

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

ACC

10000/109/1192
(VOL. I)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

10000/109/1192
(VOL. I)

ALLIED & ITALIAN TROOPS IN ITALY,
POLICY
MAY 1945 - FEB. 1946

EC/8723

Allied + Italian Troops in Italy

Restricted in Scope #3

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

*Restricted in
Sgt #3*

10000/109/1192

THIS FOLDER

CONTAINS PAPERS

FROM

CATALOGUE.

Ex. Com. by cgs running ³ by 101.

this signal was sent in reply to the
attached which was received to 13 Corps.
No action has been taken by PRB
on it, nor are they contemplating any.

H/2/2

18/19/2.

JPRB

(4)

We spoke. Please ensure that if telegrams
as in 2 have been sent, they are sent Secret

H/2/2

(5)

Ex. Com.

Thank you. Will do. Report again.

H/2/2/20 H/2.25/2

82.Chief Commissioner.

Reference our conversation this morning, attached are (a) letter to the Prime Minister for your signature, (b) suggested reply of the Prime Minister for his signature.

29 Dec. 45.

MSL
Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

87

ESO

Pse see 86 in reply to 85.

EJS 7/1

93

A/ESO

92 has arrived in answer to 85.
I do not know what started it.
Perhaps you would like to show it to Ex C. for instructions. At any rate the three Service S/Cs should have copies of 85 & 92, which I will see about if you minute file back to me after Ex C. has seen 92.

Capt B.

94

EJS 28/1

084

Send copies of 92 to Service S/C's with covering letter requesting them to take co-ordinated action on para 2. Request them to treat as urgent & to forward letter containing their proposals to AFHQ for Ex. Comm. to sign. Copies of your letter to Polack & Leon Sec. (+ copy for P.C.'s file.)

H.S. 29/1

Ex-Com. Given orders for info. Com-635 is
at. Volnoyo.
in 82 November.

778 (1.1.12)

79.

Ref 78, 9 July 76, para 2. Our instructions are
"to obtain an undertaking from the 11.900
not to station troops other than Carabinieri
anywhere within 15 miles etc (para 4 of 69).
In view of this para 2 of 76 is not correct.
The remainder of 76 falls with our
instructions - para 4 of this will be complied with
(see 3-4 of 69)

27/12.

80.

Executive Commissioner.

1. Ref. p. 76, please see minute 79. Our instructions are - vide X of p. 67 - that the Chief Commissioner should informally notify the Italian Prime Minister that (1) when the transfer documents came to be signed, a condition that Italian troops other than Carabinieri should not be stationed within 15 miles of the Franco-Italian border, might be imposed; (2) ~~it would probably be necessary to make a public announcement that the transfer would be without prejudice to any rectifications of the Italian frontiers which might subsequently be agreed upon.~~
2. As far as I am aware there has been no exchange of letters between ourselves and the Italian Government covering this point. You will also see that at para. 4 of p. 69, SAC, in his signal to the CCS "proposes at the time of hand over to obtain an undertaking by the Italian Government not to station troops other than Carabinieri anywhere within 15 miles of the Franco-Italian border."

Ref 78, 9 July 76, para 2. Our instructions are
 "to obtain an undertaking from the 16. Govt
 not to station troops other than Carabinieri
 anywhere within 15 miles etc (para 4 of 69).
 In view of this para 2 of 76 is not correct.
 The remainder of 76 tallies with our
 instructions - para 4 of this will be complied with
 (see 3-4 of 69) 27/12

80.

Executive Commissioner.

1. Ref. p.78, please see minute 79. Our instructions are - vide X of p.67 - that the Chief Commissioner should informally notify the Italian Prime Minister that (i) when the transfer documents came to be signed, a condition that Italian troops other than Carabinieri should not be stationed within 15 miles of the Franco-Italian border, might be imposed; (ii) it would probably be necessary to make a public announcement that the bandages would be without prejudice to any rectifications of the Italian frontiers which might subsequently be agreed upon.
2. As far as I am aware there has been no exchange of letters between ourselves and the Italian Government covering this point. You will also see that at para.4 of p.69, SAC, in his signal to the CUS "proposes at the time of hand over to obtain an undertaking by the Italian Government not to station troops other than Carabinieri anywhere within 15 miles of the Franco-Italian border."
3. Has this point been dealt with by you or the Chief Commissioner? If not, and you agree, I will ask Legal to prepare the appropriate document. As regards the discrepancy between our instructions, Y of p.76, I will take this up with the American Embassy on return of file.

28 Dec. 45.

C.S.O.

i. 83 off

stencil

K. 12.11

C.S.O.

Check folio 59 with Gen. Browning before despatch.

/s/ M.S.L.
15 Dec62

Ex. loun.

Min 61 - 61A submitted for signature
Gen. Browning's draft is at folio 59.-min
17/1263Reference folios 59 + 60. E.C. has
discussed with G.O.C. Land Forces S/C.Decided that letter should not be
sent as whole subject was discussed
at SACMED's conference on 14. Dec. 1945.
Await minutes.P. 11
54.See
folio 7467

Min 61 - 61A submitted for signature
Gen. Browning's draft is at folio 59.

17/12

63.

Reference Folios 59 + 60. E.C. has
discussed with G.O.C., Landa & Co. S/C.

Decided that letter should not be

sent as whole subject was discussed
at SACMED's Conference on 14 Dec. 1948.
Await minutes.

17/12
54.

See
Folio 74

Ex. Com.
25/12

See see

for info

17/12
25/12

seen by
Ex. Com.
17/12

47.

CAS

The numbers shown in 44 were supplied by the Italian Police Agencies and are those originally submitted for Frontier duty. No further reinforcements have been sent and none applied for.

As local changes may have been made signals were sent to Regions for further information. (Copy attached). A complete list of Police posts along the Italian Frontier to the Brenner Pass has been obtained from Capt. T. Braccapletti, Chief of C.I.C. Frontier Control and is attached. A reply from Piedmonte Region also attached. The reply from Liguria is awaited. Full details will be submitted immediately they are received.

13-12-45.

C. J. Byc. Cdt.

C.C.S.

54

49

The summary on the 5th page of 49 (which is for the whole border) is less than the figures for Piedmont only shown on 50. It is understood 50 relates to greater depth. A list of stations follows

C.A.S.
13 DEC 194556

Chief Commissioner.

No letter has been sent to Mr. Cdt. on last paragraph 37. Will you inform de Gasperi



information. (Copy attached). A complete list of police posts along the Italian frontier to the Brenner Pass has been obtained from Capt. T. Braccapiedi, Chief of C.I.C. Frontier Control and is attached. A reply from Piedmont Region also attached. The reply from Liguria is awaited. Full details will be submitted immediately they are received.

13-12-45.

C. J. Dye. cc.

cc. S.

5th

1945

The summary on the 5th page of 49 (which is for the whole border) is less than the figures for Piedmont only shown on 50. It is understood 50 relates to greater depth. A list of relations is attached.

C.A.S.
17 DEC 1945

5th

W. J. Dye

Chief Commissioner.

No letter has been sent to H. C. B. on last
page of 137. Did you inform de Gasperi
verbally?
W. J. Dye

5th

Reference minute 56 - EC spoke to CC.
CC told de Gasperi verbally re last para of P.S. 4.

W. J. Dye

81

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

CAS.

45

I do not understand P.S. approach to this.

C.C. wishes to know how the C.C. & P.D. Agents are distributed - & if there has been any increase as result of withdrawal of British troops.

First thing is to find out from the R.C.S. where the police forces are. If P.S. don't know exact they find out. A sample telegram would suffice.

Second. We want reply to C.C.s second query.

Again P.S. can find out by a sample telegram.

Then explained all this verbally to C.A. Bye.

C.C. wishes to know how the CCR & P.D. Agents are distributed - & if there has been any increase as result of withdrawal of Brita 2 troops.

First thing is to find out from the R.C.S. where the police forces are. If P.S. don't know exact they find out. A sample telegram would suffice.

Second. We want reply to C.C.'s second query.

Again P.S. can find out by a sample telegram. Perplained all this verbally to CA Byr.

Let me hear the answer please & quickly.

WV/g/au.

PS.

In action please

CAS
19 FEB 1946
X-525.

[Signature]

083

Exon.

Ref 1 of 39.

(a) Carabinieri. (along the border, posts unknown)

2 officers
15 nets

(b) Guardi Finanzi.

135 carabinieri

(along border in Imperia, Torino, Susa, Aosta, Cuneo, Saluzzo)

(c) Agents of P.S.

(along frontier in 12 different posts)

11 officers
117 agents

10/12 4/12

at

Chal Commission

The Franco Italian frontier to a depth of

15 miles. 15 miles Eastwards will be left in charge of

352 CERR.

557 Finanza Guardie. 128

Police Security.

1037 in all - about

1 agent of Public Security per — square miles

MS 4/12

42.

FC

117 agents.

10/12 88 4/12.

it

Chin Commission

The Franco Italian frontier to a depth of
 15 miles Eastwards will be left in charge of

352 CCR. 557 French Guards. 128

Police Security. 1037 in all - about

1 agent of Public Security per — spec. kilos

12.

MS 4/12.

F.C.

yes, but is this more than
 we have originally when Allied
 troops were there.

b
 1
 C.C.

No more.

DEF 6 RED
 CC 640

MS 4/12

07.

✓

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

(38)

Chief Commissioner

Please see p 37. In view of the indication
to leave the Franco Italian frontier without any
troops at all on the Italian side I think we
should inform the Italian Gov. - & expect a reaction

DS/2/11.

CSC

39.

DEC 8 1945
RECD

1. Discussed with C.S. who, noting that CERR are not
troops as indicated in telegram, instructs me to find out
strength of CERR & other Police Agencies in the Area and
whether they have been reinforced & will be reinforced as
result of their sight. CD Bye is finding out. Please follow up.
2. Discussed with Brig Tate & AFHQ who gives authority to
inform French Rep if occasion arises. No action on this
point until I am asked.

DS/3/11

078

³²
P31 cancelled by telephone to C.C. from AFHQ

C.C. has requested new instructions

But the telegram should not have been sent for
info to the Ex. Ref. without instructions.

DS/30/11

(33)

~~ESB~~ ~~1/12~~

Ref min 32 - Message Center has been instructed
as per para 2.

ESB 30/11

36

Ex. Com.

I think you have already seen P.30 & 37.

Suggest no action of X for the time being.

~~1/12~~
2/12

077

22.

Cso

See 21. Draft letter submitted. Is
 this the right form? Copies, of course, would
 go to all dist. of 21.

LBS 16/11

26

G.S. Com.

P. 24 for -1-

Final
 - 18/11

(27)

Cso

This was a top sec. signal. There we should
 be very chary about repeating it to others until
 we are instructed. Better to tell Rcs that it
 is a top sec. and see to further their

26

Gex. Com. R. 24 for info.

- 18/11/54

(27)

C80

This was a top sec. signal. I think we should be very chary about repeating it to others until we are instructed. Better to tell RCE that it is ~~for~~ Top Sec and Sec & for their own info. only. Otherwise someone will tell someone else & there will be hell to pay.

Mr. C. E. D. 1. 578

Capitaine Moullec informed of 121 by me today. He fears protest.

18/11/54

18/11/54

3.
 16/6. Draft 20 letter withdrawn re for 2.000
 I shall discuss with C & S Army. Z.
 Int. Sec.

(12)

Executive Commissioner:

8. 11.
 Polios & and 8 for information.

SH
 G.S.O.

18 June 45.

778/15/6

16

Exclur

Understand to be a clerk

Seen a copy 7 15.

5/4.

2.

Chief Commissioner.

Approved
 Attached is submitted for your signature

8. 11.
Folios 8 and 9 for information.

18 June 45.

C.S.O.

MS/15/6

16

Ex. Com.

Understand to have clearly

seen a copy of 15.

Ex. 5/3.

2.

Chief Commissioner.

attached is submitted for your signature information

CC has seen MS/15/6

20.

Ex. Com. P. 19 for info. 15/6

8273

101

E.O.A.C. (R) VAM AFHQ

C IN C MED

RESTRICTED IMPORTANT

FEB 4 1946

TRANSPORT YOUR 021019 ⁹⁹ WILL BE ARRANGED.

-----031140A FEB-----

T/P

P/L

TOR 1540

PAG.D.

4/2

DIST. 2-H/M EXEC COMMISSIONER ALLIED COMMISSION

(CAPT C) 512

Copies sent to: L.F. SFC
air forces, SFC
52

071

785017

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

File

100

~~SECRET~~

4 February 1946
Confidential

Ref: 8273/53

SUBJECT: Pantelleria and Lampedusa.

TO : H.Q., Sicily Liaison Group, A.O.

98

Ref my signal 861 of 2 February.

Herewith copies of the correspondence referred to in the last paragraph.

G. R. BRAYBROOKE

L
Brigadier
Executive Commissioner

Refs sent

*97
96
95
92
85*

Typing 46. FAN 684 (file 2605/EC)

*PA
4/2
98*

673

8273

99

SECRET

FEB 4 1946

C IN C MED (R) VA MALTA A.F.H.Q.

FROM EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER
ALCOM
021019A Feb

One representative each from Navy, Land Forces
and Air Forces Sub-Commissions ready to proceed via ALCOM plane to MALTA
February 4th under orders A.F.H.Q. to conduct inspection of PANTELLERIA
and LAMPEDUSA. Request suitable vessel as transportation from MALTA
to PANTELLERIA, LAMPEDUSA and return. Inspection should take three days.

D.T.G. 021019A Feb

Comd of Malta Cypher "C" D.R.B.C. Cr 72 I/T P.M. 2.1.46
T/P for AFHQ

List: 0 to 4 25 (NSC 4 copies)
Exec Commissioner

(CAPT C) 4/2

072

pre file
(Pant. Lamp.)

785017

98

ALCOHOL TO RICHLY

861

PAGE 2

PRIORITY

Confidential

SECRET

ABLE FOR HOW QUEEN HAVE ACCEPTED THAT LIAISON OFFICERS ON PANTHERIA
AND LAMPEDUSA MAY BE RECALLED PROVIDED ISLANDS COVERED BY YOU PD THEY
DESIRE INITIAL INSPECTION TO BE CARRIED OUT BY THE THREE SERVICE
SUBCOMMISSIONS PD REPRESENTATIVES WILL LEAVE BY AIR FOR MALTA ABOUT
FEBRUARY FOUR AND THREE PROCEED BY SEA TO VESSEL FOR INSPECTION IN
COPIES OF CORRESPONDENCE FOLLOW PD

See 100

Copy to:-

Chief Commissioner
Nominations Sec
Polad (A)
Polad (B)
Navy Secs 3/3
Land Forces 3/3
Air Forces 3/3

See 100

Office of the Executive
Commissioner

300

071

785017

~~SECRET~~

8273/SC
Ref: ~~SEC/1556~~

Confidential

2 February 1946.

SUBJECT: PANTELLERIA and LAMPEDUSA.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
G-5 Section.

