

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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10000/109/1905

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PATRIOTS, ROUTINE
JUNE - AUG. 1944

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
R.C. & M.G. SECTION
PATRIOTS BRANCH
APO 394

Ref/51/ /PAT.

30 August 1944.

SUBJECT : Reports by Patriot Representatives.

30 AUG 1944

TO : A.M.C. 5 & 8 Armies,
R.C. Regions 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11 & 12.

1. The development of the organization set up for handling the Patriot problem has reached a stage at which it is imperative that information concerning patriots should flow back regularly to H.Q. A.C.C. This information is required for use by the Propaganda division of the Patriots Branch in order to make it possible :-

- (a) to encourage patriots North of the Line.
 - (b) to convince public opinion in liberated Italy that the patriots are receiving a fair deal.
2. Apart from the teams of officers provided by forward regions and charged with the task of producing on a regional basis intelligence which each Region specifically requires, there are two sources of information which must forthwith be made to flow back smoothly and regularly to A.C.C. :-

- (a) Regional H.Q. are asked to ensure that the patriot representatives at every Provincial H.Q. report regularly and fully once a week, through the Regional Officer charged with handling patriot problems, to the Patriots Branch, A.C.C.
- (b) The Regional Officer referred to above is asked to ensure that all Regional, Provincial and C.A. Officers forward to him for onward transmission to A.C.C. all intelligence concerning patriots, and all stories which might be of use for propaganda purposes, which they encounter in the course of their duties.

3. For the guidance of Regional patriot officers, information is required, inter alia, about the following matters:-

2375

Patriot recruits for the Italian Army.
Patriots desiring to return to their homes.
Collecting of Arms.
Certificates issued.
Political tendencies among the patriots.
Courageous acts of patriots.
Compensation and rewards to patriots.
Records of service of groups and bands.
Re-employment of patriots.
Parades and ceremonies in which patriots are concerned.

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 Parades and ceremonies in which patriots are concerned.

PA/BMS

Copy to: C.A. Branch. AH Ed. Shrin.

P.B.

Could not much of the go through

Italian Channel. Do not take on too much

MS/LIS

Major,
 Sir P.M. Magnus,
 for Col. C.D. Mc Carthy,
 Patriots Branch, A.C.C.

785017

TO: Lt.Col.Shipp.

26 Aug 44

30

Rep

Patriots.

1. ¹² At ~~75~~ is a note by Patriots Branch on their current problems. ✓
I like (B) 1 and (C) 1 and 2.
2. ²³ At ~~76~~ is Col. McCarthy's speech at R.C.'s Meeting. ✓
3. ²⁴⁻²⁶ At ~~77~~ - ~~79~~ are some notes on Patriot activities - interesting but ✓
academic. ¹⁷⁻¹⁸
4. ²⁹ At ~~80~~ - ~~82~~ is a slightly muddling "history" of the Patriots Bands -
interesting but academic. ✓
5. ²⁹ At ~~83~~ is a covering letter from Patriots Branch. ✓
6. ^{20ad} I suggest you should ~~send~~ the lot (except 76) but Exec. Commissioner
need really only see ~~76~~
²⁷

EL
E. TALBOT.
Major.

31st August, 1944

To: Executive Commissioner

1. ⁷² ~~Z~~ makes good sense but I am a little perturbed at seeing the *Propaganda*
various Sections into which the Patriot Branch has been organised. ^{2, 27, 28}
should not have thought that it was necessary to organise a ~~Propaganda~~ Section
or an Intelligence Section within a Branch of this HQ but rather that the
Propaganda ~~Intelligence~~ and Intelligence work required should be done by the corresponding
Branches of A.C.C. HQ.

2. I will talk to Col. McCarthy about this, but Major Talbot tells
me that he is hoping to have most of the work done by CACS with Armies
and Regions quite soon, so possibly the impression I have received of an
unnecessary complicated work being set up may be erroneous. ^{IV}

III
I think Wicks might have the fax.

W/45

EL
G. W. I. SHIPP
Lt. Colonel
Big Main, Wading, will be asked to send
Splice Col
McCarthy, who is
arranging. 8/19

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HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
R.C. & M.G. SECTION
PATRIOTS BRANCH
APO 394

Ref/64/43/PAT.

SUBJECT: Patriots.

TO : Distribution as Below.

24 August 1944.
22-28 2 AUG Recd

1. I enclose for your general information, copies as listed under distribution, of the following papers which may be of interest to your staff and I shall be particularly grateful if you will arrange that your Patriot Representatives are able to see these papers:

The Patriot Movement in Italy. This paper will be of considerable interest to many. The main object of its production is to enable everyone to realise what the Patriot Movement has achieved so far. It does also explain exactly how patriot units and gaps are organised which is so important when disarming has to be considered.

Speech of 22 August 1944. This will be of interest to those who want to know of the constitutions and scope of the Patriots Branch. The speech was delivered at the Acting Chief Commissioner's meeting in Rome on 22 August 1944.

Current Problems. I am circulating this note so that you may see what we are working on at present. If you have any comments I shall be grateful if you will let me have them.

2. Danger Points in German Occupied Territory.

Notes on particular places e.g. power stations, the PO River, and notes on the composition of bands in German occupied territory are being distributed to those concerned. I mention this here so that if anyone should for any particular reason require such information, it may be possible to find it with A.M.G. of Armies. If you do not find it there please ask this Branch and if it can be obtained it will be sent to you.

C.D. Mc Carthy

C.D. MC CARTHY,
Colonel,
Patriots Branch,
A.M.G. Section

2377

785017

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2373

C.D. Mc Carthy

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Colonel,
Patriots Branch,
R.C. & M.G. Section.

CIN/PBS.

COPIES TO:

Brigadier Lush
Brigadier Marwaring
Admin Section
Economic Section
Political Section
P.W.B.
P.R.O.
Information Div
M.H.I.A.
Air Forces S/C
Navy S/C
Security Br.

DISTRIBUTION:

A.M.G. 5 Army	(5)	R.C. Region 6	(1)
A.M.G. 8 Army	(5)	R.C. Region 7	(1)
R.C. Region 1	(1)	R.C. Region 8	(9)
R.C. Region 2	(1)	R.C. Region 9	(8)
R.C. Region 3	(1)	R.C. Region 10	(7)
R.C. Region 4	(1)	R.C. Region 11	(9)
R.C. Region 5	(6)	R.C. Region 12	(8)
		No. 1 Special Force	(2)

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HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
R.C. & M.G. SECTION
PATRIOTS BRANCH
APO 394

PATRIOT BANDS IN CENTRAL ITALY

(This report concerns only the liberated areas of Regions 4, 5 and 8.)

1. ORIGIN OF THE BANDS.

The Patriot Movement does not represent something completely new in Italian life; it can be considered a new and wider development of the struggle carried out during the last twenty years by several underground organizations against the Fascist regime. The activities of these underground organizations had a direct influence in creating the conditions which made possible the coup-d'etat of July 25, 1943.

After the coup-d'etat, leaders and members of the underground organizations came out into the open. With the re-establishment of the Fascist regime (25 Sept. 1943), it became imperative for anti-fascists in enemy occupied territory, to go into hiding. The same was done by many other people who had not taken part in the anti-fascist activities before July 25th; and who after that date had shown sympathy for the new regime and for the Allied cause.

As a result of the armistice, most of the Italian Army disbanded. Officers and soldiers went home or tried to reach home, hoping that the Allies would soon arrive. When the new Fascist Government was re-established and it became evident that the enemy was going to occupy parts of the country for a certain while, officers and soldiers who did not want to join the new Fascist Army or were afraid of being sent to Germany to work, went into hiding.

Among the hundreds of thousands who went into hiding during the months of September and October 1943, there was a minority willing to engage in anti-fascist and all anti-German activities. In the towns the old anti-fascist organizations absorbed many of the people willing to act against the enemy. New groups were formed mainly by former officers in the Italian Armed Forces. In the rural districts a separation was soon established between members of bands and those who were simply waiting for the arrival of the Allies. Also in the rural districts, members of the former anti-fascist organizations succeeded in establishing some kind of authority over the bands, except for those bands which were formed by officers and men of the disbanded Italian Army.

2. DEVELOPMENT OF BANDS.

Fairly large bands were already in existence at the end of September. They could be found chiefly in the mountainous regions. There were bands in the Maiella and the Gran Sasso. A cluster of bands could be found all along

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2. DEVELOPMENT OF BANDS.

Fairly large bands were already in existence at the end of September. They could be found chiefly in the mountainous regions. There were bands in the Maiella and the Gran Sasso. A cluster of bands could be found all along the VIA SALARIA from RIMI to ASCOLI and for a depth of about 30 to 40 miles north of this road. Other bands were formed in the Upper Tiber Valley and surrounding districts. Bands could be found in the sparsely inhabited area of MAREMA, from PESCINA to CIVITA' VECCHIA. Large concentrations of bands were formed in the mountains north and east of the Arno Valley. Small groups which in some cases developed into large bands existed in the mountains between Lazio and Abruzzi, and in the hilly districts of southern Lazio (Castelli Romani, Monti Lepini). It is possible that the average strength of genuine bands in rural areas of Regions 4, 5 and 8 has varied from 8,000 to 12,000 true patriots.

