

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785020

ACC

10000 1120 1669

SD/141 CAR.
opened June -
June - Nov. 19

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785020

10000/120/669

SD/141 CARABINIERI .

1st Cover

Opened June 24, 1944 . Closed Nov. 28, 1944

June - Nov. 1944

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

SG/ Lt. General H. C.

28 November 1944

3/70

To : A.C.-Public Safety Subcommission
Subj. : Return on CC.HH.strength

SD/28
35/4 R'm.

Transmitting the return of CC.HH.strength, at November the 1st., we point out :

1) 5173 soldiers have not been supplied, as they were absent (in convalescence leave, farmer leave, recovered in hospitals, etc.)

This personnel is included in Legions' strength.

Besides, for 691 soldiers, rations have not been drawn, owing to difficult of transportation means, and, for them, it has been provided with purchase of stuffs at the market.

2) The total strength of officers (col. 5a and 5b), is inferior of 22 men, in comparison with the one of last month.

The diminution is due to the discharge of officers.

3) The total strength of n.c.o. and rank and files, col. 10 (including soldiers absent, being in hospital, leave etc.), is superior of 2235 men, in regard to the one which has been pointed out in last month.

Increase is due to personnel recovered from, lately occupied, territories and to recruitments.

the General of Army Corps
Commanding General
Taddeo Orlando

4663

Land Forces Sub. Commission (M.M.I.A.)

Copy forwarded for your information




W. L. H. 1.4

for Director of Public Safety

29th Nov. 1944

MAPS AND CHARTS TOO LARGE TO FILM
ON ONE EXPOSURE ARE FILMED CLOCKWISE
BEGINNING IN THE UPPER LEFT CORNER,
LEFT TO RIGHT, AND TOP TO BOTTOM.

SEE DIAGRAMS BELOW.



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LEGIONI O COMANDI	Generali	Colonnelli	T. Colonnelli	Maggiori	Capitani	Tenenti e Sottotenenti	Totale ufficiali		Marescialli		Brigadieri		Vigilanti	Fiduciari	Appuntati		Carabinieri		
							8		9		10				12				
							In servizio territoriale	Mobilizzati	Richiamati	Effettivi	Richiamati	Effettivi			Richiamati	Effettivi			
I	2	3	4	5	6	7	a	b	a	b	a	b	a	b	a	b	a		
							4661												
Comando Generale Arma	3 (1)	4	5	10	7	8	37	-	I	34	4	28	I	30	-	7	I		
Legione Abruzzi	-	I	I	7	17	15	41	-	67	113	32	41	51	66	67	102	38		
							43	-	86	149	29	75	71	86	21	167	26		

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[illegible]

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"	Ancona	-	I	2	6	I3 I	2I 3	43	- 4	86	I49	29	75	7	86	2I	I67
"	Bari	-	I	5	II I	I9 5	2I I4	57	- 20	I40	I70	50	62	I4	65	98	240
"	Cagliari	-	-	5	3	I9 3	I8 6	45	- 9	I46	I96	38	83	II	92	II4	348
"	Catanzaro	-	I	2	4	I8	I6 I	4I	- I	I49	206	70	96	I2	66	37	I62
"	Firenze	-	2	8	6	I6	20	52	-	60	257	24	I7I	5	280	I6	222
"	Lazio	I (2)	2	2	I3	23	30	7I	-	II7	38I	45	I69	II	I97	26	252
"	Livorno	-	I	-	6	I2	I3	32	-	53	I04	35	57	8	82	I2	I29
"	Messina	-	I	3	8	I5	2I	48	-	I07	III	34	99	I2	99	8I	292
"	Napoli	2 (3)	I	7	I5 I	3I 4	46 I2	I02	- I7	233	3I7	7I	88	2I	I50	30	436
"	Palermo	I (4)	I	6	9	I8 I	36	7I	- I	93	I80	3I	I53	20	27I	8I	375
"	Roma terr.	-	-	7	I3	45	5I 8	II6	- 8	II9	403	I3I	230	22	26I	I0	238
"	Allievi Ro- ma	I (5)	I	I	3	I2	I4	32	-	2	72	4	8I		32	-	2I
	Nucleo Organizzati- vo legione Bologna	-	I	4	4	6	I2	27	-	5	45	3	27	I	56	-	43

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I49	29	75	74	86	2I	I67	29I	I63I	50I	2I68	I599	259	I577	I836	4445	2868
I70	50	62	I4	65	58	240	603	I300	993	I837	2386	20I9	I342	336I	6I9I	4849
I96	38	83	II	92	II4	348	75I	I350	II59	2069	2292	535	362	897	4I25	3763
206	70	96	I2	66	37	I62	503	II29	882	I659	224I	236	I294	I530	407I	2777
257	24	I7I	5	280	I6	222	297	I742	454	2672	I750	328	-	328	3454	3454
38I	45	I69	II	I97	26	252	562	2I77	869	3I76	2805	-	-	-	4045	4045
I04	35	57	8	82	I2	I29	464	826	644	II98	I695	-	-	-	I842	I842
III	34	99	I2	99	8I	292	9I3	I369	I264	I970	2287	250	620	870	4I04	3484
3I7	7I	88	2I	I50	30	436	85I	2620	I395	36II	352I	684	2330	30I4	8020	5690
I80	3I	I53	20	27I	8I	375	739	265I	II48	3630	368I	I0	I073	I083	586I	4788
403	I3I	230	22	26I	I0	238	456	2438	937	3570	4279	I37	-	I37	4644	4644
72	4	2I		32	-	2I	6	933	20	I079	4064	-	-	-	I099	I099
45	3	27	I	56	-	43	75	783	94	954	-	-	-	-	I048	I048

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No.

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Reporto compl. e recu
peri di Napoli

Reporto compl. e recu
peri di Bari

Centro Raccolta Roma
(6)

" " Livorno

Btg. Allievi Andria

" " Cagliari in
Iglesias

" " Palermo

Centro Rifornimento
per territori di
nuova occupazione
in Firenze

-	-	I	I	2	7	II	-	6	8	3	5	4	7	-
-	-	-	-	I	-	I	-	I	2	3	7	2	6	-
I	II	II	7	24	20	74	-	32	166	16	58	20	92	2
-	-	2	I	4	5	12	-	6	II	3	6	4	2	I
-	-	I	-	2	2	5	-	-	5	2	7	3	22	-
-	-	-	I	2	7	10	-	-	4	2	3	-	5	-
-	-	-	I	2	8	II	-	I	-	-	5	I	5	-
-	-	-	3	6	20	29	-	-	3	-	2	23	101	I

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3	5	4	7	-	8	28	53	41	81	-	-	-	-	122	122
3	7	2	6	-	5	6	101	12	121	-	-	-	-	133	133
6	58	20	92	2	81	133	1249	203	1646	-	-	-	-	1849	1849
3	6	4	2	I	3	13	27	27	49	-	-	-	-	76	76
2	7	3	22	-	-	11	534	16	568	-	-	-	-	584	584
2	3	-	5	-	I	5	293	7	306	-	-	-	-	313	313
-	5	I	5	-	-	-	405	2	415	-	-	-	-	417	417
-	2	23	101	I	9	92	1212	116	1327	-	-	-	-	1443	1443

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TOTALI.....

9	29	73	134	328	455	968	60	1424	2937	630	1493	1597	2073	557	3141	71
---	----	----	-----	-----	-----	-----	----	------	------	-----	------	------	------	-----	------	----

Detratti i militari assenti per licenza ovvero ricove

- (1) Un Generale di Corpo d'Armata Comandante Generale; un Generale di Divisione a disposizione dante designato ff. della 1^a Divisione CC.RR. "Faustrengo"-Milano;
- (2) Un Generale di Divisione comandante la 2^a Divisione CC.RR. "Podgora"-Roma;
- (3) Due generali di Brigata di cui uno facente funzioni comandante la 3^a Divisione CC.RR. Napoli;
- (4) Generale di Brigata comandante la 6^a Brigata CC.RR. Palermo;
- (5) Un Generale di Corpo d'Armata a disposizione del Ministero della Guerra;
- (6) Un Generale affluuto al centro raccolta di Roma, proveniente dai territori di nuova occupazione.

N.B. Le cifre in nero, della forza "UFFICIALI", indicano quelli del servizio territoriale; quelli in rosso, quelli del servizio di riserva.

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105A
~~SD/28~~

C O P Y

FROM: DISTHREE

TO : DISTHREE EAST

30

INFO: AFHQ (G-3 ORG BRIT). ROME AREA. MMIA. MMIA LO BARI. ROME AREA.
MOVEIT. MOVWIT. MOV BARI. MOV FOGGIA. MOV ROME. ALLIED COMMISSION.

442

CONFIDENTIAL

Ref AFHQ FX 59661 of 28 Nov not to all (.) FIRST (.) Take action
move units PICENO DIV less units in para second as ordered in
conjunction with MOVEIT MMIA LO BARI AED COMMANDO PUGLIA (.)
SECOND (.) Coy 2 Bn 336 INF REGT now at TARANTO will not move
until orders received from this HQ (.) THIRD (.) For AFHQ (.)
Request you deal direct with DISTHREE EAST on matters affecting
this move

WB

MMIA DIST.:

SD/13/3
SD/50

4660

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INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Originator's Reference: FX9861
Date/Time of Origin: NOV 28 2015

Message Centre No: 0/2259
Date Time Rec'd: NOV 28 1537A 105B
Precedence: PRIORITY

FROM: AFHQ SIGNED SACRED CITE FNGCT

TO : (1) DISTRICT 3 (2) ALLIED COMMISSION, INFO (3) MOVEIT (4) MOVEIT (5) MOV BART
(6) MOV FOGGIA (7) MOV ROME (8) MIA (9) RAAC (10) AAI (11) DISTRICT 3 EAST

ACTION

SECRET.

1. For DISTRICT 3. Following units of PICENO Combat Group will move soonest under orders of DISTRICT 3 in conjunction with MOVEIT from under command of SMRE to under command of Allied Commission. Read in 6 columns.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>O.R.</u>	<u>TONS STORES</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DESTINATION</u>
1 Battalion 235 Infantry Regt	20	480	24	MARTINA FRANCA	CATANZARO
2 Battalion 235 Infantry Regt	20	480	24	LOCOROTONDO	NAPLES
1 Battery 152 Arty Regt	20	480	24	CEGLIE NOCI ALBEROBELLO and CISTERMINO and LECCETO BART line	BARI
20AA Group	20	480	24	BARI	ORTONO for onward move. CHIETI under arrangements Allied Commission.

2. 2 Battalion 336 Inf Regt 20 officers 480 O.R.s 24 tons stores will move under orders of DISTRICT 3 in conjunction with MOVEIT on or after 4 December from under

SECRET

Note:- Message Centre informed that Action copy should be addressed to Public Safety Sub Com. AAL. 22.11.



- 2 -

(EX 5961 continued)

SECRET

command of SHRE at BARLETTA and TARANTO to ROME for LAZIO to under command of ALLIED COMMISSION who will arrange onward move as required. /

3. Units will be administratively self contained with cooking utensils, blankets and proportion of unit stores. Personal equipment including rifles will be carried.

4. For ALLIED COMMISSION. Confirm earliest whether ordered to report tentage required. Request you confirm your action in paras 1 and 2 above. Balance of personnel for ANCONA and ROME will move later. On arrival all personnel available till 15 FEB 45 in lieu CCHR.

DIST

ACTION: Land Forces S/C 2 -

INFO: Chief Commissioner

C.O.S.

P. Safety

C.A. Sec

Th S/C

File

Public Safety

4653

Page

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DIST

ACTION: Land Forces S/C 2

INFO: Chief Commissioner

C.O.S.

P. Safety

C.A. Sec

Tn S/C

File

Public Safety

4053

Copied

*Original not use
copy of file*

ACTION R Safety

30/11



SECRET

STATO MAGGIORE REGIO ESERCITO
UFFICIO ORDINAMENTO E MOBILITAZIONE
Sezione Ordinamento

SEGRETO

n° 8936 /Ord. di prot. P.E. 151, ²⁴ nov. 1944

ALLA SOTTOCOMMISSIONE PER L'ESERCITO (EMIA) ROMA
e, per conoscenza:
AL MINISTERO GUERRA - Gabinetto - Uff. C.A. - P.N. 151
AL COMANDO GENERALE ARMA CC.RR. ROMA

OGGETTO: 1ª compagnia CC.RR.--

Con i reparti della 205ª divisione è stata recentemente trasferita dalla Sardegna in continente la 1ª compagnia CC.RR. (forza complessiva 205 uomini).--
Detta compagnia è impiegata in compiti di vigilanza e guardia.--

In considerazione della nota deficienza di carabinieri per i normali servizi d'istituto e di ordine pubblico, si prega di voler esaminare la possibilità che detta compagnia venga svincolata dall'attuale impiego e messa a disposizione del comando generale dell'arma dei CC.RR. per i compiti predetti.--

In sua sostituzione potrebbe essere impiegata una compagnia del btg. guardia, oppure una compagnia da costituire appositamente con personale di classi



IL GENERALE ADDDETTO
(Alessandro Santi)

4637
Traslate
pl
29
11

SECRET

103

SUBJECT: Recruiting of Carabinieri.

Land Forces Sub-Com. A. C.
(M.M.I.A.)

SD/28

29 Nov 44

TO : H.Q. A.C.
Civil affairs section.

Ref your AC/14601/61/PS dated 25 Nov.

1. Our latest figures show your present CC.RR. strength at close on 50,000 i.e. only 5,000 short of the present authorised ceiling.
2.
 - (a) I agree in principle to what you propose in your paras 2 and 3.
 - (b) As you say, limitation of the percentage of Carabinieri to be taken from the call-up, and the prohibition of the taking of certain classes of technicians, will be necessary.
 - (c) It will also be necessary for you to have your CC.RR. reps in the call-up centres to "vet" volunteers for CC.RR.
3. Please discuss details with Lt. Col. INGLDEN, so that we can get a definite proposition onto paper.

Major General
M.M.I.A.

102

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject:- Move of units of PLOENO CP and para 20 AA Bty.

LAND FORCES SUB-COMMISSION A.C.
(M.M. I.A.)
File No. SD/28

27 Nov 44.

TO: AFHQ (2)

Copy to: SD AAI (2)

3 DISTRICT

AC (2) incl copy for Public Safety Sub Com.

MINISTRY OF WAR

L.O. Land Forces Sub Com A.C. (MMIA), o/o HQ 1 Dist.

" " " " o/o HQ 3 Dist.

" " " " o/o PBS

" " " " o/o HQ 54 Area.

1. Appx A att to this HQ SD/28 of 7 Nov is cancelled and it is requested that Appx A heretc be substituted.
2. Ploeno Unit cadres will remain present Group area under each unit commanding officers and will incl all unit specialists. Unit 2s i/o will in each case command PLOENO dets specified in Appx A, which in NO case will be reduced below the strength specified.
3. Serial 2.-
AFHQ EX 56383 of 22 and MMIA SD 1842 of 25 neither to all refer.
Adm matters will be dealt with separately vide MMIA SD/28 of 28 Oct.
- 4.

4654

1. Appx A att to this HQ SD/28 of 7 Nov is cancelled and it is requested that Appx A hereto be substituted.

2. Pico Unit cadres will remain present Group area under command unit commanding officers and will incl all unit specialists. Unit 2s i/o will in each case command PICO dets specified in Appx A, which in NO case will be reduced below the strength specified.

3. Serial 2:-

AFHQ EX 56383 of 22 and MMIA SD 1842 of 25 neither to all refer. 4654

4. Adm matters will be dealt with separately vide MMIA SD/28 of 28 Oct.

Copy to:- 2 i/o

A/C

Spec Sec

Gov (2)

Circulator File

File

War Diary

File G/3

for Mr. M. I. A.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

Move of Units of PICENO GROUP

	U N I T	Move Strengths			Entraining Station	Retraining Station
		Offrs	OR's	Tons		
1	I Bn (BIS) 235 Inf Regt	20	480	24	MARTINA FRANCA	CATANZARO
2	II Bn (BIS) 235 Inf Regt	20	480	24	LOCOROTONDO	NAPLES
3	20 L.A. (ex 20 L.A. Reggimentamento, & earmarked for PICENO)	20	480	24	BARI	CHIETI
4	II Bn (BIS) 336 Inf Regt	20	480	24	BARLETTA TARANTO	ROME for LAZIO
5	III Bn (BIS) 336 Inf Regt	20	480	24	CRISPLANO	ROME
6	I Gruppo 152 Arty Regt	20	480	24	CEGLIE NOCI ALBEROBELLO CISTERNINO	BARI
(p) 7	MONTEGRANERO Bn less one coy 533 Coy MONTEGRANERO	30 6	620 166	30 20	VAIRANO TRESTI	ANCONA
8	Bn formed of CONGEDANTI in SARDINIA	25	475			
	T O T A L S	181	4141	174		

(p) - Request Serial 7 NOT be moved until called forward by AAI

My Unit is arranging to assemble except serials 1, 2, 8.

19/1

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CONFIDENTIAL

Apex " " MMIA
SD/28 of 27 Nov 44

Move of Units of PICENO GROUP

Tons	Entraining Station	Retraining Station	REMARKS
24	MARTINA FRANCA	CANTANZARO	
24	LOCOROTONDO	NAPLES	
24	BARI	CHIETI	
24	BAILETTA TARANTO	ROME for LAZIO	
24	CRISPINO	ROME	
24	CEGLIE NOCI ALBEROPELLO CISTERNINO	BARI	All stations on BARI - LECCE line
30 20	VAIRANO IESI	ANCONA	All older men. 150 young men remain with LEGNANO Combat Group
			For CAGLIARI - MMIA signal SD1680 of 27 Oct refers
174			

forward by AAI

1. 7. 2.
19/1

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785020

101

File

58/28

1615

R 2/1

13MIA

ADIR

ARI, PUB SAFETY SUB-COM

SP 1833

Ref your FA 57214 of SA (.) Agree to loan of
personnel from FIGARO to reinforce GO RR but
consider that minimum two months will be required
between return of personnel and readiness of Gp
for moving fed (.) for ARI (.) Understand this is
acceptable

4651

A/Q
Spec Res

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED COMMISSION
Civil Affairs Section.
APO 394.

100

Ref. AG/14601/61/PS.

25th November, 1944.

SUBJECT : Recruiting of Carabinieri.

TO : Director General, Land Forces Sub-Commission, MEMIA.

1. At the present time the effective strength of the Carabinieri is 11,000 below the authorised ceiling of 55,000 and no less than 21,000 below the minimum strength considered necessary to maintain this force at an efficient level.
2. This has been discussed with the Commanding General, CC.RR., and it has been calculated that an intake of up to 1,000 recruits a month can be dealt with so as to augment their present numbers as quickly as possible. In order to provide these recruits it is proposed that men being called up for Army service should be given the opportunity of electing to serve with the CC.RR., instead of being drafted into military service. This proposal has been examined by the Chief Commissioner and his approval has been given.
3. It is understood that there is a substantial deficiency in the Italian Army strength but, on the other hand, the Army cannot by comparison with the Carabinieri be in greater need of recruits at the present time. The principle of making Police service alternative to Army service is one which has been successfully pursued in Great Britain since the beginning of the war. It will, of course, be necessary to exercise controls in such an arrangement. For example, restricting the percentage to be admitted to the Carabinieri and also prohibiting certain classes of technicians from Police service.
4. In a recent interview with Lt. Col. Ingledew on this subject it was suggested by him that a voluntary call-up be made of Italian soldiers over the age of 30 for Carabinieri service. The use was offered of the Italian Army recruiting

arrangements, but, although this has been carefully considered, it is thought that owing to the very few volunteers who would be forthcoming, such a scheme would be impracticable.

5. In the meantime arrangements are going forward for the transfer of 3,000 volunteers from the Italian Army to the Carabinieri.

6. I should be glad therefore, if you will consider the principle of making Police service an alternative to service with the Italian Army and let me know whether you will give your agreement to this scheme.

G. R. Upjohn *en*

G. R. UPJOHN, Brigadier,
Vice President,
Civil Affairs Section.

4648

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SECRET & URGENT 99

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

A.M.
27 Nov.

Ref: 3/11B/CA

27 Nov 44.

SUBJECT: Parade of Carabinieri.
TO: RC, Lazio Region,
Land Forces Sub-Commission,
Public Safety Sub-Commission.

SD/28
27/11
R 27/11

Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander will hold a parade and review of Carabinieri formations in the Via dell' Imperio and Piazzali dei Trionfi at 1030 hrs on Saturday, 9 Dec 44. Public Safety Sub-Commission will be responsible for drawing up the details in so far as this Commission is concerned and will keep all informed.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER.

G.R. Upjohn c1
G.R. UPJOHN, Brig.
VP CA Section,
DCDS AC.

Tel: 478008.

Copy to: R A A C.

4647

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AFHQ INFO LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION (MMIA)

HQ ALCOM PUBLIC SAFETY S/C

7049

25/11/44

SD/28

RESTRICTED 27/11

PRIORITY

PUBLIC SAFETY S/C

RESTRICTED PD

PARA ONE PD REFERENCE YOUR FX DASH FIVE SEVEN TWO ONE FOUR DATED TWENTY
FOUR NOVEMBER FORTY FOUR PD

PAREN TO AFHQ INFO LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION (MMIA) FROM ALCOM PAREN

PARA TWO PD IT IS CONFIRMED THAT MOVEMENT OF FIVE THOUSAND SOLDIERS IS A
DEFINITE REQUIREMENT PD

Copy to Chief Commissioner

CA Section.

4645

16/25
SECRET

ALCOM, INPO: MMIA

APHQ SIGNED SACMED

EX-57214

NOV 24/1334A

C/1783

N97/24

2/10
ROUTINE

CITE PHGCT

SP. 128

25/4

SECRET.

Your AGO/14522/PS of 9 November 44.

1. After due consideration have decided to extend period for which the 5,000 Italian soldiers are to be loaned to ~~current~~ carabinieri until 15 Feb 445.

(2) Arrangements will be made for these personnel to be released for return to normal military duties on this date.

(3) You will now take all necessary measures to step up recruiting for the carabinieri so that these 5,000 soldiers may be adequately replaced. This may entail accepting a slightly lower standard of recruit.

Fortnightly progress reports on recruitment will be rendered to APHQ

26/12

until 15 Feb 445.

(2) Arrangements will be made for these personnel to be released for return to normal military duties on this date.

(3) You will now take all necessary measures to step up recruiting for the carabinieri so that these 5,000 soldiers may be adequately replaced. This may entail accepting a slightly lower standard of recruit. Fortnightly progress reports on recruitment will be rendered to AFHQ promptly.

4643

(4) Confirm that movement of these 5,000 soldiers is a definite requirement in accordance with the programme as agreed originally.

HEADQUARTERS

24 NOV 1944

C.

DISTRIBUTION

Action: P. Safety (2)

Info: Chief Commissioner

CA Sec

Land Forces S/C

File (2)

Float

SECRET

NOV 24/1700

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785020

Original SD/13/3

copy for

10/18
10/28

96

From DISTHREE

142100A

To DISTHREE EAST

Info 52 AREA 54 AREA MOVEIT MMIA (G-3 Org Br)

SD 167 (*) RESTRICTED (*) Ref MMIA SD1567 of 11 Nov NOT
to all (*) arrange move of 534 Spec Coy in relief of Coy 2
Bn 336 Inf Regt as requested reporting str and completion to
K MMIA rptd this HQ (*) ACK

4642

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

FROM DISTHREE 191302
TO MMIA
INFO DISTHREE EAST 52 AREA 54 AREA 210 SUB AREA
MOVKIT AFHQ (G-3 ORG BRIT)

SD 251

RESTRICTED


Ref MMIA SD1767 of 11 Nov and this HQ SD 167 of 14 Nov both
NOT to all (.) FIRST (.) This HQ above sig has been cancelled
(.) SECOND (.) 534 Spec Coy 518 Gd Bn is now deployed on GD
duties in 54 Area (.) Not available for Gd TARANTO (.) THIRD (.)
Proposed to retain coy 2 Bn 336 Regt until completion commitment

ogl

DISTRIBUTION:

S/SD/30
SD/28
SD/18
SD/13/3
SD/50
Float

4642



OX/VC

MINISTERO DELLA GUERRA

Gabinetto

Ord. N° 204603/c^a Alligati

Registral Fidei

Oggetto: Carri armati e semoventi.

Roma, P.M. 151, 14 novembre 1944

Dir. 151

LA

LA LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION - A.C. - (M.M.I.A.)

