

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

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INT/105 REPORTS BR. ITALIAN

Feb. - June 1945

SECRET

REPORT ON VISIT OF G.I.I. 'I' LIAISON TO
A.F.H.Q. 3 DISTRICT

20 - 21 JUNE 45

I.

POSSIBILITY OF G.I.I. CIVIL LIAISON, 8 ARMY, AND STAFF WORKING
FOR MIA

A.F.H.Q., Maj REDFERN, G-2 EXEC. BR.

The situation at the moment is that G.I.I. Civil Liaison (Maj Colquhoun) and 3 British Intelligence officers will probably remain with 8 Army. The remaining 4 British Intelligence officers will probably be posted to MIA.

These officers will have to be posted on MIA W.E. and will not be extra to W.E. It is unlikely that they will have transport. A.F.H.Q. will shortly inform MIA definitely.

II.

ABOLISHMENT OF ITALIAN INTELLIGENCE UNITS

A.F.H.Q., Maj MACDONALD, G-2 EXEC.

Ref MIA letter SD/18/2 of 1 June, AMHQ letters AG 091.711/073 GBI - C of 14 and 17 June.

- (a) The Central Int. Office, S.M.G., cannot be discontinued because it is required for organization and centralization of information.
- (b) 808 C.S. Bn. (Counter-Intelligence and Security) could not be disbanded without grave consequences because the majority of F.S.S. and C.I.C. personnel are being transferred to Austria, U.S., U.K. etc. 808 C.S. Bn. will have to take on their commitments.
- (c) 4 Section I.A.I. is solely responsible for codes and ciphers in the Italian Army. In the event that the Italian Army is to be continued this unit cannot be disbanded.
- (d) 863 Increment to C.S.D.I.C. This unit should not be disbanded because it is felt that as long as there is an Italian Army a nucleus of interrogators will be required.

Furthermore, it is considered desirable to keep these Intelligence units in being as we have trained them, we know who they are and in fact we have them taped. If we disband them others will come into being.

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Furthermore, it is considered desirable to keep these Intelligence units in being as we have trained them, we know who they are and in fact we have them taped. If we disband them others will come into being of whom we know nothing.

III. INTELLIGENCE POLICY

A.P.H.Q., Lt. Col. EVANS-MANSFIELD, G-2 (CI EXEC)

Counter-Intelligence at this stage is chiefly interested in Italian Army from the point of view of morale, whether for example it can be relied upon should there be, say, cases of civil disturbances etc.

IV.

CENSORSHIP POLICY

A.F.H.Q., Lt. Col. LOVEGROVE, G-2 (CC)

Lt. Col. LOVEGROVE has been extremely anxious to get the policy settled but has had to await the approval of 15 Army Group. He had hoped to be able to discontinue internal censorship in the whole of Italy but 15 Army Group have insisted that both civil and military censorship be maintained in the Provinces of CORRIZIA, TRIESTE, UDINE, BOLZANO, TRENTO, COMO, ACOSTA, TORINO, CUNEO. However, the military mail will be read on the spot by Allied Civil Censorship units thus obviating the need to send the mail to 7 and 9 Base Censors in Naples and Rome.

CSI

Major RICE of 9 Base Censor, ROSE, will call on GI, 101A, during the afternoon of 22 June to clear up the whole matter.

V.

POGGIA CALL-UP AND MAIL

A.F.H.Q., Maj STONEY, G-1 (Br)

The AG of S G-1 (Maj. Gen. WHITE GSC) on 18 June instructed AG to send a letter to C4/IAF/ATO to the following effect :-

G(SD)

- (1) Attempts to call up personnel of 1915 - 25 classes in the POGGIA area for the Italian Army have been abortive.
- (2) The reason for this failure is reported as being the apparent protection granted by IAF units to Italian personnel who do not possess authenticated exemption certificates.
- (3) It is directed that all IAF units be instructed to assist the Italian authorities in every way possible in calling up for the Italian Army all personnel not possessing certificates of exemption granted under provision of A.F.H.Q. Administrative Memo No. 10 of 20 Feb 45 (amended).