It soon became customary for the bands in the rural districts to have some kind of military organisation, and they called themselves Battalions or Brigades. Battalions were bands with a strength of around 100 men. Brigades were usually bands or groups of bands with a strength which varied from about 250 men to a maximum of 800 men. Most Brigades had around 350 men.

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- 2 -

In the towns, the leaders of the anti-fascist organisations who had some experience of underground work, organised Gruppi d'Azione Patriottica (G.A.P.), small squads usually containing from five to twelve men. In the city of Rome there were both bands which usually had been organised by officers of the Italian Army and "gangs". It is possible that in the city of Rome there have been as many as 7,000 to 8,000 true patriots.

3. CENTRAL CONTROL.

While bands and gangs were being organised spontaneously in every section of Central Italy, efforts were being made to coordinate their activities and to bring them under some kind of unified control.

Before the coup-d'etat of 25 July 1943 an agreement had been reached between the six main anti-fascist political parties, and in most provincial capitals clandestine committees were formed by representatives of the six parties. After a while all the clandestine committees adopted the name of Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale (C.L.N.).

In Central Italy the Rome C.L.N. soon acquired special importance. It established a Giunta Militare, also composed of representatives of the six parties. After the armistice, the Rome Giunta Militare tried to establish contact with the provincial C.L.N.'s. in Central Italy and with the bands, but on the whole the real influence of the Rome Giunta Militare on the bands outside the cities' area was negligible. The fact remained however, that most bands considered themselves subordinated to the provincial C.L.N.'s, and through them to the Giunta Militare.

Soon after the armistice, anti-German officers of the Italian Army organised in Rome, the Military Clandestine Front. An offshoot of this organisation was the Comando Bande, divided into two sections: Bande Interne and Bande Esterne. The C.B.I. was supposed to control bands inside Rome and to it were connected several military bands formed by loyal officers and men of disbanded units of the Italian Army. The C.B.E. was supposed to contact the Patriot Bands outside Rome. Only at a late stage was the C.B.E. able to establish contact with a certain number of bands in Central Italy, but, as in the case of the G.M., contact did not mean control.

Dissident political groups tried to establish their own unified Patriot Command. Their efforts had negligible results.

A number of bands had been organised spontaneously chiefly in the mountainous areas of Central Italy. Not less than two important central organisations and several smaller ones had been established in Rome, but there was little relationship between the former and the latter.

More successful were local attempts at creating cooperation between different bands. In several instances small bands got together and formed Brigades. In this way came into existence the Spartaco Brigades in Macerata Province and in Siena Province, the Garibaldi Brigades of Foligno, of the

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Brigades also tried to get together. There was a time for instance when several Brigades in the provinces of Macerata and Perugia were working together. Later on various Brigades in the Marche Region established cooperation and formed a Garibaldi Division. Another Division came into existence in the Arno valley. In the provinces of Siena and Grosseto, officers of the Italian armed forces brought together several bands and formed a Raggruppamento which was in contact with the C.B.E. Other Raggruppamenti were formed in northern Lazio, southern Lazio and in the area east of Lazio.

4. ARMAMENT - FOOD AND CLOTHING - POLITICS.

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ARMY - FOOD AND CLOTHING - POLITICS

The majority of the Patriots who went to the hills or the mountains of Central Italy in September and October 1943, had little or no arms. A band of more than 200 patriots on the Gran Sasso had more than 40% casualties when attacked by the Germans because of a deficiency in weapons and ammunition. The situation improved before the end of Autumn 1943, thanks to the attacks made against barracks of the Fascist Militia and the Carabinieri and thanks also to the raids on dumps of either the Italian or the German Armies. In certain districts arms were supplied by the Allies.

The food situation for the patriots in Central Italy was altogether satisfactory. Peasants gave generously. More food was obtained by the patriots by raiding the depots organised either by Italian or German authorities. Even in the city of Rome food was obtainable for the patriots. A large organisation sprang into being for the transport of foodstuffs from the countryside to the city.

A severe winter helped in creating a serious situation as far as clothing was concerned. Shoes also were practically unobtainable.

Politics have been an important element in the life of the patriots in Central Italy. The rank and file can be considered anti-German and anti-Fascist. In each band have usually been present a few patriots with rather determined political views who tried to acquire a following in the bands.

Until the end of April a sharp distinction existed between "badogliani" and "anti-badogliani". The former were supporters of Marshall Badoglio and of the Crown. The latter were in favour of the overthrow of the Monarchy. In this second group the most active elements were the Democrats (Action Party) and the Communists. The solution of the political crisis of April 1944 improved the relations between "badogliani" and "anti-badogliani". On the other hand the cleavage between Democrats and Communists increased.

There is little doubt that the Communists have found a more favourable ground for their propaganda among patriots than either the Monarchists (mostly regular Army officers) or the action party Democrats. On the other hand it appears that in most patriot bands the Communists were a minority and that their success in establishing their leadership was mostly due to better organisation and greater spirit of initiative.

5. ALLIED SUPPORT.

It is known that soon after the armistice of September 8, 1943, contacts were established between the Allied Armies in Italy and several bands in Central Italy. The bands received arms, ammunition, and funds. Directives were given to them concerning operations to be carried out.

An important element in the relationships between the bands and the Allied was represented by the propaganda coming from Allied radio stations. The Patriots were encouraged to carry out acts of sabotage against the enemy. Certain broadcasts could be interpreted by the patriots in such a way that they

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An important element in the relationships between the bands and the Allied was represented by the propaganda coming from Allied radio stations. The Patriots were encouraged to carry out acts of sabotage against the enemy. Certain broadcasts could be interpreted by the patriots in such a way that they expected their work to be recognised and rewarded when the areas in which they operated were liberated.

It was something of a shock for many patriots to find, on their first contacts with Allied troops or with A.M.C. representatives, that the Allied officers with whom they came in touch knew little or nothing of patriot activities and had little or no idea of what Allied propaganda had said and promised.

/6. ACTIVITIES

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- 4 -

6. ACTIVITIES AGAINST THE ENEMY.

In the appendix are listed a series of examples of what bands and "gangs" did in Central Italy during the period of enemy occupation. It is impossible yet to give a complete record of patriot activities in Central Italy and it will be some time before all facts are collected and verified. It is impossible yet to say how many Germans and Fascists have been killed by the patriots, or how many trucks or railway were destroyed. By summing up what the bands did in various areas, the total is far from negligible.

Patriot activities in Central Italy can be summarised as follows:

- (a) Killing of Fascists and of Germans.
- (b) Sabotage against means of communications.
- (c) Attacks in the outlying districts against small groups of Fascists, of Carabineers and of Germans.
- (d) Raids on food and petrol dumps.
- (e) Supplying information valuable to the Allied war effort.

A German map shows the areas in which it was not advisable for Germans to travel unless they were in fairly large numbers. It is an indication of the seriousness of the problem created by the patriots to the enemy troops. It appears that the Germans usually believed the patriots to be more numerous, better organised and better armed than they really were.

Considerable hardships were endured by the patriots during the months of enemy occupation. Their losses at times have been fairly high. The number of people shot by the Germans in Rome alone is probably between 1000 and 1500. Everywhere in Central Italy bands suffered losses. One Garibaldi Brigade in Umbria is reported to have had about 60 patriots killed, out of a total strength of less than 500. A group of bands in the Province of Frosinone suffered the loss of 43 patriots killed. A Spartaco Brigade in Siena Province is reported to have suffered 75 casualties out of a strength of less than 600 men. An Army band lost in one engagement 18 killed at Capranica. In another engagement at Colle Croce a C.L.N. band lost 25 patriots killed while 7 more were killed in minor skirmishes, the enemy suffering 22 casualties. In one day at Montemarcio the patriots lost 16 killed.

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22 August 1944.

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APPENDIX

Patriot Activities in Central Italy.

There follow now a few examples of what the patriots did in Central Italy. The list is by no means comprehensive but from the few examples given an idea can be gained of the kind of acts the patriots were performing throughout the whole of Central Italy.

R O M E =

12th Sept. '43 - During the curfew hours, in the Prenestina zone isolated Germans were attacked by an Action Party Squad of Tor Sapienza armed with revolvers and 5 Germans were killed. In reprisal the Germans shot 10 Italians.

Sept. '43 - The leader of the "Filippo" band established in Rome a W/T clandestine information service in favour of the Allied Force. On Sept. 15th 1943 a wireless transmitter was carried from the Contrada la Storta to Rome by FILIPPO and other helpers on a small cart laden with vegetables in order to elude the strict control of the Nazi-fascists on all road approaches to Rome.

Sept. 20-22nd '43 - Acts of sabotage were carried out by the "Garibaldino" Group at the Garage "Stella d'Italia", Via Pompeo Magno which was being used as a repair shop. 30 Jeeps (North-African booty) were rendered unusable by breaking of axles and destroying of parts and tyres.