ROMA

e per conoscenza:

ALLO STATO MAGGIORE REGIO ESERCITO

AL COMANDO GENERALE ARMA CC.RR.

ALLA DIREZIONE GENERALE DI ARTIGLIERIA

ALLA DIREZIONE GENERALE DELLA MOTORIZZAZIONE

P.M. 151

ROMA

SEDE

SEDE

Con riferimento al foglio 304269/C.A. del 10 corrente mese, relativo alla richiesta dei 42 pezzi semoventi per l'arma dei CC.RR., si precisa che non si è trattato di una interpretazione erronea dello S.M.R.E., ma bensì di un suo punto di vista sulla questione, che è da ritenersi tuttora allo studio, e la cui definizione è subordinata agli accordi che dovranno essere presi tra il Comando Generale dell'Arma CC.RR. e la Sottocommissione per la Sicurezza pubblica.

ALLA DIREZIONE GENERALE DI ARTIGLIERIA
ALLA DIREZIONE GENERALE DELLA MOTORIZZAZIONE

S E D E
S E D E

Con riferimento al foglio 304269/C.A. del 10 corrente mese, relativo alla richiesta dei 42 pezzi semoventi per l'arma dei CC.RR., si precisa che non si è trattato di una interpretazione erronea dello S.M.R.E., ma bensì di un suo punto di vista sulla questione, che è da ritenersi tuttora allo studio, e la cui definizione è subordinata agli accordi che dovranno essere presi tra il Comando Generale dell'Arma CC.RR. e la Sottocommissione per la Sicurezza pubblica.

IL SOTTOSEGRETARIO DI STATO ALLA GUERRA
(Generale G.B. OXILIA)

G. Oxilia

4649

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

MESSAGE FORM

Date-Time of Origin
14 A

FROM BMIA

TO (FOR ACTION) 52 AREA

TO (FOR INFORMATION) DISTHKA LAND FORCES ABRIATIS

11 TORN MAJOR BMIA LO 54 AREA

(REF. NO.) AS-2209

CONFIDENTIAL

REY YOUR 2400/50 OF 11 NOV NOT TO ALL (.) MOVEMENT OF PIONNO
DIV FROM PRESENT LOCATION DEPENDANT ON ALTERNATIVE AGOR BEING
FOUND FURTHER NORTH (.) RECRET NO RPT NO FIRM DATE CAN YET
BE GIVEN

PRECEDENCE _____

AUTHENTICATION _____

4639

Copy to: 'G' "Spec. Sec"

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

SUBJECT: Formation of a CC RR Bn in SICILY

LAND FORCES SUB-COM. A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)

File No. SD/28

14 Nov 44

TO : PUBLIC SAFETY SUB-COM. A.C.

Further to MMIA letter SD/28 dated 10 Nov.

1. I have just returned from a tour of SICILY where I had a conference with Gen. MARIOTTI the Italian Military Commander there on the whole matter of Internal Security.

2. (a) I am convinced that the proposal to organize a Special well armed Carabinieri Bn in SICILY as proposed by Ministry of War is the correct answer and I back it strongly.

Gen MARIOTTI told me that, in his opinion, with such a CC RR Bn we would soon have SICILY tranquil.

(b) This conception merely follows the normal military principle that the best form of defence is attack.

3. I should be glad of your very early approval and would suggest that the same sort of thing be laid on in other parts of ITALY also.

Major General
M. M. I. A.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

FROM DIA

TO 3 DISTRICT

INFO 3 DISTRICT PARTIES DET
MINISTRY OF WAR
AMHQ (ATT 03)
AMT
EAAF
AC
DATA LG 3 DISTRICT

OD 1715

RESTRICTED

Amend by SD 1767 of 11 para FM by insertion of word
before words Coy 2 Bn 286 Regt
Request.

RECEIVED

AUTHENTICATED

Copy to Spec Sec
SD 1767

4636

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

From : MMIA

111315A

To : 3 DISTRICT

Info : 3 DISTRICT EASTERN DET
MINISTRY OF WAR
AFHQ (ATT G-3)
AAI
MAAF
AC
MMIA LO 3 DISTRICT

RESTRICTED

SD 1767

ONE (*) 534 Spec Coy 518 Gd Bn (ex 107 Btg Territoriale) now
S. Severo under command MAAF is placed at your disposal for
purpose of guard at camp TARANTO in lieu of one Coy 2 Bn 336 Regt
(PICENO) (*) Arrange move mutually with Mil HQ (IT) BARI
reporting completion and strength this HQ (*) TWO (*) Request
Coy 2 Bn 336 Regt will rejoin parent fmn soonest under your
arrangements (*) THREE (*) AFHQ AG 091.711/3CT-0 of 7 and
FX 49938 of 8 not to all refers

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

AUTHENTICATED STANTON MAJOR

Cop: to: MOV
SL/13

785020

URGENTE SEGRETO

MINISTERO DELLA GUERRA

Cabinetto

Roma, 10 Novembre 1944

Dir. Sez. V

Oggetto: Carri armati e semoventi

As
10/11

LA L.F.S.C.- A.C. (M.M.I.A.)

ROMA

e, per conoscenza:

ALLO STATO MAGGIORE R. ESERCITO

SEDE

AL COMANDO GENERALE ARMA CC.RR.

ROMA

ALLA DIREZIONE GENERALE ARTIGLIERIA

SEDE

ALLA DIREZIONE GENERALE MOTORIZZAZIONE

SEDE

Mi riferisco al foglio L/4784/Serv., data 6 corrente, dello

S.M.R.E.-

Prego di non tener conto della richiesta di assegnazione di 42 pezzi semoventi e 21.000 colpi da 75/18 all'arma dei CC.RR. -

Detta richiesta è stata redatta dallo S.M.R.E. per un errore di interpretazione di direttive verbali.

Si ritiene invece assolutamente necessario, per ovvie ragioni, che siano assegnati all'arma dei CC.RR. i carri armati leggeri richiesti, che si prestano per servizio di ordine pubblico. E si prega vivamente cotesta M.M.I.A. di voler accogliere favorevolmente la proposta.

IL SOTTOSCRITTARIO DI STATO ALLA GUERRA
(Gen. G. B. Oxilia)

G. B. Oxilia

785020

AL/SP

STATO MAGGIORE REGIO Esercito
Ufficio Servizi - Sezione S.M.

SAR

911

N. 1/ 4784 /Serv. di prot. -

E.M. 151, 14 6 novembre 944

OCCETTTO: Assegnazione carri armati e semoventi. -



ALLA M. M. I. A.
e, per conoscenza:

AL MINISTERO DELLA GUERRA:

- Gabinetto - Ufficio C.A.
- Direzione Generale di artiglieria
- Direzione Generale della Motorizzazione

AL COMANDO GENERALE DELL'ARMA DEI CC.RR. R. O. M. E.

R. O. M. E.

P.M. 151

P.M. 151

P.M. 151

R. O. M. E.

Si prega codesta Sottocommissione compiacersi autorizzare, per esigenze di ordine pubblico in continente, in Sicilia ed in Sardegna, l'assegnazione al Comando Generale dell'Arma dei CC.RR. di:

- 42 pezzi semoventi e 21.000 colpi da 75/16 per detti;
- 34 carri armati ^{leggi} (in luogo della autobloccante di cui non si ha disponibilità).

I materiali di cui sopra sono disponibili rispettivamente:

- Semoventi:
 - in Sardegna
- Carri armati:
 - 12 presso il parco auto di Neugne
 - 22 in Sardegna

Tenuto conto che in Sardegna necessiterebbe disporre 4636 semoventi (con 3.000 colpi) e 146 carri armati, i materiali di cui trattasi dovrebbero affluire in continente ed in Sicilia nelle seguenti misure:

si prega codesta Sottocommissione compiacersi autorizzare, per esigenze di ordine pubblico in continente, in Sicilia ed in Sardegna, l'assegnazione al Comando Generale dell'Esercito del CC. SS. II:

- 42 pezzi semoventi e 21.000 colpi da 75/18 per detti;
- 34 carri armati ^{Bigli} (in luogo delle autoblindo di cui non si ha disponibilità).

I materiali di cui sopra sono disponibili rispettivamente:

- Semoventi:
 - in Sardegna
- Carri armati:
 - 12 presso il parco auto di Masagne
 - 22 in Sardegna

Tenuto conto che in Sardegna necessiterebbe disporre **4633** 6 semoventi (con 3.000 colpi) e di 5 carri armati, i materiali di cui trattasi dovrebbero affluire in continente ed in Sicilia nella seguente misura:

- Semoventi:
 - 30 in continente (con 15.000 colpi)
 - 5 in Sicilia (con 3.000 colpi)
- Carri armati:
 - 10 in continente
 - 5 in Sicilia

Qualora nulla osti, preghi codesta Sottocommissione voler impartire le disposizioni per il trasporto del materiale e del munizionamento di cui trattasi.



P. C. C.
CAPO UFFICIO STAMPA
col. A. Quercia

IL GENERALE ADDETTO
P/ta Alessandro Santi -

SUBJECT: Procurement of Carabinieri

SECRET

HQ ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY


Tel: FILFOT 23

1603/50/44/G(SD1)

16 Nov 44

AFHQ

Copy to: MAIA



1. The attached file of correspondence between Allied Commission, MAIA and AAI on the inadequate numbers of Carabinieri in Italy is forwarded for such action as you consider necessary.

Summary of the AC demands

2. Present strength Carabinieri (early Sep)

44,000

Ceiling authorized

55,000

Deficiency

11,000

Numbers AC consider necessary for policing

(i) present Allied occupied territory (incl nucleus for use in North)

55,000

(ii) all Italy when captured

65,000

3. AC state that virtually no further Carabinieri can be recruited in Italy in our hands and that it has been reported that the Germans have deported those in the North. AC ask therefore that 11,000 qualified Italian Army personnel should be transferred to the Carabinieri. If it is found that no Carabinieri can be obtained in the North then AC recommend that a further 12,000 Italian Army should be attached to the Carabinieri for police purposes.

4. The comments of MAIA are generally agreed. The recommendations of AAI are as follows.

4633

Deficiency

Numbers AC consider necessary for policing

- (i) present Allied occupied territory (incl nucleus for use in North)

55,000

- (ii) all Italy when captured

65,000

3. AC state that virtually no further Carabinieri can be recruited in Italy in our hands and that it has been reported that the Germans have deported those in the North. AC ask therefore that 11,000 qualified Italian Army personnel should be transferred to the Carabinieri. If it is found that no Carabinieri can be obtained in the North then AC recommend that a further 12,000 Italian Army should be attached to the Carabinieri for police purposes.

4633

4. The comments of MIA are generally agreed. The recommendations of AAI are as follows.

Numbers of Carabinieri required.

5. The AC demand a total ceiling of 65,000 to cover the requirements of all Italy. They state that to provide sufficient COR for police purposes in the area of Italy at present occupied and for a nucleus for Northern Italy some 55,000 are required. A further 10,000 will apparently cover the needs of the densely populated North. This seems unlikely.

6. As the traditional guardians of law and order in Italy, the Carabinieri have been of invaluable assistance to the Allies, and it is essential that their numbers should be adequate. The AC contention that the ceiling should be enlarged is agreed and it is recommended that Combined Chiefs of Staffs should be asked to increase the ceiling to 65,000 or more.

The formation of a sixth combat group has been abandoned and from this source alone can ceiling cover be offered for the increase of Carabinieri. A new and vital operational commitment has arisen for formation of up to seventeen mule companies i.e. approximately 9,000 personnel. These should be covered by the BR-ITI Service unit ceiling of 93,000 but if this ceiling is already taken up, it is essential that the mule companies should take priority before any increase of the Carabinieri.

...../Sheet 2.

- 2 -

Deportation of Carabinieri

7. AC state that the Germans have removed virtually all Carabinieri from Northern Italy. No information at AI confirms that this has in fact happened and, even if the Germans have attempted such a deportation, it is thought that only partial success can have been achieved, and that many of the Carabinieri will have "gone to ground".

Dilution of the Carabinieri

8. The CCRR is the back bone of the Italian law, order and security. Its reputation depends on the quality of personnel enrolled, and any dilution as proposed by AC and MIA would destroy the good name of the Corps and thus render it virtually ineffective.

Metropolitani

9. The transfer of 'Metropolitani' on a temporary basis to the CCRR recommended by MIA would not solve the problem since their existing tasks (e.g. traffic control) would still have to be carried out. An enlargement of the Metropolitani and employment under the direction of CCRR would on the other hand increase the security forces.

Partisans

10. Employment of Partisans as CCRR would be undesirable in view of their overbearing attitude and tendencian towards the extreme left. The CCRR have always been non-political.

Use of Italian Army

11. The AC request for the transfer of 11,000 Italian Army to CCRR is neither practicable nor desirable for the following reasons :-

- (a) If the quality of the CCRR is to be maintained, only the best of the Italian Army could be transferred. This removal of the best would probably render the Italian Army useless for our purposes.
- (b) Even if the best were taken, the soldier is not trained in police duties. Dilution with untrained inefficients would inevitably ruin the reputation of the CCRR.

Partisans

10. Employment of Partisans as CCRR would be undesirable in view of their overbearing attitude and tendencies towards the extreme left. The CCRR have always been non-political.

Use of Italian Army

11. The AD request for the transfer of 11,000 Italian Army to CCRR is neither practicable nor desirable for the following reasons :-

- (a) If the quality of the CCRR is to be maintained, only the best of the Italian Army could be transferred. This removal of the best would probably render the Italian Army useless for our purposes.
- (b) Even if the best were taken, the soldier is not trained in police duties. Dilution with untrained inefficients would inevitably ruin the reputation of the CCRR.
- (c) If as is supposed, no Carabinieri are found in Northern Italy, AG propose that some 12,000 further Italian Army personnel should be attached to the Carabinieri, and claim that this experiment worked well in connection with grain collection in Sicily. The task of the Carabinieri is principally that of the policeman. The Army may well have been employed successfully on grain collection which can be considered as a form of requisitioning, but it would be most unwise to deduce from this experiment that the Army can equally well undertake police work.
- (d) Employment in lieu of Carabinieri proper would merely add fuel to the criticism and scorn which has been directed at the Italian Army since the Armistice. It is particularly important that every effort should be made to revive the morale of the Italian Army which has not yet recovered from the degradation of defeat. The Army should be used in aid of the civil power only as a last resort before Allied Forces are called in.

Provision of personnel

12. In view of the present operational situation, it is important that the present ceiling of 55,000 should be filled as soon as possible.

...../Sheet 3.

- 3 -

A carefully conducted propaganda campaign supported by press and broadcasting agencies should attract considerable numbers especially if the conditions of service were improved at the same time. Whether or not the Germans have removed all the Carabinieri from Northern Italy remains to be seen, but at least some will have escaped. The large cities of the North should present a fertile field for recruiting.

Conclusion

13. It is considered that
- (a) the ceiling of Carabinieri should be increased to 65,000. Ceiling cover for this can only be provided by charging personnel against the Sixth Combat Group, provided that this will not conflict with other commitments.
 - (b) the standard of personnel enrolled in the Carabinieri should not be lowered.
 - (c) dilution with Italian Army would destroy the reputation of the Corps.
 - (d) employment of the Army on police work is most undesirable from the point of view of morale.
 - (e) every effort should be made as a matter of urgency to obtain the necessary recruits by propaganda.

4629

General,
Commander in Chief.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785020

To :- G(Internal).
Ufficio Trasporti.
Float File.

From :- Mov. L.O. (MIA)

2 Nov 44

Move of Piceno Division.

Given below is copy of MOVEIT signal MOV/1/1345 dated 8 Nov 44.

FROM MOVEIT.

TO MIA. AFHQ GITE HIGH. RAAC.

MOV/1/1345 (.) RESTRICTED (.) Ref my Mov/1590 dated 5 Nov (.) Complete move shown therein is cancelled. (.) All informed.

Capt RE.
Mov. L.O.

4623

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

CIPHER SECRET
ROME AREA ALLIED COMMAND

8429

11/50 84
4/10/14

INCOMING

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ MESSAGE

QVR 11-12-17

OFFICE OF ORIGIN : DISTHREE
DATE TIME ORIGIN : 091440
AUTHENTICATED BY: Deciphered 091930
PRECEDENCE : IMMEDIATE

	TOP SECRET
X	SECRET
	CONFIDENTIAL
	RESTRICTED

TO: ACTION: 52 Area 54 Area 64 Garrison MMIA IO Bari Movwit
Moveit Mov Taranto Mov Bari Mov Sicily Mov Barletta
~~XXXX~~ Mov Rome ✓

Info Rome Area G3 British 56 Area 70 Sub Area Disthree East
AFHQ G3 (British) MMIA

SD84 SECRET 70

Ref this HQ 17/11/G of 4th November. Under authority AFHQ PA49938
of 8th November NOT to all. First. Move of elements FICENO Div
to assist Carabinieri is cancelled.
Second. This HQ SD59 of 7th October NOT to all remains effective.
Third. further instructions follow

Original 9
40 Copy mov
Lindh
Stoate

10/11

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785020

RAAC MESSAGE FORM

8227

CALL

CIRCUIT No.
NR

PRIORITY

TRANSMISSION INSTRUCTIONS

SPACES WITHIN RED LINES FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY

FORM (A)

AFHQ G3 SIGNED SAC CITE PRGCT

DATE/TIME OF ORIGIN
061315A

TO (FOR ACTION) DISTHRE

TO (FOR INFORMATION) (MAI), ARI, LOVIT.

Message Instructions

GR

QVR 2

(REF. No.)

FA 49038

SECURITY
CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

ONE. MOVE OF PERSONNEL OF PICERO DIV TO ASSIST CARABINIERI
AS ORDERED IN OUR FA 43589 NOT TO YOU IS CANCELLED. FURTHER
DETAILS LATER. MMIA NOV613 OF 7 NOV NOT TO YOU MMIA SD/28
OF 28 OCT AND YOUR 17/11/G OF 4 NOV ALSO REFER. TWO. EM-
PLOYMENT OF ONE COY OF PICERO REQUESTED IN YOUR SD975 OF
2 NOV IS AUTHORIZED ON TEMPORARY LOAN

DECIPHERED 2230/08 RT

LOCAL DISTRIBUTION

PRECEDENCE
ORIGINATING
SECTION

IMMEDIATE

A. G. AUTHENTICATION:

ORIGINATOR'S AUTHENTICATION:

THI OR TOR

Op.

TIME CLEARED

Original to G.
Copy taken from
Official Logbook
402/15

*File with rest of
more 9/28 J2*

MOVIMENTO GRUPPO COMBATTIMENTO "PICENO" DALLA PUGLIA

1° Scaglione - 155° e 198° Sez.CC.RR. (Martina Franca)	Uff. 2	trupp. 97	tons. 13
- 3° Btg. 235° Ftr. (Massafra)	" 36	" 446	" 24
2° Scaglione - 3° Btg. 336° Ftr. (Crispiano)	" 18	" 320	" 20
- Comando 336° Ftr. (Fasano)	" 11	" 231	" 18
3° Scaglione - I° Gr. V° Gr. 152° Art. (Noci)	" 12	" 200	" 9
- II° Gruppo 152° Art. (Alberobello)	" 6	" 150	" 10
- VI° Gruppo 152° Art. (Cisternino)	" 6	" 110	" 10
4° Scaglione - I° Btg. 235° Ftr. (Martina Franca)	" 36	" 440	" 24
- Comando 235° Ftr. (Locorotondo)	" 5	" 249	" 24
5° Scaglione - II° Btg. 235° Btr. (Locorotondo)	" 36	" 386	" 24
6° Scaglione - III° Gruppo 152° Art. (Ceglie Messapico)	" 6	" 14624	" 8

- II° Gruppo 152° Art. (Alberobello)	"	6	"	150	"	10
- VI° Gruppo 152° Art. (Cisternino)	"	6	"	110	"	10
4° Scaglione - I° Btg. 235° Ftr. (Martina Franca)	"	36	"	440	"	24
- Comando 235° Ftr. (Locorotondo)	"	5	"	249	"	24
5° Scaglione - II° Btg. 235° Btr. (Locorotondo)	"	36	"	386	"	24
6° Scaglione - III° Gruppo 152° Art. (Ceglie Messapico)	"	6	"	140	626	8
- Comando 152° Btg. Genio e Comp. Teleradio (Martina Franca)	"	1	"	117	"	24
7° Scaglione - I° Btg. 336° Ftr. (a cura della M.M.I.A.)	"	19	"	527	"	20
8° Scaglione - II° Btg. 336° Ftr. (Barletta)	"	194	"	3473	"	238



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

SUBJECT: Formation of a CO. RR. Bn. in SICILY.

Land Forces Sub-Com. A.C.
(L.F.L.A.)

SD/28
(D. War. Id.)

To: Public Safety Sub-Com. A.C.

Ref: att copy of letter from Ministry of War.

Will you please confirm that you have no objection to the use of this unit from within the ceiling authorized for the Island of SICILY.

This H.C. will take action on the release of tanks and arms, if you approve the scheme as a whole.

[Signature]
Major General
L.F.L.A.

4623

B.F. 16/11/50

B.F. 20/11/50

B.F. 5/12/50

785020



MINISTERO DELLA GUERRA
Cabinetto

Prot. N. 104155, 104156
320-III-2

Reparto di Stato

Roma, 8 novembre 1944

Dir. Sec. N. 1

Oggetto: Costituzione di un battaglione CC.RR. in Sicilia -

Costituzione di Batt. di Carabinieri in Sicilia
55/28
8.11.44
R. 11

Al LA M.M.I.A.

ROMA

1° In Sicilia il fenomeno del banditismo rurale sta dilagando in modo crescente.

Vere e proprie bande forti di numerosi malfattori, largamente armate di moschetti automatici, fucili mitragliatori, mitragliatrici e bombe a mano, vivono ben sistemate e protette in zone montane, ricattano, estorcono denaro, depredano le fattorie.

2° Considerato che per affrontare e reprimere tali bande occorrono mezzi idonei questo Ministero, in accordo con la Presidenza del Consiglio, intenderebbe costituire nell'isola uno speciale battaglione di CC.RR. da impiegare contro le formazioni di banditi che vengono di volta in volta segnalate.

3° Le caratteristiche del costituendo battaglione sarebbero le seguenti:

- organico: 4 compagnie, ciascuna di circa 150 carabinieri; 4627
- armamento: individuale (moschetto), 96 moschetti automatici, 64

lano, estorcono denaro, derubano le fattorie.

2° Considerato che per affrontare e reprimere tali bande occorrono mezzi idonei questo Ministero, in accordo con la Presidenza del Consiglio, intenderebbe costituire nell'isola una speciale battaglione di CC.RR. da impiegare contro le formazioni di banditi che vengono di volta in volta segnalate.

3° Le caratteristiche del costituendo battaglione sarebbero le seguenti:

- organico: 4 compagnie, ciascuna di circa 150 carabinieri; 4027
- armamento: individuale (moschetto), 88 moschetti automatici, 64 fucili mitragliatori, 10 mitragliatrici, 5 - 6 carri L.
- mezzi di trasporto per il rapido trasferimento del reparto: da provvedere in posto mediante requisizione d'intesa coll'Alto Commissario per la Sicilia.

4° Il personale per la costituzione del reparto sarebbe tratto da quello attualmente nell'isola. Esso rientrerebbe nel contingente di forza stabilito da cotesta M.M.I.A. per l'Arma dei CC.RR.-

5° L'armamento sarebbe provveduto da questo Ministero.

I carri L occorrenti potrebbero essere tratti da quelli della disciolta 5° co. carri L. - Il personale dei carabinieri per l'impiego e la condotta dei carri sarebbe preventivamente addestrato mediante un corso di specializzazione.

6° Tenuto conto degli scopi di carattere sociale e politico da raggiungere mediante l'impiego di detto reparto prego cotesta M.M.I.A. di volerne autorizzare la costituzione.

I L MINISTRO

D. Carlucci

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-22-2011 BY 60322 UCBAW

Valencia, 11 d'octubre 1944

[illegible]

APR 22 1944
CORRIERE

A. S. G. M. WILKINSON & J. H. CLARKE

[illegible]

A S. R. IL CAPO DI S. M. DELL'ARMATA
A S. R. IL COMANDANTE GENERALE DELL'ARMATA
A S. R. L'ALTO COMANDANTE PER LA SICILIA
AL COMANDANTE LA VI. DIVISIONE DI S. R.

Il triste consumo dello delinquente, nonché la manifestazione in questi due ultimi reclusi una netta tendenza a dilatare in modo progressivo.

