

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785020

10000/120/190

AQ/53/17

Col. - Howard's Liaison Logs

1st Cover

MAR. - APR. 1945

LAIR FORCE'S SUB CORP. A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)

DO/3

April 48

TO : MMIA LO 8 Army
MMIA LO 5 Army, Br Iner

50 BLU,
51 BLA.
52 BLU,
53 BLU,
54 BLU,
55 BLU,
56 BLU,
57 BLU

Copies to: 58 BLU,

59 BLU

Dear

Prompted by Lt. Col. HOWARD's Liaison report to GOC MMIA after his last visit to the Armies, I am taking this opportunity of putting you in the picture and answering certain specific questions which he raised.

Firstly the relationship of MMIA to the BLUs. As seen as a Combat Group comes under command of an army the BLU becomes rather like a British Div HQ entirely dependent on its next higher commander of all G and Q matters, but, being Italian, the A matters pass largely through Italian channels, so MMIA still comes in here. I attach a copy of AFHQ letter, AG 091.112/119 OCT-3 of 20 December 1944, which is the latest order on the subject and must be obeyed, which means of course, you are no longer as much our child as you used to be!

Naturally we cannot help continuing to take a keen interest in children of our own begetting, but obviously must let their present employers have full control of them operationally and continue in the background to do our utmost for them as far as we are permitted.

Secondly the question of the method of trying men accused of serious crimes and the proposal to attach a legal officer to Group (or Adm Divs concerned) is being considered at this moment and a decision will be given you as soon as the investigations are complete. It is a question of fully qualified officers, there are also Italian legal questions involved.

Thirdly the question of stoppages of pay to make good losses of equipment is being examined. If the punishment is to have any deterrent value it would seem that certain items of personal equipment and attractive stores must be given a higher value than the actual cost price to the British Govt (in view of Black Market prices and their temptation); on the other hand the cost of damage to M.F. or armaments could obviously not be charged in full. We will give you guidance as soon as we can.

Fourthly the question of W.E's is entirely one for Armies concerned and as we are not in a position to act on recommendations until the matter is referred to us by Army HQ.

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least visit to the Armies, I am taking this opportunity of putting you in the picture and answering certain specific questions which have been raised.

Firstly the relationship of MHA to the ELAs. As soon as a Combat Group comes under command of an Army the ELA becomes rather like a British Div HQ entirely dependent on its next higher commander for all G and Q matters, but, being Italian, the A matters pass largely through Italian channels, or MHA still comes in here. I attach a copy of AFHQ letter, AG 091.112/119 GGT-O of 20 December 1944, which is the latest order on the subject and must be obeyed, which means of course, you are no longer as much our child as you used to be.

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Fourthly the question of W.E.'s is entirely one for Armies concerned and we are not in a position to set on recommendations until the matter is referred to us by Army HQ.

Fifthly It is admitted that up to now the reinforcements training Centro at CESANO has not been able to produce what the Groups wanted and reinforcements have inevitably been sent up badly clothed and not fully trained.

I should like to emphasize that the RHC is a very different thing now from what it was a few weeks ago. There are over 11,000 men there under training. As you can well realize, it has been quite a business starting CESANO but Field-Marshal ALEXANDER visited it himself on May 12 and was very pleased and satisfied to find it a live and rapidly developing concern. A letter describing fully the organization and the kind of training that is carried out is being sent to you. The equipment situation is well in hand now and as from the middle of April, all infantry reinforcements will have had at least eight weeks training.

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- 2 -

In this question of reinforcements we are trying to establish the principle of direct contact between the Groups and the RTO. The same applies to the BLU's and "M" BLU at RTO. If Combat Group officers can visit the RTO and explain their reinforcements problems, so much the better, and Lieut/Col HACKER, the commander of "M" BLU has told me that he will always be pleased to see officers of BLU's, whenever they can be spared. "M" BLU is on a similar W.E. to the Combat Group BLU with a GSO1 and a representation of each Service.

