advice and assistance regarding this is offered to me.

In my letter reference number 010101/Ag of the 10th January 1945 I explicitly said how difficult it was for me G.O. no matter what his authority, to sustain the then existing situation by only personally intervening and with words. I said that such intervention, even then, of limited effectiveness would end by becoming more damaging than useful, and I suggested what could be done to improve the situation, also in order to give sufficient authority to myself.

I do not know what objective and efficacious advice can be given to me today in order to help me face the new situation.

The only thing would be to communicate to the Duce the complete and integral truth regarding the future destiny of the Italian Air Forces, and to attempt to promote in the personnel a species of ecstatic and transcendental state of mind, a procedure so far never attempted on the souls of the fighters of my country.

Since, if the noble human aim of the struggle -- the defense and the rebirth of the country and its institutions -- is to cease to exist, nothing is left to us but the sacrifice for the conquest of an aim beyond this world. This, however, would be an apostolic mission, not one of war. I do not know how and what results any Commander of Armed Forces could resort to these means.

8. It is clear that under such conditions the Air Ministry cannot and must not assume the entire responsibility, which you would attribute to it, for the maintaining of the efficiency of its own Air Forces, since not having any material and moral possibility of intervening, it is certain that from now on will be an alternative between existence and non-existence it would appear that the result is to be the collapse of the Italian Air Forces.

On the other hand, a passive and quiescent attitude would prejudice the solidarity and the discipline of our Forces, fatally contributing to future situations which it is our precise duty to foresee and provide for in order not to make ourselves responsible before the country and the Allies.

9. I regret to have been forced to be so painfully frank, but whatever is destined to happen to me personally it is my sacred duty to safeguard that which I consider to be the just recognition due to our Forces, to the memory of our Fallen and those who have yet to fall, to its dignity which has been injured by the conditions which have been imposed upon it up to now, and for the sake of that hoped-for small but merited future which constitutes its soul and most aim.

I beg you therefore to place the situation before the competent authorities so that they may judge whether the cruel sentence undergone, the efforts made in order to rise up again, and the unconditional offer of new efforts are not deserving of more understanding and comprehension.

GENERAL M. ALMOND GAT
CHIEF OF AIR STAFF.

ACTIVITIES OF THE L.A.P. UNIT FROM SEPTEMBER 9TH 1943
TO THE 28TH OF FEBRUARY 1945.

(36)

OPERATIONAL FLIGHTS.	4,140
AIRCRAFT USED ON OPERATIONAL FLIGHTS.	7,700
AIRCRAFT USED ON NON-OPERATIONAL FLIGHTS, (TRANSPORT, LAISON, ETC),	31,400
FLYING HOURS ON OPERATIONS	18,300
TOTAL OF FLYING HOURS	39,000
BOMBS DROPPED	122 641,000
SUPPLIES DROPPED ON FLIGHT	122 3,492,000
PASSENGERS CARRIED	23,300
HEAVY TRANSPORT OR INSTALLATION DESTROYED	370
HEAVY TRANSPORT OR INSTALLATION DAMAGED	1,000
A.L. SPENT BATTERIES DESTROYED	5
HEAVY RAFTS SUNK	10
HEAVY PLANE SUNK DOWN OR DESTROYED ON THE GROUND	26
ITALIAN LOSSES IN ACTION (PLANE)	64
ITALIAN LOSSES FOR OTHER REASONS (CRASHES ETC)	64
FLYING PERSONNEL LOST (KILLED OR MISSING)	121
Officers } N.C.O's } O.E's }	130
SURFACED AND WOUNDED RESCUED	

SEVERAL WHITES AND VESSEL PRIZES BY M.A.A.P, N.A.P, AND ONE BY MARSHAL VITO.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS

PAULSON AND GARDNER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

ANY TRADING OR INVESTING DIVIDED

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

STILL BETTER TOGETHER

REAR FLARE SHOT DOWN OR INTERVIEWED ON THE GROUND

STATION LOCATED IN (TOWN)

ITALIAN LAWYERS FOR CENTER RIGHTS (CRUCIAL 1993)

THE PRESIDENT (KING OF SWEDEN)

8330 F1070

100%

100

INTERESTED AND WANTED PERSONS

STEWART, BERTHA AND VERONAL FRANKS BY M.A.A.T., D.A.T., AND ONE OF MARSHAL TRO.

2046



STATO MAGGIORE DELLA R. AERONAUTICA

Roma, 11 | 5 MAR 1945

35

Prot. 010649/SE.V

AL VICE MARESCIALLO BOWEN-BUSCARLET
A.F.3.C./A.C.

= E C M A =

Caro Maresciallo,

1. - Ho tardato a rispondere alla Sua lettera AF3C/23/AIR del 27 Febbraio 1945 perchè:

a) la gravità e le conseguenze dei provvedimenti da Lei comunicati per ordine del Comando in Capo del M.A.A.F., sono tali da imporre molto serie riflessioni circa l'opportunità e la forma di trasmissione degli ordini agli Enti dipendenti e da costringermi ad esaminare attentamente la mia stessa posizione di responsabilità nei confronti della situazione attuale dell'Arma, che diviene ormai insostenibile ed insostenibile e di quella futura che appare irrimediabilmente compromessa.

b) l'immediatezza con la quale si chiede l'esecuzione di tutti gli ordini impartiti, non può essere in alcun modo realizzata per il complesso di ragioni che devono essere perfettamente note al Comando del M.A.A.F. ed a lei e che derivano dalle condizioni di vita e di funzionamento dell'Arma, nella attuale situazione del Paese, già da me più volte prospettate verbalmente e per iscritto.

L'altra parte il breve ritardo non influisce sull'attività bellica dei Reparti di linea e non ne pregiudica, per ora, il rendimento, mentre paesi sventati e mal fatti, potrebbero condurre a conseguenze gravi, delle quali non vorrei a nessun costo accusare la responsabilità.

Ritengo quindi indispensabile chiarire francamente il mio pensiero, prima di dar corso alla parte più drastica delle disposizioni pervenute, mentre disporrò senz'altro per l'altra che si riferisce all'ordinamento ed al controllo del personale.

2. - Convegno perfettamente con il Comando in Capo del M.A.A.F. e con lei sulla necessità di organizzare la nostra Aeronautica "in una

2045

Caro Maresciallo,

1. - Ho tardato a rispondere alla Sua lettera AFSC/21/AIR del 27 Febbraio 1945 perchè:

- a) la gravità e le conseguenze dei provvedimenti da lei comunicati per ordine del Comando in Capo del M.A.A.F., sono tali da imporre molte serie riflessioni circa l'opportunità e la forma di trasmissione degli ordini agli Enti dipendenti e da costringermi ad esaminare attentamente la mia stessa posizione di responsabilità nei confronti della situazione attuale dell'Arma, che ritiene ormai insanabile ed insostenibile e di quella futura che appare irrimediabilmente compromessa.
- b) l'immediatezza con la quale si chiede l'esecuzione di tutti gli ordini impartiti, non può essere in alcun modo realizzata per il complesso di ragioni che devono essere perfettamente note al Comando del M.A.A.F. ed a lei e che derivano dalle condizioni di vita e di funzionamento dell'Arma, nella attuale situazione del Paese, già da me più volte prospettate verbalmente e per iscritto.
- c) l'altra parte il breve ritardo non influisce sull'attività bellica del Reparto di linea e non ne pregiudica, per ora, il rendimento, mentre paesi sventati e mal fatti, potrebbero condurre a conseguenze gravi, delle quali non vorrei a nessuno costo assumere la responsabilità.

Ritengo quindi indispensabile chiarire francamente il mio pensiero, prima di dar corso alla parte più drastica delle disposizioni pervenutemi, mentre disporrò senz'altro per l'altra che si riferisce all'ordinamento ed al controllo del personale.

2345

2. - Convegno perfettamente con il Comando in Capo del M.A.A.F. e con lei sulla necessità di organizzare la nostra Aviazione "in una Arma piccola ma efficiente, che sia in grado di assistere le Forze Alleate nella loro sconfitta dei tedeschi".
- Ma ritengo si debba convenire con noi sulla ingiustizia ed insostenibilità di imporre il combattimento per sconfiggere il nemico e finire con lui, senza alcun beneficio dalla vittoria, per limitare a modesto che possa essere.
3. - questo il nostro caso, poi che trascorsi i presunti 12 mesi di lotta contro la Germania, l'Aviazione italiana che oggi dovrebbe ridurre su 20 aerei alleati di linea, forse 22 aerei alleati per scuola e 121 aerei di tipo italiano, accantonando e demorando gli altri, e senza alcuna speranza di concessioni organicamente previste e mantenute, varrebbe a trovarsi a terra, con l'assoluta

.../...



