

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

ACC

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

ALBRIGHT, SPOFFORD
APR. - AUG. 1944

ESTABLISHMENT BRANCH

JJA/jmv

19 May 1944

Colonel Charles M. Spofford
Assistant Chief of Staff
G-5, AFHQ

My dear Colonel Spofford:

I have before me your recent letter to General Mason MacFarlane with reference to the personnel situation, particularly reduction of American enlisted personnel. As you know, enlisted personnel has been our greatest worry for the last several months. In the first place, the percentage of enlisted men to officers in the original allocation to the 2675th Regiment was inadequate, but since it has been approved there is probably no chance at the present time for an increase. As a matter of fact I have been holding the draft of a letter asking for an increase until General Sawbridge had sufficient time to return from Washington and make such adjustments as he found necessary. I am still holding the letter but believe that I have a good talking point in that I ask for the increase from Limited Service men only. We cannot function in the forward areas with Limited Service personnel but in the rear areas we have a very considerable number of specialist jobs which could be well handled by trained men who are not physically able to take part in combat operations. Reports from various sources indicate that we have a very large number of limited service enlisted men now in Replacement Centers in Italy and North Africa. They are attempting, I know, to have Base Sections and other line of communication units take these limited service men and send physically fit men to Replacement Centers in return. However, I believe that there will still be a considerable surplus of limited service men available. It seems only logical that those men should be used to help the war effort in such organizations as ours when we are in desperate need of additional enlisted men. I suggest that at some opportune moment you put forward such a request or inform me so that I can forward the request officially from ACC.

With reference to the recent cables requiring us to make a further reduction of 39 enlisted men on the 2675th Regiment, G-1 seems to have the mistaken idea that we did not fully comply with the directive previously issued. I do think that idea should be corrected. Our reduction was made on a directive from AFHQ MCS that we reduce by 398 enlisted men. We assumed that being close to Regimental Headquarters and having correct figures available that 398 was the correct figure. We sent that number to the Replacement Center. Colonel Parkin further asked that replacements for certain men who had returned to the United States on rotation be not forwarded to the Regiment. This request was apparently not granted as replacements have been received. These, in addition to men who were returned to us from hospitals, (who had previously been dropped from our strength) have created the present small surplus of 39.

With reference to the over-head of the Regimental Headquarters reported by Lt. Col. Uhler, I do not know what he could have included which would total anywhere near 60. The figure is considerably less than that and I have recently gone over the Regimental over-head and reduced it so far as it was possible under existing conditions. The reduction of 39 men will, therefore, have to come from operating units. The loss of each one, with the exception of about 10 men, will be the same as the loss of blood. It seems more logical to us that Geery's Group which is not in operating status should absorb the cut especially so since it may "blow up." If it is not absorbed otherwise, it is believed the Force with which it is associated might temporarily absorb 39 men. A loss of 39 trained men now cannot be helped by 60 untrained men at a later date.

No real reduction in the overhead of the 2675th Regiment is possible so long as it is called a Regiment and while every report and regulation which applies to a normal Regiment applies to an organization which is not a Regiment in any accepted sense. It will always be necessary to keep a considerable group of clerk-typists busy putting out reports and duplicating work which should be performed as a part of Hq. ACC. The Regiment was formed, to the best of my knowledge, by redesignation of a Company in order to circumvent the requirement that no more units would be activated in this theatre and it has been a source of difficulty ever since. It has resulted in some very silly situations such as the C.O. 2675th Regt directing the Chief Commissioner to comply with NATOUSA Order reference the preservation of National Monuments and the assumption that junior officer Company Commanders have sole responsibility for things which obviously the Senior American Officer in the Region must be responsible.

These things are a constant source of irritation to Hq. ACC and to Regional Commissioners. It is not all due to the personality of the present Regimental Commander. He is being harassed by NATOUSA regulations designed to govern a normal Regiment and by certain Army Regulations which were not written for such a hybrid organization as ACC. So far as I know, this is the only organization which has British and American personnel so inextricably mixed. All others have units of each working side by side, which for ACC to parallel would require a major reorganization of ACC in the midst of operations. British procedure permits the handling of administration through British channels which are an integral part of ACC. I am loathe to believe that American procedure is too inelastic to permit a similar procedure.

My recommendations are (1) that we do away with the Regimental designation and make the Senior Officer of Headquarters ACC the officer commanding American troops in ACC; (2) if a unit designation is necessary, redesignate the Regiment as a Group or as a Company and the Regional Units as Sub-Groups or Detachments and that U.S. personnel in each Region be commanded by the Regional Commissioner or the Executive whichever position is held by an American Officer; (3) that such reports as are necessary, no matter what we call the organization, be submitted by the Senior American Officer of Headquarters ACC for the U. S. Contingent, e.g. Materiel

Status Reports and personnel reports. If this were done, I believe a fair saving in the personnel now required is possible. Certainly the cooperation of the American Headquarters and Headquarters ACC would be much greater.

I have recommended in the past to General Lemnitzer, who commands Headquarters and Headquarters Company AAI, that we should have a General Officer at Headquarters ACC who would be the officer commanding American troops in ACC. I still think that would be the best solution. As a member of General Macfarlane's Staff, just as General Lemnitzer is a member of General Alexander's Staff, he would have the ACC point of view and would be solely responsible for the proper disciplinary powers over the officers which no officer below General Officer can exercise. If a General Officer is not assigned to the Headquarters, certainly the Senior Officer thereat must be the Commander of the U.S. Contingent and administrative correspondence should pass through his office or that of his staff instead of directly to a Regimental Headquarters which holds itself more or less aloof and ignorant of ACC operations.

I do not believe it possible, after several months' trial, to properly coordinate and integrate the activities of the present Regimental organization with ACC. This is especially true with the present personnel in Regimental Headquarters. Recommend that you approach G-1, AFHQ (NATOUA) with the idea of redesignating the Regiment as a Group or as a Company and find out what their reaction to this step might be. I can see no reason why American administration would not proceed through American channels after such a change and I certainly can foresee a much better type of organization than the present one. It would be possible to integrate the activities much more closely with Headquarters ACC and give us much smoother operation with somewhat less personnel.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

CMS/AHA/r1

Military Government Section

Ref/DO/7

2 May 1944

Dear Fiske:

Reference is made to your inquiry, transmitted by Major Van Dusen, regarding action to release non-essential personnel.

