

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND

No.

785017

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No.

785017

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PWB OPERATION, VENEZIA GIULIA
AUG. 1945

17

TO: Chief Commissioner
(Through Executive Commissioner)

(16)

Action taken, carbon copy attached.

20 August, 1945
R230/PRI

L. Pennington
Public Relations Branch

18

Ex Comm

16. For your & let's info on per min 17. see folio

OK 20/8

19

24/8 noted. EC has already approved -
(min 18) and this therefore need not be
referred again to him. 2

1243

Political Adviser (A)
Political Adviser (B)

Please see draft TSB directive for Venezia
Giulia at 918, on which your comments are
requested.

11 Aug 45

M. Pasby Carlisle

Executive Commissioner:

In General I approve the draft directive for FBI operations
in Venezia Giulia (Folio B). I should like to raise, however,
the following minor points:

1. I feel that paragraph 3(c) under Section B "Directive"
might be re-worded to eliminate any suggestion to the reader that
the United States and Great Britain ever had at any time any
intention of establishing themselves permanently in Venezia
Giulia. The sub-paragraph as presently worded states such an
obvious truth that it may raise a doubt in the mind of the reader.
2. Paragraph 5(d) of Section B "Directive" states "where
possible directly or indirectly we link expropriation, the trial and
punishment of Nazi and Fascist war criminals everywhere with
Allied Military Government". Surely this must be an exaggeration
of the facts and I would suggest that, if this portion of the
directive is to be linked to AMG, it should be less general in
its scope.

J. Wesley Jones
Political Adviser (A)

Aug. 14/45

13.

J. Wesley Jones' directive is satisfactory

- large very long. I agree with it.

Wesley Jones' two points.

the United States and... intention of establishing themselves permanently in Venezia Giulia. The sub-paragraphes presently worded states such an obvious truth that it may raise a doubt in the mind of the reader.

2. Paragraph 3(d) of Section B "Directive" states "where possible directly or indirectly we link epuration, the trial and punishment of Nazi and Fascist war criminals everywhere with Allied Military Government". Surely this must be an exaggeration of the facts and I would suggest that, if this portion of the directive is to be linked to AMG, it should be less general in its scope.

J. Wesley Jones
Political Adviser (A) Aug. 14/45

13. I think this direction is satisfactory

- range very long. I agree with

Wesley Jones' two points.

[Signature]
Pol. Adviser (B) Aug 14

Major Stearns
above please see Pol. Advisers comment on folio 12
PWX 15/8 AUG 16 RECD 1106

[Signature]
15. 14/8

PRB
16/8 Approved, subject to modification
as per recommendation of Board (AF) *[Signature]*
cc

9277

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
PUBLIC RELATIONS BRANCH

GSE/dp

R230/PRB

August 18, 1945

TO: C. A. Raleigh Radford, Assistant Deputy Director, PWB, AFHQ.

SUBJECT: Directives of Venezia Giulia. (A)

Reference your memorandum of 8 August to the Chief Commissioner on the above subject.

The Directive draft has been reviewed by the Allied Commission and meets with its concurrence except that it is believed advisable to raise the following points.

(A) It is felt that paragraph 3(c) under Section B "Directive" might be re-worded to eliminate any suggestion to the reader that the United States and Great Britain ever had at any time any intention of establishing themselves permanently in Venezia Giulia. The sub-paragraph as presently worded states such an obvious truth that it may raise a doubt in the mind of the reader.

(B) Paragraph 6(d) of Section B "Directive" states "where possible directly or indirectly we link epuration, the trial and punishment of Nazi and Fascist war criminals everywhere with Allied Military Government". This must be an exaggeration of the facts and we would suggest that, if this portion of the directive is to be linked to AMG, it should be less general in its scope.

G. STEWART BROWN 1241
Director
Public Relations Branch

see 17161
11/17/45
21/19

9277
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394

(10)
LWS/hjp

11 August 1945

AUG 11 1945

TO: Executive Commissioner, Hq., A.C.

The Chief Commissioner desires that the attached draft directive for the PWB operation in Venezia Giulia be referred to the Political Advisors for their information and comment and return to this office.

(1-8)

L. W. STEARNS
Major, A.G.D.
Staff Officer to CC

1 Incl:
Ltr fr Mr Radford, PWB,
8 Aug 45 (with 1 incl.)

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10A
~~Major~~ Stearns:

I have read it
and concur & I
have no revisions
to suggest. Perhaps
the C.C. will
wish to have the
Pol. advisors read
it.

Major S. GSB
Refer to Palade
5-

3

AUG 9 1945
REC'D
CE 1125
(9)

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
INFORMATION AND CENSORSHIP SECTION
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH
ITALIAN THEATRE HEADQUARTERS
P.W.B. UNIT No. 12 U.S.A.P.O. 512

8 August 1945.

To: The Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.

From: Assistant Deputy Director, PWB. AFHQ.