STATO MAGGIORE DELLA R. AERONAUTICA

= 2 =

34

preclusione a quel modesto avvenire per il quale ha cercato di ri-
sorgere, per il quale ha vissuto e lottato un anno fra sacrifici,
amarezze ed umiliazioni, verso il quale tendono tutte le sue ener-
gie migliori e più sane; quell'avvenire in nome del quale soltan-
to è possibile chiedere oggi dedizione e sacrificio ed imporre
ordine e disciplina.--

3. - Tale sanguinosa previsione è conseguenza unica e diretta degli at-
tuali provvedimenti disposti dal Comando del M.A.A.P., riferiti a
precedenti circostanze che è opportuno non dimenticare.--
Le eventuali cessioni di Wellingtons in sostituzione dei nostri
bombardieri più malconci, se potè essere auspicata, non fu certo
impostata da noi.-- E bisogna pure ammettere che la riunione tenu-
ta a Lecce, non per nostra iniziativa, più che a speranze, dava
edito a certesse molto prossime, quasi immediate.--
Ed invece non soltanto non si parlò più dei Wellingtons, ma quan-
do accennai a Sir John Slessor la necessità che la nuova piccola
Aviazione italiana, fino alla ripresa delle industrie nazionali,
e quindi per molti anni, impiegasse del materiale alleato, ne eb-
bi in risposta che "non si sapeva se dopo la guerra l'Italia avreb-
be avuto i danari per comprare gli aerei alleati o se gli Alleati
avessero voluto regalare il loro materiale"; come se non esistes-
sero altre possibilità di economia politica per risolvere simili
problemi.--


Lo stesso concetto fu ribadito pochi giorni dopo da Sir John Sles-
sor nella sua lettera JCS.1076 del 15 Gennaio 1945, dove mi infor-
ma essere suo compito di utilizzare e quindi assistere l'Aviazio-
ne italiana per la guerra in corso, ma non potermi raggiungere
sulle sorti della nostra Arma che dovranno essere decise a pace
conclusa.--

Tuttavia, pur soffrendo l'asprezza umiliante di queste risposte,
non vi era ancora motivo di perdere le ultime speranze che le at-
tuali disposizioni del M.A.A.P. annullano.--

4. - Le attuali disposizioni vengono emanate con effetto immediato e
nella piena consapevolezza del duro colpo che si infligge sul quo-

3. - Tale angosciosa previsione è conseguenza unica e diretta degli attuali provvedimenti disposti dal Comando del M.A.A.P., riferiti a precedenti circostanze che è opportuno non dimenticare. - Le eventuali cessioni di Wellingtons in costituzione dei nostri bombardieri più moderni, se potè essere auspicata, non fu certo impostata da noi. - E bisogna pure ammettere che la riunione tenuta a Lecce, non per nostre iniziative, più che a speranza, dava edito a certenze molto prossime, quasi immediate. - Ed invece non soltanto non si parlò più dei Wellingtons, ma quando accennai a Sir John Slessor la necessità che la nuova piccola Aviazione italiana, fino alla ripresa delle industrie nazionali, e quindi per molti anni, impiegasse del materiale alleato, ne ebbi la risposta che "non si sapeva se dopo la guerra l'Italia avrebbe avuto i danari per comprare gli aerei alleati o se gli Alleati avessero voluto regalare il loro materiale"; come se non esistessero altre possibilità di economia politica per risolvere simili problemi. -
- Lo stesso concetto fu ribadito pochi giorni dopo da Sir John Slessor nella sua lettera JCS.1076 del 15 Gennaio 1945, dove mi informa essere suo compito di utilizzare e quindi assistere l'Aviazione italiana per la guerra in corso, ma non potermi raggiungere sulle sorti della nostra arma che dovranno essere decise a pace conclusa. -
- Tuttavia, pur soffrendo l'asprezza umiliante di queste risposte, non vi era ancora motivo di perdere le ultime speranze che le attuali disposizioni del M.A.A.P. annullano. -

4. - Le attuali disposizioni vengono emanate con effetto immediato e nella piena consapevolezza del duro colpo che si infligge "al cuore dei nostri piloti di guerra, con la soppressione dei Macchi della prima linea" ed a "molti altri piloti che, con l'accantonamento e la demolizione di oltre 200 apparecchi, non avranno più la possibilità di volare". -
- Ma i nostri piloti non hanno alcuna tenerezza per i Macchi. - Si aggratificano i Macchi con altri aerei da guerra, e se ne avrà la conferma. -
- I nostri piloti si sono attaccati disperatamente ai Macchi nel timore che non avrebbero avuto altro e che la fine dei Macchi avrebbe coinciso con la riduzione prima e la liquidazione poi dell'Aviazione italiana; perché il Macchi è tipo bellicamente più efficiente.



STATO MAGGIORE DELLA R. AERONAUTICA

= 3 =

te, fra tutti i nostri rotti. I piloti si illudevano che i Maghi avrebbero potuto finire, con loro sopra, sul fronte italiano. La loro illusione non poteva essere infondata, perchè non vi sono aerei di eguale tipo dall'altra parte, e perchè si sarebbero anche potuti adottare i distintivi alleati. Ma è stato deciso diversamente, e noi abbiamo il dovere di subire la decisione. Ma come potranno credere, i piloti, che si impongono loro la dissoluzione delle poche vecchie gloriose squadriglie che hanno retto alla prova della catastrofe nazionale, e collaborato con gli Alleati nella misura e nelle condizioni che non dovrebbero essere dimenticate?

5. - Le Squadriglie che oggi dovrebbero scomparire e quelle che dovrebbero cessare di esistere domani, a guerra conclusa, furono anche esse dibattute, dopo l'infausto 8 settembre 1943, fra il senso dell'onore militare e quello istintivo di combattere contro il socolare nemico. Esse superarono rapidamente la loro crisi spirituale e si schierarono spontaneamente a fianco degli Alleati. Si impongono al rispetto ed alla commiserazione degli Alleati per gli sforzi sovrumani con i quali riuscirono a ripristinare la propria efficienza, traendo aeroplani e motori da rottami e da ferraglie che nessuna altra aviazione al mondo avrebbe avuto il coraggio di utilizzare per il volo.

E voi sapete ed avete visto cosa si faccia a Brindisi per i nostri D.B. 605.

Parteciparono alle operazioni di guerra cercando di emulare, con pieno successo ed ampi, frequenti ed incondizionati riconoscimenti da parte alleati, i Reparti della Nazione alleate del D.A.F. Ma il dovere di accludere a questa lettera i dati dell'attività da loro svolta dall'8 settembre ad oggi, delle perdite subite, fra le quali due Comandanti alla testa delle rispettive formazioni, e di ricordare il riconosciuto slancio nel superare difficoltà di ogni genere, in volo ed a terra, pur di realizzare il massimo dei risultati.

E tutto questo hanno fatto in condizioni di vita dura ed avvilente per insufficienza di alimentazione, per irrisorietà per gra-

anche potuti accettare i distintivi alleati.-- Ma è stato deciso di
veramente, e noi abbiamo il dovere di subire la decisione.-- Ma
come potranno credere, i piloti, che si impongono loro la dissolu-
zione delle poche vecchie gloriose squadriglie che hanno retto alla
prova della catastrofe nazionale, e collaborato con gli Alleati
nella misura e nelle condizioni che non dovrebbero essere dimen-
ticate?

5. -- Le Squadriglie che oggi dovrebbero scomparire e quelle che dovreb-
bero cessare di esistere domani, a guerra conclusa, furono anche
esse dibattute, dopo l'infausto 8 settembre 1943, fra il senso del
l'onore militare e quello istintivo di combattere contro il seco-
lare nemico.-- Esse superarono rapidamente la loro crisi spiritua-
le e si schierarono spontaneamente a fianco degli Alleati.-- Si im-
peccero al rispetto ed alla commiserazione degli Alleati per gli
sforzi sovrumani con i quali riuscirono a ripristinare la propria
efficienza, tracciando aeroplani e motori da rottami e da ferraglie
che nessuna altra aviazione al mondo avrebbe avuto il coraggio di
utilizzare per il volo.--

E voi aspettate ed avete visto cosa si faccia a Brindisi per i moto-
ri D.B. 605.--

Parteciparono alle operazioni di guerra cercando di emulare, con
pieno successo ed anzi, frequenti ed incondizionati riconoscimen-
ti da parte alleata, i Reparti della Nazione alleata del B.A.F.--
Ho il dovere di escludere a questa lettera i dati dell'attività
da loro svolta dall'8 settembre ad oggi, delle perdite subite, fra
le quali due Comandanti alla testa delle rispettive formazioni,
e di ricordare il riconoscimento al lancio nel superare difficoltà di
ogni genere, in volo ed a terra, pur di realizzare il massimo dei
risultati.--

E tutto questo hanno fatto in condizioni di vita dure ed avvilene-
ti per insufficienza di alimentazione, per irrisorietà ^{23/3} per gra-
vi deficienze di vestiario ed equipaggiamento.--

Lei stesso ha constatato e lamentato con noi la miseria delle pa-
ghe, chiedendo al Ministro provvedimenti che egli ha cercato di
ottenere, ma in misura ancora inadeguata alla necessità, a causa
delle nostre impossibilità materiali di provvedere.--

I suoi stessi Ufficiali hanno segnalato l'insufficienza dei vive-
ri in rapporto alla pesantezza dei lavori effettuati ed hanno pro-
posto compensi per gli ottimi lavoratori che si prestavano oltre
l'orario stabilito.--

Queste segnalazioni ci sono state trasmesse per competenza, pur
sapendo che siamo nell'assoluta impossibilità di provvedere, come
certo faremo, se potessimo, e di gran cuore.--

.../...



STATO MAGGIORE DELLA R. AERONAUTICA

= 4 =

32

Ho chiesto fin dall'inizio dell'assunzione della mia carica, lo adeguamento delle condizioni dei soli nostri combattenti e quelli dei combattenti della Neazione all'esta meno favorita, e non l'ho ottenute perchè il problema deve essere deciso a Washington. Ma lo si rappresenta a Washington, se non vi è altra via di intervento e si dia al combattente quella base morale e materiale che lo mantenga al necessario livello della sua dignità di uomo e di soldato.

Invece, nessun ausilio sensibile è stato dato per combattere il senso di desolazione e di disperazione del personale che - come già purtroppo gran parte del popolo italiano - finirà con il ritenere la causa perduta ed inutile il sacrificio.

6. - Se è vero che i materiali di volo troppo onerosi in relazione al rendimento, non possono più essere impiegati, o li si sostituiscono appena possibile anche a guerra finita, o li si accentrano senza demerli, se dovranno essere gli unici sui quali l'aviazione italiana dovrà contare nel suo lungo oscuro avvenire del dopo-guerra.

Lo sforzo che dovrebbe conseguire, per mantenere in linea gli aerei impiegabili, potrebbe essere fatto con il consenso e con un po' di aiuto da parte alleata.