1. In accordance with your F 59503, representatives of the three Service Sub-Commissions will depart from Rome on or about February 4, via ALCOM plane to Malta and via surface vessel from that Port for the purpose of conducting an initial inspection of the above-mentioned two localities. The representatives of the three Service Sub-Commissions, as listed below, have been instructed to implement the provisions of paragraph 4b of PAF 634:

Navy Sub-Commission - Lt. H.A.V. HALL, R.N.V.R.

Land Forces Sub-Commission - Captain J.J. WARD, U.S.A.

Air Forces Sub-Commission - ~~Major H.G. SASS~~ ^{MAJOR H.G. SASS}

2. The above-named Officers will depart from Rome via ALCOM plane on or about February 4 for Malta. Vice Admiral, Malta is being requested by separate signal to furnish transportation via surface vessel for the purpose of the inspection to Pantelleria and Lampedusa.

For the Chief Commissioner.

M. F. LUSH,
Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

Copy to: Chief Commissioner.

Polad (1)

Polad (2)

Rome Sec.

NAVY S/C

LAND FORCES S/C

AIR FORCE S/C

See 98 + 99 + 102

070

785017

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
NAVY SUB-COMMISSION APO 894

NSC/4535

1 February 1946

S-E-C-R-E-T

FEB 2 1946

From: Navy Sub-Commission, Allied Commission.
To: Executive Commissioner, Allied Commission.
Subject: Pantelleria and Lampedusa.
Reference: (a) Your letter 8273/95/EC of 29 January 1946.

1. In accordance with reference (a), co-ordinated action has been taken by the Navy Sub-Commission, Land Forces Sub-Commission, and Air Forces Sub-Commission on paragraph 2 of F 59503, regarding an inspection by representatives of the three Service Sub-Commissions to Pantelleria and Lampedusa.

2. A meeting of representatives of the three Service Sub-Commissions was held this date in the Navy Sub-Commission for the purpose of working out the details for this inspection.

3. As a result of the meeting mentioned in paragraph 2 above, the Air Forces Sub-Commission has agreed to furnish transportation by air to Malta, said transportation to be ready by February 4. The following-named representatives of the three Service Sub-Commissions will conduct the initial inspection as called for in reference (a), F 59503, and paragraph 4b of FAN 634:

Navy Sub-Commission - Lt. H.A.V. HALL, R.N.V.R.

Land Forces Sub-Commission - Captain J.J. WARD, U.S.A.

Air Forces Sub-Commission - Major M.C. MIXSON, USAAF.

4. It is requested that Vice Admiral, Malta be requested by signal to make available a suitable surface vessel to transport the above-named Officers from Malta to Pantelleria, Lampedusa and return. It is contemplated that the entire trip should take four to five days from time of departure from Rome.

G. F. MENTZ,
Captain, U.S.N.,
CHIEF, NAVY SUB-COMMISSION, AC,
Acting.

(CAPT B)

Copy to file 7002/EC

See 97

785017

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

SECRET.

95

Ref: 8273/95/EO.

29 January 1946.

SUBJECT: PANTELLERIA and LAMPEDUSA.

TO : Navy Sub-Commission.
Land Forces Sub-Commission. (LMIA)
Air Forces Sub-Commission.

Confidential

(92)

(85)

1. Attached are copies of this Headquarters' signal 9891 of 3 January 46 and AFHQ's reply (F 59503) of 26 January 46.
2. You are requested to take coordinated action on para 2 of F 59503 and to submit a draft letter to AFHQ for the Executive Commissioner's signature containing your proposals.
3. Please treat this matter as urgent.

(92)

C. R. BRAYBROOKE

Chief Staff Officer,
To the Executive Commissioner.

Copy to: Chief Commissioner
Polad (A)
Polad (B)
Econ Sec

Copy to file 7002/EC. for ACTION

068

1A
3011

785017

CIPHER

INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Originator's Reference: F 59503

Message Centre No: G/8192

Date/Time of Origin: 261301A

Date Time Rec'd: JAN 27 1200

Precedence: URGENT
JAN 26 1946

FROM: FREEDOM SIGNED SACHED CITE FREG

TO : ACTION ALCON HOME

SECRET**SECRET** Confidential

REUR SIGNAL 9891 OF 3 JANUARY.

1. LIAISON OFFICERS ON PAUTALIERIA AND LAMPEDUSA MAY BE RECALLED PROVIDED THAT THESE ISLANDS ARE COVERED BY LIAISON OFFICERS PALERMO AS PROPOSED BY YOU.
2. IT IS DESIRED THAT AND INITIAL INSPECTION SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE 3 SERVICE SUBCOMMISSIONS AND THAT THE LATTER SHOULD ISSUE INSTRUCTIONS TO IMPLEMENT THE PROVISIONS OF PARA 4 B OF PLAN 634. THEREAFTER OCCASIONAL VISITS OF A LIAISON OFFICER SHOULD SUFFICE PROVIDED THAT HE IS ADEQUATELY BRIEFED BY THE SERVICE S/C S.
3. INSPECTION REPORTS ON THESE ISLANDS SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO AIRHQ.

CIPHER TELEGRAM

This message will not be distributed outside British or U.S. Government Departments or Headquarters or be submitted even in Cipher O.T.P. need not be submitted. (If submitted, it should be marked as such.)

AC DIST

ACTION: EX COMMISSIONER (2)

INFO : CHIEF COMMISSIONER

POLAND A

P OLAD B

See M.93

Precedence: ~~Department~~
JAN 23 1956

FROM: FREEDOM SIGNED SIGNED CITE FRELLO
TO : ACTION ALCON ROLE

SECRET Confidential

SECRET

REF SIGAL 9891 OF 3 JANUARY.

1. LIAISON OFFICERS ON PANTALLERIA AND LANGELOSA MAY BE RECALLED PROVIDED THAT THESE ISLANDS ARE COVERED BY LIAISON OFFICERS PAINTED AS PROPOSED BY YOU.
2. IT IS DESIRED THAT AN INITIAL INSPECTION SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE 3 SERVICE SUBCOMMISSIONS AND THAT THE LATTER SHOULD ISSUE INSTRUCTIONS TO IMPLEMENT THE PROVISIONS OF PARA 4 B OF FAN 634. THEREAFTER OCCASIONAL VISITS OF A LIAISON OFFICER SHOULD SUFFICE PROVIDED THAT HE IS ADEQUATELY BRIEFED BY THE SERVICE S/C S.
3. INSPECTION REPORTS ON THESE ISLANDS SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO AFHQ.

CIPHER TELEGRAM
This message will not be distributed outside
British or U.S. Government Departments or
Headquarters or be transmitted even in Cipher
without being paraphrased. (Message transmitted
O.T.P. need not be paraphrased)

AC DIST

ACTION: EX COMMISSIONER (2.)

INFO : CHIEF COMMISSIONER

POLAND A

P. OIAO B

BOOK (2)

FILE(S) (SPECIMEN)

See M93

mg

11

Copy to file 7002/EC

17	0.	(15)	} 3/1
"	0.	(18)	
"	0.	(18)	

SP6

Super B

785017

8273-91
SECRET

0-172
22 151

91
L.T. Cowan
0/7865

JAN 23 0915

IMPORTANT

JAN 24 1015

EMIA

DISTWO

INFO: ALCON -AFHQ

SECRET

MINISTRY OF WAR PROPOSAL.

1. TO MOVE 114 INF REGT AT PRESENT IN AREA CORO TO AREA GENOA.
 2. TO CANCEL MOVE OF 37 INF REGT FROM AREA BELLUNG TO AREA REGGIO EMILIA.
 3. TO MOVE 111/87 RECENTLY MOVED TO REGGIO EMILIA BACK TO BOIZANO TERRITORIAL REGION.
- PLEASE STATE YOUR VIEWS ON THESE PROPOSALS.

Confidential

SECRET

AG DIST

ACTION: P. SAFETY S/C (2)

INFO : CHIEF COMBINED

EX COMMISSIONER

CIVIL AFFAIRS - EC

FILE

RELISTON

HEADQUARTERS

23 JAN 1946

1.C.

CIPHER TELEGRAM

This message will not be distributed outside British or U.S. Governmental Departments or Headquarters and should even in cipher without being paraphrased. (Messages marked O.T.P. need not be paraphrased).

(907 13) CIB
74

660

PA
24/1
8
2

785017

581 590

375
90

CG 8253

4 January 1946

JAN 7 1946

SUBJECT: Italian Troops along France-Italian
Frontier

TO : G-5, AFHQ

88989

There are forwarded herewith original copies
in Italian and English of the President of the Council's
undertaking not to station Italian troops other than
Carabinieri within fifteen miles of the Franco-Italian
frontier.

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Copies to: Exec Commr
VP, CA Sec
Land Forces S/C
American Embassy
British Embassy

PA
7/11

06: LEB

CHPT 10
1444 5
7/11
H 7/11

COPY

IL PRESIDENTE DEL CONSIGLIO DEI MINISTRI

3/2335

Roma, 30 Dic. 1945

Care Ammiraglio,

in risposta alla Sua lettera del 29 dicembre 1945,
Le scrivo per confermarLe il mio accordo verbale già comunicato nel
nostro colloquio del 12 dicembre 1945 e per dichiararLe quindi che il
Governo italiano s'impegna a non dislocare truppe all'infuori dei CC.MR.
entro 15 miglia dalla frontiera Franco-Italiana, fino a nuova
comunicazione da parte del Supremo Comandante Alleato.

Molto cordialmente,

/s/ De Gasperi

Ammiraglio Hilary H. Stone, USNR
Capo della Commissione Alleata

ROMA

C O P Y

IL PRESIDENTE DEL CONSIGLIO DEI MINISTRI

3/2335

30 December 1945

My dear Admiral,

In reply to your letter of 29 December 1945, I write to confirm my verbal agreement expressed at our meeting on 12 December 1945 and to state that the Italian Government undertakes not to station troops other than CC.RR. anywhere within fifteen miles of the Franco-Italian frontier pending further notification from the Supreme Allied Commander.

Very truly yours,

/s/ De Gasperi

Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone, USNR
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
Rome

INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

CIPHER TELEGRAM

Originator's Reference: **7 48898**

Date/Time of Origin: **JAN 051437A**

Message Centre No: **6/18000**

Date Time Rec'd: **JAN 060900M**

Precedence: **ROUTINE**

FROM: **GHQ CMT SIGNED SIGNED CITE PREG**

TO : **ALLIED COMMISSION ROME**

JAN 7 1946

SECRET.

SECRET

Reur 9891 of 3rd January 1946.

Plans of CINC MED are being obtained after which a decision will be made.

Confidential

AC DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: ELEC COMM (2)

**INFO: CHIEF COMMISSIONER
FILE**

CIPHER TELEGRAM

This message will not be distributed outside British or U.S. Government Departments or Headquarters unless it is submitted even in cipher without the O.T.P. (See M. 87)

See M. 87

TO : ALLIED COMMISSION ROKE

JAN 7 1946

45

SECRET

SECRET.

Reur 9891 of 3rd January 1946.

Views of CINC MED are being obtained after which a decision will be made.

Confidential

RECEIVED

6 JAN 1946

AC DISSEMINATION

ACTION: EXEC COMM (2)

INFO: CHIEF COMMISSIONER
FILE

CIPHER TELEGRAM

This message will not be distributed outside
British or U.S. Government Departments or
Headquarters. It is transmitted even in cipher
without O.T.P. (all messages are
transmitted).

BS/13/1.

Final 2/1

Copy to file 702/K

BS/13/1.

SECRET

062

See M-87

11

785017

file 8273

15

85

HQ ALCOM

G-5, AFHQ

9891

3 JANUARY 46

PRIORITY

69

SECRET PD

REFERENCE MAP ONE ZERO NINE EIGHT OF ONE ONE DECEMBER FOUR FIVE PD
DO YOU WISH ABLE MIKE GEORGE OFFICERS PANTELLERIA LAMPEDUSA REMAIN
AS LIAISON OFFICERS PD
SUGGEST THEY BE RECALLED AND THESE ISLANDS COVERED BY LIAISON
OFFICERS PALERMO

Confidential

See 92

Office of Exec. Commr.

300

F. H. McCLEARY

C.S.O.

Copy to 7002/EC.

Handwritten signature

BU
9/11

(A)

061

785017

SECRET

(84)

Confidential
December 1945.

Ref: 8273/81/80.

SUBJECT: Handover of Northern Provinces to the Italian Government.

TO : The American Embassy.
The British Embassy.

(81)

Attached for your information is a copy of the Chief Commissioner's letter 8273/81/80 dated 29 December 45, addressed to the President of the Council of Ministers, together with a copy of the Prime Minister's reply also dated 29 December 45.

(81A)

T. A. L.

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

Incls.

PA
3/1
[Signature]

060

785017

83

SECRET

Ref: 8273/83/EO.

31 December 1945.

Confidential

SUBJECT: Handover of Northern Provinces to the Italian Government.

TO : G-5 Section, A.P.H.Q.

1. Reference HAF 1098 of 11 December 45 and in confirmation of our telephone conversation to-day, the Handover documents were signed in ROME on 20 December 45.
2. The undertaking by the Italian Government not to station troops other than Carabinieri anywhere within fifteen miles of the Franco-Italian border was signed by the Italian Prime Minister on 29 December 45. A copy of this undertaking, to which no publicity has been given, is enclosed. — 81(A)

For the Chief Commissioner:

/s/ F.H. McCreary Lt. Col.
for Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

Incl.

Copy to: Polad (A)
Polad (B)
Econ Sec
GA Sec
Est Sec
Navy Sub-Comm.
Land Forces Sub-Comm. (MIA)
Air Forces Sub-Comm.

59

785017

(41)

Ref: 8273/81/20.

29 December 1945.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Confirming my conversation with you on 12th December 1945, I write to inform you that the Combined Chiefs of Staff require, in connection with the imminent restoration of territory in Northern Italy, an undertaking from the Italian Government not to station Italian troops other than CO.RM anywhere within fifteen miles of the Franco-Italian border pending the outcome of diplomatic negotiations between the United States, United Kingdom and French Governments.