In caso di emergenza si deve
 chiamare il numero di emergenza
 112.

That little Santa Rita summer she spent in the mountains of New Mexico, he did not know her name. He had heard of her in the papers, but he had not known her name. He had heard of her in the papers, but he had not known her name.

785020

si ripresentava. Ciò che, nella banda, secondo l'esperienza, nella popolazione la fiducia, non corrispondeva al bisogno.

Occorre dunque, se vogliamo combattere la delinquenza con successo, creare nell'isola una specie di reparto che per forme, equipaggiamento, armamento, trattamento economico, mezzi di trasporto, che in condizioni di efficienza con sicurezza si succedesse la banda, adducendo alle loro attività ed alla loro eliminazione.

È inutile che io chiedo a V.V. l'invio di un reparto di carabinieri reali che non dovrebbe essere di entità inferiore al battaglione. Io che V.V. - per residenti parzialmente conto delle necessità della Sicilia - non me lo potrebbe dare.

Si basta che nessun altro carabinieri sia d'ora innanzi sottratto all'isola (almeno per il periodo di tempo durante il quale si dovrà condurre questa lotta contro il banditismo), secondo gli impegni che l'occasionalità l'alto comando per la Sicilia mi ha comunicato avrebbe preso con lui V.V. il ministro agli Interni.

Con l'approvazione dell'alto Comando, con il consenso del Comandante della VI Brigata 22.22. - ten. Longo - che più ha rappresentato in forma pressoché analoga a quella fatta innanzi da me la situazione della situazione pubblica in Sicilia a V.V. il Comandante Generale dell'isola del 22.22., chiede di sia data sanzione alla costituzione di un battaglione 22.22. nell'isola, formato da elementi tratti dalle disponibilità attuali, da impiegare direttamente del Comandante della VI Brigata. Un'altra a basso, sostituito, se necessario, nei limiti delle sue attuali modestie disponibilità, da reparti organici dell'Esercito, in modo che si possa con sicurezza pervenire la zona della quale informazioni si sono danno l'esistenza di una banda, controllarla, sventarla, e, quindi, la, di nuovo alla sua eliminazione.

461

provvisoria della VI Brigata. ... - Ma, brava - che gli ho rag-
presentato in forma pressoché esatta e quella infondata da me-
la situazione della situazione pubblica in Italia e U.S. Il Coman-
dante Generale dell'Armata del N. 11, dicendo che da data imminente al-
la costituzione di un battaglione N. 11. nell'isola, formato 461
elementi tratti dalle disponibilità attuali, da impiegare di-
renti dal Comandante della VI Brigata, generalmente a mezzo, neces-
sario, se necessario, e nel limiti della mia attuale autorità dispo-
nibilità, da ripetuti organismi dell'Incarico, in maniera che mi pos-
so con sicurezza dire che la cosa nella quale informazioni viene
danno l'esistenza di una banda, rastrellata, costata, e via, e via, e
la, sfuggono alla sua considerazione.

Il Comandante della VI Brigata sta studiando come costituire,
ingegneri, e, sempre, equipaggiare questo battaglione che intenderà
costituire su quattro compagnie di circa 150 u. ciascuna, laviori,
al Comandante Generale - se il provvedimento da me proposto non
sufficiente - la richiesta minima di personale di ingegneri, di ar-
mento, di equipaggiamento che non potrà essere dallo mio dispo-
nibilità e che non potrà fornirli io.

Per i mezzi di trasporto provvederò io, d'accordo con l'Alto
Comandante, con provvedimenti straordinari di requisizione.

Occorre solo che il Governo studi e stabilisca:

- a) - una speciale indennità per il personale del N. 11, che per la
pe di lotta che dovrà sostenere, sarà accolta a circa 1 a pari
colli superiori e quelli che sopporta la massa del rimanente
personale;
- b) - una speciale fonda da destinare a spese per informazioni confi-
denziali (i confidenti nell'attuale situazione affrontano la

Morta e roglione esser una roglia.

Però conto a V.E. se vorrà perorare presso il governo e presso il Comandante Generale dell'Armata l'opportunità della costituzione di questo battaglione speciale. Ne attendo la sua volontà per dare subito vita al reparto ed iniziare - dopo un momento - il periodo di addestramento e di arruolamento - la speranza che la parte della popolazione siciliana attende con ansia.

IL COMANDANTE GENERALE
ARMATA
- A. Maciotti -

4610

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND

No.

785020

RAAC MESSAGE FORM 1

CALL	CIRCUIT No. NR	PRIORITY	TRANSMISSION INSTRUCTIONS	
SPACES WITHIN RED LINES FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY				
FROM (A)	ROME AREA		DATE-TIME OF ORIGIN 08 0915 A	
TO (FOR ACTION)	MMTA		MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS GR	
TO (FOR INFORMATION)				
(REF. No.)	SD 1290		(SECURITY CLASSIFICATION) SECRET (.) SD 12	

PAREN ROME AREA 179 PAREN (.) RNF DISTREE 17/11/G DATED 4 (.) MOVE OF
UNITS FICING DIV IT (.) REQUEST INFO LOCATION SERIALS THREE AND SIX ON ARRIVAL
ROME

TEAM	SD
FILE	
DATE	8 11

R9

Picene

4614

LOCAL DISTRIBUTION

G5 British

PRECEDENCE:	ROUTINE
ORIGINATING SECTION:	G5 British
A. G. AUTHENTICATION:	I. E. CHEEK CAPT. A. G. Q.
ORIGINATOR'S AUTHENTICATION:	<i>[Signature]</i>

THI OR TOR

Opr.

080949

TIME CLEARED

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND

No.

785020

FROM: SAC

TO: SAC

FROM: 3 DISTRICT

SD 1980

RESTRICTED

Re: your EX 49079 of 5 Nov (.) Officer from this

He will receive site tomorrow 9 Nov and necessary

arrangements will be made through District

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

4613

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785020

C-FIVE AFHQ ACTION INFO ALLIED FORCES PUB COMMISSION (AFHA)

RE ALLIED COMMISSION PUBLIC SAFETY S/C

6150

7/11/44

RESTRICTED

PRIORITY

Public Safety S/C.

RESTRICTED PD

PAR. ONE PD REFERENCE YOUR LETTER 6 PD FIVE SEVEN ZERO ONE FOUR PD

ONE TWO ONE D FOURTH NOVEMBER FORTY FOUR PD

PAR. TWO C FIVE AFHQ ACTION INFO ALLIED FORCES PUB COMMISSION (AFHA) FROM

RE ALLIED COMMISSION PUBLIC SAFETY

PAR. TWO PD REQUESTED THAT MOVEMENT OF FIVE THOUSAND ITALIAN MILITARY

TRANSFERRED TO CHARLIE CHARLIE ROGER ROGER BE SUSPENDED PENDING FURTHER

DISCUSSION ON RELEASE DATE PD

Internal : A/C.C.
C. of S.
C.A. Section
Public Safety

6-11-44 4611

1100 hrs 8/11 - Movement to AFHQ phone to ask if details firm
for move, starting 9/11 & remainder of move in next four
period

1100 hrs 8/11 - Advised AFHQ of details contained in above
signal & requested they contact G.S. AFHQ & advise us
result - also to contact mobile if traffic cancelled
Nov. 8/11

76
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Move of Units of FICENO Division

LAND FORCES SUB-COMMISSION A.C.

(S.M.I.A.)

File No. SD/28

1 NOV 44

TO : AFHQ (2)

Copy to: SD A.I. (4)
3 DISTRICT

ACC incl copy for Public Safety Sub Com.
MINISTRY OF WAR

Ref this HQ SD/28 of 28 Oct 44 and Appx "A" attached.

1. Attached is fully amended Appendix "A" for move of FICENO
SF embodying all amendments to date.

2. Appendix "A" attached to this HQ SD/28 of 28 Oct 44 should
therefore be destroyed.

Copy to: Comd
2 1/c

A/Q

Spec Sec

Nov (2)

Circulation File

File

War Diary

General
Major General
N. M. I. A. 4011

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785020

CONFIDENTIAL

Move of Units of PICENO Gp

	UNIT	Move Strength				Entraining Station	Detraining Station	
		Offrs	ORs	Animals	Stores in tons			
1	152 & 198 Sezioni CC.RR. III Bty 235 Regt Ftr	2 36	97 446		13 27	MARTINA. P. CRISPINO	CATANZARO	
2	III Bty 336 Regt Ftr Cdo 336 Regt Ftr	13 11	320 231		20 13	MASSAIA PASANO	NAPLES	
3	1 Gruppo 152 Regt Art 2 Gruppo 152 Regt Art Gruppo 152 Art	12 6 6	200 150 110		9 10 10	MOCI ALBEROHELLO CISTERNUO	IRMA ROMA IRMA	
4	1 Bty 235 Regt Ftr Cdo 235 Regt Ftr	36 5	440 249		24 24	MARTINA. P. LOCOROTONDO	MESSINA	
5	2 Bty 235 Regt Ftr	36	386		24	LOCOROTONDO	PALEMO	
6	3 Gruppo 152 Regt Art Cdo 152 Bty Genio and 252 Comp Teleradio	6 1	140 117		8 24	CEGLIE MESSAPICO MARTINA. P.	IRMA (per LAZIO)	
7	1 Bn 336 Regt	25	575		30	BENVENUTO	CHIETI	
8	Two Coys 2 Bn 336 Regt Two Coys 2 Bn 336 Regt	15 19	455 527		20 20	BRINDISI BARIETTA	BARI	
9	MONTESERRATO Bn less one Coy Coy MONTESERRATO (533 Coy)	30 6	620 166		30 20	VAIRANO TUSI	ANCONA	all older men remain with 11
10	Bn formed at CONGEDANTI in SARONNO	25	475		--	-----	-----	For CAGE L.R.I. and 27 Oct 44
	TOTALS	295	5704					
11	Div H.Q. Tot and Sup Coy 83 and 91 Fd Hosps 337 Sezione Sanita Additional Personnel	24 3 9 8 17	110 50 78 67 87	200		MARTINA FIENCA LOCOROTONDO CISTERNUO NAPLES	To be signalled by 3 District	Animals are 5
	TOTALS	65	392					


e - Request serial NOT be moved until called fwd by AAI.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

CONFIDENTIAL

APPEX 'A' to NMIA
SB/28 of 27 Nov 44

Move of Units of PICENO Gp

Strength Animals Stores		Entraining Station	Detraining Station	REMARKS
	in tons			
13		MARTINA. F.	CATANZARO	
24		CRISPANO		
20		NASSATRA	NAPLES	
18		FASANO		
9		NOCI	ROMA	
10		ALBEROBELLO	ROMA	
10		CISTERNINO	ROMA	
24		MARTINA. F.	MESSINA	
24		LOCOROTONDO		
24		LOCOROTONDO	PALESTRO	
8		CEGLIE MESSAPICO	ROMA	
24		MARTINA. F.	(per LAZIO)	
30		BENEVENTO	CHIETI	
20		BRINDISI	BARI	
20		FARFETTA	BARI	
30		VATRANO	ANCONA	All older men, 150 young men remain with LECORNO Combat Group. For CAGLEARI. NMIA Signal ED 1680 and 27 Oct 44 refers. 
20		IESI		
--		-----	-----	
00		MARTINA FRANCA LOCOROTONDO CISTERNINO NAPLES	To be signalled by 3 District	Animals are from all units PICENO Division.

ed by AAI.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

FROM: MIA
TO: AFHQ
RPTD: AAI
DISTURB
WAR MINISTRY

SD 1722

RESTRICTED

As per Serial 11 Appx A to MIA letter SD/28 of 28 OCT as follows (.) For 152 SEZIONE SANITA and detail read 33 SEZIONE SANITA 8 offers 67 ORs Entrenning Station NAPLES.

RECEIVED

AUTHENTICATED

Internal Spec Sec
Roy

4606

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

FROM: MMIA

TO : B DISTRICT

Rptd: CS ORG AFHQ

SD 1748

07

1735

74
File
8/11

SP/18.

RESTRICTED

Ref your 17/11/G of 4 Nov (.) Para 5 (.) This is matter
for AMHQ decision (.) Para 6 (.) All young men from
MONTROVANO Bn have been transferred to newly formed
ABRUZZI Bn being the third Alpine Bn in LIGURIO Gruppo (.)
Para 7 (.) MMIA offer and reps of PIGNO will receive suitable
loan in Bari - CERIGNOLA area as requested

RECORD NO.

ROUTINE

AUTHENTICATED

Approved

Capt.

Intermit: A/C
Spec Sec.

4684

73
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Move of Units of PIGENO Division

LAND FORCES SUB-COMMISSION A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)
File No. SD/28
7 Nov 44

TO : ATHO (2)

Copy to: SD AAI (2)
3 DISTRICT
ACC incl copy for Public Safety Sub Com.
MINISTRY OF WAR

Ref this HQ SD/28 of 28 Oct 44 and Appx "A" attached.

1. Attached is fully amended Appendix "A" for move of PIGENO
OF embodying all amendments to date.

2. Appendix "A" attched to this HQ SD/28 of 28 Oct 44 should
therefore be destroyed.

Copy to: Comd
2 1/2

2/Q
Spec Sec
MOT (2)
Circulator File
File
War Diary

General
Major General
M. V. I. A.

460

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785020

CONFIDENTIAL

Move of Units of PICENO Gp

	UNIT	Move Strength				Entraining Station	Detraining Station	
		Offrs	ORs	Animals	Stores in tons			
1	155 & 198 Sezioni CC.RR. III Bty 235 Regt Ftr	2 36	97 446	-	13 24	MARTINA. F. CRISPANO	CATANZARO	
2	III Bty 336 Regt Ftr Cdo 336 Regt Ftr	18 11	320 231		20 18	MASSATHA FASANO	NAPLES	
3	1 Gruppo 152 Regt Art 2 Gruppo 152 Regt Art 6 Gruppo 152 Art	12 6 6	200 150 110		9 10 10	NOCI ALBEROBELLO CISTERNINO	ROMA ROMA ROMA	
4	1 Bty 235 Regt Ftr Cdo 235 Regt Ftr	36 5	440 249		24 24	MARTINA. F. LOCOROTONDO	MESSINA	
5	2 Bty 235 Regt Ftr	36	386		24	LOCOROTONDO	PALESTRO	
6	3 Gruppo 152 Regt Art Cdo 152 Bty Genio and 252 Camp Teleradio	6 1	140 117		8 24	CEGLIE MESSAPICO MARTINA. F.	ROMA (per LAZIO)	
7	1 Bn 336 Regt	25	575		30	BENEVENTO	CHIETI	
8	Two Coys 2 Bn 336 Regt Two Coys 2 Bn 336 Regt	15 19	455 527		20 20	BRINDISI BARLETTA	BARI BARI	
9	MONTESANO Bn less one Coy Coy MONTESANO (533 Coy)	30 6	620 166		30 20	VAIRANO JESI	ANCONA	All older m remain with
10	Bn formed at CONGEDANTI in SARDINIA	25	475		--	-----	-----	For CAGLARI and 27 Oct.
	TOTALS	295	5704					
11	Div H.Q. Tpt and Sup Coy 83 and 91 Fd Hosps 33 Sezione Sanita Additional Personnel	28 3 9 8 17	110 50 78 67 87	200		MARTINA FRANCA LOCOROTONDO CISTERNINO NAPLES	To be signalled by 3 District	Animals are
	TOTALS	65	392					

* - Request serial 9 NOT be moved until called fwd by AAT.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

CONFIDENTIAL

APPX 'A' to MMIA
SD/28 of 7 Nov 44

Movement of Units of FICEMO Gp

Stores in tons	Entraining Station	Detraining Station	REMARKS
13 24	MARTINA. F. CRISPINO	CATANZARO	
20 18	MASSATRA FASANO	NAPLES	
9 10 10	NOCI ALBEROBELLO CISTERNINO	ROMA ROMA ROMA	
24 24	MARTINA. F. LOCOROTONDO	MESSINA	
24 8 24	LOCOROTONDO CEGLIE MESSAPICO MARTINA. F.	PALESTRO ROMA (per LAZIO)	
30 20 20	BENEVENTO BRINDISI BARLETTA	CHITTI BARI BARI	
30 20 ---	VAIRANO UESI ---	ANCONA ---	All older men, 150 young men remain with LEGNANO Combat Group. For CAGLIARI. MMIA Signal SD 1680 and 27 Oct 44 refers.
	MARTINA FRANCA LOCOROTONDO CISTERNINO NAPLES	To be signalled by 3 District	Animals are from all units FICEMO Division.

AAI.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785020

RAAC MESSAGE FORM

2372

CALL	CIRCUIT No. NR 7633	PRIORITY ROUTINE	TRANSMISSION INSTRUCTIONS QVR-1
SPACES WITHIN RED LINES FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY			
FORM (A)	AFHQ SIGNED SACRED CITE PRGCT FROM G-3 (ORG) FOREIGN		DATE/TIME OF ORIGIN 051415A
TO (FOR ACTION)	IRIA		Message Instructions GR 1/1
TO (FOR INFORMATION)	DISTANCE		
(REF. No.)	FX ARXAR 49079	(SECURITY CLASSIFICATION) SECRET	SD/28 7"

REFERENCE SERIAL 11, APPENDIX A, IRIA SD/28 OF 28 OCTOBER.

ONE REQUEST YOU SUBMIT FOR APPROVAL TRAINING LOCATION SELECTED
FOGGIA/CEIGOLA AREA FOR DIV HQ AND SPECIALISTS. WHEN APPROVED MOVEMENT
WILL BE ARRANGED

*aff. from line
Barocco Side to
and area is the
2 bisk*
DECIPHERED 070545A EFS

CIPHER
SECRET 45941

LOCAL DISTRIBUTION

PRECEDENCE
ORIGINATING
SECTION

A. G. AUTHENTICATION

ORIGINATOR'S AUTHENTICATION

THI OR TOR

Op.

TIME CLEARED

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

Subject: Piceno Division

Land Forces Sub Commission
R.G. (MMIA)
R O M E
AQ/15

7 Nov 44

To : Minister for War

1. Par 3h of AQ/15 of 30 Oct is rescinded and the following substituted therefor:

New items of clothing and equipment issued for the use of personnel will remain the property of the Carabinieri and will not be retained by individuals when they are withdrawn. When new clothing is issued the original Italian Army uniform worn by the personnel on arrival will be stored by the Carabinieri and re-issued to the troops on their departure.

CLAYTON P. KERR, Colonel,
for Major General,
M. M. I. A.

CPK/wk

Copy to:

AFHQ (2)
AAI (SD)
AC (2)
MMIA LO's
G
Spec. Sec.
A.C. Public Safety Sub-Comm.

SUBJECT: Move of Units of PICENO Division

SECRET

3 District
Ext 7
17/11/G

4 Nov 44

52 Area (3)
54 Area (2)
64 Garrison (2)
MMIA LO BARI (2)
Movements East Italy
Movements West Italy

Mov TARANTO
Mov BARI
Mov SICILY
Mov BARLETTA
Mov ROME

ROME Area (G-3 BRIT)
56 Area
70 Sub Area

3 District Eastern Det
AMEQ (G-3 Org Brit)
MMIA

Copy to :- 2 Mov LO MMIA LO

1. Under authority AMEQ sig EX 46882 of 1 Nov and MMIA SD/28 of 28 Oct, the moves of units of PICENO Division shown at Appx A are required to take place as soon as possible and to be completed within three weeks.
2. They will be ordered by the Area etc in which the unit concerned is located and will take place under the arrangements of the appropriate Movement Authority.
3. Orders for the move of Div HQ two Regtl HQs and certain auxiliary units will be issued later.
4. Reception arrangements and other adm. matters have been dealt with separately by MMIA.
5. For AMEQ and MMIA Serial 8. One coy has been retained meantime at BRINDISI with a view to its emp as gd coy on "displaced personnel" ex GREECE at TARANTO. This HQ SD 975 and conversation INGLEDEW - WATSON both of 2 Nov refer.
6. For MMIA Ref Serial 9. It is assumed that the segregation of the two age gps in MONTEGRANARO Bn has taken place and that you have arranged the movement of the LECANO party to that fm.
7. Ref para 4 of your letter. It is requested that you will arrange for reps of PICENO Div to carry out a recce of the area proposed for their new loon, after

70

59/28

9/11

55

64

433

2. They will be ordered by the Area etc in which the unit concerned is located and will take place under the arrangements of the appropriate Movement Authority.

3. Orders for the move of Div HQ two Regtl HQs and certain auxiliary units will be issued later.

4. Reception arrangements and other adm matters have been dealt with separately by MIA. 459

5. For AFHQ and MIA Serial 3. One coy has been retained meantime at BRINDISI with a view to its emp as gd coy on "displaced personnel" ex GREECE at TARANTO. This HQ SD 975 and conversation INCLUDED - WATSON both of 2 Nov refer.

6. For MIA
Ref Serial 9. It is assumed that the segregation of the two age gps in MONTECRANERO Bn was taken place and that you have arranged the movement of the LEBANO party to that fm.

7. Ref para 4 of your letter. It is requested that you will arrange for reps of PICENO Div to carry out a recon of the area proposed for their new locn, after consultation with 54 Area and MIA LO BARI, and thereafter that the proposals be forwarded to this HQ for approval.

JPW/ETP

Watson
(JP WATSON) Major
for Lt col
G S

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785020

Move of Units of FIGERO Gr

	UNIT	Move Strength				Entraining Station	Detraining Station
		Offrs	CRs	animals	Stores in tons		
1	155 & 198 Sezioni CC.RR. III Bty 235 Regt Ptr	4 21	90 371		30 75	MARTINA F UNISPIANO	CATANZARO
2	III Bty 336 Regt Ptr Cdo 336 Regt Ptr	21 5	371 149		75 60	PASSEATHA PASANO	NAPLES
3	1 Gruppo 152 Regt Art 2 Gruppo 152 Regt Art	16 20	214 238		75 75	NOCI ALBEROBELLO	ROMA ROMA
4	1 Bty 235 Regt Ptr Cdo 235 Regt Ptr	21 11	371 149		75 60	MARTINA F LOCOROTONDO	MESSINA
5	2 Bty 235 Regt Ptr	21	371		75	LOCOROTONDO	PALERMO
6	3 Gruppo 152 Regt Art Cdo 152 Bty Genio and 252 Comp Tele-radio	18 8	226 195		75 75	CEGLIE MESSINICO MARTINA F	ROMA (per LAZIO)
7	1 Bn 336 Regt	25	575		30	BENEVENTO	CHIETI
8	One Coy 2 Bn 336 Regt Two Coys 2 Bn 336 Regt	7 15	220 455		10 20	BRINDISI MARLETTA	BARI BARI
+9	MONTEGRANERO Bn less one Coy	30	620		30	VAIRANO	ANCONA

+ Serial 9 NOT to move, until called fwd by AAI.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785020

of Units of PIGNO Cr

App. for the 1st Div. of the 1st Army
17/11/52 of the 1st Army

Strength Animals	Strength in tons	Entraining Station	Detraining Station	Remarks
	30 75	MARTINA F CRISPINO	CATANZARO	
	75 60	MASSARA PASANO	HAPLOS	
	75 75	NOCI ALFEROBELLA	ROMA ROMA	
	75 60	MARTINA F LOCOROTONDO	MESSINA	
	75	LOCOROTONDO	PALERMO	
	75 75	CEGLIE MESLAPICO MARTINA F	ROMA (per LAZIO)	
	30	BENEVENTO	CHITTI	
	10 20	BRINDISI BARLETTA	BARI BARI	
	30	VAIRANO	ANCONA	All older men, 150 young men remain with LEGNANO Combat Group.

AI.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

SUBJECT: 1st Co. CC.RR.

Land Forces Sub-Commission A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)

SD/28
Rev 44

Ministry of War.

Your ref: 203/76/L.A. of 30 Oct.
317.V.I.

1. Your request for the 1st Co. CC.RR. to remain on SARDINIA must be refused.
2. In this respect, your attention is called to App. 1A of our SD/28 of 28 Oct. in which you will notice that a Bn, of strength 500, is to be formed of COMBANT in SARDINIA. This Bn should be able to take over the duties of the 1st Co. CC.RR.

Major General
M.M.I.A.

4594

SUBJECT: Italian Soldiers assisting Carabinieri.

Land Forces Sub Commission
(A.C.) M. M. I. A.

R O M E

SD/28
3 November 1944

TO : Hq AG

Copy to: AFHQ
AAI

Public Safety Sub Commission AG.

Reference AFHQ PX38608 and PX43589 and
AAI Signal SD-1334 of 27 October 1944.

