

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

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SD/41/1 RFTS, GENERAL

Opened Sept. 19, 1944 - Closed Feb. 24, 1945

Sept. 1944 - Feb. 1945

COPY TRANSLATION

From: Ministry of War

Ref: 40049

TO : DIA

Date: Feb 45

Subject: Absence Strength.

Circular 3055/Troops dated 12 September 1944 is cancelled.

Bearing in mind the contents of secret circular 307295/C.A. - Cabinet - dated 27 Dec 1944 "Administrative Instructions N. 18," the said circular is therefore modified thus:

1. All troops on the strength of units who, for any reason (A.S.O.L. - various leave - temporary release, etc.), are away from duty for a period of more than 30 days must be struck off the strength of their units and t.o.s. of the respective Depots (normal or subsidiary) where they will be shown on a special roll, under the heading of "Absence Strength," held by the Depot, assisted by an alphabetical nominal roll.

2. When these troops have to return to duty (because of establishing of their position either following their trial for desertion or the expiration of their leave, or the revoking of their temporary release) they must report, not to the unit nor to the Depot on which they are on strength, but directly to the reinforcement Centre (BR-IFI, IG-IFI, IIF-IFI, or for Italian Fighting Forces) according to whether they previously formed part of units reinforced by said reinforcement Centres.

i.e.

Those belonging to BR-IFI Units)	To the nearest of the three reinforcement Centres for BR-IFIs.	(Afragola (Trani (Orvieto
those belonging to IG-IFI Units)	To the P.B.S. reinforce- ment Centre	(Astroni
those belonging) to IIF-IFI Units)	To the IIF-IFI reinforce- ment Base Depot	(Frosinone
those belonging) to Combat Groups)	To the Italian Fighting Forces Training Centre	(Casano

The Depots will, therefore, take action to:

- Notify in time (through Garrison H.Q.s of CC.RI stations) the troops concerned as to which Reinforcement Centre they must report for successive postings to units.
- Send a copy of the notification to the Reinforcement Centre that it may be informed that the soldier has to report himself there. The Reinforcement Centre will then arrange to inform the Depot of:

~~Postings effected in order that the consequent forwarding of service documents to the Mobilisation Centre of the new unit may be carried out.~~

~~or Failures to Report for the carrying out of the eventual apprehension and trial of the soldier who has not reported.~~

3. Particularly in the respect of military patients in Hospitals or Convalescent Depots:-

~~-for periods up to 30 days (in which included any eventual convalescent leave) they must remain on the strength of the units as "Hospital Patients".~~

~~-for successive periods of hospitalisation from 30 up to 60 days (in which included any eventual convalescent leave) they will be taken over onto the strength of the appropriate Reinforcement Centre, as referred to in para 2. Notification of the transfer will also be given to the respective Depot (which will still handle the service records) in addition to the Directorate of the Hospital.~~

~~-after 60 days in military Hospitals or Convalescent Depots they will have to be taken over by civilian Hospitals or Convalescent Depots and will therefore cease to be shown on the effective strength of the Reinforcement Centres. Notice of the transfer will be given to the Depots who have them on strength in order that they (troops) will be definitely passed over to the districts, who will enter them in the absent strength until their military position is established.~~

4. The troops, referred to in para 3, who, upon discharge from Hospitals or termination of convalescent leave, are held to be still on the strength of their units, having spent a period of not more than 30 days in hospital and on convalescent leave, will return to their units.

~~-If, however, the period spent in hospital or on convalescent leave exceeds a period of 60 days, they will report to the Reinforcement Centre (to which they will be transferred by the corps to which they belong) who will arrange a new posting for them, informing the original depot of it, (as in para 2) for the forwarding of the service records to the Mobilisation Centres of new unit to which posted.~~

Upon discharge from Hospital the soldier must be informed, by that Hospital, to which Reinforcement Centre he must report at the expiration of eventual convalescent leave.

5. Troops included in the special roll of "Absent Strength" held as shown in para 1, will not have to be shown in the periodical return of the effective strength of the Depot.