I should be glad, my dear Mr. Prime Minister, if you would confirm in writing your verbal agreement expressed at our meeting.

Very truly yours,

See h. 79 10 12

*PA ref 81A
228571*
8/11 5/1
Noted
OP.

ELERY W. Stone
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Dr. Alcide de Gasperi,
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government,
Rome.

Copy to: Poland (A)
Poland (B)
L.F. 2/2 (MMA).

058

785017

81A


PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
ITALIAN GOVERNMENT
ROME

29 December 1945

My dear Admiral,

81
In reply to your letter of 29 December 1945, I write to confirm my verbal agreement expressed at our meeting on 12 December 1945 and to state that the Italian Government undertakes not to station troops other than OC.BR anywhere within fifteen miles of the Franco-Italian frontier pending further notification from the Supreme Allied Commander.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Alcide De Gasperi


Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone, USNR
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
Rome.

657

581
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSIO..

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

78

DEC 21 1945

C.S.O.

This needs checking very carefully
with our instructions. Note line underlined
in page 2. We had no such restriction as
"troops (CERA) already stationed there"

See M. 79-80

M. 79-80

See M. 79-80.

636

DEC 21 RECD

Paraphrase of Telegram Received at the American Embassy, Rome,
from the American Embassy, Paris, dated December 15, 1946. 77

Last evening the question of the "official French announcement reported by the United Press", mentioned in Rome's telegram of December 13, was taken up urgently with Chauvel and he was apprised of the very unfortunate impression this had made in Rome and at AFHQ. He was astonished and said there had been NO official statement. He showed Ambassador Caffery a paper which had been approved by Bidault and himself several days before, stating that the French Minister thought any announcement by the French would not be wise and probably would complicate the Italian situation. Chauvel called the chief press officer and asked that this announcement be accounted for. The press officer said there had been no official announcement and said he imagined the UP story was based on an AFP despatch which had NOT been cleared by the Foreign Office but which had appeared on Thursday evening in Le Monde (generally looked on as a semi-official publication). The despatch was based on a communique issued by the Italian President of the Council, containing two final paragraphs reading as follows: ✓

One learns at Paris that Allied troops are evacuating a zone on the Franco-Italian frontier 25 kilometers deep where territorial adjustments are desired by the French in the Alpine region.

However, it is understood that the Italian troops will not be permitted to reoccupy this frontier zone after the Allied troops have withdrawn.

Chauvel called attention to the fact that the information in these two paragraphs was not correct as the area in question is only fifteen kilometers deep, and ascribed this incident, which he said he considered "deplorable" to the ill considered activities of some irresponsible person. He requested Ambassador Caffery to explain that the publication of the AFP despatch did not represent the policy of either the Foreign Minister or the French Government and to convey the sincere regrets of the French for the publication of the announcement.

Copy to: Chief Commissioner

M

Paraphrase of Telegram Received from the American Embassy, Paris
at the American Embassy, Rome, dated December 15, 1945. (76)

Today the British Embassy delivered a note to the French Government based on instructions received from London, in the following vein:

1. Since the British Ambassador at Paris communicated with the French Foreign Minister on December 1 and 3, HMG, in consultation with the United States Government, considered most carefully the French Government's representations.
2. HMG wishes to make it clear that the withdrawal of Allied troops from the Franco-Italian frontier was not at variance in any way with the agreement reached by the French High Command and SACMED last June, which agreement provided "that for so long as Anglo-American troops are available in NW Italy, Italian troops will not be stationed on the Franco-Italian frontier." Anglo-American troops, as it has been explained already, are no longer available, and it has consequently not been possible to stay their withdrawal from the areas in question. However, SACMED immediately ordered that for the present no Italian troops except Carabinieri already stationed there could enter a fifteen mile zone along the frontier.
3. On December 12, the Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission, on instructions from SAC, pointed out to the Italian government that the pending transfer of certain Italian provinces to Italian Government administration would not prejudice any rectification of the Italian frontier which might later be arrived at. The French Government will undoubtedly be acquainted with the press statement made by the Allied Commission on December 13, with respect to this transfer. Knowing the French Government's interest in this matter, HMG wish to inform the French Government that as soon as possible a statement will be made which will indicate that the withdrawal of Allied troops, as well as the transfer of these territories to Italian Government administration will not prejudice any frontier rectification which the peace treaty may later contain.
4. SAC has been instructed to inform the Italian Government that the withdrawal of Allied troops from the Franco-Italian frontier does not prejudice any question of frontier rectification, and to arrange as far as possible, for no Italian troops except Carabinieri to enter those areas in which the French Government is particularly interested.
5. HMG hopes that, taking the foregoing into consideration, the French Government will agree all possible measures have been taken to insure French interests are not jeopardized.

The British Embassy does not intend to say anything of the press article from Paris mentioned in Rome's telegram of December 13.

Copies to: Chief Commissioner ✓
~~Executive Commissioner~~
~~Polad (P)~~

TOP SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

B 1157

DEC 20 1945
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TOP SECRET

COPY NO 28

DEC 20 1945

MINUTES OF A SPECIAL MEETING CALLED BY THE
SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER
TO DISCUSS PAR 635
HOLD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1200 HOURS
ON MONDAY 17 DECEMBER 1945

PRESIDENT :-

Lieutenant General Sir William D. Morgan,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Lieutenant General M.B. Ridgway,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Major General A.P. Ward,
Chief of Staff, AFHQ

Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Major General A.C. Duff,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Brigadier General A.L. Hamblen,
Acting Deputy Chief of Staff, AFHQ

Mr. Philip Broad,
Deputy British Resident Minister

Mr. Homer H. Byington, Jr.,
Deputy U.S. Political Adviser

Brigadier D.P. Yates,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

Colonel J.E. Bastien, Jr.

Confidential

see M75.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

DISCUSSION

Confidential Centre

Lieutenant General Sir William D. Morgan,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General H.B. Ridgway,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre.

Major General A.D. Ward,
Chief of Staff, AFHQ

Dear General Ellery W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission:

Major General A.C. Duff,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Brigadier General A.I. Hamblen,
Acting Deputy Chief of Staff, AFHQ

Mr. Philip Broad,
Deputy British Resident Minister.

Mr. Homer I. Livingston, Jr.,
Deputy U.S. Political Adviser

Erinellier D.P. Yates,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

Colonel J. E. Easton, Jr.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander

SECRETARIES :-

Lt. Colonel D.C. Cummings
 Major William H. Hays

CLASSIFIED TOP SECRET:
BY AUTHORITY OF SAC

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TOP SECRET

LC Diss. 20 Dec

Box No 27 End Corner

28 End Corner

29 ~~End Corner~~ 28 SW

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

493 (13)

The Conference had before them a telegram* from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander, directing him as to the formal public announcement of the handover to the Italian Government Administration of the remaining Italian territory now under Allied Military Government, including the islands of LIPARI, LINOSA, and PANTERRELLA, but excluding VENEZIA, GUILIA and the Province of UDINE.

The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER wished to decide whether any immediate action was required. He considered that to defer action would inevitably lead to complications; false rumors, which were inevitable, and articles in the Press would do further harm. He referred in particular to the United Press release made in PARIS on the 12th. The Chief of Staff read out this release.

Mr. Philip BROAD stated that a further Press release had been made, the text of which he handed to the Supreme Allied Commander. The Supreme Allied Commander read this to the meeting.

The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER recommended that, in view of what they had already heard, an immediate announcement would be in every way desirable. He stated that there was, in addition, another reason why he would like to make an announcement within the next few days. As this reason was a purely British one, he did not wish to press it unduly. A question had been asked in the House of Commons on 17/12, and H.M.G. would like to be able to give a comprehensive answer to this question before the House of Commons rose on the 20th. This would only be possible if a formal public announcement was made and released to the Press in time for publication on the 19 December.

Rear Admiral STONE, Chief Commissioner Allied Commission, said that in view of his instructions of the 11 December, that he was to ensure that the agencies under his control would at present give no publicity to the exclusion of Italian troops from the BRUNICO-ITALIAN Frontier zone or to the possible rectification to the ITALIAN Frontier, he would prefer to postpone the announcement, possibly until the time of actual handover. He had assured the Italian Prime Minister that the Allies had not been responsible for the United Press release from PARIS with regard to this. To make this further announcement now would he considered create a bad impression on the Italian Government.

The DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER expressed the opinion that it might give the impression that we were not keeping good faith with the Italian Government, and he agreed with Admiral STONE that it would be better to postpone the announcement for this reason.

The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER tabled a proposed draft of the wording of the announcement for discussion at the meeting, whether to be made public now or at a later date.

785017

Chief of Staff read out this release.

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The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER tabled a proposed draft of the wording of the announcement for discussion at the meeting, whether to be made public now or at a later date.

Mr. Philip BROAD suggested that this announcement might be more acceptable if the wording was slightly changed so as to give the impression that it was being made after the matter had been discussed with the Italian Government. Also that this night, at the same time, overcome the objection to making an immediate announcement rather than waiting until the date of handover.

Rear Admiral STONE said he would like to discuss this matter with the Italian Prime Minister, and if possible, get his agreement to making this public announcement. He also wished to keep to the wording of paragraph 4 of F.N. 635, thereby leaving out any reference to agreements other than to the Peace Treaty.

* F.N. 635

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- 2 -

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Mr. Philip HODGKINS stated that it was in the interests of the Italian Government to make this statement early, in order to stop further undesirable rumors circulating as to future frontier rectifications and withdrawal of troops.

The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER agreed and directed that the wording should be changed to that suggested by Mr. Philip HODGKINS, which would make this announcement more palatable to the Italian Government, make possible an immediate public announcement which would appear as confirmation of Admiral STONE's previous announcement of 13 December, and at the same time should emphasize our confidence in the Italian Government.

The DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER and Admiral STONE concurred.

The agreed wording of the public announcement was read to the meeting and follows:-

"Since his announcement of 13 December 1945, Rear Admiral Henry H. STONE, USNR, Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission, has been in consultation with the Italian Government with regard to the detailed arrangements for the handing back to Italian administration of the territories therein mentioned.

It is confirmed that the remaining Italian Territory now under Allied Military Government, including the islands of LIPARI, LIPARI, and LIPARI, but excluding VENEZIA, GORIZIA, and the Province of UDINE, will be transferred to Italian administration on 31 December 1945.

The transfer of these territories and any withdrawal of Allied troops which the Supreme Allied Commander may determine is without prejudice to any frontier rectification which may be decided in the Peace Treaty."

Rear Admiral STONE stated that he would call on the Italian Prime Minister this evening or tomorrow morning, and would endeavour to get his agreement to the release of this statement in time for publication in world Press on the morning of Wednesday 19 December.

The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that, if necessary, he was prepared to bring pressure to bear on the Italian Prime Minister to agree to the publication of this announcement.

Mr. BYINGTON expressed the opinion that the announcement should not be made without the agreement of the Italian Prime Minister.

Rear Admiral STONE expressed the opinion that the announcement should

Government.

The DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER and Admiral STONE concurred.

The agreed wording of the public announcement was read to the meeting and follows:-

"Since his announcement of 13 December 1945, Rear Admiral Wilfrid T. STONE, USNR, Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission, has been in consultation with the Italian Government with regard to the detailed arrangements for the handing back to Italian administration of the territories therein mentioned.

It is confirmed that the remaining Italian Territory now under Allied Military Government, including the islands of LIPARI, LIGURI, and EPIROTI, but excluding VENEZIA, GUILM, and the Province of UDINE will be transferred to Italian administration on 31 December 1945.

The transfer of these territories and any withdrawal of Allied troops which the Supreme Allied Commander may determine is without prejudice to any frontier rectification which may be decided in the Peace Treaty."

Rear Admiral STONE stated that he would call on the Italian Prime Minister this evening or tomorrow morning, and would endeavour to get his agreement to the release of this statement in time for publication in world Press on the morning of Wednesday 19 December.

The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that, if necessary, he was prepared to bring pressure to bear on the Italian Prime Minister to agree to the publication of this announcement.

Mr. SYNGE expressed the opinion that the announcement should not be made without the agreement of the Italian Prime Minister.

Rear Admiral STONE expressed the opinion that the Italian Prime Minister would agree to the publication, and did not wish to use pressure unless it was essential. The announcement would be released in time for publication by world Press on Wednesday 19 December, subject to agreement by the Italian Prime Minister.

The SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

- (c) Approved as amended in discussion the wording of the public announcement to be made as directed by P.M. 635.

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

- 4411 (1)
- (b) Instructed the Chief Commissioner Allied Commission to communicate to the Italian Prime Minister the text of the announcement referred to at (a) above, and obtain his agreement to its release for publication in the Press on Wednesday 19 December 1945.

J. F. Gurne
J. F. GURNE,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

Handwritten:
P.O. BOX
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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- 4 -

785017

8273 - 2605.

TOP SECRET
AFHQ MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

TOO: 150043Z
PRIORITY

PARAPHRASE UNNECESSARY
TOP SECRET

AFSC

70
TOP SECRET

Confidential

FROM : AGWAR FROM CCS

TO : AFHQ FOR MORGAN INFO: CABINET OFFICES FOR
BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF.

REF NO THIS MESSAGE: W 88779

15 DECEMBER 1945

24 35
This message is FAN 635.

1. With reference NAF 1090 and NAF 1096. Withdrawal of Allied Troops is approved.

2. You should continue to keep Italian Troops (other than Carabinieri) as far as possible out of areas actually claimed by French. Intervention by you would be covered by directive in FAN 487.

3. You should inform Italian Government that withdrawal of Allied Troops is without prejudice to any question of frontier rectification.

4. On handover of territory to the Italian Government, or earlier if possible, you should include in the public statement referred to in FAN 634, words to the effect that "The transfer of these territories and any withdrawal of Allied Troops is without prejudice to any frontier rectification which may subsequently be decided in the Peace Treaty."

5. It is desired that this public statement should in any case be made within next two weeks and at same time as announcement referred to in paragraph 3 of FAN 634.