The best way of giving the Combat Group a direct interest in the RTO, as suggested by Lt/Col HOWARD, would be to organize the reinforcements according to the Groups, an Infantry Bn for example being allotted to each Group, and being trained by officers of that Group. An arrangement of this kind is being made for the Naval Personnel of the San Marco Regiment.

I will see what can be done to extend this principle at the RTO, but I am advised by Lt/Col HACKER that it raises certain difficulties on the training side. Also, ~~concerning~~ at one central place is far better than individual efforts of Groups forward. There is one thing that Groups can do to help. The GME is withdrawing surplus officers from the Groups. It would help enormously if the Groups send back not the duds, but officers who would make good instructors, preferably those who did courses at the CMU and have now had some battle experience as well. I understand the GME has already put this point to the Groups with a far from warm response. On arrival at CESANO these officers could also look after the interests of their old Group.

Sixthly the cigarette problem has been rather a headache but we are still plugging away at it. Q tell me that "MACEDONIA" cigarettes are made in various grades in the same way as Allied ones. The "MACEDONIA" which is issued free is one of the cheap civilian brands (e.g. Woodlines). MILIT are slightly better grade and are usually the repayment brand. The quality of the free cigarettes will be checked with the government monopoly but they may have difficulty in raising the quality of the free issue (20% of their total output for the whole country). (In view of the quantities available for Br Increment BR-III tps, will MEMPH please say if Br Increment ST distribution for the 10 free per day is now satisfactory.)

Seventhly Withdrawal of Battle Dress from Combat Group Officers during summer. Orders for withdrawal of winter uniform will be issued by AMHRS. Suggest BLUs represent their views on this point through usual channels.

Eighthly. Our Special Section ceased to exist on 31 March and we are having an internal reorganisation, as a result of which we hope to have distinct branches as well as our present SD and AQ (which would become Q). I suggest that the proposals are approved.

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I will see what can be done to extend this principle at the RGC, but I am advised by Lt. Col. MCKAY that it raises certain difficulties on the training side. Also, ~~concerning~~ at one central place is far better than individual efforts of Groups forward. There is one thing that Groups can do to help. The GMEC is withdrawing surplus officers from the Groups. It would help enormously if the Groups send back not the duds, but officers who would take good instructors, preferably those who did courses at the GMEC and have now had some battle experience as well. I understand the GMEC has already put this point to the Groups with a far from warm response. On arrival at CESANO these officers could also look after the interests of their old Group.

Sixthly the cigarette problem has been rather a headache but we are still plugging away at it. Q tells me that "MACDONIA" cigarettes are made in various grades in the same way as Allied makes. The "MACDONIA" which is issued free is one of the cheap civilian brands (e.g. Woodbines). The quality of the slightly better grade and are usually the regiment monopoly but they may have free cigarettes will be shared with the government monopoly (20% of their total output difficulty in raising the quality of the free issue (20% of their total output for the whole country). (In view of the quantities available for Br Movement 32-III type, will NEWTON please say if Br Movement St distribution for the 10 free per day is now satisfactory.)

Seventhly Withdrawal of Battle Dress from Combat Group Officers during summer. Orders for withdrawal of winter uniform will be issued by AMIES. Suggest Hils represent their views on this point through usual channels.

Eightly. Our Special Section ceased to exist on 31 March and we are having an internal reorganisation, as a result of which we hope to have distinct A and Fg branches as well as our present SA and AQ (which would become Q). I hope to send you a full "A" directive as soon as the proposals are approved.

Lastly The General who, as you know, takes a great personal interest in you all is very delighted that the Groups are making their mark and being as well spoken of, and sends his best wishes.