3943

6. Pay accounts and acquittance rolls for troops on the special "Absent Strength" roll, entitled to pay, will be held by the same Depot as has them on the roll. It remains well understood that they are not entitled to ration issue.

7. On the service record of the troops dealt with, after the entries relative to their position (extraordinary leave without ration allowance, convalescent leave, three month exemption, trial for desertion, etc.), will be entered the following change:

"On the 'Absent Strength' of the Depot
circular (quoting this one) ... the"

At the cessation of the special position, (through expiration of the leave granted to them without other renewal, or because a check-examination has fixed the medical category, or the Military Authorities withdrew and did not renew the three monthly exemption, or the position following trial for desertion has been defined, etc), after the relative entry, the following service entry will be made:-

"Taken off of the 'Absent Strength' of the Depot
circular (quoting this one)
and reported to the Reinforcement Centre of
else handed over to Military District
(according to whether he is for further service or
discharge) on the"

"Posted to the (Corp or unit to which posted by the
Reinforcement Centre) on the"

8. The H.Q.s addressed will arrange for the urgent proclaiming of this circular to all the Units located within their own jurisdiction.

Sgd. CASATI

S I G N A L

FROM: MALA

TO : AFHQ FOR G-1 BR G-3 ORG NOV

INFO: HQ 15 ARMY GROUP

CG FIFTH ARMY

FIFTH ARMY FOR BR INCR

EIGHTH ARMY

DISTONE

DISTWO

DISTTHREE

FENSOUTH

FENSEASE

FIFTH ARMY FOR MALA LO

FIFTH ARMY BR INCR FOR MALA LO

REAR EIGHTH ARMY FOR MALA LO

DISTONE FOR MALA LO

DISTTHREE FOR MALA LO

MOVWIT

MOVWIT

MOVCEUT

DELEGATIONE TRASPORTI o13 REGGIO

FENSOUTH FOR MALA LO

52 AREA FOR MALA LO

54 AREA FOR MALA LO

ICF REP TWO CENTRE CESANO

SIGS OFFICE BARLETTA FOR O'DONNELL

ITALIAN RPT DEP ORVETO

ALCON SICILY FOR MALA LO

SD 2331S E C R E T

F I R S T (.) REQUEST YOU ARRANGE FOLLOWING MOVES IN WEEK 5 M A R TO 11

M A R (.) READ IN COLUMNS A NUMBERS B DESCRIPTION C PLACE FROM

D DESTINATION E RECEIVING TBN (.)

	A	B	C	D	E
1 (.)	200	COMBAT REFS	CESANO	TO PESARO	FOR FRIULI
2 (.)	200	COMBAT REFS	CESANO	TO PESARO	FOR CREMONA
3 (.)	200	COMBAT REFS	CESANO	TO AREZZO	FOR LEGNANO
4 (.)	200	COMBAT REFS	CESANO	TO RENEVENTO	FOR MANTOVA
5 (.)	250	SICILY REGALL	REGGIO	TO TRANI	FOR BR-IT
6 (.)	1000	LABOUR	CASORIA	TO AREZZO	FOR BR INCR 5 ARMY
7 (.)	500	SCREENERS	CASORIA	TO AREZZO	FOR BR INCR 5 ARMY

REQUEST SERIAL 6 MOVE EARLY IN WEEK AND SERIAL 7 LATE SC THAT A R E Z Z O

CAN ACCOMMODATE (.)

3941

FIFTH ARMY BR INCR FOR MILA LO
 REAR EIGHTH ARMY FOR MILA LO
 DISTANCE FOR MILA LO
 DISTANCE FOR MILA LO

SD 2331

S F C R E T

F I R S T (.) REQUEST YOU ARRANGE FOLLOWING MOVES IN WEEK 5 M A R TO 11

M A R (.) READ IN COLUMNS A NUMBERS B DESCRIPTION C PLACE FROM

D DESTINATION E RECEIVING FMV (.)

