

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

ACC

10000/109/1547
(VOL. I)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

10000/109/1597
(VOL. I)

CARABINIERI
DEC. 1943 - APR. 1944

HEADQUARTERS
ALBINO CENTER OF THE ARMY
R.O. & B.O. Section
at 324

24 April 1944

102/302/112/22

SUBJECT: Candidates for Chieti Province.

TO : A.R.G. 8 AFGE.

Reference your Oa/B of 19 April 44.

Administrative Section (Public Safety
Sub-Commission) are taking action and will reply
to you direct.

HERMAN E. FINCH
Colonel,
Deputy Executive
Commissioner.

4446

Copy to : Administrative Section.

3030/4
see 110
224K
Noted
[Signature]

SUBJECT:

Capitoli. 302

App Recd 22
HQ AM. 22
Rear EIGHTH ARMY.

OA/8

19 APR 44.

TO: Executive Commissioners Branch,
Allied Control Commission.

1. The Commander of the CHIETI Group OGR says his HQ at BARI promised a short time ago to increase his strength OGR by 100 men, but has not yet been able to do so.

2. It is appreciated that there are many calls for OGR reinforcements but CHIETI Province in an Army Area as it is, with many demands upon the OGR available, is particularly short of personnel and deserving of priority in the allocation of reinforcements.

P. C. Benta Jan

Major, OA
for Group Captain,
Officer Commanding,
AMT EIGHTH ARMY.

Copy to: PC CHIETI Province, Letter reference SCAFO/OAR/4/CH dated
13 Apr 44 refers.

: Administrative Section, Allied Control Commission.



Ref Conference minutes para

Range Admin Sec and drew their attention to
para 2 of 77. (Para 3 of 85 also applies.)

They will take up to Sec PS. Sec. Sec
CER R to Study.

ll 20/4

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
R.C. & M.G. Section
APO 394

Ref/302/10/0A.

10 April 1944.

SUBJECT: Interference with duties of CC.RR

TO : R.C. Region V.

1. The Chief Public Safety Sub-Commission advises that the General Commanding the CC.RR has reported to him that AOC Officers in the Province of Foggia have interfered with the CC.RR in their duties of arresting deserters from the Italian Army. Details of such accusations have not been supplied, but the Chief of the Public Safety Sub-Commission has requested them.

2. This matter is called to your attention for information purposes at this time.

NFA interference

TEP
NORMAN E. FISKE
Colonel,
Deputy Executive
Commissioner.

105
26/4/44
105

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
R.C. & M.C. Section
APO 394

Ref/302/17/CA.

10 April 1944.

SUBJECT: Relationship of Public Safety AOC with
CC.HR

TO : V.P. Admin. Section - For Public Safety
Sub-Commission.

1. Reference your letter AOC/14601/14/PS
of 4 April 1944.

2. The recommendation made in para.2 of
your letter is being carried out.

DAF
NORMAN E. FISKE
Colonel,
Deputy Executive
Commissioner.

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
R.C. & H.C. Section
APO 394

20 April 1944.

Ref/302/ci/ca.

SUBJECT: Relation of Public Safety A.C.C. with CC.HH

TO : Regional Commissioners Regions I, II, III, & VI.

1. Attached is copy of English text of a letter being sent by the General Commanding CC.HH to all his subordinates in unoccupied territory.
2. In regions which have not passed under the control of the Italian Government, paras. 1 to 4 will merely serve as a guide to the channels of communication which are desirable. Para. 5 will not apply.
3. You are requested to circularize this letter among the Public Safety officers in your respective regions.

KENNETH E. FISKE
Colonel,
Deputy Executive
Commissioner.

Copy to: R.C. Region IV & V.
SQACs 5th & 6th Armies

} For information.

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
R.C. & H.C. Section
APO 394

105

Ref/302/101/CA.

17 April 1944.

SUBJECT: General TADDEI, Leonetto (OC.RR) P.O.W. in India.

TO : H.Q. Allied Armies in Italy.

1. You will recall that I have previously written you suggesting that certain officers of the OC.RR should be released from P.O.W. Camps and repatriated.
2. General Fieche, Commanding General of the OC.RR has now made a very strong request for release and return of General TADDEI, Leonetto of the OC.RR, now a P.O.W. in India.
3. The Public Safety Sub-Commission reports to me that the OC.RR is in urgent need of highly competent senior officers, and that General TADDEI can be of great assistance. The Sub-Commission further submits to me a record history of General Taddai, and it appears he is a career man of good record.
4. It will be greatly appreciated if immediate steps could be taken to release General Taddai and repatriate him to this country where his services are urgently needed at this time.

WOL. HANSON MACFARLANE
Lieut-General,
Chief Commissioner.

Send copy to P/S Sec

referring to 102

copy sent to P/S Sec 444

785017

1 7 APR Recd - 3187 302 JM

REAR HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission.

6 APR 1944

4270

APR 18 1944

5 April 1944

ACC/14881/PS.

SUBJECT: Interference with the duties of CCRR.

TO: Executive Commissioner, R.C. & M.S. Sect:

1. It has been reported to me by General Piesche, Commanding General of the Royal Carabinieri, that A.C.C. officers in the Province of FROSINA have been interfering with the CCRR in their duty of arresting deserters from the Italian Army.

2. I have asked General Piesche to supply me with full details, but in the meantime this complaint is forwarded to you for any immediate action you may think desirable.

100100

Paul G. Hirk

PAUL G. HIRK
Colonel, Infantry.
Chief, Public Safety
Sub-Commission

YAS/c

Pa

724

4270

SUBJECT: Co-operation of Italian Forces 7 APR Recd

TO : Executive Commissioner, A.C.C.
R.C. AMG Section, APO 394

AMG Rear Eighth Army

Ref: OA/31

3 April 1944

Reference your 302/71/CA of 19 Mar 44 and 302/90/CA of 27 Mar 44.

1. The circular from BARI Legion CCRR which gave rise to the return of firearms by the CCRR at MALFALDA Prov. CAMPOBASSO was referred to in this H.Q. letter to H.Q. AMG 15 Army Group on 5 Jan 44 to which reply AMG /421/43 of 13 Jan 44 was received.
2. It was sent to the CAMPOBASSO Command CCRR in Dec 1943 before the G.O.C. Carabinieri had been informed of the correct method for routing information or instructions to CCRR units in AMG territory.
3. The circular was sent to CCRR stations in CAMPOBASSO Province and intended for information only.
4. The Marsociale CCRR then at MALFALDA misinterpreted the circular and released the firearms, a fact of which his Senior Officers were not aware.
5. They were recalled immediately the matter was brought to notice.
6. The Commander of the CAMPOBASSO Province CCRR has been strongly warned to take measures in order to prevent recurrence of such incidents.

P.C. Burt a Tam Inge RA
Group Captain,
Officer Commanding,
AMG Eighth Army.

3028 CA Bv
W Recd
1024
100
HEAD HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APO 394

5 April 1944

ACC/14601/6/PS

SUBJECT: Repatriation of General TADDEI, Leonetto, (CCRR)
P.O.W. in India

TO : Executive Commissioner, RC & MG Section.

1. With reference to my letter ACC/14601/6/PS dated 10 March 1944, is it possible to state if there is any prospect of Gen. TADDEI of the CCRR being released from internment as a Prisoner of War in India to return to active duty in Italy?

62
See 105
PAUL S. LIND
Colonel, JAG
Chief, Public Safety
Sub-Commission

APW/ndd

6 APR Recd

REAR HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission

302 CAB
J-3034

107
2

4 April 1944.

ACC/14601/14/PS

SUBJECT: Relationship of Public Safety ACC with CCRP.

TO : Executive Commissioner, R.C. & M.C. Section.

1. Attached is the English text of a letter which will be sent by the General Commanding the CCRP to all his subordinates in unoccupied territory.
2. It is recommended that a copy of the letter be circulated to each Region for the information of Public Safety Officers.
3. In the case of Regions which have not passed under the control of the Italian Government, paragraphs 1 to 4 will merely serve as a guide to the channels of communication which are desirable. Paragraph 5 will not apply.

Paul G. Kirk

PAUL G. KIRK,
Colonel, Infantry.
Chief, Public Safety
Sub-Commission.

COMANDO ARMA CARABINIERI REALI DELL'IT'IA LIBERATA
Ufficio Mobilitazione

1049

1. In order to establish a standard procedure, eliminate administrative duplication, and promote better collaboration between the various CCRR Hqs. and ACC Hqs., the following provisions will govern the relationship between the several echelons of the CCRR and ACC (Public Safety):-
 1. The Group commanders will keep in touch with the Provincial P.S. officers of ACC in order to keep them informed of the instructions received.
 2. The Legion commanders will maintain liaison with the Regional P.S. officers of ACC where the territory of the region generally corresponds to the territory of the legion.
 3. This General Hq. will maintain liaison with the P.S. Sub-Commission of ACC at Salerno.
 4. The Generals of Brigades and Divisions while having the power to intervene in cases where legions are lacking or uncertain in their relations with all other Commands with whom they are in contact, will limit their actions to coordinate the regulations adopted by the Commands of the various regions under their commands or jurisdiction. Difficulties which cannot thus be eliminated will be presented to this Headquarters for consideration and determination.
 5. Periodic reports to the P.S. Sub-Commission of ACC at Salerno will be a function of this command. Lower Hqs of CCRR will not make written periodic reports to P.S. Officers of ACC, though they will make available any reports, statistics or information which have already been prepared in the normal course of duty. They will also report orally on such specific matters as may be referred to them, informing the higher Hq of the CCRR as soon as possible.
 6. The foregoing regulations are applicable only to territory directly administered by the Italian Government.

Il Generale Comandante.

GIUSEPPE PIECHE

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

1 DEPARTMENT
ADMIN. CONTROL COMMISSION
H.C. & H.C. SECTION
APO 34

29 March 1944

Ref 1302/95/CA.

SUBJECT: C.C.R.R.

TO : Admin. Section
(Att: Public Safety Sub-Commission)

Attached copies of correspondence regarding
C.C.R.R. are forwarded for information.

NORMAN E. PIRKE
Colonel
Deputy Executive
Commissioner

4435

SUBJECT: CG. Am.

HEADQUARTERS

28 MAR 28 MAR Recd

SECRET

AMT ADM BCI, CMF.

3064/2/4(0)

Executive Commissioner,
The Allied Control Commission

26 Mar 44

92

1. With reference to your letter, AMB/30/80 dated 16 Jan 44, on the above subject, this matter has been under examination.
2. A statement is attached showing the accommodation at present occupied by troops. In the majority of cases the occupation has taken place with the agreement of the German Authorities.
3. It will be appreciated that for operational reasons continued occupation is necessary and it is not proposed to take further action at present. Should any special cases arise, will you please notify this HQ.

CMF/PA

Chief Administrative Officer.

C. O. 1st Lt. Brig

PA

FHP

93-

Worshipful.

Summary

Report:

Carabinieri Buildings have been occupied in the following places,
but the Carabinieri have not been displaced:

CACERES: S. MARIA, MADONNANTES, MADALIANI, FLESMANVIL,
RAVISCANTINA, AILANO, PRATELLA, FLETRANGELARA, PLETRAVILPONO,
VATRANO, CAINGEO.

In the following towns Carabinieri Buildings have been occupied. Carabinieri either have remained in them or also moved to alternative accommodation. In the latter case, war damage has necessitated the moving.

POSSACCEIA, LANCIARO, SAN VITO, ORTONA.
Three rooms at GISSI have been occupied by part of the HQ of Desert Air Force - no requests have been made by the Carabinieri to the Army, to vacate it.

The Carabinieri Buildings in CATANIA, MESSINA and TRINOLI are accounted by Allied troops, as follows:-

• **Observation**

CAMPORASSO.
station at CAMPORASSO - 6 rooms. 4 occupied by Carabinieri and
" " Allied Forces.

4. 6. 8. 10. 12. 14. 16. 18. 20. 22. 24. 26. 28. 30. 32. 34. 36. 38. 40. 42. 44. 46. 48. 50. 52. 54. 56. 58. 60. 62. 64. 66. 68. 70. 72. 74. 76. 78. 80. 82. 84. 86. 88. 90. 92. 94. 96. 98. 100. 102. 104. 106. 108. 110. 112. 114. 116. 118. 120. 122. 124. 126. 128. 130. 132. 134. 136. 138. 140. 142. 144. 146. 148. 150. 152. 154. 156. 158. 160. 162. 164. 166. 168. 170. 172. 174. 176. 178. 180. 182. 184. 186. 188. 190. 192. 194. 196. 198. 200. 202. 204. 206. 208. 210. 212. 214. 216. 218. 220. 222. 224. 226. 228. 230. 232. 234. 236. 238. 240. 242. 244. 246. 248. 250. 252. 254. 256. 258. 260. 262. 264. 266. 268. 270. 272. 274. 276. 278. 280. 282. 284. 286. 288. 290. 292. 294. 296. 298. 300. 302. 304. 306. 308. 310. 312. 314. 316. 318. 320. 322. 324. 326. 328. 330. 332. 334. 336. 338. 340. 342. 344. 346. 348. 350. 352. 354. 356. 358. 360. 362. 364. 366. 368. 370. 372. 374. 376. 378. 380. 382. 384. 386. 388. 390. 392. 394. 396. 398. 400. 402. 404. 406. 408. 410. 412. 414. 416. 418. 420. 422. 424. 426. 428. 430. 432. 434. 436. 438. 440. 442. 444. 446. 448. 450. 452. 454. 456. 458. 460. 462. 464. 466. 468. 470. 472. 474. 476. 478. 480. 482. 484. 486. 488. 490. 492. 494. 496. 498. 500. 502. 504. 506. 508. 510. 512. 514. 516. 518. 520. 522. 524. 526. 528. 530. 532. 534. 536. 538. 540. 542. 544. 546. 548. 550. 552. 554. 556. 558. 560. 562. 564. 566. 568. 570. 572. 574. 576. 578. 580. 582. 584. 586. 588. 590. 592. 594. 596. 598. 600. 602. 604. 606. 608. 610. 612. 614. 616. 618. 620. 622. 624. 626. 628. 630. 632. 634. 636. 638. 640. 642. 644. 646. 648. 650. 652. 654. 656. 658. 660. 662. 664. 666. 668. 670. 672. 674. 676. 678. 680. 682. 684. 686. 688. 690. 692. 694. 696. 698. 700. 702. 704. 706. 708. 710. 712. 714. 716. 718. 720. 722. 724. 726. 728. 730. 732. 734. 736. 738. 740. 742. 744. 746. 748. 750. 752. 754. 756. 758. 760. 762. 764. 766. 768. 770. 772. 774. 776. 778. 780. 782. 784. 786. 788. 790. 792. 794. 796. 798. 800. 802. 804. 806. 808. 810. 812. 814. 816. 818. 820. 822. 824. 826. 828. 830. 832. 834. 836. 838. 840. 842. 844. 846. 848. 850. 852. 854. 856. 858. 860. 862. 864. 866. 868. 870. 872. 874. 876. 878. 880. 882. 884. 886. 888. 890. 892. 894. 896. 898. 900. 902. 904. 906. 908. 910. 912. 914. 916. 918. 920. 922. 924. 926. 928. 930. 932. 934. 936. 938. 940. 942. 944. 946. 948. 950. 952. 954. 956. 958. 960. 962. 964. 966. 968. 970. 972. 974. 976. 978. 980. 982. 984. 986. 988. 990. 992. 994. 996. 998. 1000. 1002. 1004. 1006. 1008. 1010. 1012. 1014. 1016. 1018. 1020. 1022. 1024. 1026. 1028. 1030. 1032. 1034. 1036. 1038. 1040. 1042. 1044. 1046. 1048. 1050. 1052. 1054. 1056. 1058. 1060. 1062. 1064. 1066. 1068. 1070. 1072. 1074. 1076. 1078. 1080. 1082. 1084. 1086. 1088. 1090. 1092. 1094. 1096. 1098. 1100. 1102. 1104. 1106. 1108. 1110. 1112. 1114. 1116. 1118. 1120. 1122. 1124. 1126. 1128. 1130. 1132. 1134. 1136. 1138. 1140. 1142. 1144. 1146. 1148. 1150. 1152. 1154. 1156. 1158. 1160. 1162. 1164. 1166. 1168. 1170. 1172. 1174. 1176. 1178. 1180. 1182. 1184. 1186. 1188. 1190. 1192. 1194. 1196. 1198. 1200. 1202. 1204. 1206. 1208. 1210. 1212. 1214. 1216. 1218. 1220. 1222. 1224. 1226. 1228. 1230. 1232. 1234. 1236. 1238. 1240. 1242. 1244. 1246. 1248. 1250. 1252. 1254. 1256. 1258. 1260. 1262. 1264. 1266. 1268. 1270. 1272. 1274. 1276. 1278. 1280. 1282. 1284. 1286. 1288. 1290. 1292. 1294. 1296. 1298. 1300. 1302. 1304. 1306. 1308. 1310. 1312. 1314. 1316. 1318. 1320. 1322. 1324. 1326. 1328. 1330. 1332. 1334. 1336. 1338. 1340. 1342. 1344. 1346. 1348. 1350. 1352. 1354. 1356. 1358. 1360. 1362. 1364. 1366. 1368. 1370. 1372. 1374. 1376. 1378. 1380. 1382. 1384. 1386. 1388. 1390. 1392. 1394. 1396. 1398. 1400. 1402. 1404. 1406. 1408. 1410. 1412. 1414. 1416. 1418. 1420. 1422. 1424. 1426. 1428. 1430. 1432. 1434. 1436. 1438. 1440. 1442. 1444. 1446. 1448. 1450. 1452. 1454. 1456. 1458. 1460. 1462. 1464. 1466. 1468. 1470. 1472. 1474. 1476. 1478. 1480. 1482. 1484. 1486. 1488. 1490. 1492. 1494. 1496. 1498. 1500. 1502. 1504. 1506. 1508. 1510. 1512. 1514. 1516. 1518. 1520. 1522. 1524. 1526. 1528. 1530. 1532. 1534. 1536. 1538. 1540. 1542. 1544. 1546. 1548. 1550.