The electrical and telephone installations were damaged by the Patriots of the group "Garibaldino".

Early Sept. '43 - Two fascists were wounded in a skirmish against fascists at APPINO. An attack was made against Germans and paratroopers in vicinity of MONTE MARIO. Two Germans and one paratrooper were killed. (Group "Garibaldino").

28th Oct. '43 - Squads of the Action Party attacked a militia garrison (Piazza Ungheria) at night and wounded some militiamen.

6th Nov. '43 - At night at Via Regina Elena a squad of the Action Party, with an explosive grenade, sabotaged a German garage. One person was killed. Three vehicles and a consi-

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12th Sept. '43 - During the curfew hours, in the Prenestina zone isolated Germans were attacked by an Action Party Squad of Tor Sapienza armed with revolvers and 5 Germans were killed. In reprisal the Germans shot 10 Italians.

Sept. '43 - The leader of the "Filippo" band established in Rome a W/T clandestine information service in favour of the Allied Force. On Sept. 15th 1943 a wireless transmitter was carried from the Contrada la Storta to Rome by FILIPPO and other helpers on a small cart laden with vegetables in order to elude the strict control of the Nazi-fascists on all road approaches to Rome.

Sept. 20-22nd '43 - Acts of sabotage were carried out by the "Garibaldino" Group at the Garage "Stella d'Italia", Via Pompeo Magno which was being used as a repair shop. 30 Jeeps (North-African booty) were rendered unusable by breaking of axles and destroying of parts and tyres.

The electrical and telephone installations were damaged by the Patriots of the Group "Garibaldino".

Early Sept. '43 - Two fascists were wounded in a skirmish against fascists at ARPINO. An attack was made against Germans and paratroopers in vicinity of MONTE MARIO. Two Germans and one paratrooper were killed. (Group "Garibaldino").

28th Oct. '43 - Squads of the Action Party attacked a militia garrison (Piazza Ungheria) at night and wounded some militiamen.

6th Nov. '43 - At night at Via Regina Elena a squad of the Action Party, with an explosive grenade, sabotaged a German garage. One person was killed. Three vehicles and a considerable amount of material were damaged.

12th Nov. '43 - A mixed group of Action Party and Communist Party men, at night, detached a wagon from a German train loaded with ammunition and incendiary bombs at the Prenestina Station. Part of the material was destroyed.

- 2 -

C O M P I D E N T I A L

27th Nov. '43 - A squad of the Action Party at the Prenestina Station at night attacked a train loaded with ammunition and fuel. Five wagons with their loads were destroyed.

28th Nov. '43 - G.A.P. of the Communist Party executed at 2030 hours in Via Magella a fascist consul called MUSSO (sic) killing him with revolver shots.

2th Dec. '43 - G.A.P. of the Communist Party killed a German of the S.S. with revolver shots at Via Regina Elena, at 1750 hours.

19th Dec. '43 - G.A.P. of the Communist Party attacked Hotel Flora, a German H.Q., with grenades. This occurred at 1805 hours. 14 Nazi-fascists were killed and 2 trucks were damaged.

16th Jan. '44 - G.A.P. of the Communist Party sabotaged a German garage with a bomb at Via San Nicolò da Tolentino at 1750 hours. 5 German trucks were damaged.

January '44 - Sabotage squads were formed by the "Filippo" band. They scattered thousands of nails on the Cassia and Flaminia highways.

23rd Jan. '44 - G.A.P. of the Communist Party attacked, with a bomb, German troops at the Railway Station in Piazza del Cinquecento at 1800 hours. 4 Germans were killed and 19 wounded.

23rd March '44 - G.A.P. of the Communist Party attacked a German Company with hand grenades at Via Rasella at 1500 hours. 32 Nazis were killed and 71 wounded.

June '44 - Members of the Filippo band, in a Company of 80 strong, occupied FORTE MONTE MARIO, at the time of the Allied entry into Rome. They captured 25 German soldiers, a tank and various arms and ammunition. Another band occupied the Military Hospital Baldo and saved all medical equipment, uniforms and provisions left behind by the Germans.

Sept. '43 - June '44 - From the very first days of Nazi occupation of Italy, the Action Party was very active in the production of false identity documents and their distribution to Partisans in the whole of Italy. False documents in circulation included the following:

1. Papers stating unfitness for military service;
2. Papers stating membership of the Fascist Republican Forces;
3. Papers stating absence from labour service of the Isottero-rato Fascista Repubblicano;

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June '44 - Members of the Filippo band, in a Company of 30 strong, occupied FORTE MONTE MARIO, at the time of the Allied entry into Rome. They captured 25 German soldiers, a tank and various arms and ammunition. Another band occupied the Military Hospital Baldo and saved all medical equipment, uniforms and provisions left behind by the Germans.

Sept. '43 - June '44 - From the very first days of Nazi occupation of Italy, the Action Party was very active in the production of false identity documents and their distribution to Patriots in the whole of Italy. False documents in circulation included the following:

1. Papers stating unfitness for military service;
2. Papers stating membership of the Fascist Republican Forces;
3. Papers stating absence from labour service of the Ispettorato Fascista Repubblicano;
4. Ausweis of the Todi organisation;
5. By falsifying the orders of the German High Command and Embassy the Action Party was able to sequester vehicles and food supplies which, with false permits, were sent through German control points to Patriots in the hills.

LTA Z I O (not including Rome).

On September 18, 1943 the Sardinian band (Italian Army) engaged the enemy near Capronia, inflicting about 50 casualties. Eighteen Patriots were killed.

In October 1943, Patriots of the bands near TURRITA TIBERINA made two successful attacks against trains carrying ammunition and petrol. Three attacks were made against the railway bridge on the GALATINA river.

6th. Dec. '43 - A C.I.N. band using a machine gun, and sabotaging the road with a mine and nails killed 2 German officers, wounded another and destroyed a vehicle on the Via Appia.

20 Dec. '43 - Two actions were engaged in on the principal railway lines of Rome-Cassino and Rome-Fornia by a C.I.N. band. Two trains were blown up - one carrying troops and one loaded with war material and fuel. On the Rome-Fornia line there were 400 dead and many wounded. On the Rome-Cassino line the goods vans loaded with war material and fuel were completely destroyed together with 2 engines. The German personnel on the train were all killed.

At the end of January, the Patriot band at TURRITA TIBERINA, in order to help the Allied landing at Anzio, mined several roads near the Tiber river.

Also at the end of January, the bands of GENZANO attacked small units in the Geron rear in an effort to help the Allied troops at Anzio. They met with strong resistance and suffered severe casualties.

In March '44 a Fascist who had denounced an escaped Allied P.O.W. was killed at Monte Celio by members of the Partisan Brigade. Members of the same Brigade sabotaged effectively German telephone lines at SITTICAMINI, MONTE CELIO, GUIDONIA, PONTE LUCAO, MONTE LIBRETTI.

Several bands in GIOCIARIA (Prov. of FROSINONE) were active in cutting wires and putting nails on roads during the period October 1943 - May 1944. In the period of the enemy withdrawal, they engaged effectively small German units, which lost 43 killed and 179 prisoners. The bands lost ten Patriots killed.

2375

railway bridge on the GALATINA river.

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19th May '44 - At Rustica Vecchia a band connected with the C.E.F. threw hand grenades at a truck. 6 Germans were killed and truck immobilized.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

MARCH -

G.A.P. of PERMO in Sept. '43 obtained by force from the Fascists 25 rifles, 3 Breda machine guns, 2 cases of hand grenades and 13 cases of ammunition.

Oct. '43 - The C.L.N. group of MONTE NERO - CINCOLI fought a Nazi-fascist force. They killed 1 German, captured 3 and also a vehicle.

Nov. Dec. '43 - The Nicolò di Monteceto Group had a clash with Nazi-fascists at S. GINESIO. Eight of the enemy were killed. The Patriots lost one killed.

March '44 - The a/m group began a cleaning up operation against the Nazi-fascists. In heavy fighting the enemy lost several killed and wounded. The Patriots had 2 killed and several wounded.

Nazi-fascist reaction to the activities of the C.L.N. bands in the province of ASSOLI during the early months of '44 was very strong. They employed strong forces against the patriots and on the 18th March '44 16 Patriots were killed at MONTERO-NACO in severe fighting.

In April '44 a C.L.N. band captured and shot near MONTERO-NACO a German Captain of the Intelligence Service who had worked his way into the band as well as four other spies captured in the RIVITOLLO-MONTEONACO area.

May '44 - The AVINALE di CINCOLI group attacked a Fascist H.Q. at SARNANO. The town was finally captured by the Patriots. The Patriots had 2 men killed.

On May 18: 1944, a force of about 300 Italian S.S. attacked the Patriots in the area of MONASTRO. The enemy was reported to have left behind nearly 40 dead and wounded.

In June '44 C.L.N. bands attacked the enemy in retreat. There was fighting along the ASSOLI-AMANDOLA-MACERATA road - in the areas at MONTE GALLO = ARQUATA = ACQUASANTA = CASSIGNANO = OFFIDA. These attacks delayed the enemy's movements and allowed the patriots to retrieve a large quantity of cattle. In the hills the Germans were prevented from looting and requisitioning.

