

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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AQ/53/17

Col. Egerton - Liaison log and Reports

2nd Cover

MAR - SEPT 1945

'G' POINTS

1. What encroachment is there on Italian territory ?
2. What strength and composition is the force encroaching ?
3. What are their intentions as far as you can see ?
4. What is the disposition of Allied and Italian tps on the frontiers ?
5. What Italian units will be left behind by Fifth and Eighth Armies ?
6. What Italian units are performing functions other than that for which they are designed - i.e. muleteer units doing gd duties ?
7. What is the state of trs within units ?
8. Can units adequately absorb the personnel now being forwarded to it ?
9. Can you spread among units a favourable impression of Base Depot CERSINO ?
10. Are all the Territorial HQs functioning, and are they "in power" ?
11. Are districts and depots in position ?
12. Are there many patriot bands still in your territory ? If so, please list them.
13. Have they banded in their arms ? If not, what do you consider their intention is ?
14. Are there any prominent patriot leaders who are not co-operating with either Allied or Italian authority ?
15. Are the present screening agencies performing a useful purpose ? Do you consider their work could be handed over to Territorial District HQ by end Jun at latest ?
16. What is the morale of (a) Italian tps working for Allies (b) Italian tps working for Ministry of War ?
17. Are the Italians endeavouring to obtain any 'I' information on any other nation, if so what ?
18. What 'I' information can you forward on countries bordering ITALY ?

POINTS

From the 'A' angle, if the Italian Army is to be lowered in quantity it must be raised in quality; there is no shortage of men for replacements but we must be careful to accept only the best types. The Army must not be a home for incurables. Long term policy is therefore being directed towards:-

- (a) long-sighted and careful screening for recruitment;
- (b) improvement and standardisation of conditions of service;
- (c) reorganisation of the judicial and penal systems;
- (d) revision of regulations for appointing, promoting and downgrading officers.

Your views on the above points would be appreciated.

Immediate problems are:-

- (a) screening and enlistment of the greatest number of patriot volunteers which can be accepted;
- (b) transfer of some 15,000 US-ITI to other categories;
- (c) change of status of some 30,000 cooperators to bring them back into the Italian Army;
- (d) absorption of eighth Army units and personnel left behind when Army goes to Albania;
- (e) repatriation of half a million PWs now in Allied hands and re-absorption of some into the Army;
- (f) standardisation of terms of service for "volunteers" as opposed to recalled conscripts;
- (g) revision and standardisation of rates of pay;
- (h) movement of leave personnel;
- (i) trial of outstanding cases and solution of the AMEL problem.

We are looking ahead to the replacement of war time methods of reinforcement by those of peace conditions better understood by Italian officers. Any information gleaned on this subject would be of value.

'A' work entails looking a long way ahead, possibly further than in other matters - any warning notes you can sound would be helpful.

With so many matters of principle needing alteration it is essential that MEA should not be choked with detail, and that Italian staffs and commands should be made to accept and deal effectively with more and more of their own internal affairs. Suggestions for increased decentralisation would be welcomed.

1. POINTS

Four main headings in addition to minor services such as postal:-

(a) IFT

- (i) State and shortages of IFT in Units with any special requirements.
- (ii) Collection of illegal vehs etc.
- (iii) Workshops progress, output etc, possible future needs.

(b) RATIONS

- (i) availability of Allied provided items in depots.
- (ii) availability of Italian provided items.
- (iii) Soap and cigarettes.
- (iv) any likely future change in supply points.

(c) CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT

- (i) availability of items with any special needs.
- (ii) Progress, output etc of repair plants.
- (iii) any likely future change in location of depots and consignment points.

(d) ACCOMMODATION AND CAMPS

- (i) Demands or likely demands by Allies or Italians.
- (ii) Buildings or camps not needed and which could be offered to Allies.

Subject: Genl. Liaison Officer's Report.

Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C.
H.O. M.M.I.A.
SIO/64.

8 Sep 45.

To: HQ MIA (4 copies)

1. This report covers the period 10 - 31 August 1945 and includes points arising from visits to the following:-

- 52 BLU and LEGNANO Combat Group.
- MIA 10 TURIN.
- No. I Territorial HQ, TURIN.
- Comd. 7 AGRA, TURIN.
- No. IV Territorial HQ, BOLZANO.
- 50 BLU and TRIULI Combat Group.
- 56 BLU and MANTOVA Combat Group.
- No. II Territorial HQ, GENOVA.
- 51 BLU and CREMONA Combat Group.

N.B.

- (a) Separate report has been submitted regarding visit to FOLGORE Combat Group and 53 BLU from 19-22 Aug.
- (b) Notes regarding visits to Nos. 1 and 2 Districts, 217 Area BOLOGNA and No. III Territorial HQ MILAN already taken by Lt. Col. INGLEDEN.

2. 52 BLU and LEGNANO Combat Group.

OSO 1 of BLU states that morale of Gruppo has deteriorated owing to the delay in discharging older classes. Some ex-deserters who came back as volunteers and were pardoned have since obtained their discharge over the heads of men who remained with the Gruppo all along and didn't desert. The loss of combat pay caused a further drop in morale. Furthermore, the nature of the present Internal Security duties is unpopular with the men.

It is exceedingly difficult to get the Gruppo to do any training; there is much delay in getting started, and many

No. IV Territorial HQ, BOLZANO.
 50 BLU and PHILIP Combat Group.
 56 BLU and MANTOVA Combat Group.
 No. II Territorial HQ, GENOVA.
 51 BLU and CEMONA Combat Group.

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It is exceedingly difficult to get the Gruppo to do any training; there is much delay in getting started, and many excuses.

Comd. 59 Area (Milan) had held a parade there recently, and the discipline and turn-out of the LEGHANO representatives was shocking. Morale is much lower now than it was during the fighting.

Many officers are being retained after their release dates owing to lack of replacements. Other rank technicians and specialists are particularly difficult to get hold of. Civilian replacements in place of soldiers are paid much better although carrying out the same work. This all causes discontent.

USO 1 does not recommend the removal of any vehicles or weapons from the Gruppo, as this would cause a further lowering of morale. The 25-pdrs and 17-pdrs have already been collected in a central park to ensure better supervision.

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Medical. Two good medical officers are being replaced because they were originally Fascist. This in spite of the shortage of Medical Officers. The two, Lieuts. WERF and RUMCO, are both entirely satisfactory and feel they are leaving under a cloud. Their replacements have not yet arrived and Gen. UTILI is holding on to the officers for the time being. He states that the Comitato di Epurazione (WENH) will force them to be dismissed. He also states that Lieut. RUMCO was not a Squadrista at all; the Fascists appointed him to a certain vacancy and ante-dated his certificate of membership of the Fascist Party, thus qualifying him as a Squadrista.

The retention of a British M.O. with the B.L.U. is not considered necessary; a visiting officer would be sufficient.

The establishment of a convalescent depot or rest centre for the Gruppo would be a good thing because otherwise men straight out of hospital are sent to their homes in an unfit state and very often have to hitch-hike without adequate rations for the journey. Gen. UTILI is in favour of having a Gruppo rest centre, but the men would probably prefer to go home on sick leave.

It is understood that Welfare MIA is endeavouring to obtain accommodation for a rest centre on one of the lakes.

Reply is requested to a letter sent to Med MIA on 13 July regarding Lt. Col. POLSEN, senior Med Offr LIGORANO Gr.

Gen. UTILI stressed importance of declaring Govt's demobilisation scheme at once. If the men know how they stand they will feel happier about it, if not, they will desert. In his opinion it is better for the Groups to be understrength officially than unofficially, i.e. get rid of older classes at expense of being understrength.

There is a state of unrest and indecision in the Gruppo partly due to the composition of the present Govt. Gen. UTILI feels that in the event of civil disturbances the men might not open fire or otherwise quell Communist demonstrations as there might be a come-back on the Army. From a logical point of view the Army owes some allegiance to Communists, as they are represented in the Govt. The general feeling seems to be that the Army in the Govt is pulling in a different direction.

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Arms have undoubtedly been hidden in the district, but the Communists are not the only persons to blame in this respect.

3. TURIN.

(a) Conference with Brigadier GRAHAM (Comd 7 AREA); General PRALOMMO (Comd Terr HQ No. 1), Capt. O'DONNELL & Major BIRD.

Brig. GRAHAM is concerned regarding the amount of weapons and ammunition in dumps guarded by civilians and also hidden arms in the district. He proposed carrying out searches and asked MELA ruling as to how far he could make use of Italian troops under Gen. PRALOMMO'S command.

It was explained that AFHQ ruling prevents Italian

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commanders from searching but that there was no objection to their being employed to convey already classified material from dumps to safer places and subsequently guarding it.

Brig. GRAHAM is obtaining 20 Italian Army lorries from A.M.G. for the purpose; these lorries will afterwards pass to No. I Terr HQ.

(b) Political.

P.S.S. and A.M.G. reports tend to show that there is a well-organised Communist party throughout Piedmont. Some of its leaders are:-

ROSSATELLI, the Sindaco of NOVARA, who is an ex-partisan leader and is now very communist and considered dangerous,

ROVERDA, the Sindaco of TURIN, Socialist, alleged to have said that his party is ready for the time when the Allies depart, and

PASSONE, Prefect of the Province, a leading Communist.

Proof is lacking as to the extent of power or the intentions of these men and the "reds" in general, but it is generally believed that they are in possession of large quantities of hidden arms and vehicles. It is argued that the partisans fought a three-day battle with the Germans and even used artillery; the proportion of weapons handed in does not correspond to the amount in use at that time.

Areas such as BIELLA, CUNEO and the CANTAVESSE mountains were surrender areas for several German divisions and a vast amount of material must have been collected there.

The general opinion is that there will be a rising as soon as the Allies leave.

NOVARA and VARESE are known communist centres.

The Cussetura in TURIN is largely composed of ex-partisans since the epuration of the old members. The new lot are thoroughly mistrusted by the general public.

There has been no trouble in the AOSTA region except minor brigandage, and no signs of French encroachment, though many French officers visit TURIN.

Brig. GRAHAM will use all available force in the event of disturbance.

(c) Various.

General PRALOMEO is satisfied with the number of troops

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General PRALOMBO is satisfied with the number of troops at his disposal provided the Gremona and Mantova Groups come up to scratch.

There are about 8000 Carabinieri available, but they are of course armed with carbines against possible automatic weapons.

There is sufficient Barrack room in TURIN to house many more troops than at present.

4. MILAN.

Notes regarding visit to 2 District were taken to HQ by Lt. Col. INGLETON.

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5. Ro. IV Terr HQ, BOLZANO.

General NEGROMI considers that the POLICIA and PRIMI Combat Groups are too spread out over the area and would like to see them more concentrated so that they could be moved easily in the event of trouble. This is at present impossible owing to the nature of their duties.

The Guard Bns are protecting food depots and supervising civilian guards. These latter are carefully selected and are trustworthy. The Guard Coy have received a proportion of their vehicles.

General NEGROMI considers that three Guard Bns plus an Engineer Bn for Guard and Garrison duties should be enough. He would like to have more CC.RR as they are popular even with the German-speaking population and are more suitable for keeping public order than troops.

6. SO B.I.U. and PRIMI Combat Group.

(a) The proposed Pay Cut from 59 lire to 14, and Ration Allowance Cut from 20 lire to 5, which is due to take place from 1 Oct, is going to cause serious trouble.

This matter was discussed at the War Ministry meeting held in Rome recently.

It is reckoned that men will desert freely when they hear of the proposed reduction in their pay; there will also be no inducement for recruits to join up and the only way of maintaining the Army will be by Call-ups or Conscription.

General SCATTINI feels that this cut will not prove an economy, but a great harm.

(b) The demobilisation question is causing a lot of unrest.

Can a definite policy be broadcast so that the men know how they stand.

(c) Discipline in the Gruppo has fallen off and the CC.RR are weak. Traffic discipline very bad.

(d) The Gruppo is about 600 below strength.

(e) Gen. SCATTINI wants to move his Services from VERONA to TRENTO, but even in latter place is still occupied by

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- (b) The demobilisation question is causing a lot of unrest. Can a definite policy be broadcast so that the men know how they stand.