with a Porod.

Temporary Station of USSO - 4 rooms, 2 occupied by Allied Forces,
" " " " " Carabiniers.

1997-1998

ITEMS.

| | |
|---------------------|--|
| Station of VINAPO - | 17 rooms of which 15 occupied by French troops |
| " " | " " Carabinieris. |
| - 4 | |

Station of CAPRIATI al VULTEGIO - 8 rooms of which 5 occupied by

Station of Carabites as follows:
 French Troops and 3 by Carabites.
 It accounted by French Troops.

Station of WILLIAM - 5
rooms all
the same

[illegible][illegible]

Station 20 - 11/10/1945

Figure 1

PERSONNEL
- 27 men - 27 rooms
all occupied by Allied Troops.

| Station | of TANKS | - 27 rooms |
|---------|----------|------------|
| Station | of TANKS | 5 rooms |

Station of Camp Martin 8

Station of MOUNTAINPOLE - 15 rooms
all occupied by

Station of MONTEVALLOES del SALTO DIVIS - 5 rooms all occupied by Allied troops.

(NOTE. In the quantity of roves stated all service provisions are excluded).

SUBJECT:

CC.RR.H.Q. A.M.G.
15 Army Group
S.M.P.H.Q.
A.F.I.

AMG/30/80

18th January 1944

The Carabinieri(CC.RR) have for the most part performed their functions as the only effective police force in Sicily and Italy remarkably well since the occupation. They have maintained their state of efficiency (according to Italian standards) and loyalty to their country as opposed to any particular party and have worked in close cooperation with A.M.G. officials. It is largely due to them that order has been maintained.

2. It is essential that they should receive from the Allied Forces all the support and assistance which can be given to them. This unfortunately has not always been afforded and there have been many instances in which troops have either obstructed them or diminished their authority by thoughtless actions. There have been many cases of where the Carabinieri forced literally to live from hand to mouth.

1. I propose to deal with the first difficulty by an explanatory article in the Allied newspapers but I would ask that in the combat areas the Carabinieri barracks should not be occupied except in emergency and that on the LOC they should not be occupied at all. Unless this is done, it will be impossible to reorganise order, a duty which will then have to fall on to troops who should be otherwise engaged.

Brigadier,
Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Office

9729

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2/3

91

Suggest these matters be
referred to Col Ship for
his consideration.

BM

Col Ship

4431

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
R.C. & M.C. Section
APO 394

90

Ref/302/90/CA.

27 March 1944.

SUBJECT: Cooperation of Italian Forces.

TO : S.C.A.O. 8th Army.

89

1. Reference your letter CA/51 of 21 Mar 44.
2. Herewith forwarded copy of ACHP/1402/B/C(Ib) dated 29 Feb 44, as requested.

68

751P
NORMAN E. FISKE
Colonel,
Deputy Executive
Commissioner.

all 103

4430

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

SUBJECT: Cooperation of Italian Forces

TO: Executive Commissioner Branch
H.Q. A.C.C. APO 394

302

WAF Head C442
AMG Rear Eighth Army

Ref: OA/31

21 March 1944

1. Reference your letter 302/71/CA dated 19 Mar 44.

It is requested that a copy of ACMS/1402/8/G(1b) dated 28 Feb 44 referred to in para. 1 of your letter, be forwarded to this office.

E. Banta Lewis

for

Major R.A.
Group Captain,
Officer Commanding,
AMG Eighth Army.

4428

2/10

22 MAR Recd

302 31 MAR 1944

370

88

REAR HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APO 394

21 March 1944

ACC/14601/1/PS

SUBJECT: Enlistment into Carabinieri

TO : RC & MG Section.

Reference 302/10/CA of 19 March 1944.

1. This matter has been brought to the attention of the Commanding General CC.RR

2. The 43 members of the Militia referred to were attached to the CC.RR awaiting the decision of the Italian Government who have now decided that Militia will not be admitted to the Carabinieri.

3. If action has not already been taken these 43 ex-Militia members will be removed as soon as arrangement can be made for their disposal.

A. E. YOUNG

Colonel,

Deputy Chief,

Public Safety Sub-Com.

AEY/lgd

Pa

123 MAR 1944 302 CAB

29 MAR 1944 872

REAR HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APO 394

ACC/14601/10/PS

21st March 1944

SUBJECT: CC.RR from Enemy lines
Reporting for duty.

TO : Regional Public Safety Officer Regions II, III, IV, V.
SCAPO Fifth Army
SCAPO Eighth Army.

1. Arrangements have been made through the General Commanding CC.RR that all CC.RR returning through enemy lines are to be sent to replacement pools at Naples or Bari. From these replacement pools reserve CC.RR are sent to districts where they are needed.
2. CC.RR who report for duty in forward areas should not be retained locally on the orders of AMG officers but should be sent to the replacement pools, in accordance with CC.RR instructions, where they will be officially checked, equipped and assigned for duty.

PAUL G. KERR
Colonel, Inf.
Chief, Public Safety
Sub-Commission

FW/hgd

Copy: RC & MG Section ✓

PG

4427

302 23 MAR 1944

Brig Lush

5781

HEADQUARTERS 23 MAR 1944

FROM MMIA 21

TO FATIMA REAR

RPTD FATIMA FOR LUSH

AQ 515

FOR KIRK AND QUINSMITH FROM DUCHESNE (.) REF YOU

ACC/14601/8/PS OF 17 MARCH (.) FIRST (.)

CARABINIERI ARE ~~THE~~ ACCEPTED AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE ITALIAN

ARMY ENTITLED TO SHARE OF ITALIAN CLOTHING RESOURCES EXISTING

WHICH ARE MAINLY UNDERCLOTHING CONTROLLED BY MINISTRY OF WAR (.)

IN ADDITION ENTITLED RATIONS AND DARKGREEN ~~BATTLE~~ DRESS AND BOOTS ARE

OF ALLIED ~~ORIGIN~~ ORIGIN CONTROLLED BY MMIA THROUGH

MINISTRY OF WAR (.) ~~THERE~~ DEMANDS FOR BOOTS AND BATTLE DRESSES

SHOULD GO THROUGH MINISTRY OF WAR AND CAN BE MET IN REASONABLE

QUANTITIES (.) ADVISE ME WHAT QUANTITIES ARE GENUINELY REQUIRED

SEPARATING MAINLAND SICILY AND SARDINIA (.) SECOND (.) GUARDIA ~~FINANZIARIA~~

FINANZIARIA AT PRESENT ACCEPTED FOR ~~AFHQ~~ RATIONS AS INTEGRAL PART OF

ITALIAN ARMY BUT THIS MAY BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL (.) I HAVE ASKED FOR

POLICY DECISION FROM CHIEF COMMISSIONER IN MY 0303 OF TODAY COPY TO YOU

(.) THIRD (.) AGENTS OF PUBLIC SECURITY HAVE NOT PREVIOUSLY BEEN CLAIMED

TO BE INTERNAL PART OF ITALIAN ARMY AND COPY OF AFHQ LETTERDATED 16

JAN FORWARDED REFERS ONLY TO STATED REQUEST FOR CAPTURED STOCKS (.)

THEIR DUTIES NOT (NOT) UNDERSTOOD BUT CLAIM DOES NOT (NOT) APPEAR

STRONG (.) SU 55 TO CHIEF COMMISSIONER FOR POLICY DECISION (.)

TO CAPTIONS BOOTS AND CLOTHING

0728

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

091.711

WHICH ARE MAINLY UNDERCLOTHING CONTROLLED BY MINISTRY OF WAR(.)

IN ADDITION ENTITLED RATIONS AND DARKGREEN BATTLE DRESS AND BOOTS ARE

OF ALLIED ORIGIN ORIGIN CONTROLLED BY MMIA THROUGH

MINISTRY OF WAR (.) THESE THESE DEMANDS FOR BOOTS AND BATTLE DRESSES

SHOULD GO THROUGH MINISTRY OF WAR AND CAN BE MET IN REASONABLE

QUANTITIES (.) ADVISE ME WHAT QUANTITIES ARE GENUINELY REQUIRED

SEPARATING MAINLAND SICILY AND SARDINIA (.) SECOND (.) GUARDIA ARMEE

FINANZA AT PRESENT ACCEPTED FOR ARMY RATIONS AS INTEGRAL PART OF

ITALIAN ARMY BUT THIS MAY BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL (.) I HAVE ASKED FOR

POLICY DECISION FROM CHIEF COMMISSIONER IN MY 0303 OF TODAY COPY TO YOU

(.) THIRD (.) AGENTS OF PUBLIC SECURITY HAD NOT PREVIOUSLY BEEN CLAIMED

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THEIR DUTIES NOT (NOT) UNDERSTOOD BUT CLAIM DOES NOT (NOT) APPEAR

STRONG (.) SU 85 TO CHIEF COMMISSIONER FOR POLICY DECISION (.)

FOURTH (.) THE STRENGTH OF ALL THOSE ENTITLED TO RATIONS BOOTS AND CLOTHING

OF ALLIED ORIGIN MUST BE INCLUDED IN STRENGTH STATES SUCH AS THE 1266-

WARD TO QUINSMITH UNDER MY 6/11/28 OF 16 MARCH (.) THESE FIGURES ARE

SHORTLY TO BE BE FORWARDED TO ALLIED CHIEFS OF STAFF ON THEIR

DEMAND FOR AUTHORIZATION OF FUTURE TOTALS ALLOWABLE (.) QUESTION

IS THEREFORE OF URGENT POLICY IMPORTANCE (.) POLICY FOR ARMY SUPPLY

ORGANISATION ITALIAN MILITARY IS LAID DOWN IN FREEDOM LETTER AG 400-1

(ITALY GDS - AGN OF 9 JAN URGENT URGENT ADDRESSSED TO

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION)

ACC DIST

(INFO) Secy Gen

Def Sec

CB BR

ECON SEC

PLANS

T00 21100 TH1 211330A

SENT 1845A GF AR

RECE 1845A SS AR

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

MJET LRHY 1042 QVR

FROM FLAMBO 241455

ACTION FREEDOM

INFO FATIMA FOR LUSH

QQY GR26

A25211

A25212 YOUR 67761 O F21(.) PLEASE INCLUDE IN 50 CCRR BEING RELEASED
THOSE NAMED IN OUR ACMF/3073/3/AO DATED 13 MAR(.) GRATEFUL EARLIEST
INFORMATION OF ETA ITALY

THI 241516

SENT NR 1042 24/2115 JA

REC NR 9 24/2115 A FY AR



A.C.C. DISTRIBUTION
(INFO) - C.A. B. (2)

" - DEP. CC
" - P. SEPT 4/18/44 (NO)
" - NMIA HQ.
" - FILE
" - FLOAT

302-2188 CA, Br 84

ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY, (OAS)
APO-464, U.S.A.

25 March 1944

SUBJECT: Carabinieri for Sicily.

TO : Executive Commissioner, HQ., A.C.C.,
APO-394, U.S. Army.

1. In reply to your 302/77/CA letter of 19 March 1944, arrangements have been made, as requested, for the release of 200 Carabinieri for Sicily.

2. The Carabinieri are ready to proceed from Naples on 24 hours notice.

3. I have directed Lt. Col. Pollock to contact the Public Safety Sub-Commission in order to effect the transfer.


EDGAR ERSKINE HUME,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Senior Civil Affairs Officer.

Copies to:

Col. GEVERS

Lt. Col. POLLOCK

4424

HEADQUARTERS,
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
APO 594

Regional Control and Military Government Section.

Ref: 902/77/CA

19th March 1944

SUBJECT: Carabinieri for Sicily.

TO : S.C.A.C., AMS, 5 Army.

1. The Chief Commissioner has given careful consideration to the distribution of Carabinieri as between Sicily and Rome and has decided to accede to the request made by the Italian Government to send 200 Carabinieri from those earmarked for Rome to Sicily.

2. You should give all facilities for these men to be released and handed over to the representatives of the Public Safety Sub-Commission who will also take action on this letter.

ML/JC

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

Copy to: Public Safety Sub-Commission.
Region IV for Rome Sub-Region.

SUBJECT: Carabinieri for Sicily.

TO : Executive Commanding Officer.

16 March 1944.

Reference * (75) ²

1. Many previous demands have been made for the use of this force of Carabinieri, but they have all been requests for loans. This is the first time that a permanent withdrawal has been envisaged, and Brig-General Hume does not recommend permanent withdrawal of 200 Carabinieri from his Rome Party for duty in Sicily.

2. Although the Germans are reported to have disbanded the Carabinieri in Rome, it is probable that many will emerge from hiding a few days after occupation, and provided that the question of uniforms for these men can be settled, it is probable that the numbers thus available as reinforcements would more than compensate for the 200 which it is proposed to withdraw now. I sympathize with General Hume's reluctance to release the men asked for, but the need in Sicily is an urgent one and it is not considered that the suggestion in the last para. of his letter to employ Italian soldiers in their place will be acceptable.

W. Shipp 10651

C.W.I. SHIPP
Lieut. Col.