On June 13th '44 a G.A.P. attacked a group of Republican Guards who had halted in the middle of the square at PERMO. They killed one officer and wounded 3 others. The G.A.P.

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U M B R I A - S A B I N A =

In October 1944 the Giuseppe Garibaldi Brigade located near Foligno attacked enemy transport. Fifteen Germans and Fascists were reported killed.

CONFIDENTIAL

In order to obtain arms, ammunition and food, the Garibaldi, Gramsci and Spartaco Lavagnini Brigades attacked barracks of the Fascist Militia and of the Carabinieri at Camerino, at Nocera Umbra (when two Carabinieri were killed), at Campello (where two agents of the Fascist Police were killed), at Matigge di Trevi.

Two Fascists were killed by members of the Spartaco Brigade on January 24.

In November 1943, members of the Spartaco Brigade took 800 quintals of wheat and distributed it to the population. In March, members of the Garibaldi Brigade took 200 quintals of wheat from the Germans.

Severe mopping-up operations were undertaken by the Germans at the end of November 1943 and in March 1944. In the course of an engagement at Colle Croce, 25 Patriots were killed, the enemy suffering eight casualties. In the course of another engagement at Bettonia six more Patriots were killed by the Germans.

A C.L.N. band at Monterotondo in Sabina, regularly, twice a week, from November 1943 to March 1944 put nails on the roads Salaria, Nomentana and Tiburtina.

The same C.L.N. band at Monterotondo attacked enemy transport on Dec. 8th (when six Germans were killed), on Dec. 18th (when five Germans were killed), on Jan. 15th 1944 (when seven Germans were killed). When the enemy was withdrawing (June 1944), the band attacked two enemy armoured cars which were captured. The Patriots lost 10 killed and 16 wounded.

A B R U Z Z I

25th Sept. '43 - The band of Bosco Martese attacked a German cleaning-up party consisting of 26 troop carrying vehicles loaded with troops and two 82mm artillery pieces. The Germans were forced to withdraw leaving 57 killed or wounded behind. A Fiat 1100, 2 trucks loaded with mines and several cases of hand grenades were also captured. 2372

January 1st, 1944 - Members of the band located in Pescara destroyed or damaged with hand grenades 12 enemy vehicles

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January 1st, 1944 - Members of the band located in Pescina destroyed or damaged with hand grenades 12 enemy vehicles near Forca Caruso.

February 7th - Members of the band located in Pescina killed an enemy D/R at Km. 140 on Via Tiburtina.

14th March '44 - 400 Germans attacked the patriots at UNIO and in the surrounding hills. The battle lasted 3 hours. The patriots were obliged to retreat. 36 patriots were killed but the Germans had 23 casualties.

A small band in the Collepardo area carried out cutting of telephone wires and sabotaging of petrol dumps during the Winter and the Spring.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

- 6 -

The Maraica Band in eight months of partisan struggle lost 15 dead and 12 wounded. They have to their credit: - 45 Germans and Fascists killed and wounded, 41 trucks destroyed or damaged, 40 railway wagons sabotaged, 3 armoured cars rendered unserviceable, 15 cases of ammunition and 70 weapons of various kinds captured.

T U S C A N Y (Area liberated at 15th August).

During January and February 1944, members of the C.L.N. Brigade Spartaco Lavagnini engaged the enemy at MURLO and MONTE CUCIO. The Patriots had severe losses but they are reported to have killed or wounded 30 Fascists. The Roccheggiano mines were damaged in March.

During the Winter and Spring, G.A.P. of CHIUSI tried to halt trains at that important railway centre.

A Fascist leader was killed at ORTIGNANO on March 8th by members of a Garibaldi Battalion. A few days later the same battalion attacked the Carabineers of Talle and obtained a considerable quantity of hand grenades. Another group of Carabineers was attacked at Chiusi della Verna. Another Fascist was killed at FIBBINA. Four Germans were killed on March 23rd and six more on April 2nd. The same Battalion is reported to have engaged actively the enemy during their withdrawal (Part of the area where the Battalion operated had not been liberated by August 15th).

During night of April 15th, Patriots from SINIGUZZA cut enemy telephone wires. On May 25th other Patriots attacked an enemy vehicle and killed two Germans.

The Distaccamento Ripa (C.E.E.) reports that in May they were able to halt, for several hours, 40 enemy vehicles near San Quirico d'Orcia. A Fascist was shot by them at Montalcino on June 3rd.

At end of June, 1944, Patriots demolished two road bridges near Castiglione.

The C.L.N. Brigade Spartaco Lavagnini, operating in Siena Province, reports to have had the following losses in engagements with the enemy: 42 Patriots killed, 33 wounded.

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The 3rd Garibaldi Brigade is reported to have collaborated wholeheartedly with the Allies. Patriots were sent through the lines to carry useful information on military activities of the enemy and location of mined areas. Losses of this formation were considerable, the total in dead, wounded and prisoners amounting to well over 150 men.

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23
Confidential

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
R.C. & M.G. Section
Patriots Branch
APO 394

Ref/46/14/PAT.

22 August 1944.

Speech made by Colonel C.D. MC CARTHY Patriots Branch
at Regional Commissioner's Conference 22 Aug. 1944.

1. Patriot Bands many of which are large and highly organised bodies have been created in various centres of German occupied territory in Italy and have received considerable encouragement and active help and instructions from the Allied Command. It is therefore clearly one of our chief tasks to look after the individual members of these bands when their fighting is over and in this connection it has been laid down by A.A.I. that bands must not accompany the armies forward out of their own areas.

The Patriots Branch of A.V.C. was formed early in July as a result of an instruction from A.A.I. and is responsible for all dealings with Resistance Groups as soon as the territory in which they have been operating is liberated by our troops.

2. In all dealings care is taken to distinguish between bogus Patriots and genuine patriots who are defined as being those in the ranks of genuine fighting bands who have carried arms, engaged in sabotage or secured important military information to the benefit of the Allied War effort. It must be remembered that these genuine patriots have in very many cases lived extremely precarious lives, suffered considerable casualties and been a very great nuisance to the enemy. Let us not forget that they have been living under the black cloud of torture and death not only for themselves but also for their families. I will read you the text of a German Order signed for the Commander in Chief of the German Armed Forces and found in the SUBBIANO area in mid-July:

ONE. Whoever is found in possession of arms or explosives and does not report them to the nearest German Headquarters WILL BE SHOT.

TWO. Whoever gives shelter to bandits, protects them or gives them clothing, food or arms..... WILL BE SHOT.

THREE. If it is found that anyone knows a group of rebels or even a single rebel without having reported them to the nearest Headquarters..... WILL BE SHOT.

2373

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ONE. Whoever is found in possession of arms or explosives and does not report them to the nearest German Headquarters WILL BE SHOT.

TWO. Whoever gives shelter to bandits, protects them or gives them clothing, food or arms..... WILL BE SHOT. 2371

THREE. If it is found that anyone knows a group of rebels or even a single rebel without having reported them to the nearest Headquarters, he..... WILL BE SHOT.

FOUR. Whoever gives information to the enemy or to the bandits on the location of German Headquarters or Military dumps.. WILL BE SHOT.

FIVE. Any village where it can be proved that there are bandits or where attacks against German or Italian soldiers have been made, or where acts of sabotage intended to damage or destroy warlike stores, have taken place.... WILL BE BURNED TO THE GROUND. However, male inhabitants of the village over 18 years old... WILL BE SHOT. Women and girls will be interned in labour camps.

There is no doubt that many patriots have acted with extreme bravery and courage and a note of their activities has been prepared and is available to those who would like to read it.

- 2 -

3. Many questions have been asked of the political tendencies of patriot bands. After speaking to a large number of patriots in various corners of the country I personally feel that in the great majority of cases these men have been fighting first to defeat the Germans, second to destroy Fascism and third in the case of some of them, to build up a new Italy. Most of them have at this stage of the war very little idea of the aims and ambitions of the six political parties in Italy but they are keenly alive to the fact that something drastic must be done about politics in the very near future and being mostly young and active men they are keenly susceptible to influence and require a lead from the Italian Government. Some of them will undoubtedly be of importance in the new Italy and they are a great responsibility for us all.

4. Plans have been drawn up for dealing with patriots. A message in roster form signed by General Alexander has been distributed in forward areas, a form of certificate of merit has been approved and certificates have been sent to Regions and to the 5 and 8 Armies for distribution. Although many patriots are used for a short while by the Army in their own area as guides and patrols and for reconnaissance work, the intention generally is to direct nearly all of them into civil life. About 50% return to their own homes and occupation locally. Of the remainder some will be used for police duties or as drivers, others will be employed on engineering work, and on mine clearance; and arrangements have been made for recruiting and passing back volunteers for service in the Italian Army and Air Force. Communal committees are being set up to assist Provincial Commissioners in this work, and to help weed out bogus applicants among the genuine patriots. The problems of collecting and disposing of the patriots' arms is in hand. The arms will be used for future operations as directed by A.A.I.