Yours

Green



Copy to: File G 31/6

16x

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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12304

44
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46
47

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
AFC 512

: S P C 2 B 14 :
 : AUD: SACMT :
 : Initials: 003 :
 : 20 December 1944 :

AD 001.112/119 OCT-0

20 December 1944

SUBJECT: Responsibilities of Land Forces Sub-Commission
(MILIA) to Italian Group.

TTO : President, Allied Commission, APO 394
PCB: Land Forces Sub-Commission (NMIA)

1. In order to clarify the responsibilities of the Land Forces Sub-Commission towards the Italian Gruppi when the latter pass from under command of SURE (General Staff Headquarters of the Italian Army) to that of Allied formations, authorization is made for the Land Forces Sub-Commission to communicate direct with BLUs attached to Combat Groups under command of Allied formations on the following points:

- a. All matters of purely Italian administration.
 - b. Strengths and reinforcements.
 - c. Discipline.
 - d. Conditions of service, welfare, etc.
2. Copies of all correspondence on the above matters should be sent to the Allied Headquarters concerned.

3. all operational, executive and policy matters, also proposals by GLUs or Combat Groups for changes in organization will be made through normal staff channels to the Allied Headquarters concerned for decisions or recommendation to NMIA.

by command of Field Marshal Alexander:

/s/ R. H. Froese
/t/ R. H. FROESE
Captain, AGO,
Asst Adjutant General.

NOTIFICATION:

Example - 3

15th Army Group

(MMIA) to Italian Gruppi.

TO : President, Allied Commission, APO 394
FOR: Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA)

1. In order to clarify the responsibilities of the Land Forces Sub-Commission towards the Italian Gruppi when the latter pass from under command of SURE (General Staff Headquarters of the Italian Army) to that of Allied formations, authorization is made for the Land Forces Sub-Commission to communicate direct with BLUs attached to Combat Groups under command of Allied formations on the following points:

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 - b. Strengths and reinforcements.
 - c. Discipline.
 - d. Conditions of service, welfare, etc.
2. Copies of all correspondence on the above matters should be sent to the Allied Headquarters concerned.
3. All operational, executive and policy matters, also proposals by BLUs or Combat Groups for changes in organization will be made through normal staff channels to the Allied Headquarters concerned for decisions or recommendation to MMIA.

By command of Field Marshal ALEXANDER:

/s/ R. H. Freese
/t/ R. H. FRESE
Captain, AGD,
Asst Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION:
2 - Addressee
1 - 15th Army Gp
1 - ALCOM
1 - G-3 Ops (B)
1 - G-3 C-5 (B)
1 - G-1 (B)
1 - G-4 (B)
2 - G-3 (Org) Foreign
2 - AG Records
1 - AG M&T

5719

SECRET

To AMIA LO S Army. BR, Inc.
 PHIA LO S Army

Copies to EO 81.82.83.86. F. B. I.
 Form to file 5 31/8

Dear

Remember

It got through because report to ABC
 sent view to the Division, I am looking
 in the picture and
 this opportunity of putting you in the picture and
 this opportunity of putting you in the picture and
 this opportunity of putting you in the picture and

Fourth

As soon as we know rather like a British Div
 Army the BEU know rather like a British Div
 actually depended on the need for the matter
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Thirdly, the question of eligibility of persons to make good cars is a significant one in any circumstances. If the ~~present~~ ^{unimpaired} is to have any deterrent value it ~~is necessary~~ ^{is necessary} that certain items of personal equipment or ~~other~~ ^{other} attractive items must be given a higher value than the actual cost ~~present~~ ^{present} price of the British car (in view of Black ~~market~~ ^{market} ~~operation~~); or the other licensed the car of design 15 H.T. on armaments will stand out and be charged in full. We will give no guidance as soon as we can.

Fourthly, the question of W.C. is in another one to America concerned & we are not in a position to act on a decision until the matter is referred to us by any HQ.

Fourth (from Q)

Fourth

I hope you do not think your friends at H.M.H. are in a position to meet the needs of your needs.