4037

Dec 21 / en
PA to Executive
Commissioner,
Hq. Allied Control
Commission.

15 Mar 44
IMIA Liaison
Officer.

Reference signal CEM/22153 dated 10 Mar 44
from HOC, FLAMES.
The Executive Commissioner would be grateful
if quantities of boots could be made available
for use by the Carabinieri.

A. J. Stewart
A. J. STEWART,
Captain,
PA to Executive Com.

4421

785017

15 MAR Recd

302/52

CA B.

75

HEADQUARTERS
A.M.G. FIFTH ARMY (CAS)
APO-464, U.S. ARMY

11 March 1944

SUBJECT: Carabinieri.

TO : Executive Commissioner, Allied Control Commission,
APO-394, US ARMY.

52

1. Reference is made to letter No. 302/52/CA, dated March 8, 1944, anent the permanent withdrawal of 200 of the Carabinieri now under training for duty in Rome.

2. While it is appreciated that the request of the Prime Minister that Carabinieri be supplied for Sicily must be given earnest consideration, the matter is one of much moment for our AMG organization for Rome. We are informed by General Pièche, chief of the Carabinieri, that the present group for Rome constitutes the only source of such officials; that when these are assigned no others may be expected. Since the Germans have disbanded the Carabinieri in Rome and to the north thereof, we must face the prospect of maintaining order in Rome with only approximately 2500 men. Not all are Carabinieri, some being of the Guardia di Finanza. Normally there are some 6000 Carabinieri in Rome.

3. It is believed that the desired Carabinieri for Sicily should not be supplied from the Rome Group. The knowledge of the existence of our Rome Carabinieri has become so widespread that there are constant demands for the permanent or temporary detail of parties of these men. Some of the requests are no less urgent than the one from Sicily. We simply cannot agree to the piecemeal dispersal of our Rome police force if we hope to be ready to perform the expected duties in the Italian capital.

-2-

4. Sooner or later it will become necessary to supply military policemen other than Carabinieri or Guardia di Finanza. It is thought that Italian soldiers not otherwise engaged could be used in the present need in Sicily.

Edgar Erskine Hume

EDGAR ERSKINE HUME,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
AMG-Fifth Army.

H/z

4419

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
R.C. & M.C. Section
APO 394

19 March 1944.

Ref/302/72/7A.

SUBJECT: Rations for CC.RR.

TO : Admin. Section - Per Public Safety Sub-Commission.

The attached copy of AQ/2 dated 12 Mar 44 is forwarded for information.

ROBERT E. YERK
Colonel, Cavalry,
Deputy Executive
Commissioner.

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
R.O. & H.Q. Section
APO 394

19 March 1944.

Ref/302/72/CA.

SUBJECT: Cooperation of Italian Forces.

TO : H.Q., A.A.I.

1. In reply to your AMSP/1402/8/3(1b) of 29 Feb 44, it is regretted that though such has occurred, this action is contrary to instructions issued to the CO.24 or any other Italian officials in King's Italy. The correct procedure is for any order which is required to be sent from King's Italy into AMG territory to be despatched in an open envelope through AMG channels.

2. Action is being taken by this H.Q. to prevent any recurrence, if possible, of such events, and this particular incidence is being taken up.

M. S. LUSH
Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

Copy to: AM 8 Army - Would you please say what action has been taken by you in this matter.
Public Safety Sub-Com. (thru' Admin. Section) with copy of AMSP/1402/8/3(1b) of 29 Feb 44.
Land Forces Sub-Commission.

HEADQUARTERS
DED CONTROL COMMISSION
R.C. & M.G. Section
APO 394

70

Ref/302/70/OA.

19 March 1944.

SUBJECT: Enlistment into Carabinieri.

TO : Admin. Section for P.S. Sub-Commission.

1. The following letter has been received from Region VI
Sardinia :

"An investigation of the position shows that in Sardinia 43 members
of the Highways and Port Militia have been admitted into permanent
service with the Carabinieri.

They are disposed as under :

At CAGLIARI: 1 Capitano
1 Maresciallo
28 Militi

At GENOA: 1 Maresciallo
11 Militi

The Carabinieri consulted all agree that there is considerable
dissatisfaction among the regular Carabinieri because of the admission
of these men. The reasons are that the Militia men are reported to be
strong Fascists and cannot be trusted to do their job impartially, but
show favours to their friends. It is further added that the public
has no confidence in them. They wear the same uniform as the
Carabinieri except the lapel insignia is worn on the lower part of the
sleeve. "

2. This matter was discussed (Col. Young - Col. Shipp) and it
is agreed that these 43 members of the Highways and Port Militia
should not be allowed to continue to serve in the Carabinieri.

3. Will you please take the necessary action.

4416
MORGAN E. FIDEN
Colonel, Cavalry,
Deputy Executive
Commissioner.

302
16 MAR Recd

REAR HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394

CA B
5
S-604
QS/mme

QS103

16 March 1944

TO: Regional Control and Military Government Section,
A.C.C. Main HQ., Naples.

Reference attached letter from ACMF. Stato Maggiore
have been informed and have been instructed that such
action is not to take place in the future without con-
sultation with the local or Allied and civil authorities.
It is not clear if the Commissioner of No. 5 Region was
referred to in this matter as MAFALDA is in King's Italy.

With reference to para 3 of the ACMF letter, it
will be appreciated if you would answer direct and in-
form this office of the substance of your reply.

G. W. Quinsmith Lt. Col.

(G. W. QUINSMITH)
Army Sub-Commission

1 Incl. as in para 1.



See 71.

4415

COPY
SUBJECT: Co-operation of Italian Forces

Headquarters
Allied Central Mediterranean Force
Br. SECRET - U.S. SECRET
ACMF/1402/S/G(Ib)
29 Feb 44

A.C.C.

1. The following report has been received from Eighth Army area:-

"Recent enquiries at MAFALDA (CAMPOBASSO) revealed that all privately owned fire-arms which had been handed in according to A.M.G. Proclamation had been returned to their owners.

It was found that the return of these arms had been carried out following an order received from the CC.RR, BARI."

2. It is believed that the person responsible for the execution of this and similar orders is the Major commanding the CC.RR at CAMPOBASSO.

3. It would be appreciated if it could be ascertained how far the CC.RR actually come under control of A.M.G. in this area. It is felt that for policy matters such as the one above mentioned there should be the closest co-operation with the Allied armed forces.

For administrative matters there would appear to be no objection to orders being given through normal channels.

Lieut-General,
Chief of General Staff

SF

Copy to:- Eighth Army.

COPY

See 71

302
16 MAR Recd

16 MAR 1944

SUBJECT :- Carabinieri Assigned Fifth Army

HQ AAI (Adm Bch)

CIE

2901.2 G(SD)

14 Mar 44



TO :- HQ AGC (6)

Detachments of the following units are assigned to Fifth Army and are designated as C.I.H.R. Detach C.A.S. - A.M.B. Fifth Army

| | Offrs | S.M. | Total |
|--|-------|------|-------|
| Carabinieri, Legione di Napoli | 4 | 202 | 206 |
| At Bari | 12 | 617 | 629 |
| " At Cagliari | 16 | 1300 | 1316 |
| Financial Guards, Legione di Bari | 17 | 223 | 240 |
| Vigili del Fuoco, 58th Corps of Napoli | 8 | 102 | 110 |

GRAND TOTAL

2094

Copy to:

HQ AAI (6)

Fifth Army (10)

Army Sub-Commission (AGC)

A.M.B. Legione di Napoli

14 Mar 44

U.S. Army
16 MAR 1944
AGC
14 MAR 44

785017

SUBJECT: Rations for CC.RR.

302 6 MAR Recd

CAB 2

Army Sub Commission, A.C.C.
Main HQ (MIA)
LEQUILA (LEGG)
AQ/2
12 Mar 44.

H.Q., A.C.C.

Copy to: Army Sub Comm, A.C.C. Adv HQ SALEMMO.

Reference your 302/2/CA dated 2 Mar.

The Ministry of War have confirmed that the CC.RR draw the standard scale of rations through Italian Army sources. The rations for CC.RR and Guardia Finanza are included in the demand made by the Ministry of War.

It is suggested that the senior officer of the CC.RR affected should make immediate application to the local Italian Military authority.

tvv/PJH.

Army Sub Comm, A.C.C.

See 72

P. & N. ram
for Brig.

This will
be dealt with
by P. & N. ram
also with the
necessary
H. & A. ram
15/3
pa

SECRET

302

16 MAR 1944

CA 41

TO:


FROM:

SUBJECT:

REFERENCE:

DATE:

H.Q., A.C.C. (Regional Control and Military Government Section)
 H.Q., Region 6, A.C.C.
 Articles 12 & 15 of Royal Decree 16/8
 HQ/1021
 24 February 1944.



In reply to your letter of 11 Feb 44 on the above subject.

1. An investigation of the position shows that in Sardinia 43 members of the Highways and Port Militia have been admitted into permanent service with the Carabinieri.

They are disposed as under:-

At CAGLIARI:

1 Capitano
 1 Maresciallo
 28 Militi

At OLBIA:

1 Maresciallo
 11 Militi

2. The Carabinieri consulted all agree that there is considerable dissatisfaction among the regular Carabinieri because of the admission of these men. The reasons are that the Militia men are reported to be strong Fascists and cannot be trusted to do their job impartially, but show favours to their friends. It is further added that the public has no confidence in them. They wear the same uniform as the Carabinieri except the lapel insignia is worn on the lower part of the sleeve.

See 70

J. K. DUNLOP,
 Brigadier,
 Regional Allied Commissioner.

⁶³
The members of the Agents' Secretariat
will be provided out of civil stocks
with a ration which is as nearly
as possible the equivalent of the CERA
of Fin.

Dis 10/3

Ref 59

77 11 MAR Recd

REAR HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission

10 MAR 1944

10 March 1944.

ACC/14601/6/TS

SUBJECT: Repatriation of General TADDEI, Leonetto, (OCRR), P.O.W. in India.

TO : Brig. M. S. Lush, Executive Commissioner.

1. On or about March 1, 1944, there was passed to you, through your personal aide, Capt. Stewart, a list of 57 officers of the Carabinieri Reali who are prisoners of war. At the head of the list was the name of the above general officer, TADDEI, who is said to be a prisoner of war in India. The remainder are believed to be prisoners of war in East Africa.

2. General Picche is in urgent need of highly competent senior officers, as you are aware; and is especially desirous of having the services of Gen. TADDEI if it is at all possible. To this end, he is making a formal request to the War Ministry. The following data regarding Gen. TADDEI is submitted:-

Cadet of Military School in 1905.

2nd Lieutenant (Infantry) in 1907.

Transferred Carabinieri Reali in 1913.

As a lieutenant, Captain and Major was always classified as a very good officer.

Transferred in Tripolitania - as a Lt. Col. - in 1928. Remained in Tripolitania as Group Commander for about 5 years also when Gen. Badoglio was appointed Governor of Tripolitania.

Legion Commander at Florence (as a Colonel) and later Commander of the Non-Commissioned School in the same town.

Transferred East Africa (following Gen. Gerica) and appointed Commander of the Carabinieri. After a few months taken prisoner and captured owing to the capitulation of the Italian Forces of East Africa (1940/1941).

Is to be considered a self-made man as he is son of a warrant Marshal of OCRR. Very capable, intelligent, honest, strict in his duty. Gen. TADDEI was known as one of the best and most capable officer of the Royal Carabinieri.

After Gen. Picche he is the senior officer in the R. Carabinieri. He would be of a very great help inspecting men and troops of OCRR all over the territory of liberated Italy.

His family is actually at Florence (wife and two sons). Without political aims he passed his life between work and family.

62

4111

10 MAR 1944

-2-

3. It is believed that the return of Gen. TADDEI would contribute substantially to the efficiency and discipline of the OCPR; and it is accordingly requested that a special effort be made to effect his release as a prisoner of war and his return to active duty in Italy.

Paul G. Kirk

PAUL G. KIRK,
Colonel, Infantry,
Chief, Public Safety
Sub-Commission.

4409

Dec

302 MAR Recd

G.A. R. (for E. G. R.)

257/60

HEAD HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission

11 MAR 1944

11 March 1944.

V-1599

ACC/14601/11/PS

SUBJECT: Use of Arms by OCRR.

TO : Brigadier Lush, Executive Commissioner.

HEADQUARTERS

12 MAR 1944

A.C.C.

1. In connection with the attached correspondence, it is my view that the position taken by Gen. Aliberti is substantially correct, and that he should be supported.

2. The degree of force which police agencies should employ in the maintenance of law and order is that which is reasonably necessary under the circumstances. No hard and fast rule can be prescribed to cover every contingency. Much naturally depends upon the state of training and discipline of the police force concerned. From conversations which I have earlier had with Gen. Piccho on the subject, I am sure that he will not tolerate wanted shootings by his command.

3. In view of the uncertain state of affairs in Italy, I consider it a serious mistake for Allied officers in unoccupied Italy to forbid flatly and under any circumstances the use of the weapons with which the OCRR have been furnished them to meet extraordinary conditions. Since the final responsibility in this area rests with the Italian Government, I do not believe that the judgment of others, who do not share that responsibility, should be substituted for theirs.

4. The foregoing comments are confined to the terms of the question raised by Gen. Aliberti. Beyond that of course remain other policy problems such as the extent to which public assemblies are to be permitted by the Italian Government in unoccupied Italy. Violence may occur in dispersing an assembly which is unlawful only because a permit has not been granted, and not because the purpose of the assembly is unlawful in itself. This aspect is receiving the attention of the Administrative Vice-President.

5. If you should entertain a view different from that set forth by me, I should be pleased to be advised, since I have received a communication from the Minister of the Interior on the same subject.

Paul G. Kirk

PAUL G. KIRK
Colonel, Inf
Chief, Public Safety
Sub-Commission

PGK/hgd

4408

302-11 MAR Recd

C. H. M. (for L. W.) 259/60

REAR HEADQUARTERS

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

Public Safety Sub-Commission

11 MAR 1944

U-1599

11 March 1944.

AOS/14601/11/78

SUBJECT: Use of arms by OHR.

TO : Brigadier Lush, Executive Commissioner.

12 MAR 1944

REAGUANT, AS

A.C.C.

1. In connection with the attached correspondence, it is my view that the position taken by Gen. Aliberti is substantially correct, and that he should be supported.

2. The degree of force which police agencies should employ in the maintenance of law and order is that which is reasonably necessary under the circumstances. As hard and fast rule can be prescribed to cover every contingency. Much naturally depends upon the state of training and discipline of the police force concerned. Previous conversations which I have carried out with Gen. Pincus on the subject, I am sure that he will not tolerate weapon showings by his command.

3. In view of the uncertain state of affairs in Italy, I consider it a serious mistake for Allied officers in unoccupied Italy to forbid freely and under any circumstances the use of the weapons with which the OHR have been furnished them to meet extraordinary demands. Since the final responsibility in this area rests with the Italian Government, I do not believe that the judgement of others, who do not share that responsibility, should be substituted for theirs.

4. The foregoing comments are confined to the terms of the question raised by Gen. Aliberti. Beyond that of course remain other policy problems such as the extent to which public assemblies are to be permitted by the Italian Government in unoccupied Italy. Violence may occur in dispersing an assembly which is unlawful only because a permit has not been granted, and not because the purpose of the assembly is unlawful in itself. This aspect is receiving the attention of the Administrative Vice-President.

5. If you should entertain a view different from that set forth by me, I should be pleased to be advised, since I have received a communication from the Minister of the Interior on the same subject.