5. Reports are being received from Patriot Representatives and from the leaders of the Patriot bands. Information from these reports is extracted and passed on when relevant, for use by P.R.O., P.W.B. and by the press. Italian newspapers are closely scrutinised. Information is being collected about conditions in enemy occupied territory in order that suitable plans can be made for handling patriot problems in that territory when it has been liberated.

6. Liaison is maintained with the Italian Ministry of War through an Italian senior officer who is responsible for coordinating the work of the two groups which are recognised - the C.I.N. Group and the Military Centre Group.

7. Directives have been issued as required in agreement with A.A.I. and other authorities. It is fair to say that the task of ensuring that these directives are acted upon by Allied officers concerned and by the leaders of the patriot bands is well in hand. The broad political aspect of the patriot problem has been borne constantly in mind, and very close liaison is being maintained with those Allied officers who are concerned.

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8. The patriot question is very much in the news at present and I am bombarded with questions about what we are likely to find on the other side of the line. We have a fairly good idea and I am endeavouring to furnish this information when it is essential to do so. At the same time I am endeavouring to see that those on the other side of the line are properly informed about what is going on this side of the line. I would like in conclusion to take this opportunity to thank the press, P.R.O. and P.W.B. for the active cooperation given in recent weeks and for the manner in which publicity has been treated. The power of the press is tremendous in this present era of the patriot movement; and we must remember that the Germans are spreading propaganda against us as energetically as they can so that it is necessary for us to encourage our patriots as much as we can. I am trying to help in this firstly by ensuring that the proper arrangements are made for their welcome on this side of the line and secondly by taking care that they shall be informed immediately what that welcome will be.

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
R.C. & M.G. SECTION
PATRIOTS BRANCH
APO 394

CURRENT PROBLEMS

(A) PROBLEMS FOR THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT.

1. Institution of a Patriot Commission for Italy.
2. Patriot Committee for Rome.
3. Nomination of truly representative Patriot Representatives.
4. Keeping a check on names and performances of genuine Patriots and seeing that they have employment.
5. Providing Patriot Branch with information.
6. Collect money for Patriot needs, such as pay and salary for Patriot Representatives, compensations for Patriots and provision of food, clothing and cigarettes to fighting Patriots pending their employment.
7. Provide transport and drivers for Patriot Representatives.

(B) PROBLEMS FOR A.M.G. OF ARMIES.

The whole brunt of the patriot problem falls on the Armies. The following will be helpful for handling patriot problems behind the Army areas.

1. Collection of stories for propaganda purposes and we should like to send Press Representatives up to witness the distribution of certificates.
2. Collecting and forwarding of reports from Patriot Representatives and Band Leaders.
3. A short summarized weekly report of patriot activities.

(C) PROBLEMS FOR REGIONS

(in addition to some or all the A.M.G. problems)

These are connected with the final winding up of the patriots in each Region.

1. Training of an Allied officer, whole or part time, to look after patriot problems in each Region.

22
Selling up a Patriot
on the way out of school
of seeing the band
of living it out
of the patriot
of the patriot

Yes but
prepared by Patriot
Rep. as 1st

2. Patriot Committee for Rome.
3. Nomination of truly representative Patriot Representatives.
4. Keeping a check on names and performances of genuine Patriots and seeing that they have employment.
5. Providing Patriot Branch with information.
6. Collect money for Patriot needs, such as pay and salary for Patriot Representatives, compensations for Patriots and provision of food, clothing and cigarettes to fighting Patriots pending their employment.
7. Provide transport and drivers for Patriot Representatives.

(E) PROBLEMS FOR A.M.G. OF ARMIES.

The whole brunt of the patriot problem falls on the Armies. The following will be helpful for handling patriot problems behind the Army areas.

1. Collection of stories for propaganda purposes and we should like to send Press Representatives up to witness the distribution of certificates.

2. Collecting and forwarding of reports from Patriot Representatives and Bend Leaders.

3. A short summarised weekly report of patriot activities. *Yes but prepared by Patriot*

(C) PROBLEMS FOR REGIONS (in addition to some or all the A.M.G. problems). *Rep. at 144*

These are connected with the final winding up of the patriots in each Region.

1. Training of an Allied officer, whole or part time, to look after patriot problems in each Region.
2. Formation of an Italian Patriot Committee and prodding of it to see that it functions.

(D) PROBLEMS FOR INTELLIGENCE SECTION OF PATRIOTS BRANCH.

1. Information to AMI of Armies and Regions concerning composition of forward bands etc.
2. Information regarding Po flooding, sea flooding and pump station preservation.
3. Information regarding Prefects and prominent men in present occupied area.

- 2 -

4. Statement on damage to be avoided - this may need a special committee of Italians.
5. Collect reports weekly from Patriot Representatives and Band Leaders (through Armies and Regions) and examine and pass to Italian Government for their need.

(E) PROBLEMS FOR PROPAGANDA SECTION OF PATRIOTS BRANCH.

1. Collect news from all Regions all sources. Collect good stories and statistical data. *Link with whom?*
2. Produce anti-Boche and anti-Fascist propaganda.
3. Give news to patriots of what is happening through P.R.O., P.W.B., B.B.C. broadcasts to civilians, leaflets and press.

(F) PROBLEMS FOR H.Q. SECTION OF PATRIOTS BRANCH.

1. Look after problem of returning volunteers.
2. Investigate question of providing patriots with food, cigarettes, clothes and boots.
3. Keep up to date lists of Italian officers for special jobs.

22 August 1944.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

CD McCarthy

I disagree entirely with your 4
- p 2. Please speak.

12/18 2003

20

~~Confidential~~

HEADQUARTERS

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

R.C. & M.G. Section

APO 394

12 AUG Recd

8 August 1944.

Ref/57/1/PAT.

SUBJECT: Notes Written after a Visit to Florence.

I arrived in the South of Florence at 1300 hrs on 6 August accompanied by two Patriot Representatives from Rome, one of the Bernabo Group and one of the Bauer Group. I left at 2000 hrs on the same date having seen in Florence Lt-Col. Benton-Jones (AMG 8 Army) and his staff also the British Garrison Commander, the F.S.S., the I.C.U. and Special Forces and the chiefs of the Patriot Bands.

GENERAL.

The situation briefly was that the enemy was holding the North bank of the river Arno and was sniping across the river from there and was shelling the approaches to Florence, chiefly about dawn and dusk. All bridges were down except the Ponte Vecchio. Communications between N. Florence and S. Florence existed in various peculiar ways. The Germans had removed all food and live-stock. AMG was sending in ten 3-ton vehicles every evening starting on 5 Aug (this is now to be increased to twenty) so that essential food requirements were being met. There was no light nor water in the town except drinking water. Most of the original Carabinieri had crossed the river and were reported to be on the side of the enemy, but more carabinieri had been brought up from the South. I was told by an officer who had valuable information that both Germans and civilians were sniping across the river and that the Germans had imposed a 24 hour curfew and that two Patriot Companies were in the centre of Florence: also there were he thought a few Germans left South of the river in a very small pocket.

PATRIOTS.

The situation which had been a bit tricky to handle because Patriots do not like the idea of handing in their arms had been settled very satisfactorily and seemed to be as follows. There were no Military Patriots. The C.L.N. Patriots were divided into a party of approx 600 South of the river and the Garibaldi companies whose chief said he definitely owed allegiance to CLN; but he acted independently and said he had altogether 10 companies (110 each) North of the river 4 South and there were also two others many miles South near POGGIORENSI.

Lt-Col. Benton-Jones (AMG 8 Army) who had arrived in Florence on 4 August arranged after a little difficulty for all these Patriots to hand in their arms (which they guarded themselves) by noon on 6 August and the arrangement was that they should only draw them out when they went out with the British Army for guide or other duties. All this seemed to be working satisfactorily.

A certain amount of trouble had been experienced with local bandits who had

785017

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A certain amount of trouble had been experienced with local bandits who had to be cleaned up. The genuine Patriots disliked them intensely and were willing to help to put them down.

VISIT TO A.A.I.

On my return I discussed the Florence picture with Brig. Manwaring at AAT. H.Q. Five points at our discussion can be recorded here.

First Brig. Manwaring wants it to be clearly understood that Patriots should be expected to help the Army as guides, Patrols etc in their own area, but must not be recruited for moving farther forward outside their own recognised beat.

Second I explained it would be difficult to organise, in the 8th Army area, the returning transport and camps and supervision for Patriots who wish to enlist. At present the numbers are few: but Patriots are being told everywhere now

/that

18/

Confidential

- 2 -

that they can enlist if they bide their time and wait for collection at the Army's convenience. This position was agreed as being satisfactory meantime Brig. Manwaring said he would arrange with 8 Army that in due course the M.M.I.A. Screening agents should be allowed into Corps Areas.

In future

Third. It will be advisable to have a plan laid on beforehand and subsequent close operational contact between Ops., Special Forces, P.W.B. and the Patriot Branch.