- (c) Discipline in the Gruppo has fallen off and the G.O.N.R. are weak. Traffic discipline very bad.

- (d) The Gruppo is about 500 below strength.

- (e) Gen. SCATTINI wants to move his Services from VERONA to TRENTO, but even in latter place is still occupied by
FOLGORE.

- (f) Gen. SCATTINI asked regarding the policy of awards of Italian decorations to British personnel, as he was desirous of making recommendations. The circumstances were explained to him.

7. 56 B.L.U. and MANTOVA Combat Group.

The general standard of morale and discipline in this Group is quite good, and I should count them as being one of the best of the Combat Groups at the present moment.

In order to maintain discipline and keep training going, the B.L.U. must have authority to give orders on the subject.

(5)

The Gruppo are about 1000 under strength, but reinforcements are arriving satisfactorily.

MANTOVA Op did not get copy of original correspondence regarding No. 1421 Officers Shop, with the unfortunate result that they did not get the opportunity to purchase goods while they lasted. Application was made to 231 Div who are endeavouring to obtain more, but the allotment is small and in any case ceases at end of September.

May a special allotment be made for the MANTOVA Group?

A release of 2000 caps was recently made to the Gruppo. On arrival, these proved to be German type and obviously unsuitable for issue to a Gruppo. 5000 Italian type caps are required in order that the men may be dressed alike as regards headgear.

The retention of the M.O. with the B.I.U. and the complete D.A.D.O.S. staff are recommended by the B.I.U.

General BOLOGNA pointed out that the Gruppo were far too widely dispersed and had too many Guard duties. There were consequently insufficient men for the maintenance of public order (should this prove necessary) and for other requirements. 76 Regt were originally available, but 60 Sub-Area required their presence in GSHOVA. 114 Regt is under command LEONARDI Op in COMO area and there is some resentment owing to the fact that LEONARDI training programmes frequently show a large part of their own men on "summer leave" while MANTOVA are left to carry out Guard duties.

Attached Order of Battle of MANTOVA Op shows how widely the Gruppo are dispersed; there are representatives as far East as FORLI and as far South as AREZZO, and for practical purposes the Gruppo has turned into a series of independent small units.

It is believed that AFHQ authority is required before the Carriere can be moved from AREZZO; it is also strongly recommended that 114 Regt be withdrawn from COMO.

No. 2 District are aware of the situation in general regarding Combat Ops dispersal, but it is difficult to do anything until the Internal Security Bdes are formed.

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Attached Order of Battle of MAFFOIA Op shows how widely
the Gruppo are dispersed; there are representatives as far
East as FORLI and as far South as ALESSANDRIA, and for practical
purposes the Gruppo has turned into a series of independent
small units.

It is believed that AFHQ authority is required before the
Carriers can be moved from ALESSANDRIA; it is also strongly
recommended that 114 Regt be withdrawn from COMO.

No.2 District are aware of the situation in general
regarding Combat Ops dispersion, but it is difficult to do
anything until the Internal Security Ideas are formed.

Ministry of War policy regarding demobilisation is ~~already~~
awaited. It is considered that discharging one class per
month is not enough. The order for demobilising the 1915
Class arrived very late. It is hoped that new reinforcements
are arriving regularly the demobilisation scheme will be
speeded up.

Spare parts for vehicles are not arriving. Access to G.P.A.
or scrap dumps might relieve the situation.

Clearing and repairing of winter clothing is in hand.

(6)

8. No. II Territorial HQ, GENOVA.(a) Accommodation:

There is an acute shortage on account of repatriation of ex-prisoners of war.

(b) Vehicles.

Terr. HQ has great need of more vehicles; the Guard Coy has about 7 efficient vehs instead of 60. This comd is handicapped by the fact that there is no railway and it is a long stretch from SPEZIA to the French frontier. Other comds are more fortunate as their territory is not so elongated and in most cases they have railways. The importance of this HQ in pre-war days was not so great as at present; there is now just as much reason for No. II Terr. HQ to have vehicles as for any of the other Terr. HQ's. Under present conditions the visiting of outlying districts is practically impossible.

(c) Captured Enemy Material.

A.M.C. 5 Army authorised local Prefects to collect CEM. This order was due to expire on 31 August, when 60 Area will issue fresh orders on the subject. The local Prefect at GENOVA is stated to have disposed of a large quantity of CEM by sale.

9. 51 B.L.U. and CREMONA Combat Group.

(a) The reduction of the Ordnance Staff in the B.L.U. is causing some concern. Control of the O.P.P. and Dump will be impossible under the new W.E. and no supervision of indents will be possible.

(b) The Gruppo is at present employed on frontier guards and collection of illegal arms. Gruppo HQ will shortly move to TURIN. The Gruppo, like other Gruppi, is widely scattered.

(c) Morale has slackened off to a certain extent, but the discipline as a whole is satisfactory, and the general bearing and turn-out of the men compares very favourably with that of other Gruppi.

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- (b) The Gruppo is at present employed on frontier guards and collection of illegal arms. Gruppo HQ will shortly move to TURIN. The Gruppo, like other Gruppi, is widely scattered.
- (c) Morale has slackened off to a certain extent, but the discipline as a whole is satisfactory, and the general bearing and turn-out of the men compares very favourably with that of other Gruppi.
- (d) Strength is satisfactory and reinforcements are coming in from various sources. These rifts all have to be trained (basic training only is possible) on arrival.
A request for 40 more officers has already been put up to the Ministry of War. These officers should be sent to the Gruppo direct.
- (e) Gen. PRINIMATI cannot always fill senior officer's vacancies at CESARO courses, as Comd. 7 A.G.R.A. insists on a high proportion of senior officers being always available.
- (f) The proposed reduction in the soldier's pay is regarded as a great mistake and will cause a lot of trouble.
- (g) The Gruppo is dependent on Terr. HQ for discipline, Promotion, Records, etc, instead of being dependent S.M.R.E. as previously. Previous arrangement was considered better.

(7)

(h) The general attitude of the Press towards the Army is regarded with great concern. The "Unita" published a full report regarding an incident which happened at FORLI in which men of 205 Division took part.

A reply to this and other derogatory articles have been sent to the various newspapers concerned, but are never published.

It is generally felt that the Government should take a strong line with the Press in order to ensure that unfair or erroneous statements are contradicted as early as possible. Disciplinary action should be taken against the offenders in 205 Div and the result of such action widely published.

As things are at present, the Army is only getting adverse criticism in the Press. It is consequently very badly regarded generally, and several senior officers have asked to be relieved.

This state of affairs, if allowed to continue, may seriously affect the future Italian Army as well as any interim Army.

At a recent parade held in TURIN (31 Aug) Gen. CASSORRA was present and made a speech. The general opinion seems to be that he missed a golden opportunity to put in a good word for the Army.

Wm. R. R. R.

Lt. Col., G.S.

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H. J. F. F. F.

Lt. Col., G.S.

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8/9/53/17 ←
(10)OUTGOING SIGNAL

FROM : M M I A
TO : MMIA LO MILAN
REF : DISCUE FOR MMIA LO (BOURNE)
SD 2945

05 1200 B

UNCLASSIFIED

RAC

FOR EXERTON REF SLD/18 OF 4 SEP (.) FIRST (.) YOUR
CONFERENCE INOOPORTUNE AT MOMENT (.) SECOND (.) BYATT
VISITS BOURNE 12 SEP AND THEN MOVES BOLZANO (.) THIRD (.)
SELBY SPENDS 13 AND 14 AND POSSIBLY 15 SEP WITH BOURNE AND THEN
MOVES 13 CORPS (.) FOURTH (.) WILL DISCUSS DETAILS WITH
YOU IN ROME ON 9 SEP

PRECEDENCE : IMMEDIATE

AUTHENTICATED:

L.M. Z. (Laden),
H-GlINTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

File : G/35
Major Byatt
Major Selby
AQD (2)
A

Q.2.

8/9/53/17. ←

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COPY INCOMING SIGNAL

S/Q/53/17
9

041800 Z

FROM: MMIA LO MILAN

TO : MMIA ROME

INFO: MMIA LO DISTONE
MMIA LO 13 CORPS

REF : SLO/18

UNCLASSIFIED

IMPORTANT

N.T.

FROM ROBERTSON (.) YOUR 9/35 OF 30 AUG (.)
SUGGEST BOURNE MOVES MILAN BY
18 SEP (.) MONICO BYATT AND
SXLBY SHOULD ALSO ARRIVE MILAN ON
SAME DATE (.) CONFERENCE REGARDING UNIFIED POLICY
AND DETAILED REQUIREMENTS CAN THEN BE HELD AND
NECESSARY HAND OVER COMPLETED (.) SENIOR L O
ARRIVES ROME 7 SEP AND LEAVES 9 SEP

RAS

SD DISTRIBUTION:

Action: 9/58

Info: A
Q (Two)

Q.2

SEE 10

S/Q/53/17 ←

us
05 Sep 48

5733

Subject: Report re POL 53 Combat Group.

CONFIDENTIAL

Land Forces Sub-Comm. A.C.
H.Q. H.M.I.A.

Ref 10/51.

S/Q/53/1728 Aug 45.

A. This report concerns a special visit paid by the Senior L.O. to the POLGNS Combat Group, in company with Col. K.G.P. Chavasse, DSO, of H.Q.

5 Army, from 19-22 Aug 45.

The visit was the result of the following exchange of communications, and I accompanied Col. Chavasse at the request of 5 Army.

1. AFHQ signal FK33175 of 7 Aug, added 5 Army with copy to Matero and Alcon, requesting 5 Army to investigate causes of terrorisation on the part of the POLGNS Group and asking whether substitution by the POLLI Group in that area would exist matters.

2. 5 Army signal 7774 of 9 Aug in reply to above, saying that substitution would not help matters as existing conditions were due to the fact that Italian troops were not well disciplined and that there was no choice between the two Groups.

This signal went on to say that the Provincial Commissioner of BOLANO and the Provincial Commissioner of TERNI agreed that no improvement would result from the suggested change-over. The switch would take a long time owing to the dispersed lay-out of both Groups and was NOT recommended.

3. ALCON signal 5776 of 16 Aug which pointed out that the Italian Govt had specifically asked for the change-over and that on political grounds it was considered most necessary. The Regional Commissioner fully supported this view and felt that his Provincial Commissioners were probably swayed by their desire to have no troops at all. If complete Group not removed, the signal requested that the 10000 Regt, as most undesirable, should be substituted.

4. AFHQ signal FK3237 of 17 Aug, in reply to (2) above, promising allegations re POLGNS substantially true. Such a state of unsatisfactory discipline will not be tolerated. Agreed that relief was not desirable. There would be no useful purpose in replacing POLGNS by Allied troops as in any case Italians would have to assume responsibility in September. Senior Allied Commander directs that action be taken urgently in conjunction with MIA to raise standard of discipline in POLGNS; 5 Army to forward comments and recommendations.

5. AFHQ signal FK3241 of 18 Aug. Confirms acceptance of 5 Army recommendation of non change-over (see 2 above) and goes on to say that 5 Army and later Italian will eventually replace all or part of POLGNS if such future action

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2. 5 Army signal 774 of 9 Aug in reply to above, saying that substitution would not help matters as existing conditions were due to the fact that Italian troops were not well disciplined and that there was no choice between the two Groups.

This signal went on to say that the Provincial Commissioner of BOLZANO and the Provincial Commissioner of TRIESTE agreed that no improvement would result from the suggested change-over. The switch would take a long time owing to the dispersed lay-out of both Groups and was NOT recommended.

5. ALOM signal 376 of 16 Aug which pointed out that the Italian Govt had specifically asked for the change-over and that on political grounds it was considered most necessary. The Regional Commissioner fully supported this view and felt that his Provincial Commissioners were probably swayed by their desire to have no troops at all. If complete Group not removed, the signal requested that the MEMO Regt, as most undesirable, should be substituted.

4. AFHQ signal FV36237 of 17 Aug, in reply to (2) above, promises allegations re POLONE substantially true. Such a state of unsatisfactory discipline will not be tolerated. Agreed that relief was not desirable. There would be no useful purpose in replacing POLONE by Allied troops as in any case Italians would have to assume responsibility in September. Senior Allied Commander directs that action be taken urgently in conjunction with EMIA to raise standard of discipline in POLONE; 5 Army to forward comments and recommendations.