The relief from active duty of officers over 38 whose services are not required may be effected either (1) on recommendation of the officer's commander through channels or (2) on request of the officer.

In the first instance the officer's concurrence is not necessary and he does not have the right to a hearing before a reclassification board or any similar procedure, but action must be taken within ten days of the time the officer became surplus.

In either case the date of the officer's becoming surplus and the reason must be shown. Such reason may be the elimination of the specific position or the type of work, because of reorganization, reduction of the allotment of positions for the work, or any other pertinent facts. In AOC reduction of staff resulting from turnover of functions to the Italian government or change in functions from such work as police and fire protection to economic activities would constitute reason for officers becoming surplus. The officer's request need not be filed within the ten day limit for recommendation by the commanding officer.

The AC NATOUSA informs us that these cases are now being handled within the theater and that if complete information is furnished they should normally be acted upon within three weeks from the time of receipt here. This time is necessary to process the cases and to circulate them to appropriate units for determination as to whether the officer's services might be used. If the officer's services are needed by another unit, the application will not be approved.

Attention is called to the reclassification procedure set forth in AR 605-230, applicable to officers of any age, as a means of eliminating officers who are assigned to duties for which they are not suited. This is not a substitute for disciplinary action, which should, of course, be taken when the officer is guilty of malfeasance, neglect, conduct unbecoming an officer or any other offense. It is an appropriate means of effecting the demotion or reassignment of officers who do not measure up to the technical or administrative demands of their work. The fact that AOC has apparently not used this procedure may indicate that its applicability is not generally understood.

An officer may be recommended through channels for demotion without the reclassification procedure being invoked, but in such case he would have the right to request trial by court martial or a hearing before a reclassification board. 856

Attention is also called to the fact that if an officer is satisfactory in his work but his services are not needed, a recommendation may be made through channels to NATOUSA for his reassignment, specifying that a replacement is not needed. Such recommendation has no relation to the age of the officer concerned and hence may apply to officer under 38. Approval would be given if there were current need for the services of such officer in another unit or anticipated need on the basis of which he would be kept in replacement center, and if the releasing unit had no contemplated need for an officer of similar qualifications.

We shall be glad to obtain any further information on the subject that you may desire and to help expedite any cases that are sent to this headquarters.

CHARLES M. SPOFFORD
Colonel, GSC
Chief of Section

Colonel Norman E. Fiske
RC & MG Section
Hq. Allied Control Commission
APO 394

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

CMS/RB/jjr

28 May 1944

G-5: 381.1.3

SUBJECT: Personnel for Allied Control Commission

TO : Headquarters, Allied Control Commission, APO 394
Reference is made to your 16031/1/G-1 of 24 April 1944.

1. Your conclusions as to the need of 1270 officers are concurred in and this number will be allotted. Your conclusions as to the number of EM/ORs needed cannot under present conditions be implemented. The number available is discussed as to American EM in Appendix A, and as to British OR's in Appendix B.

2. The above allotment of officers and EM/ORs will therefore be your ceiling for Italy under the following conditions:

a. Continued enemy resistance in Central Europe and in Italy as far south of the PISA-RIMINI line, requiring you to carry out Military Government and control activities in all territories South of the PISA-RIMINI line.

b. Enemy collapse in Central Europe before the Allied Armies in Italy are North of the PISA-RIMINI line, requiring you to carry out such Military Government and control activities as may be necessary in the whole of Italy, but at the same time without the necessity of further prosecuting the war in Europe.

3. Your request for an additional 300 officers and 600 EM/ORs in the event of enemy resistance in Central Europe continuing for some considerable time after the enemy has either been driven out of, or withdrawn from Italy is noted. It is not possible at this stage to provide an allotment for such a contingency, as this matter is bound up with the future development of the war as a whole, and not merely the campaign in Italy. The situation will, however, be reviewed from time to time in the light of developments.

4. Current proposals for implementing the allotment of American officers, EMs, are contained in Appendix "A".

5. Proposals which are to be put forward with regard to the British War Establishment are contained in Appendix "B".

/s/ Charles M. Spofford
/t/ CHARLES M. SPOFFORD
Colonel, GSC
Asst Chief of Staff, G-5

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OFFICERS:

Appendix "A"

1. Although the 2675th Regiment (Prov) was originally established for ACC-AMG, it has been for sometime, as a result of War Department & Natoussa directives as to other operations and limitations as to personnel available, the repository for civil affairs personnel for various Theater operations. The approved T/O for the regiment provides for 829 officers. On this T/O are now carried officers with ACC and the Civil Affairs Detachment and those on detached service, principally with MGS and FWB.

2. With approval of an allotment of 635 American Officers for ACC, the remaining allotment will, when administratively feasible, be transferred to a separate unit, leaving the 2675th Regiment (Prov) confined to ACC personnel. This should simplify administration as to personnel not in Italy, and should permit certain economies because of the identity of the regimental records and those for American personnel, ACC.

3. As other needs develop any available qualified officers in excess of the allotment of 635 will be transferred from ACC. From time to time there will also be some substitution of specialized personnel, such as engineers, for officers with qualifications not needed in ACC but required elsewhere.

4. The War Department has indicated that additional officers from the Zone of Interior are not available for ACC. It is expected that the infiltration of civilian specialists will continue. Unless further limitations as to personnel are imposed by the War Department, this will not affect the allotment of 635 officers.

5. Attached Naval Officers, now numbering approximately 20, will not be counted against the allotment of 635.

6. The ranks in the allotment of 635 will be as follows:

	<u>Regt T/O</u>	<u>ACC Allotment</u>	<u>Allotment other Needs</u>
Colonel	44	32	12
Lt Colonel	107	79	28
Major	290	224	66
Captain	268	208	60
1st Lt	89	68	21
2d Lt	31	24	7
Total	<u>829</u>	<u>635</u>	<u>194</u>

ENLISTED MEN:

7. The T/O for the 2675th Regiment authorizes 1045 EM. Of this number, by previous action, 65 were reserved for the Civil Affairs Detachment and 9 for MGS.

8. It appears that there is no possibility of increasing the regimental T/O, but it is proposed to remove the 74 EM reserved for other needs from the regimental rolls when and if other provision is authorized for them, the total of 1045 EM then becoming available to ACC. It may be pointed out that this is slightly above the ratio of 1.6 EM to 1 officer indicated by the War Department, as the approved ratio in its plans for SHAEF. It is recognized that 1045 is below the minimum considered essential for ACC; the deficit will have to be made up by the employment of Italians and if feasible American civilians.

