

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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No.

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POST HOSTILITIES PLANNING
AUG., SEPT. 1944

809 Civil Affairs Branch

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JOINT COMMUNIQUE
AMERICAN AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS

30 SEP Recd

The President and the Prime Minister held further discussions Monday and Tuesday, September 18th and 19th at Hyde Park on subjects dealing with postwar policies in Europe. The result of these discussions cannot be disclosed at this time for strategic military reasons and pending their consideration by our other Allies. The present problems in Italy also came under discussion and on this subject the President and the Prime Minister issued the following statement: "The Italian people freed of their Fascist and Nazi overlordship have in these last twelve months demonstrated their will to be free to fight on the side of the democracies and to take a place among the United Nations devoted to principles of peace and justice. We believe we should give encouragement to those Italians who are standing for a political rebirth in Italy and are completing the destruction of the evil Fascist system. We wish to afford the Italians a greater opportunity to aid in the defeat of our common enemies. The American and the British people are of course horrified by the recent mob action in Rome but feel that a greater responsibility placed on the Italian people and on their own government will most readily prevent a recurrence of such acts. An increasing measure of control will be gradually handed over to the Italian administration subject of course to that administration's proving that it can maintain law and order and the regular administration of justice. To mark this change the Allied Control Commission will be renamed the Allied Commission. The British High Commissioner in Italy will assume the additional title of Ambassador. The United States Representative in Rome already holds that rank. The Italian Government will be invited to appoint direct representatives to Washington and London. First and immediate considerations in Italy are the relief of hunger and sickness and fear. To this end we instructed our representatives at the UNRRA conference to declare for the sending of medical aids and other essential supplies to Italy. We are happy to know that this view commended itself to other members of the UNRRA Council. At the same time first steps should be taken toward the reconstruction of an Italian economy. An economy laid low under the years of the misrule of Mussolini and ravished by the German policy of vengeful destruction. These steps should be taken primarily as military aims to put the full resources of Italy and the Italian people into the struggle to defeat Germany and Japan. For military reasons we should assist the Italians in the restoration of such power systems, their railways, motor transport roads and other communications as enter into the war situation and for a short time send engineers, technicians and industrial experts into Italy to help them in their own rehabilitation. The application to Italy of the Trading With The Enemy Acts should be modified so as to enable business contacts between Italy and the outside world to be resumed for the benefit of the Italian people. We all wish to speed the day when the last vestiges of Fascism in Italy will have been wiped out and when the last German will have left Italian soil and when there will be no need of any Allied troops to remain, the day when free elections can be held throughout Italy and when Italy can earn her proper place in the great family of free nations."

Reproduced at
Headquarters ACG
29 September 1944

R/A

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Lt Col Shipman

JFK

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Ref: 609/7/CA.
A/CG 091.711

4th September 1944

SUBJECT: Post Hostilities Planning.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
Attn: G-5 Section.

3

1. Further to my letter A/CG 091.711 of August 31st, I attach herewith comments by the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Station, in reply to the questions raised by the Post Hostilities Planning staff. I would also add that Major-General Browning, G.O.C., Army Sub-Commission, has stated that he is in agreement with the drafted replies forwarded with my above-quoted letter.

2. Would you please arrange for this further information to be forwarded to Lieut. Colonel Geddes.

ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

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Hq ACC - Sec'y Gen.
DISPATCHED
Date-Time 6 Sep 44 1815
Via 144
Initials MPR

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POST HOSTILITIES PLANNING - ITALY

(Executive Commissioner R.C.M.C. Section A.C. letter of
29th August 1944).

Confidential 6

II

No. L. 341/1.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, MEDITERRANEAN STATION.
(Copy to: Flag Officer Taranto, Adriatic
and Liaison, Italy).

In view of urgency of reply am sending enclosed direct by
car for your comments etc.

2. I have informed the Executive Commissioner that his comments
are all that can be given at the present time and that I have referred
the matter to you.

ROME.
30th August 1944.

(Sgd) ? Palmer.
For Rear Admiral.

III

Med. 00700/1
THE FLAG OFFICER,
TARANTO, ADRIATIC & LIAISON
ITALY (ROME).

2283

The Commander-in-Chief's comments have been added and correspondence
is returned to you.