5. AFHQ signal FV36524 of 18 Aug. Confirms acceptance of 5 Army recommendation of non change-over. (see 2 above) and goes on to say that 5 Army and later Mistro will doubtless replace all or part of POLONE if such future action considered necessary.

6. 53 HAN signal O 435 of 10 Aug and 50 HAN signal O 136 of 10 Aug (in both cases copies to EMIA) reconfirm that change-over is NOT effected.

B. The following individuals were interviewed by Col. Chavanne and myself.

1. Provincial Commissioner BOLZANO (Lt. Col. MacBraithy)
2. Cmdr POLONE Combat Group (Gen. Pialoral)
3. Sindaco of BURNIDG.
4. Cmdr 3rd Bn MEMO Regt (Major Deasy)
5. Cmdr MEMO Regt (Col. Ronco)
6. Secretary of Sindaco of CORTINA d'AMPEZZO.
7. Cmdr IV Territorial Hq BOLZANO (Gen. Negroni)
8. Provincial Commissioner TRIESTE (Major Davis)
9. Cmdr POLONE Combat Group (Gen. Santini)

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In addition, the mother was diagnosed with 29.1° of 50 and 53 mmHg.

One large dump of captured enemy material concerning which there had been reports at Losos, and which was guarded by men of the 888888 Regt, was seized. A summary of points noted will be found later on in this report.

C. As a result of our questioning, the following information was brought to light.

M. L. Col. Mandrariety (MAG PROV COAR BOLSAHO)

There have in the past been a large number of petty complaints and some major ones against the POLICING. These complaints have fallen off recently and the Prov Guard has ceased to bother about them. No major cases have been reported recently. There was one recent case of a black market coppered deal in which soldiers were involved. Also, on 12 and 13 August, some men of the POLICING in company with civilians, demonstrated outside the Police Barracks at BROTHING and demanded the release of some other civilians who had been arrested. Shots were fired by the GQ, III but no casualties had resulted and the demonstrators dispersed.

Prov Comar said that the local German-speaking population probably regarded the arrival of the POLICE as the first demonstration of Italian Govt control over Southern TIROL. At the back of their minds they do not want to belong to ITALY. It was significant that most of the houses which had suffered thefts were Tyrolean and not Italian.

Provo Ormer reclaimed that nearly all the soldiers had featured their names and had at least 10,000 lire in their pockets. He quoted an instance of a POLACCHI man offering half a million lire for a car, and producing the money out of his pocket.

said that O.G.R.R. might be better than the ALLEGHENY, but JEFF another Geopgo, as there was the danger that a new Geopgo might copy the previous one and start lining their own pockets.

Said that the Prefect of POLIGNO is Socialist and has always recommended the substitution of the VALDRE by OS. 112.

Peer Court's general opinion is that things are not quiet and that the behaviour of the POLICERS has improved.

2. Genival Plalored (Oad. WJGOWE Co-hat Group)

On taking over the Group from Gen. Morigi, he found it much better than he had been led to expect. He has got rid of several fairly senior officers and has forwarded a further list of 25 officers to the Ministry of War for removal.

believes that the present state of discipline is fairly good, and is confident that the men will obey the orders of their officers if they have to act in aid of the civil power.

Invited us to speak to local civil authorities and obtain their plans. The General has spoken to the Hsiao and told them not to be "bureaucratic". Said he was favourably impressed by the first 500 men of the Garibaldi.

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been reported recently. There was one recent case of a black market deal in which soldiers were involved. Also, on 12 and 13 August, some men of the POLIGNES in company with civilians, demonstrated outside the Police Barracks at NUXIEN and demanded the release of some other civilians who had been arrested. Shots were fired by the OC.EL but no casualties had resulted and the demonstrators dispersed.

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Prov Oxeur reckoned that nearly all the soldiers had feathered their nests and had at least 10,000 lire in their pockets, he quoted an instance of a POLIGNES man offering half a million lire for a car, and producing the money out of his pocket.

Said that OC.ER might be better than the POLIGNES, but NOT another Gruppo as there was the danger that a new Gruppo might copy the previous one and start lining their own pockets.

Said that the Prefect of BOLZANO is Socialist and has always recommended the substitution of the POLIGNES by OC.ER.

Prov Oxeur's general opinion is that things are now quiet and that the behaviour of the POLIGNES has improved.

2. General Pialorini (Oxid POLIGNES Combat Group)

On talking over the Gruppo from San Moritz, he found it much better than he had been led to expect. He has got rid of several fairly senior officers and has forwarded a further list of 23 officers to the Ministry of War for removal.

Believes that the present state of discipline is fairly good, and is confident that the men will obey the orders of their officers if they have to act in aid of the civil power.

Invited us to speak to local civil authorities and obtain the "373 Battalion".

The General has spoken to the HADSO and told them not to be the Garibaldi. Said he was favourably impressed by the first 500 men of the new Regt, who are replacing the San Marco Marine Regt, but says that the new Regt is at least 1000 below strength as compared to the San Marco.

Should welcome reinforcements as reinforcements to make up this deficiency, particularly in view of fact that the Garibaldi Regt are largely Alpine troops. He is working out a plan for their training, but it will be very difficult in view of army-guarding duties.

The Vice-Command and Chief of Staff of the Gruppo were present at this interview.

3. Mayor of NUXIEN.

Tyrolean. Said that the men of the POLIGNES had definitely stolen quite a lot of people's property, but that the civilians had also done so; it was mainly due to the lack of carabinieri in the district.

For example, the troops took tyres and sold them to civilians. It was impossible to trace the receivers. There had not been much theft lately as there was not much left to steal. Had not heard of any money being stolen.

(3)

Mayor of BRUNICO (continued)

There had been trouble in the local hotel owing to the troops demanding food and creating a disturbance when supplies ran out. The Mayor had obtained help from the local military commander (Major Denny) who had posted N.G.O's at the hotel during meal hours. This had put a stop to further incidents.

There had been no cases of shooting, no trouble in connection with the female population, and no major incidents of any kind. On the whole, relations between soldiers and civilians were good.

4. Major Denny (Command 3rd BN KESBO Regt at BRUNICO)

This officer gave a very favourable impression. He has been in BRUNICO only about 3 weeks, during which time there have been no major incidents. He keeps in close touch with the Mayor and has told him to come and report any trouble at once.

He assisted local authorities by repairing bridges, etc, and relations are cordial.

Part of his command are permanently engaged on searching for Germans escaped SS men in the mountains.

5. Colonel Ramon (Command KESBO Regt ; HQ at DOBBIANO)

Stated that there had been only two major incidents in the Regiment during the past 3 months :-

- (a) A case of murder, which was not provoked. Two men of the Regt had been severely beaten up by about 20 local pro-nazis. As a reprisal two Sardinian soldiers of the Regt had gone to the house of one of the ring-leaders, and after some altercation, shot him. The culprit has since been awarded 16 years imprisonment. Col. Ramon paid for the funeral expenses and gave the widow 5000 lire.
- (b) A case of rape, which is still under investigation. Col. Ramon says however that he has a statement from the girl concerned to the effect that she consented, but had to invent the story of rape in order to justify her condition to her fiancé. This same girl was stated to have had her hair cut off by the soldiers ; the Colonel has seen her and states that this is not the case.

The Colonel stated that on arrival in the area he had been asked whether the appointments of Mayors should go to Italians or to Tyroleans. He had replied that in view of the fact that two thirds of the local population were German-speaking, the local Mayors should be Tyroleans. He himself is on very good terms with the civil authorities given them assistance in many ways. His Regt is non-political, anything anti-communist.

He also stated that the Mari element amongst the Sud-Tyrol

only about 3 weeks, during which time there have been no major incidents. He keeps in close touch with the Mayor and has told him to come and report any trouble at once.

has assisted local authorities by repairing bridges, etc, and relations are cordial.

Part of his command are permanently engaged on searching for German escaped SS men in the mountains.

5. Col. Luigi Ronco (Commanding Regt ; HQ at DOMBIAIO)

Stated that there had been only two major incidents in the Regiment during the past 3 months :-

- (a) A case of murder, which was not investigated. Two men of the Regt had been severely beaten up by about 20 local pro-nazis. As a reprisal two Sardinian soldiers of the Regt had gone to the house of one of the ring-leaders, and after some altercation, shot him. The culprit has since been awarded 18 years imprisonment. Col. Ronco paid for the funeral expenses and gave the widow 5000 Lire.
- (b) A case of rape, which is still under investigation. Col. Ronco says however that he has a statement from the girl concerned to the effect that she consented, but had to invent the story of rape in order to justify her condition to her fiancé. This same girl was stated to have had her hair cut off by the soldiers ; the Colonel has seen her and states that this is not the case.

The Colonel stated that on arrival in the area he had been asked whether the appointments of Mayors should go to Italians or to Tyroleans. He had replied that in view of the fact that two thirds of the local population were German-speaking, the local Mayors should be Tyroleans. He himself is on very good terms with the civil authorities given them assistance in many ways. His Regt is non-political, anything anti-communist.

Said that there was a definite Nazi element amongst the Sud-Tyrol Volkspartei, which is an organization working for the return of the S. TYROL to Austria. These extremists (a minority in the Party) invent and spread stories about NAZISSS doings, which are generally unfounded. In Col. Ronco's opinion the Prefect of BOLZANO, though a self-proclaimed Socialist, is in reality ultra-Communist and is at the bottom of the trouble and magnifies small incidents to the detriment of the POLICE.

As an example of cordial relations existing between military and civilians, Col. Ronco said that over 100 civilians had recently attended the funeral of one of his men who had been accidentally killed ; this was entirely spontaneous and on their own initiative.

(4.)
6. Secretary to Mayor of COSENZA.

Had nothing but good words for the behaviour of the NEMO men stationed in this town. There had been no trouble whatsoever.

7. General Negroni (Cmd IV Territorial HQ, MILANO)

Said that he had never had the POLICIA under his command, but only administratively. Could therefore speak frankly as a looker-on.

On arrival in the area the POLICIA looked like everyone else. It was the result of disturbed conditions at the end of hostilities, and the camp had occurred after the last war. What the civilians resented was that the Gruppo had behaved like occupying troops of a foreign power, and not like liberators of their own land.

There had been a mass of captured material and the temptation to turn things to their own advantage had been too much for them. There was also the desire to keep as much material in ITALY and prevent it falling into Allied hands and leaving the country. Officers as well as men were in the racket and for this reason the discipline of the Gruppo had been undermined. The officers could no longer order the troops to desist as the latter all knew that their officers had also benefitted. This state of affairs had apparently been tolerated by Gen. Morigi.

The arrival of Gen. Pialorsi had greatly improved the situation. He was an honest man, energetic and quick to take action. He has removed some of the culprits amongst the officers and is combing it more.

Gen. Negroni regards the substitution of the San Marco Regt by the Garibaldi as a good thing. He would like to see the NEMO removed too, or anyway "expatriated". There is no need to touch the HQ Services, Artillery Regt or Engineer bn of the POLICIA, who are all good.

Relations between the Gruppo and civilians has now greatly improved and there is no resentment as regards the retention of the Gruppo in the area except on political grounds. For instance, the "volunteered" do not like having Italian troops in the area. The Prefect of MILANO originally advocated administrative autonomy for TRENTO and BOLZANO, which was all right as far as it went. He subsequently started spreading socialist republican propaganda instead of looking to a policy of reconstruction. The Prefect now regards the presence of the POLICIA in the area as an obstacle to his political aims in view of the forthcoming elections.

He receives reports from his party and exaggerates them to bring disfavor on the Gruppo.

Gen. Morigi thinks that the original choice of an Italian Command should be more popular

269

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Gen. Negroni regards the substitution of the San Marco Regt by the Gariboldi as a good thing. He would like to see the REGNO removed too, or anyway "expatriated". There is no need to touch the HQ, Services, Artillery Regt or Engineer Bn of the REGNO, who are all good.