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Appendix "A"

Recommendation has been made for a change in War Department policy to permit the employment of American civilian women.

WARRANT OFFICERS:

9. The T/O for the 2675th Regiment authorizes 15 warrant officers. One of these positions is now included in the Civil Affairs Detachment. The remaining 14 will continue to be available to ACC. The memorandum of ACC of 24 April 1944 does not mention Warrant Officers; they may be considered to constitute a small safety margin of personnel above the minimum estimates.

EQUIPMENT:

10. The reduction of the personnel ceiling for ACC from 1889 (829 off, 15 W.O., 1045 EM) to 1694 will necessitate a proportionate reduction in equipment available. This will amount to approximately 10%.

Appendix "B"

OFFICERS:

1. The present WE which was approved locally authorises 663 Officers. This was originally designed to cover the whole of Italy. The War Office now proposes to investigate this WE in some detail.

2. Since the WE was formed the following major changes in policy have occurred.

- (a) Limitation of present Civil Affairs planning & provision for occupation only so far as the PISA-RIMINI Line. (but see para 2 of covering letter).
- (b) Equal American and British representation.

3. The establishment of 663 officers as approved locally here for Italy has now been frozen by high policy decision in London as the para military ceiling of officers for this Theatre. Future commitments placed upon the SAC Mediterranean Theatre will require an increase in this theatre ceiling either by an overall world increase which is unlikely, or by transferring a proportion of the allotment of SHAEP to this Theatre. This process will of necessity take considerable time, whereas a great deal of planning is required now.

4. It has therefore become urgent that a small Civil Affairs planning establishment be set up in North Africa for the purpose of investigating requirements and planning for future commitments outside Italy and the Balkans.

5. It is therefore proposed to set up a small planning WE of 18 Officers, to be offset by a reduction of 18 Officers in WE NA/266/1. The reduction in your establishment will be effected in the following ranks.

Brigadier	3
Colonels	5
Lieuts	10
	<u>18</u>

This will leave you with 645 Officers, which gives you a reserve of 10 Officers over the 635 required.

6. It is hoped to obtain War Office confirmation of your existing WE except as modified by para 5 above.

OTHER RANKS:

7. The only reduction of ORs that is likely to be made is substitution of Italian transport personnel as approved in your 16031/2/G-1 of 1 April 44. This will leave you with an establishment of approximately 1031 British ORs and 605 Italian ORs.

8. It is not proposed that the creation of a small Civil Affairs planning unit will require any further reduction in your ceiling for ORs.

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Appendix (contd)

TRANSPORT:

9. It is not proposed to alter the WE for transport.

GENERAL:

10. It is pointed out that with the proposed officer reduction in WE the greatest care must be taken to ensure that, by further local recruiting by you and upgrading of existing officers, your establishment is not exceeded, either in total numbers or in particular ranks (other than the holding of junior ranks against higher ranking vacancies). If this care is not exercised considerable disappointment and financial hardship will result in the case of a number of officers. Recruitment of officers above a strength of 645 should not be made.

COMMENTS ON COL. SPOFFORD'S LETTER

1. In view of the present tactical situation, it seems a logical conclusion that the Pisa-Rimini line will be passed prior to any enemy collapse in Central Europe. The possibility that it may be passed at an early date indicates the necessity for reviewing at once the situation and our request for an increase of officers and EM/ORs.

Our proposals for distribution of our present allotment of officers is given at appendix _____. The distribution to cover all of Italy can be made only by a reduction of our present commitments in Regions now under control. This means a very rapid turnover to an Italian government, which is not yet firmly established, of many responsibilities now being operated or closely supervised by ACC officers. Among these responsibilities to be turned over are:

- a. Warehousing and distribution of food supplies.
- b. Maintenance of military vehicles allotted to civil supply haulage.
- c. Care of refugees behind army rear boundaries.
- d. Maintenance of roads.

2. Appendix 'A' is now affected by the reduction of 63 officers by NATOUSA letter of 3 June. If our ceiling remains at 635 only 131 are available for other needs.

The question of safety margin of American Warrant Officers and Naval Officers was not mentioned but was considered when the Chief Commissioner accepted a ceiling of 635 American officers.

3. The statement in par. 10 of appendix 'A' that a 10% reduction of equipment is necessary cannot be accepted. The use of Italian or Allied personnel to replace officers will require as much or more office equipment as if officers filled the positions. As many or more motor vehicles are necessary since with the reduced number of officers, each one has to cover a wide territory.

COMMENTS ON APPENDIX "B" TO COLONEL SPOFFORD'S LETTER

1. W.E. of 663 Officers (British) was designed to cover the whole of Italy but did not take into consideration the following extra commitments with which ACC is now burdened.

Food Sub-Commission - not considered at all originally.
Increased staff Displaced Persons Sub-Commission.
Italian Refugees Branch - not considered at all originally.
Largely increased staff of Economic Section.

2. The 635 British Officers quoted by the Chief Commissioner takes us only as far as the Pisa-Rimini line and no further. It appears certain that we shall go further than this before any collapse occurs in Central Europe.

3. We must obtain confirmation of the present W.E. At present the position of

- 1 Lieut. General
- 1 Brigadier
- 5 Colonels
- 23 Lieut. Colonels

is uncertain.

We cannot make promotions to fill these vacancies nor can we take on Officers to fill our establishment up to 645.

If in addition we have to hold Officers against the 18 who are to be struck off, the position becomes more difficult. I am afraid we shall lose staff pay for some Officers from 6 Jan until the date that the 18 are removed from us to F _____. That cannot be permitted. There are at least 4 Officers who should be struck off against this 18, in my opinion. This has not yet been confirmed by AFHQ.

4. As regards O.Rs.-

The position is not clear and a separate letter is being put up. We have to lose some British M/T personnel who will be replaced by Italians. There is some difference of opinion as to actual numbers.

We are, however, faced with the loss of over 200 G.D. men who are surplus - at the same time we have no hope of getting our deficiencies in Clerks and M/T personnel made up. The solution is to post us A.T.S. We have asked A.A.I. for

200 A.T.S. Clerks
70 A.T.S. Drivers

Up to date none have been received. They are urgently needed.