Fourth. At a much later date it may be necessary to have (say) a company of the Italian Army up in certain forward areas to help deal with turbulent Patriots and other Patriot problems: in general it was agreed that the Italian Army would probably have to provide the man-power for looking after Patriot problems in the Army areas and in the L of C.

Fifth. We discussed briefly if the time was ripe for a political utterance or broadcast to outline the Patriot situation generally. Brig. Manwaring agreed with me that the time had now arrived when such a statement could be made, with advantage.

Col. Manwaring

C.D. MC CARTHY.
Colonel,
Patriots Branch,
R.C. & M.G. Section.

DISTRIBUTION

- 1 Copy for Brigadier Lush.
- 1 " " Brigadier Manwaring.
- 2 Copies for Group Capt. Benson (AMG 8 Army).
- 1 File.
- 1 War Diary.

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Wm. Carthy

C.D. MC CARTHY.
Colonel,
Patriots Branch,
R.C. & M.G. Section.

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- 1 " " Brigadier Manning.
- 2 Copies for Group Capt. Benson (AMG 8 Army).
- 1 File.
- 1 War Diary.

2360

Wt. 50779/1178. 52M lifta. 4/43. P.I. 81-6493.

Army Form C 348
(Life of 100 in duplicate)

MEMORANDUM.

Sender's Reference

Receiver's Reference

Date

From

TO :

*mm**file 18-31**Transferred from
file 559*

785017

Brig dash.

P.M.

459
21 JUL Recd

16

This is a short note merely to keep you informed about what I am trying to do on Patriots.

1. Having a meeting at rear AAI today (1100 hrs) with Brig Ritchie to tie up the admin angle of dealing with food & employment of Patriots behind the lines if they are employed by the army. Heads of services are being consulted.
2. Capt Stone is seeing Gen Browning, Cacchia Reber & self at 12.15 today to find out to what extent Patriots can in fact be absorbed by the army & how quickly.
3. Mainwaring has signalled that I can see him & Maj Gen Coxwell Rogers at 11.00 hrs on Sat to discuss employment of Patriots by RE units.
4. I hope to be able to have worked out details of the employment of the hard core of 30% of the Patriots by say Sunday.
5. Mainwaring may call an army meeting to explain this to the army.

Call
for
Patriots
file

Cdm

785017

18 JUL 1944 902

HEADQUARTERS
AMG FIFTH ARMY
A.P.O. 464 U.S. ARMY

Confidential

13th July 1944.

108/1

Subject: Recruiting for Italian Army.

To : H.Q., A.C.C. attn. Col. McCarthy.

1. In handling Patriot groups on this side of the line AMG is much handicapped by the absence of any machinery by which suitable young men who are keen to contribute to the struggle against the Germans can be enlisted into the Italian Army. The declared policy is to encourage such enlistment but GAOs report unanimously a sense of great frustration when they have to reply to candidates for enlistment that no facilities exist in practice.
2. At present this Headquarters knows of no centre where recruits can be enlisted nearer than Rome, a distance of 300 kilometres from the battle areas, nor is there any sign of recruiting centres being set up further North. It is clearly impracticable to send would-be recruits down there to enlist.
3. It is appreciated that the problem is complicated by the imposition of a top limit to the establishment of the Italian Army, but it is urgently requested that something be done immediately to set up some machinery by which recruits can at least be registered in forward areas even though it is impossible to guarantee immediate equipment and training.
4. If some such step is not taken quite soon it will be necessary to recommend a revision of the policy that patriots should be encouraged where of suitable age and type to enlist in the Italian Army, since it is agreed by all that one of the things to be avoided in the handling of them is the non-fulfilment of promises.

Copy to

RC and HQ Section,
Army Subcommission,
AMG Fifth Army.

E.B. MAYNE,
Colonel, U.D.F.,
Chief of Staff.
AMG FIFTH ARMY.

2365

785017

RAAC 640
800 ACC
84 LTCH V HAR 235 IMPORTANT

459 8, R/426/12
912 12 0 Recd 4124 64714

FROM NAIN AMG EIGHTH ARMY 1119303

TO ADV HQ ACC HOME FOR COL NEGATIVE

QOX GR 30

R 396

RESTRICTED . FIRST PARTY FOUR PATRIOT REPRESENTATIVES

TOGETHER WITH DRIVERS ARRIVED PERUGIA .

SECOND PARTY OF TWO REPRESENTATIVES

~~INTEND~~ INTENDED FOR EAST

SIDE NOT YET ARRIVED .

WILL SIGNAL YOU UPON THEIR ARRIVAL

THU 1956

REFIN 64 34 235 PIP 441930 30 AND THE CITY

PERUGIA 1956

TA 16

R. Heigh
1958

1410

Confidential
CAB

DIST
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(INT) JCC 1
FILE 1
FLOAT 2

ACTION 2362

785017

Q 982 12 JUL Recd

RPMG, 1/13

AMG FIVE ARMY AMG EIGHT ARMY INFO REGION FIVE AND REGION EIGHT

ADV AAI

ACC ADV

ADV 296

7 1245

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

Civil Affairs Branch.

PROPOSE DESPATCH PATRIOT REPS OF MILITARY AND CIN REPEAT CIN PARTIES AS FOLLOWS
 PD FIRST IN EACH CAR THERE WILL BE ONE REP ALSO DRIVER ALSO THREE DAYS RATIONS
 ALSO TWO FIVE ZERO ZERO REPEAT TWO FIVE ZERO Z ERO NOTICES ALSO TWO COPIES OF
 SIGNATURE AND TWO IDENTIFICATION PAPERS FOR EACH INDIVIDUAL PD PAREN TO AMG
FIVE ARMY AMG EIGHT ARMY INFORMATION AMG REGION FIVE AMG REGION EIGHT ADV ALLIED
ARMIES IN ITALY FOR BRIGADIER MAINWARING FROM ABLE CHARLIE, ADVANCE FROM MC CARTHY
PAREN PD SECOND FOUR CARS DUE DEPART ROME MORNING EIGHT JULY REPORT AMG
 PREFECTURA AT PERUGIA WHERE WILL AWAIT FURTHER INS TRUCTIONS FROM GROUP CAPT
 BENSON PD THIRD FOUR CARS UNDER ESCORT MAJOR TALBOT WILL DEPART ROME MORNING
 NINE JULY FOR AMG FIVE ARMY PD FOURTH TWO CARS WILL BE READY LEAVE ROME TENTH
 JULY FOR ADRIATIC COAST WILL GROUP CAPT BENSON PLEASE TELEGRAPH INSTRUCTIONS WHERE TO
 REPORT PD FIFTH IN ADDITION SENDING SEPARATELY ONE ZERO ZERO ZERO ZERO REPEAT
 ONE ZERO ZERO ZERO ZERO NOTICES TO AMG FIVE ARMY AND ONE FIVE ZERO ZERO ZERO REPEAT
 ONE FIVE ZERO ZERO ZERO TO AMG EIGHT ARMY ALSO MINUTES OF THIRD JULY AND FURTHER
 RELEVANT INSTRUCTIONS PD IT IS HOPED SEND CERTIFICATES OF MERIT NUMBERED BY BLOCKS
 TO REACH YOU WITHIN A WEEK PD SIXTH CSI(b) ALLIED ARMIES ITALY STATE THAT PATRIOT
 REPS CAN OBTAIN BROWN SECURITY PERMITS AT CORPS HEADQUARTERS PLEASE ARRANGE

COPIES TO:- AAI

ACC MAIN for Civil Affairs Branch

ACC HEAR for Admin Section

PWB Rome

Col Fiske

Security

Political

P.R.O.

2363

26
1947

Subject: Resistance Groups.

644
7902
12 JUL Recd
11 JUL 1944
Main H.Q., A.M.G.
Eighth Army.

OA/200

27 June 44.

R.C. & M.G. Section,
Main H.Q., A.C.C.
A.P.O. 394.

7901

novelty meeting
letter by meeting
of 3 July
CSM

1. Reference your 459/9/CA dated 20th June 44 and the nomination by this H.Qs of a member for the Commission on Resistance Groups which is to be set up.
2. May this H.Qs please be informed where this Commission is to sit and whether it is to be in permanent session.
3. It is impossible for this H.Qs to spare an officer to sit on the Commission if his services are required full time by the Commission away from his other duties. If on the other hand, the Commission will only meet from time to time and the nominee of this H.Qs available for other duties in the Field when the Commission is not sitting, there will be no difficulty in nominating an officer to attend the sessions, provided of course, that they are held at a place reasonably accessible.

Agnew

Group Captain,
Officer Commanding,
H.Q., A.M.G. Eighth Army Main.

Copy to: H.Q., A.M.G. 5th Army

2362

JKD/1m

HEADQUARTERS REGION 4
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
A. P. O. 394

10 JUL 1944

11 JUL Recd

TO : HQ ACC (RO & MG Section)

9 July 1944

SUBJECT: Partisans.

FILE No: R4/091.711

1. I Have recently returned from a tour in the Provinces of Rieti, Terni, Perugia and Viterbo. This tour was taken immediately after the Conference on the subject of Partisans, held at the Headquarters of ACC.