NOTE: NAF 1090 IS FX 53113 MC OUT 1071 14/11/45 G-3 (AFHQ).
NAF 1096 IS FX 55074 MC OUT 2312 30/11/45 G-3 (AFHQ).
FAN 487 IS WX 29633 MC IN 23763 31/1/45 G-5.
FAN 634 IS W-87691 MC IN 1765 9/12/45 G-5. - Min 63

B.O. on arrival of
minutes referred to at time 63
MC IN 2976

PARAPHRASE UNNECESSARY

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

COPY NO.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

785017

REF NO THIS MESSAGE: W 88779 (CONTD)

15 DECEMBER 1945

ACTION: G-3(APHQ)

INFORMATION:	G-2	C/S MTO	SACS	US POLAD	G-5 ✓
	CAO	G(SD)	CINC MED RAF		LIAISON
	RESMIN	aa			

MC IN 2978

16 DECEMBER 1945

0010A

REF NO W 88779

JJC/E

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

BEST COPY POSSIBLE

INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Originator's Reference: **NA 51664**Date/Time of Origin: **DEC 11 1917A**Message Centre No: **045158**Date Time Rec'd: **DEC 1309**Precedence: **URGENT**FROM: **AFHQ SIGNED SIGNED CITE PHOOS**TO : **ACTION: AGWAR WASHINGTON FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF AND CABINET OFFICERS
FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF
INFO: ALCON ROSE****SECRET.**

This is NAV 1098 Reference FAN 624 and NAV 1096.

Para 1. The immediate handback of the Northern Provinces raises the question of whether the rights of the Italian Government in the Franco-Italian frontier zone are to be in any way restricted.

Para 2. It is clear that unless we do restrict the employment of Italian troops in this zone pending the outcome of diplomatic negotiations between the United States, United Kingdom and French Governments we risk provoking the French into precipitate action.

Para 3. Logically the Italian Government when responsible for the administration of the Provinces of Piedmont and Liguria should be permitted to station such troops as they consider necessary anywhere in these provinces. I am reluctant to attach further formal conditions to the hand over of territory, but I feel that the present restriction on the employment of Italian troops in the frontier zone (NAV 1096) should be maintained until the question is settled with the French Government.

Para 4. I therefore propose at the time of hand over to obtain an undertaking from the Italian Government not to station troops other than Carabinieri anywhere within 25 miles of the Franco-Italian border. This undertaking will be given no publicity. The Italian Prime Minister will be informed now that some such condition may be imposed.

Para 5. I estimate that the hand over of the Northern Provinces will be effected about 31 December. Urge that the question of restrictions in the Franco-Italian Frontier Zone be settled with the French Government by that date.

AC DISTRIBUTION**INFO ACTION: SEC COMMISSIONER****INFO: CHIEF COMMISSIONER****FOIA (A)****FOIA (B)****C A SECTION****LAND FORCES S/C****PLS (SECRETARY)****Confidential**

TO : ACTION: ACHAR WASHINGTON FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF AND CABINET OFFICES
FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF
INFO: ALCON ROME

SECRET.

Dec 66
CONFIDENTIAL

This is NAF 1096 Reference FAF 634 and NAF 1096.

Para 1. The immediate handbook of the Northern Provinces raises the question of whether the rights of the Italian Government in the France-Italian frontier zone are to be in any way restricted.

Para 2. It is clear that unless we do restrict the employment of Italian troops in this zone pending the outcome of diplomatic negotiations between the United States, United Kingdom and French Governments we risk provoking the French into precipitate action.

Para 3. Logically the Italian Government when responsible for the administration of the Provinces of Piedmont and Liguria should be permitted to station such troops as they consider necessary anywhere in these provinces. I am reluctant to attach further formal conditions to the hand over of territory, but I feel that the present restriction on the employment of Italian troops in the frontier zone (NAF 1096) should be maintained until the question is settled with the French Government.

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AC DISTRIBUTION

INFO ACTION: MAC COMMISSIONER

INFO: CHIEF COMMISSIONER

POLAD (A)

POLAD (B)

C A SECTION

LAND FORCES S/C

FILE (SECRETARY)

W/C NOTE: Distribution delayed on instructions of Office, Mac. Commissioner.

File
CSO has seen
Dec 66

(CSO)

018

101
SECRET.

CONFIDENTIAL

Top
SECRET.

70
68
CONFIDENTIAL
EXTRACT from the MINUTES OF SACRED'S CONFERENCE
(10th Meeting) held at AFHQ on 11 December 1945

MINUTE No. 5.

CONFIDENTIAL

5. HANDBACK OF NORTHERN PROVINCES TO THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT.
(JPS Study No. P/321 (Final)).

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper by the Joint Planning Staff examining, in the light of the current restrictions on employment of Italian troops in the FRANCO-ITALIAN frontier zone, the situation produced by receipt of the Combined Chiefs of Staff signal PAN 634 directing the Supreme Allied Commander to hand back the northern Italian provinces and other Italian territories to Italian government control, and attaching a draft signal on the subject to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that three possible courses were open:

- (i) To carry out literally the instructions of PAN 634.
- (ii) To hold up action and refer the whole matter back to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
- (iii) To take cognizance of the fact that, if the instructions of PAN 634 were carried out as they stood, the Italians would probably move troops into the frontier zone thereby provoking a violent French reaction, and therefore to attach to the handback of territories some condition designed to prevent such a state of affairs arising.

He recommended course (iii). He also thought it would be necessary to inform the French in regard to what was being done.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE considered it most important that he be authorized to notify the Italian Government immediately that the handback of territories had been approved. He understood the reasons which made reservation in regard to the Franco-Italian frontier zone necessary and he suggested that this could be dealt with if he told the Italian Prime Minister that, when the transfer documents came to be signed, it might be necessary to raise the question of whether Italian troops could be allowed in the frontier zone. If handled in this way the matter would not be likely to cause the Italian Prime Minister any alarm.

MR. BYINGTON said that the United States Ambassador regretted that he was unable to attend the meeting. The Ambassador was of the opinion that the contents of PAN 634 should be notified to the Italian Government immediately.

Commander to hand back the northern Italian provinces and other Italian territories to Italian government control, and attaching a draft signal on the subject to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

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- (ii) To hold up action and refer the whole matter back to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
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MR. BYINGTON said that the United States Ambassador regretted that he was unable to attend the meeting. The Ambassador was of the opinion that the contents of PAN 634 should be notified to the Italian Government immediately.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER then tabled a revised draft signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

MR. BYINGTON said that he would have to ask for instructions, with regard to any plan which did not contemplate the handback without restriction of all northwestern Italian territory, up to the 1939 Franco-Italian frontier, on the same basis as other northern provinces. However, if it were decided that some condition must be attached to the handback, the method of approaching the matter suggested by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, was in his view more satisfactory than any other.

SIR NOEL CHARLES agreed that this method of approach was the most satisfactory. He further agreed with the Supreme Allied Commander that steps should be taken to prevent the Italian Government moving troops into the frontier zone.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM considered that restrictions should definitely be imposed on the employment of Italian troops in the frontier zone.

-2-

REAR ADMIRAL STONE, referring to the suggestion in the draft cable that a public announcement should be made that the hand over of northern provinces would be without prejudice to any rectification of the Italian frontier which might subsequently be decided on, pointed out that a direction as to the public announcement required was included in para 3 of PAN 634. These instructions had presumably been carefully considered by the State Department and Foreign Office and agreed by them.

MR. BROAD read a signal from the British Ambassador in WASHINGTON to the Foreign Office which stated that the State Department agreed that the Supreme Allied Commander should be instructed:

- (a) that on the withdrawal of allied troops no Italian troops other than Carabinieri should enter a 15 mile belt along the frontier;
- (b) that in handing over territory to Italian Government administration a communication to the Italian Government and a public announcement should be made stating that this is without prejudice to any frontier rectifications which may be subsequently decided.

MR. BYINGTON said that he could not accept this signal as expressing the State Department view, which, according to his present directive, was that Italian northwest border territory should be returned to Italian administration at the same time and on the same terms as the rest of northwest Italy.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that, in view of this political signal and in the light of information he had obtained when visiting the War Office, it was most probable that he would receive further directions in regard to an announcement concerning the Franco-Italian border zone.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE thought it would be unwise to commit ourselves at this time to making a public statement in regard to the northwest frontier. However, he pointed out that the terms of PAN 634 included a specific reservation in regard to BOLZANO. If no similar warning were given to the Italian Government in regard to the Franco-Italian border zone, they would inevitably conclude that a definite decision had been taken to hand back the northwestern border territories without any conditions.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL RIDGWAY agreed.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

- (a) Approved, as amended in discussion, the draft signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff which he had tables and instructed the Chief of Staff to despatch it. X
- (b) Instructed the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, to inform the Italian Government that the territories mentioned in PAN 634 would be handed back to Italian government control about 31 Dec.

- (b) that in handing over territory to Italian Government administration a communication to the Italian Government and a public announcement should be made stating that this is without prejudice to any frontier rectifications which may be subsequently decided.

MR. BYINGTON said that he could not accept this signal as expressing the State Department view, which, according to his present directive, was that Italian northwest border territory should be returned to Italian administration at the same time and on the same terms as the rest of northwest Italy.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that, in view of this political signal and in the light of information he had obtained when visiting the War Office, it was most probable that he would receive further directions in regard to an announcement concerning the Franco-Italian border zone.

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LIEUTENANT GENERAL REDWAY agreed.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

- (a) Approved, as amended in discussion, the draft signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff which he had tables and instructed the Chief of Staff to despatch it. X
- (b) Instructed the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, to inform the Italian Government that the territories mentioned in FAW 634 would be handed back to Italian government control about 31 Dec.
- (c) Further instructed the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, when communicating the above information to the Italian Prime Minister, to notify him informally that:
- (i) when the transfer documents came to be signed, a condition that Italian troops other than Carabinieri should not be stationed within 15 miles of the Franco-Italian border, might be imposed;
 - (ii) it would probably be necessary to make a public announcement that the handover would be without prejudice to any rectifications of the Italian frontiers which might subsequently be agreed upon.

-2-

X Despatched as NAF 1098 of 11 December.

U46

-3-

- (d) Directed that the agencies under his control should at present give no publicity to the exclusion of Italian troops from the Franco-Italian frontier zone or the possible rectification of the Italian frontiers.
- (e) Instructed the Chief of Staff to inform the Chief of the French Liaison Mission to AFHQ, on the same day as the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, would approach the Italian Government in accordance with (b) and (c) above:
- (i) that pending the outcome of diplomatic negotiations between the US, UK and French Governments, the handback of territory would not affect the existing restrictions on the employment of Italian troops other than Carabinieri in the frontier zone;
 - (ii) that the handover would be without prejudice to any rectifications of the Italian frontiers which might subsequently be agreed upon;
 - (iii) that, in order to avoid embarrassing the Italian Government the Supreme Allied Commander wished that no publicity should at present be given to the conditions of the handover stated at (i) and (ii) above.

and Commission, would approach the Italian Government in accordance with (b) and (c) above:

- (i) that pending the outcome of diplomatic negotiations between the US, UK and French Governments, the handback of territory would not affect the existing restrictions on the employment of Italian troops other than Carabinieri in the frontier zone;
- (ii) that the handover would be without prejudice to any rectifications of the Italian frontiers which might subsequently be agreed upon;
- (iii) that, in order to avoid embarrassing the Italian Government the Supreme Allied Commander wished that no publicity should at present be given to the conditions of the handover stated at (i) and (ii) above.

045

785017

10 December 1945

DEC 14 1945

My dear Mr. Ambassador:

Thank you for your letter of 6 December forwarding paraphrase of a telegram from the State Department to the American Embassy in Paris on the subject of recent developments in the demilitarization of the French-Italian frontier.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

The Hon. Alexander Kirk
American Ambassador
Via Vittorio Veneto 119
Rome

cc Epe Com

See M. 17.
See M. 320

011 PA 12.

(CAPT B)

COPY

Telegram from Department of State

November 30, 1945

Paraphrase

Following telegram has been sent to Paris:

In the opinion of the Department the Doyen-Truscott, Morgan - Carpentier agreements of last June on the withdrawal of French troops from the Italian frontier and the establishment there of AMG, are purely military and do not contain any commitment regarding the duration of AMG or obligation extending beyond the period of AMG; they provide merely that as long as Allied troops are available Italian forces will not be stationed within fifteen miles of the Franco-Italian border.

General Juin has now been informed by AFHQ that on December 1 Allied troops must be withdrawn from this border since, on account of redeployment, they are no longer available. In connection with your telegrams nos. 6847 and 6883 of November 28 and 29 respectively, you may explain the above to Bidault and tell him that this territory is soon to be returned to the administration of the Italian Government and that in the opinion of the Department the presence there of liaison officers of the Allied Commission, who will remain for some time, will constitute a guarantee that Allied interests will be safeguarded.

BYRNES

See 66. m 67.

See m 280

043

785017

SECRET

Confidential

Ref: 8273/58/SC.

December 1945.

SUBJECT: Troops on Franco-Italian Frontier.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
Attn: S-5 Section.

1. I refer to your signal PX 55074 - REF 1096 - dated 30th November 1945.

2. I think you should know that the immediate reaction of the new Minister for War (Signor ROSIO) to the position regarding the French frontier was to suggest that the three mobile battalions of the CC.ME should be removed from GORRA, TORIN and MILAN, and located in the 15 mile zone.

3. General Browning at once discussed the matter with me and as a result put A.C. point of view to the War Minister that afternoon (14 December). The points made to the War Minister are summarized in Appendix "A".

For the Chief Commissioner.

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

Copy to: Land Forces S/C (MIA)
Point (A)
Point (B)

See M. 61. 62. 63

3. Gen. Brown's at once discussed the matter
with me & as a result put the points
referred to the War Ministry that
afternoon (14 Dec). The points
made ^{to the War Ministry} are summarized in Appx A

57

of See 60

See m b1 b2 b3

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref: 8273/57/EC.

December 1945.

SUBJECT: Troops on Franco-Italian Frontier.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
Attn: G-5 Section.

Confidential
356

1. I refer to your signal FX55074 - NAF 1096 - dated 30th November 1945.

2. I think you should know that the immediate reaction of the new Minister for War (Signor BROGIO) to the position regarding the French frontier was to suggest that the three mobile battalions of the CC.RR should be removed from GENOA, TURIN and MILAN, and located in the 15 mile zone. As these mobile battalions are primarily for the prevention of internal disaster he was (a) told that it could not be done now, (b) strongly advised not to take such action later.

For the Chief Commissioner:

MSL/JG.

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

57

SECRET.

Ref. : G.13.

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT : ITALO-FRENCH Frontier.

Confidential

Acting on instructions from the Executive Commissioner, A.C. I put the following to the new Minister of War BROSIO at an interview p.m. on 14 December.