Ma ci si conceda almeno il premio di conservare i nostri vecchi rottami, se non potremo avere la certezza di altri aiuti, sia pure modesti e limitati.

7. - Si conta su di me e si ha grande fiducia nella mia opera, per dare immediata esecuzione alle riduzioni e demolizioni, senza essere abbassamenti di morale e di efficienza nei Gruppi operativi; e mi si offrono consigli ed assistenza al riguardo.

Nella mia lettera 010101/3g del 10 Gennaio 1945 dissi esplicitamente quanto fosse *deffibile* a qualsiasi superiore, per quanto autorevole, di reggere la situazione di allora con il solo intervento della presenza e della parola. - Dissi che tale intervento, già allora di limitata efficacia, finirebbe in seguito con il diventare più degnato che utile e succedendo i provvedimenti atti a

da io si rappresenti a Washington, se non vi è altra via di intervento e si dia al combattente quella base morale e materiale che lo mantenga al necessario livello della sua dignità di uomo e di soldato.--

Invece, nessun ausilio sensibile è stato dato per combattere il senso di desolazione e di disperazione del personale che -- come già purtroppo gran parte del popolo italiano -- finirà con il ritenere la causa perduta ed inutile il sacrificio.--

6. -- Se è vero che i materiali di volo troppo onerosi in relazione al rendimento, non possono più essere impiegati, o li si sostituiscono appena possibile anche a guerra finita, o li si accantonano senza demolirli, se dovranno essere gli unici sui quali l'aviazione italiana dovrà contare nel suo lungo oscuro avvenire del dopo-guerra.--

Lo sforzo che dovrebbe conseguire, per mantenere in linea gli aerei impiegabili, potrebbe essere fatto con il consenso e con un po' di aiuto da parte alleata.--

Ma ci si conceda almeno il premio di conservare i nostri vecchi rottami, se non potremo avere la cortezza di altri aiuti, sia pure modesti e limitati.--

7. -- Si conta su di me e si ha grande fiducia nella mia opera, per dare immediata esecuzione alle riduzioni e demolizioni, senza curare abbassamenti di morale e di efficienza nei Gruppi operativi; e mi si offrono consigli ed assistenza al riguardo.--

Nella mia lettera 010101/Sg del 10 Gennaio 1945 dissi esplicitamente quanto fosse defettiva a qualsiasi superiore, per quanto autorevole, di reggere la situazione di allora con il solo intervento della presenza e della parola.-- Dissi che tale intervento, già allora di limitata efficacia, finirebbe in seguito con il diventare più dannoso che utile e suggerii i provvedimenti atti a migliorare la situazione, anche per dare sufficiente autorità al superiore.--

Non so quale consiglio obiettivo ed efficace potrebbe essermi dato oggi per fare fronte alla nuova situazione.--

L'unico potrebbe essere quello di comunicare ai Reparti la piena ed integrale verità sul futuro destino della nostra aviazione e di tentare di promuovere nel personale una specie di apostolico apostolato trascendentale, mai sperimentato finora, sullo animo del combattente di nessun Paese.--



STATO MAGGIORE DELLA R. AERONAUTICA

21
= 5 =

Poichè, se il nobilissimo scopo umano della lotta - la difesa e la rinascita della Patria e delle sue Istituzioni - cessa di esistere, non vi è altro ricorso possibile che il sacrificio per la conquista delle mire ultra-terrene. - Ma sarebbe questo un apostrofo di carità e non di guerra. - Non so come e con quali risultati si potrebbe farvi ricorso, un qualsiasi Comandante di Forze Armate.

8. - E' chiaro che in simili condizioni il Ministero dell'Aeronautica non potrà e non dovrà assumersi la intera responsabilità che gli si vorrebbe attribuire, per il mantenimento in efficienza della propria Aviazione, poichè, non avendo nessuna possibilità materiale e morale di intervenire, è certo fin d'ora che l'alternativa fra l'esistenza e la caduta, dovrà comunque risolversi con la caduta dell'Aviazione.

L'altra parte un atteggiamento passivo ed acquiescente, pregiudicando la solidarietà e l'ordine nella nostra Arma, contribuirebbe fatalmente ad avviare verso situazioni future che è nostro preciso dovere prevedere e prevenire, per non farcene corresponsabili di fronte al Paese ed agli Alleati.

9. - Sono episcanto di essere stato costretto a tanta rude franchezza; ma quale che sia il destino che dovrà essere riservato alla mia persona, io ho il sacro dovere di tutelare quelli che ritengo i giusti riconoscimenti dovuti all'Arma, alla memoria dei suoi Caduti e di quelli che dovranno ancora cadere, alla sua dignità, che è stata lesa dalle condizioni di vita che le si sono fatte finora, nella prospettiva di quel piccolo, meritato avvenire che costituisce la sua meta dolorosa e modesta.

La prego quindi di prospettare la situazione alle autorità competenti, perchè giudichino se la immane sventura subita, gli sforzi compiuti, per sollevarci e l'offerta incondizionata di nuove, illimitate dedizioni e sacrifici, non meritino maggiore rispetto e comprensione.

conquista delle mire ultra-terrene. Ma sarebbe questo un apostolato di carità e non di guerra. Non so come e con quali risultati potrebbe farvi ricorso, un qualsiasi Comandante di Forze Armate.

8. - E' chiaro che in simili condizioni il Ministero dell'Aeronautica non potrà e non dovrà assumersi la intera responsabilità che gli si vorrebbe attribuire, per il mantenimento in efficienza della propria Aviazione, poichè, non avendo nessuna possibilità materiale e morale di intervenire, è certo fin d'ora che l'alternativa fra l'esistenza e la caduta, dovrà comunque risolversi con la caduta dell'Aviazione.
- L'altra parte un atteggiamento passivo ed acquiescente, pregiudicando la solidarietà e l'ordine nella nostra Armata, contribuirebbe fatalmente ad avviare verso situazioni future che è nostro precioso dovere prevedere e prevenire, per non farcene corresponsabili di fronte al Paese ed agli Alleati.

9. - Sono spiacente di essere stato costretto a tanta rude franchezza; ma quale che sia il destino che dovrà essere riservato alla mia persona, io ho il sacro dovere di tutelare quelli che ritengo i giusti riconoscimenti dovuti all'Armata, alla memoria dei suoi caduti e di quelli che dovranno ancora cadere, alla sua dignità, che è stata lesa dalle condizioni di vita che le si sono fatte finora, nella prospettiva di quel piccolo, meritato avvenire che costituisce la sua meta dolorosa e modesta.
- Le prego quindi di prospettare la situazione alle Autorità competenti, perchè giudichino se la immane sventura subita, gli sforzi compiuti, per risollevarci e l'offerta incondizionata di nuovo, illimitata dedizioni e sacrifici, non meritino maggiore rispetto e comprensione.

IL CAPO DI STATO MAGGIORE
(Gen.S.A.-M.AJMONI-CAT)

23/1

Amf



STATO MAGGIORE DELLA R. AERONAUTICA

ATTIVITA' DEI REPARTI DELLA R. AERONAUTICA

Dal 2 Settembre 1943 al 28 Febbraio 1945

Azioni di guerra	n°	4.140
Velivoli impiegati per azioni di guerra	"	7.700
Velivoli impiegati complessiv. (azioni guerra, trasporto collegamento, addestramento)	"	31.400
Ore di volo per azioni di guerra	"	12.300
Ore di volo complessive (azioni guerra, trasporti, collegamento, addestramento)	"	39.000
Peso bombe lanciate	Kg.	641.000
Colpi sparati	n°	407.000
Materiale sviorifornito e trasportato	Kg.	3.492.000
Passaggeri trasportati	n°	23.300
Mezzi terrestri nemici distrutti	"	370
Mezzi terrestri nemici danneggiati	"	1.000
Postazioni artiglieria c.a. nemiche distrutte	"	5
Zattere nemiche affondate	"	10
Velivoli nemici abbattuti o distrutti al suolo	"	86
Velivoli nazionali perduti per cause di guerra	"	64
Velivoli nazionali perduti per cause occidentali	"	64

Perdite personale navigante (decaduti e dispersi):

Ufficiali

Azioni di guerra	n°	4.140
Velivoli impiegati per azioni di guerra	"	7.700
Velivoli impiegati complessiv. (azioni guerra, trasporto collegamento, addestramento)	"	31.400
Ore di volo per azioni di guerra		18.300
Ore di volo complessive (azioni guerra, trasporti, collegamento, addestramento)		39.000
Peso bombe lanciate	Kg.	641.000
Colpi sparati	n°	407.000
Materiale avariato e trasportato	Kg.	3.492.000
Passeggeri trasportati	n°	23.300
Mezzi terrestri nemici distrutti	"	370
Mezzi terrestri nemici danneggiati	"	1.000
Postazioni artiglieria c.s. nemiche distrutte	"	5
Zattere nemiche affondate	"	10
Velivoli nemici abbattuti o distrutti al suolo	"	86
Velivoli nazionali perduti per cause di guerra	"	64
Velivoli nazionali perduti per cause accidentali	"	64

Perdite personale navigante (decaduti e dispersi):

Ufficiali	n° 38	
Sottufficiali	" 30	121
Truppe	" 53	
Navfraghi e feriti recuperati	n°	130

Vari riconoscimenti scritti e verbali del M.A.A.P. - del P.A.F. ed uno del Maresciallo TITO.

785017

SECRET
API48ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

RHP/13a

: : : : :
: **SECRET** :
: Auth: SAC MT :
: Initials :
: 6 March 1945 :
: : : : :
6 March 1945**Confidential**
Exec. Comm.