Subject: Directives for Venezia Giulia. (8)

1. I submit herewith a draft directive for the PWB operation in Venezia Giulia.
2. This directive has been ^{submitted} ~~approved~~ by Lt. Col. Street, O.C. AIS, Trieste, and his advisors in that city.
3. I understand that the directive has the approval of the 13th. Corps and of the local representatives of AMG.
4. Your concurrence in this directive is requested in order that it may be submitted to the Chief of Staff AFHQ for approval through normal channels.

G.A. Raleigh Radford
G.A. Raleigh Radford
Assistant Deputy Director
PWB. AFHQ.

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SECRET

DRAFT.

CENTRAL DIRECTIVE FOR
VENESIA GIULIA.

A. AIMS

(I) To assist in the maintenance of law and order in

Venesia Giulia.

(II) To support the Allied Military Government in its
policies and actions.

(III) To project Great Britain and U.S.A.

B. MESSAGE

1238

1. ALLIED PRESENCE IN VENESIA GIULIA.

We make this the basic fact in our output. We use suitable
occasions, therefore, to reiterate the reasons for the presence
of Allied troops in this area and the basis for assumption of
authority by the Allied Military Government.

policies and actions.

(iii) To project Great Britain and U.S.A.

B. DIRECTIVE.

1238

1. ALLIED FRIENDSHIP IN YUGOSLAVIA.

We make this the basic fact in our output. We use suitable occasions, therefore, to reiterate the reasons for the presence of Allied troops in this area and the basis for assumption of authority by the Allied Military Government.

2. LAW AND ORDER IN YUGOSLAVIA.

We support the disarmament of patriots, partisans and other such bodies in this area by instructing the whole population in the ways of peace and acclimatizing them to a reign of law and order after long years of evasion of the law and acts of violence under fascist and German rule.

In particular:

- 2 -

- (a) Therefore, we stress any item of news etc., which shows the working of true democratic principles locally or internationally, in particular decisions arrived at by negotiations rather than unilaterally or by force.
- (b) We make minimum reference to border disputes and border problems except when these have been settled by negotiation based on democratic principles.
- (c) We make minimum use of stories of mob rule or mob vengeance, particularly in connection with punishment of fascists, Nazis, collaborators, etc.
- (d) We recognize the past misdeeds of fascies as regards ¹²³³ ~~unlike~~ mass in this area but deplore unlicensed violence and revenge as a remedy.
- (e) Where possible, we convey by implication that public disorders, strikes, intimidations etc., in this area are the work of an

(c) We make minimum use of stories of mob rule or mob vengeance, particularly in connection with punishment of fascists, Nazis, collaborators, etc.

(d) We recognize the past misdeeds of fascists as requiring ¹²³² ~~as a remedy~~ ^{as a remedy} in this area but deplore unlicensed violence and revenge as a remedy.

(e) Where possible, we convey by implication that public discourse, strikes, intimidations etc., in this area are the work of an irresponsible minority and only serve to postpone the ultimate return to normal conditions.

(f) We give prominence to the arrest, trial and punishment of persons charged with intimidation, illegal possession of arms etc., in Venezia Giulia.

3. AIMED IMPARTIALITY IN VENEZIA GIULIA.

We show strict impartiality on racial, linguistic, cultural,

- 3 -

religious, boundary and political problems.

In particular, throughout the whole area.

(a) Whilst giving prominence to democratic reconstruction in

Italy we avoid any appearance of carrying out propaganda on

behalf of the Italian Government or State.

(b) Whilst giving full publicity to the achievements during the

war of the Yugoslav liberation movement, we avoid comparing

actually or by implication, these achievements with the Italian

contribution to victory, and the Italian status of co-belligerency

with the Yugoslav status of ally.

(c) Whilst projecting Great Britain and the United States, their

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aim, achievements and way of life, we avoid conveying the

impression by so doing, of running a propaganda campaign in

favour of ultimate control by these two nations of this area.

In particular in the Corfu and Vloha areas.

war of the Yugoslav liberation movement, as well as
actually or by implication, these achievements with the Italian
contribution to victory, and the Italian status of co-belligerency
with the Yugoslav status of ally.

(a) whilst projecting Great Britain and the United States, their
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aims, achievements and way of life, we avoid conveying the
impression by so doing, of running a propaganda campaign in
favour of ultimate control by these two nations of this area.

In particular in the Gorizia and Pola areas:-

(d) in all media, when dealing with Slovene or Croat problems,
we treat these problems as Yugoslav ones generally and avoid
all appearance of attempting to support the autonomous
traditions and ambitions of either race or of playing one off
against the other.

(e) in dealing with ecclesiastical and religious subjects in this

area we bear in mind -

- 4 -

- (i) The present relations between the Yugoslav State and the Roman Catholic Church in Croatia and Slovenia.
- (ii) The anti-clerical movements and incidents in this area.
- (iii) The problem of Slovene clericalism and anti-clericalism and its connection with the pertinent movement.

Therefore, whilst reporting activities and statements of the Roman Catholic Church as items of general interest, we avoid the appearance, particularly in Yugoslav media, of attempting to carry out propaganda on behalf of this church.