Paul G. Mire

PAUL G. MIRE
Colonel, Inf
Chief, Public Safety
Sub-Commission

2. The degree of force which police agencies should employ in the maintenance of law and order is that which is reasonably necessary under the circumstances. No hard and fast rule can be prescribed to cover every contingency. Much naturally depends upon the state of training and discipline of the police force concerned. From conversations which I have had, I am sure that he will not tolerate violent abridgments by his command.

3. In view of the uncertain state of affairs in Italy, I consider it a serious mistake for Allied officers in unoccupied Italy to forbid flatly and under any circumstances the use of the weapons with which the OSS have been furnished them to meet extraordinary emergencies. Since the final responsibility in this area rests with the Italian Government, I do not believe that the judgment of others, who do not share that responsibility, should be substituted for theirs.

4. The foregoing comments are confined to the terms of the question raised by Gen. Mitterli. Beyond that of course remain other policy problems such as the extent to which public assemblies are to be permitted by the Italian Government in unoccupied Italy. Violence may occur in dispersing an assembly which is unlawful only because a permit has not been granted, and not because the purpose of the assembly is unlawful in itself. This aspect is receiving the attention of the Administrative Vice-President.

5. If you should entertain a view different from that set forth by me, I should be pleased to be advised, since I have received a communication from the Minister of the Interior on the same subject.

Paul G. Kirk

PAUL G. KIRK
Colonel, Inf
Chief, Public Safety
Sub-Commission

PGK/ahd

4208

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED
CONTROL COMMISSION
& M.G. SECTION
APO 394

11 March 1944

Ref/302/57/CA

SUBJECT: Rations for C.C. RR.

TO : Land Forces Sub-Commission.

A reply to our 302/21/CA of 2 March is required.

NO 14/3
15/4/4
NORMAN K. FISKE,
Colonel, Cavalry,
Deputy Executive
Commissioner.

4407

P/A

57

HEADQUARTERS,
ALLIED CHIEFS OF STAFF,
AFS 394

Regional Control and Military Government Section.

Ref: 302/56/02.

3th March 1944.

SUBJECT: COLER Officers in North Africa.

TO : Headquarters, A.C.M.F.

1. You will remember that I wrote from 15 Army Group AFS in January suggesting that certain officers of the COLER should be released from POW camps and repatriated.

2. I have had a further examination from General Picche, Commander General of the COLER in which he makes a very strong request for the return of the following officers:

Col. Contadini Giuseppe
Lt. Col. Fazio Giuseppe
Major Costa Vittorio
Major Cappotti Angelo
Major Carlo Montecchi Ottavio
Capt. Pepe Nicola
Capt. Santoli Giovanni

Capt. Gargano Arturo
Capt. Farsia Nello
Lieut. Bordonero Lauro
Lieut. Farnelli Matteo
Lieut. Mattioli Luigi
Lieut. Masoli Luciano Ugo
2/Lt. Fratelli Mario

3. The Royal Carabinieri are desperately short of good officers and public security is suffering on this account. I should be most grateful if immediate steps could be taken to release these officers and repatriate them to this country where their services are urgently required for the maintenance of public order.

MSL/JL

Brigadier 4306
Executive Commissioner.

Copy to: Public Safety Sub-Com.

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APO 994

ADC/14601/694

5 February 1944

SUBJECT: CORR Officers in North Africa

TO : Vice President
Administrative Staff-Section

In accordance with the directions of the Chief Commissioner the names of the undermentioned officers of the Carabinieri Regli who are believed now to be in North Africa as prisoners of war have been submitted by General FLECHER, Commanding General of the CORR.

| | |
|------------------------------|------------------------|
| Col. Contadini Giuseppe | Capt. Guongus Arturo |
| Lt. Col. Furla Giuseppe | Capt. Tarzia Nicolo |
| Maj. Costa Vittorio | Lt. Bordonaro Lauro |
| Maj. Cappotti Angelo | Lt. Torelli Matteo |
| Maj. Currei Manforte Ottavio | Lt. Mattioli Luigi |
| Capt. Pepe Nicola | Lt. Basoli Luciano Ugo |
| Capt. Santoli Giovanni | 2nd Lt. Fratelli Maria |

1. It is suggested that the list be transmitted to AFHQ with a request that the officers named be released on parole and repatriated to Italy where their services are urgently required in connection with the maintenance of public order.

PAUL G. KIRK
Colonel, Infantry
Chief, Public Safety
Sub-Commission

JAF55

ELENCO DEI UFFICIALI PRIGIONIERI DI GUERRA

IN INDIA

1°) = Generale

TADDEI

Leonetto

IN A. O.

| | | |
|-----------------|---------------|-------------|
| 1°) = Maggiore | PORTA | Giuseppe |
| 2°) = Maggiore | ROMERIO | Luigi |
| 3°) = Maggiore | CAPPIELLO | Aurelio |
| 4°) = Maggiore | RADAELLI | Emilio |
| 5°) = Capitano | MANNATRIZIO | Sabino |
| 6°) = Capitano | GALLUCCI | Giovanni |
| 7°) = Capitano | TRIVILETTI | Alessandro |
| 8°) = Capitano | PALUGI | Antonio |
| 9°) = Capitano | ANTICO | Alceo |
| 10°) = Capitano | POLLANO | G. Battista |
| 11°) = Capitano | RIZZO | Leopoldo |
| 12°) = Capitano | SONCINI | Francesco |
| 13°) = Capitano | LEVET | Felice |
| 14°) = Capitano | STINGONE | Giovanni |
| 15°) = Capitano | RUSSO | Gennaro |
| 16°) = Capitano | DE GIACOMO | Paride |
| 17°) = Capitano | LOIACONO | Domenico |
| 18°) = Capitano | CELI | Giovanni |
| 19°) = Capitano | RIPA DI MEANA | Umberto |
| 20°) = Capitano | SEVERINI | Ambrogio |
| 21°) = Capitano | MODENA | Giovanni |
| 22°) = Capitano | BORGNA | Pietro |
| 23°) = Capitano | MARINA | Arturo |

= 2 =

| | | |
|---------------|-------------------|-----------|
| 24°)=Capitano | BARBIERI | Luigi |
| 25°)=Capitano | BONZANO | Carlo |
| 26°)=Capitano | POZZINI | Giovanni |
| 27°)=Capitano | GASPARRO | Giuseppe |
| 28°)=Capitano | BUONO | Michèle |
| 29°)=Capitano | GIGLIO USAI | Antonio |
| 30°)=Capitano | FERRI | Alfonso |
| 31°)=Capitano | ACAMPORA | Francesco |
| 32°)=Capitano | LOCIDI | Patrizio |
| 33°)=Capitano | VALLI | Giotto |
| 34°)=Capitano | CARTA | Gaspare |
| 35°)=Capitano | CAPARELLI | Dante |
| 36°)=Capitano | CASANO | Opofrio |
| 37°)=Capitano | PICCINNI LEOPARDI | Silvio |
| 38°)=Tenente | FRANCARDO | Giuseppe |
| 39°)=Tenente | GARELLA | Pasquale |
| 40°)=Tenente | PEZZATINI | Ugo |
| 41°)=Tenente | MONTINARO | Antonio |
| 42°)=Tenente | MAZZARELLA | Guglielmo |
| 43°)=Tenente | GUGLIERI | Gerolamo |
| 44°)=Tenente | AZZARI | Dagoberto |
| 45°)=Tenente | DELIA | Mario |
| 46°)=Tenente | PALCIGLIA | Rosario |
| 47°)=Tenente | PICCHIOTTI | Franco |
| 48°)=Tenente | TOMASELLI | Francesco |
| 49°)=Tenente | PIEROTTI | Virgilio |
| 50°)=Tenente | CUCULI | Antonio |
| 51°)=Tenente | MANTARRO | Santi |
| 52°)=Tenente | MIONDI | Francesco |
| 53°)=Tenente | D'AMORE | Luigi |
| 54°)=Tenente | RAVERA | Ferruccio |

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

53

• 3 =

53°)=S.Tenente

CAMBULE

Antonio

56°)=S.Tenente

ZICCARDI

Ferdinando

4402

52

HEADQUARTERS,
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
APO 394

Regional Control and Military Government Section.

Ref: 302/⁵²~~44~~/CA.

8th March 1944.

SUBJECT: Carabinieri.

TO : S.C.A.O., AMG, 5 Army.

1. The Prime Minister, Marshal Badoglio, has made strong representations to the Chief Commissioner for the release of 200 of the 2500 Carabinieri earmarked for Rome. These men are required as reinforcements for the garrison in Sicily where the state of public safety is giving the Marshal great anxiety.

2. I should be glad to have your comments on this reduction for I would impress on you that it will mean a total reduction and that the Carabinieri will not return from Sicily for Rome.


Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

WLL/SL.

4401

HQ AGC, APO 394

Sec. 1

Rec'd 27 Feb 1944

By 1st Lt.

51

File No. 586

Salerno, 28/2/1944

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF THE GOVERNMENT

My Dear General:-

I am aware that General Picche has given you a list of High Officers and Generals of the Royal Carabinieri, whose repatriation is needed. I beg to point out to you the urgent necessity for this repatriation, in view of the need for making changes in the territorial Commands of the Corps.

I also submit a further question to you.

On the request of the Allied Supreme Command, the High Command of the Corps has held in readiness 2500 Carabinieri for the occupation of Rome. These Carabinieri, who made an excellent impression on the Allied Authorities for their equipment and bearing, are concentrated behind the lines of the Fifth Army.

Would it not be possible to reduce this amount to 2300, leaving me 200 available to be sent as reinforcements to the garrisons in Sicily, where the state of public safety is alarming.

To supply these 2500 requested men, we have had to extend ourselves up to the utmost limit and there remain no more effectives to be drawn upon.

And the Carabinieri Candidate School will have no graduates for another six months.

I would be obliged to you for your interest in the matter.

Very cordially Yours.

/s/ BADOGLIO

TO: GENERAL MASON MACFARLANE
Chief of the Allied Control Commission

Naples

Brig. Land

1. No list received as yet.
 2. Discuss with Hamm 1400
plus if possible
- Wm. J. J.

50

File No. 586

Salerno, 28/2/1944

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF THE GOVERNMENT

My Dear General:-

I am aware that General Picche has given you a list of High Officers and Generals of the Royal Carabinieri, whose repatriation is needed. I beg to point out to you the urgent necessity for this repatriation, in view of the need for making changes in the territorial Commands of the Corps.

I also submit a further question to you.

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And the Carabinieri Candidate School will have no graduates for another six months.

I would be obliged to you for your interest in the matter.

Very cordially Yours.

/s/ BADOGLIO

TO: GENERAL MASON MACFARLANE
Chief of the Allied Control Commission

Naples

4398

NR. 586 DI PROT.



IL CAPO DEL GOVERNO

SALERNO 28 . 2 . 1944

HO AGG. APO
Rec'd 27/5/44
By 49

MIO CARO GENERALE,

SO CHE IL GENERALE PIÈCHE VI HA RILASCIATO UNA NOTA DI UFFICIALI SUPERIORI E GENERALI DEI CARABINIERI REALI DI CUI NECESSITEREBBE IL RIMPATRIO. IO MI PERMETTO DI SEGNALARVI L'URGENTE NECESSITÀ DI QUESTO RIMPATRIO, DATO CHE SI SENTE IL BISOGNO DI EFFETTUARE CAMBIAMENTI NEI COMANDI TERRITORIALI DELL'ARMA.

VI SOTTOPONGO ANCORA UN'ALTRA QUESTIONE.

PER DESIDERIO DEL COMANDO SUPREMO ALLEATO IL COMANDO GENERALE DELL'ARMA HA PREPARATO 2500 CARABINIERI PER L'OCCUPAZIONE DI ROMA. QUESTI CARABINIERI, CHE FEGERO OTTIMA IMPRESSIONE PRESSO LE AUTORITÀ ALLEATE PER IL LORO EQUIPAGGIAMENTO E PER IL COMPORTAMENTO, SONO CONCENTRATI NELLE RETROVIE DELLA 5^a ARMATA.

NON SAREBBE POSSIBILE RIDURRE LA CIFRA A 2300 LASCIANDOMENE DISPONIBILI 200 DA INVIARE IN RINFORZO ALLE GUARNIGIONI DI SICILIA, OVE LE CONDIZIONI DELLA PUBBLICA SICUREZZA DESTANO PREOCCUPAZIONI?

PER FORNIRE QUEI 2500 RICHIESTI NOI CI SIAMO SPREMUTI FINO ALL'ULTIMO LIMITE E NON CI RIMANE PIÙ ALCUNA

DISPONIBILITÀ.

E LA SCUOLA ALLIEVI CARABINIERI NON POTRÀ DARE
ALCUN GETTITO SE NON FRA SEI MESI.

VI SAREI GRATO DEL VOSTRO INTERESSAMENTO AL RI-
GUARDO.

MOLTO CORDIALMENTE

Carosini

AL SIGNOR GENERALE MASON MACFARLANE

CAPO DELLA COMMISSIONE ALLEATA
DI CONTROLLO

NAPOLI

785017

6 MAR 1944

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION ON
SICILY REGION HEADQUARTERS
APO 394.

U-638

2 MAR 1944

2 3/2/44.

FILE RPS. 014.1.

SUBJECT - ART. 12-15 ROYAL DECREE 16/B of 6 DEC. 1943.

TO - - H.Q. ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION.

1. With reference to memo dated 11th February, 1944, discreet enquiry has been made but no information has come to hand that concern is being caused among the Carabinieri as a result of Articles 12-15 of the Decree referred to.

R. Hancock
A. R. HANCOCK.
Lt. Colonel.
Regional Commissioner.

Dep. Rex. Com.

At 27 Rex. Com. asked Region for his reactions of CCRR to the Decree incorporating other bodies into the CCRR. Replies are at 32, 33, 47 and 48.

2. This matter was discussed at the recent conference and as the Decree is in suspense and may be altered, do not make that the reports (which were handed to me by Lt. Young) need be considered further.

Seen by Col. Fisher

No action required

SFS 10/3

4391

785017

1st Ind.
HQ, A.C.C., Region II, APO 394, 16 Feb 44.

Aguiar
4026 *HH*
GDM/pjh

To: Brigadier Lush, R.C. and M.G. Section, A.C.C. HQ, Naples. ✓

1. CC.RR. within Region II have not at any time made any representation to CAPO's regarding the subject matter of the basic communication. I am in entire agreement with paragraph 3 of this letter.

33,321 27926

G. H. McCaffrey
G.H. McCaffrey
Lt. Col., Inf.
R.C.

HEADQUARTERS,
MILITARY CONTROL COMMISSION,
APO 394

Regional Control and Military Government Section.

Ref: 100-58CA.

6th March 1944.

SUBJECT: Use of Area by O.C.M.

TO : Colonel P.C. Kirk,
Public Safety Sub-Commission.

1. I enclose herewith copy of translation of letter from General Aliberti forwarded by Brigadier Duchesne.
2. Before submitting the correspondence to the Executive Commissioner I would appreciate it if you would let me have your views on the matter.

A. J. SHERMAN,
Captain,
IC to Executive Commissioner.

AJS/JL

46

13/4 11/3
13/4 11/3

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

SUBJECT: CARABINIERI

Brig 133H
Br. A.C.C. NAPLES

302.
6 MAR Read
Army Sub Commission A.C.C.
Main M.C. (13312)
LEQUILL (12008)
I/103/1
24 Feb 44

I forward herewith the original copy and two copies
of translation of Ministry of War letter 802/8 of 26 Feb.
Will you please enable me to reply.