AG 334/111 IS/PS-O

SUBJECT: Directive for Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission

TO: Mr Vice-Marshal T.A.B. Bowen-Buscarlet, C.B.E., D.F.C.
Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission
FROM: Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

MAR 8 1945

1. The following instructions supersede and cancel the directive which was issued to you from this headquarters on 7 December 1944, under reference Number JCS.1321.

2. Your duty is to represent the Allied Air Forces on the Allied Commission and to advise the Chief Commissioner on matters affecting the Italian Air Force. As representative of Mediterranean Allied Air Forces you will be responsible to the Air Commander-in-Chief. As a member of the Allied Commission you are responsible to the Chief Commissioner on matters which, under the Armistice Terms, are the direct responsibility of the Allied Commission.

3. a. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that an Italian Air Force, with an authorized manpower ceiling of (at present) 31,000, shall be allowed to remain in being for the present, as a co-belligerent Service for the defeat of GERMANY.

b. Your primary function, in general, is to assist the Italian Air Minister, Chief of Staff and Italian Air Force authorities generally, to run as efficient an Air Force as possible for the above end, in accordance with the policy laid down by the Air Commander-in-Chief, within the limits of their authorized resources and of such resources as the Allies can make available to them. You should be quite clear, and should make clear to the above mentioned Italian authorities, that the efficiency of the Italian Air Force is their responsibility. Your responsibility is first to transmit to the Italian Air Ministry the policy instructions of the Air Commander-in-Chief, and secondly to assist them with advice and with such material resources as can be made available by the Allies. If in your view the Italian Air Force authorities are failing in their duty, you will make such representations as you may think fit to the Air Commander-in-Chief and the Chief Commissioner including, if necessary, recommendations for the removal of any particular officer or officers.

2539

4. a. Your function is thus a professional and not a political one. In the event of a change of government in ITALY you will be responsible for advising the Air Commander-in-Chief, in the light of your knowledge and official contacts as a member of the Allied Commission, as to the qualifications, from the Air Force point of view, of any potential Secretary or

Superseded see file 78

SECRET

SECRET

Ltr. Hq. AFHQ, AG 334/111 ISAPS-O,
dtd 6 March 1945 (Cont'd)

Under-Secretary of State. And you will reserve the right to approve or reject on grounds of professional suitability, the appointment of Commanding Officers and Senior Staff Officers in the Italian Air Force; in doing so, however, you should as far as possible ensure that there is nothing in the officer's previous record under the Fascist government that makes him unsuitable for his appointment. You should discourage any political activities on the part of Italian Air Force personnel that may come to your notice. Apart from this it is not your function to concern yourself with the political views of any Italian Air Force personnel unless they obtrude themselves by affecting the efficiency of the Italian Air Force; nor is it your duty to discover any political activities in which Italian Air Force personnel may be engaged - that is a matter for the Italian Air Force authorities themselves.

b. Thus you and your staff have no political responsibilities, but should keep in close touch with, and consult as necessary, any authorities under Allied Force Headquarters whose duty it is to concern themselves with the past and present political activities of any Italian Service personnel.

5. You and your staff will be in the same relation to the Staff branches of Mediterranean Allied Air Forces concerned with organization, maintenance, supply, training and equipment, as a subordinate Air Officer Commanding and his staff. You should keep these branches fully informed and you are entitled to their assistance and advice as required.

6. Five (5) squadrons of the Italian Air Force are equipped with Allied types. Anything above that must be maintained from existing Italian material resources. You should ensure that the Italian Air Force authorities retain in the Service only such Italian-equipped units as can effectively contribute to the war against GERMANY, in which should be included such Communications units as may be essential for internal courier services; the decision on the number, strength and composition of units falling under this category is one for the Air Commander-in-Chief acting on your advice. You will be responsible for ensuring that the Italian Air Ministry does not maintain any units in excess of those authorized by the Air Commander-in-Chief.

7. All first line operational units will be unreservedly at the disposal of the Air Commander-in-Chief who will place them under the operational control of the appropriate Mediterranean Allied Air Forces subordinate Commander.

8. You will submit routine reports on matters affecting the organization, administration and maintenance of the Italian Air Force to Commanding General, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces. All normal reports concerning the operations of the Italian Air Force units will be rendered by the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces Commander responsible for operational control. Special reports by you or the operational Commander concerned may be necessary from time to time, such as on matters of organization, administration or maintenance of Italian Air Force units which are affecting their operational efficiency. No reports are to be made direct to any higher authority except

785017

SECRET

Ltr, HQ, AG 334/111 IS&PS-O,
 dtd 6 March 1945 (Cont'd)

the Chief Commissioner and this headquarters; the latter will be responsible for determining any wider distribution which may be necessary.

9. Over and above the requirements of the operational units, and of such nonoperational and ancillary units as may be authorized, there is and will be a surplus of trained Italian Air Force manpower within the present ceiling of 31,000 referred to above. You will be responsible for organizing the provision of such surplus manpower - and any additional surplus that may become available - for the use of the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, the decision on the proportion to be employed in the Italian Air Force and in Allied Air Force establishments respectively resting with the Air Commander-in-Chief.

10. The Italian Air Ministry should be encouraged, and as far as possible assisted, to reorganize and rehabilitate such resources of the Italian aircraft industry as may now be available, or may become available as additional Italian territory is occupied, and that could be of service to the Italian or Allied Air Forces in the prosecution of the war against GERMANY.

11. You should ensure that the Intelligence Staff of the Italian Air Ministry make available to you, for the information of Commanding General, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, any information that they may obtain that may affect the operational situation or be in any way of value to the Intelligence Staff at Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

Robert H. Tamm
 Colonel, AG
 Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2 - Addressee
- 4 - Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
- 1 - Supreme Allied Commander
- 1 - Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
- 1 - Secretary General Staff
- 2 - Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
- 2 - Commander, 8th Fleet
- 10 - Ltr (Send under informal cover to
 Wing Commander CEME, office of
 the Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief)
- 1 - CG, HQUSEA
- 2 - Chief Administrative Officer
- 2 - 15th Army Gp
- 2 - US Political Adviser
- 2 - Br. Rep. Min
- 2 - Liaison

- 2 - Psychological Warfare Branch
- 1 - G-1
- 1 - G-2
- 1 - G-3
- 1 - G-4
- 1 - G-5
- 2 - AG Records
- 1 - AG M & D

DIST 2538
 1 - CHIEF COMM.
 1 - EXEC. COMM.
 1 - (MAY STAFF)
 1 - ESTAB. SEC.
 2 - HISTORICAL

SECRET

8501

27

26 Feb 45

Admiral Stone. - -

Received a call from Colonel Mitchell, G-5 AFHQ :

1. He referred to a cable we received on 25 Feb in which Lieut. Col. Howard Baidrive, Air Corps, U S Army, has been designated as Deputy to AVM Bowen - Buscarlet, and wished you to know that he considered him a very capable gentleman. He said further that he had been a congressman from Iowa and hoped that you wouldn't hold that against him. He will not be reporting to AC for some 10 or 15 days.

X X X X X X

*Extract from above letter to Admiral Stone.
(Action on Para 2 of letter on file 8262/cc)*

Lieut. Lannin.

2337

PA
7/3

8501
AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION, MAR 1 1945
Rome

AFSC/23/AIR.

SECRET.

Confidential
February, 1945.

My dear General,

MAR 1 - 1945

1. I have to inform you that in accordance with the Supreme Allied Commander's policy of relaxing control over the Italian Government's Institutions, I have been instructed that the responsibility of this Sub-Commission is first to submit to the Italian Air Ministry the policy instructions of the Air/C-in-C, and secondly to assist you with advice and with such material resources as can be made available by the Allies. Under this new directive you will see that this Sub-Commission will take far less a part in the actual running of the Italian Air Forces than heretofore. In the past it has often been made necessary for Officers of my Staff to carry out the duties of Italian Air Force Officers to a great extent, in order that your Forces should continue to function efficiently. This has been particularly so in the case of the Engineering and Technical Branches.
2. The efficiency of the Italian Air Forces is therefore entirely the responsibility of the Italian Air Ministry, and the Italian Air Force must stand or fall by the efforts of the Air Ministry to turn it into an efficient and well organized Force. While the staff of this Sub-Commission is no longer to take upon itself the duties of Italian Officers, our function is to assist the Italian Air Minister, yourself, and Italian Air Force authorities generally to run as efficient an Air Force as possible in accordance with the policy laid down by the Air/C-in-C. To this end various changes are to be made to my staff, to which officers will be posted where duty it will be to advise and assist you to the greatest possible extent.
3. I must emphasize again that the Air/C-in-C has laid the responsibility for the efficiency of the Italian Air Force upon the shoulders of the Italian Air Ministry. I can only assure you that I will do everything possible to help you to maintain and improve that efficiency, and will be only too glad to offer you my advice at any time, should you require it.
4. The broad outlines of the Air/C-in-C's policy as regards the Italian Air Force were passed to you in Sir John Clements's letter JCM.4076 of the 15th January 1945, which was written following the discussions with you on the 14th January 1945. In the following paragraphs I shall set forth the application of this policy in accordance with instructions which I have received from the Air/C-in-C.
5. In paragraph 4 of the above quoted letter the Air/C-in-C ²²³⁶intended you of his intention to appoint a Technical Commission to determine what Italian Equipped Units could be employed usefully, and could be maintained from Italian resources for a period of 12 months. The report of this Technical Commission has now been examined and approved at Headquarters M.A.A.F., and a decision has been arrived at as to the future composition of the Italian Air Force, until the conclusion of the war against Germany. This is set out in the Appendix attached to this letter. To the units shown may be added the minimum necessary repair and maintenance units,

785017

to assist you with advice and with such material resources as can be made available by the Allies. Under this new directive you will see that this Sub-Commission will take far less a part in the actual running of the Italian Air Force than heretofore. In the past it has often been made necessary for Officers of my Staff to carry out the duties of Italian Air Force Officers to a great extent, in order that your Force should continue to function efficiently. This has been particularly so in the case of the Engineering and Technical Branches.