5. I think we must alter the W.E. for Transport. G-4 has submitted proposals. These proposals also involve a large increase in Driver personnel.

6. Care is being taken of para 10 of the Appendix.

15 June 44

R. H. FARREN
Colonel
Executive Officer

ESTABLISHMENT BRANCH

EstO/Jun-2

JJA/jmv

2 June 1944

MEMORANDUM:

TO : G-5, AFHQ

1. To implement recommendations contained in my letter and later conversation with Colonel Spefford, the following recommendations are made for the reorganization of American administration within ACC:

a. That the 2675th Regiment ACC (US Contingent) be re-designated as Headquarters & Headquarters Company ACC (US Contingent).

b. That the Senior American Officer assigned to and stationed at Headquarters ACC be designated Commanding Officer of the above Headquarters & Headquarters Company.

c. That the Senior American Officer (Regional Commissioner or Executive) in each Region and Army AMG be designated as the Commanding Officer of the American Detachment of the Region or of the Army AMG.

d. That the Senior Officers designated in b and c above appoint such number of American officers as may be required to conduct the essential American administration and supply for the American officers and enlisted men at Headquarters and within the Regions and AMG of Armies. The above number of officers will vary according to the strength of the American personnel within any of the Sub-Divisions. In areas where the numbers are few, the American Detachment Commander, Supply Officer and any others required may perform American Administrative duties in addition to other duties. The Senior Officer will in all cases be responsible that the necessary reports are submitted, that supplies are drawn, issued, maintained and accounted for as required by American Regulations, and that the discipline and welfare of officers and enlisted men are properly administered.

2. The advantages accruing from this redesignation, in my opinion will be as follows:

a. It will permit a considerable saving in man power at Headquarters ACC by the abolishment of the Regimental Headquarters and a combination of the S-1 and S-4 Sections of the Regiment with G-1 (A) and G-4 (A) Sections of Headquarters ACC. The S-1 and S-4 Sections are the bookkeeping elements of the G-1 (A) offices. For purely American reports through American channels, the Commanding Officer of Headquarters & Headquarters Company, either personally or through an Executive, will be responsible for the submission and correctness of the required reports and for all American administration. Saving of personnel in a lesser degree will be possible within each of the Regional organizations.

b. The activities of American administrative personnel will be much more closely coordinated with ACC activities since the Commanding Officer of the U. S. Contingent at Headquarters ACC will also be a Staff Member of the Chief Commissioner, and in the Regions and AMG of Armies will either be the Regional Commissioner, SCAC, or their Executives. At present the Commanding Officer, 2675th Regiment is not a Staff Officer of the Chief Commissioner and the Company Officers in the field are Junior Officers responsible to the Regimental Commander. This sets them apart from, and to a certain extent, isolates them from ACC policies and activities.

c. The redesignation will eliminate the necessity for compliance with certain regulations applicable to a normal Regiment, but which are not applicable to the U. S. Contingent of ACC. This contingent and its present organizations are in no way comparable to a normal Regimental organization. Attempts to comply with all regulations applicable to a normal Regiment has resulted in increase in the number of personnel necessary for administration.

d. It will ensure a greater degree of cooperation on the American Administrative Headquarters with Headquarters ACC.

e. It complies with the military principle that the Senior American Officer in any Sub-Division is the officer who is completely responsible for all American affairs in that area.

f. A constant source of irritation to the Chief Commissioner and Regional Commissioners would be removed by the elimination of the dual chain of command now existing - ACC and Regimental channels.

3. It is believed that if the Senior American Officer at Headquarters ACC were a General Officer, there would be many advantages, particularly so for disciplinary measures over the officer personnel in ACC. This would place the American representation at Headquarters more nearly on a par with the British.

JOHN J. ALBRIGHT
Colonel, Infantry
Establishment Officer

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HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
ESTABLISHMENT BRANCH
APO 394

JJA/el

KstO/Aug-25

25 August 1944

SUBJECT: Dilution of Enlisted Strength

TO : AFHQ -- G-5

1. Reference your letter of 3 August 44, G-5: 230.4-11, subject as above, the enlisted strength of the 2675th Regiment has never been sufficient for all of Italy. The original allocation to the 2675th Regiment was based on a Paper which included the strength from Regions 1 to 7. We are now functioning, in addition, in Regions 8 and 9. A considered study of the needs for enlisted men in ACC made on April of this year, after experience in the Southern regions, indicated that up to the Pisa-Rimini Line we needed 1605 enlisted men. Since we have had less than that, we already have had to dilute our strength with Italian personnel, both soldiers and civilians. The figures of the present strength of EM/ORs, Italian soldiers and civilians, by classification, now employed by ACC are given below:

	American	British	Italian Soldiers	Italian Civilians
Clerks	627	261		559
Drivers	184	484		175
Mechanics	21	25		56
Cooks	14	43		
General Duty	52	356	9 Off 254 ORs	321 (*)
Sp Technicians	24			
Motor Transport.			3 Off 159 ORs	
Hotels & Messes				461
	952	1174	12 Off 413 ORs	1572

(*)

Includes cleaners

The distribution of the present enlisted men in ACC is as given in inclosure one. You will note that the total strength at present is 73 short of our full allotment. The shortages are caused by men returned to the United States on rotation (replacements for which have not been received) and by the transfer of a group to the 2678th Regiment. Requisitions for the shortages, less those on rotation for whom replacements are due, have been made and are expected within a few days. From this number the enlisted men for Regions 10 and 11, and additional ones for Region 12, must be found. A large number of these will come from those shown at Headquarters.

2. The total of 400 shown at Headquarters includes detachments of the Transportation Subcommittee, the Food Subcommittee, and others working in the field under Headquarters direction. It also includes personnel used in the Regimental Headquarters, Supply, and Personnel Sections.

EptO/Aug-25

Hq ACC Ltr, 25 Aug 44

Subject: Dilution of Enl Strength

3. You will note that there are only 205 drivers and mechanics despite the fact that we have 654 American vehicles on the T/E of the Regiment and some 400 or 500 American vehicles issued for use of road haulage of civilian supplies. Thus, the above number is entirely inadequate to properly maintain American vehicles despite the fact that we have already diluted the strength with Italian drivers and mechanics. It has been found from experience that it takes at least one American driver and mechanic to supervise the work of three to four Italian drivers and mechanics.