ABC

C. F. F. F.
Brigadier,
Army Sub Comm 1334.

TRANSLATION

SUBJECT:- Use of Arms by CC.RR

Army Sub Commission A.C.C.
Main H.Q. (MMA)
LEUILE (LECCO)

Ministry of War (Cabinet)
Ref: 802/C
26 Feb 44

Further to verbal information to Brig DUCHESNE, we beg to confirm to you that Allied officials in the Provinces, especially in CALABRIA, instructed the CC.RR HQ not to make use of their arms to maintain order.

At CATANZARO: all the hand grenades have been withdrawn from the CC.RR barracks.

At TARANTO: Further to a public demonstration in the square, the British General having his residence in the town forbade the use of arms and added that strong measures would be taken in the case of bloodshed.

At MATERA: The Allied official suggested that sticks had to be used as by the American MPs.

We beg to point out:

That the GHQ of the CC.RR recently gave to the various CC.RR HQs definite instructions regarding Public order adding that arms were to be used only when other measures of persuasion had failed and that the Police having had wounded or dead was on the point of being overpowered by the crowd.

Hand grenades were to be used only when the barracks were attacked. In such cases it is the only possible method of defence left to the CC.RR for their own safety.

It has been realised that during all the demonstrations, the crowd was always in possession of automatic arms and hand grenades.

We do not think it advisable to use batons as suggested by some Allied officers as this will remind the crowd of the "MANGANELLO" used by the Fascists thus entitling the people to make accusations of fascism against the CC.RR or the authorities responsible for the maintenance of Public order.

The Public Security authorities and the CC.RR HQs realise the consequences of using arms and are aware that in the present circumstances the misfortune of the people should not be increased by street fighting resulting from violent repression. The men chosen to maintain public order are not bloodthirsty. This is proved by the fact that the actual use of arms was the cause of forced during public

At MATERA: The Allied official suggested that sticks had to be used as by the American MPs.

We beg to point out:

That the GHQ of the CC.RR recently gave to the various CC.RR Hqs definite instructions regarding Public order adding that arms were to be used only when other measures of persuasion had failed and that the Police having had wounded or dead was on the point of being overpowered by the crowd.

Hard grenades were to be used only when the barracks were attacked. In such cases it is the only possible method of defence left to the CC.RR for their own safety.

It has been realised that during all the demonstrations, the crowd was always in possession of automatic arms and hand grenades.

We do not think it advisable to use batons as suggested by some Allied officers as this will remind the crowd of the "MANGANELLO" used by the Fascists thus entitling the people to make accusations of fascism against the CC.RR or the authorities responsible for the maintenance of Public order.

The Public Security authorities and the CC.RR Hqs realise the consequences of using arms and are aware that in the present circumstances the misfortune of the people should not be increased by street fighting resulting from violent repression. The men chosen to maintain public order are not bloodthirsty. This is proved by the fact that the actual use of firearms by the armed forces during public disturbances is very rare in the history of ITALY.

But if we give up the idea of using arms it will be therefore vain to hope that the fury of the crowd resulting in assault, arson and wilful destruction could be stopped once out of control.

It is clear that an armed force which cannot use its arms becomes an armed force nominally only.

It appears that the Public Security Authorities and the CC.RR Commanders should be considered as those only responsible to judge the question and that for what concerns their duties they should be answerable only to their direct superiors.

As suggested by Brig DUCHESNE we asked the GHQ CC.RR of liberated ITALY to contact direct Col KIRK of the A.C.C. SALERNO; meanwhile we would appreciate if you could recommend the question in order that the matter may be resolved on the basis of our wishes.

signed

Gen ALIBERTI

1. ARMY MISSION

27 Feb 44 43

ARMY



MINISTERO DELLA GUERRA

GABINETTO

N. di ord. 803 / C. Ufficio Collegamento Missioni Alleate, 1.00. 107, 1126 febbraio 1944

OGGETTO: Uso delle armi da parte del C.F.M. nei servizi di

ordine pubblico.

USE OF ARMS IN THE PART OF C.F.M. IN

THE SERVICE OF PUBLIC ORDER

ALLA SODDISFAZIONE DEI DEVERI DELL'A.C.C.

Comando Truppa (Italia)

LEAGUE

A conferma di quanto verbalmente riferito al Generale INTERUSCO al comitato che, secondo segnalazioni pervenute a questo Ministero, Uff. Fidiati alleati, preposti alle provvisorie, specie in Calabria, avrebbero ordinato ai Comandi locali dell'arma del C.F.M. di non far uso delle armi durante il servizio di ordine pubblico.

In particolare è avvenuto che :

- a Catanzaro sono state fatte ritirare le loro armi che esistevano presso la caserma N. 21.
- a Taranto, in occasione di una dimostrazione in piazza, il generale inglese ivi residente proibì l'uso delle armi aggiungendo che, in caso di spargimento di sangue, sarebbero stati presi a più gravi provvedimenti.
- a Matera l'ufficiale alleato esprimeva il parere che si dovesse far uso di bastoni, come è praticato dalla polizia americana.

Al riguardo si fa presente che :

- il Comandante dell'arma del C.F.M. anche di recente ha nuovamente detto che al dispendio Comandi di ordine, perché dispendiosi, se non si al servizio di ordine pubblico, continuando di ricorrere all'uso delle armi soltanto quando ciò rappresenti l'estrema possibilità di riva-

ordine pubblico.

USE OF ARMS ON THE PART OF Q.A.R.R. IN
THE SERVICE OF PUBLIC ORDER
ALLA SOMMOCOMMISSIONE E DEI ILLUSTRI DI A.S.C.
Comando Polizia (Italia).

LEGGI

A conferma di quanto verbalmente riferito al generale D'AMICO
si comunica che, secondo segnalazioni pervenute al primo ministero, tra
fidati clienti presenti alle provincie, specie in Calabria, avrebbero
ordinato ai comandi locali dell'Arma del P.S. di non far uso delle
armi durante il servizio di ordine pubblico.

In particolare è avvenuto che :

- A Catanzaro sono state fatte affiggere 10 bozze a mano che esortavano
tuttavia la polizia C.M.I.

- A Taranto, in occasione di una manifestazione in piazza, il generale
inglese del residente proibì l'uso delle armi continuando che, in
caso di spargimento di sangue, sarebbero stati presi i più gravi
provvedimenti ;

- A Matera l'ufficiale addetto esprimeva il parere che al Torinese far
uso di bastoni, come il portatore della polizia materana.

Al riguardo si fa presente che :

- Il Comando dell'Arma del P.S. che di recente ha nuovamente riferito
sulle ai dirigenti comandi di polizia, proibisce espressamente l'uso
in servizio di ordine pubblico, al punto di ritenere che l'uso delle
armi soltanto quando ciò rappresenta l'ultima possibilità di rim-
ediare alle situazioni irrimediabili comprese e premeditate quale
se, fatta ogni altra provvidenza, la forza armata intervenisse in
servizio di ordine pubblico stiano per essere portate dalla polizia,
che aver evitato feriti o morti per violenza o fuoco della polizia non
destina ;

- L'uso delle bombe a mano è riservato ai casi di eccezionale
emergenza. I difensori in tali casi non hanno altro mezzo per riavviare
l'ordine e tutelare la propria incolumità.

Si ha motivo in rilievo che la parte la manifestazione è stato

osservato che la folla sembra di armi, minor spensieratezza, e di più
della mano;

- non sembra possibile ed opportuno ricorrere all'uso del bastone, come
comandato da qualche ufficiale alleato, perché esso richiamerebbe
subito alla memoria delle masse "il canagottino" usato dai fascisti ed
avrebbe spinto per conseguenza di "fascismo" i carabinieri e le autorità
resistenti dell'ordine pubblico.

Le Autorità di Pubblica Sicurezza ed i Comandi del CC.M. si
rendono perfettamente conto delle conseguenze dell'uso delle armi e ad
esso sono pervenuti che, nella attuale crisi costituzionale, non si devono ag-
gravare i dolori del popolo con tutti determinati da una violenza repressi-
vistica. Gli stessi opinioni a tale riguardo l'ordine pubblico non sono del qua-
drante. Ciò è provato anche dal fatto che le centinaia di fucili in parte
della forza armata in servizio di ordine pubblico sono rimesse nella
storia italiana.

Ma se si rinunciassero in anticipo all'impiego della forza armata
sarebbe vano sperare di poter frenare la violenza della folla quando que-
sta è portata in misura e la taglie - assalgono, malmenano, incendiano,
distruggono.

Come è evidente che se la forza armata viene a priori infor-
to in qualsiasi circostanza l'uso delle armi, esse finiscono per essere
forza armata soltanto di nome.

Sembra pertanto necessario che le autorità di Pubblica Sicurezza
ed i Comandanti dell'Arma del CC.M., siano considerati i soli respon-
sabili della questione e che, nell'esplorazione dei propri compiti, essi
dipendano esclusivamente dal loro diretto superiore.

Come ha suggerimento del generale MURCHIESE si è invitato il co-
mande del CC.M. dell'Italia alleata a prendere contatti diretti con
il colonnello LITZ della commissione alleata di controllo, ~~del~~ Salerno, in
quanto si sarà stati a conoscenza M.L.I.A. se vorrà dare il proprio appoggio
affermare la questione possa trovare soluzione sulla base dei criteri so-
pra riportati.

breve tempo per ottenere la "Cassafano" i carabinieri e la polizia
prestavano dell'ordine pubblico.

Le autorità di pubblica sicurezza ed i Comandi del 10.75, si
rendono perfettamente conto delle conseguenze dell'uso delle armi e ag-
graveranno, oltre alle attuali, gravi condizioni, non si devono ac-
contentare i dolori del popolo per tutti i delinquenti da una violenta rapre-
saglia. Gli uomini spinti a tentare l'ordine pubblico nei seno del con-
sumarsi. Ciò è provato anche dal fatto che le tensioni di fuoco in parte
delle forze armate in servizio di ordine pubblico sono rinasce nella
minoria italiana.

La se si ribellano in anticipo all'impiego della forza armata
sarebbe vano sperare di poter trovare la violenza della "colle" quando que-
sto - perduta la misura e la ragione - monologano, malinconico, incoerente,
distruggono.

Come è evidente che se ad una forza armata viene a priori im-
posto in qualsiasi circostanza l'uso delle armi, essa finisce per essere
forza armata soltanto di nome.

Sembra pertanto necessario che le autorità di pubblica sicurezza
ed i Comandanti dell'Arma del C.C. si siano spinti a soli responsabili
della questione e che, nell'esplicazione dei propri compiti, essi
dipendano esclusivamente dai loro diretti superiori.

Come da suggerimento del generale D'AMENSI si è invitato il co-
mando del C.C. di Italia liberata a prendere contatti diretti con
il colonnello LINT della commissione alleata di controllo, in Salerno; in-
tanto si sarà pronti a colare il I.A. se vorrà dare il proprio appoggio
affinché la questione possa trovare soluzione sulla base dei criteri su-
periori.

GENERALI ALIENATI

Alienati

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
R.C. & M.C. Section
APO 394

H2

Ref/302/24/CA.

2 March 1944.

SUBJECT: Rations for CO.RR

TO : Land Forces Sub-Commission.

ff 37

1. Your comments are requested on the contents of the enclosed copy of a memorandum from S.C.A.O. PUGIA Province to Regional Commissioner Region V.
2. This H.Q. would appreciate it if you would take this opportunity of informing them of the latest arrangements in regard to the feeding and rationing of the Carabinieri.

HURMAN E. FISKE
Colonel, Cavalry,
Deputy Executive
Commissioner.

6/4/45
Noted
PB

4391

U P Y

CIPHER MESSAGE IN

SIGS: A001
INFORMANT
MOST SECRET

TO: 5 ARMY ADV CP FOR ACTION
FLAMBO FOR INFO

FROM: 5 ARMY

3142

25

ISSUE RATIONS FROM ALLIED MILITARY SOURCES TO CARBONIERI AND ROYAL
FINANCE GUARD COOPERATING WITH TROOPS IN BRIDGEHEAD ON BASIS
AUTHORIZED FOR ITALIAN TROOPS WITH SUCH MODIFICATIONS IN THE RATION
SCALE AS MAY BE NECESSARY DUE TO TYPES OF RATIONS STOCKED.
INCLUDE THE INDIVIDUALS IN RATION STRENGTH DAILY ADMINISTRATIVE
REPORT

SAC DISTRIBUTION: ACTION Q
INFO ST GA

JMD
SMD/260625

4390

COPY

40

PLAGE

25 FEB 1946
1730A

03 5th ARMY

G4

SECRET

CITE PLAGEFOR 131 X ITALIAN CARABINIERI AND ROYAL FINANCE GUARDS
COOPERATING WITH ALLIED TROOPS IN BRIDGEHEAD SHOULD BE AUTHORIZED
TO DRAW RATIONS FROM ALLIED SOURCES IN SAME MANNER AS AUTHORIZED
FOR ITALIAN TROOPS IN COMBAT AREA ON MAIN FRONT

IMPORTANT

DOUGLAS N. LAWLEY
Colonel, G.S.C.
Executive G-4

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
R.C. & M.C. Section
APO 394

38

27 February 1944.

Ref/RC2/20/CA.

SUBJECT: Nations for OCMR and GMP.

TO : Major Brown, ADC Liaison Officer AMHQ,
Adv. Adm. Echelon.

1. Please note action taken on the Italians at the beachhead. No action being taken on soap, and none contemplated so far as I know.

2. Please return papers to G-4 for file.

NORMAN E. FENKE
Colonel, Cavalry,
Deputy Executive
Commissioner.

4389

25 FEB Recd

302 *C.A. Br.*

TO : Civil Affairs Branch, Reg. Control & MG Section,
HQ., A.C.C., A.F.O. 394.
FROM : HQ., A.M.C., Region 5.

SUBJECT: Rations for CC.RR.

REF : R5/514/8

DATE : 22 Feb. 44.

37
U-248

For information please on which to base reply.

For R.C.A.O.

J.H.G. WOMERSLEY
Capt.
Adj.

Copy to - P.C.A.O. - Foggia province.

Ref:- FP/1121

23 Feb 44.

SUBJECT:- Rations for CC.RR.

TO:- AMG REGION IV.

FROM:- AMG, FOGGIA PROVINCE.

Copy to:- AMG REG 5,
HE the Prefect.
P. Safety Div.

It is understood that CC.RR. in other parts of ITALY and in SICILY ARE BEING issued, as members of the Italian Army, with special rations from Allied sources.

The CC.RR. are much under-paid and the provision of special rations for them would help to rectify this.

See 24

Copy to - P.C.A.O. - Foggia province.

Ref:- FP/1121

23 Feb 44.

SUBJECT:- Rations for CC.RR.

TO:- AMG REGION IV.

Copy to:- AMG REG 5,
HE the Prefect.
P.Safety Div.

FROM:- AMG, FOGGIA PROVINCE.

It is understood that CC.RR. in other parts of ITALY and in SICILY ARE BEING issued, as members of the Italian Army, with special rations from Allied sources.

The CC.RR. are much under-paid and the provision of special rations for them would help to rectify this.

It is accordingly strongly recommended that CC.RR. in this province should be included in the general scheme, in that they should be issued with special rations as is done elsewhere.

CEE/EGFM.

S.C.A.O. FOGGIA PROVINCE.
Lt. Colonel.

4384

2222222222222222

for record.
J.H.G. WOMERSLEY
Capt.
Adj.

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394

AMC/421/73.