Mediterranean.
31st August 1944.

(Sgd) E. R. LAING.
For ADMIRAL.

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Question.	Reply.	Comments.	by
6			
1. It would be of great assistance to P.H.P. if you could discover, from the Control Commission, what plans (if any) they have in mind for the disarming and demobilization of the Italian Forces (including Naval and Air) some of which we understand are under Allied control, while others are under Italian control. We would appreciate the latest figures of this with breakdown, showing Carabinieri Territoriale and Guardia Finanza, separately.	No plans have been made and while all the Italian armed forces are fighting with the Allied Forces it would seem premature to make them. It is certainly impossible to make them until the policy of the Allied Nations regarding the disarmament of co-belligerents is known.	None, Cunningham and the post turned over	All
2. What plans, if any, have been formulated for restricting the construction of Italian merchant ships or warships?	No plans have been made.	None, are under	
3. We shall have to consider the restrictions to be imposed on Italian coastal and frontier defences. It is understood from C.A.7 that the Germans either destroyed the coastal defences or removed the guns, etc. Is this correct? If not, have essential parts of guns been removed by the Control Commission? Have the Control Commission any plan for dealing with any frontier fortifications which the Germans may not be able to destroy, eg, those seized by Italian patriots?	Such defences as were not destroyed by the Germans are now manned by Italians as co-belligerents in aid of the Allies. It is not the Control Commission's responsibility to deal with Frontier fortifications.	In fact the Italian the apparatus	
4. Politically there are obvious difficulties in disarming Italians after making use of their forces, and even equipping them, but do the Control Commission foresee any practical difficulties in carrying this out?	Not only will many of Italian forces be necessary for internal security and frontier defence and quite apart from the volte-face which disarmament and disbandment would be, there are many practical difficulties in carrying out it out. The very suggestion would create a political crisis of the highest order.	Conce	

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Reply.

Comments.

by Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

assistance to P.H.P. if
the Control Commission,
have in mind for the dis-
armament of the Italian Forces
some of which we under-
stand, while others are
would appreciate the
breakdown, showing
Guardia Finanzia,

No plans have been made and while all
the Italian armed forces are fighting
with the Allied Forces it would seem
premature to make them. It is
certainly impossible to make them
until the policy of the Allied Nations
regarding the disarmament of co-
belligerents is known.

None, beyond the terms of the Armistice,
Cunningham - De Courten agreement, CCS 515/1
and the possibility of certain ships being
turned over to the Russians.

All naval forces are under allied control.

have been formulated
action of Italian

No plans have been made.

None, except that at present the Forces
are under Allied control.

under the restrictions.
coastal and frontier
from C.A.7 that the
the coastal defences or
this correct?
parts of guns been
disarm? Have the
for dealing with any
which the Germans may not
be seized by Italian

Such defences as were not destroyed
by the Germans are now manned by
Italians as co-belligerents in aid of
the Allies. It is not the Control
Commission's responsibility to deal
with Frontier fortifications.

In fact we have added to the defences
the Italians now man A/S stations etc. although
the apparatus remains our property.

obvious difficulties
making use of their
them, but do the Control
political difficulties in

Not only will many of Italian forces be
necessary for internal security and
frontier defence and quite apart from
the volte-face which disarmament and
disbandment would be, there are many
practical difficulties in carrying out
it out. The very suggestion would
create a political crisis of the highest
order.

Concur Executive Commissioner.

Question.

Reply.

Comments.

5. Temporarily, at any rate, the United Nations must be responsible for the administration and internal security of the disputed frontier areas, but, ultimately, when the frontiers have been decided on the Italians will have to undertake this task. If they are to do this some skeleton organization will have to be left in addition to the Carabinieri, etc., Have the Control Commission any ideas on this subject?

The present ceiling of the Carabinieri is 55,000. This should be raised as soon as possible to 65,000 (representations have already been made). It is impossible to give a reasonable estimate of the strength of the internal security forces until the political and administrative picture in the North is known.

Concur Ex

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Reply.

Comments.

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city of the disputed
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on to the Carabinieri,
ommission any ideas

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tions have already been made). It is
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trative picture in the North is known.

Concur Executive Commissioner.