1. It has been directed that a battalion of 500 Italian soldiers be organized in Sardinia to reinforce the CC.RR on that island. This is being accomplished.
2. The official report of the CC.RR officer commanding the CC.RR in Sardinia, dated 11 October 1944, shows:

Assigned strength- 56 officers - 3504 men.

Of the above, On leave- 8 officers - 513 men.

3. It is assumed that the personnel are on leave in Sardinia, as leave outside Sardinia is not authorized.

4. In view of the requirement for the Italian Army battalion to reinforce the CC.RR in Sardinia, it is suggested that the granting of leave to over 14% of the CC.RR be examined.

CLAYTON P. KERR, Colonel
for Major General
M. M. I. A.

CPK/vi

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785020

LEGIONE TERRITORIALE DEI CARABINIERI REALI DI CAGLIARI
Ufficio amministrazione Sezione Prima

SITUAZIONE DELLA FORZA EFFETTIVA, PRESENTE E VETTOVAGLIATA AL 9 OTTOBRE 1944

R E P A R T O		DISLOCAZIONI	F O R Z A											
			Effettiva	Ricoverati	In Licenza	A S S E N T I		P R E S E N T I						
			in luogo			Arbitrari	Del repar	Aggregat						
			di cura.				ito.	in suss						
								stenza d						
								altri re						
								parti e						
								corpi.						
			Uff. S.T.	Uff. S.T.	Uff. S.T.	Uff. S.T.	Uff. S.T.	Uff. S.T.	Uff. S.T.	Uff. S.T.	Uff. S.T.	Uff. S.T.	Uff. S.T.	Uff. S.T.
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Legione Terr/le	Cagliari													
CC.RR. di	per la forza													
Cagliari	dislocata in	56	3504	=	86	8	513	=	=	48	12911	=	2	
	Sardegna													

a Cagliari, 11 ottobre 1944

IL MAGGIORE D'ARM/NE RELATO
(Armando Meloni)



Armando Meloni

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785020

ORIALE DEI CARABINIERI REALI DI CAGLIARI
o amministrazione Sezione Prima
=oCo=

SENTE E VETTOVAGLIATA AL 9 OTTOBRE 1944

F O R Z A													
P R E S E N T I							A S S E N T I						
in luogo							in licenza						
di cura.							arbitrari						
							del n. par.						
							in sussidiati						
							stenza di						
							altri re						
							parti e						
							corpi.						
Uff. IS. T.							Uff. IS. T.						
3							3						
4							4						
5							5						
6							6						
7							7						
8							8						
9							9						
10							10						
11							11						
12							12						
13							13						
14							14						
36							36						
8							8						
513							513						
48							48						
12911							12911						
2							2						
48							48						
12913							12913						

IL REGIONE D'AMBI/NE RELATORE
(Artando Meloni)

Artando Meloni

785020

[illegible]

9 OTTOBRE 1944.

2

IL COLONNELLO CON LA LEGIONE
(Andrea del Leo)

785020

U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20315

67

220771346

2014

(Compresi
(giur.Com=
(mando Mi
(litare
(della Ca
(labria.

IL COLONNELLO COMANDA LA LEGIONE
(Andrea De Leo)



Comando Generale dell'Arma dei Carabinieri Reali

UFFICIO ORDINAMENTO

N. 59/25

di prot.

Roma, 11 23 ottobre

1944

Risposta al

del

n.

Allegati n.

OGGETTO: Situazione della forza effettiva, presente e vettovagliata

Effectiveness and Fueling Return

ALLA SEZIONE MILITARE ITALIANA (M.I.A.) PRESSO IL
COMANDO ALLEATO

SECRET

A norma del foglio di questo Comando Generale n. 59/25
del 10 corrente, si trasmette la situazione della forza ef-
fettiva, presente e vettovagliata, alla data del 7 corrente,
della Divisione di Ostensio.

Il Capitano
IL COLONNELLO CAPO DI S. M.
-Rosario della Chiesa-

4589

Luciano Ligabue
Luc. Taken off by JMI

785020



Comando Generale dell'Arma dei Carabinieri Reali

UFFICIO ORDINAMENTO

N. 59/27 di prot.

Roma,

14 27 ottobre

1944

Risposta al

del

n.

Allegati n.

OGGETTO: Situazione della forza effettiva, presente e vettovagliata.

ALLA S.M.I.A. - Via Veneto Palazzo delle Corporazioni -

P. O. R. A.

A seguito del foglio di questo Comando Generale n. 59/23 del 19 corrente, si trasmette la situazione della forza effettiva, presente e vettovagliata, alla data del 9 agosto, della Legione di Cagliari.

4588

IL COLONNELLO CAPO DI S. M.
-Russo della Chiesa-

Luciano

guc

Taken by Gill

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

LNKE V LAEE NR49

FROM DISTHREE 221625A

TO AFHQ (Z1 G-3 ORG BRIT)

INFO (NNIA)

QQY GR55 BT

SD975/ CONFIDENTIAL/ REF AFHQ WD-W/AHS OF 25 OCT AND
CONFERENCE AFHQ 1 NOV/ ONE ITALIAN COY REQUIRED AS GDS ON
DISPLACED PERSONNEL PENDING ~~SCREENING~~.

NOT AVAILABLE FROM ITALIAN TPS VALLOTTED ~~5511/11/12~~ 3 DISTRICT.

SUGGES THAT ONE COY 2 BN 386 REGT (PICENO)

PRESENT LOCN BARLETTA AND BRINDISI BE ALLOTTED.

NNIA SD/28 OF 25 OCT ALSO REFERS

BT TH11652A

SEMT NR49 1947A RM
RITH

S
RECD NR 49 021947 A (PER COPY) AAA AB // B1

4587

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

CIPHER

ROME AREA ALLIED COMMAND

LOCKDOWN MESSAGE

6279

QVR 5-5-7-8.

OFFICE OF ORIGIN AFHQ SIGNED SACRED CITE PHGCT.

DATE TIME ORIGIN 011700A.

AUTHENTICATED BY DECIPHERED 021355A.LW.

PRIORITY ROUTINE

TO:

ACTION: (1) DISTRESS

INFO:

(2) MAIN AAI (3) LMIA (4) MOVWIT (5) AC (6) MOVET
(7) RAAC (8) MOV ROME.

FA 46882

SECRET

1. ORDER MOVES UNITS SHOWN IN APPX 'A' TO LMIA SD/28 QF 28 OCT
NOT REPEAT NOT TO ALL.
2. MOVES TO BE COMPLETED WITHIN THREE WEEKS.

SECRET

4586

Handwritten notes and signatures:
TOP 3/11
JAN 4/11
COP 8/11
6/11

REF. No. 1

DTG

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

SUBJECT: MONTESGRANERO Battalion

RESTRICTED

Land Forces Sub Commission A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)

SD/2/1/6 - Per 11
1 Nov 44

TO : War Ministry

Your 303553/C.A. of 30 Oct 44 is answered by this H.Q.
letter SD/28 of 28 Oct 44.

for
APL H. H. H.
Major General
M.M.I.A.

Copy to SD/28

4585

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

FROM MMIA

TO 50 MIU

RPTD WAR MINISTRY

SD 1703

01

A

CONFIDENTIAL

Ref para THREE your MF/25 of 29 OCT (.) 152 ARTIERI Coy is for
PICENO (.) It will move later from your area on orders MMIA to
join PICENO Div HQ in FOGGIA area (.) 69 TELEGRAFISTI Coy is
for MANTOVA

PRECEDENCE _____

AUTHENTICATED _____

Internal Spec Sec
RE
Z
File SD/28.

SUBJECT: Piceno Division.

59
61
59/28
MILITARY MISSION, ITALIAN ARMY
R O M E
AQ/15

30 October 1944.

TO : Minister for War.

Reference MIA letter SD/22 of 28 October.

1. Certain personnel of the Piceno Division (Serials 1-9 of Appendix A of above letter), plus one Bn. to be organized in SARDINIA, will be used for a limited period as reinforcements for the CC.RR.
2. During the period of duty with the CC.RR this personnel will be in the ITI-ITI category (7).
3. The following plan for clothing this personnel is:
 - a. Items of Italian Army equipment will be utilized wherever possible and to the fullest extent. Personnel will move with the Italian Army equipment now issued to them. Italian Army blankets only will be used and should be carried by each individual.
 - b. Outer uniform will be Italian Army uniform. For this purpose the War Ministry will prepare and earmark 5000 repaired Italian Army uniforms and 5000 repaired Italian overcoats.
 - c. Shirts, underwear, boots, and socks will be supplied from Allied sources only insofar as it is necessary to supplement available items from Italian sources. Such of these items as are supplied from Allied sources will be taken from the Allied items earmarked for the CC.RR.
 - d. The 155 & 158 Sez CC.RR will be clothed by the CC.RR from clothing already made available to the CCRR (MIA letter AQ/15 of 3 October).
 - e. Clothing as specified in sub-paragraphs b and c above will be issued to the individuals concerned only after arrival of the individuals at the destination as shown in Appendix A of above reference letter.

3. The following plan for clothing this personnel is-

a. Items of Italian Army equipment will be utilized whenever possible and to the fullest extent. Personnel will move with the Italian Army equipment now issued to them. Italian Army blankets only will be used and should be carried by each individual.

b. Outer uniform will be Italian Army uniform. For this purpose the War Ministry will prepare and earmark 5000 repaired Italian Army uniforms and 5000 repaired Italian overcoats.

c. Shirts, underwear, boots, and socks will be supplied from Allied sources only insofar as it is necessary to supplement available items from Italian sources. Such of these items as are supplied from Allied sources will be taken from the Allied items earmarked for the CCRR.

d. The 1st & 1st SS CCRR will be clothed by the CCRR from clothing already ready made available to the CCRR (MIA letter AQ/16 of 3 October).

e. Clothing as specified in sub-paragraphs b and c above will be issued to the individuals concerned only after arrival of the individuals at the destination as shown in Appendix A of above reference letter.

f. MIA LO's at Naples, Palermo (for Palermo and Messina), Chieti, Bari and Arcona will inspect these troops upon arrival at the stations named and advise Hq MIA by signal the items, and quantities of each, needed to clothe and equip this personnel to scale. Officers from Hq MIA will inspect the units arriving in Rome. An officer of the Public Safety Sub-Commission will inspect the unit arriving in Catanzaro.

g. MIA LO, Sardinia, will handle the clothing and equipping of the Battalion in Sardinia in accordance with instructions already issued.

h. Items excess to scale will be withdrawn from individuals when new items are issued. Items withdrawn will be returned to Italian Army depots.

CLAYTON P. KERR, Colonel
for Major General
MIA.

max/ag

copy

INFO (2)

AA: SD

ACC (2)


MIA

G

Spec. Gen.

60

tu/vc



MINISTERO DELLA GUERRA

Cabinetto

Ind. N° 103476/C.A. All'Esce
317.7.1.
Riposta al fido

Roma, P.L. 151, 30 ottobre 1944

Dir. Se. N°

Oggetto: 1° compagnia CC.RR. per alleati.

1.07. Carabinieri Reg. per la M. S. 128
M. Ia. R.M.I.A. -
4.10.1944
3.1.1.1.

- 1) - Il 1° agosto c.a. su richiesta del Comando alleato in Sardegna si costituì a Cagliari la 1° compagnia CC.RR. per A.A. con compiti di vigilanza dei magazzini, delle locali sedi dei Comandi alleati, del porto, per scorta treni e autocarri.
- 2) - Comando militare della Sardegna comunica che ora detta compagnia ha avuto ordine di tenersi pronta per seguire la 205 divisione in continente. I servizi da essa disimpegnati dovrebbero passare alla legione CC.RR. territoriale di Cagliari, la quale però, è impossibilitata ad assumerli per deficienza di personale.

- 1) - Il 10 agosto c.a. su richiesta del Comando alleato in Sardegna si costituì a Cagliari la 1ª compagnia CC.RR. per A.A. con compiti di vigilanza dei magazzini, delle locali sedi dei Comandi alleati, del porto, per scorta treni e autocarri.
- 2) - Comando militare della Sardegna comunica che ora detta compagnia ha avuto ordine di tenersi pronta per seguire la 205 divisione in continente. I servizi da essa disimpegnati dovrebbero passare alla Legione CC.RR. territoriale di Cagliari, la quale però, è impossibilitata ad assumersi per deficienza di personale.
- 3) - prego esaminare le possibilità di evitare l'invio in continente della compagnia suddetta, anche della considerazione che la Legione CC.RR. di Cagliari è già fortemente impegnata per i numerosi servizi inerenti alla pubblica sicurezza dell'isola.

IL SOTTOSCRITTARIO DI STATO ALLA GUERRA
(Generale G.B. CATTI)

G. Cattini

3 mag 1948
H. Cattini
F. Cattini

SUBJECT: Move of Units of
PICENO Division

CONFIDENTIAL

MILITARY MISSION ITALIAN ARMY
ROME
SD/28
30 Oct 44

TO : AMHQ (5)

Copy to: CD AAI (2)
3 Dins

ACC (incl copy for Public Safety Sub-Commission)
Ministry of War

Please amend Appx "A" to this H.Q. letter SD/28 of 28 Oct 44, as follows:

- (a) Serial 2. Cdo 336 Regt Ptr. Amend strengths of offrs and ORs to read 5 and 149.
- (b) Serial 3. Delete "Cdo 152 Regt Art" and relevant detail.
- (c) Serial 4. Cdo 235 Regt Ptr. Amend strengths of offrs and ORs to read 11 and 149.
- (d) Amend "TOTALS" to read 282 and 5491.
- (e) Add "17 offrs 87 ORs" to the personnel to be moved with serial 11.

The above reductions to personnel of serials 2, 3 and 4 are made in order to leave behind (for movement with serial 11 of Appx "A") a train Div specialists, and other Div rfts that are moved from time to time.

458

to this H.Q. letter SD/28 of 28 Oct 44 as

- (a) Serial 2. Cdo 336 Regt Ptr. Amend strengths of offrs and CIs to read 5 and 149.
- (b) Serial 3. Delete "Cdo 152 Regt Art" and relevant detail.
- (c) Serial 4. Cdo 235 Regt Ptr. Amend strengths of offrs and men to read 11 and 149.
- (d) Amend "TOTALS" to read 282 and 5491.
- (e) Add "17 offrs 87 CIs" to the personnel to be moved with serial 11.

458

The above reductions to personnel of serials 2, 3 and 4 are made in order to leave behind (for movement with serial 11 of type "A") a sufficient number of their Div specialists, and any other Div rfts that may remain are to be to time.

L. H. Ingledew.

Major General
R.M.I.A.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Move of Units of PICENO Division

MILITARY MISSION ITALIAN ARMY
R O M E
File No. SD/28
28 Oct 44

TO : AFHQ (2)

Copy to: SD AAI (2)
3 DISTRICT
ACC incl copy for Public Safety Sub Com.
MINISTRY OF WAR

Re: AFHQ signal FX 43589 of 25 Oct 44 and AAI SD1334 of 27 Oct.

1. Will you please arrange move of units of PICENO GP vide serials 1 to 9 and 11 of Appx A attached.
2. Adm matters, incl issue of clothing to receiving Legion HQ of CC RR, have been dealt with separately.
3. Attention is drawn to serial 11 of Appx A which requests move of Div HQ itself together with Div Specialists to a more suitable training location in FOGGIA/CEIGNOLA area.

L.M. L. G. J.
It-cc
Major General
M. M. I. A.

Copy to: Comd
2 1/c
A/Q
Spec Sec
Mov (2)
Circulator File
File
War Diary

See also Appendix
at P. 54.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

CONFIDENTIAL

Move of Units of PICENO Gp

	UNIT	Move Strength				Entraining Station	Detraining Station
		Offrs	OR's	animals	Stores in tons		
1	155 & 198 Sezioni CC.RR. III Bty 235 Regt Ftr	4 21	90 371		30 75	MARTINA. F. CRISPIANO	CATANZARO
2	III Bty 336 Regt Ftr Cdo 336 Regt Ftr	21 10	371 174		75 60	MASSATRA PASANO	NAPLES
3	1 Gruppo 152 Regt Art 2 Gruppo 152 Regt Art Cdo 152 Regt Art	16 20 7	214 238 37		75 75 60	NOCI ALPEROBELLO MARTINA. F.	ROMA ROMA ROMA
4	1 Bty 235 Regt Ftr Cdo 235 Regt Ftr	21 16	371 174		75 60	MARTINA. F. LOCOROTONDO	MESSINA
5	2 Bty 235 Regt Ftr	21	371		75	LOCOROTONDO	PALERMO
6	3 Gruppo 152 Regt Art Cdo 152 Bty Genio and 252 Comp Teleradio	18 8	226 195		75 75	CICLIE MESSAICO MARTINA. F.	ROMA (per LAZIO)
7	1 Bn 336 Regt	25	575		30	NOCI	CHIETI
8	Two Coys 2 Bn 336 Regt Two Coys 2 Bn 336 Regt	15 15	455 455		20 20	PERDISI PARLETTO	BARI BARI
9	MONTTEGRANERO Bn less one Coy Coy MONTTEGRANERO (533 Coy)	30 6	620 166		30 20	VATRANO TESTI	ANCONA
10	Bn formed at CONGEDANTI in SAFDINIA	25	475		--	-----	-----
	TOTALS	299	5578				
11	Div H.Q. Tpt and Sup Coy 83 and 91 Fd Hosps 152 Sezione Sanita	28 3 9 7	110 50 78 54	200		MARTINA FRANCA LOCOROTONDO CISTERNINO LOCOROTONDO	To be signalled 3 District

9 - Request serial 9 NOT be moved until called fwd by AAI.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785020

CONFIDENTIAL

APPX 'A' to MMIA
SD/28 of 28 Oct 44

Move of Units of PICENO Gp

Move Strength				Entraining Station	Detraining Station	REMARKS
Men	OR's	animals	Stores in tons			
	90		30	MARTINA. F.	CATANZARO	
	371		75	CRISPIANO		
	371		75	MASSATRA	NAPLES	
	174		60	FASANO		
	214		75	NOCI	ROMA	
	238		75	ALPEROBELLO	ROMA	
	37		60	MARTINA. F.	ROMA	
	371		75	MARTINA. F.	MESSINA	
	174		60	LOCOROTONDO		
	371		75	LOCOROTONDO	PALESTO	
	226		75	CIGLIE MESSATTO	ROMA	
	195		75	MARTINA. F.	(per LAZIO)	
	575		30	BRINDISI	CHIETI	
	455		20	BRINDISI	BARI	
	455		20	PARLITA	BARI	
	620		30	VATRANO	ANCONA	
	146		20	TESTI		
	475		--			All older men. 150 young men remain with LEGNANO Combat Group. For CAGLIARI. MMIA Signal SD 1680 and 27 Oct 44 refers.
5578						
110		200		MARTINA FRANCA	To be signalled by 3 District	Animals are from all units PICENO Division.
50				LOCOROTONDO		
78				CISTERNO		
54				LOCOROTONDO		

Still called fwd by AAL.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Move of Units of PICENO Division

MILITARY MISSION ITALIAN ARMY
R O M E
File No. SD/28
28 Oct 44

TO : AFHQ (2)

Copy to: SD AAI (2)
3 DISTRICT
ACC incl copy for Public Safety Sub Com.
MINISTRY OF WAR

Ref AFHQ signal FX 43589 of 25 Oct 44 and AAI SD1334 of 27 Oct.

1. Will you please arrange move of units of PICENO GP vide serials 1 to 9 and 11 of Appx A attached.
2. Adm matters, incl issue of clothing to receiving Legion HQ of CC RR, have been dealt with separately.
3. Attention is drawn to serial 11 of Appx A which requests move of Div HQ itself together with Div Specialists to a more suitable training location in FOGGIA/CEIGNOLA area.

A. M. Ingleside
Major General
M. M. I. A.

Copy to: Comd
2 1/c
A/Q
Spec Sec
Mov (2)
Circulator File
File
War Diary

4576

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785020

Move of Units of PICENO Gp

	UNIT	Move Strength				Entraining Station	Detraining Station
		Offrs	OR's	animals	Stores in tons		
1	155 & 198 Sezioni CC.RR. III Bty 235 Regt Ftr	4 21	90 371		30 75	MARTINA. F. CRISTIANO	CATANZARO
2	III Bty 336 Regt Ftr Cdo 336 Regt Ftr	21 10	371 174		75 60	MASSARA FASANO	NAPLES
3	1 Gruppo 152 Regt Art 2 Gruppo 152 Regt Art Cdo 152 Regt Art	16 20 7	214 238 37		75 75 60	NOCI ALPESOBELLO MARTINA. F.	ROMA ROMA ROMA
4	1 Bty 235 Regt Ftr Cdo 235 Regt Ftr	21 16	371 174		75 60	MARTINA. F. LOCOROTONDO	MESSINA
5	2 Bty 235 Regt Ftr	21	371		75	LOCOROTONDO	PALERMO
6	3 Gruppo 152 Regt Art Cdo 152 Bty Genio and 252 mp Teleradio	18 8	226 195		75 75	CEGLIA RESS. FICO MARTINA. F.	ROMA (per LAZIO)
7	1 Bn 336 Regt	25	575		30	REG. 11 MP	CHIETI
8	Two Coys 2 Bn 336 Regt Two Coys 2 Bn 336 Regt	15 15	455 455		20 20	BRIANDISI BARIETTA	BARI BARI
9	MONTEGRANERO Bn less one Coy Cof MONTEGRANERO (533 Coy)	30 6	620 166		30 20	VALERANO TESTI	ANCONA
10	Bn formed at CONGEDANTI in SARDEGNA	25	475		--	-----	-----
	TOTALS	299	5578				
11	Div H.Q. Tpt and Sup Coy 83 and 91 Fd Hosps 152 Sezione Sanita	28 3 9 7	110 50 78 54	200		MARTINA FRANCA LOCOROTONDO CISTERNINO LOCOROTONDO	To be signalled by 3 District

@ - Request serial 9 NOT be moved until called fwd by AAI

47 242
64

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785020

CONFIDENTIAL

APPX 'A' to MMIA
SD/28 of 28 Oct 44

Move of Units of PICENO Gp

Move Strength				Entraining Station	Detralning Station	REMARKS
frs	OR's	animals	Stores in tons			
4	90		30	MARTINA. F.	CATANZARO	
1	371		75	CRISPIANO		
1	371		75	MASSATRA	NAPLES	
0	174		60	PASANO		
6	214		75	NOCI	ROMA	
0	238		75	ALFEROBELLIC	ROMA	
7	37		60	MARTINA. F.	ROMA	
1	371		75	MARTINA. F.	MESSINA	
6	174		60	LOCOROTONDO		
1	371		75	LOCOROTONDO	PALERMO	
8	226		75	CEGLIE MESS. F.	ROMA	
8	195		75	MARTINA. F.	(per LAZIO)	
5	575		30	BRINDISI	CHIETI	
5	455		20	BRINDISI	BARI	
5	455		20	BARI	BARI	
9	620		30	VALLINO	ANCORA	All older men. 150 young men
2	166		20	TESTI		remain with LEGNANO Combat Group.
	475		--	-----	-----	For CAGLARI. MMIA Signal SD 1680 and 27 Oct 44 refers.
	5578					
	110	200		MARTINA FRANCA	To be	Animals are from all units PICENO Division.
	50			LOCOROTONDO	signalled by	
	78			CISTERMINO	3 District	
	54			LOCOROTONDO		

Mail called fwd by AAI

SUMMARY

4705957

Action

- Col Young, Lt Col Wilcocks from Public Safety Sub Commission
A.C.C.

50
49
48

Personnel

3. It was agreed that units should be approx strength as above and that own ofrs etc should accompany.

Tpt end Equip.

4. It was agreed that units on the way already in possession should accompany together with personal arms and cargo of personnel.

Clothing.

5. M.A.I.A. stated that issues of Indian clothing would count against CC.P.R. ceiling. Clothing at present 55,000 and only 43,000 sets of clothing have been issued to date. Issues will be made to CC.P.R. region 79 for tps on arrival.

Specialists.

- It was agreed that specialists from dvrs and militaries of PICHO should NOT accompany provided nos were maintained.

ex units of Piacenza Gruppo.
" " " "
" " " "
" " " "
" " " "
" " " "
ex Sardinia consigati
possibly ad bn of Piacenza G
city with Death Army
ex unit , of Piacenza Gruppo
" " " "
Admiral Antonio Di

3. It was agreed that units should be of the strength as above and that own efforts should accompany.

Tot and End.