Supplemental information - letter to [unclear]

Fifteen

2. It is admitted that up to now the reinforcement
 training Center of [unclear] has not been able to produce what
 the groups wanted and reinforcement have been out of body
 clothes and not fully trained. Consequently the reinforcement
 has been of no value in the whole situation.

I should like to emphasize that [unclear] is a
 very different thing now from what I was a few weeks ago.

Paula Morales Abreu visited [unclear] on May 12 and was very
 pleased to find her and [unclear] very
 fully to experience at the kind of training that is carried out
 in being sent to you. The equipment situation is still a hard
 one and we fear the middle of April all infantry reinforcement
 will have had at least eight weeks training.

The [unclear] question of reinforcement for the [unclear]
 to establish the principle of direct contact between the

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of the San Marcos Regiment

I will see what can be done to extend the principle
of the RTC but the ~~the~~ ³ are advised by Lt/Col Buckley that
I ~~must~~ raise the ^{confusion} of difficulties on the Training side. & there is one
thing that I hope we do to help. The S.M.C. is withdrawing

enough officers for the group. It would help consistency of the group and back me its duties but officers who would make good instructors, preferably those who did courses at the CMTC and have now had some little experience as well. I understand the S.M. B.E. has already put this ~~off~~ point to the group with an end for your action response. On point I believe the officers will also look after the interests of their old group.

~~With regard to the points raised with the Board
in the question of improvement training about a year or so
previously for the Committee however, the group was charged by the
LOB and if losses are expected then as no reason why improvements
should not be called forward from now to some extent in anticipation
of personnel being sent off. The committee it is now to be understood
that personnel will be sent off the rolls of the unit after 30 days
absence or in hospital, in the etc in deciding how many men~~

Sincerely

CIGARETTES:

The cigarette problem has been rather a headache but we are still plugging away at it. A bill me ~~the~~

(a) Quality of ~~VACEDONIA~~ FREE issue.

That "VACEDONIA" cigarettes are made in various grades in the same way as Allied makes. The "VACEDONIA" which is issued free is one of the cheap civilian brands (e.g. Goodwins). MILIT are slightly better grade and are usually the repayment brand. The quality of the free cigarettes will be checked with the government monopoly but they may have difficulty in raising the quality of the free issue (20% of their total output for the whole country).

(b) (in view of the quantities available for Br Increment BR-III tps, will NEWTON please say if Br Increment ST distribution for the 10 free per day is now satisfactory.)

Sincerely

Buttle Dues

Withdrawal of ~~free~~ Combat Op Offrs during the summer.

Orders for withdrawal of winter uniform will be issued by AEMIS. Suggest BLDs represent their views on this point through usual channels.

Luntly

P

who, as you know, take a great personal interest in you all

The General is very delighted that the Groups are making their mark & being so well spoken of, and sends his best wishes

now

Lightly.

Our Special Section as such has ceased to exist on 31 March and we are having an internal reorganisation as a result, which in hope to have distinct A and Tq branches as well as an ~~unit~~ SO and AQ (which would become Q). I hope to send you a full 'A' document. 11;

I intend as soon as the proposals are approved
file 6- 3/8

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SECRETSUBJECT: Liaison Tour to Combat GroupsTO : Land Forces Sub-Com. A.C. (3)
(M. M. I. A.)Senior Liaison Officer
Land Forces Sub-Com. A.C.
(M. M. I. A.)O/L
27 March 45