1. The whole matter is now being thrashed out on the highest level and a decision is hoped for soon.
2. British troops are really only withdrawing into winter quarters.
3. S.A.C. has given a ruling that no Italian troops except CC.RR are to be allowed within 15 miles of the Italo-French frontier.
4. Nothing can be done till the Northern Territories handed over, perhaps on Dec. 31st, 1945. All troops there at present are under AFHQ through 2 District.
5. (a) A.C. view is that mobile has should be kept for their assigned role in MILAN, TURIN and GENOA and NOT sent to frontier.
(b) Otherwise there is a vacuum behind instead of in front; also such moves would tend to appear provocative and it is doubtful if it is within the meaning of the act to send CC.RR mobile Battalions.
6. So Ministry of War are strongly advised to "hold hard", let M.M.I.A. know their views and proposals for CC.RR in frontier zone. Gen. BROWNING will then pass these to Chief Commissioner.

d. Browning

Major General,
M.M.I.A.

1. The whole matter is now being thrashed out on the highest level and a decision is hoped for soon.
2. British troops are really only withdrawing into winter quarters.
3. S.A.C. has given a ruling that no Italian troops except CC.RR are to be allowed within 15 miles of the Italo-French frontier.
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6. So Ministry of War are strongly advised to "hold hard", let M.M.I.A. know their views and proposals for CC.RR in frontier zone. Gen. BROWNING will then pass these to Chief Commissioner.

d. Browning

Major General,
M.M.I.A.

15 Dec 45.

u40

See 60

Recd. 17/12.

17/12

785017

8273-46

55

AFHQ FOR CHIEF OF STAFF

9318

14 DECEMBER 1945

PRIORITY

DEC 14 1945

UNCLASSIFIED PD

FOLLOWING HUNTERS DISPATCH DATED PARIS THIRTEENTH APPEARED IN ITALIAN PRESS
THIS MORNING COLON

PAREN TO AFHQ FOR CHIEF OF STAFF FROM HQ ALCON FROM ADMIRAL STONE CITE ACSEC PAREN

QUOTE IS FRANCE GIVING UP HER CLAIMS QUERY PARIS CMA THIRTEENTH CMA REUTER PD
IT IS LEARNED THAT FRANCE GAVE UP HER CLAIMS ON VAL DAOSTA AND THE SUZA ZONE PD IT
SEEMS THAT BRITISH AND AMERICAN TROOPS ARE WITHDRAWING FROM THE ZONE IN QUESTION PD
IT IS BELIEVED THAT AN AGREEMENT TOOK PLACE BETWEEN THE ALLIED COMMAND OF ROME AND
THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT CMA ACCORDING TO WHICH ALLIED TROOPS ARE TO BE WITHDRAWN
FROM THE AREA WHICH WOULD NOT BE OCCUPIED BY ITALIAN TROOPS PD ONLY A FEW
CARABINIERI UNITS ALREADY STATIONED THERE WOULD REMAIN PD UNQUOTE

DISTRIBUTION:

US Ambassador
BR Ambassador
Exec Commr
CC

Chief Commissioner

222

ELIERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

039

(CMT 0)

Subject Italian Troops on Italian Frontier following withdrawal of Allied troops

(53)

Memo for Executive Commissioner

- 1) Following French representations SAC has decided as temporary measure that no Italian troops, other than CCIR, shall be allowed within a belt 15 miles deep along Frontier, pending intergovernmental discussion on subject.
- 2) CC wishes to know in detail the disposition of Italian Police Forces in the Frontier zone:
 - a) present disposition
 - b) disposition prior to the withdrawal of Allied troops which started to be put in effect from 1 Dec.
- 3) Overall figures give 352 CCIR 537 GFF 178 PS Agents over the whole frontier line

033

785017

8273 41

52

AFHQ For Chief of Staff

9268

13 December 1945

PRIORITY

DEC 13 1945

UNCLASSIFIED PD

FOLLOWING IS TRANSLATION OF ARTICLE APPEARING IN ITALIAN PRESS THIS MORNING PD
PAREN TO AFHQ FOR CHIEF OF STAFF FROM H. ALCOM FROM ADMIRAL STONE GITE ACSCC PAREN
QUOTE ALLIED TROOPS WITHDRAW FROM THE ITALO FRENCH FRONTIER PD PARIS CMA
TWELFTH PAREN UNGLE PETER PAREN PD IT HAS BEEN OFFICIALLY ANNOUNCED THAT AT
THE REQUEST OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT THE ALLIED TROOPS STARTED WITHDRAWING FROM
THE ZONE THEY HAD UNTIL NOW BEEN OCCUPYING ON THE ITALO FRENCH BORDER SEMICOLON
THEY WITHDREW TO A DEPTH OF FIFTEEN MILES IN ITALIAN TERRITORY PD
THE ZONE IS NOT TO BE OCCUPIED BY ITALIAN TROOPS CMA BUT WILL REMAIN AS
SUBQUOTE NO MANS LAND END SUBQUOTE UNTIL THE PEACE TREATY WITH ITALY IS SIGNED PD
IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE FRENCH REQUEST WAS MADE BECAUSE OF THE ADVISABILITY
OF NOT PREJUDICING THE FINAL DELIMITATION OF THE FRONTIER WITH ITALY CMA IN
VIEW OF THE MODIFICATIONS TO SUCH FRONTIER THAT FRANCE IS CLAIMING FOR STRATEGICAL
REASONS PD END QUOTE

Distribution:
US Ambassador
Br Ambassador
As Commr
Chief Commr

Chief Commissioner

222

ELMER W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

037

(CPT 0)

785017

INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Originator's Reference: 14

Message Centre No: 3/5476

Date/Time of Origin: DEC. 12 1805A

Date Time Rec'd: DEC. 13 1215

Precedence: IMPORTANT

FROM: PUBLIC SAFETY HQ PIEMONTE REGION

TO: ALCOM ATT PUB SAFETY SUB COMMISSION

UNCLASSIFIED.

1. Your signal 9181 France Italian frontier police strength now received. Figures given in my signal in reply were for whole region of Piemonte.

2. Correct figures for France Italian frontier are -
 Guardia di Finanza 282 in 23 Stations -
 Carabinieri 291 in 31 Stations -
 Agenti 6 in 1 Station.

3. These are normal strengths and no increase is contemplated.

4. P O complete List of Stations and strength in post.

AC DIST

ACTION : PUBLIC SAFETY SC 2
 INFO : CHIEF COMMISSIONER
 FILE 2
 FLOAT

Precedence: **IMPORTANT**

FROM: **PUBLIC SAFETY HQ PIEMONTE REGION**

TO: **ALCOM ATT PUB SAFETY SUB COMMISSION**

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

UNCLASSIFIED.

50

1. Your signal 9781 France Italian frontier police strength now received. Figures given in my signal in reply were for whole region of Piemonte.
2. Correct figures for France Italian frontier are -
Guardia di Finanza 282 in 28 Stations -
Carabinieri 291 in 31 Stations -
Agenti 6 in 1 Station.
3. These are normal strengths and no increase is contemplated.
4. P O complete List of Stations and strength in post.

AC DIST

ACTION : PUBLIC SAFETY SC 2
INFO : CHIEF COMMISSIONER
FILE 2
FLOAT

036

785017

56

INCOMING MESSAGE
Headquarters Allied Commission

Originator's Reference: 9181

Message Centre n°: 5408

Date/Time of Origin: DEC 11

Date Time Rec'd: DEC 121500

Precedence: ROUTINE

FROM : PUBLIC SAFETY HQ PIEMONTE

TO : A C HQRS (PUBLIC SAFETY SUB COMMISSION)

CONFIDENTIAL.

256 Carabinieri in 47 Border Stations 491 Guardia di
Finanza in 52 Border Stations - 18 Agenti, Pubblica Sicurezza
in 2 border stations, in Piemonte Region. Full list of
stations follows by letter. Above strengths are normal.

AC DIST.

action : P SAFETY

INFO : CHIEF COMMISSIONER

L F 2

FILE 2

FLOAT

*See 51.
M. 54.*

035

PROVINCIA IMPERIAUfficio P.S. Ponte S. Luigi*10ff. 7 Agents*

Ponte S. Luigi (CC.RR.10)

Ponte S. Ludovico-stradale 1° Cat. (CC.RR.4)

Ufficio P.S. Ventimiglia*10ff. 7 Agents*

Ventimiglia (CC.RR.10)

Passo Muratone-montano 2° Cat. (GG.FF.4)

Serra Cabenasso-montano 2° Cat. (GG.FF.4)

Ufficio di P.S. Piene*10ff. 7 Agents*

Piene (CC.RR.6)

Piene Dogana stradale 1° Cat. (CC.RR.3)

La Colletta montano 2° Cat. (GG.FF.4)

Monte Mergo montano 2° Cat. (GG.FF.4)

Passo Vescovo montano 2° Cat. (GG.FF.4)

Monte Palma montano 2° Cat. (GG.FF.4)

Passo Cuore montano 2° Cat. (GG.FF.3)

Passo Ciotti montano 2° Cat. (GG.FF.3)

Colle Paola montano 2° Cat. (GG.FF.3)

PROVINCIA DI CUNEOUfficio P.S. San Dalmazzo di Tenda*10ff. 7 Agents*

S.Dalmazzo di Tenda (CC.RR.14)

Valle Roja stradale 1° Cat. (CC.RR.6)

San Grato montano estivo 1° Cat. . (CC.RR.5)

Madonna delle Finestre montano estivo 1° Cat. (CC.RR.5)

Casali Ciriega montano estivo 1° Cat. (CC.RR. 5)

Mollieris montano 1° Cat. (CC.RR.5)

S.Anna di Vinadio montano estivo 1° Cat. (GG.FF.5)

Ufficio P.S. Saluzzo*10ff. 7 Agents*

Colle Puriak montano estivo 2° cat.(GG.FF.3)

Ufficio P.S. Piena *10ff. 7 agosto*
 Piena (CC.RR.6)
 Piena Dogane stradale 1° Cat. (CC.RR.3)
 La Colletta montano 2° Cat. (GG.FF.4)
 Monte Mergo montano 2° Cat. (GG.FF.4)
 Passo Vescovo montano 2° Cat. (GG.FF.4)
 Monte Palma montano 2° Cat. (GG.FF.4)
 Passo Cuore montano 2° Cat. (GG.FF.3)
 Passo Ciotti montano 2° Cat. (GG.FF.3)
 Colle Paola montano 2° Cat. (GG.FF.3)

PROVINCIA DI CUNEO

Ufficio P.S. San Dalmazzo di Tenda *10ff. 7 agosto*
 S. Dalmazzo di Tenda (CC.RR.14)
 Valle Roja stradale 1° Cat. (CC.RR.6)
 San Grado montano estivo 1° Cat. . (CC.RR.5)
 Madonna delle Finestre montano estivo 1° Cat. (CC.RR.5)
 Casali Ciriega montano estivo 1° Cat. (CC.RR. 5)
 Mollieris montano 1° Cat. (CC.RR.5)
 S. Anna di Vinadio montano estivo 1° Cat. (GG.FF.5)

Ufficio P.S. Saluzzo

10ff. 7 agosto
 Colle Puriak montano estivo 2° cat. (GG.FF.3)
 Colle della Maddalena stradale 1° Cat. (CC.RR.6)
 Colle Seutron montano estivo 1° Cat. (GG.FF.5)
 Colle dell'Agnello montano estivo 1° Cat. (CC.RR.5)
 Colle Traversette montano estivo 1° Cat. (CC.RR.5)

PROVINCIA DI TORINO

Ufficio P.S. di Bardonecchia *10ff. 7 agosto*
 Bardonecchia (CC.RR.10)
 Colle della Croce montano estivo . (GG.FF.4)

Colle d'Abries, montano estivo, 2° cat. (GG.FF.4)
Colle Bousson, montano 1° " (CC.RR.4)
Monginevro stradale 1° " (CC.RR.9)
Colle della Scala, montano estivo 1° cat. (CC.RR.5)
Colle Frejus, montano estivo 1° cat. (CC.RR.5)

Ufficio P.S. Susa

10ff 7 agents

Gran Moncenisio, stradale 1° cat. (CC.RR.9)
Piccolo Moncenisio, montano estivo 2° cat. (CC.RR.4)

PROVINCIA DI AOSTA

Ufficio P.S. di Aosta

10ff 7 agents

Col Du Rheme, montano estivo 1° cat. (CC.RR.5)
Col du Mont, montano estivo 1° " (CC.RR.5)
Piccolo S.Bernardo, stradale 1° " (CC.RR.6)
Col de la Seigne, montano estivo 1° " (CC.RR.5)
Colle del Gigante, montano estivo 1° cat. (CC.RR.5)
Col del Ferret, montano estivo 1° cat. (CC.RR.5)
Gran S.Bernardo stradale 1° " (CC.RR.6)
Colle Theodull, montano 1° " (CC.RR.4)
Testa Grigia, montano 1° " (CC.RR.4)

PROVINCIA DI VERCELLI

N.N.

PROVINCIA DI NOVARA

Ufficio P.S. Domodossola

10ff 7 agents

Domodossola (CC.RR.15)
Paglino stradale 1° cat. (CC.RR.5)
Passa S.Giacomo, montano estivo 1° " (GG.FF.5)
Bagni di Cravaggio " 1° " (GG.FF.5)
Ponte Ribellasca, stradale 1° cat. (CC.RR.5)

Ufficio P.S. Cannobio

10ff 7 agents

Ufficio P.S. di Aosta *10/11/74*

Col Du Rheme, montano estivo	1° cat.	(CC.RR.5)
Col du Mont, montano estivo	1° "	(CC.RR.5)
Piccolo S.Bernardo, stradale	1° "	(CC.RR.6)
Col de la Seigne, montano estivo	1° "	(CC.RR.5)
Colle del Gigante, montano estivo	1° cat.	(CC.RR.5)
Col del Ferret, montano estivo	1° cat.	(CC.RR.5)
Gran S.Bernardo stradale	1° "	(CC.RR.6)
Colle Theodull, montano	1° "	(CC.RR.4)
Testa Grigia, montano	1° "	(CC.RR.4)

PROVINCIA DI VERCELLI

N.N.