Relations between the Gruppo and civilians has now greatly improved and there is no resentment as regards the retention of the Gruppo in the area except on political grounds. For instance, the "Volksgericht" do not like having Italian troops in the area. The Prefect of BOLZANO originally advocated administrative autonomy for TRIESTE and BOLZANO, which was all right as far as it went. He subsequently started spreading socialist republican propaganda instead of heading to a policy of reconstruction. The Prefect now regards the presence of the REGNO in the area as an obstacle to his political aims in view of the forthcoming elections. He receives reports from his party and exhortates them to bring disfavor on the Gruppo.

Gen. Negroni thinks that the original choice of an Italian Cavalry Group for this particular area was a mistake. Carabinieri would be more popular as they go down well with the German-speaking population. The necessity for troops would however remain. The OLGR would maintain public order but would require the backing of the troops for any major disturbance.

A French Mission was in the BOLZANO area last May. The apparent idea was to unite the people of ALTO ADIGE to form a bloc under French protection against Russian influence. This Mission was requested to leave by the Americans.

Gen. Negroni stated that in his opinion the 25th I Group had not had the same temptations and opportunities for looting as the REGNO. The 25th I was composed of a more stable type of men, largely German, and their discipline had been better and fewer changes had been necessary.

The Volksgericht do not give any trouble. They are quiet and unthreatening and are rather waiting to see what the future will bring. They will probably co-operate peacefully with ITALY, as it would be to their advantage economically.

Gen. Negroni concluded by expressing a hope that the Allies will remain for some time in this part of ITALY, at any rate until the Italians can themselves organize things on sound lines.

(5)

8. Major Davis (AME THURVO)

Confirmed that relations between military and civilians were satisfactory. There had been no serious incidents in THURVO.

He had had experience of both Gruppi and did not consider the MILITARI any better than the PULGORE.

In his opinion the Italian Guards over dumps sell material to the civil population. (Grand 50 MIL states that he has had no reports to this effect from Major Davis).

Said that road blocks afford opportunity for extracting much money from civilians carrying doubtful cargoes.

There are about 700 OM in the district but they are widely dispersed and cannot check up on everything.

9. Gen. Scattini (Grand MILITARI Combat Group)

Has much opposed to change-over of the two Groups as he considered that morale would suffer.

Considers that relations between his men and local civilians are cordial. Has reticent about "incidents" but gave the impression that there had been several of minor importance.

10. Visit to Captured Army Material Dump near MESSICO.

The dump is a few miles east of MESSICO and is off the main road and enclosed in a wood. There are several huts containing a quantity of valuable material including wireless parts, whilst other material and vehicles are parked or stacked in the open under the trees.

German personnel are engaged in sorting the stores under U.S. supervision. The Guard however is provided by the MESSICO Regt.

A theft of wireless valves had occurred some time previously. On being questioned, the Italian Lieutenant (who has 17 men available for Guard duties) stated that the valves had disappeared during the time when German personnel were sleeping in the huts, and before his men took over.

As this was all "old history" and the subject of an enquiry carried out about two months ago by 5 Army, we did not pursue the matter further; but it is interesting to note that this is possibly an instance of the Italians being wrongly blamed for loss of stores.

The Lieutenant has now made a complete inventory of all the stores and seems to have the situation in hand. It was pointed out to him that the two existing sentries by night are insufficient for such a large dump, to which access can easily be gained through the very scanty wire surround.

B. Conclusion.

As a result of the above interviews and further discussion with *2768* of 50 and 53 MIL's, I consider that there has undoubtedly been looting on a fairly extensive scale in the MESSICO, and probably on a lesser scale in

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9. Gen. Scattini (Grand FALILI Combat Group)

has much opposed to change-over of the two Groups as he considered that morale would suffer.

Considering that relations between him and local civilians are cordial, his reticent about "incident" but gave the impression that there had been several of minor importance.

10. Visit to Captured Enemy Material Dump near BAHIGBO.

The dump is a few miles east of BAHIGBO and is off the main road and concealed in a wood. There are several huts containing a quantity of valuable material including wireless parts, whilst other material and vehicles are parked or stacked in the open under the trees.

German personnel are engaged in sorting the stores under U.S. supervision. The Guard however is provided by the 11250 Regt.

A theft of wireless valves had occurred some time previously. On being questioned, the Italian Lieutenant (who has 17 men available for Guard duties) stated that the valves had disappeared during the time when German personnel were sleeping in the huts, and before his men took over.

As this was all "old history" and the subject of an enquiry carried out about two months ago by 5 Army, we did not pursue the matter further; but it is interesting to note that this is possibly an instance of the Italians being wrongly blamed for loss of stores.

The Lidoutenant has now made a complete inventory of all the stores and seems to have the situation in hand. It was pointed out to him that the two existing sentries by night are insufficient for such a large dump, to which access can easily be gained through the very scanty wire surround.

B. Conclusion.

As a result of the above interview and further discussion with *W. L. S.*'s of 50 and 53 HLI's, I consider that there has undoubtedly been looting on a fairly extensive scale in the POLICIA, and probably on a lesser scale in the FALILI Group.

Reorganization, however, can hardly be said to exist.

The original choice of the FALILI in this particular area was unfortunate, but I understand that it was a case-up which of the two groups was sent.

The arrival of Gen. Piazzi has undoubtedly done a great deal of good. The removal of the officers guilty of benefitting by the illegal disposal of goods is essential. A gradual build-out amongst the men of the 11250 Regt is desirable, but the Regt should be allowed to maintain its identity.

No change-over of the Gruppi is now necessary in view of general reports of cordial relations between soldiers and civilians. Indeed, the arrival of a new Gruppo might cause an outbreak of fresh incidents.

The substitution of the Prefect of BAHIGBO by a more impartial man might ease the situation, but this is a matter outside the scope of this report.

W. L. S.

24/P.M.M. BENTON, Lieut-Col. G.S.O. 1 (B)
M.M.I.A.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785020

COPY INCOMING SIGNAL

FROM : MMIA LO MILAN

DATE/TIME
240162

TO : MMIA ROME

56 BLU

REF : SIG/17

UNCLASSIFIED.

FROM ROME/17 (.) VEHICLE OFF ROAD BROKEN HALF SHAFT (.)
PROCEEDING TO 56 BLU BROKEN VEHICLE (.) REQUEST YOU
DISPATCH TO LO MILAN NEW HALF SHAFT FORD STAFF CAR
EARLIEST.

ACTION COPY: 0/3/6

Info: 3/0/33/17

Float.

5747

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8/Q/53/14

6

(COPY)

INCOMING SIGNAL

FROM : 90 BLU FROM HONKONG

22 1745 Z

TO : RMIA

INFO : RMIA LD MILAN 56 BLU

Immediate

REF RLD/17

UNCLASSIFIED

YOUR ^{Q 33} 57 OF 21 (..) EARLIEST ARRIVE MILAN 23 AUG AND 56 BLU
24 AUG

ED DISTRIBUTION

A/S Q/33
INFO A
Q (two)

Q 2

8/Q/53/14

5746

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785020

COPY RECEIVING SIGNAL

FROM: 5 ARMY
TO : MMIA (ROME)
REF : 3698
SLG/18

191432 B

UNCLASSIFIED

IMPORTANT

FROM EORRTON (.) VISITING FOLCORE
AND PRIULI WITH CHAVASSE (.)
RETURNING 5 ARMY 21 AUGUST

"G" DISTRIBUTION:

Action: 0/33

Info: A
Q (Two)

WS 20 Aug 45

5745

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785020

COPY INCOMING SIGNAL

FROM : MMIA LO TURIN
TO : MMIA ROME
REF : SLO/14

181730 Z

UNCLASSIFIED

ROUTINE

FROM B G E R T O N (.) PROCEEDING TO 5 ARMY 19 AUGUST (.)

SD DISTRIBUTION

Action Copy: G/33

Info: A

2 (Two)

3e/22/8/45

5/9/53/17
Col 91

5744

Subject: C.S.O. 1 (Linton) Report.

8/52/47

Land Forces Sub-Commission,
Allied Commission,

H.Q. W.M.I.

SLC/G/4.

7 Aug 45.

To: H.Q. W.M.I.
(4 copies)

3

Herewith second part of report of tour carried out between 13 July and 4 August 1945.

1. 209 Division, GERMANY.

Visited on 21 July.

There are approximately 1300 of the 1914 Class still to be demobilised, but the requirements allotted as substitutes exceed this figure by about 500.

The Division is expected to move to PADERBORN as soon as 228 Division vacates the accommodation there.

Capt. BOWMAN is in close touch with the Division and there are no major difficulties.

2. No. 6 Territorial HQ, BELGIUM.

Visited 22 July.

The HQ is well established and working satisfactorily with sufficient staff. There is however a shortage of administrative officers in the Military Districts and in some depots. This is partly due to the fact that many administrative officers "swore in" during the German occupation, and for political reasons they are now not allowed to function.

This HQ finds the lack of sufficient operational troops a cause for alarm in view of local communist power. The latter are very well organised and well armed. They are instead of handing

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7. 209 Division, CHUNG.

Visited on 21 July.

There are approximately 1300 of the 1944 Class still to be demobilized, but the reinforcements allotted as substitutes exceed this figure by about 500.

The Division is expected to move to R.D.V. as soon as 228 Division vacates the accommodation there.

Capt. BUNN is in close touch with the Division and therefore no major difficulties.

8. No. 6 Territorial HQ, BANGKOK.

Visited 22 July.

The HQ is well established and working satisfactorily with sufficient staff. There is however a shortage of administrative officers in the Military Districts and in some depots. This is partly due to the fact that many administrative officers "swore in" during the German occupation, and for political reasons they are now not allowed to function.

This HQ finds the lack of sufficient operational troops a cause for alarm in view of local communist power. The latter are very well organized and well armed. The individuals who have retained their arms instead of handing them in are known; their weapons could be taken from them by force if a general round-up were possible; such a thing is of course out of the question.

There are about 300 CR. available for maintenance of law and order, also No. 6 Guard Coy, recently formed, which is stated to be reliable and anti-communist, but which possesses no transport. This Coy is commanded by Capt. HILL, a Cavalry officer, who is apparently very efficient and loyal.

Attempts are being made to obtain transport from CMM sources at NICOLO.

The allotting of 523 Guard Bn to No. 6 Terr. HQ will ease Guard duties and enable the Guard Coy to be kept for active duty in event of trouble.

(2)

Enlistment of patriots was very disappointing. Of the 100 allowed by SMH 17531/Mob., only 58 have been enrolled. It is thought that the reason is that the patriots do not wish to lose their identity. They might join the Army in bands, but are not keen to do so as individuals.

The Chief of Staff (Col. Paolo PETERONI) made the following points:-

Reformation of the Army must be hastened, in order to provide a sufficiently strong and loyal force to cope with emergencies. Without any prompting, he quoted the figure of 140,000 as being the proposed strength of the future army.

The CC.RR are frightened to act in any way (e.g. against illicit weapon-holders or the Black Market) as they feel they are unsupported.

There is a general doubt as to whether TOGLIATTI and Nenni are acting in good faith.

Gen. CERICA is very tactful and diplomatic with the local factions and has caused many troubles. He is on friendly, but not intimate, terms with the Partisan HQ and recently gave them the use of a military dance hall.

In Col. PETERONI's opinion, M.M.I. has done a great deal for the Italian Army, but must do more. The establishment of a well-selected force which can be trusted to cope with emergencies is essential and urgent.

Other points discussed.

1914 Class is on its way to demobilisation, but there has been delay due to lack of reinforcements.

Ex-cooperators are behaving well. Early discharge of these men is recommended in view of what they have been through.

Col. RAMPA, of the Motorisation Directorate, is in touch with 1 District regarding location of Italian military vehicles. **5742**

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Other points discussed.

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Col. RAMPA, of the Motorisation Directorate, is in touch with 1 District regarding location of Italian Military vehicles. **5742**

9. No. 1 District, PADOVA.

From 22-30 July was at PADOVA, my departure being delayed owing to vehicle trouble.

(a) Discussed question of war establishment of BLU's with G(SD). Action had already been taken on MILA signal SD 2846 of 16 July, and BLU's opinions asked for.