4. The dilution of British ORs by Italian soldiers has been of equal benefit to the American side of ACC and dilution must be considered as an overall picture. In my opinion, dilution cannot be further made without a great loss in efficiency. The Chief Commissioner asked for an additional 600 EM/ORs for the area north of the Pisa-Rimini Line. His request was made with the full consideration of a possible dilution of Allied personnel by Italian soldiers and civilians. Efficiency of operation has been considerably reduced by the dilution which has already been made. As we stretch our personnel over a wider area it will be impossible to properly supervise the present strength of Italian personnel with the available officers, EM/ORs. The entire northern half of Italy recently liberated and to be liberated in the near future will require more Allied military personnel than can actually be spared for the job and with the situation which will arise in Northern Italy, it will be impossible to utilize in that area any considerable number of Italian personnel for some time.

JOHN J. ALMIGHT
Colonel, Infantry
Establishment Officer

20 August 44

AMC/ACC - Strength of EM

	Clerks	Supply	Gen Dy	Cooks	Misc	Drivers	Veh Mech	Total
Hq & Hq Co	253	12	31	21	20	48	15	400
Region 1	18	1	1	2		8		30
Region 2	14		1	1				16
Region 3	39	1	1	4	2	2		49
Region 4	70	1	5	2		23	3	104
Region 5	26	3	1	1		7	1	39
Region 6	16			3				19
Region 7	3	1						4
Region 8	31	1		2	1	18		53
Region 9	35	3	2	2	1	13	2	58
Region Z	36			4		17		57
AMC 9th A) &) AMC 8th A)	28	2	10	1		43		84
I.R.B.	3							3
I.D.P.	13	6		1		5		25
ACC Liaison	1							1
TD G-5 AFHQ	9							9
	596	31	52	44	24	184	24	952

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

CMS/GLB/as

G-5: 230.4-11

3 August 1944

SUBJECT: Dilution of Enlisted Strength.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Control Commission, APO 394.
(Attention: Establishments Branch)

1. In line with the request for the dilution of the British Other Rank strength of ACC, as set forth in the letter of the Chief of Staff 423/Org-3, dated 28 July 1944, the Deputy Chief of Staff, AFHQ, has now directed that similar steps be taken in the case of United States enlisted personnel, as stated to Brigadier Lush by telephone.

2. It is requested that an immediate report be furnished this Section, showing a functional breakdown of the enlisted men assigned to the 2675th Regiment and the number of EM engaged in each activity.

3. It is further requested that your views be expressed as to which, and in what amounts, functions now being performed by enlisted men can be turned over to Italian personnel, either military or civilian.

4. An amount of dilution, on paper only, has already been effected in the case of British Other Rank drivers. Similar steps have not yet been taken with enlisted men and it is believed that this can be done with less sacrifice of efficiency than in most other fields. Italians can, to an even greater extent, be substituted for those EM now on straight-duty assignments.

5. The policy of the Deputy Chief of Staff has been so stated as to require a determined effort by ACC to furnish an accurate statement of the present position and immediate steps to perform any dilution subsequently ordered.

/s/ Charles M. Spofford
CHARLES M. SPOFFORD,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5

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REPLACEMENT BRANCH

JSA/jav

3 July 1964

EstO/Jal-3

Colonel Charles M. Spofford,
Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-5, AFHQ, APO 512.

My dear Colonel Spofford:

I have been in the hospital about ten days and trying to catch up on the work for the last three or four days so that no reply to your letter 24 June, G-5: 381.1-3, with reference to the problem of ACC coming within the agreed ceiling on the American side, has been given. We have, however, been hard at work attempting to make out a list of the officers that we can most easily spare and will probably be able to create vacancies as rapidly as you will need them.

Thus far, we have been counting Captain Correa as one vacancy, we are this date transferring to the Civil Affairs Detachment, at Col. Garry's request, a Major Long and Capt. Powhida (Divisional GAOs), and we are about to request transfer to Replacement Centers of a few junior officers who are not suitable as Civil Affairs Officers.

We are undoubtedly going to have to declare surplus several officers over the age of 38. I anticipate that such transfers will take a considerable length of time to accomplish unless we have the assistance of your office. We will send copies of all correspondence to you so that you will be in a position to speed up action. We will probably need the same type of assistance on our request to send junior officers of combat branches to Replacement Centers. For that reason, I am attaching a copy of a letter to which we have received no reply in which we attempted to get blanket authority to transfer these officers to Replacement Centers. You will note in Col. Parkin's indorsement that one officer was transferred by NATOUSA authority. If we can get blanket authority either for our own Headquarters or for Headquarters AAI to make these transfers, it will speed, very greatly, the creation of vacancies for other Civil Affairs commitments.

If there is anything you can do to speed up the decision on the Army Sub-Commission's separate T/O on the American side, it will be of great assistance to us. When the Chief Commissioner accepted the 635 ceiling, he did not include any personnel for this Sub-Commission, and there are now carried on our rolls 12 American officers.

If we have to carry those within the 635 limit in our expanding territorial situation, it is going to be a real hardship and some other activities will suffer seriously. Major Warren of the International Division, mentioned in your letter referred to above has not appeared here and consequently we have received no information from him in reference to the situation.

It would be a further help if the arrival of the civilians arranged by Mr. Gedy in Washington could join us before too long.

We appreciate all the efforts you have made to help us and in return we will do everything possible on this side to create vacancies as they are needed for the other commitments.

Sincerely,

JOHN J. ALBRIGHT,
Colonel, Infantry,
Establishment Officer.

Incl: a/n letter

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

GMS/AHA/as

G-5: 381.1-3

24 June 1944

SUBJECT: Allotment of Personnel.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Control Commission,
APO 394.

1. Reference your letter of 9 June and our letter of 28 May. We have given further consideration to the difficult problem of ACC's coming within the agreed ceiling, in the light, particularly, of the rapid territorial advance.

2. The allotment of 635 officers, 14 Warrant officers and 971 EM within the regimental totals of 766 officers, 15 Warrant officers and 1045 EM may be increased temporarily to 655 officers and 985 EM. At the present time there are 75 officers in the C.A.D. and approximately 10 others attached who do not count against your ceiling of 635.