It was agreed that units on the way already in possession should accompany together to personal arms and crew of personnel.

Clothing:

5. M.A.I.A. stated that issue of unaltered clothing would come against CC.RR ceiling. Clothing now is present 55,000 and only 43,000 sets of clothing have been issued to date. Issues will be made to CC.RR clothing for the on arrival.

Specialists:

It was agreed that specialists and type and millaters of
FICEMO should NOT accompany party, but was retained.

Document#108.

7. it was agreed that per ~~they~~ should be placed as III - III while on loan to CC,RR and that documentation should remain as before.

8. It was agreed that receipts for arms and wounded should NOT be supplied owing to (a) short situation of ice and (b) so say this.

9. It was agreed that personnel should be recruited through their own offices.

Detailed Instructions.

10. It was decided that M.M.I. should request permission of W. J. L. to produce draft detailed based on M.M.I.A. policy.

-2-

Visits.

11. Public Safety Sub Comm agreed that G.O.C. PIONEER or his staff have right to visit any of his tps providing prior Spec Sec notification was given to senior CC.RR.offr.

Differences.

12. It was decided that any inter-servicepoints for discussion should be referred to M.M.I.A. through Public Safety Sub Comm.

27 Oct 44

Lt Col

Lt Col
General Staff

Distribution:-

G - 3 Cms, AFHQ.
SD AAI
Public Safety Sub Comm, ACC
Ministry of War
Comm
2 1/c
G
AQ
Spec Sec.

4572

Action.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

FROM MAIN AAI

271500A

TO MMIA

RPTD AFHQ
ACC

SECRET

SD 1334

50

Reference AFHQ FX 43589 Cite FHGCT of 25th Oct (.)

Request you arrange provision of personnel as required from PICENU Division insuring following categories are retained for use in ITALIAN COMBAT FORCE (.) All specialists including drivers driver mechanics fitters signallers MULETEERS FARM SADDLERS VETS (.) Troops required for CAGLIARI to be formed from existing units already in SARDINIA

PRECEDENCE PRIORITY

Action already taken
WPP

ek

4571

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

ROME AREA ALLIED COMMAND

OUTGOING MESSAGE

4606

OFFICE OF ORIGIN MAIN AAI

DATE TIME ORIGIN 271500A

AUTHENTICATED BY:

PRECEDENCE

IMPORTANT

TO:

ACTION MMIA

INFO AFHQ ACC

MMIA	
FILE REF	
Date Recd	

	TOP SECRET
X	SECRET
	CONFIDENTIAL
	RESTRICTED

MMIA	
FILE REF	
Date Recd	

SD 1334.. SECRET.

REF AFHQ FX 43589 CITE FHGCT OF 25th OCT. REQUEST YOU ARRANGE PROVISION
PERSONNEL AS REQUIRED FROM AICQU? DIVISION ENSURING FOLLOWING CATEGORIES
ARE RETAINED FOR USE IN ITALIAN COMBAT FORCE. ALL SPECIALISTS INCLUDING
DRIVERS, DRIVER MECHANICS, FITTERS, SIGNALERS, MULETEERS, FARRIERS, SADDLERS,
VETS. TROOPS REQUIRED FOR CAGLIARI TO BE FOUND FROM EXISTING UNITS ALREADY
IN SARDINIA.

DECIPHERED 272140A EFS

CIPHER
SECRET

4569

REF. No.

DTG

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

FROM MIA
TO AGO BARDINIA
INFO AFHQ G-3 org
SD AAI
A.C.C.

SD 1680

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

FOR SIMMONS (.) PAREN ROME AREA PAREN (.) Form from personnel
destined for mainland one bn inf on approx following WE (.) HQ 15 all ranks
under Lt Col (.) Five Coys under Capt each of three pls of 30 all ranks
and Coy HQ 10 all ranks (.) On completion report to O.C. Region Cagliari
for temp duty with CORR until 31 Dec (.) Personal arms and equip to
accompany (.) Documentation through mil channels as before (.) On completion
of duty unit will be placed on shipping List 7 ~~and consigned to~~ (.)
These are ITI-ITI (.) Adds to authorized strength of garrison (.) Remain in
Italian outer uniform (.) Advise quantity and items of Italian and Allied
clothing necessary to equip to scale (.) All available Italian items will
be utilized

PRECEDENCE

AUTHENTICATED

Internal: A/C
Spec Sec

4568

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

C O P Y

Sp/28 50
26/10 Res 26/10

FROM: AFHQ SIGNED SAC

TO : AAI

Info: MMIA
AAC CITE FHGCT

FX 43589

251352A

SECRET

41
PROVISION OF 5000 SIAMIAN SOLDIERS TO ASSIST CARABINIERI
IS SUBJECT (.) REQUEST YOU ARRANGE PROVISION OF PERSONNEL
AS IN OUR FX38608 OF 14 OCTOBER BY OCTOBER 31 (.) PERSONNEL
WILL BE PROVIDED FROM PICENO DIVISION (.) NO DRIVERS WILL BE
USED FOR THESE DUTIES (.) THIS ANSWERS YOUR SDD169 OF 15
OCTOBER (.) LETTER FOLLOWS

42
PRECEDENCE PRIORITY

AUTHENTICATED _____

4567

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

M/C NR 4311

(P) ROME AREA ALLIED COMMAND

INCOMING MESSAGE

6/25
SECRET

FROM	AFHQ SIGNED SAC	SECRET	CLASSIFICATION
REFERENCE NO.	FX 43589	PRIORITY	
DATE TIME RECEIVED	251942A	PRIORITY	PRIORITY
DATE TIME GROUP	251352A		
TO:	AAI		
ACTION:	MMIA, AAC		
INFO:	CITE FHGCT		

SD.
X610

PROVISION OF 5000 SIAMIAN SOLDIERS TO ASSIST CARABINIERI
IS SUBJECT.

REQUEST YOU ARRANGE PROVISION OF PERSONNEL AS IN OUR FX38608
OF 14 OCTOBER BY OCTOBER 31. PERSONNEL WILL BE PROVIDED FROM
PICENO DIVISION. NO DRIVERS WILL BE USED FOR THESE DUTIES.

THIS ANSWERS YOUR SD1169 OF 15 OCTOBER. LETTER FOLLOWS.

un
SECRET
6001

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

SUBJECT: Montegranero Bn

MILITARY MISSION ITALIAN ARMY
R O M E
File No. 3D/28
15 Oct 44

TO : AFHQ (2)

Copy to: SD AAI
AGC

Ref 26/10

1. Montegranero Bn has come out of the line for re-org with C.I.L. where it recently took part in active operations under Eighth Army.
2. A nucleus of this Bn has been used to form the third Alpine Bn (to be known as either ARSIZI or SALLONA Bn) in the Legnano Gruppo di Combattimento.
3. The Montegranero Bn, less the nucleus mentioned in para 2 above, is composed of over-age personnel who are due for demobilization when their homes in Northern Italy have been liberated.
4. As these men are not able to fight in the Italian Army, and as the unit is surplus to Italian Army requirements, I should like to recommend that the Montegranero Bn be employed under CC RR and carried within CC RR Ceiling. In the CC RR, I feel that this unit, composed of steady men with Basic Military Training, would be a valuable asset.
5. Will you please let me know if you agree, when the necessary instructions could be issued from this Bq.

A. B.
Major General
M. M. I. A.

456

Feb 47
24/28

Reg 25
10

24

WIA

APBQ

SPED CO COM ONE NATSUSA COMMA
PIS COMMA PIS FOR WIA LG

RESTRICTED

SN 1667

REFERENCE APBQ AG 014 POINT 12/157 OCT-6 BY 16 OCT AND COMONE
370 POINT 093 W OF 4 OCT AND PIS AG 370 POINT 093 (BPLNO) ON
24 SEPT (.) SUBJECT NUMBER 46 AND 166 CARABINIERI SECTIONS ASSIGNED
TO 212 ITALIAN DIVISION (.) TOTAL STRENGTH TWO OFFICERS AND 106
MEN (.) FIRST (.) NO REPEAT NO INSTRUCTIONS HAVE BEEN ISSUED BY
WIA OR SMRE FOR WITHDRAWAL OF THIS PERSONNEL (.) SECOND (.) THREE
TWO SECTIONS AT PRESENT STRENGTH REMAIN ASSIGNED TO 212 DIVISION
UNLESS OTHERWISE ORDERED BY APBQ (.) FURTHER AREA _____ PIS (.)

Copy sent to
War Ministry.
25 Oct.

4563 RCB

ROUTINE

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

47320 RESTRICTED

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

AG 014.12/137 GCT-0

16 October 1944

SUBJECT: Retention of Carabinieri with Headquarters 212th Italian Command

TO : Deputy President, Allied Control Commission
Attention: (i) Public Safety Sub-Commission
(ii) Commander, Headquarters, MMIA, (FOR: Army Sub-Commission)

1. Attached is a copy of letter received from Headquarters Peninsular Base Section, through Headquarters COMZONE NATOUSA, requesting the retention of all the Carabinieri in the Naples Area performing guard duties at various installations.

2. Presumably you have ordered the removal of these personnel to meet increased commitments elsewhere, but it is requested that you re-examine the situation, having regard to the attached letter, with a view to the retention of these personnel in their present employment.

3. For your information, should the Carabinieri be removed, it is extremely doubtful if Allied military personnel can be made available to replace them on the installations now being guarded.

By command of General WILSON:



R. H. Freese

R. H. FREESE
Captain, AGD

Asst Adjutant General

1 Incl:
Copy, ltr, PHS, 24 Sept 44,
w/1st Ind, Hq Comzone Natousa, 4 Oct 44

copy to: CG Comzone Nato

4561

RESTRICTED

C O P Y

HEADQUARTERS
PENINSULAR BASE SECTION
APO 782

AG 370.093 (BPLNO)

JWL/awf
24 September 1944

SUBJECT : Retention of Carabinieri with Headquarters 212th
Italian Command.

TO : Commanding General, SOS NATOUSA, APO 759, U.S. Army.

1. At the time the program for utilization of Italian Army personnel was initiated two Sections of the Carabinieri, consisting of two officers and 106 Carabinieri, were allotted to the 212th Division by the S.M.R.E. (Italian General Staff). Personnel of this Detachment was to be used in key positions and as a sort of nucleus for the numerous groups required for guarding essential military installations.

2. Among the installations to be guarded were the Naples Port Area, railway stations, convoys hauling equipment, and the Astroni Staging Area. The necessity for the utilization of Carabinieri arose from the fact that the Army personnel was not, and is not considered to be of a calibre to whom vital installations can be turned over. The Carabinieri, on the other hand, because of their tradition, their high state of training and discipline, and the care with which its personnel are selected, are fully qualified to assume the responsibility, and their authority is respected by all Italians, both civilian and military.

3. During the period when the activities of the Italian Command were more or less concentrated in the Naples area, the number of Carabinieri made available was not excessive. Now that the Italian Army activities have spread from Naples to Leghorn, the need for these Carabinieri is even more urgent. Despite the urgency for this personnel, the S.M.R.E. recently informed the 212th Italian Command that the number of Carabinieri to remain at their disposal would be reduced 50 per cent.

4. Since the removal of this highly trained and efficient personnel can not but have an adverse effect on the safeguarding of the essential installations enumerated above, it is urgently requested that your head-

4589

quarters make representations to the S.M.R.E. for the retention of the Carabinieri Detachment at its present strength.

For the Commanding Officer:

/s/ Harrison Shaler,

HARRISON SHALER,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

- - - - -

370.093 - M 1st Ind.
HEADQUARTERS, COMZONE NATOUSA, APO 750, U.S. Army, 4 October 1944.

To: Commanding General, NATOUSA, APO 534, U.S. Army.

1. This headquarters recommends that the Carabinieri strength presently available to Peninsular Base Section be not reduced, in view of existing policies regarding reduction in the number of U.S. troops employed on service functions, and in view of the non-availability of U.S. personnel to replace Italian Carabinieri.

2. The duties presently being performed in Peninsular Base Section are such that they cannot be performed by ordinary Italian Military guards, and reduction as referred to in basic communication would necessitate the use of an equivalent number of U.S. personnel at the vital installations now being secured by Carabinieri personnel. These installations include the Naples Port, Railroad stations, protection of moving convoys and various Headquarters buildings. Military Police Companies are not now available to replace presently employed Carabinieri.

For the Commanding General:

4553

/s/ J. V. Sheldon,

J. V. SHELDON,
Major, A.G.D.,
Asst. Adjutant General.

SUBJECT:- Aid to the Civil Power.

SECRET

3 District
Ext 9
69/G

17 Oct 44

52 Area (2) 94 Sub Area
54 Area (2) 64 Garrison
56 Area 67 Garrison
70 Sub Area

Copy to:- RC & MG Section HQ ACC
Southern Region ACC
LAZIO Region ACC
ABRUZZI/MARCHE Region ACC
SICILY Region ACC
MIA
A Pro
MIA LO

Under authority of AAI Adm Instr No 4B dated 8 Aug 44, (which has been subsequently endorsed by AFHQ letter AG 370.6/107 GGT-0 dated 24 Sep 44), this HQ issued Operation Instruction No 10, "Aid to the Civil Power" (Copies attached for LAZIO and ABRUZZI/MARCHE Regions ACC).

1. Area/Sub Area/Gm commanders will ensure that their liaison with ACC Zone Commissioners (Regional HQ in SICILY) is such that they receive early information of any civil disturbances, should they arise.
2. While the quelling of civil disturbances, which do NOT directly affect Allied interests, is a matter for Italian administrative authorities, it will be borne in mind that the latter will normally only dispose of police and CC RR for the purpose. Area defence schemes will be drawn up in the light of this.
3. Where as in SICILY and CALABRIA the Italian authorities do dispose of troops, such will NOT, except in grave emergency, be employed without prior reference through ACC to the Area Commander, who will be kept fully informed of all incidents and actions taken.
4. Areas will forward full reports of all civil disturbances to this HQ, although Allied action may NOT have been called for.

EDW/MH

It col
G S
(EP WARNER)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

CONFIDENTIAL

WIDEAST RPTD AAI MAIN ACC

ATHQ SIGNED WILSON

FX 39623

OCT 161615A

CONFIDENTIAL. Ref AAI message SD 1121 of 12th Oct. Notify ETA serial 5020 direct this Hq and to ACC for information.

FOR INFORMATION ONLY



WMP 17/10

MMIA 44 8214

SD/28

73/16

ROUTINE

Reg 17/10

CITE FHGAB

D/st

Inf-Act - Pub Safety &

Inf - ALEC

MMIA -

File (2)

Flort

4555

CONFIDENTIAL

OCT 170830A

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 7850120

9/16
RESTRICTED

ARMY SE
FOR INFORMATION ONLY

Date 43

8124

14/16

50/28

Ref 10.

ACTION MIDWEST INFO TO MAIN AAI ACC

AFH, SIGNED WILSON

FX 39321

OCT 15/2020

ROUTINE

CITE: FIRST

29
RESTRICTED. Ref main AAI 301121 of 12 October. This is restricted.

1. Request you signal RPA
2. Serial 94 allotted

ACC DIST

INFO ACTION : FOR SAFETY (2)

INFO : A/CC
ARMY SC
FILE (2)
FIDAT

HEADQUARTERS
15 OCT 1944
A. C. C.

4554

RESTRICTED

OCTOBER 16/1920

CIPHER SECRET**ROME AREA ALLIED COMMAND****INCOMING MESSAGE**

FROM: 1414 AAI
 REFERENCE NO: SD1169
 DATE/TIME RECEIVED: Deciphered 160300
 DATE/TIME GROUP: 152115Z
 TO: APMQ
 ACTION: 111A
 INFO: 41

CLASSIFICATION
Secret

SD/28

PRECEDENCE
Immediate

QVR 2

Ref FAX8608 of 14th Oct. FIRST. C in C is particularly anxious that completion reorg personnel of groups should proceed as planned by the third and fourth mid Oct fifth and sixth early Nov. Issue complete equipment will be deferred past groups will have trg scale. Essential groups have maximum time trg. See my 1910/00/0 (SD1) of 14th Oct. SECOND. employment 8000 (5000) personnel 5th and 6th groups in lieu carabinieri until end Dec will set back seriously trg and final date readiness for ops. this is NOT repeat NOT acceptable to C in C. THIRD. Security in ANCONA is responsibility this HQ. Have no knowledge any requirement additional troops there. FOURTH. employment troops on Civil Police duties for which they are not trained or suited will be detrimental to Italian arms morale which we are trying hard to raise. Suggest instead Civil Police Forces and GFF be increased. If demand for troops you require must be met following plan will make 4000 troops available. FIFTH. Phase II plan for redistribution 3D duties troops is by 1205/30/1/16/31 24th Sep covered requirements in 1st/2nd/3rd/4th/5th/6th/7th/8th/9th/10th/11th/12th/13th/14th/15th/16th/17th/18th/19th/20th/21st/22nd/23rd/24th/25th/26th/27th/28th/29th/30th/31st/32nd/33rd/34th/35th/36th/37th/38th/39th/40th/41st/42nd/43rd/44th/45th/46th/47th/48th/49th/50th/51st/52nd/53rd/54th/55th/56th/57th/58th/59th/60th/61st/62nd/63rd/64th/65th/66th/67th/68th/69th/70th/71st/72nd/73rd/74th/75th/76th/77th/78th/79th/80th/81st/82nd/83rd/84th/85th/86th/87th/88th/89th/90th/91st/92nd/93rd/94th/95th/96th/97th/98th/99th/100th/101st/102nd/103rd/104th/105th/106th/107th/108th/109th/110th/111th/112th/113th/114th/115th/116th/117th/118th/119th/120th/121st/122nd/123rd/124th/125th/126th/127th/128th/129th/130th/131st/132nd/133rd/134th/135th/136th/137th/138th/139th/140th/141st/142nd/143rd/144th/145th/146th/147th/148th/149th/150th/151st/152nd/153rd/154th/155th/156th/157th/158th/159th/160th/161st/162nd/163rd/164th/165th/166th/167th/168th/169th/170th/171st/172nd/173rd/174th/175th/176th/177th/178th/179th/180th/181st/182nd/183rd/184th/185th/186th/187th/188th/189th/190th/191st/192nd/193rd/194th/195th/196th/197th/198th/199th/200th/201st/202nd/203rd/204th/205th/206th/207th/208th/209th/210th/211st/212nd/213th/214th/215th/216th/217th/218th/219th/220th/221st/222nd/223rd/224th/225th/226th/227th/228th/229th/230th/231st/232nd/233rd/234th/235th/236th/237th/238th/239th/240th/241st/242nd/243rd/244th/245th/246th/247th/248th/249th/250th/251st/252nd/253rd/254th/255th/256th/257th/258th/259th/260th/261st/262nd/263rd/264th/265th/266th/267th/268th/269th/270th/271st/272nd/273rd/274th/275th/276th/277th/278th/279th/280th/281st/282nd/283rd/284th/285th/286th/287th/288th/289th/290th/291st/292nd/293rd/294th/295th/296th/297th/298th/299th/300th/301st/302nd/303rd/304th/305th/306th/307th/308th/309th/310th/311st/312nd/313th/314th/315th/316th/317th/318th/319th/320th/321st/322nd/323rd/324th/325th/326th/327th/328th/329th/330th/331st/332nd/333rd/334th/335th/336th/337th/338th/339th/340th/341st/342nd/343rd/344th/345th/346th/347th/348th/349th/350th/351st/352nd/353rd/354th/355th/356th/357th/358th/359th/360th/361st/362nd/363rd/364th/365th/366th/367th/368th/369th/370th/371st/372nd/373rd/374th/375th/376th/377th/378th/379th/380th/381st/382nd/383rd/384th/385th/386th/387th/388th/389th/390th/391st/392nd/393rd/394th/395th/396th/397th/398th/399th/400th/401st/402nd/403rd/404th/405th/406th/407th/408th/409th/410th/411st/412nd/413th/414th/415th/416th/417th/418th/419th/420th/421st/422nd/423rd/424th/425th/426th/427th/428th/429th/430th/431st/432nd/433rd/434th/435th/436th/437th/438th/439th/440th/441st/442nd/443rd/444th/445th/446th/447th/448th/449th/450th/451st/452nd/453rd/454th/455th/456th/457th/458th/459th/460th/461st/462nd/463rd/464th/465th/466th/467th/468th/469th/470th/471st/472nd/473rd/474th/475th/476th/477th/478th/479th/480th/481st/482nd/483rd/484th/485th/486th/487th/488th/489th/490th/491st/492nd/493rd/494th/495th/496th/497th/498th/499th/500th/501st/502nd/503rd/504th/505th/506th/507th/508th/509th/510th/511st/512nd/513th/514th/515th/516th/517th/518th/519th/520th/521st/522nd/523rd/524th/525th/526th/527th/528th/529th/530th/531st/532nd/533rd/534th/535th/536th/537th/538th/539th/540th/541st/542nd/543rd/544th/545th/546th/547th/548th/549th/550th/551st/552nd/553rd/554th/555th/556th/557th/558th/559th/560th/561st/562nd/563rd/564th/565th/566th/567th/568th/569th/570th/571st/572nd/573rd/574th/575th/576th/577th/578th/579th/580th/581st/582nd/583rd/584th/585th/586th/587th/588th/589th/590th/591st/592nd/593rd/594th/595th/596th/597th/598th/599th/600th/601st/602nd/603rd/604th/605th/606th/607th/608th/609th/610th/611st/612nd/613th/614th/615th/616th/617th/618th/619th/620th/621st/622nd/623rd/624th/625th/626th/627th/628th/629th/630th/631st/632nd/633rd/634th/635th/636th/637th/638th/639th/640th/641st/642nd/643rd/644th/645th/646th/647th/648th/649th/650th/651st/652nd/653rd/654th/655th/656th/657th/658th/659th/660th/661st/662nd/663rd/664th/665th/666th/667th/668th/669th/670th/671st/672nd/673rd/674th/675th/676th/677th/678th/679th/680th/681st/682nd/683rd/684th/685th/686th/687th/688th/689th/690th/691st/692nd/693rd/694th/695th/696th/697th/698th/699th/700th/701st/702nd/703rd/704th/705th/706th/707th/708th/709th/710th/711st/712nd/713th/714th/715th/716th/717th/718th/719th/720th/721st/722nd/723rd/724th/725th/726th/727th/728th/729th/730th/731st/732nd/733rd/734th/735th/736th/737th/738th/739th/740th/741st/742nd/743rd/744th/745th/746th/747th/748th/749th/750th/751st/752nd/753rd/754th/755th/756th/757th/758th/759th/760th/761st/762nd/763rd/764th/765th/766th/767th/768th/769th/770th/771st/772nd/773rd/774th/775th/776th/777th/778th/779th/780th/781st/782nd/783rd/784th/785th/786th/787th/788th/789th/790th/791st/792nd/793rd/794th/795th/796th/797th/798th/799th/800th/801st/802nd/803rd/804th/805th/806th/807th/808th/809th/810th/811st/812nd/813th/814th/815th/816th/817th/818th/819th/820th/821st/822nd/823rd/824th/825th/826th/827th/828th/829th/830th/831st/832nd/833rd/834th/835th/836th/837th/838th/839th/840th/841st/842nd/843rd/844th/845th/846th/847th/848th/849th/850th/851st/85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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND

No.

785020

FROM : AMEMBASSY ROME
TO (ACTION) AAI
TO (INFO) DIA - ACC

7/1/44

41

11:15:00A

SD/28

16/10 R 17/10

1038608 (.) SECRET (.) IT HAS BEEN DECIDED TO PROVIDE IMMEDIATELY
5000 ITALIAN SOLDIERS TO ASSIST THE CARABINIERI UNTIL 31 DEC 1944 (.)
IN VIEW URGENCY REQUEST YOU ARRANGE PROVISION AS UNDER BY 25 OCTOBER
TO FOLLOWING CARABINIERI REGIONS HQ:

PARMA 700; REGGIO 700; CAGLIARI 700; CREST 700; ROME 800; ROME
(LAZIO) 700; ANCONA 700 (.)

IN VIEW FACT THAT 5 AND 6 CRISTO CANNOT BE EQUIPPED BEFORE FEB-MARCH
1945 THESE PERSONNEL WILL BE FOUND FROM THIS SOURCE (.) HED/46 OF
30 SEP 1944


London (SD AAI)
phase 15 0 of 44
stating NO AC-119G
AAI 20

IMPORTANT

See 945 1605

was the
signal unless
instructed

4552 16
CA



CU/da.