(b) Disbandment of MAIRILLA appears to have gone satisfactorily. A good many of the personnel went to the MANTOVA Group. The Ufficio Stralicio of the Banda, now at CASTEL SAN PIETRO, will move to TORRICELLA PESONA (CHIEFI).

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(3)

(c) Discussed question of captured enemy material with Major CAMPBELL-ORDE, CSM Officer. No. 5 Terr. HQ at UDINE had published a poster in the provinces of UDINE, TRIESTE, etc., with 8th Army approval, in which it was laid down that all material of Italian Army origin was to be handed in to Terr. HQ.

This poster was not allowed to be exhibited in the 1 District area, as it was in contravention of AFHQ letter AG 386.3/163 LOC-O of 22 June 45.

Gen. ZAULI, 2nd in Command of No. 5 Terr. HQ, was in PADOVA and paid daily visits to MIA LO to find out whether any ruling could be given.

The matter is one for AFHQ to decide, and the simplest solution would be for them to allow Italian Terr. HQ's, through their recovery units, to collect material and report exact details through Districts, areas, etc.

It is also essential that announcements are made in the press and through the medium of posters, pointing out the correct procedure and making it clear that the Liberation Committees are NOT authorized to receive material of any sort.

Major CAMPBELL-ORDE is attempting to get a ruling.

(d) Forwarded copy of 1 District Operation Instruction No. 32 of 23 July 45 and Blue Print to MIA.

This deals with future lay-out and adjustment of boundaries in N.E. ITALY.

(e) In view of changes referred to in para (d) above, it is suggested that MIA publish a print showing the areas controlled by Territorial HQ's and the areas administered by Admin Divs.

This would clear up a good many doubts as to which Div is responsible for which units.

(f) Policy towards CC.BB requires clearer definition.

To what extent should they be helped as regards clothing, instruction, etc.; not only now but in the future?

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- (d) Forwarded copy of 1 District Operation Instruction No. 32 of 23 July 45 and Blue Print to MEMA. This deals with future lay-out and adjustment of boundaries in N.E. ITALY.
- (e) In view of changes referred to in para (d) above, it is suggested that MEMA publish a print showing the areas controlled by Territorial HQ's and the areas administered by Admin Divs. This would clear up a good many doubts as to which Div is responsible for which units.
- (f) Policy towards CC.NR requires clearer definition. To what extent should they be helped as regards clothing, instruction, etc.; not only now but in the future?

10. 228 Division, ZADOKA.

- 228 Division, ~~FAIRFAX~~.
- (a) Co-operators. Most of these have been absorbed, but there is a shortage of specialists. 50 are being taken from a Pioneer Coy at WESTWICK in order to speed up the discharge of 800 of the 1914 Class.
- Sub-areas find some difficulty in administering their co-operators, and have been told to send them to the Transit Camp and replace them with British personnel.
- (b) Reinforcements are arriving well from 210 Division.
- (c) 92 Hosp is being disbanded. 1422 Officers Shop will probably remain PADOVA and not accompany 228 Div to 13 Corps Area.

(4)

11. No. 5 Territorial Bn. UDINE.

Spoke with Gen. MULLINI on 31 July.

- (a) Recovery of material. (See foregoing para. 9(c)).
8th Army agreed to the publication of the poster which 1 District vetoed. There is a lot of ammunition still lying about and Gen. MULLINI is afraid of its getting into the wrong hands. He stated that Tugo-Slavs had removed ammunition from dumps guarded by Allied personnel.

All the Amm depots and dumps in the UDINE area and dependent military districts (a total of 59 munition depots) are guarded by Allied troops. The amun in mixed, and is in many cases deteriorating into a dangerous state. Most Allied guards will not allow Italian artificers to enter depots and sort the amun by types.

In one case, Allied soldiers are carrying out target shooting inside a munition depot.

On other occasions, wooden material has been removed by Allied troops from a munition depot, leaving the amun exposed to the elements.

The Direzione d'Artiglieria have skilled personnel. The General would like to have the depots handed over to the Italians, who will be responsible for their safety and well-being. In many cases shells can be disassembled and the chemical used for agriculture.

- (b) Partisan activity.

The local A.N.P.I. are reported to be well armed and clothed, possess a large number of hidden vehicles, and are well provided with funds. All this is reputed to have been supplied by Marshal TITO.

They could mobilise quickly. They are in league with the C.L.N. are well organized and communist to a man.

Recently they took possession of some accommodation which had been earmarked for the Army. No action can be taken to expel them. They have no regard for the Government of ROME.

C.L.N. are in possession of some Italian Army vehicles.

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C.L.N. are in possession of some Italian Army vehicles.

The Territorial HQ has about 8000 troops and 600 CC.N. in its whole area. There is an urgent necessity for more troops, more transport, and more authority.

Very few volunteers for the Army have come forward, as the partisans are well supplied with money and have no need to work.

In Gen. ARNOLDI's opinion there will be a rising organized by Tito as soon as the Allies leave Italy.

(c) Liaison Officer.

228 Div (ARNOLDI) may go to Trieste. Gen. ARNOLDI would like THURUP to be based on Udine if possible, as part of No. 5 Terr. HQ is in 13 Corps area and part in 1 District, and close touch with an I.C. is essential.

(5)

12. 50 B.L.U. and FRIULI Combat Group., LEXICO.

Visited on 31 July-1 August.

(a) Unwanted British equipment.

A list has already been sent to District. Intention of one Bty 25-pdrs and one Tp 17-pdrs for training purposes considered desirable.

(b) Dispersal of Gruppo.

The Gruppo is widely dispersed in small groups, which makes administration difficult. There are many dumps to guard and much work in connection with refugees.

Withdrawal of any transport would completely handicap the Gruppo from carrying out these duties.

Little training is being done, and the Gruppo can hardly be said to be carrying out its correct role of Internal Security.

(c) Strength. The Gruppo is 1280 below strength.(d) Selection of Officers.

The best type of Officer is not being sent to the Group. Gen. SCATTINI considers there is a tendency to send the better officers to Territorial HQ's.

(e) Relations with Allied troops.

There have been several unfortunate incidents between members of the Combat Group and U.S. troops. Each is taken up by the B.L.U. commander with 5th Army as it occurs.

(f) Military Tribunal.

After urgent requests for a Tribunal while the Gruppo was in the line, one has recently arrived, too late. It is now preferable to send men before the Territorial Tribunal, as no facilities exist in Combat Groups for prisons, etc.

(g) Demobilization, Reinforcements, Morale.

Gen. SCATTINI said that this was a vital period for the Combat Groups. The Allies and the Italian Government must come to an early decision on many points.

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(g) Demobilisation, Reinforcements, Morale.

Gen. SCATTINI said that this was a vital period for the Combat Groups. The Allies and the Italian Government must come to an early decision on many points.

The 1915-16-17 classes should be demobilised quickly; then the 1918-19-20 classes and any more over the total ultimate strength agreed upon.

If this is not done soon there is the danger of men deserting with their clothing, etc.

It is essential that the demobilisation policy is announced by the Government without delay, so that the soldiers will at least know how they stand.

Gen. SCATTINI cannot guarantee that 100 per cent of the Gruppo would do their duty in the event of internal disorders in this country.

(5)

(h) Cancellation of Charges.

It is considered that the commander of a Combat Group should be granted the authority to cancel outstanding charges against a soldier in cases where the man has done well and distinguished himself and the charge has been outstanding a long time.

In this Combat Group, for instance, there are several untried cases dating back to the time when the Group were at SAN GIORGIO eight months ago; some of the accused have since died, others did well in the line, and it is felt that the charges against them should be dropped.

(1) Soldiers and Volunteers.

The Volunteers were given a special status, and after three months were discharged and given a "Premio di solidarieta nazionale" amounting to 5000 lire.

The soldier, after several years service, gets no premio and has to wait indefinitely for his discharge.

The partisan volunteer is boosted in all the newspapers particularly in the North.

With the exception of "La PATRIA" and some of the ROME newspapers, no publicity is given to the Combat Groups. Criticism is in fact often levelled at the Generals.

Preferential treatment on return to civil life is given to the partisan volunteers.

The soldier gets none.

Note: In compiling this report I have recorded the opinions of the various officers I met with. They are not necessarily my own views.

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W. F. ...

Lt.Col., C.S.

Subject : GSO 1 (Liaison) Report.

RESTRICTED

Land Forces Sub-Comm., A.C.,
H.Q., M.M.I.A.,
Ref. SIO/G/4.

26 July 45.

8/53/17

H.Q. M.M.I.A. (4 copies)

Herewith first part of report of a tour carried out
between 18 July and Aug 45.

1. R.T.C.I.O.P., CESANO.

Visited on 18 July.

Explained reason for sudden clear-out of reinforcements
to Col. MACKAY, and handed over MIA letter A Q14 of 17 July.

RTO estimate they will be able to provide the required
number of men, although owing to insufficient permanent
staff, many of the Rfts have necessarily to be employed
on maintenance of vehicles and tracked vehicles.

As an example, the official establishment for Maint of
tracked vehs in the centre is 3 Oftrs and 6 Sergts, which
is totally inadequate.

Spent morning going round CESANO. Saw lay-out of 1 and 2
Regiments. The buildings require much repair. New gymnasium
will be very good when fixed up; some equipment already
received.

Ration and clothing stores excellently kept. Men's quarters
poor as there are no windows, or rather no glass in the gaps,
which have in most cases been partially bricked in.

Electric lighting in barrack rooms insufficient.

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Ration and Clothing stores excellently kept. Men's quarters poor as there are no windows, or rather no glass in the gaps, which have in most cases been partially bricked in. Electric lighting in barrack rooms insufficient.

There are at present no proper dining halls. Demonstration rooms are excellent and there are many clever wall drawings of an instructive nature, done by a good draughtsman. The demonstration room in the Carrier Wing is also good.

Visited BRACCIANO in afternoon; saw Engineer training Ground and Engr and Signal barracks and lecture rooms. The equipment is very adequate; no difficulty with DMT over this.

Then went on to MANZIANA and saw the S.I.V.A. (Scuola Istruttori Varii Armi). This runs courses in Weapon Trng, Tactics, Administration and Hygiene. A TWT on the ground was in progress. The school is well run, there are plenty of sand- and cloth-models, and also air photos on plaster of Paris mounting, from OMT, BENEVENTO.

Numbers attending the courses are disappointing. The Signals school, which has a capacity of 300, had only 180

(2)

students, and the Engineer School, capacity 500, had only 18 students. There is apparently no demand from the Gruppi for these two courses.

Similarly, Gruppi do not avail themselves of vacancies allotted in the Tactical Wing, and never send their full quota. This is not very encouraging for the R.T.C.I.C.F., and it is thought perhaps that the Gruppi are afraid of losing their best officers as instructors.

RTCIOF are anxious to point out their difficulties and also show representatives of the Gruppi how they can help.

It is felt that a visit from the Colonels of Regts in the Gruppi would clarify a good many points. I understand that Gen. BOLOGNA in a recent visit was much impressed.

280 1's of RIU's should also see this place, and Col. MACKAY would welcome a visit from them after the ROME conference on 7 August.

Transport. The removal of the G.T Coy will leave insufficient transport for students at the Tactical Wing.

General. An Italian Officers Shop recommended.

Discussed various points with Gen. VIGNI and Gen. MATTEOLI and Chief of Staff in the evening.

2. 802 Re-ORG Depot, ORVETO.

Visited on 19 July.

There were on that date 1284 all ranks present, of which 703 form the permanent staff.

The first draft of ex-cooperators from LEGHORN (US-171)

It is felt that a visit from the Colonels of Regts in the Grappi would clarify a good many points. I understand that Gen. BOLOGNA in a recent visit was much impressed. GSO 1's of BLU's should also see this place, and Col. MACKAY would welcome a visit from them after the ROME conference on 7 August.

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The first draft of ex-cooperators from LUGNOR (US-ITL) arrived on 17 July and amounted to 5 Officers and 165 OR's; 150 more were due 19 July.

Most of the first batch were due for leave and morale was very low. Draft conducting officer stated that between 1 July and the date they left for ORVETO, 40% of his party deserted. Since arrival, a further 21 men had attempted to board trains at the station.