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Maj. STONEY feels that this letter will settle the matter.

VI.

MORALE AND DESERTIONS

1 DISTRICT: Capt. ROBERTS GII 'I'

Morale is fairly satisfactory among the Italian Troops and desertions have not been excessive. Generally speaking the

CSI

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- (3) It is directed that all AAP units be instructed to assist the Italian authorities in every way possible in calling up for the Italian Army all personnel not possessing certificates of exemption granted under provision of A.P.H.Q. Administrative Memo No. 10 of 20 Feb 45 (amended).

Maj. STONEY feels that this letter will settle the matter.

VI. MORALE AND DESERTIONS

1 DISTRICT: Capt. ROBERTS GIII 'I'

Morale is fairly satisfactory among the Italian Troops and desertions have not been excessive. Generally speaking the Army is found more attractive now for two reasons :

- (a) The War is over.
- (b) Living conditions in the Army are, on the whole, better than in civil life.

The two main grievances are :

- (a) The Leave scheme to the North is being very slow.
- (b) Mail is slow.

On the whole new recruits into the Army appear to find it better than they expected.

22 June 45

DISTRIBUTION

C of S, GSO 1, GSD, GSI, A

R G A Evans-Raines
Captain
GIII 'I' Liaison

GSI

5508

A dark, heavily textured rectangular object, possibly a book cover or a piece of wood, with a faint, illegible label in the center. The surface is covered in numerous small, light-colored specks and scratches, giving it a worn appearance. The label in the center is dark and contains some indistinct markings that could be interpreted as '1161' or similar characters.

POINTS FROM TOUR OF G III 'I' LIAISON
May 6 - 11, 1945

1. GENERAL

(a) 15 ARMY GROUP. MAY 1950E GII 'I' (5)

15 Army Group is unlikely to move from FLORENCE for some weeks. It is possible that it may not move at all.

(b) 1 District. Capt. BOUNGE MATA LO

1 District H.Q. has just moved from PERUGIA to FOLLI. In about 3 weeks it will probably move to FERRARA provided the medical authorities decide that FERRARA is not malarious.

(c) 2 District, Capt. WILSON GILL Y'

There are only elements of 2 District at SIENA and a Command Post at 15 Army Gr. Admin. FLORENCE. On May 9 the elements at SIENA became 2 Dist Rear Party and the main body was scheduled to open up at MILAN.

(d) 5 Army Capt., HARLEY S/C "A" 15 ARMY GP.

5 Army is at VERONA. Capt NEWTON, MILIA
LO Br. Increment is with them, but Capt.
THURPP is still at FLORENCE.

(c) 84th. Capt. FARLEY S/C "A" 15 Army Gp.

8 Array Main in at WESTRE.

(f) 59 Area, Capt, PITCHARD S/C "C"

59 Area has moved to M ELM leaving a Rear Party at SING., due to move any moment.

71 Sub Area (AREZZO) have taken over
SIENA.

2. DESCRIPTION

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GSD

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(e) 8 Army. Capt. HARLEY S/C "A" 15 Army Gp.

8 Army Main is at MESTRE.

(f) 59 Area. Capt. PRITCHARD S/C "C"

59 Area has moved to MILAN leaving a Rear Party at SIENA, due to move any moment.

71 Sub Area (AREZZO) have taken over SIENA.

2. DESERTION

(a) MAI. RUSQUE. GIII 'I' (D) 15 Army Gp.

No reports received of serious desertion.

(b) Capt. CRAIG. 802 BRQ ORVIETO

Very little desertion.

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- 2 -

2. DESERPTION (Continued)

(c) Capt. BOURNE, MMIA LO 1 Dist.

50 men deserted in a batch from the Italian Pack Tpt. Coy near AREZZO.

BADL, 1 Dist informed Capt. BOURNE on 8 May that only 33 of an 8 Army Italian Pioneer Coy out of 209 turned up to work.

(d) Mai. NISKIN Trg. Incr. GARDIADI Div.

There has been practically no desertion.

3. LEAVE AND DEMOBILIZATION

Capt. HARRY S/C "A" 15 Army Gp.