A	B	C	D	E
1 (.) 200	COMBAT REFS	CESANO	TO PESARO	FOR FRIULI
2 (.) 200	COMBAT REFS	CESANO	TO PESARO	FOR CREMONA
3 (.) 200	COMBAT REFS	CESANO	TO AREZZO	FOR LEGNANO
4 (.) 200	COMBAT REFS	CESANO	TO RENEVENTO	FOR MANTOVA
5 (.) 250	SICILY RECALL	REGGIO	TO TRANI	FOR BR-ITI
6 (.) 1000	LABOUR	CASORIA	TO AREZZO	FOR BR INCR 5 ARMY
7 (.) 500	SCREENERS	CASORIA	TO AREZZO	FOR BR INCR 5 ARMY

REQUEST SERIAL 6 MOVE EARLY IN WEEK AND SERIAL 7 LATE SO THAT A R E Z Z C

CAN ACCOMMODATE (.)

8 (.) 200	LABOUR	CASORIA	TO ANCONA	FOR 1 DIST
9 (.) 110	LABOUR	CASORIA	TO ROME	FOR 503 SMOKE COY
10 (.) 100	LABOUR	CASORIA	TO CANCELLO	FOR 506 SMOKE COY
11 (.) 50	LABOUR	CASORIA	TO SAN ANTONIO	FOR 152 COY 404 PNR REGT
12 (.) 70	LABOUR	CASORIA	TO LA PICCICOLA	FOR 2 BN 407 PNR REGT
13 (.) 20	LABOUR	CASORIA	TO LA PICCICOLA	FOR 144 COY 404 PNR REGT
14 (.) 300	LABOUR	TRANI	TO PESARO	FOR 8 ARMY

3941

15 (.) 160 LABOUR TRANI TO TARANTO FOR 1 BN 406 PNR REGT
 16 (.) 500 LABOUR TRANI TO BARI FOR 2 BN 406 PNR REGT
 17 (.) 140 LABOUR TRANI TO BARI FOR 2 BN 408 PNR REGT
 18 (.) 60 LABOUR TRANI TO POLIGNANO FOR 142 CCY 404 PNR REG
 19 (.) 150 RLY ENGRS TRANI TO ROMA FOR 6 RLY BN
 20 (.) 150 ENGINEERS TRANI TO ANCONA FOR 1 DIST
 21 (.) 100 ENGINEERS TRANI TO AREZZO FOR 1 DIST
 22 (.) 50 LABOUR TRANI TO CERNIA FOR 141 CCY 404 PNR REGT
 23 (.) 500 APULIAN YS TRANI TO ORVIEO FOR BR-ITI
 24 (.) 200 APULIAN YS CAMPOBASSO TO ASTRONI FOR US-ITI
 25 (.) 300 APULIAN YS POTENZA TO ASTRONI FOR US-ITI
 26 (.) 300 APULIAN YS LECCE TO ORVIEO FOR BR-ITI
 27 (.) 100 APULIAN YS FOGGIA TO ORVIEO FOR BR-ITI
 28 (.) 300 APULIAN YS BARI TO ASTRONI FOR US-ITI
 29 (.) 150 APULIAN YS BARLETTA TO ASTRONI FOR US-ITI
 30 (.) 200 APULIAN YS TARANTO TO ASTRONI FOR US-ITI

(.) S E C O N D (.) FOLLOWING BIDS HAVE ALL BEEN ACCEPTED PREVIOUSLY AND
 ARE ALL AWAITING MOV ON FERRY (.) DUE TO LARGE INFUX INTO CAMPS REQUEST
 THAT THESE MOVES ARE NOT FURTHER DELAYED (.)

31 (.) 300 LABOUR TRANI TO PESARO FOR 8 ARMY
 32 (.) 400 LABOUR TRANI TO PESARO FOR 8 ARMY
 33 (.) 50 SCREENERS TRANI TO PESARO FOR 8 ARMY
 34 (.) 107 ENGRS TRANI TO PESARO FOR 6 ARMY
 35 (.) 100 ENGRS TRANI TO ANCONA FOR 1 DIST