22 February 1944

SUBJECT: Unauthorized promotions of CC.RR

TO : D.C.A.O.,
AFHQ. Adv. Adm. Echelon, C.M.F.

1. With further reference to your 3073/R/A.2 of 5 Dec 43 the matter of the promotions in the SALERNO Group of the CC.RR has not yet been disposed of entirely.
2. In the course of a discussion which the Chief of the Public Safety Sub-Commission had with Major General SASSINO the latter proposed transferring the officers concerned following an assurance from the G.O.C. Carabinieri that they would then be reduced to one rank higher than that which they held when the meritorious services, for which they were promoted, were performed. Failing this assurance they will remain in the SALERNO Group.
3. There is every reason to believe that the G.O.C. Carabinieri will give this assurance.

M. S. LAMM
Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

CIRCULATION SLIP
Please pass file QUICKLY

| FROM | OFFICER | TO |
|------|--------------------------|----|
| | Brig. M. S. Lush | |
| | Col. N. E. Fiske | ✓ |
| | Lt. Col. T. Farley Smith | |
| ✓ | Major Driffield-White | ✓ |
| | Major Van Dusen | |
| | Capt. Talbot | |
| | Capt. Carr | |
| | Capt. Stewart | |
| ✓ | Registry | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |

REMARKS
Initial HERE and POLIO referred.

Please see 17
Principle is approved -
50 are coming.
Can we put out?
I think not put out.
necessary but not by some one
I think they are coming
2

Brig Gen Hume
informa personally.
26/2.

let 26/2

P.A. (keep back up)

785017

20 FEB 1944 302 C.A. 35
HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
APO-464, U.S. ARMY.

19 February 1944

SUBJECT: Carabinieri in Tripoli.

TO : Executive Commissioner, Main Headquarters,
Allied Control Commission, APO-394, U.S. Army.

1. The number of Carabinieri available for use by Allied Military Government in Italy is limited. Lieut. General Piechi, head of the Carabinieri, states that if the Carabinieri now assembled for duty in Rome all remain in that city when the Fifth Army moves forward, we cannot hope to have any additional recruits from parts of Italy now within our control. This may result in a serious situation.

2. General Piechi states that according to his information, and the same statement is made by other senior Carabinieri officers, he believes there are in Tripoli some 2,000 Carabinieri now held as prisoners of war. These men were not on duty as military police, and so, may not be listed in the records as Carabinieri. They were an actual group of one or more military organizations serving as infantry, this being one of the several functions of the Carabinieri.

3. It is believed that the urgency of the situation is sufficient to warrant taking up the matter with the proper authorities in Tripoli to ascertain if Carabinieri now being held as prisoners could be returned to Italy for duty.


EDGAR ERSKINE HUME,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
SCAO, AMG-Fifth Army.

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18 FEB 1944

RTM/15

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HEADQUARTERS REGION 4
Allied Military Government
APC 394

TO : HQ. A.C.C., R.C. & M.G. Section.
FROM : R.C.A.O. Region 4 AMG.
SUBJECT: Articles 12 and 15 of Royal Decree 16/B.
REF : R4/091.1(PO).
DATE : 16 February 1944.

1. In reply to your letter dated February 11, 1944, careful inquiries and consideration show the following:-

- a. Feeling amongst all ranks of the CCRR against this decree is high. This may be due to some extent to the effect admission may have on promotion.
- b. The feeling against admission to permanent service with the CCRR of the Highway Police is more intense than against that of Port Militia.
- c. The Highway Militia are considered by the CCRR to have been recruited largely from Squadristi, and wholly from convinced Fascists who are most unlikely to prove politically sound in the new circumstances.
- d. There is an impression, for which the foundation may only be the wish, that the BADOGLIO government may annul this decree.
- e. Some hesitancy appears on the part of CCRR officers to be associated openly by name with strong opinions against the decree; but there can be no doubt as to the keen and sincere dislike of the provisions of the decree by CCRR.

M. Carr
M. CARR, Brigadier
R.C.A.O., Region 4

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HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
R.C. & E.C. SECTION

34

Ref/302/16/CA

NEF/mrd
18 February 1944

SUBJECT: Rations for CCHR and COFF

TO : Major Brown, Liaison Officer AFHQ, Adv. Adm. Sch.

1. The Royal Carabinieri and the Royal Finance Guards are an integral part of the Italian Army. In general they are rationed by the Italian Army and are included in the ration ceiling for the Italian Armed Forces as set by AFHQ.

2. In certain forward areas, such as the beachhead, it appears to be impracticable for the Italian supply system to furnish these elements with rations and they are subsisted like the refugees, on anything they can get. Is it possible for them to be subsisted on Allied Force rations wherever, for operational reasons it is not practicable for the Italian Army supply system to reach them.

3. In addition to rations, many Carabinieri units, especially those destined for service in forward areas, are not receiving any soap.

4. Please obtain Flambo's views on these points and see if it is possible for Flambo to issue a directive which will take care of this situation.

By Command of Lieutenant General MASON MACFARLANE:

NORMAN E. FISKE
Colonel, Cavalry
Deputy Executive Commissioner

Flambo
10/83

16 FEB Recd

page 1191

302 ~~RCM~~ 3527

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HEADQUARTERS
REGION 3, ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
APO 394, U. S. ARMY

LM/111

15 February 1944

014.12 B

TO: Regional Control and Military Government Section
Headquarters, Allied Control Commission

1. Reference letter of 11th February. Subject: Articles 12 and 15 of Royal Decree 16/3 (Carabinieri). The Carabinieri in this Region did express great alarm at the above decrees. Up to the present they had managed to keep free from politics even under fascism. It was feared that the advent of men from other police formations would spoil that record, and also tend to lower the prestige of the Carabinieri in the eyes of the public.

2. If this decree is carried through, it is felt that the Carabinieri authorities should be allowed to carry out a very careful scrutiny of all applicants.

Forester

LORD FORESTER
Lt. Colonel, R.H.C.
D. R. C. A. C.

CONFIDENTIAL

Headquarters
Allied Control Commission
- Security Intelligence

15th. February, 1944.

To: Brigadier M. Lush, Executive Commissioner, A.C.C.
Subject: General Pièche, CC.RR.

1. With reference to my report of 8th. February, I have obtained the following information, which is from a reliable source, regarding General Pièche.

2. There is no doubt of this officer's professional ability, which is recognised on all sides. When he was second in command of the Carabinieri to General Mazon (later killed in an air raid on Rome) he was not on the best of terms with his chief, because he saw more of Mussolini and Ciano than did Mazon himself.

3. Carabinieri opinion has it that Pièche's job in Dalmatia was obtained through the influence of Ciano and that his sojourn in Spain during the Spanish war was remarkable on account of the comparatively small number of Carabinieri in that country, which did not appear to justify the presence of such a high ranking officer. On his return from Spain, Pièche made a speech extolling Mussolini's aim in the Spanish Civil War, which was later published in pamphlet form (copies are no longer obtainable).

4. When Mussolini last visited Naples, following a Fascist parade, the Duce called Pièche to him and the two conversed privately for some twenty minutes to the annoyance of the Prefect, who was kept waiting.

5. Lt. Col. Di Nuzio, CC.RR., now at Cosenza, is said to be a personal friend of Pièche. Di Nuzio has the reputation of being a close friend of Farinacci and lived in Farinacci's residence at Cosenza. He also accompanied him to Russia on his visit to Moscow.

6. General Cariga, somewhat to the surprise of the Carabinieri, was appointed Commanding General upon the death of Mazon instead of Pièche, who was expected to receive this appointment. The Carabinieri are of the opinion that when General Cariga, who is believed to be still in Rome, again encounters Pièche, he will display some enmity to him, particularly if their former positions are to be

Carabinieri to General Hazon (later killed in an air raid on Rome) he was not on the best of terms with his chief, because he saw more of Mussolini and Ciano than did Hazon himself.

3. Carabinieri opinion has it that Pièche's job in Dalmatia was obtained through the influence of Ciano and that his sojourn in Spain during the Spanish war was remarkable on account of the comparatively small number of Carabinieri in that country, which did not appear to justify the presence of such a high ranking officer. On his return from Spain, Pièche made a speech extolling Mussolini's aim in the Spanish Civil war, which was later published in pamphlet form (copies are no longer obtainable).

4. When Mussolini last visited Naples, following a Fascist parade, the Duce called Pièche to him and the two conversed privately for some twenty minutes to the annoyance of the Prefect, who was kept waiting.

5. Lt. Col. Di Nunzio, CC.RR., now at Cosenza, is said to be a personal friend of Pièche. Di Nunzio has the reputation of being a close friend of Parinacci and lived in Parinacci's residence at Cremona. He also accompanied him to Russia on his visit to Moscow.

6. General Ceriga, somewhat to the surprise of the Carabinieri, was appointed Commanding General upon the death of Hazon instead of Pièche, who was expected to receive this appointment. The Carabinieri are of the opinion that when General Ceriga, who is believed to be still in Rome, again encounters Pièche, he will display some animosity to him, particularly if their former positions are to be reversed, and Pièche is to become Commanding General.

7. In my view, nothing has been said which would justify even the consideration of any change in the present appointment, but I believe the matter will require careful attention during the occupation of Rome when the effect of new Carabinieri personalities may have to be considered.

Alleging
W.E. YOUNG,
Colonel.

Security Intelligence.

Copy to Colonel Kirk (Public Safety).

CS file 630

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Suspense

[illegible]

For: Signature _____
Recommendation _____
Information _____
Approval or Disapp. _____
Appropriate Action _____
Investig. & Report _____
File _____
Return to Cent. Files _____
Transmission _____

Remarks:

HEAD HEAD, BARTONS
AND CONTROL, CAPTAIN/CH
Public Safety, Sub-Commission
LFO 336

SEC/14601/9/RS

14 February 1944

SUBJECT: Nations for COMR and COMR

TO : RC + IG Section
(Chrc' Affs. Section)

The position is as follows:

1. Certain Carabinieri operating in forward areas are being nationalized by the armies to which they are attached. The particulars given in Form 1 (b) of Col. Sime's report do not fully agree with those given by COMR and Fifth Army but can be accepted for the purpose of this memorandum.

It is suggested that all COMR performing duty forward of German rear boundaries should be attached to military units for reasons, on the grounds of operational necessity.

2. Carabinieri serving in the remainder of occupied or free Italy are supplied with armed military rationnaires from a bulk issue made to the Italian Army. This arrangement should continue.

3. 1- Usually COMR receive a special ration at a higher scale than that of the ordinary civilian. No information is available as to the ration scale in Germany but it is recommended that all COMR wherever serving should be dealt with as in P 10 2 where it is recommended that there should be a differentiation between positions of a national service.

4. As the Quartermaster's stores are accepted as numbers of the Italian Army for clothing and equipment it is recommended that they be treated in the same way as COMR in respect of rationnaires also. The Chief, Land Forces Sub-Commission has been consulted and supports this view.

Paul G. Linn
for

PAUL G. LINN
Colonel, Inf.
Chief, Public Safety
Sub-Commission

The position is as follows:

1. Certain Carabinieri operating in forward areas are being rationed by the armies to which they are attached. The particulars given in para 1 (b) of COL. Fickel's report do not tally with those given by STARG and Fifth Army but can be accepted for the purposes of this memorandum.

It is suggested that all CON performing duty forward of Corps rear boundaries should be attached to military units for rations, on the grounds of operational necessity.

2. Carabinieri serving in the remainder of occupation or free Italy are supplied with Allied Military Rations from a bulk issue made by the British Army. This arrangement should continue.

3. As usually CON receive a special ration on a higher scale than that of the ordinary civilian. No information is available as to the practices in Sardinia but it is recommended that all CON wherever serving should be dealt with as in para 2 above if being supplied. There should be no differentiation between sections of a national service.

4. As the Carabinieri Finocchi are accepted as members of the Italian Army for clothing and equipment it is recommended that they be treated as the same by the ARS in respect of rationing also. The Chief, Land Forces Sub-Commission has been consulted and supports this view.

Paul G. Viter
for

PAUL G. VITER
Colonel, Inf.
Chief, Public Safety
Sub-Commission

4381

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
R.C. & M.G. SECTION
APO 394

11 February 1944

MEMORANDUM:

TO : Brigadier Lush

1. The matter of rationing of Carabinieri and Finance Guards appears to need re-examination. The existing situation is as follows: In Apulia they are subsisted on the regular Italian Army ration. In the 5th and 8th Armies they have been rationed similarly except,

(a) Carabinieri on the beachhead are subsisting like the refugees, on anything they can get.

(b) Following groups are subsisted on Allied Army Rations:

- (1) 30 Carabinieri operating as a mobile group with 10 Corps.
- (2) 150 Carabinieri designated for service on the beachhead and now in route.
- (3) 300 Carabinieri designated for employment in the Cassino area.

(c) The following are subsisted on British Army rations supplied from 23rd Base Supply Depot, No. 2, R.A.S.C., Torre Innunciata:

850 Carabinieri and 500 Finance Guards brought from Bari and designated for eventual employment in Rome. These latter are, however, without soap, insecticide and cigarettes.

2. In Sicily the Carabinieri and Finance Guards are rationed the same as civilians. The bread and pasta ration has been increased to 300 grams and 40 grams respectively and an increase of pay has also been granted.

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3. Present information is that elsewhere in Italy these elements are rationed by the Italian Army. Royal Carabinieri and Royal Finance Guards are an integral part of the Italian Army and might properly be rationed as such. The Economic Section objects to this on policy and states that the existing situation in Sicily is satisfactory.

4. I am informed that subsistence of these troops on Allied Force rations is contrary to specific directive from A.F.H.Q. For operational reasons, however, it may be a necessity, especially on the beachhead and in certain forward areas where the Italian Army supply service can not function.

NORMAN E. FISKE
Colonel Cavalry
Deputy Executive Commissioner

HEADQUARTERS,
ARMED CONTROL COMMISSION,
APO 394.

Regional Control and Military Government Section.

11th February 1944

Subject: Articles 12 & 15 of Royal Decree 16/3.

To : Regional Commissioner, Region I
" " " Region II
" " " Region III
" " " Region IV
" " " Region V
" " " Region VI

1. It has been represented to me that Articles 12 and 15 of the Royal Decree 16/3 of 6th December, 1943, are causing some concern amongst the Carabinieri.

2. This decree disbanded, among other institutions, the Alpini and Fort Militia, and ruled that personnel of these Militia in permanent service could apply for admission to permanent service with the Carabinieri, where they would be employed in a special branch of that force.

3. Personally I do not think that the Carabinieri need have any fears that this will disrupt their force but I should be glad to know whether you have heard of any reactions in your Region.

M. S. LEE,
Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

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Security Intelligence.
6th February, 1944.

Confidential.

To :- Brigadier Lush, Executive Commissioner.
From:- Col. A. Young.

Subject:- Newspaper article referring to General Picche and
Royal Decree 16/B.

(1) The edition of Italia Libera published on 7th February, 1944 contained two short articles making reference to the Carabinieri and in particular to the Commanding General Picche and also to the Royal Decree 16/B which deals with the dissolution of the Militia.

(2) A translation of these articles and also of the Royal Decree is attached.

(3) So far as the indictment of Picche is concerned, I believe that it is substantially founded on fact, but I will peruse enquiries further since it has raised the whole question of his suitability for his present office.

(4) Recently Carabinieri Officers in Naples were informed through their own service channels of Royal Decree M. 16/B of the 6th December, 1943, which deals with the dissolution of the "Fascist Militia". Considerable surprise and alarm was evinced by them to learn that Articles 12 and 13 made provision for specified officers and men of the Militia to be enrolled into the ranks of the Carabinieri.