(a) The areas to which leave may be granted are defined in 15 Army Group Signal A(F.S.) 51 of 6 May to MMIA.

The areas to which personnel may be demobilized are defined in 15 Army Gp. signal AO 55 of 6 May copy to MMIA.

The eventual limits will probably be defined in the West by a North-South line through but exclusive of TULIN and in the East by a North-South line through but exclusive of UDINE.

(b) Specialist Units such as Sigs and Engrs must be kept up to strength but otherwise 15 Army Gp. is prepared to accept a certain amount of wastage.

(c) The main difficulty in granting leave and demobilization is transport. Could MMIA press AFHQ for more Tpt. facilities for leave. For example the allotment for Sardinians is for 50 per month over all which works out at approx 2 per month for Admin Div.

4. COMBAT GROUPS

(a) Mai. MORGAN, GII SD (Pr) 15 Army Gp.

5206

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(a) Wai. MORGAN. GII S2 (Br) 15 Army Gp.

Combat Groups will probably be used as occupational troops. Two have been offered to 5 Army. There is no firm plot as yet and no dates have been fixed.

If they are used as occupational troops the War Establishments will need drastic readjustment.

G(SD)

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4. COMBAT GROUPS (Continued)

(b) Cant. HALEX S/C "A" 15 Army Gp.

Positions of Combat Gps on 7 May were as follows :-

- FRUIT - DOZZA near IMOLA (NW of FAENZA)
- CREMONA - VILLANUA di GIBBO area near ROVIGO
- LEGNANO - BRESCIA
- FOLGORE - BOLOGNA doing security duties.
- MANTOVA - RADA in CHIANTI.

5. IMPLEMENTATION OF TERRITORIAL R.Q.'s

(a) MaJ. MORGAN GII SD(Er) 15 Army Gp.

This matter is being handled on a very high level. G(SR)

15 Army Gp sent a signal to both armies asking that Territorial R.Q.'s be permitted to open up as soon as conveniently possible.

8 Army replied that they did not want them before 10 May and would inform 15 Army Gp how soon after that date it would be possible for them to open up.

(b) Lt. Col. PRESSER GSD (American) 15 Army Gp.

No reply had yet been received from 5 Army but 15 Army Gp had sent another signal pressing for a reply.

The matter was brought up by Col. MESSINI Min of War Liaison Officer at 15 Army Gp.

6. TREATMENT OF "REPUBLICAN" ITALIANS

MaJ. MUSOL GIII "I" (B) 15 Army Gp.

Those are being treated in the same way as the German Gps, that is units have been told to stand fast until ordered to move into the concentration area near BOLOGNA. They will probably be desobilised and returned to their homes except units of special interest such as 10 MAS and undesirable individuals.

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GSI

(a) Mal. MORGAN GII SD (Br) 15 Army Gp.

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7. INTELLIGENCE POLICY

Mal. RUSCOE GIII 'I' (B) 15 Army Gp.

The policy is to hand over and more of the political and internal security work over to the Italian Government and S.I.M. except in so far as it directly affects Allied interests.

8. FURTHER POINTS 15 ARMY GROUP

(a) MAJ. MORAN GII SD(Br)

Can MIA inform 15 Army Gp as soon as possible what is to be done with the Borda Maiella and Rocco Squadrons?

G(SD)

(b) No Italian troops are to be used in Austria in accordance with instructions from AFHQ.

(c) Capt. HARLEY S/C "A"

231 Admin Div will move on 15th May probably to VERONA.

805 Transit Camp will move on the same date probably to RACONA.

It is therefore most urgent that 801 Transit Camp be formed at AREZZO by May 15th.

(d) 230 Admin Div has been called fwd. to FLORENCE under 2 Dist.

Personnel for 2 Dist should be routed to 5 Army as it is planned to use 5 Army Transit Camp which will probably be handed over to 2 Dist.

(e) Can Capt. HARLEY have a new MIA Staff List please?