23 (.) 500 APULIAN YS TRANI TO ORVIETO FOR ER-ITI
 24 (.) 200 APULIAN YS CAMPOBASSO TO ASTRONI FOR US-ITI
 25 (.) 300 APULIAN YS POTENZA TO ASTRONI FOR US-ITI
 26 (.) 300 APULIAN YS LECCE TO ORVIETO FOR ER-ITI
 27 (.) 100 APULIAN YS FOGGIA TO ORVIETO FOR ER-ITI
 28 (.) 300 APULIAN YS BARI TO ASTRONI FOR US-ITI
 29 (.) 150 APULIAN YS BARLETTA TO ASTRONI FOR US-ITI
 30 (.) 200 APULIAN YS TARANTO TO ASTRONI FOR US-ITI

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 33 (.) 50 SCREENERS TRANI TO PESARO FOR 8 ARMY
 34 (.) 107 ENCHS TRANI TO PESARO FOR 8 ARMY
 35 (.) 100 ENCHS TRANI TO ANCONA FOR 1 DIST
 36 (.) 500 CAMPANIAN YS AFRAGOLA TO ANCONA FOR 1 DIST
 37 (.) 100 SCREENERS AFRAGOLA TO PESARO FOR 8 ARMY
 38 (.) 100 LABOUR AFRAGOLA TO ANCONA FOR 1 DIST

3940

Internal:
 Ministry of War

AQ
 Spec Sec
 RE
 X
 ST (2)
 Lab
 Mov (2)

G II (E)

SD/61
SD/43

PRECEDENCE IMMEDIATE

AUTHENTICATED

SUBJECT: Strength Returns.

LAND FORCES SUB-COM. I.O.
(M.S.I.A.)
File No. SD/41/1
18 Feb 45

TO : MIA IO NAPLES
CAPT. O'DRUMMEL, c/o SIBS OFFICE, BARIATA
ITALIAN RPT. INQUIRY, ORVETO

) Ref MIA SD/50 of 19 Dec 44.

) Ref MIA SD/51/1 of 3 Jan 45.

Please submit the weekly Strength Return as at Sunday night
instead of Friday night, so as to fit in with the weekly RPT period.

Lt. Col.
G.S.

Copy to: 42/2
42/3
42/5

R19
12

3923

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

S I G N A L

FROM: MMIA,

TO : AFHQ G-1 HR and MOV

Date 11/7/45 Time A

INFO: DISTONE
DISTONE FOR MMIA LO

SD 2275

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT M M I A SD 2260 OF 08 DELETE SERIAL 16 (.)

UNDERSTAND RAIL MOV HAS BEEN ARRANGED FOR 1000 ON 14 FEB

AND 1000 ON 16 FROM ORVIETO TO FOSSOMBRONE FOR 253 PACK

TPT GP (.) T U N G A T E IS ARRANGING TO INCLUDE MULETEERS

EX 7th MTN REGT IN THESE DRAFTS WHICH WILL INCREASE TOTAL

SLIGHTLY

PRECEDENCE Important

AUTHENTICATED 151.5

Internal: ST
Mov (2)
File: SD/41/1

WS

R₂

2938

/CONFIDENTIAL/

11
10SUBJECT: Recall of 1914 Class.LAND FORCES SUB-COM. A.C.
(M.F.I.A.)

SD/38/1

24 JAN 45

TO : Ministry of War.

Ref your 201411/11 of 20 Jan (being the date on which VITERBO recall started)

1. This HQ is informed by its IO that the recall in the VITERBO district has produced only 25 men in the first four days.
2. Your forecast of numbers to be enrolled was 70 per day, i.e. 280 for the first 4 days.
3. In view of the failure to date of this recall the suggestion contained in your letter under reference cannot be agreed, especially as all arrangements have already been made (your letter was received by MFA on 21 Jan).
4. Arrangements exist for the screening of reinforcements received at CERSANT, and therefore any men unfitted medically or otherwise for combat will be weeded out.

J.M.B. J.F. Cl
Major General
M.F.I.A.

3937

INTERNAL:

AQ

SD/38/1

SD/50

30/4/11

/CONFIDENTIAL/

11
10

SUBJECT: Recall of 1914 Class.

LAND FORCES SUP-CON. A.C.
(M.E.I.A.)

24 SD/38/1
JAN 45

TO : Ministry of War.