Capt. CRAIG informed me that it was proposed to send all the 1919 class and younger on leave as soon as possible, before they report to CESAMO, and keep the older classes until they are sorted out. He intended visiting MMIA on 21 July to discuss this arrangement.

(3)

Meanwhile it was arranged that the men should be told that they would all get a fortnight's leave sooner or later, as soon as arrangements could be made. Col. GATTA, the Italian Commandant, thought this would stop desertion.

Immediate commitments for the week 30 July - 5 August are 200 men for ANCONA and 300 for BOLOGNA; if these cannot be found from personnel already at the Depot, ORAIG will make up numbers by sending co-operators whose homes are in these provinces.

A new ELS Coy (strength 3 Officers and 82 OR's) is being formed from ex-US-IT's (MIA letter A 110/5 of 16 July refers).

Col. GATTA seems to be sensible and efficient and is well-liked, though I am told that his predecessor was more popular with the Depot Staff.

3. No. 7 Territorial HQ, FLORENCE.

Visited on 20 July. Interviewed Chief of Staff, as Gen. de SIMONE was away.

The HQ is established and working satisfactorily.

The Staff is adequate.

This HQ is not enlisting volunteers, as SMRS signal 17551/Mob did not authorise this HQ to enlist men.

Lists of volunteers however are kept at Military District HQ.

The only enlistments carried out have been 6000 ex-partisans between February and April.

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No. 7 Guard Coy has arrived but has no transport yet 735
Chief of Staff would like another Guard Coy.

The HQ is suffering from lack of accommodation, but POSSNET has this in hand.

(4)

4. 230 Division, FLORENCE.

Visited on 20 July. Discussed points with Gen. VIVALDA and T. Col. BIANCHI (Chief of Staff).

This Div is experiencing NO difficulty with ex-cooperators. The following numbers have been absorbed into units shown :

Unit	Officers	OR's
410 Regt Pionieri	1	170
412 Regt Pionieri	7	55
420 Regt Pionieri	2	557
1005 Autoreparto		125
Total	10	906

US-171 Reinforcements for the Div are coming half from LEGHORN and half from 5 Army. This is easing demobilisation. 412 Regt is already up to strength and should be able to send all its 1914 Class home. There is a certain transport difficulty from LEGHORN.

Two points concerning equalisation of pay, etc were raised :-

(a) The War Ministry (Telegram 12210/3/1 of 28 June) established a demarcation line NORTH of which the messing allowance is 20 lire and SOUTH of which it is 5 lire. The line runs as follows :-

PORTO CORSIKI - RAVENNA - FORLI - NOCCA S. CASCIANO -
 DICOMANO - PONTASSIEVE - FIRENZE - Sesto - PRATO -
 PISTOIA - MONTecatini - PESCIA - LUGIA - MASSAROSA -
 VIAREGGIO.

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Unit	Offs	CR
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412 Regt Pionieri	7	35
400 Regt Pionieri	2	557
1005 Autoparto		125
Total	10	906

US-ITI Reinforcements for the Div are coming half from LEGHORN and half from 5 Army. This is causing demobilization. 412 Regt is already up to strength and should be able to send all its 1014 Class home. There is a certain transport difficulty from LEGHORN.

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(a) The War Ministry (Telegram 12210/8/1 of 28 June) established a demarcation line NORTH of which the messing allowance is 20 lire and SOUTH of which it is 5 lire. The line runs as follows :-

PORTO CORSINI - RAVENNA - FORLI - BOCCA S. CASCIANO -
DIOMANO - PONTASSIEVE - FIRENZE - SESTO - PRATO -
PISTOIA - MONTECATINI - PESCIA - LUGNA - MASSAROSA -
VIAREGIO.

This is causing much dissatisfaction.

(b) The old question of better pay in the Combat Groups was also brought up. Briefly, the difference is :-

Combat Group	Pay	Messing
BR-ITI (NORTH)	45	20
BR-ITI (SOUTH)	32	20
ITI-ITI (NORTH)	32	5
ITI-ITI (SOUTH)	12	20
	12	5

The only other point raised by Gen. VIVALDA was that an Italian Officers Shop is needed.

*250 per cent more
for shops in 43 Militia
Regts. Shop in 100000
Militia units. Informant
JAN 2003*

(5)

5. Other points discussed with Capt. V. THRUPP.

- (a) Partisan activity in FLORENCE is NIL. There are no active bands.
- (b) Disbandment of unwanted BR-ITI units is being looked into at 1 District.
- (c) No reduction is considered desirable in 230 Admin Div HQ.
- (d) Substitution of certain army personnel by civilians is not always satisfactory, as civilians are less disciplined.
- (e) All Italian units in FLORENCE draw rations from the Italian D.I.D. Those outside FLORENCE draw from British D.I.D's.
- (f) Following units (previously reported) can be disbanded as they are serving no useful purpose :-

576 Hosp	CAFFAGIOLLO
866 Hosp	do.
964 Hosp	SIGNA
Ambulanza Radiologica	CAFFAGIOLLO
- (g) Paid a visit to the 230 Div Clothing Store and found all in order. Capt. THRUPP is in close touch with the Div and there are no major difficulties.

6. Continuation of this report will follow in due course.

- (c) No reduction is considered desirable in 230 Admin Div HQ.
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5733

sd/ P.M.M. EGERTON, Lt. Col.
G.S.O. 1 (Maison) H.E.I.A.

Padua, 26 July 45.

785020

COPY INCOMING SIGNAL



FROM: MEXIA LO FLORENCE COMD

ROISKI B

TO : MEXIA ROME

REF : SLO/A

RESTRICTED

YGR INGLEDEW FROM ROBERTON (.)
MACKAY STRONGLY RECOMMENDS THAT CSOS1
OF BLUB VISIT ORRANG ON 7 AUGUST AFTER
MEETING IN ROME (.) HEARTILY CONCUR

3D DISTRIBUTION:

Action: G/33/2
Q (Three)
Maj. HYATT
Info: A

ws 21 July 45

WS

R68

5782

785020

COPY RECEIVING SIGNAL

FROM: NMIA LO 52 BLU
TO : NMIA
REF : BX 1

Q/53/17
SC MTF
IMMEDIATE
RESTRICTED

FOLLOWING SIGNAL RECEIVED THIS HQ FROM 151 SUB AREA
AND REDIRECTED TO YOU (.) REF HS (.) RESTD 16th
FROM H O U A R D (.) HAS BOOKED AIR PASSAGE TO
R O M E FOR WEDNESDAY 30th (.) PROPOSE REPORTING
R O M E FOR THREE DAYS AND RETURNING BY AIR (.)
PLEASE CONFIRM

SD DISTRIBUTION:

Action copy: 0/33

Info

A
Q (two)

Jv 28 May 45

Q/53/17
R. E. Q.
5731

785020

COPY INCLUDING SIGNAL

FROM: 151 SUB AREA FROM HOWARD

TO : AREA

INFO: 4 US CORPS
HQ WILMINGTON

REF: M 1

SIGNALS B

REMIER

IMMEDIATE

B A U M A N RETURNING SUNDAY NIGHT WITH ALL DETAILS
 UP TO 25 MAY OF T R A B U C C H I CASE AND PROPOSED
 ESTABLISHMENT OF PARTISANS (.) REFERENCE T R A B U C C H I
 / T R A C O R M O I PERSUADED GENERAL C A D O R N A
 LAST NIGHT TO ISSUE ORDER TO ALL NORTH ITALY PARTISANS
 CONTAINING CONFIRMING THE FUNCTIONING OF ALL ITALIAN
 ARMY TERRITORIAL COMMANDS AND REQUESTING THEIR CO-
 OPERATION (.) COPIES OF THIS ORDER ARE BEING SENT TO
 TERRITORIAL COMMANDS AND TO ALL REGIONAL COMMITTEES OF
 NATIONAL LIBERATION (.) I CONSIDER THIS ORDER
 SATISFACTORILY WORKING TAKEN OVER LEGALITY TERRITORIAL
 COMMANDS AND WILL CONTINUE TO CLEAR UP ANY CONSIDERABLY (.)
 REFERENCE THE PERSONAL ATTITUDE OF GENERAL
 T R A B U C C H I BY LETTER REPORT FOLLOWS (.)
 AM RETURNING T U R I N (Y) TOMORROW (.) PLEASE
 ADVISE ALL FUTURE SIGNALS 151 SUB AREA FOR H O B A R D

785020

UP TO 25 MAY OF 1945. I HAVE BEEN ADVISED THAT THE
 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (.) DEPENDS ON THE
 1/23/45. I HAVE BEEN ADVISED THAT THE
 LAST NIGHT TO BE ORDER TO ALL NORTH ITALY PARTISANS
 COMING TO THE FRONT OF ALL ITALY
 ANY TERRORIST GROUPS AND REQUESTING THEIR CO-
 OPERATION (.) COPIES OF THIS ORDER ARE BEING SENT TO
 TERRORIST GROUPS AND TO ALL REGIONAL COMMITTEES OF
 NATIONAL LIBERATION (.) I CONSIDER THIS ORDER
 SATISFACTORILY HANDLING THE TERRORIST TERRORIST
 COMING AND WILL HAVE TO CLEAR THE AIR CONSIDERABLY (.)
 DEPENDS THE TERRORIST ACTS OF TERROR
 1/23/45. I HAVE BEEN ADVISED THAT THE
 ALL PARTISANS (.) DEPENDS (.) PLEASE
 ADDRESS ALL FUTURE SIGNALS TO THE AREA FOR THE

Figure 1. A schematic diagram of the experimental design.

Action: copy: 0/270

1974

Action error: A

$$0.011 \pm 0.001 \text{ (cm)}^2$$

At 09:00 on 10 May 1998

0429

Dr.

✓ 6/10/15

11/13/1977

785020

5718

SUBJECT: Liaison visit Army Gr. Armies
and GRUPPI

SECRET

SENIOR LIAISON OFFICER

LAND FORCES SUB-COM, A.C. (MOTIA)

A acting in my own capacity

Q/4

18 May 1945

TO : LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION, ← (3)
A.C. (MOTIA)

1. During the period 26 April 17 May the following HQs were visited:
15 Army Gr, 5 Army, 8 Army, HQ MANTOVA, LEGNANO, GEMONA, TRIEST and FOLGORE
Ops, 56, 52, 51, 50 and 53 ML's.

2. Generally speaking I found that morale was high in all of the GRUPPI with the possible exception of the MANTOVA whose officers felt depressed about the group not having entered the line. O.C. ML's were not unduly worried about discipline, which still leaves a good deal to be desired, but they seemed to feel that it was necessary to take a strong disciplinary line now the battle was over, and this in many cases had not been done, failure being partly due to the fact that a great many men from the GRUPPI have been sent on leave to their homes in the North and also partly to the weak attitude of certain of the Commanders to enforcing discipline. All the groups did well in the final battle, but GEMONA and LEGNANO were outstanding.

All the groups were resting when visited except the LEGNANO which was carrying out an occupational role in the BERGAMO - BRESCIA area with units dispersed from TUNIN to BERGO.

The remaining groups were very anxious firstly to go North and secondly to find employment

Desertion, according to both the Italians and the ML's, is negligible.

3. The following points were raised during my visit and are common to all the GRUPPI.

(a) The future of the GRUPPI when what might be called the second semi-operational phase (a/e Army or District) is over.

(b) The disastrous effect that an order to move South (say to the MARITIME Area) would have on morale and discipline.

(c) The disastrous effect on morale that any large scale "handing

2. Generally speaking I found that morale was high in all of the GRUPPI with the possible exception of the MANTOVA whose officers felt depressed about the group not having entered the line. C.O. MU's were not unduly worried about discipline, which still leaves a good deal to be desired, but they seemed to feel that it was necessary to take a strong disciplinary line now the battle was over, and this in many cases had not been done. Failure being partly due to the fact that a great many men from the GRUPPI have been sent on leave to their homes in the North and also partly to the weak attitude of certain of the Commanders to enforcing discipline. All the groups did well in the final battle, but CREMONA and LEGNANO were outstanding.