Ministero della Guerra

GABINETTO

N. 302454/C.A.
319-7-E

R.M. 156, 14 ottobre 1944

OGGETTO: Militari delle varie armi da assegnare in rinforzo ai CC.MR.

Militari (CC.MR.) da assegnare

ALLA M.M.I.A.

ROMA

1) Comando Generale Arma CC.MR. ha ripetutamente prospettato la urgente necessità di rinforzare i propri reparti con 5000 militari armati ed equipaggiati da trarsi dalle varie armi del R. Esercito (500 uc. per legione; 11 legioni = totale 5.500 uc)./-

Provvedimento si rende necessario in conseguenza:

- dell'aggravarsi della situazione ordine pubblico in Sicilia;
- del fabbisogno carabinieri per le esigenze del servizio di sicurezza nei territori di recente liberati o che lo saranno prossimamente.

2) Detti militari non possono essere tratti dalle già scarse disponibilità delle unità a disposizione di questo Ministero

ALLA M.M.I.A.

R O M A

1) Comando Generale Arma CC.RR. ha ripetutamente prospettato la urgente necessità di rinforzare i propri reparti con 5500 militari armati ed equipaggiati da trarsi dalle varie armi del R. Esercito (500 uo. per legione; 11 legioni = totale 5.500 uo). -

Provvedimento si rende necessario in conseguenza:
- dell'aggravarsi della situazione ordine pubblico in Sicilia;
- del fabbisogno carabinieri per le esigenze del servizio di sicurezza nei territori di recente liberati o che lo saranno prossimamente.

2) Detti militari non possono essere tratti dalle già escarse disponibilità delle unità a disposizione di questo Ministero per la sicurezza interna.

Propongo che siano tratti dai 13 battaglioni a disposizione degli alleati per servizio di guardia. 4550

3) Cve codesta M.M.I.A. acconsenta alla presente urgente richiesta, i 5.500 uomini forniti dai battaglioni guardia potrebbero essere sostituiti con altrettanti elementi da richiamare in Abruzzi. -

IL MINISTRO

Adak

30

SUBJECT: CORR drawing rations from
ORTONA Depot

MILITARY MISSION ITALIAN ARMY
R O M E
SD/28
14 Oct 44

Public Safety Sub-Commission

1. MIA 10 with 67 Garrison reports that the undermentioned CORR units and detachments draw rations from the Italian depot at ORTONA.

C/do Gruppo CORR Ascoli	250
C/do Camp CORR Chieti	300
" " Stazione CORR Ortona	48
" " Camp CORR Sulmona	200
" " 193 Sez CORR	45
" " Camp CORR Lanciano	100
" " Gruppo CORR Chieti	250
" " Gruppo CORR Pescara	400
" " 713 Sez CORR Cerna	20
" " Gruppo CORR Aquila	500

TOTAL 2113

2. In view of the large number involved it would be appreciated if you would compare these figures with your records and inform these HQs if all these men are in full employment.

3. 200 of the CORRs at CHIETI are awaiting calling forward by 8 Army.

" Comp CORR Sulmona	200
" 193 Sez CORR	45
" Comp CORR Lanciano	100
" Gruppo CORR Chieti	250
" Gruppo CORR Pescara	400
" 713 Sez CORR Cerna	20
" Gruppo CORR Aquila	500
TOTAL	2115

2. In view of the large number involved it would be appreciated if you would compare these figures with your records and inform these HQs if all these men are in full employment.

3. 200 of the COMs at CHIETI are awaiting calling forward by 8 Army.

4848
Gilox Capa
 for Major General
 F M I A

(Orig in ST/33/2)

COPY

MIA.I.O.
c/o 67 Garrison.
6.10.44.

To HQ.M.M.I.A.

Subject:- Italian D.I.D. at ORTONA.

1. Reference your ST/359 of 4.
2. Units fed by this Italian D.I.D. were:-

* C/do Gruppo CCRR Ascoli	250
* = Campo Transitio	162
Vice C/do 209 Div	234
12 Sez Disinfest:	50
Ospedale Militare Chieti	460
Vice C/do 209 Div Messa uff;	13
C/do Comp CCRR Chieti	300
" Stazione CCRR Ortona	48
" Comp CCRR Sulmona	200
" Btg Alpini CIL	300
" 184 Paracad: Nembo.	100
" 198 Sez CCRR	45
" 521 Osped da campo	65
" 29 Minatori comp	140
" 562 Comp Bastrell:	180
" 91 Telegrafisti	80
" Distretto milit Sulmona	40
" 1 Btg 410 Regt	192
" Comp CCRR Lanciano	100
" Genio 209 Div	27
" Gruppo CCRR Chieti	250
" GERSA	145
" Gruppo CCRR Pescara	400
" 713 Sez CCRR Gersa	20
" C/do Tappa	23
" Gruppo CCRR Aquila	500
	4624

4548

NOTES:

* * *	Vice C/ao 209 Div Messa uff;	460
* * *	C/ao Comp CCRR Chieti	13
* * *	" Stazione CCRR Ortona	-300
	" Comp CCRR Sulmona	-48
	" Btg Alpini GIL	-200
	" 184 Paracad: Nembo.	-300
	" 198 Sez CCRR	-100
	" 521 Osped da campo	-45
	" 29 Minatori comp	65
	" 562 Comp Rastrell:	140
	" 91 Telegrafisti	180
	" Distretto milit Sulmona	80
	" 1 Btg 410 Regt	40
	" Comp CCRR Lanciano	192
	" Genio 209 Div	-100
	" Gruppo CCRR Chieti	27
	" CERSA	-250
	" Gruppo CCRR Pescara	145
	" 713 Sez CCRR Cersa	-400
	" C/ao Tappa	-20
	" Gruppo CCRR Aquila	.23
		-500
		4624

4540

NOTES:

1. Units marked with (+) have now moved.
2. Number of CCRR at Chieti includes some 200 waiting to be called forward by 8 Army.
3. I have written to Vice C/ao 209 Div for clarification and verification of several points in above list-copy of my letter attached.

(SD) F.A. BOURNE, Capt.

Cdr. Kern.

We were all surprised at the large number
 showing from Ortona report. There is the breakdown
 as a matter of interest.

11/2/57

12/10

785020

CONFIDENTIAL

8/28 3629

Army SE

50/28 1188

AFHQ INFO DIVISION - ACC FOR CHAIRMAN

MAIN AFI

00121

007 1218302

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

126/12

NOTE

Ref 13/10

HEADQUARTERS

13 OCT 1944

A. C. C.

No Trans

CONFIDENTIAL. Ref ACC/12601/6/12 of 5 Oct to AFI only. Request AFHQ advise ACC direct RTA 24 MIDWEST of 1676 CARABIRIEMI and GRANELA FINANCE allotted serial 5020 list 6 by AAS 001269 of 24 Aug and 1618/15/0(221) of 5 Sep. This serial omitted from AFHQ list 6 ref 1260/199 of 15 Sep and subsequent reprint.

Ex. Prod East
Shipping List

no Invoice no brand

(14-10-1) BLT Det. Coy chg @
by #C

Army SK -
Fik ①

15/10

4544 Flint

This name nothing to me yet!

14 Oct

CONFIDENTIAL

007 1223302

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

RESTRICTED

SUBJECT: Carabinieri Reali (CC RR)

MILITARY MISSION ITALIAN ARMY
R O M E
File No. SD/28
12 Oct 44

TO : AAI

1. Will you please state if any action has been taken on this HQ letter SD/28 of 20 Sep 44.

L.M.T. J.C.L.
Maj Gen
M M I A

4542

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

Subject :- Movement of Carabinieri.

Transportation Sub-Commission,
H.Q. A.S.C.

Military Mission Italian Army,
ROM. (Tele :- 578206).
Ref :- Mov/4/130.
6 Oct 44.

Reference your AGO Th/46 of 2 Oct 44.

Please refer to my Mov/4/130 of 5 Oct, copy of which
is attached for easy reference.

Copy SD/28

W. Westbury
Capt. R.E.
(The Lord Westbury),
Movements Liaison Officer.

4547

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

Subject :- Movement of Carabinieri.

Public Safety Sub-Commission,
H.Q., A.C.C.

Copy to :- A/C (Internal).

Military Mission Italian Army,
ROME. (Tele :- 478206).
Ref :- Mov/C/150.
3 Oct 44.

Reference telephone conversation Major Wilson - Capt.
Lord Westbury.

Plans for movement of Carabinieri should be made by
the War Ministry to M.M.I.A. through S.M.R.E.

M.M.I.A. has agreed to arrange such movements with the
appropriate HQs, but as it is not fully in the picture, cannot
guarantee that the numbers and destinations asked for by the War
Ministry are those desired by you. Movements L.O., M.M.I.A.,
however, will keep you as far as possible informed and will ask
S.M.R.E. to furnish you with a copy of all demands in order that
you may keep a check on the situation.

Italian Movement Control will be instructed to
supervise the moves throughout.

Copy to SD/28 /

V/B.

[Signature] 4540
Capt RE.
(The Lord Westbury),
Movements Liaison Officer.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

ACP/12 25

HEADQUARTERS
ARMED CONTROL COMMISSION
Transportation Sub-Commission
APO 394

So. 28

4 10

Tele : 470701

2 October 1944

ACC Tr/40/

Rec'd 10

SUBJECT : Movement of Carabinieri

TO : M.I.A. HQ. ACC.

1. The question of conveyance of Carabinieri by rail was discussed at the meeting of In. Committee held on 25 September last, when the following decision was registered:

Minute 102 Movement of Carabinieri

ARMQ said they desired that the responsibility for the movement of Carabinieri be centralised through M.I.A. organisation

AGREED : M.I.A. should be so informed

2. Will you please therefore make all future arrangements for such movements direct with ARMQ or M.I.A. according to the territory in which the movement is to take place.

61
Have talked with PING
regarding above. It
should involve very
little work for
M.I.A. It just means
ACC have passed the
if applying to ARMQ
for the military
if
4533
4
10

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

file SD/28

C O P Y

Lt Col S.M. INGLEDEN
M M I A
C M F

1 Oct 44

My dear Brigadier,

CALCINIERI

Ref your phone call yesterday and confirming my phone call to SMYTHE
(you were not in this afternoon).

Enclosed herewith is copy of Gen BROWNING's letter to ACC of 22 Sep
which was forwarded to G.5. Sec AFHQ under ACC ref 9/12B/AS of 23 Sep.
It is possible that G 5 has not given you a copy in which case you will
have a one-sided case presented to you. The letter explains the position
fully and further comment from me is unnecessary.

Hope you are fit,

Regards,

Stuart M Ingledew

Brig J. Napier C.B.E.,
G 3 org (Br)
A F H Q

Note:- refers to SD/23 of 22 Sep

4536

COPY

23

RESTRICTED

SUBJECT:- Carabinieri Reale (CC.RR)

Military Mission Italian Army
ROME.

SD/28
22 Sep 44

HQ A.C.C. (2)

Ref your proposals re CC.RR, I have the following comments to offer:-

1. QUALIFICATIONS FOR CC.RR

- (a) Applications are voluntary. CC.RR are not conscripted.
- (b) Men must have completed their voluntary school studies.
- (c) They must have passed all medical requirements.
- (d) They must be 1.65 metres in height for foot CC.RR and 1.70 metres for mounted CC.RR.
- (e) If already in the Army, they must have C.O.'s recommendation.
- (f) They must pass tests for CC.RR training.

Obviously a high class type of man is necessary.

2. TRANSFER OF SOLDIERS TO CC.RR

- (a) If this is permanent, it involves a vast selection project covering the whole Army, would take weeks if not months. It would produce transport difficulties in getting the soldiers to some central depot or depots from all over ITALY. It would skim the cream of an already indifferant Army, whose efficiency would in consequence suffer deplorably by the removal of 5000 of its superior personnel.

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- (a) If this is permanent, it involves a vast selection project covering the whole Army, would take weeks if not months. It would produce transport difficulties in getting the soldiers to some central depot or depots from all over ITALY. It would skim the cream of an already indifferent Army, whose efficiency would in consequence suffer deplorably by the removal of 5000 of its superior personnel.
 - (b) If this is temporary I cannot see where it is to come from, except at the expense of some vital Army requirement. Vide Appx "A" (latest ceiling proposals), there is no category of combination of categories which can transfer any soldiers, let alone 5000. Also, a troupe en bloc as formed units is useless, as CC.RR work is individual and a large proportion of the personnel of such units would be quite unsuitable, if not a positive menace.
- I would mention that the Allied Garrison in CORNIGIA is composed of men of Yugo-Slav origin; that AOC and M of W are pressing for the retention of both of the two Divs in SICILY owing to unrest; that 'Internal Security troops 4100' is already earmarked by AAI to be organised into essential guard battalions.

The figure of 18400 for reinforcements etc is illusory. A large proportion are not available, as this covers sick in hospital, men in transit, men being called up etc. It is the only 'cushion' (and in my opinion too small a one) for the operation of the personnel of the always changing Italian Army.

- (c) From the above, it is obvious that NO transfers of soldiers from the Army proper to CC.RR is possible. Some other solution must be sought.

3. HOW TO INCREASE STRENGTH OF CC.RR

- (a) From para 2 it can be seen that the strength of CC.RR can be increased only by some new kind of organisation, special call-up of tapping of some other (than the Army) existing organisation.

- 2 -

- (b) It would be possible to reinforce the Army conscription law and call back men from the older age groups. BUT -
- (i) many would not answer the call. We are having great difficulty, as it is, in calling up men for the Army. Only a small proportion present themselves and if comprehensive action is taken to apprehend and punish delinquents, the trial and jail problem for this large number would produce another problem impossible of solution.
- (ii) those that did present themselves would for the most part come unwillingly (a wrong basis on which to coopt guardians of law and order) or be unsuitable.
- (c) It would be possible to extend the existing Army conscription law all over liberated ITALY and to 'screen' the resultant call-up for men suitable for CC.RR. BUT this would mean that:-
- (i) the cream would be skimmed to go to CC.RR and the Army would get the 'leavings'. This would have serious repercussions in the Army, particularly as regards the 57,000 Combat Force. The great problem for the latter is the getting of specialists without which the Combat Groups cannot be effective. If CC.RR had first pick, these specialists would not be forthcoming.
- (ii) the whole process, to get 5000 suitable men, would take a considerable time.
- (d) There are in ROMA the 'Metropolitani' i.e. the local auxiliary police. They exist, I understand, under other names, in all big towns. Here is one solution. Auxiliary police could be enlisted locally on a volunteer basis in all big towns, under a national charter for (say) one year only, with attractive terms of service and pay, to ensure the necessary number of applicants. The CC.RR nucleus in any town would control this auxiliary police.
- (e) Another solution is to use the ready-made patriot organisation in any locality; using these as auxiliary police as in para 3 (d). This would have the great advantage of:-
- (i) using an existing organisation which could be effective at once.
- (ii) affording an outlet and recompense for patriot enthusiasm and good work.

Any political differences in the hands could be forbidden and ~~negotiated~~ by the terms of the national charter and a form of oath.

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(i) using an existing organisation which could be effective at once.

(ii) affording an outlet and recompense for patriot enthusiasm and good work.

Any political differences in the bands could be forbidden and negated by the terms of the national charter and a form of oath.

(f) I do not know if any attempt has been made to recruit new CC.RR from the population as a whole. I think not. This is the obvious solution and should have been carried out by the CC.RR themselves long ago. A proclamation and appeals in the press, radio etc should even now bring forth applicants.

(g) Finally, it can be noted that any of the combat groups may be made available for I.S. control where necessary.

4. REORGANISATION OF CC.RR ITSELF

(a) I am not in a position to say whether a figure of 55,000 (or 65,000) is really necessary. If the figure is put forward on the basis of pre-war it does NOT by any means follow that the figure need be so large. The Italians have always been extravagant in man-power, which was always in plentiful supply.

(b) I suggest that there should be much scope for reorganisation within CC.RR, so as to do the job with less men.

- 3 -

4. REORGANISATION OF CC.RR ITSELF (cont'd)

(b) (cont'd)

This would involve an examination into:-

- (i) the degree of danger of trouble in the various areas and allotment of priorities, "risking" quiet areas such as APULIA etc.
- (ii) the subdivision of allotment in all areas to reduce the wide distribution of CC.RR and achieve greater concentration of forces with the necessary reserves.
- (iii) the actual duties required under present circumstances, including the hours of work, number of reliefs provided per man per job etc.
- (c) This in effect means that the CC.RR would be "cutting their coat according to their cloth", as the Army proper are doing. The whole 5000 required might be saved thereby.

5. TO SUM UP

- (a) The Army can NOT be tapped by either the temporary or permanent transfer of either personnel or units, without serious harm to the vital military effort.
Another solution must be found.
- (b) The most likely solutions for exploration are:-
 - (i) for CC.RR to recruit fresh personnel themselves, launching a press and radio campaign to this end.
 - (ii) to extend the local 'Metropolitani' or other auxiliary police in the towns, CC.RR retaining control.
 - (iii) to use the existing patriot organisation as auxiliary police, with a national charter and attractive terms of service on a volunteer basis.

(c) This in effect means that the CC.RR would be "cutting their coat according to their cloth", as the Army proverb are doing. The whole 5000 required might be saved thereby.

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Another solution must be found.

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(i) for CC.RR to recruit fresh personnel themselves, launching a press and radio campaign to this end.

(ii) to extend the local 'Metropolitani' or other auxiliary police in the towns, CC.RR retaining control.

(iii) to use the existing patriot organisation as auxiliary police, with a national charter and attractive terms of service on a volunteer basis.

(iv) to reorganise the CC.RR itself, to enable fewer men to do the same job.

(v) to use combat groups as and where necessary. Should the war end within the next few months, these certainly would be available.

4532

signed

L. BROWNING

Major General
Military Mission "Italian Army

tvs.LB.
3.
encls.1

Appendix "A" to SD/28
dated 22 Sep 44

ITALIAN ARMY

1. Administrative Installations	27,000
2. Combat formations, including C.I.L.	57,000
3. Service Units under Allied Command	
(a) P.B.S.	53,000
(b) FIFTH ARMY	12,000
(c) Allied Garrison SARLINIA	9,000
(d) Allied Garrison CORSIKA	5,000
(e) British Command	93,000
4. AA and CD	600
5. Internal Security Troops, including	
(a) A.C.C.	3,000
(b) 1st Guard Battalion (800)	14,000
(c) S.I.M.	1,500
(d) Two Divs SICILY	10,000
(e) One Div SARLINIA	5,000
(f) Internal Security Troops	4,100
6. Reinforcements, sick in hospital, not assigned to units, and unassigned personnel including Liaison Officers, Interpreters, etc.	18,400
7. CC.RR. including CC.RR assigned to military formations	55,000

	368,000

4531

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

C O P Y for SL/23 from SL/14/2

MESSAGE FORM

230822A

FROM AGS SIGNED MMIA LO

TO MMIA

AGS Y 194 (*) RESTRICTED (*) CHQs CGRR have asked COMANDO MILITARE
SARDEGNA for 300 CARABINIERI cadets for 30 SEPTEMBER at NAPLES (*)
Enrolment in progress from other branches of services (*) 100 men now
ready (*) Request earliest authority for shipment

G-1

1. Neither 'G' nor 'P' can have
any authority to the Phabans
to call for Carabinieri
volunteers from Army.
Byatt is checking with War
Min.

2. In meantime SIMMONS
has been told to ship above
100 men on ⁴⁵³⁰ reasonable
priority. G-2 $\frac{2}{10}$

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

COPY

(SI/28)

SECRET

HQ ACC FOR LUSH

147/23

REGION ONE (CARR)

REG 310

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY
CITE: NONE

SEPT 23/NFT

SECRET. HEARD INDIRECTLY TODAY THAT ONE BATTALION ITALIAN ARMY LEAVES
HERE TOMORROW ON ORDER RECEIVED THROUGH MILITARY CHANNELS. ALSO THAT
1,000 CARABINIERI ALERTED TO LEAVE HERE IN APPROX 14 DAYS TIME.
COLLECTING FOR GRANAI DEL PONERO IS SLOWING DOWN TO ALARMING EXTENT.
ABOVE MOVES ARE DIRECTLY OPPOSED TO POLICY AND RECOMMENDATION GIVEN
IN YOUR 203/28/CA OF 6TH JULY. MOVES ALSO ARE NOT IN KEEPING WITH
SECURITY ASPECT. FOR ANY ACTION POSSIBLE ALSO REQUEST THIS HQ BE
INFORMED OF ALL SIMILAR MOVES WHEN CONTEMPLATED IN FUTURE.

ACC DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: C.A. BR (2)

INFO: A/CC
PUB. ?
ARMY S/C (2)
FILE (2)
FLOAT

4529

Subject:- Carabinieri Reali (CC RR)

file.

19

RESTRICTED

MILITARY MISSION ITALIAN ARMY

ROME

SD/28

20 Sep 44

per 2/a.

HQ AAI

Ref your 1605/50/44/G(SD1) dated 15 Sep:-

1.

HISTORY

- (a) I think it is advisable to summarize the history of this matter before I reply to your letter as above.
- (b) The original demand for Carabinieri was a figure of 60,000. At a meeting at AAI on 17 Jun examination was made as to how reductions should be effected, so as to bring the ceiling of the Army (including Carabinieri) down to the much lower figure proposed. It was felt that the Carabinieri should bear a part of the reduction and their figure was reduced to 55,000.
- The latest proposal of 343,000 for the Army and 55,000 for the Carabinieri shows a reduction on the original ceiling asked for, of 17% for the Army and only 8 1/2% for the Carabinieri, despite the Army's urgent need of Italian manpower.
- (c) On 1 Aug in their letter A/CC 014.13 (Appx 'A') ACC asked for an increase in Carabinieri to 65,000, stating that at the moment they only had approx 42,000 in the ranks.
- They pointed out the extra task for the CC RR North of the PISA - RIVINI line. This however applies equally to the Army proper.
- (d) On 13 Aug in your letter 1605/50/44/G(SD1) (Appx 'B') you requested ACC to examine two alternatives for forming a separate CC RR Corps (para 3) and to explain in detail why they considered 55,000 was too small a figure and why an increase to 65,000 was necessary (para 4). No answer has been given to your letter.
- (e) Instead, on 6 Sep ACC in their ACC 014.13 (Appx 'C') again reiterated their damaged statement that the figure 55,000 was too small and now demanded a transfer of 14,000 'qualified' men from the Army to CC RR

HISTORY

1.

(a) I think it is advisable to summarize the history of this matter before I reply to your letter as above.

(b) The original demand for Carabinieri was a figure of 60,000. At a meeting at AAI on 17 Jun examination was made as to how reductions should be effected, so as to bring the ceiling of the Army (including Carabinieri) down to the much lower figure proposed. It was felt that the Carabinieri should bear a part of the reduction and their figure was reduced to 55,000.

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They pointed out the extra task for the CC RR North of the PISA - RIVINI line. This however applies equally to the Army proper.

(d) On 13 Aug in your letter 1605/50/44/G(SM) (Appx 'B') you requested ACC to examine two alternatives for forming a separate CC RR Corps (para 5) and to explain in detail why they considered 55,000 was too small a figure and why an increase to 65,000 was necessary (para 4). No answer has been given to your letter.

(e) Instead, on 6 Sep ACC in their ACC 014.13 (Appx 'C') again reiterated their ~~devised~~ statement that the figure 55,000 was too small and now demanded a transfer of 11,000 'qualified' men from the Army to CC RR to complete the latter to a total of 55,000, plus a temporary transfer from the Army to CC RR of a further 23,000 for the area north of the PISA - RIVINI line. This would mean that the Army would be deprived of 34,000 (11%) selected men (the cream) to assist the CC RR in police duties.

(f) This was followed on 8 Sep by a letter ACC/4604/53/PS (Appx 'D') from Public Safety Sub Commission to MIA asking for a temporary transfer of only 5,000 soldiers to CC RR.

I replied to this in my SP/26 dated 10 Sep (Appx 'E').

(g) With the above background I turn to your 1605/50/44/G(SM) dated 15 Sep.

-2-

QUALIFICATIONS FOR CC RR

- (a) Applications are voluntary. CC RR are not conscripted.
- (b) Men must have completed their elementary school studies.
- (c) They must have passed all medical requirements.
- (d) They must be 1.65 metres in height for foot CC RR and 1.70 metres for mounted CC RR.
- (e) If already in the Army, they must have C.O.'s recommendation.
- (f) They must pass tests for CC RR training.

Obviously a high class type of man is necessary.