Ref your 201431/11 of 20 Jan (being the date on which VITERBO recall started)

1. This HQ is informed by its LG that the recall in the VITERBO district has produced only 25 men in the first four days.
2. Your forecast of numbers to be enrolled was 70 per day, i.e. 280 for the first 4 days.
3. In view of the failure to date of this recall the suggestion contained in your letter under reference cannot be agreed, especially as all arrangements had already been made (your letter was received by RMIA on 21 Jan).
4. Arrangements exist for the screening of reinforcements received at CESANO, and therefore any men unfitted medically or otherwise for combat will be weeded out.

[Signature]
Major General
M.E.I.A.

INTERNAL:

AQ
~~SD/41/1~~
SD/50

SD/41/1

3937

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785020

Subject:- Rfts for 209 Division.

Liaison Officer,
Land Forces Sub Comm
A.O. (MMIA).
c/o HQ., I District.
Ref. LO/G22.

26 January 45.

To:- Land Forces Sub Comm. A.C.
M. M. I. A. R O M E.

Reference phone conversation G2 - MMIA., L.O.

1. Send to IESI Iti-Iti rfts and Eng., rfts.
2. For Bri-Iti I.P.L. rfts, the Pioneer Groups have established their own little transit camps at ANCONA and AREZZO.

MMIA
3930
Capt.
MMIA LO., I District.

C O P Y

FROM: AFHQ 261836A

TO REAR EIGHTH ARMY

INFO 15 ARMY GROUP MMIA

REF NO FX91896 CONFIDENTIAL

YOUR Q3337 OF 25 JAN (.) SIGNED SACMED CITE FHQAE (.)

EVERY EFFORT MADE TO ENSURE REINFORCEMENTS SENT FORWARD CLOTHED

AND EQUIPPED TO SCALE (.) CASE CITED UNDER INVESTIGATION (.)

WILL INFORM YOU OF RESULTS (.) NO TRACE IN OUR FILES OF MMIA

SS 590 OF 22 JAN SENT NR 36 26/1943A PHIL BBB

READ INFORM UO YOU OF RESULTS RPT RES LT KK

RECD NR 36 26/1943 A AAAA BBBB

SD from AA 79
52/1/54

WT

52/1/54

29/11
027
Spec Sec
who are
sending
of supplies
for them
incl
Blankets?

Subject:- Italian Army - Demobilisation.

Land Forces Sub Comm. A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)
R O M E
AQ/17

M.M.I.A. L.O.
H.Q. 1 District
C.M.F.

22 Jan 45.

Ref your LO/G15 of 14 Jan/45.

1. Whilst the desirability of the early discharge of soldiers who are qualified to be demobilised is appreciated, the present intake of reinforcements will not permit such demobilisation to take place until such time as all Units are up to strength and replacements are "on the ground" to replace demobilisable personnel.

2. All reinforcements, therefore, must be used to complete Establishments, and not as replacements for demobilisable personnel.

S.P. Archer Capt.

S.P. ARCHER, Capt.
for Major General,
M.M.I.A.

Copy to:- G M.M.I.A.

SPA/ab

3933

26/11

(SECRET)

SUBJECT: Reinforcements.

Land Forces Sub-Com. A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)

SD/54
H JAN 15

TO : MMIA LO 1 Dist

Ref your LO/C22 of 2 Jan.

1. It is regretted that 200 pnr rfts for 15 Army Group arrived at AREZZO on 29 Dec without prior notification.
2. Copies of MMIA signals SD 1976 of 20 Dec and SD 1985 of 22 Dec are att.
3. It is understood 15 Army Group requested AFHQ to despatch to destination AREZZO.


- Major General
M.M.I.A.

INTERVAL:
SD/50

3932

SUBJECT: Provision of Personnel for Italian Army Units

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

CR/1644/G.1(Br)

11 Jan 45

MIA. 1

1. Attached is a list of Italian Military personnel both skilled and unskilled who are available for release from units in 3 District and subsequent posting to units in direct support of operations.
2. Will you please arrange for the provision and posting of suitable low medical category personnel as replacements and the withdrawal of those released.
3. No personnel should be withdrawn until replacements have been provided.