4. UNITY IN YUGOSLAVIA

We call upon all men of goodwill of whatever party, nationality or race, to collaborate and live together under and for the government and the reconstruction of this area but we avoid giving prominence or encouragement to Italo-Slovene Committees of Liberation and similar bodies, which are not really representative of the people.

Catholic Church as items of general interest, as well as
anywhere, particularly in Yugoslav media, of attempting to carry
out propaganda on behalf of this church.

4. UNITY IN VENETIA GIULIA.

We call upon all men of goodwill of whatever party, nationality or
race, to collaborate and live together under and for the government
and the reconstruction of this area but we avoid giving prominence
or encouragement to Italo-Slovene Committees of liberation and
similar bodies, which are not really representative of the people.

5. GENERAL WORLD PROBLEMS AND VENETIA GIULIA.

We treat the problem of Venetia Giulia, not as an individual
problem of paramount importance, but as part of the general problems
of the postwar world, and whilst keeping the Pacific war in its
prominent place in the area we emphasise the problems of destruction
and reconstruction everywhere, and more particularly throughout

Europe. In particular -

- 5 -

(a) We use the maritime, economic and international connections of the area to give additional point to reports of economic dislocation and re-organization elsewhere.

(b) By implication we contrast the economic and food situation of this area favourably with others which have been more severely ravaged by war and its aftermath.

6. ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN VENEZUELA

We use all stories, rumours, official statements etc., to show the achievements of all Allied Military Governments everywhere, and in this area in particular. But in so doing -

(a) We refer to the particular political and racial problems

of this area.

(b) We bear in mind the special economic problems of this area

such as coal, and therefore, whilst reporting Allied Military

Government achievements in other areas, we avoid unfavourable

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We use all stories, releases, official statements etc., to show the achievements of all Allied Military Governments everywhere, and in this area in particular. But in so doing -

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- (a) We refer to the particular political and racial problems of this area.
- (b) We bear in mind the special economic problems of this area such as coal, and therefore, whilst reporting Allied Military Government achievements in other areas, we avoid unfavourable comparisons with this area.
- (c) We take special care not to raise false hopes of an early complete solution of the above problems.
- (d) Where possible, directly or indirectly, we link operations, the trial and punishment of fascists and Nazi war criminals everywhere with Allied Military Government.
- (e) We give prominence, particularly in Yugoslav media, to all

- 6 -

items of news and official announcements showing how the Allied Military Government in this area is reinstating or facilitating the use of the Slovene and Croat languages.

(f) We give prominence to the work of the Allied Military Government in Carinthia, particularly in connection with the destruction of nazism and its attitude towards the Slovene element.

(g) In reporting the work of the Allied Military Government in Germany and Austria, we take special care to see that the tenor of our output and the phraseology used for this differs from that used in reporting the work of Allied Military Government in

Yugoslavia and Italy.

(h) INSERT - See last page.

7. UNITY OF USA, USSR AND UK.

We stress the basic unity of these three great powers and use only official statements on matters upon which there is divergence of opinion between them.

123C

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1233

Venezia Giulia.

(h) INSERT - See last page.

7. UNITY OF USA, USSR AND UK.

We stress the basic unity of these three great powers and use only official statements on matters upon which there is divergence of opinion between them.

8. "FEDERATION" OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND.

We stress the aims, achievements and sacrifices in this war of these two nations, in particular we stress -

(a) The basic continuity of their foreign policy based on democratic principles and we place occasional discrepancies and party politics in their true perspective.

(b) We stress the achievements of the Allied troops in this area.

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using them as an example of the United Nations at work.

- (c) We stress the assistance by these two nations to formerly occupied Europe in relief and rehabilitation and in this connection we stress the sacrifices, such as ration cuts, which are still being made at home. We stress particularly, allied aid to Jugoslavia and Russia, past and present.

- (d) We report the action taken by these two nations in the complete eradication of the Nazi system in Germany.

- (e) We picture these two nations in their peaceful pursuits and report their gradual process of turning swords into plowshares but avoid emphasizing them as lands of plenty and luxury.

9. CONQUERED PROPAGANDA IN RUSSIA SINCE.

Whilst ensuring that where possible misrepresentations of Allied activity in this area are rectified, we avoid the appearance of

complete eradication of the Nazi system in Germany.

- (a) No picture these two nations in their peaceful pursuits and report their gradual process of turning swamps into plains shares but avoid emphasizing them as lands of plenty and luxury.

9. COUNTER PROPAGANDA IN VENETIA GIULIA.

Whilst ensuring that where possible misrepresentations of Allied activity in this area are rectified, we avoid the appearance of indulging in a "propaganda fight" with foreign organizations.

drafted by D.A.M. STUART

Lt. Colonel
O.O. AIS Trieste.

P.T.O.

21st July, 1945.

Under para. ⁶7 insert -

"(b) in carrying out this campaign in support of the Allied Military Government, we take care, by watching the timing and content of our output, to avoid the impression of being on the defensive or succumbing to popular clamour on any one point."