3. We have already requested that vacancies as they occur should be filled only after reference to this section. It was planned that vacancies occurring would be used for recruitment for the Civil Affairs Detachment, and that this would be one means of your coming within your ceiling. We must ask also that you take immediate steps, by retirement of officers over 38, by sending surplus officers to replacement centers and by other appropriate means, to reduce A.C.C. officer personnel by at least 20 in order to permit essential recruitment. In other words we hope that during July, the CAD will be able to add some 25 by this reduction and normal turnover. We do not know when we may be forced to call upon you for the remaining 20 places.

4. With respect to the Army Sub Commission, the difficulty appears to be that the CCS has serious question as to the scope and function of the unit. Major Warren of the International Division is now here on temporary duty in the theater and will be able to inform you regarding this. We are hopeful that the allotment will still be approved for whatever functions it is decided are appropriate.

5. The prospect of getting an additional allotment for any other purpose appears very remote. On a global basis this theater does not now have a high priority and it appears most improbable that, even for an emergency, additional allotments

would be authorized here at the expense of other theaters. Within the theater, since it is reducing to authorized strength, there appears no present prospect of any additional allotment.

6. The infiltration of civilians and greater reliance on the existing Italian administration with the advance appears to offer partial solutions. On the EM side, we are negotiating with SHREF for an additional allotment for the Civil Affairs Detachment which would permit the release of at least 65 places to you. Of these you now have some 14 in addition to the 971 who have been firmly yours.

7. We have been glad to continue to make available, during the period of the discussion of the ceiling and for the last month, the additional officers. We trust that the current necessity of effectuating the policies we have been discussing will be in line with your own previous plans for meeting this difficult but unavoidable situation.

CHARLES M. SPOTFORD
Colonel, G.S.C.
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5



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ESTABLISHMENT BRANCH

ExtO/Jun-9

JJA/jmv

Colonel Charles M. Spofford
Assistant Chief of Staff
G-5, AFHQ, APO 512

9 June 1944

Dear Colonel Spofford:

NATOUA letter of 3 June, AG 221.02/570 A-0, subject "Allotment of Personnel" which you have undoubtedly seen decreases the allotment of officers to 766. This is a serious blow to all of us and especially to ACC at this time of increasing operations. As you probably know, we are over our 635 ceiling at present and we are finding great difficulty in getting Region VIII organized and into the area in conjunction with the officers required for the harvest.

What will happen as the advance moves rapidly north, is a very urgent problem. I discussed that point with you here and no solution seemed readily available. The hope that officers with tactical units would be made available was expressed but there is nothing definite on it. We visualize dropping our spearhead units into the last few Provinces but they will not be able to cover too much territory. It appears here that the Pisa-Rimini line will be reached fairly soon. Therefore, some decision must be reached quickly as to whether we will get any additional allotment, if so how many. If not, we must completely revamp our plans.

Our present overstrength did not worry me until receipt of the reduced allowance. It does worry me now particularly since I know it has to cover the whole theatre. If we are forced to cut our present strength, I can reduce a few by getting rid of the incapables. As we stand today, the incapables are of more value than no one at all. Our problem is further complicated by the number of specialist officers currently going to hospital - agriculture in particular.

The Army Sub-Commission is in a very bad way as eight of their officers have been directed to return to their parent unit, our request for their assignment having been disapproved. You will hear from General Lemnitzer on that by cable.

I am quite anxious to have some word from you relative plans to continue under the reduced allotment. How many of the 766 officers do you need at once? How soon must we cut to 635 or can we hold on for a reduced allotment? How should I plan for personnel of the above mentioned line? Quite a problem!

Sincerely,

JOHN J. ALBRIGHT

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

CMS/RB/jjr

28 May 1944

G-5: 381.1.3

SUBJECT: Personnel for Allied Control Commission

TO : Headquarters, Allied Control Commission, APO 394
Reference is made to your 16031/1/G-1 of 24 April 1944.

1. Your conclusions as to the need of 1270 officers are concurred in and this number will be allotted. Your conclusions as to the number of EM/ORs needed cannot under present conditions be implemented. The number available is discussed as to American EM in Appendix A, and as to British OR's in Appendix B.

2. The above allotment of officers and EM/ORs will therefore be your ceiling for Italy under the following conditions:

a. Continued enemy resistance in Central Europe and in Italy as far south of the PISA-RIMINI line, requiring you to carry out Military Government and control activities in all territories South of the PISA-RIMINI line.

b. Enemy collapse in Central Europe before the Allied Armies in Italy are North of the PISA-RIMINI line, requiring you to carry out such Military Government and control activities as may be necessary in the whole of Italy, but at the same time without the necessity of further prosecuting the war in Europe.

3. Your request for an additional 300 officers and 600 EM/ORs in the event of enemy resistance in Central Europe continuing for some considerable time after the enemy has either been driven out of, or withdrawn from Italy is noted. It is not possible at this stage to provide an allotment for such a contingency, as this matter is bound up with the future development of the war as a whole, and not merely the campaign in Italy. The situation will, however, be reviewed from time to time in the light of developments.

4. Current proposals for implementing the allotment of American officers, EMs, are contained in Appendix "A".

5. Proposals which are to be put forward with regard to the British War Establishment are contained in Appendix "B".

/s/ Charles M. Spofford
/t/ CHARLES M. SPOFFORD
Colonel, GSC
Asst Chief of Staff, G-5

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OFFICERS:Appendix "A"

1. Although the 2675th Regiment (Prov) was originally established for ACC-AMG, it has been for sometime, as a result of War Department & Natoussa directives as to other operations and limitations as to personnel available, the repository for civil affairs personnel for various Theater operations. The approved T/O for the regiment provides for 829 officers. On this T/O are now carried officers with ACC and the Civil Affairs Detachment and those on detached service, principally with MGS and PWB.

2. With approval of an allotment of 635 American Officers for ACC, the remaining allotment will, when administratively feasible, be transferred to a separate unit, leaving the 2675th Regiment (Prov) confined to ACC personnel. This should simplify administration as to personnel not in Italy, and should permit certain economies because of the identity of the regimental records and those for American personnel, ACC.

3. As other needs develop any available qualified officers in excess of the allotment of 635 will be transferred from ACC. From time to time there will also be some substitution of specialized personnel, such as engineers, for officers with qualifications not needed in ACC but required elsewhere.

4. The War Department has indicated that additional officers from the Zone of Interior are not available for ACC. It is expected that the infiltration of civilian specialists will continue. Unless further limitations as to personnel are imposed by the War Department, this will not affect the allotment of 635 officers.