2. The efficiency of the Italian Air Force is therefore entirely the responsibility of the Italian Air Ministry, and the Italian Air Force must stand or fall by the efforts of the Air Ministry to turn it into an efficient and well organized Force. While the staff of this Sub-Commission is no longer to take upon itself the duties of Italian Officers, our function is to assist the Italian Air Ministry, yourself, and Italian Air Force authorities generally to run as efficient an Air Force as possible in accordance with the policy laid down by the Air/C-in-C. To this end various changes are to be made to my staff, to which officers will be posted whose duty it will be to advise and assist you to the greatest possible extent.

3. I must emphasize again that the Air/C-in-C has laid the responsibility for the efficiency of the Italian Air Force upon the shoulders of the Italian Air Ministry. I can only assure you that I will do everything possible to help you to maintain and improve that efficiency, and will be only too glad to offer you my advice at any time, should you require it.

4. The broad outlines of the Air/C-in-C's policy as regards the Italian Air Force were passed to you in Sir John Slessor's letter JUS. 1076 of the 15th January 1945, which was written following the discussions with you on the 14th January 1945. In the following paragraphs I shall set forth the application of this policy in accordance with instructions which I have received from the Air/C-in-C.

5. In paragraph 4 of the above quoted letter the Air/C-in-C ^{21.}intended you of his intention to appoint a Technical Commission to determine what Italian Equipped Units could be employed usefully, and could be maintained from Italian resources for a period of 12 months. The report of this Technical Commission has now been examined and approved at Headquarters M.A.A.F., and a decision has been arrived at as to the future composition of the Italian Air Force, until the conclusion of the war against Germany. This is set out in the Appendix attached to this letter. To the units shown may be added the minimum necessary repair and maintenance units, the Air Ministry, and the essential administrative and Operational Headquarters and depots. I am to instruct you to take immediate steps to implement this policy.

6. The first step is to select the individual aircraft to be retained in the front line, and immediate reserve, and those to be cannibalised in order to back the front line and reserve aircraft. In this connection the Technical Commission has prepared a very valuable list of individual aircraft showing their state of serviceability, and with recommendations as to their disposal. All remaining aircraft are to have the A.C.S. equipment, instruments, etc. removed from them, and are then to be reduced to produce under Allied supervision. I am to instruct you to organize working parties with Italian Air Force labour, and I must request you to forward to me, as soon as possible, your proposals as to the number of these parties, their composition and location, so that I may approve the scheme and call for the necessary R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. engineer Officers to supervise the work.

Continued /2.....

See 39

(MAY 5 1945)

-2-

22

7. In paragraph 5 of the D/ACC-Air-C's Letter referred to above you will see that it is his opinion that the MACHIB can no longer be regarded as first line types. This has been confirmed by the Technical Commission, and these aircraft must now be relegated to training, as shown in the Appendix to this letter. It is realized that these aircraft are particularly dear to the hearts of your operational pilots, and that their removal from the front line will be a sad blow to them. I must count on you to keep their morale up in spite of this, and I shall be only too pleased to help you in every possible way by visiting the units, or in any other way, if you consider that it would be of any help.

8. You will see from the Appendix that the great mass of aircraft of very diverse types and very high unserviceability, which are to be found in the Autonomus Squadrons, the Communications Squadrons, the school at Leverano, and elsewhere, will have to be scrapped. I fully realize that this will be a blow to many pilots who will otherwise have no opportunity to fly, but I must point out that these aircraft have been using Allied petrol and oil, and to a great extent Allied material in order to be kept serviceable, and that they have not, and cannot contribute in any way whatever to the Allied war effort, and that the Allies therefore cannot afford to continue to maintain them.

9. All Italian Headquarters and Units - including the Air Ministry, squadrons, depots and maintenance units, must have proper Establishments of officers and other ranks, and no officer or other ranks over and above the authorized establishments can be allowed. All personnel surplus to these establishments, within the ceiling of 34,000 are to be made available for employment with the R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F.

10. I have been instructed to have these establishments drawn up at once, and to assist your Staff and mine in this an experienced establishment Staff officer from Headquarters M.A.A.F. will be lent to us.

11. I have also been instructed to obtain from you, at once, a complete return of all officers and other ranks on the strength of the Italian Air Force, and this return is to show where and how the personnel are employed. I should be grateful if you would give instructions for this return to be prepared as soon as possible.

12. I have also been instructed to request that you take immediate steps to bring the Italian Air Force up to its full strength of 34,000, by recruitment or other means. According to my information the actual strength is about 28,000, so that the deficiency is in the neighbourhood of 5,000 men.

13. I know that the above proposals will appear to you to be somewhat drastic, but I am sure that you will agree that this will result in a small but efficient force which will be fit to assist the Allied Air Forces in their defeat of the Germans. I have the greatest confidence in your ability to implement these instructions quickly, and without causing any lessening of the morale and efficiency of the operational squadrons.

14. I can only repeat that I and my Staff are most anxious to give you all possible help and advice in carrying out the tasks detailed above. 203

9. All Italian Headquarters and Units - including the Air Ministry, squadrons, depots and maintenance units, must have proper establishments of officers and other ranks, and no officer or other ranks over and above the authorized establishments can be allowed. All personnel surplus to these establishments, within the ceiling of 51,000 are to be made available for employment with the R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F.

10. I have been instructed to have these establishments drawn up at once, and to assist your Staff and mine in this an experienced establishment Staff officer from Headquarters M.A.A.F. will be lent to us.

11. I have also been instructed to obtain from you, at once, a complete return of all officers and other ranks on the strength of the Italian Air Force, and this return is to show where and how the personnel are employed. I should be grateful if you would give instructions for this return to be prepared as soon as possible.

12. I have also been instructed to request that you take immediate steps to bring the Italian Air Force up to its full strength of 51,000, by recruitment or other means. According to my information the actual strength is about 28,000, so that the deficiency is in the neighbourhood of 3,000 men.

13. I know that the above proposals will appear to you to be somewhat drastic, but I am sure that you will agree that this will result in a small but efficient Force which will be fit to assist the Allied Air Forces in their defeat of the Germans. I have the greatest confidence in your ability to implement these instructions quickly, and without causing any lowering of the morale and efficiency of the operational squadrons.

14. I can only repeat that I and my Staff are most anxious to give you all possible help and advice in carrying out the tasks detailed above. 233

Yours sincerely,
W.B. Bunsen

W.B. BUNSEN, ESQ.,
 AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
 AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

R.E. General M. Aime
 Chief of Air Staff,
 Italian Air Ministry,
 Rome.

Copy:

R.E. Doctor Luigi Casarotto, Minister for Air, Italian Air Ministry, Rome.
 Headquarters, M.A.A.F. C.M.F.
 Chief Commissioner, Headquarters, Allied Commission, Rome.

21

ITALIAN AIR FORCE : (RECOMMENDED BY THE BAILLY REPORT AND AGREED BY REPRESENTATIONS OF THE C-119-J, HEREIN).

Aircraft.	Present Italian Number	Aircraft U.S.	Present Controlling Formation.
S.E.F.	P. 39 Gruppo 10 P. 39 " 12 Spit V " 20	16 16 16	B.A.F. " " "
MAFAME	CL. 506 Gruppo 83 CL. 501 " 85 IS. 14 " 85	16 10 6	M.A.C.A.F. " " "
Light Bombers	Balbs Gruppo 28 Balbs Gruppo 132	16 16	B.A.F. B.A.F.
TRANSPORT	SM. 82 Gruppo 1 CL. 1007 " 28 SAI. 202 " -	12 5 1	B.A.F. B.A.F. B.A.F.
COMMUNICATION	EL. 79 " - CA. 314 " - SAI. 202 " -	15 2 3	L.A.F. L.A.F. L.A.F.
P.T.S.	MAC. 200 CA. 104 CR. 42	12 3 3	L.A.F. L.A.F. L.A.F.
O.T.U. and R.R.U.	MAC. 202 MAC. 205 SAI. P. 39 Present holdings Allied types 8 Balbs " " 8 Spit. " " 4	16 16 1	subject to confirmation.

785017

8501 v 7007
INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Originator's Reference: F 33204
 Date/Time of Origin: FEB 251157

Message Centre No: 0/3270
 Date Time Recd: FEB 251440
 Precedence: ROUTINE

FROM: AFHQ SIGNED SAGGED CITE PHOEG
 TO: AIGOM ROME FOR STONE

FEB 25 1945

SECRET

Confidential

SECRET.

BAIDRIVE, HOWARD M, Lt Col, Air Corps, Army serial number 0-130399, has been designated by General MCNARNEY as Deputy to Air Vice-Marshal BOWEN-BUSCARLET, Director of Air Force Sub Commission. Reference Supreme Allied Commanders conference (Political) of 20 February at which revised directive to Air Force Sub Commission was approved. Please advise Director, Eta ROME of Lt Col BAIDRIVE is 6th March

14.
ACTION

See minute 20

DIST

ACTION EXEC COMMISSIONER (2)
 INFO A/PRESIDENT
 CHIEF COMMISSIONER
 AIR FORCES SC
 EST SEC
 FILE

SECRET

Noted BU 1/3
 (HARRIS TALKER)

PA 27/2

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

AFC 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner.

Ref: 850143/EC.

26 February 1945.

SUBJECT: New Executive - Air Force
Sub-Commission.

TO : Director, Air Force Sub-Commission.

1. I refer to Paper No. SAC(P)(43) 3 dated 16 February, 1945, on the above subject, copy of which was furnished you by this office.

2. Herewith for your information an extract from the minutes of SAC(P)'s Political Conference of 20 February 1945 at which this paper was discussed.

/JG.

[Signature]
Staff Officer,
to Executive Commission.