(5) There is no doubt that the effect of this provision has come as an unpleasant shock to the Carabinieri and that it is resented by them but also by a considerable section of public opinion.

Colonel.

Copy to Col. Kirk (Public Safety) for information.

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ROYAL DECREE: * 6 December 1943.
Dissolution of the *Ventur* Voluntary Militias for National Security
and of the Special Militias.

Chapter 1.
Personnel not in permanent service :;:..... passes to the rolls
of the Armed Forces on reserve.
Remaining personnel not on permanent service is reallocated
to the reserve of the Armed Forces with the rank then held.

Art. 1
Officers in permanent reserve of equal rank as officers of the
Armed Forces may ask to be readmitted to the Armed Forces with
which they serve. Upon readmission, the ministers concerned will
decide rank and seniority.
Remaining regular officers and those who do not make such appli-
cation, or who are not accepted, will be dealt with in the same
way as officers not in permanent service and are eligible for
retirement and pension in accordance with the laws in force.
Pensions will be in accordance with rank.
The same provisions apply to regular soldiers and N.C.Os.

Art. 4
Arms, equipment and materials of all kinds of the legionary militia
and its special branches will be supervised by the Royal Army
(of the Royal Navy for the "Militart") which will be arranged
by the competent State Majors.
The barracks and locations of the above-mentioned bodies will be
taken over by the competent military authorities.

Chapter 2 The Railway Militia.

Art. 2
The responsibilities of which the Railway Militia are relieved
will be undertaken by the C.C.R.R. and by the authorities of Public
Safety in accordance with special arrangements which will be
promulgated under Royal Decree, based on the proposals of the
Ministers for the Interior and for Communications, under agree-
ment with the Ministry for War.

Art. 6
The component members of the Railway Militia will resume office
in the ranks of the civilian personnel of the railway administration
from which they were drawn, according to rank and categories to
which they belong, dependent on the judgment of the competent
administration.

The provisions of Arts. 2 and 3 will apply to supernumeraries.

Art. 7
Arms and Military Equipment will be surrendered to the Royal Army
and occupied posts and materials will be turned over to the Rail-
way administration.

Chapter 3
The Post Telegraph and Telephone Militia.

Art. 8

This is disbanded and members return to their own
organisations.

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Page 2

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Chapter 4 The Highway Militia

Art. 11

This is disbanded. Duties given over to CC.RR. and to the organisations in whose competence they formerly lay.

Art 12

The personnel of the Highway Militia in permanent service may request admission to the rolls of permanent service with the CC.RR. Admission is not limited by the height requirements for officers.

The Ministry of War, having consulted the Commanding General, of the CC.RR, decides upon admission and determines for each applicant his rank and seniority.

Those persons accepted into the CC.RR will be employed in the constitution of a special branch, in addition to the branches previously constituted for the CC.RR.

The provisions of Art. 2 will apply to personnel not in permanent service.

Art 13

Locations held by the Highway Police will be returned to the administration which conceded them; in absence of such administration they will be taken over by the CC.RR.

The provisions of Art 4 apply to the remainder.

Chapter 5

The Port Militia

Art 14

This is disbanded. Duties will be restored to the CC.RR and other competent organisations.

Art 15

The provisions of Art 13 apply to personnel of Port Militia.

Art 16

As Art 13

REGIO SEGRETO - LEGGE 6 DICEMBRE 1943. N.16/B.

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SCIoglimento DELLA MILITIA VOLONTARIA PER
LA SICUREZZA NAZIONALE E DELLE MILIZIE SPECIALI.

VITTORIO EMANUELE III

per grazia di Dio e per volontà della Nazione
RE D'ITALIA.

900 000 000 000 000

- Visto il R.D. 14 gennaio 1923 e successive integrazioni e modificazioni
 - Visti i RR. DD. Legge 30 Ottobre 1943 n. 2/B e 10 novembre n. 5/B;
 - Ritenuta la necessità urgente e inderogabile di provvedere allo scioglimento della milizia volontaria per la sicurezza nazionale e delle sue specialità, nonché delle milizie speciali, restituendo le funzioni di queste ultime agli ordinari organi di polizia;
 - sentito il consiglio dei ministri;
 - sulla proposta del Capo del Governo, di concerto con i ministri della Marina, dell'Aeronautica, e con i sottosegretari all'Interno, alla Giustizia, alle Finanze, alla Guerra, ai Lavori Pubblici, all'Agricoltura e Foreste e alle Comunicazioni;
- Abbiamo decretato e decretiamo:

- Titolo 1 -

La milizia volontaria per la sicurezza nazionale legionaria e sue specialità (confinaria, contraerea, marittima).-

- Art 1 -

La milizia volontaria per la sicurezza nazionale, istituita con R.D. 14 gennaio 1923, n.11, e ripartita successivamente con altre disposizioni in milizia legionaria e sue specialità (confinaria, contraerea, "M.A.C.A.", marittima "Milmar", e scielta. Non sono permesse formazioni a carattere e inquadramento militare di qualsiasi partito.-

- Art 2 -

Il personale non in servizio permanente della milizia volontaria per la sicurezza nazionale e sue specialità delle classi attualmente alle armi - e delle classi per unità di prima linea per gli ufficiali - passa nei ruoli della forza armata di provenienza.-

Il rimanente personale non in servizio permanente viene ricollocato in congedo nella forza armata di provenienza col grado in esso ricoperto.-

- Art 3 -

Gli ufficiali in servizio permanente provenienti dalla eguale categoria dagli ufficiali delle forze armate possono chiedere di/

-2-

ART 3 (Cont)

di essere riassessi nella forza armata con la quale prestano attualmente servizio.-

Sulla riammissione giudicano insindacabilmente i ministri interessati che determinano, per i riassessi, grado ed anzianità.- I rimanenti ufficiali in servizio permanente, e quelli che non presentino tale domanda o non la vedano accolta, seguono le sorti degli ufficiali non in servizio permanente, e sono ammessi al trattamento di quiescenza e di pensione loro spettante a norma delle leggi in vigore.-

In luogo del trattamento di quiescenza può essere concessa, in base a valutazione insindacabile fatta per caso dai ministri competenti, il trattamento di pensione in misura non superiore al minimo in rapporto al grado militare ricoperto dall'ufficiale.-

- ART 4 -

Egualemente si provvede per il personale in servizio permanente non avente grado di ufficiale.-

- Art 4 -

Armi, equipaggiamento e materiali di ogni genere della milizia legionaria e sue specialità saranno assunti in carico dagli enti del R. Esercito (dalla R. Marina per la "Milmar") che saranno stabiliti dalle Stati Maggiori competenti.-

Le caserme ed i locali, comunque assegnati alla milizia di cui sopra, saranno presi in consegna dalle autorità militari competenti per territorio.-

- TITOLO II -La Milizia Ferroviaria.- Art 5 -

I compiti espletati dalla milizia ferroviaria vengono assunti dall'Arma dei CC.RR. e dall'autorità di pubblica sicurezza secondo disposizioni particolari da emanarsi con decreto reale sulla proposta dei ministri dell'Interno e delle Comunicazioni, d'intesa con il ministero della Guerra.-

- Art 6 -

Gli appartenenti alla milizia ferroviaria rientrano nei ranghi del personale civile dell'amministrazione ferroviaria da cui verranno tratti, secondo i gradi e le categorie di spettanza, a giudizio insindacabile dell'amministrazione competente.- A quelli eventualmente estranei si applicano le disposizioni di cui agli art. 2 e 3.-

- Art 7 -

Le armi e gli equipaggiamenti militari saranno versati agli enti del R. Esercito designati dal competente Stato Maggiore.- I locali attualmente occupati dalla milizia ferroviaria saranno restituiti all'amministrazione ferroviaria insieme con gli arredi, materiali e mezzi di trasporto di pertinenza della stessa.-

-3-

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- TITOLO III -
La Milizia Postelegrafonica.

- Art 8 -

La milizia postelegrafonica è sciolta. - I compiti della stessa espletati vengono restituiti agli organi ai quali già competevano. -

- Art 9 -

Gli appartenenti alla milizia postelegrafica rientrano nei ranghi del personale civile dell'amministrazione postelegrafonica da cui vennero tratti, secondo i gradi e le categorie di aspettanza, a giudizio insindacabile dell'amministrazione competente. -
A quelle eventualmente estranei si applicano le disposizioni di cui agli art. 2 e 3. -

- Art 10 -

Le armi e gli equipaggiamenti saranno versati agli enti del R. Esercito designati dal competente Stato Maggiore. - I locali attualmente occupati dalla suddetta milizia saranno restituiti all'amministrazione postelegrafonica insieme con gli arredamenti, materiali e mezzi di trasporto di pertinenza della stessa. -

- TITOLO IV -

La Milizia Stradale

- Art 11 -

La Milizia Stradale è sciolta. - I compiti della stessa espletati vengono restituiti all'Arma dei CC.RR. ed agli organi ai quali già competevano. -

- Art 12 -

Il personale della milizia stradale in servizio permanente può chiedere l'ammissione nei ruoli in servizio permanente dei CC.RR. - L'ammissione è indipendente dal requisito del limite di altezza per gli ufficiali. -

Il ministero della Guerra, sentito il comandante generale dell'Arma dei CC.RR., giudica insindacabilmente sull'ammissione e determina per ciascuno, grado ed anzianità. -

Gli ammessi nell'Arma dei CC.RR. saranno impiegati per la costituzione di una specialità, in aumento agli organici previsti per l'Arma. -
Al personale non in servizio permanente si applicano le disposizioni di cui all'art. 2. -

- Art 13 -

I locali attualmente occupati dalla milizia stradale sono restituiti all'amministrazione che li concedette; in mancanza sono presi in consegna dall'Arma dei CC.RR. -

Per il rimanente si applicano le disposizioni di cui all'art. 4. -

- TITOLO V -

La Milizia Portuaria.

- Art 14 -

-4-

TITOLO V: Art. 14 (Cont.)

La milizia portuaria è sciolta. - I compiti dalla stessa espletati vengono restituiti all'Arma dei CC.RR. ed agli altri organismi ai quali già competevano. -

- Art. 15 -

Al personale della milizia portuaria si applicano le disposizioni di cui all'art. 12. -

- Art. 16 -

I locali attualmente occupati dalla milizia portuaria sono restituiti all'amministrazione che li concedette; in mancanza sono presi in consegna dall'Arma dei CC.RR. - Per il rimanente si applicano le disposizioni di cui all'Art. 4. -

- TITOLO VI -La Milizia Forestale- Art. 17 -

La milizia forestale passa a costituire con i suoi quadri il Real Corpo delle Foreste, a cui è affidata anche la custodia dei RR; tratturi e la vigilanza sulla pesca nelle acque interne. - Con decreto reale sulla proposta del ministro dell'Agricoltura e delle Foreste saranno determinate le modalità di attuazione per il ripristino del Real Corpo delle Foreste ed i compiti allo stesso assegnati, nonché la foggia delle divise. -

NORME TRANSITORIE.- Art. 18 -

Il personale delle milizie legionarie e speciale che, in applicazione del presente decreto, deve essere collocato in congedo, rientra nella piena disponibilità dei distretti militari di appartenenza e degli altri enti competenti alla tenuta a ruolo della forza in congedo, se questi si trovano in zona già libera. Gli appartenenti a distretti con sede in territori ancora non liberi dall'occupazione tedesca seguono le sorti del personale delle Forze Armate, in analoghe condizioni. - Alla loro temporanea sistemazione sarà provveduto con apposite disposizioni per la esecuzione del presente decreto. -

- Art. 19 -

Tenuto conto delle esigenze belliche attuali, è data facoltà ai ministri della Guerra e della Marina di provvedere, con appositi decreti, e nei limiti delle strette indispensabili, a mantenere nel grado attuale, finante che non sia possibile la loro sostituzione di ufficiali delle disciolte milizie "M.A.C.A." e "Milmart" non aventi grado di ufficiale nelle Forze Armate di provenienza. -

- Art. 20 -

Il presente decreto entrerà in vigore nel giorno successivo a quello della sua pubblicazione nella Gazzetta Ufficiale del Regno - serie speciale - e sarà presentato alle assemblee legislative per conversione in legge. -

Il Capo del Governo è autorizzato alla presentazione del relativo disegno di legge. /

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Ordiniamo, a chiunque spetti, di osservare il presente decreto
e di farlo osservare come legge dello stato.--

Dal Comando Supremo, 6 dicembre 1943.

VITTORIO EMANUELE

BADGLIO-DE CURZEN-SANDALLI-REALE-DE SANTIS-IUNO-
ORLANDO-DE CARO-SICILIANI-DE RAIMONDO.

Visto: (ai sensi del R.D. 30 ottobre 1943 - n.1/B).

Il Guardasigilli/ Badoglio.

REPORT FROM ITALIA LIBERA

7 Feb 1944

FROM BALDI FOR OUR OWNFrom Baldi to Fiaschi

In its selection of men, the Brindisi Government demonstrates its sentiments in the execution of its vaunted program of "defasciation". If the Allies had not intervened, we would still witness the scandal of one, Filippo BALDI in the capacity as Chief of Publication. Since his incredible nomination, we denounced Mister BALDI as one of the typical exponents of political corruption. We remembered the part he played, after the assassination of MATTEOTTI, in favoring the guilty, and shady, corrupt actions of his in Paris, to fool the French Government about the intentions of Mussolini in regard to France: actions which, aided by the complicity of Ministers, financed by fascists such as De BONIS, let the French to believe that Fascist Italy would never attack them. Specific accusations and circumstances remained indefinite. As a matter of fact, these accusations served to strengthen the opinions of the Government of Brindisi toward this dignified gentleman.

It took the action of the Allied Governments - that have been supplied with evidence of the correctness of the accusations - to cause the gentlemen of the would be Government to finally make up their minds to separate, with deep regret and the usual banquet, from their dear companion of activity and faith. And so, BALDI has gone.

The one who remains is Mr. Giuseppe FIASCHI, General Commander of the Royal Carabinieri. He, too, is a genuine soldier of the cause of freedom. As a matter of fact, in the Corps of Carabinieri, he was regarded as one of the most docile and faithful tools of fascism. Bound by servile friendship to Mussolini and Ciano, during the Civil War, he went to Spain as the Chief of the Counter-Intelligence Service and, as regard for his outstanding services, he obtained high honors from France. When the European conflict broke out, Mussolini sent him to Croatia on the police job of investigating the dreaded sympathies of some officers for the Croats.

As a good fascist, he alternated politics with business, and made good use of the first to improve the second. Owning 4 racehorses, he had them run on the Agnate Race Track and reserved for himself the office of President of the Race Track Commission.

Having left the Corps of Carabinieri, the friendly Badoglio Government appointed him Prefect of Foggia. Then, when the position of General Commander of the Corps became vacant, the fiery anti-fascists of Brindisi thought that an office of such an importance, was a "de jure" possession of the friend of Mussolini, Ciano and Franco. The trust placed in him was no disappointment. As a matter of fact, Mr. FIASCHI not only avails himself of the Corps in order to further the interests of the new monarchical fascism, but is also transferring all ex-officers of the Fascist Militia to the Corps of Carabinieri, keeping for them both seniority rights and rank. The result is that an old Carabinieri Captain who has labored to reach his rank today sees himself by-passed and in

17

conditions of inferiority before a shavetail ex-Major of the Fascist Militia who has reached his position and rank thanks to his outstanding services as a fascist stormtrooper. Until when this general with a super-Italian name will be allowed to contribute to the disorganizing and discrediting of a Military Corps of the State.