TRANSFER OF SOLDIERS TO CC RR

(a) If this is permanent, it involves a vast selection project covering the whole Army, which would take weeks if not months. It would produce transport difficulties in getting the soldiers to some central depot or reports from all over ITALY. It would skin the cream off an already indifferent Army, whose efficiency would in consequence suffer deplorably by the removal of 44,000 of its superior personnel.

(b) If this is temporary I cannot see where it is to come from, except at the expense of some vital Army requirement. Vide Annex 'F' (latest ceiling proposals), there is no category or combination of categories which can transfer any soldiers, let alone 44,000. Also, a transfer en bloc as formed units is useless, as CC RR work is individual and a large proportion of the personnel of such units would be quite unsuitable, if not a positive menace.

I would mention that the Allied Garrison in CORSICA is composed of men of Russo-Slav origin; that ACC and M of W are pressing for the retention of both the 2 Divs in SICILY owing to unrest; that 'Internal Security troops 4100' is already earmarked by you to be organised into essential guard battalions.

The figure of 18400 for reinforcements etc is illusory. A large proportion are not available, as this covers sick in hospital, men in transit, men being called up etc. It is the only 'cushion' (and in my opinion too small a one) for the operation of the personnel side of the always changing Italian Army.

(c) From the above, it is obvious that NO transfers of soldiers from the Army proper to CC RR is possible. Some other solution must be sought.

(a) If this is permanent, it involves a vast selection project covering the whole Army, which would take weeks if not months. It would produce transport difficulties in getting the soldiers to some central depot or depot from all over Italy. It would skin the cream off an already indifferent Army, whose efficiency would in consequence suffer deplorably by the removal of 11,000 of its superior personnel.

(b) If this is temporary I cannot see where it is to come from, except at the expense of some vital Army requirement. Vids Appx 171 (latest ceiling proposals), there is no category or combination of categories which can transfer any soldiers, let alone 11,000. Also, a transfer en bloc as formed units is useless, as CC RR work is individual and a large proportion of the personnel of such units would be quite unsuitable, if not a positive menace.

I would mention that the Allied Garrison in CORSIKA is composed of men of Yugo-Slav origin; that ACC and M of W are pressing for the retention of both the 2 Divs in SICILY owing to unrest; that 'Internal Security troops 4100' is already earmarked by you to be organised into essential guard battalions.

The figure of 12400 for reinforcements etc is illusory. A large proportion are not available, as this covers sick in hospital, men in transit, men being called up etc. It is the only 'cushion' (and in my opinion too small a one) for the operation of the personnel side of the always changing Italian Army.

(c) From the above, it is obvious that NO transfers of soldiers from the Army proper to CC RR is possible. Some other solution must be sought.

HOW TO INCREASE STRENGTH OF CC RR

(a) From para 3 it can be seen that the strength of CC RR can be increased ONLY by some new kind of organisation, special call-up or tapping of some other (than the Army) existing organisation.

(b) You have already made two suggestions to ACC in para 3 of your letter 1605/50/44/G(3D1) dated 13 Aug - to which no reply has been received.

(c) It would be possible to reinforce the Army conscription law and call back men from the older age groups. BUT -

(i) many would not answer the call. We are having great difficulty, as it is, in calling up men for the Army. Only a small proportion present themselves and if comprehensive action is taken to apprehend and punish delinquents, the trial and jail problem for this large number would produce another problem impossible of solution.

(11)

-3-

- (ii) those that did present themselves would for the most part come unwillingly (a wrong basis on which to coopt guardians of law and order) or be unsuitable.
- (a) It would be possible to extend the existing Army conscription law all over liberated ITALY and to 'screen' the resultant call-up for men suitable for CC RR. BUT this would mean that:-
 - (i) the cream would be skimmed to go to CC RR and the Army would get the 'leavings'. This would have serious repercussions in the Army, particularly as regards the 57,000 Combat Force. The great problem for the latter is the getting of specialists without which the Combat Groups cannot be effective. If CC RR had first pick, these specialists would not be forthcoming.
 - (ii) the whole process, to get 10,000 suitable men, would take a considerable time.
- (c) There are in ROME the 'Metropolitani' i.e. the local auxiliary police. They exist, I understand, under other names, in all big towns.
 - Here is one solution. Auxiliary police could be enlisted locally on a volunteer basis in all big towns, under a national charter for (say) one year only, with attractive terms of service and pay, to ensure the necessary number of applicants.
 - The CC RR nucleus in any town would control this auxiliary police.
- (f) Another solution is to use the ready made patriot organisation in any locality; using these as auxiliary police as in para 4 (e). This would have the great advantages of:-
 - (i) using an existing organisation which could be effective at once.
 - (ii) affording an outlet and recompense for patriot enthusiasm and good work.
- Any political differences in the bands could be forbidden and negatived by the terms of the national charter and a form of oath.
- (g) I do not know if any attempt has been made to recruit new CC RR from the population as a whole. I think not. This is the obvious solution and should have been carried out by the CC RR themselves long ago. A proclamation and appeals in the press, radio etc. should even now bring forth applicants.
- (h) Finally, it can be noted that any of the combat groups may be made available for I.S. control where necessary.

a considerable time.

(c) There are in Rome the 'Metropolitani' i.e. the local auxiliary police. They exist, I understand, under other names, in all big towns.

Here is one solution. Auxiliary police could be enlisted locally on a volunteer basis in all big towns, under a national charter for (say) one year only, with attractive terms of service and pay, to ensure the necessary number of applicants.

The CC RR nucleus in any town would control this auxiliary police.

(2) Another solution is to use the ready made patriot organisation in any locality; using these as auxiliary police as in para 4 (c). This would have the great advantages of:-

(i) using an existing organisation which could be effective at once.

(ii) affording an outlet and recompense for patriot enthusiasm and good work.

Any political differences in the bands could be forbidden and negatived by the terms of the national charter and a form of oath.

(c) I do not know if any attempt has been made to recruit new CC RR from the population as a whole. I think not. This is the obvious solution and should have been carried out by the CC RR themselves long ago. A proclamation and appeals in the press, radio etc. should have been brought forth applicants.

(d) Finally, it can be stated that any of the combat groups may be made available for I.S. control where necessary.

OTHER ASPECTS

(a) The CC RR, though the senior regiment in the Army, have always been an organisation apart. They are responsible for their own recruiting, their own clothing etc. IRIA has helped as far as possible in the clothing line, for the general good.

(b) I have had several discussions over the last few months with Public Safety Sub Commission on the whole problem. I have pointed out that it is for them to see their house in order, think ahead, produce their projects and clothe their men; also that the Army is NOT a man-power milch-cow to be milked by all and sundry.

(c).....

(c) They appear to have failed in this and are only concrete proposal they have produced is to 'pass the baby' to MIA to do their work for them and ask for transfer of much needed soldiers at the expense of the vital military effort. It is for higher authority to decide as to whether this is permitted - meanwhile, as I have said, there is no reply to your 1605/50/44/G(SDI) dated 13 Aug.

TO SUM UP

- (a) The Army can NOT be tapped by either the temporary or permanent transfer of either personnel or units, without serious harm to the vital military effort.
Another solution must be found.
- (b) The most likely solutions for exploration are:-
- (i) for CC RR to recruit Arab personnel themselves, launching a press and radio campaign to this end.
 - (ii) to extend the local 'Metropolitani' or other auxiliary police in the towns, CC RR retaining control.
 - (iii) to use the existing patriot organisation as auxiliary police, with a national charter and attractive terms of service, on a volunteer basis.
 - (iv) your proposals as in para 3 and 4 of your 1605/50/44/G(SDI) dated 13 Aug - to which no reply has been received.
 - (v) to use Combat Groups as and where necessary. Should the war end within the next few months, these would certainly be available.

- (i) for CC RR to recruit fresh personnel themselves, launching a press and radio campaign to this end.
- (ii) to extend the local 'Metropolitani' or other auxiliary police in the towns, CC RR retaining control.
- (iii) to use the existing patriot organisation as auxiliary police, with a national charter and attractive terms of service, on a volunteer basis.
- (iv) your proposals as in para 3 and 4 of your 1605/50/44/G(SM) dated 13 Aug - to which no reply has been received.
- (v) to use Combat Groups as and where necessary. Should the war end within the next few months, these would certainly be available.

gch

L. Browning
Maj Gen
Military Mission Italian Army

4528

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

Appendix "A" to AMLA letter
BB/ES of 20 Sept 44

1 August 1944

A/CC Q14.13

Subject: Strength of Carabinieri Reali

To : Hq, AAI

1. By signal dated 22 Jul 44, and transmitted to Public Safety Sub-Commission on 24 July, the following information was received:

UNCLASSIFIED (.) spoke HAMPTON HAMPTON (.) as decided at meeting of 14.30 hrs 17 Jun and recommended AAI to AAI total strength CARABINIERI five thousand (.) 1505/50/3/0

The office of origin was Main AAI: the addressee was Main...

2. The agreement referred to on 17 Jun at AAI Hq was not entered into by the Public Safety Sub-Commission, who within this Hq are charged with responsibility for the CORR for by anyone on its behalf. The only representative of AAI at that meeting was by officers whose mission was to discuss the number of Italian soldiers to be employed in the AAI organization.

3. The view of the Allied Control Commission is that the ceiling of 55,000 Carabinieri as the total strength of all Italy is totally inadequate, and in support thereof the following facts are cited:

a. The normal peacetime strength of the Carabinieri Reali, exclusive of colonial detachments, was 55,000.

b. The strength of the Carabinieri Reali, as fixed by Marshal Badoglio by decree dated 25 Jul 45 was 55,000, exclusive of colonial detachments. This still is the legally authorized strength.

c. Since the occupation of Italy by the Allied Armies, the Fascist Police Militias (Road, Port and Railway) have been disbanded and the duties hitherto performed by them have been undertaken by the Carabinieri Reali. The strength of these special police agencies totalled 15,300.

d. In addition to the foregoing, the following duties coincident with the presence of Allied troops and the administration of the occupation of the country, are performed by the Carabinieri Reali.

(1) Checking the movement of civilians, especially at Army Control Lines and at other critical points.

(2) Dealing with refugees.

(3) Guarding and escorting civilian supplies provided by

2. The agreement referred to on 17 Jun at ASI Hq was not entered into by the Public Safety Sub-Commission, who within this Hq are charged with responsibility for the GMR nor by anyone on its behalf. The only representative of ASI at that meeting was by officers whose mission was to discuss the number of Italian soldiers to be employed in the ASI organization.

3. The view of the Allied Control Commission is that the ceiling of 55,000 Carabinieri as the total strength of all Italy is totally inadequate, and in support thereof the following facts are cited:

a. The normal peacetime strength of the Carabinieri Reali, exclusive of colonial detachments, was 55,000.

b. The strength of the Carabinieri Reali, as fixed by Marshal Badoglio by decree dated 25 Jul 43 was 55,000, exclusive of colonial detachments. This still is the legally authorized strength.

c. Since the occupation of Italy by the Allied Armies, the Fascist Police Militias (Road, Port and Railway) have been disbanded and the duties hitherto performed by them have been undertaken by the Carabinieri Reali. The strength of these special police agencies totalled 16,500.

d. In addition to the foregoing, the following duties coincident with the presence of Allied troops and the administration of the occupation of the country, are performed by the Carabinieri Reali.

(1) Checking the movement of civilians, especially at Army Control Lines and at other critical points.

(2) Dealing with refugees.

(3) Guarding and escorting civilian supplies provided by the Allied Nations.

(4) Joint patrolling with Allied Military Police in congested areas because of sporadic affrays between civilian and troops.

(5) Apprehending prostitutes in an effort to reduce the incidence of venereal diseases among troops.

(6) Maintaining check posts to prevent black market activities, and to reduce illegal use of petrol.

(7) Enforcing harvest regulations (an important undertaking hitherto not performed by Carabinieri Reali).

- 2 -

e. The uncertain state of public discipline, following in the wake of war and the overthrow of the Fascist government, coupled with economic difficulties and accentuated political difference and activities, warrants a substantial increase over the strength provided for normal peacetime conditions.

f. Should the number of security divisions of the Italian Army be reduced, a not unlikely prospect, a corresponding greater burden will fall upon the Carabinieri Reali in the Communications Zone.

4. Just how the figure of 55,000 was arrived at on 17 Jun is not entirely clear. If it is based upon the peacetime figure, then it is submitted the changes of circumstances recited in para 3 above make an upward revision of the figure imperative. If it is based on a ration ceiling, then it is suggested:

a. that the ration ceiling be lifted, or if that is impossible.

b. that the personnel in excess of 55,000 be authorized a cash allowance in lieu of rations.

5. In the opinion of Allied Control Commission, it is imperative that the situation be reviewed immediately, not merely in the light of rations, but in view of the actual requirements of the situations as it exists, or can with reasonable probability be foreseen. At least the total present strength of the Carabinieri Reali, namely 41,892, making maximum use of the available manpower, will be needed to police the area south of the PISA-RIMINI line. Beyond that line the normal peacetime dispositions of the Carabinieri Reali were approximately 23,000. That area is largely industrial and is thickly populated. It has been long under German domination. It is of urgent importance therefore that provision be made now to have a police organization of tested reliability in readiness to maintain public order.

6. If the ceiling be increased to 55,000 then approximately 23,000 will be available north of the PISA-RIMINI line, i.e., the normal peacetime strength. Bearing in mind the considerations set out in para 3 of this letter, this is the minimum strength necessary to maintain order.

entirely clear. If it is based upon the peacetime figure, then it is submitted that the changes of circumstances recited in para 3 above make an upward revision of the figure imperative. If it is based on a ration ceiling, then it is suggested:

- a. that the ration ceiling be lifted, or if that is impossible,
 - b. that the personnel in excess of 55,000 be authorized a cash allowance in lieu of rations.
5. In the opinion of Allied Control Commission, it is imperative that the situation be reviewed immediately, not merely in the light of rations, but in view of the actual requirements of the situations as it exists, or can with reasonable probability be foreseen. At least the total present strength of the Carabinieri Reali, namely 41,892, making maximum use of the available manpower, will be needed to police the area south of the PISA-RIVINI line. Beyond that line the normal peacetime dispositions of the Carabinieri Reali were approximately 23,000. That area is largely industrial and is thickly populated. It has been long under German domination. It is of urgent importance therefore that provision be made now to have a police organization of tested reliability in readiness to maintain public order.

6. If the ceiling be increased to 65,000 then approximately 23,000 will be available north of the PISA-RIVINI line, i.e., the normal peacetime strength. Bearing in mind the considerations set out in para 3 of this letter, this is the minimum strength necessary to maintain order.

7. It is the considered judgment of the Allied Control Commission that the irreducible minimum strength for the Carabinieri Reali for all of Italy be fixed at 65,000. Furthermore, authority is requested, if and when circumstances warrant, to increase the figure to 70,000.

MILLY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

4523

Appendix "B" to Main Matter SD/29 of 20 Sept 44

SECRET

Subject: Italian Carabinieri

Headquarters
Allied Armies in Italy
1608/50/44/G(SDI)
15 Aug 44

ACC

Ref your A/CO 014.13 of 1 Aug 44.

1. It will be appreciated that the manpower ceiling for the Italian Army, of which the Carabinieri form part, has been reduced and that it is essential, therefore, that the reduced number pay the best dividend in the interest of the war effort.
2. It is regretted that approval to add personnel in excess of 55,000 and to pay such personnel a ration allowance cannot be agreed, as clothing, patrol etc. all have to be taken into account.
3. It is requested that you will examine the practicability of :
 - (a) Forming a separate corps of Carabinieri to be stationed in SICILY and SARDINIA to be entirely supported by the Italian Government as is now the case with the Guardia Finanza. Transfers from SICILY and SARDINIA to the mainland to be on a one for one basis. It might prove simpler to transfer Carabinieri to the Guardia Finanza.
 - (b) Carabinieri in Regions on the mainland which have been handed back to the Italian Government being formed into a separate corps and entirely maintained by the Italian Government. In this case there could be no question of transfer of individuals or formed bodies between Carabinieri maintained by the Allies and those maintained by the Italian Government, and they would have to be stationed in areas in which the Italian Government could maintain them.
4. While the proposals in para 3 are under examination by you, it would be appreciated if a statement could be forwarded showing :
 - (a) the present organisation of the Carabinieri.
 - (b) present strengths and locations of all units and detachments.
 - (c) the future organisation in outline required to cover the whole of ITALY.

2. It is regretted that approval to hold personnel in excess of 55,000 and to pay such personnel a ration allowance cannot be agreed, as clothing, patrol etc. all have to be taken into account.

3. It is requested that you will examine the practicability of :-

(a) Forming a separate corps of Carabinieri to be stationed in SICILY and SARDINIA to be entirely supported by the Italian Government as is now the case with the Guardia Finanza. Transfers from SICILY and SARDINIA to the mainland to be on a one for one basis. It might prove simpler to transfer Carabinieri to the Guardia Finanza.

(b) Carabinieri in Regions on the mainland which have been handed back to the Italian Government being formed into a separate corps and entirely maintained by the Italian Government. In this case there could be no question of transfer of individuals or formed bodies between Carabinieri maintained by the Allies and those maintained by the Italian Government, and they would have to be stationed in areas in which the Italian Government could maintain them.

4. While the proposals in para 3 are under examination by you, it would be appreciated if a statement could be forwarded showing :

- (a) the present organisation of the Carabinieri.
- (b) present strengths and locations of all units and detachments.
- (c) the future organisation in outline required to cover the whole of ITALY.

This information will serve as a basis for further examination of the problem.

signed Brig GS

for Lieut. Gen.
Chief of the General Staff

Copy to: AMIA
MA to CGS
MA to CAO
DCAO
G(Ops)
A
Q

APPENDIX 'C' to MIA letter SD/28 of 20 SEP 44.

A/CC 014.13
A/C/14622/PS

6 September 1944

SUBJECT: Carabinieri Reali

TO : Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies in Italy

1. Reference 1605/50/44/G (SDI), dated 13 Aug 44.
2. A communication, giving the data requested paragraph 4 and stating our view of the proposals made in paragraph 3 of the above reference, is being forwarded under separate cover.
3. However, since my letter to you of 1 August, which dealt with the ceiling strength of the Carabinieri, new circumstances have arisen which present an acute problem of immediate importance insofar as policing of the industrial north of Italy is concerned. The fact of outstanding importance is that it has recently been reported that 14,000 of the Carabinieri north of the PISA - RIMINI line have been sent away to Germany, and will therefore not be available for duty. This eliminates one of the principal sources of manpower upon which this Commission relied for the proper policing of the civil community in that area.

4. At the moment the actual strength of the Carabinieri is 43,954 men. A ceiling of 55,000 is authorized and for the above reason it may be impossible even to fill this ceiling. Since the Carabinieri is a part of the Italian Army, it follows that the overall strength of the Italian Army is short at least 11,000 men. It is accordingly proposed that the Ministry of War in conjunction with the MIA be authorized to arrange for the immediate transfer of 11,000 qualified men from other elements of the Army to the Carabinieri Reali. The deficit thus created in the other elements could be compensated for by calling up a new class. This would fill up the OGR to its presently authorized strength, and would form a nucleus for policing the North.

3. However, since my letter to you of 1 August, which dealt with the ceiling strength of the Carabinieri, new circumstances have arisen which present an acute problem of immediate importance insofar as policing of the industrial north of Italy is concerned. The fact of outstanding importance is that it has recently been reported that 14,000 of the Carabinieri north of the PISA - RIMINI line have been sent away to Germany, and will therefore not be available for duty. This eliminates one of the principal sources of manpower upon which this Commission relied for the proper policing of the civil community in that area.

4. At the moment the actual strength of the Carabinieri is 43,954 men. A ceiling of 55,000 is authorized and for the above reason it may be impossible even to fill this ceiling. Since the Carabinieri is a part of the Italian Army, it follows that the overall strength of the Italian Army is short at least 11,000 men. It is accordingly proposed that the Ministry of War in conjunction with the MIA be authorized to arrange for the immediate transfer of 11,000 qualified men from other elements of the Army to the Carabinieri Reali. The deficit thus created in the other elements could be compensated for by calling up a new class. This would fill up the CCRH to its presently authorized strength, and would form a nucleus for policing the North.

5. Furthermore if no CCRH are found in the North it may be necessary to go further and ask that in order to make up the balance of 23,000, which in my opinion is the minimum necessary for policing the North (see my A/CC 014.13 of 1 Aug paras 5 and 6), part of the Italian Army be temporarily attached to the CCRH to work with them on police duties. Such an attachment has been arranged in Sicily in connection with the grain system and is working well.

402

6. This Commission is still of the view that a Carabinieri strength of 65,000 is necessary. The need therefore was set forth in my letter of 1 August. But since the prospect of reaching the present authorized ceiling is made virtually impossible by the action of the Germans, it is urgently requested that favourable consideration be given to the proposal made above, while the question of ceiling is still being considered

ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USAR
Acting Chief Commissioner

cc: Army Sub-Commission

APPENDIX 'D' to MHA letter SD/28 of 20 SEP 44.

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APO 394

Tel: 489081
Ext: 365

8 September, 1944

ACC/14901/53/PS

SUBJECT : CC.RR. Strength.
TO : Director, Army Sub-Commission.

1. It is understood from reliable sources that during August 1944 14,000 CC.RR were interned in Germany from Lombardia. It is thought that the same measures may be taken in other Regions under German control. Accordingly a shortage of CC.RR must be anticipated as areas are liberated.
2. The strength of CC.RR is well below the present ceiling of 55,000, and difficulty is being experienced in finding the necessary men for Regions, 9, 10, 11 and 12.
3. It is asked by Gen. Orlando, Commanding General CC.RR, that 5,000 fully equipped and armed Italian soldiers be temporarily transferred to the CC.RR. This would release 5,000 CC.RR for duty in forward areas. The soldiers would be released when the CC.RR strength reached 55,000.

1. It is understated from reliable sources that during August 1944 14,000 CC.ER were interned in Germany from Lombardia. It is thought that the same measures may be taken in other Regions under German control. Accordingly a shortage of CC.ER must be anticipated as areas are liberated.

2. The strength of CC.ER is well below the present ceiling of 55,000, and difficulty is being experienced in finding the necessary men for Regions, 9, 10, 11 and 12.

3. It is asked by Gen. Orlando, Commanding General CC.ER, that 5,000 fully equipped and armed Italian soldiers be temporarily transferred to the CC.ER. This would release 5,000 CC.ER for duty in forward areas. The soldiers would be released when the CC.ER strength reached 55,000.

4. It is understood that Army personnel are not available in the vicinity of all Legion Headquarters. According, if this scheme meets with approval, it is suggested that 5,000 soldiers be allotted between the following Legion Headquarters -

PALERMO
MESSINA
CAGLIARI
CHIETI
ROME
ROME (LAZIO)
ANCONA

4520

(Sgd) FRANK J. WILSON, Maj.
A.E. YOUNG, Col.,
Acting Director
Public Safety
Sub-Commission.

Appendix "T" to SD/28
dated 20 Sep 44

13

ITALIAN ARMY

1.	Administrative Installations	27,000
2.	Combat formations, including C.I.L.	57,000
3.	Service Units under Allied Command	
	(a) P.B.S.	53,000
	(b) FIFTH Army	12,000
	(c) Allied Garrison SARDINIA	9,000
	(d) Allied Garrison CORSIKA	5,000
	(e) British Command	33,000
4.	A.A. & C.D.	600
5.	Internal Security troops, including	
	(a) A.C.C.	3,000
	(b) 18 Guard Battalions (800)	14,000
	(c) S.I.M.	1,500
	(d) 2 Divs SICILY	10,000
	(e) 1 Div SARDINIA	5,000
	(f) Internal Security troops	4,100
6.	Reinforcements, sick in hospital, not assigned to units, and unassigned personnel including Liaison Officers, Interpreters, etc.	18,400
7.	CC. RR., including CC.RR assigned to Military formations	55,000
		368,000

4519

SUBJECT:- Carabinieri Reali

12
RESTRICTED

HQ ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY

Tel:- FILPOT 73

1605/50/44/G(3D1)

15 Sep 44

Army Sub Commission, ACC.

1. Ref ACC letters A/CC 014.13 of 1 Aug, ACC/14622/PS and A/CC 014.13 (copy attached) both dated 6 Sep.

2. ACC propose that the deficiency of 11,000 personnel on present ceiling should be filled by taking men with the necessary qualifications from the *Italian Army* Carabinieri. Will you please obtain details of the qualifications required and give your views on the effect on the Italian Army of removing 11,000 such men. Would it be practicable to conscript personnel from older age groups who are not liable for service in the Army proper?