All the groups were resting when visited except the LEGNANO which was carrying out an occupational role in the BERGAMO - BALSACIA Area with units dispersed from RUBIN to BULGO.

The remaining groups were very anxious firstly to go North and secondly to find employment.

Desertion, according to both the Italians and the MU's, is negligible.

3. The following points were raised during my visit and are common to all the GRUPPI.

(a) The future of the GRUPPI when what might be called the second semi-operational phase (w/c Army or District) is over.

(b) The disastrous effect that an order to move South (say to the RAPALLO Area) would have on morale and discipline.

(c) The disastrous effect on morale that any large scale "handing in" of British Arms, Equipment and M.I. would have.

(d) Both GRUPPI and MU's agreed that any proposal to turn the Gunner Regts into Inf Regts would be most undesirable now and in the foreseeable future. They are usually the most disciplined elements and at present the whole group would suffer if the Gunner Regts were converted with consequent loss of morale and prestige.

(e) All Groups were worried about the possibility of finding loyal and adequate reinforcements if and when the older classes (1914-20) are demobilised and volunteers assert their prerogative of going home.

Some of the Groups know anything about RTO ICE CREMONA or have any confidence in its ability to supply adequate reinforcements of the right type.

(f) The future of the MU's is worrying both the Italian and British MU's.

(g) The "leave problem" was not raised by either GRUPPI or MU's and

785020

I understand that by fair means or foul it is being satisfactorily dealt with.

The following particular points for each GRUPO were raised:-

(a) MANTOVA

This Group would benefit from a move North (see para 2) and Garrison employment. It is well trained, reasonably disciplined, and should make a good I.S. Division although it contains a fair quantity of volunteers and ex-partisans; I should say nearly a third; who might be an unstable element in case of civil disorder. As 2 District are not yet in the saddle it is difficult to foresee any immediate employment for the MANTOVA. See signal from 15 Army Group, for section 5 Army, SD 1627 of 13 May 46.

(b) LEONANO

When I visited them the LEONANO were fully employed in their occupational role under command 5 Army and their main concern was maintenance. Discipline in this Group is, I should say, on the whole better than in the other Groups, and this combined with the fact that it has a relatively small percentage of volunteers and Patriots in its ranks should make it an excellent and dependable formation for use in the case of civil disorders. Furthermore, it is well commanded. General ULLI did, however, stress that it would be difficult to use troops in case of civil disorder until ITALY had a properly elected Government whose orders would constitute the people's mandate for strong action against agitators or mob violence. The General also said that in the future greater attention would have to be paid to the recruits for the GRUPT's moral qualifications (loyalty and discipline) and less to his technical qualifications.

He had no faith in CRESANO's ability to turn out good material for the Groups.

(c) CHENONA

The CHENONA has done exceptionally well in battle and is the only Group that 5 Army have retained under command for an occupational role in North Italy.

Their main problem is discipline and the possible reaction of their volunteer and Patriot element (50% of Group) in the case of civil disturbance, although the 25 are not as worried about this angle as the General. One Regimental Commander, Colonel FERRARA, should be relieved, and a stronger disciplinarian put in instead. General ULLI himself is too weak with his Regimental Commanders

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He had no faith in CRESANO's ability to turn out good material for the Groups.

(c) CHENCHA

The CHENCHA has done exceptionally well in battle and is the only Group that 5 Army have retained under command for an occupational role in North Italy.

Their main problem is discipline and the possible reaction of their volunteer and Patriot element (50% of Group) in the case of civil disturbance, although the EU are not as worried about this angle as the General. One Regimental Commander, Colonel FERRARA, should be relieved, and a stronger disciplinarian put in instead. General FERRARA himself is too weak with his Regimental Commanders and doesn't see that his orders are carried out. The General who had just completed a brief visit to M.S. Italy when I saw him was very anxious that propaganda in favour of the Italian War Effort generally and particularly the good work done by the GRUPPI should be carried out throughout the North which thought only in terms of the Partisan triumph. The CHENCHA should make a good I.S. Division.

(d) FRULI

This Group appears to be improving although I should say it was of less potential use as an I.S. Div than either the CHENCHA, LEGHARD or MANTOVA, and I doubt if it has overcome the defects which have characterized its progress since its formation. Poor discipline is its main problem now and General SCATTINI told me that he could not count on the loyalty of his volunteer and Patriot element (33% of the Group) in case of civil disorder.

785020

- 3 -

(e) FOLGONE

This Group is in a class by itself and although it did well in battle presents many and varied problems as a peace time formation. They can be stated as follows:-

(1) In view of the reactionary political nature of the Group as a whole, of its poor discipline, instability and general aggressiveness, should it be retained as an I.S. Division, given Garrison employment in a quiet part of Italy (SARDEGNA?), or broken up altogether?

(11) Should General MORICI retain command - I have stated my views in a DO letter to General BERNINI.

(111) In view of the possibility that the sailors, especially the officers, in the SAN MARCO Regiment may want to return to naval employment is it wise to keep this unit on I.S. or guard duties for which it is not fitted?

C.O. ES MU is going to investigate the feeling in the SAN MARCO and inform MIA of the results. Lt. Col. MARTINI COS to the Division suggested that it might be wise to disband the SAN MARCO Regiment form a BRIGADIERE Regiment instead round the Battalion now in the LIGURIA and give the latter another ALPINE Battalion to form an ALPINE Regiment.

Regarding the future employment of this Division Lt. Col. MARTINI stated that in his opinion it should either be disbanded or taken firmly in hand, disciplined and "forced".

Should it be employed on garrison and I.S. duties, he considered there would be less risk of incidents if it was widely dispersed by battalion and company which would give the men a greater sense of responsibility and less chance to perpetrate the old "MORNO" aggressiveness.

General MORICI stated that his Division was very anti-communist and that "sarebbe ideale all'impiego contra questi elementi sovversivi".

b. 5 ARMY

5 Army complained that 8 H-LI B.T. Coys formed at AFFRACIA and mobilised North of MOSE for 5 Army arrived up without their British increment and had drawn their vehicles and organized themselves at the mobilization centre without sufficient British supervision. It was felt that more care was needed in the formation of these units.

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C.C. 53 MEV is going to investigate the feeling in the SAM MARCO and inform MIA of the results. Lt. Col. MARINI COB to the Division suggested that it might be wise to disband the SAM MARCO Regiment form a BRIGADIERE Regiment instead round the Battalion now in the LEGNANO and give the latter another ALPINE Battalion to form an ALPINE Regiment.

Regarding the future employment of this Division Lt. Col. MARINI stated that in his opinion it should either be disbanded or taken firmly in hand, disciplined and "reformed".

Should it be employed on garrison and I.S. duties, he considered there would be less risk of incidents if it was widely dispersed by battalion and company which would give the men a greater sense of responsibility and less chance to perpetuate the old "MIA" aggressiveness.

General MCHIOI stated that his Division was very anti-communist and that "sarebbe ideale all'impiego contro questi elementi sovversivi".

5. 5 ARMY

5 Army complained that 2 BR-I VI S.T. Coys formed at AFRAGLIA and mobilised North of Rome for 5 Army arrived up without their British increment and had drawn their vehicles and organized themselves at the mobilization centre without sufficient British supervision. It was felt that more care was needed in the formation of these units.

5. 5 ARMY

(a) The disbandment of the GARIBOLDI Brigade and the LIGERO Company was in hand. 5 Army had made proposals to AFHQ regarding the demobilisation of "Y" Recce Bn and the MIA MIA Bde.

Lt. Col. SMITH C-1 Ops 5 Army felt it would be best to allow all except volunteers for service of these last two units to return home.

5 Army are very sensitive about the treatment of the personnel of "Y" Recce now that the battle is over as they know that they are not popular with the War Ministry and especially over the fate of Capt GUY C.C. the Sqn. This officer has had high praise from every British formation he has served under. All MIA please take action to see that the members of this formation and of the MIA MIA are given special consideration by the War Ministry and that their demobilisation or otherwise is handled tactfully.

785020

- 4 -

7. RECENT "I" & ARMY (COLONEL'S CIRCULAR)

I saw Major COLONEL and Lt. Col. VILANOVA RECLAMER O.C. RECLAMER "I". I understood that 8 Army are now desirous of breaking up this unit of about 140 Italian Liaison Officers and Lt. Col. RECLAMER raised the following points:-

- (a) He has about 40 English speaking officers who might still be useful to the Allies. They are all captains or subalterns and all except about 10 are "di complemento". I suggest a list of these officers be requested from MILA LO 8 Army and that they join the pool of War Ministry interpreters and are given indefinite leave until required. The balance should be demobilized.
- (b) Patriots should be disbanded and volunteers, after careful screening, accepted for the Army.
- (c) The problem of honorary ranks for Patriot Commanders.

The O.C. commanding the GALILEI Bde has been called Lt. Col. "MILC" for some considerable time by both the British and the Italians but no official confirmation of this rank has yet arrived from the War Ministry. The whole question is a delicate one, as I pointed out to RECLAMER, because apart from undoubted merit and British recognition Patriot Coy Comds had some 30 men only in a Coy, with no other weapons than small arms, and a Bn Comd had about 150 men under his orders. Will MILA please take up the matter with the War Ministry.

8. The following various points were raised during my liaison tour:-

(a) GENERAL

- (i) The proposed "Officers Shop" is not functioning and the problem of officer's clothes is acute.
- (ii) The pay question generally and in particular the question for specialist pay should be re-examined. Also the question of family allowances.
- (iii) A great effort should be made to get an allotment of British Sports Equipment for the Gps now that certain large formations are about to leave the country. The possibility of acquiring or making Italian footballs etc in the North should be investigated by the War Ministry.
- (iv) Replacements for non regular officers now wishing to go home is not an urgent problem but should be studied by the War Ministry. Medical officers especially are affected.

8.

but no official confirmation of this has yet arrived from the War Ministry. The whole question is a delicate one, as I pointed out to ESCOBAR, because apart from undoubted merit and British recognition Patriot Coy Comd had some 50 men only in a Coy, with no other weapons than small arms, and a Bn Comd had about 150 men under his orders. Will MMIA please take up the matter with the War Ministry.

The following various points were raised during my liaison tour:-

(a) GHUFI

- (1) The proposed "Officers Shop" is not functioning and the problem of officer's clothes is acute.
- (ii) The pay question generally and in particular the question for specialist pay should be re-examined. Also the question of family allowances.
- (iii) A great effort should be made to get an allotment of British Sports Equipment for the Gps now that certain large formations are about to leave the country. The possibility of acquiring or making Italian footballs etc in the North should be investigated by the War Ministry.
- (iv) Replacements for non regular officers now wishing to go home is not an urgent problem but should be studied by the War Ministry. Medical officers especially are affected.
- (v) There is some divergence of view over the usefulness or suitability of the 8 Army "Penne d'Italia" Canteen workers. On the whole comment is more favourable than otherwise.
- (vi) In order to relieve boredom I feel sure great attention should now be paid in the GHUFI to the organization of games and courses, battle schools etc for the Officers and NCO's.

(b) Training

Up to the present there has been little or no coordination over the translation and publication of training manuals, pamphlets, amendments, etc. This can now be done through G-1 Trg MMIA and the War Ministry.

5726

- 5 -

(c) CASINO

A series of lectures by CASINO Officers on their own Op's operations should be arranged for officers and CE's at CASINO.

(d) PATRIOTS

Colonel SCARPA C.O. Special Regiment LAMARCO told me that he could raise a battalion of volunteers from the ex ALFIM I Partisans Brigade known as the FIDELIS VERUM. I have seen some of these men in the KICLO - SEMINIO Area and they are of a good type and, I believe, apolitical.

Lt. Col. The Hon. H.A.C. HOWARD
Senior Liaison Officer
M. M. I. A.

Typed in Rome.

Authenticated

L.H.D.

HF-CL

22 May

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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Lt. Col. The Hon. M.A.C. HOWARD
Senior Liaison Officer
M. M. I. A.

Typed in home.

Authenticated *[Signature]* *HF-CL*

22 May

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believe, apolitical.