An Interview With a Marshall

Nothing stirring. It was not a question of a Marshall of Italy (there are so many of them that it would have been possible). It is a more (and better, perhaps) question of a plain, easy-going Marshall of the Royal Carabinieri.

Unwittingly, we met face to face and almost in the necessity to talk to each other. The fine non-commissioned officer began by deploring the present period of time, so sad both for his Corps and himself personally: the skyrocketing prices, the poor salaries, the family, the low morale, the ruins of the country, etc. etc. Familiar complaints. - At the time of Mussolini it was quite different a story - -? There will be many Governments in the future, but great men like Mussolini will not come back - With him we used to be everything. Now we have been reduced to nothing. These people here are trying their best, but..... - Yet, if Italy has completely gone into ruin the responsibility for it goes mostly to that great man, Mussolini..... No, it is a mistake. The traitors are responsible..... - Then the King, Badoglio and Company are responsible, are they not? The Marshall understood that he was stepping upon mined ground. Embarrassed, he remained silent and perplexed. He sought the first change he saw to disappear. Strange conversation. So, Carabinieri regret the disappearance of Mussolini and regard the people in Brindisi as traitors, at least, until the time at which they will give them back the largest powers? It is an instructing way of reasoning, or disreasoning, for those who want to understand.

One might have thought that the Carabinieri also being part of the people themselves, would have understood that their duty, their glory and the only real basis of continuity and dignity consisted in serving the nation and not in arbitrarily condemning it by order of tyrannical Governments. But, perhaps, many people will understand and see the fruit of such a way of looking at things.

EXTRACT FROM ITALIA LIBERA

7 Feb 1944

THREE BADLS FOR ONE SENTFrom Raldi to Pische

In its selection of men, the Brindisi Government demonstrates its sentiments in the execution of its vaunted program of "defascistation". If the Allies had not intervened, we would still witness the scandal of one, Filippo RALDI in the capacity as Chief of Publication. Since his incredible nomination, we denounced Mister RALDI as one of the typical exponents of political corruption. We remembered the part he played, after the assassination of MATTEOTTI, in favoring the guilty, and shady, corrupt actions of his in Paris, to fool the French Government about the intentions of Mussolini in regard to France: actions which, aided by the complicity of Ministers, financed by fascists such as De BONIS, let the French to believe that Fascist Italy would never attack them. Specific accusations and circumstances remained indefinite. As a matter of fact, these accusations served to strengthen the opinions of the Government of Brindisi toward this dignified gentleman.

It took the action of the Allied Governments - that have been supplied with evidence of the correctness of the accusations - to cause the gentlemen of the would be Government to finally make up their minds to separate, with deep regret and the usual banquet, from their dear companion of activity and faith. And so, RALDI has gone.

The one who remains is Mr. Giuseppe PISCHE, General Commander of the Royal Carabinieri. He, too, is a genuine soldier of the cause of freedom. As a matter of fact, in the Corps of Carabinieri, he was regarded as one of the most docile and faithful tools of fascism. Bound by servile friendship to Mussolini and Ciano, during the Civil War, he went to Spain as the Chief of the Counter-Intelligence Service and, as regard for his outstanding services, he obtained high honors from Franco. When the European conflict broke out, Mussolini sent him to Croatia on the police job of investigating the dreaded sympathies of some officers for the Croats.

As a good fascist, he alternated politics with business, and made good use of the first to improve the second. Owning 4 racehorses, he had them run on the Agnone Race Track and reserved for himself the office of President of the Race Track Commission.

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EXTRACT FROM ITALIA LIBERA

7 Feb 1944

FROM BALDI FOR ONE CENTFrom Baldi to Pieche

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HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
R.C. & M.G. SECTION
APO 394

11 February 1944

SUBJECT: Feeding of C.C.R.R.

TO : Col. Fiske

1. I have consulted Lt. Col. Pollock, police officer with the Fifth Army concerning the feeding of C.C.R.R. He informs me as follows:-

(a) Since 1 January all C.C.R.R. in the Regions and Apulia have subsisted on the regular Italian Army Ration.

(b) The C.C.R.R. in the 5th and 8th Army areas have been similarly fed, except for the following groups:-

(1) Any C.C.R.R. in the beachhead when we landed are subsisting like the refugees on anything they can get. There may be few, if any, C.C.R.R. in this category.

(2) Thirty C.C.R.R. working as a mobile group for Major Giffin at 10 Corps., 150 C.C.R.R. sent for 5th Army work at the beachhead in lieu of M.P.'s. and 300 C.C.R.R. to be sent to the Cassino area for work directly for the 5th Army. These groups are subsisting on Allied Army rations.

2. Lt. Col. Pollock is very strongly of the opinion that all C.C.R.R. in the Army areas should receive Allied Army rations, as they are really unable to count on receiving any other type of ration with regularity.

LEWIS H. VAN DUSEN, JR.
Major, Ord.

*When they
cannot for operational
reasons be subsisted
from 2nd Army
rations -*

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
ECONOMIC SECTION
APC 594

23/12/1944

HR/AC

5 February 1944

MEMORANDUM: Concerning Rations for Carabinieri in Sicily.

TO :

Colonel Norman Fiske, Deputy Executive Commissioner.

1. Two cables were sent from Brindisi concerning rations of Carabinieri in Sicily: No. 2050 was sent from Palermo from Fiske signed MacFarlane and was dated 21 January 1944, the other No. 2248 was sent from Palermo signed MacFarlane 2 February 1944. Copies of both cables are attached.

2. The problem of rations for the Carabinieri was carefully considered by this Headquarters at Palermo. G.O. # 5 Hq. AMG dated 13 November 1943, ordered the bread and pasta rations of the Carabinieri in Region I increased to a maximum of 200 grammes of bread and 40 grammes of pasta daily. The Carabinieri also were given an increase of pay at approximately the same time by G.O. # 14 Hq. AMG.

3. Issuance of army rations to the Carabinieri is not considered advisable because of the general policy against issuing such rations for an organization of this nature and also because of the system of issuing the Carabinieri which allows them to eat at home.

4. It is felt that the above action taken adequate provision for the Carabinieri in Sicily in view of the present level of food rations available to the general public.

Incl: 2

Cable - No. 2248, 2 Feb. 1944
Cable - No. 2050, 21 Jan. 1944

D. S. ADAMS

Colonel, D. S.

Chief Staff Officer

11

...ing ... 2 February 1944. Copies of both cables are attached.

2. The problem of rations for the Carabinieri was carefully considered by this headquarters at Rome. D.O. # 5 HQ. AMO dated 13 November 1943, ordered the bread and pasta rations of the Carabinieri in Reggio I increased to a maximum of 300 grams of bread and 40 grams of pasta daily. The Carabinieri also were given an increase of pay at approximately the same time by G.O. # 14 HQ. AMO.

3. Increase of army rations to the Carabinieri is not considered advisable because of the general policy against issuing such rations for an organization of this nature and also because of the system of issuing the Carabinieri which allows them to eat at home.

4. It is felt that the above action makes adequate provision for the Carabinieri in view of the present level of food rations available to the general public.

D. J. Adams

U. J. ADAMS
Colonel, G. E.
Chief Staff Officer

Incl- 2

Cable - No. 2245, 2 Feb. 1944
Cable - No. 2250, 21 Jan. 1944

Maintain - Glenn //
1 y Kite
1 Pollock - Remm
+ Hume -
See Doss & ...

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SECRET

RECEIVED AT

PNS SIGNAL CENTER

2 JANUARY 1944

SECRET

MOUTON

OF PNS FOR WARD, FREEDOM

HOM

PAYING BONUS, ANNUAL

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HOM

REFERENCE 1050 OF 20 JAN RPT TO FREEDOM. REGARDING DIFFICULTY
 CARADINERI IN STOLEN HAVE CREATING BATTLES ALTHOUGH INTERNAL
 PART OF ITALIAN ARMY. PLANS BEING NOT THEIR RESPONSIBILITY. CAN
 YOU ADJUST.

FOR INFO:

ATTN....AND HQ
 INFO.....AND ADV

FOR INFO:

ATTN....AND HQ(2)
 INFO....OCL SPCF AND(2)

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S-1-C-3-1-T

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RADIO

SECRET TELLING

ARRIVED AT

PAC STORM ASSAULT CENTER

21 JANUARY 1964

SECRET

ROUTINE

PLATO RTT PARD

RENN

PARTIAL FROM SIGN SIGNED ADAPLATE

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RENN

URGENT MESSAGE APPEARED REPRODUCED SAYS DIFFICULTY IN PROVISION
 OF ARMY RATIONS IN SOUTHERN ITALY. LATER IS INTERNAL PART OF ITALIAN
 ARMY. ASSUME THAT ARMY SUPPLY AUTHORITIES HAVE BEEN AUTHORIZED TO
 ISSUE RATIONS FOR 3 MONTHS BY CORN. PLEASE ADVISE.

(100)

S-S-C-S-S-T

050 C.C.R.R.
 500 Guardia di Finanza
 located in Naples from Apulia
 since before Jan 31 - came from Bari.

Basic Scale for Italian Troops
 (23 Base Supply Depot, British) (2)
 Torre Annunziata.

| Commodity | Daily Scale
in Oz. |
|-----------|-----------------------|
|-----------|-----------------------|

Whole Wheat or

16 oz

Flour or Biscuits

12

Veg. Dried

2 plus 1 of biscuits. If not
 available to be replaced
 by flour or biscuits 2 oz.

Preserved meat

1/2

or Beef Boneless

1 3/4

Herring Tinned

4/7

or Salmon Tinned

3/7

or Sardines

2/7

Lugar

1/2

Pepper

1/200

Coffee

1/2

4359

| | | |
|--------------------|---------------------|--|
| Salt | $\frac{1}{2}$ | } To be stored
under Italian
Military
Arrangements. |
| Flint Fresh | 4 | |
| Veg. Fresh | 8 | |
| Units (unobscured) | 1 | |
| Olive oil | 1 | |
| Wine | $\frac{1}{2}$ liter | |

Major Loyne - 23 B.S.D. R.S.C.

Soap

Insecticides

Cigarettes

Capt. Scott

" Rawlins

Tel. 52812 HQ. Div. of C.C.R.

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
H.Q. & H.Q. Section
APO 394

6 February 1944.

Ref/502/4/CA.

SUBJECT: Carabinieri Barracks.

TO : H.Q.A.G. Region III.
" " IV.
" " V.

1. Attached is copy of letter from H.Q. 5th Army to this H.Q.
Ref. 502.1-2.

2. It is requested that you confirm the conditions referred
to in para. 2 of the attached letter.

HUBERT H. FLECK.
Col., Cavalry,
Deputy Executive Commissioner.

B/A 19/2
✓ 1/2
9/2 4357

U S CONFIDENTIAL
EQUALE BRITISH CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY
A. P. O. #464, U. S. Army

HRH/RSB/ert
FEB 2 1944

AG 245.1-2

Subject: Carabinieri Barracks.

To : Deputy Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ Advance Administrative
Section, A. P. O. #464, U. S. Army.

1. Reference attached letter subject: CC RR, dated 22 January 1944, occupation of Carabinieri Barracks in the towns of Caserta, S. Maria, Marcianise, Maddaloni, Piedmonte, Naviolanina, Allano, Protella, Pietramelara, Pietravairano, Vairano and Caluso have been carefully investigated by this Headquarters.

2. In all instances of occupation of barracks in the above towns by U. S. Troops, it has been ascertained that in no case have the Carabinieri been displaced by such occupation, but that a small part of certain buildings are shared by U. S. Military Police.

3. Due to extremely limited facilities in the Army zone, the above occupancies are considered operationally essential. Premises will be vacated when no longer required for military purposes.

4. Copy of attached letter forwarded to Provost Marshal, Fifth Army for necessary action relative to interference with Italian troops in performance of their duties.

For the ARMY COMMANDER:

D. W. SAHRELL,
Major, A. G. D.,
Asst. Adjutant General.

1 Incl:

Incl No. 1 - Ltr. AFHQ Adv Adm Ech.
dated 22 Jan 1944, Subj: CC RR.

Ash R. P. to confirm

M/12

U S CONFIDENTIAL
EQUALE BRITISH CONFIDENTIAL

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HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
R.C. & M.G. SECTION
APO 394

ACG/302/5/CA

6 February 1944

Brigadier G. G. Duchesne
Land Forces Subcommission
Salerno

Dear Duchesne:

Since the Royal Carabinieri are part of the Italian Army and, therefore, included in the ration ceiling, an increase in their strength is, I believe, a matter for the Land Forces Subcommission - the details of which you can work out directly with Lt. Col. R. R. Cripps.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

NORMAN H. FISKE
Colonel, Cav.
Deputy Executive Commissioner

Copy: Lt. Col. R. R. Cripps

P/A

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
(Salerno Detachment),
APC 394

Administrative Staff Section.


AMM/CIA.12/AD

26 January 1944

SUBJECT : Carabinieri Recruiting.

TO : D.C.C.A.C., HQ., A.M.G., A.P.O. 394.

1. Recommend the attached draft be executed in final form, signed and despatched.
2. It will confirm program planned by Generale Alexander, McSherry and Colonel Spofford, which is actually in effect at the present time.


R. E. KRISS,
Lt. Colonel,
for the Vice Pres. Administrative Staff Section.

Encl: Draft Administrative Order.

4354

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
APO 394

..... February 1944

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER)

NUMBER ()

RECRUITING OF CARABINIERI.

1. In accordance with the verbal approval of MAJOR GENERAL LORD BENNET and BRIGADIER GENERAL MURPHY, the Commanding General, 3rd. Division Royal Carabinieri, NAPLES, (General Ernesto Pennino) is authorized to recruit and train initially, one Battalion of a strength of 500 members, U.C.R.R.

2. The recruiting of other Battalions is authorized as conditions in other parts of Italy may warrant.

3. The first Battalion will be recruited in Sicily and trained at Palermo where arrangements have been made for housing and training space in the Bersaglieri Barracks adjoining the U.C.R.R. H.Q., Palermo.

4. The Commanding General Royal Carabinieri will furnish the necessary instructors from the personnel of his present organization.

5. The Public Safety Officer, Region I will supervise the training and instruction of these new members. He will make arrangements for the acquisition of any additional space that may be required when it becomes necessary to organize and train other Battalions.

6. An indemnity of nine (9) lire per diem in addition to regular base pay and allowances is authorized for these recruits.

By Command of Lieut. General MacFARLANE:

CHARLES M. SPOTFORD
Colonel, U.S.A.,
D.C.C.A.O.

Copy to: Region II.
III, IV, V, A.C.O.

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SECRET

N 190

RAD

Col. Spofford

SECRET

TELEGRAM

RECEIVED AT

PBS SIGNAL MESSAGE CENTER

2 FEBRUARY 1944

SECRET

ROUTINE

CG PBS FOR FARGO, FREEDOM

NONE

PATINA SIGNED MACFARLANE

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NONE



REFERENCE 2050 OF 20 JAN NOT TO FREEDOM. REGARDING DIFFICULTY CARABINIERI IN SICILY HAVE IN OBTAINING RATIONS ALTHOUGH INTEGRAL PART OF ITALIAN ARMY. PLAMBO STATE NOT THEIR RESPONSIBILITY. CAN YOU ADJUST.

PBS DISTR:

ACTION....AMG HQ
INFO.....MGS ADV

ACC DISTR:

ACTION..ECON SEC(2)
INFO....COL SPOFFORD(2)

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SECRET

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Filed on 402/CA

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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Filed on 402/CA

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