Peter Higgins Lt. Colonel

(PETER HIGGINS, Lt-Col. A.G.)
for Major General,
D.A.G.
G.1(Br).

COPY TO: HQ No 3 District.
G-3 (Org) Foreign.

3931

G. Higgins

Provision of Personnel for
Italian Army Units

UNIT	Unskilled Personnel	SKILLED PERSONNEL						TOTAL
		Dvr & Dvr Hecks	Builders	Electricians	Metal Workers	Mechs	Misc	
502 Smoke Coy	552	15	13	-	6	2	3	591
135 - 140 Pnr Coys	140	15	11	1	-	-	13	178
143, 145, 146 Pnr Coys								
144, 147-152 Pnr Coys	400	5	92	6	7	36	13	559
165 - 170 Pnr Coys								
508 Smoke Coy	129	-	12	2	1	8	-	152
171 - 176 Pnr Coys	147	15	32	2	-	-	29	225
177 - 182 Pnr Coys	403	-	40	1	46	-	7	497
183 - 188 Pnr Coys	156	-	5	-	-	11	-	172
503 Smoke Coys	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	10
506 Smoke Coys								
	1,957	48	205	12	60	57	65	2,384

MMIA

CG

A

C.G. MYCUSA

C.G. FENBARK - LN SECTION PERSECUTE - S ARMY - MMIA LO S ARMY
- MMIA LO PERSECUTE

SD 2069

CONFIDENTIAL

JANUARY

REF RES BRLEO 178 OF 4 (.) FOLLOWING PERSONNEL ALLIOTED TO
US-ITI (.) FIRST (.) EX STOLLY GALL UP (.) A (.) 600 TO
COLLE SALVETTI (.) B (.) 1500 TO AGTOMI (.) OUR SD 2069
OF S EXSERS (.) SECOND (.) EX LARIO GALL UP (.) 4330 TO BE
COLLECTED FROM GALL UP CENTRES (.) OUR SD 58/1 OF 7 REFERS (.)
THIRD (.) TOTAL 7430 TO BE COMPLETE BY 31 JAN (.) ALL ABOVE
UNDERSTOOD SUBJECT TO PRIORITY DEMAND FOR 1850 MULTIBER RFTS
AS AT 2 JAN PLUS JAN WASTAGE VIDE S ARMY SIGNAL 4092 OF 8
JAN (.) BALANCE AVAILABLE FOR ALLOCATION BY CG MYCUSA

3929

IMPORTANT

Min of War

A/S

2(AK)

ST

Nov

File: SD/54

SD/50(r)

3 copies

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785020

C O P Y

FROM: 15 ARMY GROUP
TO : ABHQ CITE PHOAB
INFO: MMIA

071230A

A 117

RESTRICTED

REFERENCE CONVERSATION JACOBSON-STONEY (.) MOVE OF 1400 ITALIAN
PERSONNEL EX PICANO DIV FROM ORVETO TO POSSOMBRONE REQUIRED DURING
WEEK COMMENCING 15 JAN (.) CONFIRMED YOU ARE MAKING NECESSARY
ARRANGEMENTS (.) MMIA WILL CONFIRM TO YOU BID FOR MOVE OF 200 RPTS
FOR TRIULI GROUP AND 1100 PERSONNEL EX SICILY CALL UP DURING SAME
PERIOD

WB

SD DIST.: SD/3/1
SD/51/1
SD/54
SD/50
FLCAT

3928

FRM

M I A

AFHQ

SD 1951

This HQ continually receives demands for Italian reinftr direct (.)
Pending AFHQ meeting on documentation vide AFHQ letter ASD 922.2
undated (Minutes of AFHQ meeting of 11 DEC) para 11 request you approve
following RR-III reinftr procedure (.) FIRST (.) Units and force less
combat grs shall forward copies of strength returns to appropriate Adv
Div HQs as at 15th and last day each month less urgent CF demand which
may be signalled any time (.) SECOND (.) Adv Div with copy to MIA
desanis on Base Reinftr Depot as under (a) 227 209 and 231 Div HQ on
AFRAGOLA (b) 230 and 228 Div HQ to TRANI (.) THIRD (.) Depot will meet
if possible alternatively will demand on MIA who will keep AFHQ
informed (.) FOURTH (.) If agreed will you please issue necessary
instructions.