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SECRETSUBJECT: Liaison Tour to Combat GroupsTO : Land Forces Sub-Com. A.C.
(M. H. I. A.) (3)Senior Liaison Officer
Land Forces Sub-Com. A.C.
(M. H. I. A.)O/L
27 March 45

1. MEIA LO was contacted on 17 March at Rear 8 Army and between 18 and 25 March FULGON, FRUILLI and CNELOMA Groups were seen in that order. In each case COO, C of 8 and all available regimental Comds were seen as well as O.C. MEU the 02 and DAQMO. In addition, Brigadier AQ and GSO1 (Trg) 8 Army were visited. In the Combat Groups themselves I saw several Bn and Coy Comds and talked with a considerable number of men in the line.
2. In all three MEU's visited I got the impression that they felt out of touch with HQ MEIA HME and that although they were more than pleased with the efforts made on their behalf by the MEIA LO EIGHTH Army they regarded the Mission as a whole as a distant and often unenthusiastic supporter. This state of affairs can be remedied by more frequent personal contacts between heads of Branches and Services or their deputies and the MEU's, and by liaison visits of the kind I have just completed.
3. My general impression of the Groups was as follows:-
 - (a) Morale was almost universally excellent. There were some complaints about cigarettes, soap, the inability to get equal MAFI and Welfare treatment with British coloured troops, and widespread and well founded complaints about the slowness of mail, but by and large Officers and Men were in excellent spirits.
 - Not one of the many men talked to during my visit raised the usual complaint about leave.
 - (b) The fighting efficiency of the Groups appeared to vary according to the length of time they had had to settle down in the line, the amount of operational success so far achieved and the handling of the Group by its respective MEU. I should say that at the time of my visit their order of merit was CNELOMA, FRUILLI, FULGON. Whatever their fighting efficiency is by Allied Standards, there is no doubt that the first two are more than holding their own in the line and personal bravery is nowhere lacking.
 - (c) The opinion of the British Command concerning the CHUFFI was in each case sympathetic and laudatory. In the case of CNELOMA and FRUILLI it is generally felt that they have exceeded expectations and more than

785020

touch with HQ MIA HSE and that although they were more than pleased with the efforts made on their behalf by the MIA LO EIGHTH Army they regarded the Mission as a whole as a distant and often unenthusiastic supporter. This state of affairs can be remedied by more frequent personal contacts between heads of Branches and Services or their deputies and the HUI's, and by liaison visits of the kind I have just completed.

3. My general impression of the Groups was as follows:-

(a) Morale was almost universally excellent. There were some complaints about cigarettes, soap, the inability to get equal MAAFI and Welfare treatment with British coloured troops, and widespread and well founded complaints about the slowness of mail, but by and large Officers and Men were in excellent spirits.

Not one of the many men talked to during my visit raised the usual complaint about leave.

(b) The fighting efficiency of the Groups appeared to vary according to the length of time they had had to settle down in the line, the amount of operational success so far achieved and the handling of the Group by its respective HUI. I should say that at the time of my visit their order of merit was CROMONA, FRIULI, FULGORE. Whatever their fighting efficiency is by Allied Standards, there is no doubt that the first two are more than holding their own in the line and personal bravery is nowhere lacking.

(c) The opinion of the British Corps commanding the GRUPE was in each case sympathetic and laudatory. In the case of CROMONA and FRIULI it is generally felt that they have exceeded expectations and more than fulfilled the role for which they were originally intended. The EIGHTH Army also appears to have become more "Italian minded" than ever before as the result of the considerable success achieved by the CROMONA and the minor successes of the FRIULI.

4. The FULGORE Group appears to be at some disadvantage as against the other two owing to the personality of its COC and the strange and (in the words of an Italian Officer) unwilling entryway of the MEMBO and SAN MARCO Regiments. General MORICI is an ardent parachutist and I think there is a tendency on his part to favour the MEMBO at the expense of the sailors.

5. I have no doubt at all that the personality and behaviour of the O.C. the HUI - and therefore the behaviour of his staff and training increment - have an inestimable influence on the character and success of the Group itself. I believe that the successes achieved by the CROMONA after considerable initial difficulties

785020

- 2 -

can in very great measure be attributed to the way in which Lt. Col. KERR-CARTER has handled his Group.

6. Discipline left something to be desired in all Groups and it is essential that as many Groups as possible are furnished by the Ministry of War with the "Procuratore del RE".

Two of these J.A.O. representatives at any rate are indispensable for the four Groups.

I understand that once this gentleman is available the Group itself can convolve a Special Tribunal presided over either by the GOC or his 2 i/o and try and sentence men charged with gross breaches of discipline within a very short time.

Without any doubt the first Procuratore available should be sent to the POLLOCK.

7. Absenteeism and desertion has been negligible in all Groups from the moment they entered the line. This problem will arise again however when the North is liberated or when the Groups come out of the line.

8. The only Group which has absorbed large quantities of local non GERMANO trained patriots is the CHAMONA.

In two Bns visited they constituted between 30% and 50% of their effectives. These patriots have fought extremely well but are indisciplined and unsoldierly.

9. None of the Group HQs or ELU's appeared to know anything about the RHC ICF or to have any confidence in it. The last arrivals from GERMANO with the FRIULI were badly clothed and ill-trained.

All Group HQ wanted to run their own reinforcement centre just in rear of Divisional Area. I told them that there could be no question of this but I strongly recommend that GERMANO be run on the lines of an IKED with a Bn for each Group and one Naval Coy (for the SAN MARCO) commanded by an officer designated by the GOC Group with whom he would be in direct contact regarding officer and other reinforcements.

As in my own Guard's IKED this would foster unit esprit de corps and would in no way affect specialist or other courses nor would it mean that if an officer of the FRIULI Bn was needed with the LEONANO he would not be posted there.

If a Group was about to undertake offensive operation involving ^{greater} expected losses than could be replaced by the normal calling forward of reinforcements from GERMANO it should form its own LOB to deal with the situation.

10. The problem of replacing indifferent officers or officer casualties is very serious.

It can be solved only by bringing back to ITALY a certain number of POW Officers or calling for volunteers from IS Divisions and other BR-ITI and IRI-ITI Units.

785020

FOLGORE.

7. Absenteeism and desertion has been negligible in all Groups from the moment they entered the line. This problem will arise again however when the North is liberated or when the Groups come out of the line.

8. The only Group which has absorbed large quantities of local non CREMAO trained patriots is the CREMAO.

In two Ans visited they constituted between 30% and 50% of their effectives. These patriots have fought extremely well but are indisciplined and unsoldierly.

9. None of the Group HQs or ECU's appeared to know anything about the ETC ICF or to have any confidence in it. The last arrivals from CREMAO with the FRIULI were badly clothed and ill-trained.

All Group HQ wanted to run their own reinforcement centre just in rear of Divisional area. I told them that there could be no question of this but I strongly recommend that CREMAO be run on the lines of an IKED with a Bn for each Group and one Naval Coy (for the SAN MARCO) commanded by an officer designated by the OOC Group with whom he would be in direct contact regarding officer and other reinforcements.

As in my own Guard's IKED this would foster unit esprit de corps and would in no way affect specialist or other courses nor would it mean that if an officer of the FRIULI Bn was needed with the LEONARDO he would not be posted there.

If a Group was about to undertake offensive operation involving expected losses then could be replaced by the normal calling forward of reinforcements from CREMAO it should form its own LOB to deal with the situation.

10. The problem of replacing indifferent officers or officer casualties is very serious.

It can be solved only by bringing back to ITALY a certain number of POW Officers or calling for volunteers from IS Divisions and other ER-III and ITH-III Units.

At the moment it is almost impossible to give an inefficient officer "the sack" as there is no guarantee of early replacement by someone better.

11. I attach as Appendix "A" a list of queries and recommendations which require action.

H.A.C. Howard

Lt. Col., O. B.
Military Mission Italian Army

785020

VARIOUS PROBLEMS OF GRUPPI DI COMBATTIMENTO
REGOLAMENTI ACTING BY E.E.I.A.

G. SP

- (a) FRIULI do not require any more reinforcements from GESSANO at present.
- (b) 51 BLU put up a letter to Canadian Corps some time ago regarding the unsuitability of whereby a man can be made to pay for loss or damage to equipment up to 100% by the I consider that since the man would be unable to pay for certain valuable equipment on years this would deter him in his carelessness and therefore the regulations fail in loss or damage to valuable equipment. A copy of this letter was ~~sent~~ sent to MELA examined please.
- (c) A Staff Capt Q for each BLU is recommended. This has been proposed before and tur-tion be reopened please. FOLDORE have been lent one by 13 Corps.

"G"

- (a) The quality of the Italian "Macedonia" cigarettes was loudly complained of. Would soldiers first priority over civilians with better cigarettes such as "Militar".
- (b) The cigarette and soap position is better but needs watching on the 5 Army Front. distribution of 2 cigarettes per head for the first seven days it was in the line. had no soap issue for 52 days.
- (c) I strongly recommend that officers be allowed to retain their one suit of battle-dre-ing is withdrawn. They have almost universally taken great pains to have their-usted and I feel they should be allowed to keep them (against payment if necessary) suffer the indignity of having to hand them in. I have suggested this to MELA up to Corps.
- (d) Are FOLDORE and LEGNAHO indenting on 231 Div for caps badges of rank etc? If not Increment 5 Army understands the channels and informs all concerned.

"A"

- (a) I strongly recommend that Major MONICO be allowed to remain with the FOLDORE Gp info and delicate situation existing in the Gp. I will report on the situation after
- (b) Major CARRE HUNT is likely to request the following additions to his staff in the
 - (i) Capt MERTON to 13 Corps at a later date and as a result of like British Increment 5 Army.
 - (ii) Another LO for assignment 5 Corps when latter moves.
 - (iii) Another clerk.

VARIOUS PROBLEMS OF GRUPPI DI COMBATTIMENTO
REQUIRE ACTION BY E.M.I.A.

Appendix "A" to MIA Senior LOs
 letter G/L of _____ March 45

require any more reinforcements from CESANO at present.

A letter to Canadian Corps some time ago regarding the unsuitability of the present regulations can be made to pay for loss or damage to equipment up to 100% by the Italian Government. They since the man would be unable to pay for certain valuable equipment only over a period of say 12 months and deter him in his carelessness and therefore the regulations fail in their object of preventing loss of valuable equipment. A copy of this letter was sent to MIA but say the position be

for each BLU is recommended. This has been proposed before and turned down. May the question please. FULGORI have been lent one by 13 Corps.

the Italian "Macedonia" cigarettes was loudly complained of. Would it be possible to give priority over civilians with better cigarettes such as "Billit".

and soap position is better but needs watching on the 5 Army Front. The FULGORI had an average of 2 cigarettes per head for the first seven days it was in the line. One unit claimed to have soap for 52 days.

recommend that officers be allowed to retain their one suit of battle-dress when the G.H. winter clothing arrives. They have almost universally taken great pains to have their battle-dress tailored and adjusted. They should be allowed to keep these (against payment if necessary) like British officers and not the indignity of having to hand them in. I have suggested this to MIA LO 8 Army and CREMONA have put it

and LIGNARD indenting on 231 Div for caps badges of rank etc? If not could MIA ensure MIA LO British understands the channels and informs all concerned.

recommend that Major BONICO be allowed to remain with the FULGORI Gp indefinitely in view of the special situation existing in the Gp. I will report on the situation after my next visit.

It is likely to request the following additions to his staff in the near future which I recommend:

- (i) Capt BENTON to 13 Corps at a later date and as a result of likely developments regarding British Increment 5 Army.
- (ii) Another LO for assignment 5 Corps when latter moves.
- (iii) Another clerk.

contd. sheet

Sheet

"A" (Contd.)

- (c) There appears to be a discrepancy between British Directive No. 13 (Combat Groups) and The former strikes a man off the posted strength after 15 days absence and the latter checked please.
- (d) May the "rail problem" be examined thoroughly please. The bottleneck appears to be censorship office in NAPLES.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785020

Sheet

Puberty Rule *AFHS Rule*

be a discrepancy between British Directive No. 13 (Combat Groups) and the Italian ~~SE~~ version.
as a run off the posted strength after 15 days absence and the latter after 30. May this be
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in HAPLES.

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