2332

8501A

15

CC 100

21 February 1945

FEB 22 1945

In connection with the proposed new directive for the Air Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission, I suggest that a paragraph be added reading substantially as follows:

"On operational matters, the Director of the Air Forces Sub-Commission will be under the direction of MAAP. On all matters which come under the cognizance of the Air Forces Sub-Commission under the armistice terms, the Director of the Air Forces Sub-Commission will be directly responsible to the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission."

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Air Marshal Sir John Slessor, CBE, DSO, MC,
Deputy Commander in Chief,
Mediterranean Allied Air Forces,
APO 512.

cc: Air Forces S/C
Ex. Comm
CC files

2531

see M.10

8

SECRETEXTRACT

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

K 77

SAC (P) (45) 1st Meeting
20th February, 1945SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(Political)6. REVISED DIRECTIVE TO AIR FORCE SUB-COMMISSION OF THE ALLIED COMMISSION

(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 3)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a draft directive to the Air Force Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission, revised in accordance with the new policy of relaxing direct control over Italian Government institutions.

AIR MARSHAL SLESSOR explained that the Italian Air Force was undergoing reorganization and all elements were being eliminated which could not be used in the war against GERMANY. This would reduce the size of the force and would free personnel for Allied maintenance establishments. The object of the new directive was to lay the responsibility for running the Italian Air Force on the Italian Government's own shoulders. He felt that the risk should be accepted that the administration of the Italian Air Force might in this case break down through inefficiency. He added that the Sub-Commission had hitherto examined the political tendencies of officers whom it was proposed to appoint to important positions and enquired whether any alternative machinery for effecting this existed.

PEARL ADMIRAL STONE replied that this function might appropriately be exercised by the Security section of the Allied Commission. He suggested that a paragraph should be inserted stating that the Head of the Sub-Commission was responsible to the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, on all matters not connected with the operation of the Italian Air Force, or with its administration.

MR. MACMILLAN suggested that the third sentence of paragraph 4 of the draft directive should be modified to make it clear that "political reasons" rendering an officer unsuitable for an appointment referred only to his previous Fascist sympathies.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON enquired whether, since the revised directive to the Air Force Sub-Commission had been stated to be necessary

6. REVISED DIRECTIVE TO AIR FORCE SUB-COMMISSION OF THE ALLIED COMMISSION

(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 3)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a draft directive to the Air Force Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission, revised in accordance with the new policy of relaxing direct control over Italian Government institutions.

AIR MARSHAL SLESSER explained that the Italian Air Force was undergoing reorganization and all elements were being eliminated which could not be used in the war against GERMANY. This would reduce the size of the force and would free personnel for Allied maintenance establishments. The object of the new directive was to lay the responsibility for running the Italian Air Force on the Italian Government's own shoulders. He felt that the risk should be accepted that the administration of the Italian Air Force might in this case break down through inefficiency. He added that the Sub-Commission had hitherto examined the political tendencies of officers whom it was proposed to appoint to important positions and enquired whether any alternative machinery for effecting this existed.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE replied that this function might appropriately be exercised by the Security section of the Allied Commission. He suggested that a paragraph should be inserted stating that the Head of the Sub-Commission was responsible to the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, on all matters not connected with the operation of the Italian Air Force, or with its administration.

MR. MACMILLAN suggested that the third sentence of paragraph 4 of the draft directive should be modified to make it clear that "political reasons" rendering an officer unsuitable for an appointment referred only to his previous Fascist sympathies.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON enquired whether, since the revised directive to the Air Force Sub-Commission had been stated to be necessary on account of the new directive in respect of the functions of the Allied Commission, it was also implied that a fresh directive for the Land Forces Sub-Commission was desirable. He did not himself read into telegram No. FAN 487 the implication that fresh service directives were in fact necessary.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARDING expressed the view that any tendency to redefine the functions of the Land Forces Sub-Commission, or otherwise to interfere with the organization of the Italian land forces at present, should be resisted.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

ADMIRAL CONNORHAN observed that the arrangements in respect of the Naval Sub-Commission were somewhat different from those in respect of the Air Force Sub-Commission, but did not conflict with them.

MR. KIRK enquired whether it was proposed to appoint a Deputy to Air Vice Marshal Rosen Buscarlet as Head of the Air Force Sub-Commission.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MCHAMNEY added that he would put forward the names of an American officer for this appointment.

AIR MARSHAL SLESSOR replied that this appointment would be welcome and added that he had asked for certain other American officers to assist in the work of the Sub-Commission.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER;

- (a) Approved the draft directive to the Air Force Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission, as circulated under Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 3, subject to its amendment to cover the suggestions at 'X' and 'Y' above, and directed that Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, arrange for its issue as amended.
- (b) Directed that no amendment be made at present to the directive of the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission.
- (c) Took note with approval that it was the intention to appoint an American Deputy to the Head of the Air Force Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission.

AIR MARSHAL ELMER replied that this appointment would be welcome and added that he had asked for certain other American officers to assist in the work of the Sub-Commission.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

- (a) Approved the draft directive to the Air Force Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission, as circulated under Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 3, subject to its amendment to cover the suggestions at 'X' and 'Y' above, and directed that Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, arrange for its issue as amended.
- (b) Directed that no amendment be made at present to the directive of the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission.
- (c) Took note with approval that it was the intention to appoint an American Deputy to the Head of the Air Force Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission.

2029

~~SECRET~~

COPY.ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS.

K-60

SAC (P) (45) 3.
16TH February 1945.SECRET.
Copy No. 33.
(Original on File
218/EC).SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL).REVISED DIRECTIVE TO AIR FORCE SUB-COMMISSION
OF THE ALLIED COMMISSION.

Note by Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief.

1. In accordance with what I understand to be the Supreme Allied Commander's policy of relaxing direct control over Italian Government institutions and giving the Italians themselves more responsibility, it has been thought necessary to revise the directive (Annex II) to the Air Force Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission.

2. The revised directive (Annex I) which it is proposed to issue is attached hereto for the consideration of the Political Committee who, I suggest should be asked to advise the Supreme Allied Commander:-

- (a) Whether the underlying conception is in accordance with the general policy now being followed by the Allied Commission.
- (b) Whether this directive in any way conflicts with the policy under which the Italian Army and Navy are controlled.
- and
- (c) Whether it provides for adequate safeguards against the efficiency of the Italian Air Force, such as it is, being ruined by political activities among Italian Air Force Officers.

(Intd) J.C.S.

AIRC Distribution.

Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission - Copy No. 32-34.

AC Distribution:

Chief Commissioner - Copy No. 32
Executive Commissioner - " No. 33
Air Force Sub-Com - " No. 34

Note by Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief,

1. In accordance with what I understand to be the Supreme Allied Commander's policy of relaxing direct control over Italian Government institutions and giving the Italians themselves more responsibility, it has been thought necessary to revise the directive (Annex II) to the Air Force Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission.

2. The revised directive (Annex I) which it is proposed to issue is attached hereto for the consideration of the Political Committee who, I suggest should be asked to advise the Supreme Allied Commander:-

(a) Whether the underlying conception is in accordance with the general policy now being followed by the Allied Commission.

(b) Whether this directive in any way conflicts with the policy under which the Italian Army and Navy are controlled.

and

(c) Whether it provides for adequate safeguards against the efficiency of the Italian Air Force, such as it is, being ruined by political activities among Italian Air Force Officers.

(Initd) J.C.S.

AFHQ Distribution:

Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission - Copy No. 32-34.

AC Distribution:

Chief Commissioner - Copy No. 32
Executive Commissioner - " No. 33
Air Force Sub-Com - " No. 34

2028

Enclosures on this paper

at 1410 (14)

See (17)

SECRET.

X-60

ANNEX I.

TO : Air Vice-Marshal W.A.B. Bowen-Buscalet, CBE, DFC,
Air Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission.

FROM : Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces.

1. The following instructions supersede and cancel the directive which was issued to you from this Headquarters on 7th December 1944, under reference No. JCS.1821.
2. Your duty is to represent the Allied Air Forces on the Allied Commission and to advise the Chief Commissioner on matters affecting the Italian Air Force.

As representative of Air C-in-C on the Allied Commission your functions will be as follows:-

3. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that an Italian Air Force, with an authorised manpower ceiling of (at present) 31,000, shall be allowed to remain in being for the present, as a co-belligerent Service for the defeat of GERMANY.

Your primary function, in general, is to assist the Italian Air Minister, Chief of Staff and Italian Air Force authorities generally, to run as efficient an Air Force as possible for the above end, in accordance with the policy laid down by the Air C-in-C, within the limits of their authorised resources and of such resources as the Allies can make available to them. You should be quite clear, and should make clear to the above mentioned Italian authorities, that the efficiency of the Italian Air Force is their responsibility. Your responsibility is first to transmit to the Italian Air Ministry the policy instructions of the Air C-in-C, and secondly to assist them with advice and with such material resources as can be made available by the Allies. If in your view the I.A.F. authorities are failing in their duty, you will make such representations as you may think fit to the Air C-in-C and the Chief Commissioner including, if necessary, recommendations for the removal of any particular officer or officers.

4. Your function is thus a professional and not a political one. In the event of a change of Government in ITALY you will be responsible for advising the Air C-in-C, in the light of your knowledge and official contacts as a member of the Allied Commission, as to the qualifications, from the Air Force point of view, of any potential Secretary or Under-Secretary of State. And you will reserve the right to approve or reject on grounds of professional suitability, the appointment of Commanding Officers and Senior Staff Officers in the I.A.F.: in doing so, however, you should as far as possible ensure that there is no political reason for the officer concerned being unsuitable for his appointment. You should discourage any political activities on the part of Italian Air Force personnel that may come to your notice. Apart from this it is not your function to concern yourself with the political views of any I.A.F. personnel unless they obtrude themselves before you.