3. ACC ask in addition that 23,000 Italian Army be attached to the Carabinieri for police work. If these men are to perform the functions of civil police they must be presumably as qualified as those at para 2. If on the other hand they are required as formed military units in an internal security role they should operate under military control. Please fwd your comments on this proposal.

4. Since ACC is now directly under AFHQ, it will be necessary to fwd the proposals to AFHQ for decision and to attach to them the recommendations of AAI.

* This correction
planned by Morgan
G.S.D. AAI on 16 Sep.
G.S.D. 18
7.

13
received by 9451
Lieutenant-General,
Chief of General Staff.

Received by G.S.D. from 18 Sep.

C O P Y

EWS/afe

A/CC 014.13

1 August 1944

Subject: Strength of Carabinieri Reali

To: Hq, AAI

1. By signal dated 22 Jul 44, and transmitted to Public Safety Sub-Commission on 24 July, the following information was received:

"RESTRICTED (.) spoke HAMPTON McQUEEN (.) as decided at meeting of 14.30 hrs 17 Jun and recommended subsequently to AFHQ total strength CARABINIERI will not exceed fifty-five thousand (.) 1605/50/3/G (SDI) of 19 Jun refers."

The office of origin was Main AAI: the addressee was MMIA.

2. The agreement referred to on 17 Jun at AAI Hq was not entered into by the Public Safety Sub-Commission, who within this Hq are charged with responsibility for the CCRR nor by anyone on its behalf. The only representation of ACC at that meeting was by officers whose mission was to discuss the number of Italian soldiers to be employed in the ACC organization.

3. The view of the Allied Control Commission is that the ceiling of 55,000 Carabinieri as the total strength of all Italy is totally inadequate, and in support thereof the following facts are cited:

a. The normal peacetime strength of the Carabinieri Reali, exclusive of colonial detachments, was 55,000.

b. The strength of the Carabinieri Reali, as fixed by Marshal Badoglio by Decree dated 25 Jul 43 was 65,000, exclusive of colonial detachments. This still is the legally authorized strength.

c. Since the occupation of Italy by the Allied Armies, the Fascist Police Militias (Road, Port and Railway) have been disbanded and the duties hitherto performed by them have been undertaken by the Carabinieri Reali. The strength of these special police Agencies totalled 13,300.

d. In addition to the foregoing, the following duties coincident with the presence of Allied troops and the administration of the occupation of the country, are performed by the Carabinieri Reali.

4510

- (1) Checking the movement of civilians, especially at Army Control Lines and at other critical points.
- (2) Dealing with refugees.
- (3) Guarding and escorting civilian supplies provided by the Allied Nations.
- (4) Joint patrolling with Allied Military Police in congested areas because of sporadic affrays between civilians and troops.
- (5) Apprehending prostitutes in an effort to reduce the incidence of venereal disease among troops.
- (6) Maintaining check posts to prevent black market activities, and to reduce illegal use of petrol.
- (7) Enforcing harvest regulations (an important undertaking hitherto not performed by Carabinieri Reali).

e. The uncertain state of public discipline, following in the wake of war and the overthrow of the Fascist government, coupled with economic difficulties and accentuated political difference and activities, warrants a substantial increase over the strength provided for normal peacetime conditions.

f. Should the number of security divisions of the Italian Army be reduced, a not unlikely prospect, a corresponding greater burden will fall upon the Carabinieri Reali in the Communications Zone.

4. Just how the figure of 55,000 was arrived at on 17 Jun is not entirely clear. If it is based upon the peacetime figure, then it is submitted the changes of circumstances recited in para 3 above make an upward revision of the figure imperative. If it is based on a ration ceiling, then it is suggested:

a. that the ration ceiling be lifted, or if that is impossible.

b. that the personnel in excess of 55,000 be authorized a cash allowance in lieu of rations.

5. In the opinion of the Allied Control Commission, it is imperative that the situation be reviewed immediately, not merely in the light of rations, but in view of the actual requirements of the situation as it exists, or can with reasonable probability be foreseen. At least the total present strength of the Carabinieri Reali, namely 41,892, making maximum use of the available

manpower, will be needed to police the area south of the PISA-RIMINI line. Beyond that line the normal peacetime dispositions of the Carabinieri Reali were approximately 23,000. That area is largely industrial and is thickly populated. It has been long under German domination. It is of urgent importance therefore that provision be made now to have a police organization of tested reliability in readiness to maintain public order.

6. If the ceiling be increased to 65,000 then approximately 23,000 will be available north of the PISA-RIMINI line, i.e., the normal peacetime strength. Bearing in mind the considerations set out in para 3 of this letter, this is the minimum strength necessary to maintain order.

7. It is the considered judgment of the Allied Control Commission that the irreducible minimum strength for the Carabinieri Reali for all of Italy be fixed at 65,000. Furthermore, authority is requested, if and when circumstances warrant, to increase the figure to 70,000.

ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

cc: G-5, AFHQ

Subject: CC.RH Strength.

Army Sub Commission (MHA)
Hq ACC
Rome
SD/26
/0 September 1944

To : Hq ACC (Public Safety Sub-Commission)

Ref: Your ACC/14601/53/PS dated 8 September

1. The state of affairs as regards the Italian Army man-power is approximately as follows:

a) We are just about down to the ceiling laid down.

b) Resorting by categories is in progress so as to complete the programme of Service Units for work with the Allies and the six new combat groups.

c) We still have some 25,000 troops carried in the ceiling, still in SARDINIA, earmarked for labour service on the mainland, which is short by that number.

2. a) The only possible source from which 5000 soldiers could be taken for CC.RH is the I.S. Divisions (SABAUDA AND BARI, each 5000 strong) in SICILY.

b) Of these some 2000 will be required shortly to replace MANTOVA troops on guard duty, as MANTOVA is being reorganized for combat.

c) There will then be only 3000 I.S. Troops in SICILY as compared with the 20,000 considered necessary by General MASON-MAC FARLANE.

d) Presumably, therefore, 5000 cannot be taken from this 3000 leaving only 3000 for all I.S., guard and labour duties in SICILY.

3. The fact is that we do not have 5000 soldiers to give you, except at the expense of some existing essential military set-up. All this apart from the difficulty of screening suitable men for CC.RH and skimming the cream off the Army thereby.

4. a) As regards clothing, we have just enough to clothe the remaining troops required for the programme (dyed battle dress).

4511

4.
 - b) For the remainder of the Army (Italian uniform) though we have set up repair shops, we are still short and will be so for some time.
 - c) The boots situation is all right, thanks to our repair programme of old boots.
5.
 - a) Carabinieri have always done their own clothing in their Legion Shops.
 - b) We made available to you, 10,000 suits of old, repairable Italian uniforms, and offered you as many old, repairable boots and uniforms as you wanted. We did this, way back in June, explaining that it was up to the Carabinieri to start their own repair shops to produce wearable uniforms and boots, and that we could not do this for the CC.RR as well as the Army proper. Your stocks thus should have been repaired and available by now.
 - c) We also pointed out that the CC.RR were entitled to only one suit of uniform and by withdrawing the second suit from each CC.RR, a large stock should become available.
6. To sum up:-
 - a) We do not have 5000 soldiers to transfer to you.
 - b) If you want these, we could call them up, but you would have to clothe them.
 - c) See paragraph five above, we do not feel beholden to provide repaired uniforms for CC.RR at the expense of the Army proper, if you have not produced adequate stocks
 - d) We can provide rifles and ammunition.

L. Browning

Major General
Army Sub Commission (MMIA)

LB/lak

(Copy to H.Q.A.A.I., ref: A/CC/014.13 ACC /14622/PS,
dated 4 September)

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APO 394

SD/2.8
D
Tel : 489081
Ext : 365

8 September, 1944.

ACC/14601/53/PS

SUBJECT : CC.RR. Strength.

TO : Director, Army Sub-Commission.

1. It is understood from reliable sources that during August 1944 14,000 CC.RR were interned in Germany from Lombardia. It is thought that the same measures may be taken in other Regions under German control. Accordingly a shortage of CC.RR must be anticipated as areas are liberated.
2. The strength of CC.RR is well below the present ceiling of 55,000, and difficulty is being experienced in finding the necessary men for Regions, 9, 10, 11 and 12.
3. It is asked by Gen. Orlando, Commanding General CC.RR, that 5,000 fully equipped and armed Italian soldiers be temporarily transferred to the CC.RR. This would release 5,000 CC.RR for duty in forward areas. The soldiers would be released when the CC.RR strength reached 55,000.
4. It is understood that Army personnel are not available in the vicinity of all Legion Headquarters. According, if this scheme meets with approval, it is suggested that 5,000 soldiers be allotted between the following Legion Headquarters -

PALERMO
MESSINA
CAGLIARI
CHIERI
ROME
ROME (LAZIO)
ANCONA.

Frank Wilson A.M.S.
A. E. YOUNG
Acting Director
Public Safety
Sub-Commission.

FW/C.

SECRET

M.M.I.A.	50/28
FILE REF	1
Date Recd	11

MB/hjp

A/CC 014.13
ACC/14622/PS

6 September 1944

SUBJECT: Carabinieri Reali

TO : Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies in Italy

1. Reference 1605/50/44/G (SBI), dated 13 Aug 44.
2. A communication, giving the data requested paragraph 4 and stating our view of the proposals made in paragraph 3 of the above reference, is being forwarded under separate cover.
3. However, since my letter to you of 1 August, which dealt with the ceiling strength of the Carabinieri, new circumstances have arisen which present an acute problem of immediate importance insofar as policing of the industrial north of Italy is concerned. The fact of outstanding importance is that it has recently been reported that 14,000 of the Carabinieri north of the Pisa - Rimini line have been sent away to Germany, and will therefore not be available for duty. This eliminates one of the principal sources of manpower upon which this Commission relied for the proper policing of the civil community in that area.
4. At the moment the actual strength of the Carabinieri is 43,954 men. A ceiling of 55,000 is authorized and for the above reason it may be impossible even to fill this ceiling. Since the Carabinieri is a part of the Italian Army, it follows that the overall strength of the Italian Army is short at least 11,000 men. It is accordingly proposed that the Ministry of War in conjunction with the MMIA be authorized to arrange for the immediate transfer of 11,000 qualified men from other elements of the Army to the Carabinieri Reali. The deficit thus created in the other elements could be compensated for by calling up a new class. This would fill up the CCRI to its presently authorized strength, and would form a nucleus for policing the North.
5. Furthermore if no CCRI are found in the North it may be necessary to go further and ask that in order to make up the balance of 23,000, which in my opinion is the minimum necessary for policing the North (see my A/CC 014.13 of 1 Aug paras 5 and 6), part of the Italian Army be temporarily attached to the CCRI to work with them on police duties. Such an attachment has been arranged in Sicily in connection with the grain system and is working well.

SECRET

SECRET

6. This Commission is still of the view that a Carabinieri strength of 65,000 is necessary. The need therefore was set forth in my letter of 1 August. But since the prospect of reaching the present authorized ceiling is made virtually impossible by the action of the Germans, it is urgently requested that favorable consideration be given to the proposal made above, while the question of ceiling is still being considered.

ELBERT W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

cc: Army Sub-Commission ✓

4507

SECRET

Hq ACC - Sec'y Gen.	
DISPATCHED	
Date - Time	6 Sept 1915
Via	175.
Initials	DRK

COPY

File Carabinieri yda

SECRET

6

SUBJECT: Italian Carabinieri

Headquarters,
Allied Forces in Italy
100/50/44/5(SOL)
15 AUG 44

ACC

Ref your A/30 01419 of 1 AUG 44.

1. It will be appreciated that the proposed bill for the Italian Army, of which the Carabinieri form part, has been reduced and that it is essential, therefore, that the reduced number of the best dividend in the interest of the war effort as a whole.

2. It is regretted that approval to hold personnel in excess of 20,000 and to pay such personnel a rat ion allowance cannot be agreed, as clothing, patrol etc all have to be taken into account.

3. It is requested that you will examine the practicability of :-

(a) Forming a separate corps of Carabinieri to be stationed in Sicily and Sardinia to be entirely supported by the Italian Government as is now the case with the Guardia Finanza. Transfers from Sicily and Sardinia to the mainland to be on a one for one basis. It might prove simpler to transfer Carabinieri to the Guardia Finanza.

(b) Carabinieri in Regions on the mainland which have been handed back to the Italian Government being formed into a separate corps and entirely maintained by the Italian Government. In this case there could be no question of transfer of individuals or formed bodies between Carabinieri maintained by the Allies and those maintained by the Italian Government, and they would have to be stationed in areas in which the Italian Government could maintain them.

2. It is requested that approval be held pursuant to orders of 25,000 and to pay such person and a rat ion allowance could be agreed, as clothing, petrol etc. all have to be taken into account.

3. It is requested that you will examine the practicability of :-

- (a) Forming a separate corps of Carabinieri to be stationed in Sicily and Sardinia to be entirely supported by the Italian Government as is now the case with the Guardia Finanza. Transfer from Sicily and Sardinia to the mainland to be on a one for one basis. It might prove simpler to transfer Carabinieri to the Guardia Finanza.
- (b) Carabinieri in Regions on the mainland which have been handed back to the Italian Government being formed into a separate corps and entirely maintained by the Italian Government. In this case there could be no question of transfer of individuals or mixed bodies between Carabinieri maintained by the Allies and those maintained by the Italian Government, and they would have to be stationed in areas in which the Italian Government could maintain them.

4. While the proposals in para 3 are under examination by you, it would be appreciated if a statement could be forwarded showing :-

- (a) the present organisation of the Carabinieri 4500
- (b) present strengths and locations of all units and detachments
- (c) the future organisation in outline required to cover the whole of Italy.

This information will serve as a basis for further examination of the problem.

Signed Brig GS

for Lieutenant Gen
Chief of the General Staff

to:-
MA to CAS
MA to GAO
LACG
G(Com)
A
G

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785020

ARMY
Roma 11 Agosto 1944
559
37/28
Ministero delle Finanze
COMANDO GENERALE R. GUARDIA DI FINANZA
Divisione
Int. N.
A.C.C. Hq.
ROMA
OGGETTO: Historical and organic hints about the "REGIA GUARDIA DI FINANZA".

The connected pamphlet has the end to describe the military character that this organism always has had until from his ancient origins, and to make mention of the fulgid traditions of patriotism and of value explained by his components with much affection for their corps until the insurrectional movements of the last concentry.

To the English translation it follows the displacement of the agents of "REGIA GUARDIA DI FINANZA", at present living in the territorie delivered, and the dislocation pre-existent at 8 September 1943 for the territories yet to be delivered.--

GENERAL COMMANDER
-Crete Moriconi

18/10/44
A.C.C.
Pamphlet itself
held by G.3(4)

18/10/44
A.C.C. G.2 18/10/44

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785020

Army SC

4

1421

30/23

ACC MAIN

RE REGION 5 AND

373

JULY 22/1944

HEADQUARTERS
27 JUL 1944
A. C. C.

66/22

SPRUE

RECE

CITE: NONE

SD/28
28/1

RECUOTOM COME ARMED REGION 5

ACC DIS

From: P. J. [unclear]
To: [unclear]
Army SC
[unclear]
[unclear]

4504

JULY 23/1945

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

Army Sub-Commission

EWB/hjp

*SD/28
24/7*

3

A/CC 014.13

23 July 1944

Subject: Command of Carabinieri Reali

23 JUL 1944

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

In my letter to you of 16 July, file A/CC 014.13, subject as above, I indicated to you the concern which the Allied Control Commission has in the Command and organization of the Carabinieri Reali. Since then, following consultation with me, General Taddeo Orlando has been designated Commanding General.

It is quite probable that General Orlando with the approval of the Minister of War has under consideration plans for the re-organization of the CCRR. As this Commission is so vitally interested in the maintenance of law and order behind the fighting line, I am sure you will agree that such plans should be discussed fully with the Allied Control Commission before they become operative.

Furthermore, under our agreement regarding the appointment of higher officials, the names of any proposed changes (appointments, dismissals, transfers, etc.) in the officer personnel of CCRR in the rank of Colonel and above will of course be communicated to the Commission.

I suggest that initially, these matters be communicated to the Public Safety Sub-Commission of which Colonel Paul G. Kirk is the Director.

Yours very truly,

ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi
The President of Council of Ministers
Italian Government

*cc: Army Sub-Comm.
Public Safety S/C*

VOK 4500

dash

REAR HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APO 394

5th July, 1944

ACC/14522/RS

SUBJECT : Strength of CC.RR and GG.FF.

TO : Army Sub-Commission ACC. (Major General Browning) Urgent

Reference your 6/6/192 of 27 June, 1944

1. In connection with the letter above referred to, wherein it was recommended that the total strength of the Carabinieri Reali and Guardia di Finanza should not, in the aggregate, exceed 55,000, it is requested that I be invited to confer with you in order that the relationship of the two bodies to one another and to the Italian Army may be clarified before any final decision is reached.

2. Pending such a conference, I wish to invite your attention to the following observations:

- 12/7
- a) The Carabinieri Reali is an integral component of the Italian Army and is the senior element thereof. Its primary mission is the maintenance of public order. Its normal peace-time strength is 55,000 officers and men. By decree of July 25, 1943 Marshal Badoglio authorized the strength of the CC.RR to be increased to 65,000. The Combined Chiefs of Staff designated the Carabinieri Reali as the police agency upon which reliance would primarily be placed to preserve public order, it having been specifically determined that military police battalions would not be available for this purpose. With the disbandment or dissolution of numerous other special police bodies, the duties hitherto performed by them have devolved upon the CC.RR. This, together with the general state of unrest following in the wake of war and the lack of or defective means of communication, has taxed the strength of the CC.RR to the utmost. There is every reason to believe that the conditions which have hitherto pertained will not only continue, but will be considerably aggravated as

the advance to the north, with its numerous industrial centres, continues. That in the face of such conditions the strength of the CC.RR should be reduced below its peace time level is a decision which is fraught with peril and to which this sub-commission registers most emphatic dissent. Rather it is the view of this sub-commission that the strength of the CC.RR because of its manifold increased duties and because of the uncertain state of public discipline, should be augmented above, rather than cut below, its normal peace-time level. The present strength of the CC.RR is 33,909. Of this number 30,836 are engaged in public order duties; the remainder work under the direction of the Italian General Staff with the Italian Army. It is likewise believed that, save for the units of the Italian Army actually committed to combat, first priority as to armament, uniforms, and equipment, especially motor transport, should be accorded to the Carabinieri Reali. Whatever factors may enter into revision of the effective strength of the Italian Army as a whole, the incontrovertible fact is that the Carabinieri has a continuing and growing responsibility.

- b) The Guardia di Finanza is not an integral part of the Italian Army. It depends as you are aware, from the Minister of Finance. It is construed however, to be one of the armed forces of the Crown and for disciplinary purposes is under the command of a general officer detailed by the Italian General Staff. Because of its quasi-military character, it was, upon the invasion of Italy by the Allied Armies, diverted from its normal duties of enforcing revenue laws etc., and required to assist in the maintenance of public order. It was for this reason that it was included with the assent of AAI amongst the elements which were entitled to draw rations from Army sources. The GG.FF continue in many cases, especially in the forward areas, to be used for general law enforcement purposes, although as soon as possible they are permitted to revert to their normal duties.

The present strength of the GG.FF is, as reported to us, 8,371. The normal peace-time establishment is 32,348.

- c) If the underlying reason for the proposed reduction in strength of both the CC.RR and GG.FF is to keep the Italian Army within a predetermined ration ceiling, then it is most respectfully submitted that a different approach be used to solve the problem. Under no circumstances, in our view, should the strength of the CC.RR be reduced. Rather, an increase should be expected and provided for. Similarly, the strength of the GG.FF should not be reduced. The solution which is now offered, if the decision reached as to ceiling is inflexible, is that the GG.FF be dropped from the army ration and be authorized to draw the special ration for public safety personnel from civilian sources (schedule C special ration scale); and that the CC.RR continue to draw rations from army sources up to at least its normal peace time strength. Before this suggestion, if acceptable, is adopted and made effective an opportunity should be afforded this sub-commission to make the requisite arrangements with the Food Sub-Commission to implement it as to the GG.FF. If, pending this adjustment, an overdraft of rations is made, it will later be compensated for because the CC.RR will not have reached its authorized strength even according to your figures.

3. Finally, it is urged upon you most strongly that a reduction in the strength of the CC.RR would invite consequences which are not at all pleasant to contemplate and for which this sub-commission cannot share responsibility.

Paul G. Kirk

PAUL G. KIRK,
Colonel, Inf.
Chief, Public Safety
Sub-Commission

Copies to:

Acting Chief Commissioner
Adm. Vice-President.
Food Sub-Commission.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

ACC MAIN

AFHQ SIGNED SACRED
F 70844

102012 B

SECRET
ROUTINE

CITE FIGEG REF 6948
1 JULY

DIVERSION TO ITALY OF CARABINIERI AND FINANCE GUARDS REFERRED TO
ORIGINALLY IN OUR F 53671 OF 1 JUNE HAS BEEN AGREED BUT ALL WILL
BE IN THIRD FLIGHT. PERSONNEL WILL BE TRANS SHIPPED IN MIDEAST AND
WILL BE SENT FROM THERE DIRECT TO ITALY. ETA NOT YET FIRM BUT
PROBABLE WILL ARRIVE ITALY MID[?] SEPTEMBER

ACC ADV DIST.
ACTION--ADM SEC
INFO--D.C.C.
P SAFETY
ARMY SC
C. A. BR 2
FILE
FLOAT 2

(K)
Hq Hampton. Is making
we have on arrival
12/7
vlp.

4493

SECRET

A
AUTORITÀ MILITARE ITALIANA
IN ROMA

I. M. A. R.

R. O. 36 di prot.

ROMA, 7 luglio 1944

OGGETTO : CC.NR. in servizio al 5 luglio 1944.-

ALLA COMMISSIONE ALLEATA DI CONNECIZIO

(A.S.C. avv - Roma)

ROMA

Si trasmette l'elenco dei CC.NR. in servizio al

5 luglio 1944 : *Following is sheet return of Carabinieri*

in Rome
- in caserma 3.400

- al comando del ten.col. Perinetti 2.200

- " " " Minetti 400

(Legione Lazio)

- inviati a Siena e Grosseto 200

not found to

785020

in cassa 3.400
 - al consumo del ter. col. Terinetti 2.200
 - " " " Minetti 400
 (Legione Iorio)
 - avviati a Siena e Grosseto 200

Totale : 6.200

4494

d'ordine
 IL CAPO DI STATO NAZIONALE
 E/te Col. G. Pecinotti

P. C. C.

IL CAPO UFFICIO S.M.
 -ten.col. G. De Petro -

[Signature]

Ang. Pinchley to note.

12/7.

8/7
 262

RECEIVED

151
SD/72 J
23/6

HEADQUARTERS,
ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY.
1605/50/44/G(SUL)

21 Jun 44

Col. NERENOWI,
Chief of the Italian Mission, AAI

No Travel

Ref your letter 2632 of 16 Jun 44.

1. Our records show that Carabinieri are under comd of Allied Formations as follows :-

Unit	Comd	Offs	ORs
36 Sez CCR	PES (212 Div)	1	48
39 Sez CCR	Polish Corps (CIL)	1	54
51 Sez CCR	Polish Corps (CIL)	1	65
154 Sez CCR	Fifth Army	-	50
314 Sez CCR	Polish Corps (CIL)	1	24
711 Sez CCR	AAI (CASERTA PALACE)	1	30
Sez CCR	Fifth Army (210 Div)	-	-
Sez CCR	3 District (227 Div)	-	-
Sez CCR	Fifth Army	3	130
Sez CCR	Fifth Army	-	50
Mounted Sez CCR	Fifth Army	-	74

2. Confirmation of this list is being obtained.

3. Formation of additional units from personnel drawn from areas evacuated by the enemy will be arranged by SRS, who also hold full details of units shown in para 1 above.

39 Ser CORR	1	48
51 Ser CORR	1	54
154 Ser CORR	1	65
314 Ser CORR	-	50
711 Ser CORR	1	24
Ser CORR	1	30
Ser CORR	-	-
Ser CORR	-	-
Ser CORR	3	130
Mounted Ser CORR	-	50
		74

2. Confirmation of this list is being obtained.

3. Formation of additional units from personnel drawn from areas evacuated by the enemy will be arranged by SAGE, who also hold full details of units shown in para 1 above.

W. M. G. Lee

Brigadier,
G(3D & T).

4493

Copy to :- MIA

*I will check up on next state sheet
and show them all separately G. L.*