PROVINCIA DI NOVARAUfficio P.S. Domodossola

10/11/74

Domodossola		(CC.RR.15)
Pegolino stradale	1° cat.	(CC.RR.5)
Paese S.Giacomo, montano estivo	1° "	(GG.FF.5)
Bagni di Craveggia "	1° "	(GG.FF.5)
Ponte Ribellasca, stradale	1° cat.	(CC.RR.5)

Ufficio P.S. Cannobio

10/11/74

Piaggio Valmara lacuale	1° cat.	(CC.RR.5)
Piaggio Valmara stradale	1° "	(CC.RR.5)

PROVINCIA DI VARESEUfficio P.S. Luino

10/11/74

Luino		(CC.RR.12)
Maccagno ferroviario	1 cat.	(CC.RR.5)
Pino Ronzani ferroviario	1° "	(CC.RR.5)
Zenna stradale	1° "	(CC.RR.5)

033

Zenna lacuale 1^a cat. (CC.RR.5)
 Biegno stradale 2^a " (GG.FF.5)
 Monte Clivio stradale 2^a " (GG.FF.5)
 Palone stradale 1^a " (GG.FF.5)
 Fornasette stradale 1^a " (CC.RR.5)

Ufficio P.S. Ponte Tresa

Ponte Tresa

18ff. 7 aquas
 (CC.RR.5)

Cremensca stradale 1^a cat. (CC.RR.5)
 Levana lacuale 2^a " (GG.FF.5)
 Brusimpiano lacuale 2^a " (GG.FF.5)

Ufficio P.S. Porto Ceresio

Termine Porto Ceresio, stradale 1^a cat. (GG.FF.5)

Cà del Monte, stradale 2^a cat. (GG.FF.5)

Ponte di Saltrio, stradale 2^a " (GG.FF.5)

Arzo di Clivio, stradale 2^a " (GG.FF.5)

Bella-Vista di Clivio, stradale 1^a cat. (GG.FF.5)

S. Pietro di Clivio, stradale 2^a cat. (GG.FF.5)

Gaggiolo stradale 1^a cat. (CC.RR.5)

PROVINCIA DI COMO

Ufficio P.S. Ponte Chiasso

Ponte Chiasso

Como S. Giovanni

36ff. 30 aquas
 (CC.RR.10)
18ff. 7 aquas 25.
 (CC.RR.10)

Rodero stradale

Bizzarone stradale

Somazzo stradale

Ronago stradale

Crociale dei Mulini, stradale 2^a cat. (GG.FF.5)

Drezzo, stradale

Pizzamiglio stradale

2^a cat. (GG.FF.5)

2^a " (GG.FF.5)

2^a " (GG.FF.5)

2^a " (GG.FF.5)

2^a cat. (GG.FF.5)

2^a " (GG.FF.5)

Brusimpiano lacuale 2° " (GG.FF.5)
Ufficio P.S. Porto Ceresio 10ff. 7 agosto
 Termine Porto Ceresio, stradale 1° cat. (GG.FF.5)
 Cà del Monte, stradale 2° cat. (GG.FF.5)
 Ponte di Saltrio, stradale 2° " (GG.FF.5)
 Arzo di Clivio, stradale 2° " (GG.FF.5)
 Bella-Vista di Clivio, stradale 1° cat. (GG.FF.5)
 S. Pietro di Clivio, stradale 2° cat. (GG.FF.5)
 Gaggiolo stradale 1° cat. (CC.RR.5)

PROVINCIA DI COMO

Ufficio P.S. Ponte Chiasso 30ff. 30 agosto
 Ponte Chiasso (CC.RR.10)
 Como S. Giovanni 16ff. 7 agosto R.S.
 (CC.RR.10)
 Rodero stradale 2° cat. (GG.FF.5)
 Bizzarone stradale 2° " (GG.FF.5)
 Somazzo stradale 2° " (GG.FF.5)
 Ronago stradale 2° " (GG.FF.5)
 Crociale dei Mulini, stradale 2° cat. (GG.FF.5)
 Drezzo, stradale 2° cat. (GG.FF.5)
 Pizzaniglio stradale 2° " (GG.FF.5)
 Rongiana " 2° " (GG.FF.5)
Ufficio P.S. di Oria 16ff. 7 agosto
 Oria (CC.RR.6)
 Passo Bonello, stradale 2° cat. (GG.FF.5)
 Erbonne, stradale 2° " (GG.FF.5)
 Valmara, stradale 1° " (CC.RR.5)

S. Margherita lacuale 1^a cat. (CC.RR.5)
 Porlezza lacuale 1^a " (CC.RR.5)

PROVINCIA DI SONDRIO

Ufficio di P.S. Chiavenna *16ff. 7 agenti*

Passo dello Spluga, stradale 1^a " (CC.RR.9)
 Ville di Chiavenna, stradale 1^a " (CC.RR.7)

Ufficio P.S. Tirano *16ff. 7 agenti*

Pistattama stradale 1^a " (CC.RR.5)
 Sasso del Gallo, stradale 2^a " (GG.FF.5)
 Forcola di Livigno, stradale 1^a " (CC.RR.5)
 Ponte del Gallo, stradale 1^a " (CC.RR.5)
 Giego S. Maria, stradale 1^a " (GG.FF.5)

PROVINCIA DI BOLZANO

Ufficio P.S. Tübre *16ff. 7 agenti*

Tübre valico stradale 1^a cat. (CC.RR.5)

Ufficio P.S. Resia *16ff. 7 agenti*

Resia stradale 1^a " (CC.RR.5)
 Giego alto montano estivo 2^a " (GG.FF.5)
 Giego basso montano estivo 2^a " (GG.FF.5)
 Bocchetta dell'Altissima, montano estivo 2^a cat. (GG.FF.5)
 Posso del Rombo, montano estivo 2^a cat. (GG.FF.5)

Ufficio P.S. Brennero *16ff. 7 agenti*

Brennero Ferrovia (CC.RR.10)
 Passo Vizze, montano estivo 2^a cat. (GG.FF.5)
 Forcella di Malavalle, montano estivo 2^a cat. (GG.FF.5)
 Campo del Prete, montano estivo, 2^a cat. (GG.FF.5)
 Cima Libera, valico montano estivo 2^a cat. (GG.FF.5)
 Cima Libera Forcella Turistica 2^a cat. (GG.FF.5)

Brennero stradale 1^a cat. (CC.RR.5)

Forcola di Livigno, stradale 1° " (CC.RR.5)
 Ponte del Gallo, stradale 1° " (CC.RR.5)
 Gioigo S.Maria, stradale 1° " (GG.FF.5)

PROVINCIA DI BOLZANO

Ufficio P.S. Tubre

16ff. Tagliato

Tubre valico stradale 1° cat. (CC.RR.5)

Ufficio P.S. Resia

16ff. Tagliato

Resia stradale 1° " (CC.RR.5)

Gioigo alto montano estivo 2° " (GG.FF.5)

Gioigo basso montano estivo 2° " (GG.FF.5)

Bocchetta dell'Altissima, montano estivo 2° cat. (GG.FF.5)

Posso del Rombo, montano estivo 2° cat. (GG.FF.5)

Ufficio P.S. Brennero

16ff. Tagliato

Brennero Ferrovia (CC.RR.10)

Passo Vizze, montano estivo 2° cat. (GG.FF.5)

Forcella di Malevalle, montano estivo 2° cat. (GG.FF.5)

Campo del Prete, montano estivo, 2° cat. (GG.FF.5)

Cima Libera, valico montano estivo 2° cat. (GG.FF.5)

Cima Libera Forcella Turistica 2° cat. (GG.FF.5)

Brennero stradale 1° cat. (CC.RR.9)

Ufficio P.S. Campo Tures

16ff. Tagliato

Passo Tauri, montano estivo 2° " (GG.FF.5)

Passo di Gola, montano estivo 2° " (GG.FF.5)

Forcella Sasso Lungo di Collalto montano estivo 2° cat. (GG.FF.5)

Passo di Stalle, montano estivo 2° cat. (GG.FF.5)

Ufficio P.S. San Candido

S.Candido

Off. Laguarda

(CC.RR.5)

Ponte della Drava, stradale, 1^a cat. (CC.RR.9)

-
- 1° - i valichi di prima categoria sono transitabili alle persone munite di passaporto o di tessera di frontiera
 - 2° - i valichi di seconda categoria sono transitabili alle persone munite della sola tessera di frontiera
 - 3° - i valichi montani estivi sono aperti al transito solo durante la stagione estiva.

=====

LA PROVINCIA DI BOLZANO NON INTERESSA QUESTA COMAGLIA.

- =====
- 1° - Persons holding passports or tessera di frontiera are permitted to cross at the passes of 1st category.
 - 2° - Persons holding only tessera di frontiera are permitted to cross at the passes of 2nd category.
 - 3° - The mountain summer passes are opened to traffic only during the summer season.

Totale

-C.C.R.R.

384.

99.F.F.

249.

alle persone munite della sola tessera di frontiera
3° - i valichi montani estivi sono aperti al transito
solo durante la stagione estiva.

LA PROVINCIA DI BOLZANO NON INTERESSA QUESTA COME CNIA.

- 1° - Persons holding passports or tessera di frontiera
are permitted to cross at the passes of 1st category.
2° - Persons holding only tessera di frontiera are
permitted to cross at the passes of 2nd category.
3° - The mountain summer passes are opened to traffic
only during the summer season.

Totale C.C.R.R. 384.
G.G.F.F. 249.
P.S. 209.

In Franco. C.C.R.R. 156
Italian Zone G.G.F.F. 49
P.S. 64.

785017

file

477
148

ALCOH SITE AGENT

10 December 1945

REGIONAL COMMISSIONERS LIGURIA AND PIEMONTE REGIONS
FOR INFO

9181

10 DIC. 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

WILL YOU PLEASE REPLY SOONEST NUMBERS OF CORR AND CITY AND
BE ALERTS PERFORMING FRONTIER DUTY OF FRANCO DASH ITALIAN
FRONTIER WITHIN YOUR RESPECTIVE AREAS PD

PARTE TO REGIONAL COMMISSIONERS LIGURIA AND PIEMONTE REGIONS
FOR INFO FROM ALCOH SITE AGENT PART

PLEASE SEND NUMBERS SEPARATELY ALSO GIVE LOCATIONS WHERE
POLICE ARE PERFORMING DUTIES PD

HAVE REINFORCEMENTS BEEN RECENTLY SUPPLIED OR OTHER THAN
FILLING NORMAL VACANCIES AND ARE REINFORCEMENTS CONTEMPLATED
IN THE NEAR FUTURE PD

See W. 47-49

B/W 15/12 - letter 1/2



PRIORITY

Public Safety S/C

678427

S. J. BYR, Colonel.

G. J. LOREN
CWO USA
Asst Adjutant.

027

785017

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APO 394

AC/14080/6/1/PS

4 December 1945.

SUBJECT : Frontier Control.

DEC 6 1945

TO : Executive Commissioner
Thru - C.A. Section.

1. The following information is submitted respecting the numbers of CC.RR., GG.FF. and P.S. Agents engaged on Frontier Control duty along the Franco-Italian Border:

- a) CC.RR. 2 Officers 15 NCOs 335 Car.
- b) GG.FF. 557
- c) Agents P.S. 11 Officers 117 Agents.

2. The above forces are spread over the whole Frontier Area at Posts situated in the under-mentioned Areas: Imperia; Oneglia; Torino; Susa; Aosta; Cuneo and Saluzzo.

3. At the onset the control of the Frontier was under 15th Army Group. It later passed to C.I.C. under the direction of A.F.H.Q. under whose control it has remained until the present time.

4. Public Safety S/C was responsible only for obtaining and sending forward Italian personnel for service and therefore has no record of the actual location of the personnel employed.

EJB/da

E. J. Dye. Col.
for JOHN W. CHAPMAN
Colonel J.A.G.D.
Director Public Safety
Sub-Commission

(CART 10)

028454647

785017

8273

INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

37

Originator's Reference: FA 55073

Message Centre No: G/4/47

Date/Time of Origin: NOV 30 1822A

Date Time Rec'd: DEC 020945A

FROM: AFHQ SIGNED SACRED CITY DIRECT

Precedence: IMPORTANT
DEC 2 1945

TO : 2 DISTRICT ALCOM

ACTION
TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET.

Further to our 53101 of 14 November 45 and our FA 54812 of 28 November 45 (not to 2 District). Subject is withdrawal of Allied Troops from Franco-Italian border. As a result of further representations from the French authorities SAC has agreed that pending the outcome of Intergovernmental discussions on the subject no Italian troops other than Carabinieri will be allowed in the zone 15 miles deep along the Franco-Italian border without his personal authority. This measure is without prejudice to the withdrawal of British troops from duties on the Franco-Italian border with effect from 1 December and it is recognized that until a decision is reached there may be no troops other than Carabinieri in the Frontier Zone.

For ALCOM. You may inform the Italian Government of this temporary measure should you consider it necessary. As this HQ is already dealing with General JUI it is not considered desirable or necessary to take this matter up with the French representative on ALLIED COMMISSION.

Note by British ciphers--

This message has been delayed by necessity to obtain a repetition of part.

DIST

ACTION: EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER (2)

INFO: CHIEF COMMISSIONER

POLAD (A)

POLAD (B)

LAND FORCES S/C

C A SECTION

FILE

TOP SECRET

20 DEC 1945

(CSO)

See M.36 38/19

44-41-4203
44-41-4203

X/ You may inform the Italian Government of this temporary measure should you consider it necessary. This HQ is dealing with General Juin. It is not considered desirable or necessary to take this matter up with the French Rep to AC.

See 68

As above seen by Ex. Com.

Pl. return in file for action on

X

2/12.

026

See M. 36. 61. 62
See F. 69. 60.

TOP SECRET
INCOMINT MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Originator's Reference: FX 55074

Date/Time of Origin: 30 1831A

Message Centre No: G/4599

Date Time of Receipt: 31 1620A

Confidential

Precedence:

FROM: APHQ SIGNED SACRED

TO : ACTION. AGWAR WASHINGTON CABINET OFFICES LONDON

INFO. 2 DISTRICT ALCOM & USFET

DEC 2 1945

INFO - ACTION

To Agwar for Combined Chiefs of Staff and to Cabinet Offices London for British Chiefs of Staff.

This is Naf 1096. Reference NAF 1090. After further discussion with General Juin he informs me that the matter of Italian Troops on the Franco-Italian Border is being taken up on Governmental level. I have agreed not to allow Italian troops other than Carabinieri to enter a 15 mile belt along the Frontier pending discussion of this matter by the Governments concerned. I cannot however defer the withdrawal of Allied Troops from this area any longer and General Juin has been informed accordingly. I am prepared to accept the fact that until a decision is reached there may be no troops other than Carabinieri in the Frontier ~~Zone~~ Zone.

A.C. DISTRIBUTION

TOP SECRET

INFO-ACTION - EX COMMISSIONER 2
 INFO - CHIEF COMMISSIONER

POLAD A.

POLAD B.