2. It certainly appears very desirable that clear plans be made for dealing with these men, and that the plans take into consideration the realities of the situation. Although there are a number of hangers on, there are a large number of men who have done good work in the mountains. They certainly have expected to be given some sort of recognition and some sort of job by the Allies and the anticlimax is serious.

3. It is perhaps especially so in the case of regular officers and men. Several of these have been organizing bands of Patriots. Many are now without funds of food. After all most of these officers have done a great deal more for the Allied cause, and at much greater personal risk, than the bulk of the Italian Officers from Sardinia and South Italy. To tell these men that now:

(a) they are not officers because there is not place for them in the Italian Army,

(b) they are not going to be paid for the same reason

is a line of policy which, however it may agree with the legal aspect, is exceedingly bad psychology.

4. In Rieti, for example, there is a good Italian ~~Partisan~~ ^{Partisan} with quite a quantity of Italian stores. A Major of the regular Italian Army, with some other Officers and some regular N.C.O.'s who has come down from the Patriot Bands from the mountains, has opened proper ledgers and, so far as could be seen from a brief visit, is running a good show. Is that man to be told that his

Worked by 18 July
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
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
5. In many such cases Provincial Commissioners are making local advances of pay to men who are carrying out obviously useful work.

- 10
6. This problem is now going to be with us right up to the Alps, probably in ever increasing degree.
 7. It seems to me that, for the good of Italy it will be fatal to create a cleavage between the Army of the South and Sardinia and the Army of the Patriots.
 8. After all, in the political sphere the Government of Brindisi has expanded into the Government of Salerno and shortly into the Government of Rome. Someday it will be reinforced from Florence, Turin and Milan.
 9. What is felt by my Provincial Commissioner as well as by myself is that there should be some MHA or Italian Army machinery well forward to pick up these men and give those who want to go on a chance of enrolling in a proper Italian Army. Possibly often enough that will "call their bluff". If so it is all to the good. At least we give them the chance.


Regional Commissioner

2363

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Regional Commissioner

2363

11 JUL Recd

10 JUL 1944

HEADQUARTERS

AMC FIFTH ARMY

A.P.O. 464 U.S. ARMY

SECRET
Confidential

9th July 1944.

10 3/2

SUBJECT: Partisans.

TO : See Distribution.

Responsibility.

1. H.Q., AAI letter 40/G/Ops dated 22nd June 44 lays down that the handling of all Partisans once they are within our lines is an AMG responsibility. It also directs that troops will not allow themselves to become involved in problems affecting Partisans but will refer all such matters to the nearest AMG representative.

Types of Partisans.

two

2. There are ~~two~~ main types of organised Partisans: military bands often formed around units of the Italian Army who took the side of Badoglio in September 1943, and political groups usually organised by the local Committee of National Liberation. Either type may be found headed by allied ex-PW., including men of Russian and Slav nationalities. These organised bands have often proved of great assistance to our tactical troops and have received direct assistance from the Allies in the shape of arms, supplies etc., dropped behind the enemy lines.

In addition there are many groups of young men belonging to no particular organisation and recognizing no particular leader. Such groups are of little value to our troops and may constitute a potential menace to law and order if not correctly handled in the first instance.

Method of Handling.

3. Much must inevitably be left to the discretion of the individual GAO but certain instructions must be followed and these are set out below.

2353

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2353

3. Much must inevitably be left to the discretion of the individual CAO but certain instructions must be followed and these are set out below.

The two main principles affecting the general attitude towards the Partisans are first, the necessity for restoring the rule of law and order once the emergency period is over and re-establishing local Italian Government as soon as possible on a firm basis which can

in due course be lined up with the Central Government in the rest of liberated Italy: secondly the expression of a proper appreciation of the efforts and achievements of the Patriots and avoidance of any incident which may embarrass the Allies in future dealing with resistance groups behind the enemy lines. The United Nations have been encouraging Partisan movements by every possible means and their potential importance will increase as the attack on Germany goes forward. Intimidation and discouragement must be avoided since both will become known and will have both an adverse effect on groups still in enemy territory and undesirable long-term political results.

Tact and firmness are both required. In general it will be found that tact is the most important in case of organised groups, while firmness is more necessary in the case of unorganised groups of near-hooligans.

Status.

4. Once they are behind the Allied lines the military functions of Partisans cease: their status is no different from that of the ordinary civil population.

Political.

5. Partisan groups have no political functions or status. The C-in-C has insisted that Allied Military Government shall be enforced in newly occupied territory and this must be explained politely but firmly to Partisan leaders.

Arms and Ammunition.

6. Peremptory orders about handling in arms and ammunition are a particular source of agitation to flushed and excited patriots and should be avoided, but arms must be handed in forthwith.

It should be explained that the arms are required for supplying the patriots operating further north. If it appears impolitic to order the arms to be handed over to the C.C.R., the leaders of groups should be told to centralise their arms in their own armoury from which they can later be collected.

All collections of arms can be removed by the Army Ordnance; this will be done as soon as requested by a C.O to Corps or Army Headquarters. (Map references should be given of all armouries reported together with the name and address of the responsible persons holding the keys).

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Non-Italian Personnel.

7. Escaped Allied PW will be evacuated through normal military channels to the Refugee Interrogation Post which is always near the

the Army PW Cages.

Deserters from the German Army of Russian, Polish, Dutch etc., nationality will be thanked for their activities and evacuated through normal PW channels. (Standing orders lay down special treatment for these persons to differentiate between them and German PWs).

Privileges.

8. Italian Partisans once demobilised, have no right to special rations or any other other privileges not accorded to ordinary civilians. (see para. 4 above).

Enlistment into Italian Army.

9. Partisans wishing to continue to fight the Germans should be directed to enlist in the Italian Army: attempts are being made to speed up the provision of facilities for enlistment and further information on this will be supplied as soon as available.

Evaluation of achievements.

10. Leaders of groups should be instructed to prepare a report on their activities which can be sent on to higher Headquarters for proper evaluation.

Disposal of Prisoners.

11. It will often be found that the Partisans have made arrests; the C.I.C./SH should be requested (if they have not already done so) to screen any persons found in prison. Those whose continued detention is recommended by C.I.C./SH or against whom genuine charges are preferred under Italian criminal law should be kept in custody: the remainder should be released as soon as circumstances permit on the understanding that the allegations against them will in due course be investigated through the machinery of the law for the punishment of Fascist crimes and offences which has recently been passed by the Italian Government.

Assistance for CAOs.

12. The following are being sent to us by HQ AOC under instructions from HQ A.I.I. CAOs will receive fuller details in the near future.

2353

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10. Leaders of groups should be instructed to prepare a report on their activities which can be sent on to higher Headquarters for proper evaluation.

Disposal of Prisoners.

11. It will often be found that the Partisans have made arrests; the C.I.C./SM should be requested (if they have not already done so) to screen any persons found in prison. Those whose continued detention is recommended by C.I.C./SM or against whom genuine charges are preferred under Italian criminal law should be kept in custody: the remainder should be released as soon as circumstances permit on the understanding that the allegations against them will in due course be investigated through the machinery of the Law for the Punishment of Fascist crimes and offences which has recently been passed by the Italian Government.

Assistance for CAOs.

12. The following are being sent to us by HQ ACC under instructions from HQ 4.I.I. CAOs will receive fuller details in the near future.

- a. 4 mobile Italian representatives of the bodies responsible for organising the Partisan movement.
- b. Notices thanking partisans for their good work and explaining that they must submit for the time being to Allied Military Government.
- c. Individual certificates, including a receipt for arms handed in

by demobilised partisans.

i. It is further hoped that declarations will shortly be made by the Italian Government itself by Radio and poster which will explain to Partisans their own status and that of the Allied Military Government in Occupied Territory.

EB Wayne

E. B. WAYNE,
Colonel, U.D.F.,
Chief of Staff
AIG FIFTH ARMY.

/KR

DISTRIBUTION:

All Corps SCAOs and CAOs.
P.Cs. Region VIII (less Arezzo).
P.Os and F.P.Os, Region VIII (less Arezzo).
R.C. Region VIII. (5)
Major Collins. (3)

Copies to:

C/S Fifth Army.
G-1 Fifth Army.
G-2 Fifth Army.
C.I.C., Fifth Army.
Provost Marshall, Fifth Army.
HQ ACC. DC and MG Section.
Colonel McCarthy, HQ ACC Adv.
Legal Subcommittee, ACC.
Army Subcommittee, ACC.
Public Safety Subcommittee, ACC.
AIG Eighth Army Main.
HQ A.A.I. (EAC).

785017

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
R.C. & M.C. Section
APO 394

90L
Ref A-59/ /CA.

5 July 1944.

SUBJECT: Partisans.

TO : Civil Affairs Branch, HQ ACC ADV.
(Attention : Major Talbot)

Efforts have been made to phone you, but with little success, to obtain the following information and for your action :

- (a) Copies of Minutes of Conference held last Monday on Partisans, and copies of Manifesto are urgently required here.
- (b) Show to Capt. Stone AS SOON AS POSSIBLE on his arrival in ROME (probably THURSDAY by air).