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Ref: A/OC 091.711.

1st August 1944

SUBJECT: Post Hostilities Planning.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
Attn: G-5 Section.

1. Lieut. Colonel A.C. GEDDES from the War Office gave the attached questionnaire to the Executive Commissioner on 29th August and asked for reply by 1st September.

2. The questions raise such important matters of principle that it is impossible adequately to reply. I have, however, made replies and pass them to you in case you wish to add comment or reject them.

3. Will you ensure that Lieut. Colonel Geddes receives the papers by noon, 1st September, c/o H.A. to S.A.O.

WILLIAM W. STONE
Captain, USPH
Acting Chief Commissioner

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 Question: It would be great assistance to P.H.P. if we could discover from the Control Commission what plans (if any) they have in mind for the disarming and demobilisation of the Italian Forces (including Naval and Air) some of which we understand are under Allied control, while others are under Italian control. We would appreciate the latest figures of this with breakdown showing Carabinieri Territoriale and Guardia Finanza separately.

Answer: No plans have been made and while all the Italian armed forces are fighting with the Allied Forces it would seem premature to make them. It is certainly impossible to make them until the policy of the Allied Nations regarding the disarmament of co-belligerents is known.

Question: What plans, if any, have been formulated for restricting the construction of Italian merchant's ship or warships?

Answer: No plans have been made.

Question: We shall have to consider the restrictions to be imposed on Italian coastal and frontier defences. It is understood from C.A.7 that the Germans either destroyed the coastal defences or removed the guns, etc. Is this correct? If not, have essential parts of guns been removed by the Control Commission? Have the Control Commission any plan for dealing with any frontier fortifications which the Germans may not be able to destroy, e.g., those seized by Italian patriots?

Answer: Such defences as were not destroyed by the Germans are now manned by Italians as co-belligerents in aid of the Allies. It is not the Control Commission's responsibility to deal with frontier fortifications.

Question: Politically, there are obvious difficulties in disarming Italians after making use of their forces, and even equipping them, but do the Control Commission foresee any practical difficulties in carrying this out?

Answer: Yes.

Question: Temporarily, at any rate, the United Nations must be responsible for the administration and internal security of the disputed frontier areas, but, ultimately, when the frontiers have been decided on the Italians will have to undertake this task. If they are to do this some skeleton organisation will have to be left in addition to the Carabinieri, etc. Have the Control Commission any ideas on this subject?

Answer: It is impossible to give a reasonable estimate of the strength of the internal security forces until the political and administrative picture in the North is known. The present ceiling of the Carabinieri is 55,000. This should be raised as soon as possible to 65,000 (representations have already been made).

(HHP.9) 1. It would be of great assistance to P.H.P. if you could discover, from the Control Commission, what plans (if any) they have in mind for the disarming and demobilisation of the Italian Forces (including Navy and Air) some of which we understand are under Allied control, while others are under Italian control. We would appreciate the latest figures of this with breakdown, showing Carabinieri Territoriali and Guardia Finanza, separately.

(HHP.9A) 2. What plans, if any, have been formulated for restricting the construction of Italian merchant ships or warships?

(HHP.10) 3. We shall have to consider the restrictions to be imposed on Italian coastal and Frontier defences. It is understood, from C.A.7, that the Germans either destroyed the coastal defences or removed the guns etc. Is this correct?

If not, have essential parts of guns been removed by the Control Commission? Have the Control Commission any plan for dealing with any frontier fortifications which the Germans may not be able to destroy, e.g. those seized by Italian patriots?

(HHP.11) 4. Politically, there are obvious difficulties in disarming Italians after making use of their forces, and even equipping them, but do the Control Commission foresee any practical difficulties in carrying this out?

(HHP.12) 5. Temporarily, at any rate, the United Nations must be responsible for the administration and internal security of the disputed frontier areas, but, ultimately, when the frontiers have been decided on the Italians will have to undertake this task. If they are to do this some skeleton organisation will have to be left in addition to the Carabinieri, etc., Have the Control Commission any ideas on this subject?

Redtype this page with answers attached

Chief Clerk Webb & Lake

1 copy to G.6.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

11/81 AC Geddes

... e/o H.A. K. Sacmed.

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