L. FORCES S/C

C.A. SECTION

FILE



FROM: APMQ SIGNED SACMED

TO : ACTION. AGWAR WASHINGTON CABINET OFFICES LONDON

INFO. 2 DISTRICT ALCOM 3 USRET

DEC 2 1945

Precedence:

INFO-ACTION

To Agwar for Combined Chiefs of Staff and to Cabinet Offices London for British Chiefs of Staff.

This is Waf 1096. Reference MAP 1090. After further discussion

with General Juin he informs me that the matter of Italian Troops on the Franco-Italian Border is being taken up on Governmental level.

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A.C. DISTRIBUTION

INFO-ACTION - EX COMMISSIONER 2

INFO - CHIEF COMMISSIONER

POLAD A.

POLAD B.

L. FORCES S/C

C.A. SECTION

FILE

TOP SECRET

Paraphrase to Fr Ref.

18/1/46

785017

34

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMANDANT
APO 394
Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref: 027A/M/40

30 November 1945

SUBJECT: Withdrawal of Allied Troops

TO : HEAD (A)
HEAD (B)
Local Forces S/C
CA Section
French Rep to CG

31

Ref 027A/M/40 of 25 Nov 45 on the subject
of Withdrawal of Allied Troops from the French-Italian Border.

AMG have cancelled this cable by telephone with the
Chief Commissioner and new instructions have been requested.

C. R. BRAYBROCKE

Chief Staff Officer
to Executive Commissioner

X
30/11

785017

INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Originator's Reference: F 5012

Date/Time of Origin: NOV 28 1526A

SECRET

Message Centre No: G/4538

Date Time Rec'd: NOV 29 0945A

Precedence: **IMPORTANT**

FROM: FREEDOM SIGNED SACRED

NOV 29 1945

TO : AICOM

SECRET.

Reference your 8761 of 26 November.

A similar request for a deferment of withdrawal of Allied troops from the France-Italian border has been received from GENERAL JUIN. GENERAL JUIN is being informed that continued retention of Allied troops on France-Italian frontier is already causing difficulties which cannot be accepted after 1 December. The Supreme Allied Commander much regrets therefore that he is unable to accede to the request for deferment. You should make a similar reply to French representatives on Allied Commission.

HEADQUARTERS
NOV 29 1945**SECRET**LIST

ACTION: EXEC COMMISSIONER

INFO: CHIEF COMMISSIONER
FRENCH REP TO AC
POLAD (A)
POLAD (B)
LAND FORCES S/C
G A SECTION
FILE

0211
See minute 32 & 33.
r folio 34.

(copy) RAY (copy)

785017

30

AFHQ FOR C-5

3761

26 Nov

PRIORITY

24
Confidential

SECRET PD

YOUR FOR XRAY FIVE THREE ONE ONE THREE OF ONE FOUR NOVEMBER PD

PARH TO AFHQ FOR GEORGE DASH FIVE SECTION FROM HQ ALGER BIRCH STONE GUN AGEX PA
PARH

IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS RECEIVED FROM FOREIGN MINISTER REMAINT THE FRENCH
 REPRESENTATIVE OF ALLIED COMMISSION HAS ASKED ME TO REPRESENT TO YOU THAT ACTION
 IN THIS MATTER BE SUSPENDED UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN ABLE
 TO GIVE IT DUE CONSIDERATION PD SINCE HE AND FRENCH EMBASSY HERE APPEAR VERY
 DISTURBED SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF I COULD BE INSTRUCTED

Copy to: French Rep to AS
 POLAD (A)
 POLAD (B)
 LAND FORCES S/C
 CA SEC

(See replies to your 3721 of 26/Nov)

80 to CSO for info (30 & 39) on return

Ex. Commissioner

elb 27/11

25
 (Sgt) H.S. Leahy
 Brigadier

023

785017

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Office of the French Representative

APO 394

26 Novembre 1945

N° 2721

à M. le Brigadier LUSH
Executive Commissioner de l'A.C.

O B J E T : Retrait des troupes alliées
de la frontière des Alpes.

Je me réfère à la communication orale que vous m'avez faite le 20 Novembre au sujet du retrait des troupes alliées de la zone des 15 milles le long de la frontière des Alpes.

Suivant les instructions que M. BIDAULT m'a fait tenir, je vous demande de bien vouloir intervenir auprès de AFHQ pour qu'il soit sursis à l'exécution de cette mesure jusqu'à ce que le Gouvernement Français ait pu considérer la situation.

Le Capitaine de Vaisseau MOULLEC
Représentant Français à la
Commission Alliée

Moullec

see 30

022

(98)

(25)

TO FOREIGN MEDIA, RE LEBNIA REISS ACTION

0503

13 Nov 45

ROUTINE

TOP SECRET (See p. 28) Confidential

~~SECRET~~ 50

ONLINE TO HEAVY GROUND COMBATANTS AND REINFORCEMENT OF UNITED STATES CHA
 DOMINION AND LEBNIA WIKERS ALSO NO LONGER ASSE TO MAKE AVAILABLE ALLIED
 ESCAPE FOR DURING OF PRISON ITALIAN FRONTIER FARMER TO RECOVER CHARGE
RECOVER ITALIAN NOT BOUNTY CHARGE LEBNIA FRONTIER ACTION FARMER FROM NOV

SECRET ALONG WITH AHEAD

FORWARD ASSEMBLIES BEING INFORMED THAT ALLIED THINGS WILL BE WITHDRAWN
 FROM FRONTIER 122 OCT DECEMBER ONE THIS FIVE FIVE AND SUBSEQUENT GROUND
 RECOVERY WILL BE RECOVERED BY ITALIAN TO ITALIAN CONFIDENTIALITY

END

See 28

TOP SECRET (See Felix 28)

Confidential

SECRET NO

UNIT TO HEAVY GUNDED COMBATANTS AND DESTRUCTION OF UNITED STATES CIA
DESTRUCTION AND LITTLE TRUCKS AND NO LITTLE ASSE TO MAKE ATTITUDE ALLIED
TRUCKS FOR DIVERS OF TRUCKS ITALY FARMER PAPER TO ROGER CLARK
FARMER PAPER TO ROGER CLARK FARMER PAPER TO ROGER CLARK

SECRET ALUM CIVE SCALO

TRUCKS AUTOMATICALLY BEING INFORMED THAT ALLIED TRUCKS WILL BE WITHDRAWN
TRUCKS FARMER USE ONE DEFENDER ONE MORE FOUR FIVE AND SUBSEQUENT REUSE
REUSEMENT WILL BE REPLACED BY ITALY TO ITALY DEFENDER TRUCK

DEFENDER

See 28

[REDACTED]

Executive Officer

310 D. E. V.

at Col.
Chief Staff Officer.

020

1126727

785017

8273
INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Originator's Reference: FK 53113

Date/Time of Origin: NOV 14/1818 A

TOP SECRET

Message Centre No: 9/3735

Date Time Rec'd: NOV 16/1730

Precedence: PRIORITY

FROM: AFHQ SIGNED SACRED CITE FSCOT

NOV 17 1945

TO : AGWAR WASHINGTON FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, CABINET OFFICES LONDON FOR
BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF: INFO 2 DISTRICT ALCOM (ROME AREA PLS PASS) USFET.

TOP SECRET

Reference NAF 1010.

This is NAF 1090.

1. Owing to heavy guard commitments and repatriation of U.S. Dominion and Indian Troops I am no longer able to make available Allied Troops for duties on the Franco-Italian frontier.

2. I am informing General JUIIN that Allied troops will be withdrawn from the Franco-Italian frontier zone WEF 1 December 45 and that they will be replaced where necessary with Italian Troops.

DIST

INFO ACTION EX COMMISSIONER (2)

INFO CHIEF COMMISSIONER

POLAD (A)

POLAD (B)

MMIA

C AFFAIRS SEC (2)

FILE (2)

FLOAT

019

We've informed Italian Govt. Have we
told Liguria - Piemonte Regions?

See 25

M. 26.37

See 671

17/11

(30)

785017

(23)

Ref: 8273/22/23

17th November 1945

Dear Mr Prime Minister,

I have been requested by Allied Force Headquarters to inform you that as from the 1st of December 1945, Allied troops will be withdrawn from the Franco-Italian Frontier. Thereafter, where necessary, they will be replaced by Italian troops.

The French authorities have been duly informed.

Very truly yours,

ELBERT W. STONE,
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Professor Ferruccio Parri,
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government,
ROME.

Copies to:

Palace (A)
Palace (B)
Land Forces S/G
GA Sec

PA
19/11
018

785017

8273
INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Originator's Reference: F 53101

Message Centre No: G/3647

Date/Time of Origin NOV 14/1723 A

Date Time Rec'd: NOV 15/1430 A

Precedence: ROUTINE

FROM: FREEDOM SIGNED SACRED

TO : 2 DISTRICT ALCOM

SECRET

Confidential

Reference F 51737 of 3rd November.

1. French authorities being informed that Allied troops will be withdrawn from FRANCO-ITALIAN frontier WEF 1 December 45 and thereafter where necessary will be replaced by Italians.

2. For ALCOM request you inform the Italian Government.

DIST

ACTION RX COMMISSIONER (2)
INFO CHIEF COMMISSIONER
PO LAD (A)
PO LAD (B)
L. FORCES S/C
C A SECTION
FILE

NOTE:- MESSAGE CENTRE HAVE NO TRACE
OF CABLE UNDER REFERENCE.

See 23

me 1922

NOTATION



017

(COPY DESTROYED)

785017

8273 Ex Commissioner
INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Copy No 1

Originator's Reference: FX 47457

Message Centre No: G/177

Date/Time of Origin: OCT 051821A

Date Time Rec'd: OCT 060930A

Precedence: ROUTINE

FROM FREEDOM SIGNED SACHED CITE FHGCT

TO : ACTION CABINET OFFICES FOR BRITISH C.O.S. INFO BRITISH WASHINGTON FOR U.S.
JOINT C.O.S., ALCON

OCT - 1945

TOP SECRET.

TOP SECRET

Confidential

This is MEDCOS 277.

1. In view of the fact that the 2nd Polish Armoured Div which was formed with 2nd Polish Armoured Brigade and 16th Pomorska (Infantry) Brigade was not included in formations listed in para 5 of MEDCOS 272 the following amendment to that para should be made:

Sub para A. Sub para 5A. Amend to read 1 British Division 1 New Zealand Division 1 Indian Division 3 Polish Divisions. Total 6 Divisions.

Sub para B. Sub para 5B. Amend to read 1 British Division 3 Polish Divisions. Total 4 Divisions.

Amended 6/10/45
DIST

Copy No 1 & 2	INFO-ACTION: Ex Commissioner 2
" "	INFO: Chief Commissioner
" "	POLAD (A)
" "	POLAD (B)
" "	CA Sec
" "	L. Forces
" "	File

TOP SECRETSee 20
016 PA 10/10

COPY

SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

8273

7 September 45

SUBJECT: Handover of AMG Territory to Italian Administration

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission, APO 394

Reference is made to your cables 3748 of 15 August and 3937 of 20 August 1945.

1. The question of the handover of AMG Territories in Northern ITALY has been referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in NAF 1069 and NAF 1071 (copies to you).

2. With regard to the retention in ITALY of 5 Divisions of Allied troops, the views of the SAC on this subject were forwarded to the British Chiefs of Staff in MEDCOS 272 of which you have a copy.

/s/ M. J. Coleman Col

for

A. L. HAMBLEY

Brigadier General, G.S.C.

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

DISTRIBUTION:

G-2 US POLAD
G-3 C/S MTOUSA
CINC MED RAF MEDME
USN AAF/MTO
SACS G-4
CAO G-4 (B)
RESMIN G-5

HQ AC, CC DISTRIBUTION (10 Sep 45):

Executive Commissioner
Civil Affairs Section
Political Adviser (A)
Political Adviser (B)
CC Files

(ACTION COPY ON 2605/02)

SECRET

015

PA
10/9

785017

3636 x 8273

EXC 114

(15)

INCOMING MESSAGE 6 SEP 1945

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Copy No 1

Originator's Reference: EX 40927

Date/Time of Origin: SEPT 4/1652B

Message Centre No: T/6542

Date Time Rec'd: SEPT 5/1115B

Precedence: PRIORITY

FROM FREEDOM SIGNED ALEXANDER CITE RHOO

TO : AMSSO FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF INFO: BRITMAN WASHINGTON FOR US JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFF ALCOM

TOP SECRET.

TOP SECRET Confidential
N/K

This is MEDCOS 272. Reference your COMSEC 236.

1. My views regarding the forces to be retained in ITALY were set out in NAFS 1013 and 1030. In these signals I recommended that,

A. An Allied Corps of 2 divisions should be retained in VENEZIA GIULIA until the peace settlement.

B. One Infantry Division and 1 Armoured regiment should be retained in ITALY as a mobile reserve.

2. The above estimate was based on the assumptions that,

A. Almost the whole of ITALY would be returned to the Italian Government by about 30 September.

B. The Italian Government would be given sufficient armed forces to enable them to exercise a reasonable degree of control.

C. Owing to transport and other limitations there would in fact be considerable Allied forces available in ITALY during the period of handing over to the Italian Government and for some time thereafter.

3. My recommendation regarding the date for handing over of the whole of ITALY less certain special areas to the Italian Government were contained in NAF 1069.

4. My recommendations regarding the Armed forces required by the Italian Government to enable them to assume effective responsibility for territory returned to them were sent

TOP SECRET

See 16-17

H. 12/19

CONTINUATION PAGE 2

TOP SECRET

EX 40927

Confidential

in NAES 1051 and 1059 and provided for an "interim" Italian Army of 140000 which will include 10 internal security brigades 5 combat groups and 1 independent regiment.

5. As far as can be foreseen at present and apart from a corps of 2 divisions in VENEZIA-GIULIA the following Allied formations will probably be available in ITALY for internal security;

A. until end October, 1 British division 1 N. Z. division 1 Indian division ³ Polish divisions. Total ⁶ divisions.

B. until end December 1 British division ³ Polish divisions. Total ⁴ divisions.

6. There is no doubt that the morale of the Italian army is still low desertion high and discontent over question of pay and demobilisation prevalent. All possible steps are being taken to improve this state of affairs but it will take time and if my recommendations regarding dates for handing over to Italian government are accepted the critical transitional period will take place while maximum number of Allied troops remain in the country.

7. Political complications connected with the use of Polish troops for internal security are fully appreciated but I consider if serious disorders take place we should be prepared to use Polish rather than keep further Allied troops in ITALY.