1. MIA LO was contacted on 17 March at Rear 8 Army and between 18 and 25 March FULGOM, PHULI and CHENOMA Groups were seen in that order. In each case OOC, C of S and all available regimental Cords were seen as well as O.C. BLU the O2 and RACMG. In addition, Brigadier AQ and GSO1 (Trg) 8 Army were visited. In the Combat Groups themselves I saw several Bn and Coy Cords and talked with a considerable number of men in the line.
2. In all three BLU's visited I got the impression that they felt out of touch with HQ MIA RMZ and that although they were more than pleased with the efforts made on their behalf by the MIA LO EIGHTH Army they regarded the Mission as a whole as a distant and often unenthusiastic supporter. This state of affairs can be remedied by more frequent personal contacts between heads of Branches and Services or their deputies and the BLU's, and by liaison visits of the kind I have just completed. (See directive on our contact with BLU's - he changed.)
3. My general impression of the Groups was as follows:
 - (a) Morale was almost universally excellent. There were some complaints about cigarettes, soap, the inability to get equal MAFI and Welfare treatment with British coloured troops, and widespread and well founded complaints about the slowness of mail, but by and large Officers and Men were in excellent spirits.
 - Not one of the many men talked to during my visit raised the usual complaint about leave.
 - (b) The fighting efficiency of the Groups appeared to vary according to the length of time they had had to settle down in the line, the amount of operational success so far achieved and the handling of the Group by its respective BLU. I should say that at the time of my visit their order of merit was CHENOMA, PHULI, FULGOM. Whatever their fighting efficiency is by Allied Standards, there is no doubt that the first two are more than holding their own in the line and personal bravery is nowhere lacking.
 - (c) The opinion of the British Command concerning the GROUPS was in each case sympathetic and laudatory. In the case of CHENOMA and PHULI it is generally felt that they have exceeded expectations and more than

2. In all three EUN's visited I got the impression that they felt out of touch with HQ MIA RMC and that although they were more than pleased with the efforts made on their behalf by the MIA LO EIGHTH Army they regarded the Mission as a whole as a distant and often unenthusiastic supporter. This state of affairs can be remedied by more frequent personal contacts between heads of Branches and Services or their deputies and the EUN's, and by liaison visits of the kind I have just completed. (See directive on our contact with B.U.s - he completed.)

3. My general impression of the Groups was as follows:-

(a) Morale was almost universally excellent. There were some complaints about cigarettes, soap, the inability to get equal MAFI and Welfare treatment with British coloured troops, and widespread and well founded complaints about the slowness of mail, but by and large officers and men were in excellent spirits.

Not one of the many men talked to during my visit raised the usual complaint about leave.

(b) The fighting efficiency of the Groups appeared to vary according to the length of time they had had to settle down in the line, the amount of operational success so far achieved and the handling of the Group by its respective EUN. I should say that at the time of my visit their order of merit was CROMONA, FRULLI, FULCONE. Whatever their fighting efficiency is by Allied standards, there is no doubt that the first two are more than holding their own in the line and personal bravery is nowhere lacking.

(c) The opinion of the British Command concerning the GROUPS was in equal parts sympathetic and laudatory. In the case of CROMONA and FRULLI it was generally felt that they have exceeded expectations and more than fulfilled the role for which they were originally intended. The EIGHTH Army also appears to have become more "Italian minded" than ever before as the result of the considerable success achieved by the CROMONA and the minor successes of the FRULLI.

4. The FULCONE Group appears to be at some disadvantage as against the other two owing to the personality of its COC and the strange and (in the words of an Italian Officer) unwilling matrimony of the MIBO and SAN MARCO Regiments. General MORISI is an ablest parachutist and I think there is a tendency on his part to favour the MIBO at the expense of the sailors.

5. I have no doubt at all that the personality and behaviour of the COC, the EUN, and therefore the behaviour of his staff and training instructor, have an inestimable influence on the character and success of the Group itself. I believe that the successes achieved by the CROMONA after considerable initial difficulties

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can in very great measure be attributed to the way in which Lt. Col. WESBO-CARTER has handled his Group.

6. Discipline left something to be desired in all groups and it is essential that as many Groups as possible are furnished by the Ministry of War with a "Procuratore del RM".

Two of these J.A.O. representatives at any rate are indispensable for the four Groups.