5. Attached Naval Officers, now numbering approximately 20, will not be counted against the allotment of 635.

6. The ranks in the allotment of 635 will be as follows:

	<u>Regt T/O</u>	<u>ACC Allotment</u>	<u>Allotment other Needs</u>
Colonel	44	32	12
Lt Colonel	107	79	28
Major	290	224	66
Captain	268	208	60
1st Lt	89	68	21
2d Lt	31	24	7
Total	829	635	194

ENLISTED MEN:

7. The T/O for the 2675th Regiment authorizes 1045 EM. Of this number, by previous action, 65 were reserved for the Civil Affairs Detachment and 9 for MGS.

8. It appears that there is no possibility of increasing the regimental T/O, but it is proposed to remove the 74 EM reserved for other needs from the regimental rolls when and if other provision is authorized for them, the total of 1045 EM then becoming available to ACC. It may be pointed out that this is slightly above the ratio of 1.6 EM to 1 officer indicated by the War Department, as the approved ratio in its plans for SHAEF. It is recognized that 1045 is below the minimum considered essential for ACC; the deficit will have to be made up by the employment of Italians and if feasible American civilians.

Appendix "A"

Recommendation has been made for a change in War Department policy to permit the employment of American civilian women.

WARRANT OFFICERS:

9. The T/O for the 2675th Regiment authorizes 15 warrant officers. One of these positions is now included in the Civil Affairs Detachment. The remaining 14 will continue to be available to ACC. The memorandum of ACC of 24 April 1944 does not mention Warrant Officers; they may be considered to constitute a small safety margin of personnel above the minimum estimates.

EQUIPMENT:

10. The reduction of the personnel ceiling for ACC from 1889 (829 off, 15 W.O., 1045 EM) to 1694 will necessitate a proportionate reduction in equipment available. This will amount to approximately 10%.

Appendix "B"OFFICERS:

1. The present WE which was approved locally authorises 663 Officers. This was originally designed to cover the whole of Italy. The War Office now proposes to investigate this WE in some detail.

2. Since the WE was formed the following major changes in policy have occurred.

- (a) Limitation of present Civil Affairs planning & provision for occupation only so far as the PISA-RIMINI Line. (but see para 2 of covering letter).
- (b) Equal American and British representation.

3. The establishment of 663 officers as approved locally here for Italy has now been frozen by high policy decision in London as the para military ceiling of officers for this Theatre. Future commitments placed upon the SAC Mediterranean Theatre will require an increase in this theatre ceiling either by an overall world increase which is unlikely, or by transferring a proportion of the allotment of SHAEF to this Theatre. This process will of necessity take considerable time, whereas a great deal of planning is required now.

4. It has therefore become urgent that a small Civil Affairs planning establishment be set up in North Africa for the purpose of investigating requirements and planning for future commitments outside Italy and the Balkans.

5. It is therefore proposed to set up a small planning WE of 18 Officers, to be offset by a reduction of 18 Officers in WE NA/266/1. The reduction in your establishment will be effected in the following ranks.

Brigadier	3
Colonels	5
Lieuts	10
	<hr/>
	18

This will leave you with 645 Officers, which gives you a reserve of 10 Officers over the 635 required.

6. It is hoped to obtain War Office confirmation of your existing WE except as modified by para 5 above.

OTHER RANKS:

7. The only reduction of ORs that is likely to be made is substitution of Italian transport personnel as approved in your 16031/2/G-1 of 1 April 44. This will leave you with an establishment of approximately 1031 British ORs and 605 Italian ORs.

8. It is not proposed that the creation of a small Civil Affairs planning unit will require any further reduction in your ceiling for ORs.

Appendix "B" (contd)

TRANSPORT:

9. It is not proposed to alter the WE for transport.

GENERAL:

10. It is pointed out that with the proposed officer reduction in WE the greatest care must be taken to ensure that, by further local recruiting by you and upgrading of existing officers, your establishment is not exceeded either in total numbers or in particular ranks (other than the holding of junior ranks against higher ranking vacancies). If this care is not exercised considerable disappointment and financial hardship will result in the case of a number of officers. Recruitment of officers above a strength of 645 should not be made.

Ref: 16051/1/C-1.

24th April 1944

SUBJECT: HQ/TO - HQ. Allied Control Commission.

TO : Military Government Section,
Allied Force Headquarters.

1. I have delayed reply to your HQS.210.3 of 19th February until the reorganisation of this Commission had reached a stage when I could take stock of our commitments, both accepted and anticipated, and present to you reasonably firm proposals and estimates.

2. The Vice Presidents and I have given considerable thought to the number of officers and other personnel required to fulfill the commitments of the Commission up to the Rimini-Pisa Line.

3. The following are our conclusions:-

American Officers.....	635
British Officers.....	635
Enlisted Men.....	1195
British Other Ranks.....	1347

4. These figures in my considered opinion represent the minimum establishment for this Commission if it is to perform its proper duty of administering the forward areas and advising and controlling the Italian Government, both centrally and locally, to the best advantage of the Allied war effort in this theatre.

5. I need not enumerate the growing commitments of this Commission. I will instead, refer you to the minutes of the meeting of Regional Commissioners and Sub-Commissions of 14th April. I would emphasise two points. Firstly, HQ AAI are rightly placing upon this Commission, at HQ and in the field, particularly in the Economic Section, an ever increasing number of responsibilities, e.g., maintenance of highways, of railways, electric power, etc. Secondly, the presence in liberated Italy of Allied troops in great numbers both now and in the future make it imperative to raise the standard of administration and economic functions to a level and a tempo which are inaccessible and unnatural to the Italians unaided; constant supervision is needed; Allied officers must be at their sides - not governing but advising. Law and order must be maintained, distribution of food arranged, dispersal of refugees organized; but due to the presence of Allied troops and the proximity of operations the standard of security

must be higher than Southern Italy and the Islands have ever known: Labour must work with unprecedented regularity and efficiency: the food must be off-loaded from ships and trains and trucks more rapidly than in normal times: refugees must be collected and moved and dispersed against time, in areas reduced in number and capacity by the presence of troops. Consequently more supervision and more officers are required.