8. serious internal disorder is not likely while forces shown in para 5 remain in ITALY. In any case these forces with those of Italian government should be adequate to deal with any situation likely to arise. From New Year onwards until final effective settlement I consider forces shown in para 1 together with a rehabilitated "interim" Italian Army should be adequate.

9. I would add that Admiral STONE's memorandum CC1001 of 23 June was considered

TOP SECRET (Folio 65 File 600/uc)

TOP SECRET

CONTINUATION PAGE 3

EX 40927
Confidential

on an Allied basis at this HQ and covering letter 27 July was signed by General
MCNARNEY in his capacity acting as Supreme Allied Commander during my absence

DIST

Copy No 1 & 2 INFO-ACTION : EX COMMISSIONER (2)

"	"	3	INFO : CHIEF COMMISSIONER
"	"	4	POLAD (A)
"	"	5	POLAD (B)
"	"	6	CA SEC
"	"	7	LAND FORCES
"	"	8	FILE

Copy to: 3636/EC Public Security

TOP SECRET

012

785017

8273

EXEC. CONF.

SECRET

CG 1018

15 June 1945.

JUN 18 1945

SUBJECT: Redeployment of Allied troops in Italy.

TO : Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.
Attention: Chief of Staff.

(See 10A)

Confirming the position taken by me at your operational conference yesterday on the subject of redeployment of Allied troops in Italy, I desire to place formally before you the following recommendations:

1. In examining the question of the redeployment and distribution of Allied troops in Italy, consideration must be given to external and internal security and the undoubted duty of the Allied Governments to ensure so far as possible that free elections are held so that the population may express its opinion on (a) the institutional question; and (b) the constitutional government of the country, without fear.

2. Consideration must also be given to the size and location of the Italian land forces.

3. If the proposals for the maintenance of an interim Italian Army of 140,000 submitted in HQ AG memorandum 8251/100/AG of 7 June 1945 are approved, then the following distribution of the troops is recommended:

Combat Groups:

One each in TURIN, MILAN, BERGAMO,
UDINE and TRIESTE.

Internal Security
Divisions (Strength
2500 each):

2 Divisions in SICILY.
1 Division in SARDINIA.
1 Division in each of the Military
Regions; viz, PULIGNO, BARI, NAPLES,
ROME, FLORENCE, BOLOGNA, GENOA,
TURIN, MILAN, BOLZANO, UDINE.

4. The primary functions of the Combat Groups are for frontier defence and control. The Group at BERGAMO could be used as a reserve.

5. If the above distribution of the Italian Army is approved, then the maintenance of five Allied Divisions is recommended in addition to the administrative and service units employed in redeployment of personnel and material and exclusive of any Allied forces in

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(See Folio 193)
File 8251/100
Vol 11

see 17.6.12
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Confidential (10)

CC 1018

Subject:

Redeployment of Allied troops in Italy.

VENETIA GIULIA. Consideration has been given to the fact that Italian troops will not be maintained within 15 miles of the French frontier.

6. It is recommended that one division be placed in each of the following areas: MILAN, PADUA, FLORENCE-BOLOGNA, ROME-NAPLES, BARI.

7. The distribution of troops within these areas is a matter for military consideration. It is obvious, however, that a small force will be needed on the Franco-Italian frontier and possibly in the Southern Tyrol and UDINE. Mobility would be a prerequisite and during the weeks preceding the elections it would be expedient to allow a very wide distribution of troops in order to cover the larger towns and some of the more important rural areas. This would naturally take the form of a special exercise or operation and need not be considered in detail in this memorandum.

8. It is considered that it would be retrogressive to station Allied troops in SARDINIA or SICILY even during the election period. SARDINIA can very well be left to Italian troops and in SICILY, particularly during election times, the employment of Allied troops would be unwise.

9. The role of the Allied troops at all times and especially during the election period would be as representatives of the democracies, and it would be necessary to arrange for special instruction and even training to this end. Intervention in Italian affairs except in the gravest emergency would have to be avoided and the greatest care would have to be taken in the handling of such administrative problems as accommodation, requisitioning, etc. The troops would be not so much forces of occupation in a defeated country but forces of assistance provided by the Allies in order to give confidence to the population and the Government: to strengthen by their presence the authority of the Italian machinery of law and order (but only in exceptional cases to supplant it) and to be used in a last resort to prevent the imposition of radical methods by force.

10. The Allied troops should be maintained in this country until such time as the Italian Army and the forces of public security in Italy can play a competent role in the preservation of security. It is estimated that at the earliest this cannot take place before September 1st, 1946.

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

cc: U.S. Ambassador
British Ambassador
Exec. Comm.
CA SECTION
COL. RISKE (2)

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Extract from the Minutes of
SACMED's Conference 13th
Meeting (Operational) held
at AFHQ on 14th June 1945.

2 JUN 1945

MINUTE No. 4.4. WITHDRAWAL OF ALLIED FORCES FROM ITALY.

(JPS Study No. P/299 (Final).

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper examining the effect of withdrawal of United States and British Forces from ITALY in the light of the commitment necessary for Allied occupational and security requirements, recommending that a signal be despatched to the Combined Chiefs of Staff outlining the views of the Supreme Allied Commander in this regard.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER was of the opinion that the largest Allied commitment in ITALY between the present time and the signing of the Peace Treaty would be in the VENETIA GIULIA region. This would require a force of a Corps Headquarters and two divisions, one of which would be British. Since the occupational commitment was an Allied one, he considered that the other Division should be American. In Northwest ITALY, it would be advisable to maintain there a force of one Division. For this, Polish troops would be available, but he questioned the political advisability of employing them in this region. However, it was possible that one of the two Divisions now in GREECE could, if the situation required, be brought to ITALY and employed there after the Greek election. He believed that the Italian Army could be invaluable in maintaining security elsewhere in ITALY and therefore its training and re-arming should continue as rapidly as possible.

GENERAL McSHANEY stated that if present redeployment plans were carried out, no United States Divisions would remain in the theater after November, but he was prepared to recommend that the 10th Mountain Division remain as the United States commitment of one division in Northeast ITALY. He suggested that the matter of occupational forces should be re-examined in four or five months, at which time revised recommendations

4. WITHDRAWAL OF ALLIED FORCES FROM ITALY.

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REAR ADMIRAL STONE stated that he had discussed the occupational forces required to maintain law and order with the United States and British Ambassadors to ITALY, who were of the opinion that the force should consist of five Divisions in addition to the present Italian Group. It was their belief that this occupational force should be maintained for at least one year after all territory had been handed back to the Italian Government, or until approximately September 1946. As long as large Allied forces were present in ITALY, Communist elements would remain in the background, but would attempt to seize power as soon as Allied forces were withdrawn. He considered that a free election was imperative to the Italians and that this would never be held as long as conditions were unsettled.

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ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM expressed the opinion that ports should not be turned back to the Italian Government unless they had sufficient troops to deal with any strikes or outbreaks. He considered that sufficient United States and British forces should be retained on Italian territory so long as Italian forces remained unable to deal with any uprisings which might occur on the islands or mainland. Moreover, within a short time there would be no amphibious craft left in the theater to enable a rapid transfer of land forces to be effected to areas in which protection or support is required, and he believed that it was desirable to prevent outbreaks rather than to bring forces in afterwards for the purpose of quelling them, as had been necessary in GREECE. However, even a small occupational force could have a steady effect on the population, if it were frequently moved about the country.

VICE ADMIRAL GLASSFORD expressed the opinion that the occupational force should be kept to a minimum, but that there should be a central reserve in GERMANY or AUSTRIA which could be transported into ITALY on short notice.

AIR MARSHAL GARROD believed that mobile forces from a central reserve could be moved without difficulty by the use of air transport. Referring to the requirements for occupational air forces, contained in the draft signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, he believed that five fighter squadrons and three light bomber squadrons, RAF, did not constitute an adequate air force. Combat aircraft would be required to operate primarily against pin-point targets in the event of disturbances and he therefore recommended that the number of fighter squadrons be increased to eight, and that the medium bombers be correspondingly reduced.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

Directed the Chief of Staff:

- a. To revise the draft signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the light of the discussion above, and subsequently to despatch it.
- b. To conduct an examination of the question of organizing a central mobile reserve in EUROPE which could be called upon by the several Allied Commands to assist in maintaining law and order when needed, and to submit a report to him of his findings.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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ALLIED MEMORANDUM

5 JUN 1945

REDEPLOYMENT OF ALLIED TROOPS IN ITALY.

1. In examining the question of the redeployment and distribution of Allied troops in Italy, consideration must be given to external and internal security and the undoubted duty of the Allied Governments to ensure so far as possible that free elections are held so that the population may express its opinion on (a) the institutional question; and (b) the constitutional government of the country, without fear.

2. Consideration must also be given to the size and location of the Italian land forces.

3. If the proposals for the maintenance of an interim Italian Army of 140,000 submitted in HQ AG memorandum 8251/180/HQ of 7 June 1945 are approved, then the following distribution of the troops is recommended:

Combat Groups:

One each in TURIN, MILAN, BRESCIA, UDINE and BOLOGNA.

Internal Security

2 Divisions in SICILY.

Divisions (Strength

1 Division in SARDINIA.

800 each):

1 Division in each of the Military Regions, viz., PALERMO, BARI, NAPLES, ROME, FLORENCE, BOLOGNA, GENOA, TURIN, MILAN, BOLZANO, UDINE.

4. The primary functions of the Combat Groups are for frontier defence and control. The Group at BOLOGNA could be used as a reserve.

5. If the above distribution of the Italian Army is approved, then the maintenance of five Allied Divisions is recommended in addition to the administrative and service units employed in redeployment of personnel and material and exclusive of any Allied forces in VENETIA GIBLIA. Consideration has been given to the fact that Italian troops will not be maintained within

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15 miles of the French frontier.

6. It is recommended that one division be placed in each of the following areas: MILAN, PADUA, FLORENCE-BOLOGNA, ROME-NAPLES, BARI.

7. The distribution of troops within these areas is a matter for military consideration. It is obvious, however, that a small force will be needed on the Franco-Italian frontier and possibly in the Southern Tyrol and UDINE. Mobility would be a prerequisite and during the weeks preceding the elections it would be expedient to allow a very wide distribution of troops in order to cover the larger towns and some of the more important rural areas. This would naturally take the form of a special exercise or operation and need not be considered in detail in this memorandum.

8. It is considered that it would be retrogressive to station Allied troops in SARDINIA or SICILY even during the election period. SARDINIA can very well be left to Italian troops and in SICILY, particularly during election times, the employment of Allied troops would be unwise.

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10. The Allied troops should be maintained in this country until such

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time as the Italian Army and the forces of public security in Italy can play a competent role in the preservation of security. It is estimated that at the earliest this cannot take place before September 1st, 1946.

13th June 1946.

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EXTRACT FROM LETTER TO MR. M. MONTENAPOLI

Ref: LID/EC

14 10th June 1945.

"I have before me your telegrams 141 and 143.

With regard to electoral lists, the position is that the Allied Commission has informed the Italian Government that their present system of preparation of electoral lists is so cumbersome and impracticable that the Allied Commission does not intend to instruct its Regional Commissioners in AMG territory to take any action. I am asking the Chief Commissioner to have a meeting on this matter at the earliest possible moment because I am convinced that we must get on with the question of elections.

With regard to consultation by the Allied command on the movement of Italian troops, I wrote a letter to the Admiral on May 31st suggesting that he must press for consultation on movements and locations of all troops and he spoke to AFHQ who said that the movement of troops was a matter for 5th Army and that Hums would be consulted and it was up to 5th Army AMG to put up any protests. This is merely passing the buck and is most unsatisfactory. I will have a further talk with the Admiral tomorrow."

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PRIORITY

HQ IV CORPS FROM HOPKINSON

HQ ALCOM

Confidential

JUN 1945

SECRET.

Col FISKE reports that there have been minor incidents between troops of FOLGERS GRUPPO who were recently moved into BOLZANO Province and German speaking population. Although it appears to be nothing serious at present I think it is a good instance of a case in which ALLIED COMMISSION ought to have been consulted by Allied command before and on political aspects of movement of Italian troops. You may care to take up question of principle using above as example.

DIST

ACTION: Ex Commissioner 2
 INFO: Chief Commissioner
 SO to Chief Commissioner 2
 CA Sec
 Econ Sec
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see ACTION taken on 147/EC Pol Ado Strygo from the North.
 see Folia

see folio 5
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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

JUN 5 RECD
CC 09502nd June 1945.

My dear Admiral,

I sent you a telegram the other day regarding the location of Allied and Italian troops and recommending that you should insist on consultation in this post-hostilities period. It is the custom in any civil administration for the civil side of Government to be consulted and to have a great say in the location of troops. They must be in the best position to advise on locations from the point of view of internal security. In this country we have reached the stage where civil administration must take priority. There are many political and administrative problems of which the Military Commanders cannot be as cognisant as you and whether the location of troops is to be temporary or permanent, the Chief Civil Affairs Officer must in my opinion be consulted.

A case in point is the withdrawal of Allied troops from the northern areas of Bolzano Province and the replacement by the Volghera Italian Division. So far as I know, no Provincial Commissioner was consulted on this point and the Provincial Commissioner, Bolzano, is definitely of the opinion that the location of the Italian Division amongst the rural South Tyrolean population of Bolzano Province at this moment is a mistake and will cause resentment and possible disorder. However accurate his forecast may be, he certainly should have been consulted and as it affects a matter of the highest policy, so, I think, should you.

I think this is a matter which should be taken up personally with the Supreme Allied Commander for anything put in writing may cause resentment to the Military Commanders. But I do consider it a matter of the highest importance and I am recommending a principle which is accepted in all civil administrations.

We have got to persuade the Military Commanders that civil necessity and political considerations are now paramount, or at any rate must be considered on an equality with military considerations and that you are the Chief Civil Affairs Officer to the Supreme Allied Commander.

Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone, USNR,
Chief Commissioner,
Headquarters,
Allied Commission, APO 394.

Tomlinson

Maurice Tush.

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OF PRIORITY

From: HQ VENEZIE REGION
101 ALCOM

Confidential

MAY 30 1945

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Personal from LUSH to STONE.

I submit that it is important you as CCAC should be consulted before dispositions of Allied and Italian troops in N. ITALY are determined. We could then avoid difficulties which may arise for instance from location of Italian troops in BOLZANO and near French frontier. HOPKINSON will clarify on arrival ROME tomorrow.

Dist

Action - S.O. to Chief Comm
Info & Chief Commissioner
Exec Comm
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