I understand that once this gentleman is available the Group itself can convolve a Special Tribunal presided over either by the GOC or his 2 i/c and try and sentence men charged with gross breaches of discipline within a very short time.

Without any doubt the first Procureurs available should be sent to the POLLOCK.

7. Absenteeism and desertion has been negligible in all Groups from the moment they entered the line. This problem will arise again however when the North is liberated or when the Groups come out of the line.

8. The only Group which has absorbed large quantities of local non CREMONA trained patriots is the CREMONA.

In two Bns visited they constituted between 30% and 50% of their effectives. These patriots have fought extremely well but are indisciplined and unsoldierly.

9. None of the Group HQs or HQs appeared to know anything about the BVC IOF or to have any confidence in it. The last arrivals from CREMONA with the FRIULI were badly clothed and ill-trained.

All Group HQ wanted to run their own reinforcement centre just in rear of Divisional Area. I told them that there could be no question of this but I strongly recommended that CREMONA be run on the lines of an INED with a Bn for each Group and one Naval Coy (for the SAN MARCO) commanded by an officer designated by the GOC Group with whom he would be in direct contact regarding officer and other reinforcements.

As in my own Guard's INED this would foster unit esprit de corps and would in no way affect specialist or other courses nor would it mean that if an officer of the FRIULI Bn was needed with the LEGNANO he would not be posted there.

If a Group was about to undertake offensive operation involving greater expected losses than could be replaced by the normal calling forward of reinforcements from CREMONA it should form its own IOB to deal with the situation. *5/11*

10. The problem of replacing indifferent officers or officer casualties is very serious.

It can be solved only by bringing back to ITALY a certain number of POW officers or calling for volunteers from 16 Divisions and other RM-ITI and ITI-ITI

8. The only Group which has absorbed large quantities of local non CREANO trained patriots is the CREACMA.

In two Bns visited they constituted between 20% and 50% of their effectives. These patriots have fought extremely well but are indisciplined and unsoldierly.

9. None of the Group HQs or Bn's appeared to know anything about the RTU ICY or to have any confidence in it. The last arrivals from CREANO with the PRIULI were badly clothed and ill-trained.

All Group HQ wanted to run their own reinforcement centre just in rear of Divisional Area. I told them that there could be no question of this but I strongly recommended that CREANO be run on the lines of an IRTD with a Bn for each Group and one Naval Coy (for the SAN MARCO) commanded by an officer designated by the GOC Group with whom he would be in direct contact regarding officer and other reinforcements.

As in my own Guard's IRTD this would foster unit esprit de corps and would in no way affect specialist or other courses nor would it mean that if an officer of the PRIULI Bn was needed with the LEONARDO he would not be posted there.

If a Group was about to undertake offensive operation involving greater expected losses than could be replaced by the normal calling forward of reinforcements from CREANO it should form its own LOB to deal with the situation.

10. The problem of replacing indifferent officers or officer casualties is very serious.

It can be solved only by bringing back to ITALY a certain number of POW Officers or calling for volunteers from IS Divisions and other BR-ITI and IRI-ITI Units.

At the moment it is almost impossible to give an inefficient officer "the sack" as there is no guarantee of early replacement by someone better.

11. I attach as Appendix "A" a list of queries and recommendations which require action.

H. H. C. Howard

Lt. Col., G. S.
Military Mission Italian Army

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VARIOUS PROBLEMS OF GRUPPI DI COMBATTIMENTO
REQUIRING ACTION BY F.E.I.A.

G. SD

- (a) FRIULI do not require any more reinforcements from CESANO at present.
- (b) 51 BLU put up a letter to Canadian Corps some time ago regarding the unsuitability whereby a man can be made to pay for loss or damage to equipment up to 100% by the consideration that since the man would be unable to pay for certain valuable equipment over years this would deter him in his carelessness and therefore the regulations fail in loss or damage to valuable equipment. A copy of this letter was RM sent to MLIA examined please.
- (c) A Staff Capt Q for each BLU is recommended. This has been proposed before and MLIA has been reopened please. FOLGORE have been lent one by 13 Corps.