As representative of Air C-in-C on the Allied Commission your functions will be as follows:-

3. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that an Italian Air Force, with an authorized manpower ceiling of (at present) 31,000, shall be allowed to remain in being for the present, as a co-belligerent Service for the defeat of GERMANY.

Your primary function, in general, is to assist the Italian Air Minister, Chief of Staff and Italian Air Force authorities generally, to run as efficient an Air Force as possible for the above end, in accordance with the policy laid down by the Air C-in-C, within the limits of their authorized resources and of such resources as the Allies can make available to them. You should be quite clear, and should make clear to the above mentioned Italian authorities, that the efficiency of the Italian Air Force is their responsibility. Your responsibility is first to transmit to the Italian Air Ministry the policy instructions of the Air C-in-C, and secondly to assist them with advice and with such material resources as can be made available by the Allies. If in your view the I.A.F. authorities are failing in their duty, you will make such representations as you may think fit to the Air C-in-C and the Chief Commissioner including, if necessary, recommendations for the removal of any particular officer or officers.

4. Your function is thus a professional and not a political one. In the event of a change of Government in ITALY you will be responsible for advising the Air C-in-C, in the light of your knowledge and official contacts as a member of the Allied Commission, as to the qualifications, from the Air Force point of view, of any potential Secretary or Under-Secretary of State. And you will reserve the right to approve or reject on grounds of professional suitability, the appointment of Commanding Officers and Senior Staff Officers in the I.A.F.: in doing so, however, you should as far as possible ensure that there is no political reason for the officer concerned being unsuitable for his appointment. You should discourage any political activities on the part of Italian Air Force personnel that may come to your notice. Apart from this it is not your function to concern yourself with the political views of any I.A.F. personnel unless they obtrude themselves by affecting the efficiency of the I.A.F.; nor is it your duty to discover any political activities in which I.A.F. personnel may be engaged - that is ~~is your~~ ^{is your} for the I.A.F. authorities themselves.

Thus you and your staff have no political responsibilities, but should keep in close touch with, and consult as necessary, any authorities under AFHQ whose duty it is to concern themselves with the past and present political activities of any Italian Service personnel.

5. You and your staff will be in the same relation to the Staff branches of MAAP concerned with organization, maintenance, supply, training and equipment, as a subordinate AGC and his staff. You should keep these branches fully informed and you are entitled to their assistance and advice as required.

-2-

- 16
6. Five squadrons of the Italian Air Force are equipped with Allied types. Anything above that must be maintained from existing Italian material resources. You should ensure that the I.A.F. authorities retain in the Service only such Italian-equipped units as can effectively contribute to the war against GERMANY, in which should be included such Communications units as may be essential for internal courier services; the decision on the number, strength and composition of units falling under this category is one for the Air C-in-C acting on your advice. You will be responsible for ensuring that the Italian Air Ministry do not maintain any units in excess of those authorized by the Air C-in-C.
7. All first line operational units will be unreservedly at the disposal of the Air C-in-C who will place them under the operational control of the appropriate MAAF subordinate Commander.
8. You will submit routine reports on matters affecting the organization, administration and maintenance of the Italian Air Force to HQ, MAAF. All normal reports concerning the operations of the Italian Air Force units will be rendered by the MAAF Commander responsible for operational control. Special reports by you or the operational Commander concerned may be necessary from time to time, such as on matters of organization, administration or maintenance of Italian Air Force units which are affecting their operational efficiency. No reports are to be made direct to any higher authority except the Chief Commissioner and this Headquarters; the latter will be responsible for determining any wider distribution which may be necessary.
9. Over and above the requirements of the operational units, and of such non-operational and ancillary units as may be authorized, there is and will be a surplus of trained I.A.F. manpower within the present ceiling of 31,000 referred to above. You will be responsible for organizing the provision of such surplus manpower - and any additional surplus that may become available - for the use of the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, the decision on the proportion to be employed in the I.A.F. and in Allied Air Force establishments respectively resting with the Air C-in-C.
10. The Italian Air Ministry should be encouraged, and as far as possible assisted, to reorganize and rehabilitate such resources of the Italian aircraft industry as may now be available, or may become available as additional Italian territory is occupied, and that could be of service to the Italian or Allied Air Forces in the prosecution of the war against GERMANY.
11. You should ensure that the Intelligence Staff of the Italian Air Ministry make available to you, for the information of HQ, MAAF, any information that they may obtain that may affect the operational situation or be in any way of value to the Intelligence Staff at HQ MAAF.

Air Marshal,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief.

8. You will submit routine reports on matters affecting the organization, administration and maintenance of the Italian Air Force to HQ MAAF. All normal reports concerning the operations of the Italian Air Force units will be rendered by the MAAF Commander responsible for operational control. Special reports by you or the operational Commander concerned may be necessary from time to time, such as on matters of organization, administration or maintenance of Italian Air Force units which are affecting their operational efficiency. No reports are to be made direct to any higher authority except the Chief Commissioner and this Headquarters; the latter will be responsible for determining any wider distribution which may be necessary.

9. Over and above the requirements of the operational units, and of such non-operational and ancillary units as may be authorized, there is and will be a surplus of trained I.A.F. manpower within the present ceiling of 31,000 referred to above. You will be responsible for organizing the provision of such surplus manpower - and any additional surplus that may become available - for the use of the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, the decision on the proportion to be employed in the I.A.F. and in Allied Air Force establishments respectively resting with the Air C-in-C.

10. The Italian Air Ministry should be encouraged, and as far as possible assisted, to reorganise and rehabilitate such resources of the Italian aircraft industry as may now be available, or may become available as additional Italian territory is occupied, and that could be of service to the Italian or Allied Air Forces in the prosecution of the war against Germany.

11. You should ensure that the Intelligence Staff of the Italian Air Ministry make available to you, for the information of HQ MAAF, any information that they may obtain that may affect the operational situation or be in any way of value to the Intelligence Staff at HQ MAAF.

Air Marshal,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief.

2326

SECRET.

X-60
SECRET.

ANNEX II.

TO : Air Vice Marshal W.A.B. Bowen-Buscarlet, CBE, DFC,
Air Force Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission.

FROM : Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Force.

DATE : 7th December 1944.

Ref: JCS.1821.

Your duties as senior officer of the Air Forces Sub-Commission in Italy have recently been reviewed and it is agreed that they should henceforth be defined as follows:-

1. To represent the Allied Air Forces on the Allied Commission, and to advise the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, in respect of matters affecting the Italian Air Force.
2. To supervise the organization, maintenance, supply, training and equipment of the Italian Air Force including operational squadrons which, for operational purposes will be placed unreservedly under the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. The Italian Air Force is to consist primarily of Italian personnel and equipment, but certain squadrons are equipped for the time being with Allied types of aircraft, by agreement of the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.
3. To advise and control the Italian Air Ministry so that the Italian Air Force may be administered in such a way as to ensure its efficiency.
4. To keep the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean informed of the resources of the Italian Air Force and aircraft industry, both in equipment and manpower, which may become available, as additional Italian territory is occupied, for the use of the Italian or Allied Air Forces.
5. To reorganize and rehabilitate as far as possible the resources of the aircraft industry in Italy for the use of the Italian Air Force.
6. To organize the provision of Italian manpower in substitution for Allied personnel from the Italian Air Force within its present authorized ceiling of 34,000, in so far as such personnel are surplus to the requirements of the Italian Air Force. The decision as to the proportions of Italian Air Force personnel to be employed in the Italian Air Force and in Allied Air Force establishments will rest with the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.
7. To keep the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean informed of any intelligence from Italian or Italian Air Force sources affecting the operational situation.
8. To keep the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, and the Chief

in Italy have recently been reviewed and it is agreed that they should henceforth be defined as follows:-

1. To represent the Allied Air Forces on the Allied Commission, and to advise the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, in respect of matters affecting the Italian Air Force.
2. To supervise the organization, maintenance, supply, training and equipment of the Italian Air Force including operational squadrons which, for operational purposes will be placed unreservedly under the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. The Italian Air Force is to consist primarily of Italian personnel and equipment, but certain squadrons are equipped for the time being with Allied types of aircraft, by agreement of the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.
3. To advise and control the Italian Air Ministry so that the Italian Air Force may be administered in such a way as to ensure its efficiency.
4. To keep the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean informed of the resources of the Italian Air Force and aircraft industry, both in equipment and manpower, which may become available, as additional Italian territory is occupied, for the use of the Italian or Allied Air Forces.
5. To reorganize and rehabilitate as far as possible the resources of the aircraft industry in Italy for the use of the Italian Air Force.
6. To organize the provision of Italian manpower in substitution for Allied personnel from the Italian Air Force within its present authorized ceiling of 31,000, in so far as such personnel are surplus to the requirements of the Italian Air Force. The decision as to the proportions of Italian Air Force personnel to be employed in the Italian Air Force and in Allied Air Force establishments will rest with the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.
7. To keep the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean informed of any intelligence from Italian or Italian Air Force sources affecting the operational situation. 2325
8. To keep the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, and the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, informed of any political developments or information which may come to his notice affecting the efficiency of the Italian Air Force.
9. To maintain liaison with the Public Relations Branch of the Allied Commission in order to supply them with any information which would be of assistance to them.

(Sgd) J.C. SLESSOR,
Air Marshal,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief.

HEADQUARTERS
MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR FORCES

7

CC 135

Air Vice-Marshal Bowen-Duscarlet.
Mr. Macmillan.
Admiral Stone.
Air Vice-Marshal Cooke.
Group Captain Bailey.
Group Captain Denny.
Air Vice-Marshal Elliot.
Major-General Beaumont Newbitt.
D.A.F.L., Air Ministry.

With the compliments of
Air Marshal Sir John Slessor.