L 8
NORMAN E. PIERCE,
Colonel,
Deputy Executive
Commissioner.

2357

P/A

E.C.

Ref my pencilled
note at top of ~~25~~6.
Will you pl. confirm
now that no action
is required by Acc
here, as ^{you said} it was being
dealt with in Rome.

ll 5/7

I confirm

ML 5/7

2356

785017

1 JUL 1944

B.

Almond Brig Lush with his b
duplicate copy in Rome. no repd
on this one. By 4/7

Noted 18/7

11/7

TOP SECRET

H.Q. A.C.C.
C.M.F.

29 June 44

To: Brigadier LUSH

445 From: Col. McCARTHY

Copy in file 93

Waham
Patrials

1. The attached notes have been dictated and I have asked Col. Pidsley to look at them before they are sent to you. Two copies are attached so that you can send one on to the Administrative Section if you want to do so.

2. I met Gen. Robertson yesterday who is rather upset by a report he has received that A.C.C. are occupying 1,900 bedrooms in ROME, and he says that he is going to write to you about it. If you like I will take the matter up with the ROME command or ask FISKE to do so.

M. L. Wright
for Col. McCarthy
Col. G.S.

2355

TOP SECRET

6
Confidential

H.Q. A.C.C.
C.M.F.

R
29 June 44

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. *785017*

NOTES ON ITALIAN PATRIOTS

1. We had a good day with the Patriots and the following notes explain what happened and also what action I am taking, subject of course to any orders to the contrary from you.
2. I went to 717 with Gen. INFANTE and Col. PIDSLEY and had a general discussion with Brig. MAINWARING and later went through the proposed proclamation with General HARDING. We all then lunched with the Chief and Gen. HARDING who both read and approved the final draft as did also Gen. INFANTE later who added one paragraph with Gen. HARDING.
3. It is proposed to have this proclamation put in the Italian papers in ROME, and to have it posted up in villages in forward areas as and when we capture them. The proclamation will be signed by General ALEXANDER and the final printing should be ready mid-day Friday when we shall issue it subject to any points raised by you in the meantime. Copy is attached.
4. I attach also testimonials which we propose to give to returning Patriots who so far as I can see, must be divided into three categories; first, those who have arms and have been fighting, and third, those who have not got arms but have been helping by lending money or arranging supplies etc. General INFANTE and I think that all these testimonials should be signed both by the Patriot Leader in the field and by the A.M.G. officer in contact with the Patriot Leader, the idea being to prevent unauthorised patriots getting the certificate. The only thing the A.M.G. officer will have to do is to be sure of the qualifications of the Patriot Leader.

5. The Italian General INFANTE wants to have a proclamation issued and I agree that it is reasonable to tell the Patriots what will happen to them when they get into liberated Italy. Such points as the disbandment of armed bodies and the return

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5. The Italian General INFANTE wants to have a proclamation issued and I agree that it is reasonable to tell the Patriots what will happen to them when they get into liberated Italy. Such points as the disbandment of armed bodies and the return of ~~feet~~ soldiers to fighting Italians and the inclusion of selected Patriots to the Carabinieri or the Italian Regular Army are points which will be brought out in this proclamation. I have suggested that Gen. INFANTE's officers should produce a draft proclamation for him by Friday afternoon which could be issued three or four days later if and when approved by all concerned including the British Embassy authorities; since this proclamation will raise the wider issues and will have for its purpose fundamentally the control of the Left wing politicians:

6. My proposal is to issue in about a week's time detailed instructions to all A.M.G. officers and A.C.C. officers: instructions as to what they should do in order to fulfill the terms of these two proclamations. I propose to discuss this with A.M.G. of 5th and 8th Army tomorrow where I am going with

FIT

- 2 -

4

Brig. MAINWARING in order to clear up with both the ops side and the A.M.G. side of both armies as many problems as we can.

7. It is abundantly clear that it is important to produce as quickly as possible a drill for dealing with all these patriots, not only those coming through the lines but those who are now in ROME etc. but have never been dealt with. The Italian Military authorities here point out that some of the Patriots in enemy occupied Italy are becoming hesitant because they have heard that their friends in liberated Italy have been having unsatisfactory treatment, also it is feared that Left wing politicians will get at disaffected Patriots unless they are soon put into a job or put back into the Army. Gen. HARDING advised me very strongly in front of Gen. INFANTE that we should all keep out of politics. We all agreed to this especially Gen. INFANTE who nevertheless discussed politics for the whole of lunch and for the whole of the rest of the day. It seems to me that we must endeavour to give the Italians of all six parties an equal chance of success in the future government of the country and I think it is fair to say that if we are lax or dilatory now we shall fail to extract arms from the Left wing Patriot whereas their regular arms will hand in his arms like a good boy.

8. I had two sessions with Gen. INFANTE kindly superintended first with a man who had organised the ROME patriots both military and political before and after the liberation of ROME, and second with those outside ROME including those in enemy occupied territory. I will tell you about all this in due course but in the meantime the important point to note is that the Communist organisation has not only been first-class for a considerable time, but as in the case of bands outside ROME taken direct orders and obeyed implicitly the instructions of the regular Italian officers.

9. Gen. INFANTE asked for a protection against the French and I from

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9. Gen. INFANTE asked for a protection against the French and I know he also mentioned this to the Chief. Personally I feel that it will be very difficult to do anything to help the Italians against the French whom will continue to loathe them for ever.

10. In conclusion, Gen. INFANTE who goes to Naples tomorrow and may see you, has been extremely helpful and has introduced me to a large number of military officers and has promised to provide me with liaison officers which should be very useful.

M. L. Wright
for Col. M. Carthy

Col. G.S.

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CONFIDENTIAL

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K

ACC MAIN (Civil Affairs Branch)

21 June 1944

CONFIDENTIAL

Vapor 165 - Lush

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

HOME AREA COMBAND FOR ACC HOME RPTD AAI AIV

MY SIX FOUR NINE SIX OF TWO ZERO JUNE PD PAREN TO HOME AREA COMBAND FOR ACC HOME FOR
FINKE REPEATED AAI AIV FROM ACC MAIN FOR LUSH PAREN INTER POSTED YOU TODAY GIVING MY
 REACTIONS TO AAI PROPOSALS REGARDING RESISTANCE GROUPS PD FRO HERE CONSULTED 4/901
 MINIKES FWD WHO SAID HQ FWD IN HOME SHOULD ASSIST IN PREPARATION MATERIAL FOR
 BROADCAST AND PROCLAMATIONS REFERRED TO IN AAI LETTER FOUR CHARLIE OBLIQUE PAREN
 GEORGE PAREN OF ONE SIX JUNE PD UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES YOU SHOULD INSTRUCT
 FIELDER TO GET IN TOUCH FWD IMMEDIATELY TO PREPARE NECESSARY DRAFTS AND YOU ARE
 AUTHORIZED TO APPROVE THESE ON BEHALF ACC PD REPORT ACTION TAKEN

EC K. Lee
 You agreed to the list
 of this yesterday but I
 have taken your name in vain.

Thank you.
 M/4/6

ROGER B. DERRY
 Capt AGD
 Deputy Adjutant

2352

CONFIDENTIAL

785017

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6496

R

R

AGC MAIN (Civil Affairs Branch)

20 June 1964

RESTRICTED

Report 165 - Lash

Operational Priority

AGC MAIN
RE: AAI ADV repeated REHE AREA COMMAND FOR REHE/REHE

YOUR INFO DASH THREE FIVE FOUR EIGHT DATED NINETEEN JUNE PD PARSH TO RE AAI ADV
REPORTED REHE AREA COMMAND FOR AGC MAIN FOR FIVE PD CONTACT COM/REHE FIVE
RE AGC MAIN

216

ROGER H. DUNN
CAPT., AGC
REHE/REHE 2352

902-1
ALL D CONTROL COMMISSION
INCOMING MESSAGE

1870
R

TO: ACC
FROM: HQ AAI ADV
REFERENCE No: 0-3548
DATE AND TIME OF ORIGIN: JUNE 191930
SIGNAL MESSAGE CENTER No: 12/20
CLASSIFICATION: NONE
PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
OFFICE OF ORIGIN:

4/901

REF MY 4 C/G(OPS) OF 16 JUNE. PLEASE SIGNAL YOUR VIEWS EARLIEST.
CONSIDER MOST DESIRABLE TO DISCUSS WHOLE QUESTION WITH RESPONSIBLE
REP YOUR HQ. WHERE AND WHEN CAN THIS TAKE PLACE. SUGGEST ROME 21 OR
22 JUNE.

ACC DISTN

Re
21/6

Action - C A Br 2
Imps - Rep CC 1
- File 1
- Float 1

2350

~~WIRE~~
X CONTACT COL FISKE.
ADV HQ A.C.C. Rome 14321

DATE and Time of RECEIPT JUNE 200200

Distribution:

2 3 1 3 |