"A"

- (a) The quality of the Italian "Macedonia" cigarettes was loudly complained of. Would soldiers first priority over civilians with better cigarettes such as "Milit".
- (b) The cigarette and soap position is better but needs watching on the 5 Army Front. Distribution of 2 cigarettes per head for the first seven days it was in the line. had no soap issue for 52 days.
- (c) I strongly recommend that officers be allowed to retain their one suit of battle-dressing is withdrawn. They have almost universally taken great pains to have their uniforms kept up and I feel they should be allowed to keep them (against payment if necessary) suffer the indignity of having to hand them in. I have suggested this to MLIA up to Corps.
- (d) Are FOLGORE and LEGHEND indenting on 231 Div for caps badges of rank etc? If not Increment 5 Army understands the channels and informs all concerned.

"A"

- (a) I strongly recommend that Major MONICO be allowed to remain with the FOLGORE Gp in the and delicate situation existing in the Gp. I will report on the situation after the situation.
- (b) Major CARLES HUNT is likely to request the following additions to his staff in the 5 Army:
 - (i) Capt NESTON to 13 Corps at a later date and as a result of 13 Corps British Increment 5 Army.
 - (ii) Another LO for assignment 5 Corps when latter comes.
 - (iii) Another clerk.

VARIOUS PROBLEMS OF ONIPI DI COMBATTIMENTO
REQUIRING ACTION BY U.S.I.A.

Appendix "A" to NSIA Senior LOs
 letter C/L of _____ March 45

require any more reinforcements from CERAZO at present.

a letter to Canadian Corps some time ago regarding the unsuitability of the present regulations can be made to pay for loss or damage to equipment up to 100% by the Italian Government. They since the man would be unable to pay for certain valuable equipment only over a period of many months would deter him in his carelessness and therefore the regulations fail in their object of preventing loss of valuable equipment. A copy of this letter was sent to NSIA but say the position be

for each BLU is recommended. This has been proposed before and turned down. May the question please. FULCORE have been lent one by 13 Corps.

the Italian "Macedonia" cigarettes was loudly complained of. Would it be possible to give priority over civilians with better cigarettes such as "Wilit".

and camp position is better but needs watching on the 5 Army Front. One unit claimed to have 2 cigarettes per head for the first seven days it was in the line. One unit claimed to have 52 days.

The FULCORE had an average
 One unit claimed to have

commend that officers be allowed to retain their one suit of battle-dress when the O.Rs winter clothing. They have almost universally taken great pains to have their battle-dress tailored and adjusted. I have suggested this to NSIA LO 5 Army and CERAZO have put it

and LEGHARD indenting on 231 Div for caps badges of rank etc? If not could NSIA ensure NSIA LO British Army understands the channels and informs all concerned.

commend that Major BONECO be allowed to remain with the FULCORE Gp indefinitely in view of the special situation existing in the Gp. I will report on the situation after my next visit.

is likely to request the following additions to his staff in the near future which I recommend:

- (i) Capt NENTON to 13 Corps at a later date and as a result of likely developments regarding British Increment 5 Army.
- (ii) Another LO for assignment 5 Corps when latter moves.
- (iii) Another clerk.

contd. sheet

Sheet

"A" (Contd.)

- (c) There appears to be a discrepancy between British Directive No. 13 (Combat Groups) and the former strikes a man off the posted strength after 15 days absence and the latter checked please.
- (d) May the "mail problem" be examined thoroughly please. The bottleneck appears to be censorship office in NAPLES.

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There is to be a discrepancy between British Directive No. 13 (Combat Groups) and the Italian SMR version. It strikes a man off the posted strength after 15 days absence and the latter after 30. May this be done.

All problems be examined thoroughly please. The bottleneck appears to lie with the one and only office in NAPLES.

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