2524

785017

JAN 17 1945

CC 135

HEADQUARTERS
MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR FORCES

JCS. 1076

SECRET

15th January, 1945

JAN 17 1945

Confidential

The object of this letter is to summarize and confirm the conclusions reached at our meeting in Rome on January 13th.

In your letter 010101/89.V. of 10th January to Air Vice Marshal Buscariet you address yourself in a practical manner to certain questions of general policy governing the organization and employment of the Italian Air Force. I fully agree with you that it is time the situation was clarified, and that appropriate measures should be put in hand to dispense with superfluous organizations and personnel, and to retain and reorganize such organizations and personnel as are necessary.

2. In an early paragraph of your letter you refer to a point which unfortunately is necessarily obscure, and must remain so till the Peace Settlement, namely the question of "that part of the I.A.F. destined to continue after peace is concluded". As I told you, I am not in a position to give you any guidance on that subject. All I am authorized to do is to assist in the equipment, organization and maintenance of such units of the Italian Air Force as can be usefully employed during the present war in the fight against the common enemy. In that I include units for training of replacement aircrew to meet wastage, and for essential transport services.

3. I think however that this does provide the necessary firm basis of policy on which to establish the reorganization of the Italian Air Force. The first factor is that, for reasons which I explained to you, I am unable to equip or maintain on allied types more than the 5 squadrons at present so equipped - namely, 1 squadron Spitfires, 2 squadrons P-39 and 2 squadrons Baltimore.

4. Any other units that are retained must remain equipped with Italian aircraft. We agreed therefore that a review should be made of Italian resources by the Air Forces Sub-Commission and yourself, assisted by Staff Officers from this Headquarters, to determine what Italian equipped units can usefully be employed and can be maintained.

General Aisone Gab,
Chief of Staff,
Italian Air Force.

223

/from Italian.

From British resources for a period of 12 months, which I think we can accept as a reasonable assumption to cover the duration of the war against Germany. An important factor in this review will be the work of the newly appointed Technical Commission and I am instructing Group Captain Bailey, the Engineer Staff Officer representing the B.I. on the Technical Commission, that the foregoing should be the basis of his work; and that he should recommend the immediate retention to production of all aircraft which are not likely to be useful for this purpose. This follows a precedent recently adopted for British aircraft in this theatre, and I am sure you will agree that it would be quite wrong to waste the money of the Italian Air Force personnel, equipment or other facilities in the repair or replacement of aircraft or components which are never likely to be of any value for our purposes.

3. The most disposition of the reorganised Italian Air Force must await the outcome of the review referred to above, which should be presented forward as expeditiously as possible, but it is likely that it will be on the following lines:-

- (a) The three fighter and two light bomber squadrons referred to in para 3 above.
- (b) An operational training and refresher unit, to take the above squadrons and to keep in flying condition pilots of these squadrons to become operational again. I think this will be an easy one to which we can put the MACCHI, which can no longer be regarded as a 1st line type.
- (c) A Bomber Transport Unit for supply dropping operations in the Balkans and for essential maintenance transport.
- (d) A Reconnaissance Unit or units for Air Sea Reconnaissance, anti-submarine patrols and essential maintenance transport.

(4)

(c) The Communications unit for internal carrier services, and

(d) such training, maintenance and ancillary units as may be agreed upon as essential to support the units in (a) to (c) above.

6. It is of the first importance that this small Air Force should be based on a sound system of administration and internal organization. To this end it will be necessary to reconstitute:

(a) A small but carefully selected and soundly organized Air Ministry staff. I quite realize that the Air Ministry must be larger than would be necessary to administer only the Air Force outlined in para 5 above; but I would suggest that you should examine the possibility of organizing the Air Ministry in two distinct sections:-

- (i) To deal with the Air Force as it exists today, and
- (ii) To deal with the many complicated questions of administration, finance, personnel policy, etc. that are the legacy of the past.

I realize that the work of these two sections must to some extent overlap, but feel that there is a great deal to be said for dealing with the two quite different problems as far as possible separately.

(b) It will also be necessary to retain a small operational Headquarters between the Air Ministry and the units, to deal with the current day-to-day problems of operations and administration of the units in the field.

7. I think you will agree that on the above basis there should be no question of any fresh recruitment of officers or other ranks. Indeed the problem becomes, as you have pointed out, one of the disposal of surplus personnel. I hope that, in this connection, you will give special consideration to the disposal of officers who have reached an age when they can no longer be profitably employed in their rank, and to the advancement of younger officers with good operational records. I am sure you will also give special

attention to the disposal of those officers whose interest in the I.A.F. appears to be more political than professional.

8. The number of maintenance and specialist personnel that will be surplus to the needs of the forces in para 3 above will become apparent on the termination of the review referred to in para 4. As I told you, the I.A.F. may be able to take a valuable contribution to the war effort by making available such surplus personnel as can usefully be employed to reinforce, in the Maintenance organization behind the British and American Air Forces in the Mediterranean, Allied technical personnel who could be released to other theatres of war. I have instructed Air Vice-Marshal Cooke, the Director of Maintenance and Supply, to undertake at the appropriate time, and in conjunction with the A.F.S.C., an American technical officer and Italian Air Ministry, an investigation into the technical qualifications of I.A.F. ground personnel becoming surplus to the needs of the reorganized I.A.F., and to report on the numbers that could be absorbed in British and American Maintenance Units. In this connection I think we should not overlook the possibility that such personnel might usefully be employed, after the defeat of Germany, in the Far Eastern theatre of war against our other common enemy Japan.

9. Turning to certain specific points raised in your letters of 7th and 10th January to Air Vice Marshal Buxton, which we also discussed at our meeting.

First the question of the scale and standard of food, pay, clothing and equipment of the I.A.F. units serving with the R.A.F.

(A) As to food, the Air Force Sub-committee and this d.c. have devoted considerable efforts to obtaining a higher standard of rations for the operational squadrons; as I told you on Saturday we have been able to secure an increase in the ration which, while not as large as I should have liked, will nevertheless I hope constitute a marked improvement.

(B) I agree with you that an increase of pay is desirable, and will take up the case with the Chief Commissioner. This, however, is a complicated matter with the details of which I am not familiar and I am, of course, quite unable to promise that by attempt to obtain some increase of pay will meet with success.

- 5 -

- (c) Clothing and equipment. We have recently been able to provide some help in this direction - for instance the provision of boots; and I will continue to give you such assistance as may be essential to the extent that is within my powers. I would like to emphasize, however, what I told you at our meeting, that this problem of clothing and equipment is one which I believe can to a considerable extent be solved by the Italian Air Force themselves. I am sure you will find, when you have had more time to investigate the problem, that the equipment system of the I.A.F. is extremely inefficient. The example you quote of the oxygen masks confirms me in my view that many of your troubles are due to an almost complete lack of any proper equipment organization comparable to that in the R.A.F. It is partly this lack of system which accounts to some extent for the difficulties and lack of faith with which demands for the supply of Allied material are sometimes met - as referred to in your letter of 7th January; it has been our experience that I.A.F. units are very liable to over-demand, and to turn to us for help in equipment problems which they could solve themselves if they had an efficient system.

I have arranged for an Equipment Commission, on the lines of the Technical Commission referred to in para. 4 above, to be set on foot as early as possible. And I hope you will instruct your Equipment Staff to collaborate fully with this Commission, to establish as quickly as possible in the I.A.F. a proper equipment system - including arrangements for stock taking and the establishment of unit equipment tables on R.A.F. lines. Only by such means can we determine what are the real needs of the units, what are the I.A.F. resources available to meet them and consequently the scale and nature of the deficiencies which we will endeavour as far as possible to make good.

10. I explained to you the reasons, mainly the already excessive congestion on forward airfields, why I.A.F. fighter squadrons can not be employed on the Italian front itself. I hope, however, you will explain to the fighter units that they are making a valuable contribution to the liberation of ITALY by operating in the RAJAN AIR FORCE against the enemy in YUGOSLAVIA.

But I understand the keenness of ITALIAN personnel to take some part in the war in their own country, and I will discuss with the Air Officer Commanding Desert Air Force the possibility of

①

- 6 -

using the Baltimore squadrons against German targets in the Po Valley area.

11. I will at once discuss with Allied Force Headquarters the possibility of releasing the Italian Air Ministry building for your use, and will let you know if this proves possible.

12. I was not aware of the points raised in your letter of 7th January about the maltreatment of Italian officers in Albania. I am afraid this is to some extent inevitable, and it may be relevant to point out that we have also had examples of Allied aircrew personnel being maltreated after forced landing or being out in the Balkans. But we may possibly be able to be of some assistance in this matter - as also in the matter of obtaining information about I.A.F. personnel who are missing on operations - provided all such incidents are immediately reported, through A.F.S.C. Headquarters in Bari, to the Headquarters of the Balkan Air Force.

13. I am having the possibility examined of issuing some form of identity card to I.A.F. personnel serving with the R.A.F., to avoid such humiliating incidents as that of Major Valentini, which I much regret. We shall require your closest collaboration in the difficult matter of avoiding misuse of these identity cards, notably the most rigorous disciplinary action against any personnel convicted of such misuse. I will let you know in due course if it proves possible to come to some such arrangement.

14. I am not quite clear as to your meaning in referring, in your letter of 10th January, to the absence of a consultative body to discuss between the I.A.F. and Allied Commands certain problems of administration. The Air Forces Sub-Commission exists for just that purpose, and I am sure you will find that A.V.M. Bussarlet and his staff will continue to extend to you all possible assistance, within the bounds of the declared policy and of our available resources, in solving those and similar problems.

15. Finally, may I say how much I appreciate the practical and co-operative spirit in which you have approached the difficult problems of your new appointment, and assure you of my sympathetic understanding and assistance in solving them in the interest of the early defeat of our common enemies.

(Sgd.) J. G. GLEASON

2513

0 9 i 3 |