A/C
SD/SD (2)

3927

SUBJECT: Italians joining Italian Army.

MILITARY MISSION
ITALIAN ARMY
ROME

C/6

27 October 1944

TO : UDF Main Adm. Hq.

1. Reference conversation Col. CLAPHAM - Lt. Col. INGLDEN
26 Oct., below are listed the conditions under which Italian personnel
may be accepted into the Italian Army:

- a. By being a member of certain age classes which are called
up for compulsory service in the Italian Army.
- b. By being a member of a "Patriot" group, volunteering for
combat service, and after being screened, accepted.
- c. By presenting themselves to the appropriate authorities,
volunteering, and after being screened, accepted. This is
only true for personnel in areas where the conscription
law is not in effect.
- d. By being a regular Officer or regular NCO of the Italian
army. Those of this group in newly liberated territory
are reassumed into the service after screening.

2. Prisoners of war, whether they are cooperators or not, de-
finitely may not join the Italian Army.

REP

for Major General
M M I A

3926

200 53/11 ①

COPY TRANSLATION

From: Ministry of War
To: Maj. Gen. L. Browning

Ref 301403/CA
Date - 19. 9. 44

Subject: Strength of the It. Army in ratio to situation of the country.

1. In recent times certain facts have taken place, the extreme gravity of which should be brought to the notice of responsible authorities. These facts are not so serious in themselves as they are due to the effect they may have in the future on the peacefulness of Italian life and on the possibilities of development of the labour programme, authorized by the Allies.

I will quote the following :-

The increase in absenteeism from the Army.

The difficulty in recruiting either conscripts or patriots.

The difficulty in recovering It. W.D. property within the limits authorized by the Allies.

The difficulty in supervising, administering or controlling strength in the reserve or unemployed.

The fact that it is materially impossible for the Mil. or civilian authorities to use coercive methods in order to uphold their own responsibilities where all persuasive methods have been used and have failed. This impotence is made evident by the case with which men desert their units and culminates in the regrettable incident of the 17th Inst at the High Court of Justice, incident which might lead to the dangerous belief that the constituted authority is insufficiently endowed with power.

What proportions similar incidents may develop when Northern Italy is liberated cannot even be estimated.

2. In my opinion the symptoms of the evil are serious to such an extent that measures used up to date are no longer sufficient to control them and that it is essential to seek the deep roots of the cause in order to avoid more serious effects.

Hence that I should appeal to you, as Director of MMLA, and explain to you what, in my opinion, are the roots of the

I will quote the following:

- The increase in absenteeism from the Army.
- The difficulty in recruiting either conscripts or patriots.
- The difficulty in recovering it. W.D. property within the limits authorized by the Allies.
- The difficulty in supervising, administering or controlling strength in the reserve or unemployed.

The fact that it is materially impossible for the Mil. or civilian authorities to use coercive methods in order to uphold their own responsibilities where all persuasive methods have been used and have failed. This impotence is made evident by the case with which men desert their units and culminates in the regrettable incident of the 17th inst at the High Court of Justice, incident which might lead to the dangerous belief that the constituted authority is insufficiently endowed with power.

What proportions similar incidents may develop when Northern Italy is liberated cannot even be estimated.

2. In my opinion the symptoms of the evil are serious to such an extent that measures used up to date are no longer sufficient to control them and that it is essential to seek the deep roots of the cause in order to avoid more serious effects.

Hence that I should appeal to you, as Director of MIA, and explain to you what, in my opinion, are the roots of the evil in order to find the remedy, in the name of that solidarity which exists between our Nations, solidarity which is continuously and tangibly proved and which the highest Authority have recently solemnly affirmed.

The report I give hereunder must be considered merely as a research work to find the most advisable way of overcoming the present difficulties and I shall be only too grateful for any practical suggestions made which may lead to a solution in the common interest.

3. Observation of symptoms and the experience acquired during 3 months as Minister of War, point out to me, as chief causes of the evil, insufficient organization and lack of available personnel for organization.