6. Apart from the responsibilities already undertaken and anticipated, the Commission will assuredly be faced with new commitments in the future: they may arise through unforeseen circumstances: they may be placed upon us by the C.-in-C. in order to relieve troops for operational duties. They are innumerable but inevitable.

7. The Combined Supply Group of Combined Civil Affairs Committee which recently visited this territory was insistent that the existing representation of Sub-Commissions in the field was inadequate: they recommended an increase of 15 in one Sub-Commission alone, and suggested the appointment of one representative of each Sub-Commission in every Province, both in occupied and liberated Italy. There are 50 Provinces in the territory in question.

8. Unless I can confidently assure the C.-in-C. that the Commission is reasonably self-contained, capable of dealing with any emergency up to the Rimini-Rice line, the Commission cannot be said to be fulfilling its proper functions in this theatre. In my opinion I cannot give that assurance if the numbers of officers on which I can call is reduced below 1270 and the N/Or below 2540 (2 N/Or to every officer).

9. I do not include in these figures British or American personnel on the strength of the Army Sub-Commission. The British WE for this Sub-Commission is being dealt with separately by HQ. AAI and the American T/O should be treated in the same way. Neither do I include officers or N/Or attached to FWD, nor to formations in North Africa. Every man is needed in this theatre, and in this Commission.

10. I have not neglected dilution by Italian and civilian personnel throughout the theatre. But there are many duties and responsibilities which, at any rate in the present demoralised state of Italian officialdom, cannot be delegated to Italians and must be performed by American or British personnel. For instance, the safeguarding of imported food is vital. The value of wheat and flour alone imported since the beginning of 1944 amounts to well over twenty million dollars. There has been much publicity regarding the pilfering of this flour on its journey from ship to bakeries. The pilfering would have been infinitely greater had we not employed Allied personnel to check it, and infinitely less had we possessed more Allied personnel. Allied personnel, especially N/Ors, are a good insurance against grievous loss connected with the many valuable commodities and materials imported by this Commission.

11. The activities above referred to represent only one example of the use of N/Or. Of the 1270 officers roughly 400 are employed at the HQ of the Commission and its Sub-Commissions. A very considerable clerical staff is essential if the extensive and valuable documentary work is to be carried out adequately, and if the Sub-Commissions are to fulfill their roles in this country and furnish the abundant information required by your Headquarters, the C.C.A., and the many ministries and departments in the USA and UK whose assistance is

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vital to the Commission. Similarly, a field officer loses much of his value if he cannot pass information to Headquarters. Field officers must have clerical staffs. In the forward areas they must have Allied drivers. The mechanical transport, both domestic and Italian, will break down unless a considerable supervisory mechanical staff of Allied personnel is provided. An immobile Commission and unserviceable trucks spell disaster to administration and food distribution alike.

12. In the attached list I have shown the distribution of officers as between Sections and Sub-Commissions. The fluid state of operations makes it imprudent to be more precise regarding the distribution by Regions. The 329 CAOs shown under the P.C. & M.C. Section include Administrative staff at Regional HQs and Provincial Offices for eight Regions and two Army AMCs. The 120 officers shown against the Public Safety Sub-Commission represent 3 at HQ and 112 CAPU's in the Regions. Similarly the numbers shown against Sub-Commissions include officers at HQ and officers in the Regions in a proportion approximately of one to two.

13. The ranks of the specialist Sub-Commissions, especially in the Economic Section, may appear to be swollen. The proportion of specialists to provincial officers (CAO's) is greater in liberated Italy than in territory under Allied Military Government. In the latter areas these experts are necessary because the work is of a highly specialised nature: in the former areas it has been my experience that unless the specialist representatives of the Sub-Commissions remain, some work vital to the Allied military interests breaks down. The Public Works Sub-Commission now employs 27 officers wholly on the maintenance of military highways under military direction. With the number at my disposal you can rest assured that there will be no possibility, even if the intention was there, of prolonging Allied Military Government in liberated Italy. Every man will be required in the forward areas, and gradually but very definitely, Sicily, Sardinia, and the territory in the mainland handed over to the Italian Government will be denuded of AOC staff, leaving a bare minimum to ensure that Allied interests are safeguarded.

14. In the territory in question I am, or shall be, responsible to the C.-in-C. for the administration and feeding, directly or indirectly, of over 25 million people. All have suffered demoralization and dislocation from war and occupation by alien armies: many thousands are homeless: food is short, communications are broken, clothing is scarce: all the evils resulting from defeat and battle are present: the government of the country is makeshift, its sovereign discredited. My duty is to produce the maximum war effort in every sphere of work from these people. 1270 officers and 2540 EM/GR would appear a slender staff for the endeavour. It cannot be accomplished with less.

ROSE HAZEN MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant General,
Chief Commissioner.

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Appendix "A" to 16031/1/C-1 dated 24th Apr. 1944.

SUGGESTED CHANGES OF OFFICERS FOR AMBULANCE, SUB-COMMISSIONS, ETC., HQ. AGL.

Chief Commissioner.	3	
Deputy Chief Commissioner.	2	
Secretary General & Archives.	3	
Public Relations Branch.	7.....	15
Political Section.	3.....	3
<u>Administrative Section.</u>		
Vice President & Staff.	5	
Interior Sub-Commission.	7	
Public Safety Sub-Commission.	120	
Public Health Sub-Commission.	62	
Property Control Sub-Commission.	22	
Legal Sub-Commission.	61	
Education Sub-Commission.	11	
Monuments & Fine Arts Sub-Commission.	12.....	300
<u>Economic Section.</u>		
Vice President & Staff.	8	
Agriculture Sub-Commission.	42	
Industry & Commerce & Mines Sub-Com.	50	
Labour Sub-Commission.	34	
Food Sub-Commission.	87	
Public Works Sub-Commission.	74	
Transportation Sub-Commission.	55	
Finance Sub-Commission.	130.....	480
<u>Regional Control & Military Govt. Section.</u>		
Executive Commissioner.	3	
Civil Affairs Branch (Deputy Exec. Com)	2	
	10	
Information Division.	3	
Establishment Branch.	41	
Security Branch.	6	
Italian Refugee Branch.	24	
Displaced Persons Sub-Commission.	35	
Regions I - VII & Army Areas - CAGs.	385.....	449
<u>Independent Sub-Commissions.</u>		
Communications Sub-Commission.	20	
War Materials Sub-Commission.	3.....	23

TOTAL..... 1270

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