- 2 -

4. I believe that, should it be possible to create, immediately following the operating and advancing Allied troops, an Italian territorial organization capable of taking care of, not only the military in which they are directly concerned, but also the population, these people overcome by the anxiety of waiting, and suddenly finding a government conscious of their sufferings, they would look toward the Italian and Allied authorities, they would look toward the government be less inclined to feel the temptation to greater faith and the is often inclined to feel the temptation to greater faith and the now living.

At FLORENCE, ANCONA, LIVORNO, officers cannot be paid, patriots wishing to fight cannot be promptly enlisted into the Army, those subject to military duties, abandoned to their devices, acquire the erroneous idea that they have become free from such duties.

Now different the situation would be if Regional Commands could function from the first instant under a general of suitable rank to impose himself upon all and to re-establish the interrupted line of duties, and if in districts and depots to which the population is accustomed, they found a reception and help in their wishes and in their obligations.

The organization would have to create these units in advance with its own personnel and with essential means, to be replaced, it is to be well understood, by local resources, in the same way as the CC.RR. do it in newly conquered areas, to only with advanced preparation is it possible to obtain that immediate effect the need for which I have endeavored to make clear.

5. Facts have daily proved that lack of personnel is to be found in the following 3 branches of the organization -

- (a) Admin. force.
- (b) Internal security.
- (c) The CC.RR.

(a) I admit that it would have been advisable to employ civilian personnel in the districts, depots, territorial services a long time before this road but efforts

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5. Facts have daily proved that lack of personnel is to be found in the following 3 branches of the organisation -

- (a) Admin. force.
- (b) Internal Security forces.
- (c) The CC.RR.

(a) I admit that it would have been advisable to employ civilian personnel in the districts, depots and territorial services a long time ago. We have started on this road but efficient functioning of the new system will take some time. In order to rapidly proceed with recruiting operations, I must point out the need for the recruiting centre strength, already approved, to be increased and for these centres to be backed by the districts.

The total extra personnel required will be about 20,000 men, including recovery personnel.

(b) The Internal Security strength at present allowed is 3 Divs of 5000 men each already employed in the Islands. For the whole of liberated Italy or the part about to be liberated we have not a single man available. This, at present, warehouses and barracks must remain without guards, police strength cannot be increased, military have no restraining force against absenteeism, and Regional Commanders cannot be held responsible for anything.

~~Now~~ I think the problem must be faced that it is necessary to allot one internal security Div. to each region which would mean another 4 Divs for liberated Italy and at

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least a further 4 Divs for Northern Italy, when combat groups cannot be used.

(e) The CC.RR strength is today about 42,000 men. The inadequacy of this strength is proved by the fact that the Italian Government is unable to pursue deserters and those failing to report on being called up in order to take action which would serve as a healthy example, it is unable to suppress delinquency in SICILY and the greater cities, including ROME. The Government is also unable to cope with Allied requests for CC.RR to be held in reserve for Northern Italy.

In normal times the CC.RR strength reached about 68,000 men, a figure which certainly does not seem to be excessive for all Italy in times which are far from normal.

Nevertheless I do not consider it wise to reduce the figure below 60,000 men.

6. From all the above it can be seen that the strength to be left at the disposal of the Italian Government, in addition to the 6 Combat Groups would have to be immediately increased by 50,000 men.

What has rendered the problem of strength difficult to solve up to now has been the rationing system which is complex and which sacrifices a basic problem to a matter of accountancy form.

It would be much simpler and more practical if Allied Administration delivered to Italy the agreed number of rations (at present 364,000) and left the It. M of W to distribute them in accordance with basic principles stipulated by the Allies.

7. The persistent worsening process which is taking place under our very eyes and the wish, undoubtedly shared by you, to stop this process has lead me to point out to you so frankly the true situation in Italy.

I have been encouraged in my decision to be quite frank by the gravity of the situation and by your frequent invitations to express my points of view in order that we might discuss them.

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I feel confident that you will be prepared to examine this point of view in the light of the sincere friendship towards Italy of which you have given such ample proofs in the fulfillment of the delicate duties with which you have been entrusted.

The Minister

A. CASATI

3923