9. FURTHER POINTS 2 DISTRICT

MAJ. BIRD MIA LG

It has been reported that the civilian labour will be sufficient to work the port of GENOA. If therefore the Italian Army Units under 2 Dist are left at LEGHORN it would be better for 230 Admin Div to remain in FLORENCE rather than to move further North. Maj. BIRD is dealing with this matter.

5204

10. FURTHER POINTS 59 AREA

Capt. REICHARD S/C "C"

(a) No. 1 Guard Regt. is not moving fwd with the main body of 59 Area.

It is therefore most urgent that 801 Transit Camp be formed at AREZZO by May 15th.

- (d) 230 Admin Div has been called fwd. to FLORENCE under 2 Dist. Q

Personnel for 2 Dist should be routed to 5 Army as it is planned to use 5 Army Transit Camp which will probably be handed over to 2 Dist.

- (e) Can Capt. HARLEY have a new MMIA Staff List please? A

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10. FURTHER POINTS 59 AREA

Capt. PRITCHARD S/C HQ

- (a) No. 1 Guard Regt. is not moving fwd with the main body of 59 Area but will probably move later. For the moment they pass under 71 Sub Area for admin. QSD

- (b) Reinforcements. There is a tendency for the number of rfts which arrive to be less than that requested. A

11. FURTHER POINTS 1 DISTRICT

Capt. KOURNE MMIA LO

(a) The further allocation of tpt to Italian Units which has been agreed to will be very welcome. For example, 521 Guard Bn H.Q. in PERUGIA has detachments in PESARO, RIMINI, SAN SEPOLCHRO, POLIGNO and TERNI. The total H.Q. tpt consists of 1 x 3 tonner and 2 M/Cs. This is a typical example. Q

(b) Could 802 BRD CRIVETO be taken away from 209 Admin Div and administered from ROME as 209 Admin Div is moving from PERUGIA to GENEVA. Q

Capt. CRAIG, 802 BRD, has no objection.

12. FURTHER POINTS 802 BRD. CRIVETO

Capt. CRAIG

(a) 802 BRD has been informed that 2 Guard Bns. are to be formed there. May they be informed how long these Bns are expected to remain there, what training is intended and whether any British officers will be attached? G(SB)

The Italian Commandant has already written to 209 Admin Div asking for Italian officers to form these Bns.

(b) 228 Admin Div has asked for 1000 men to replace discharges of which 750 are specialists. 231 Admin Div have asked for 3000 men for the same reason chiefly specialists. A 5203

802 BRD will be unable to meet anything like these demands for specialists, nor have they the facilities for training specialists.

(c) 50 of the 100 drivers from TRIESTE are to be sent to 266/1 RT Coy and of the remaining 50 a certain number are due for discharge. A

(d) Col. GATTA has replaced Lt Col PAPADIA as Commandant of the BRD. He is an excellent man and it is felt that the Italians could take over the BRD entirely at any time. A

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(e) What is the policy now with regard to the British members of the BRD? Maj. FUNKATE is in Release Group 7. A

13. FURCHER POINTS GARIBOLDI DIVISION

Maj. MISKIN

(a) The British officers attached will all be leaving shortly with the exception of Maj. GRIMBLE who is remaining for the time being.

(b) The "GARIBOLDI" is one of the best regts. that Maj MISKIN has ever come across of any army. Col RAVNICH is a splendid commander and the men would follow him anywhere.

The morale is very high indeed.

14. NOTES ON LEAVE

All Italian soldiers that I spoke to were delighted at the prospect of leave but with out exception they spoke of the difficulties of getting to their homes. Some of them have had to walk most of the way. There is therefore a strong temptation for the soldier, if he hears of transport, to go off home without waiting for permission. Would it be possible for Areas etc. who have empty transport going North to inform HQ's and other large centres of Italian Tps?

13 May 1945

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Captain
GHI (I) Liaison
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Captain
GIII (I) Liaison

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File 4

POINTS FROM TOUR OF G III 'I' LIAISON

May 6 - 11, 1945

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GSD

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(b) 1 District. Capt. BOURNE MMIA LO

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(c) 2 District. Capt. WILSON GII 'I'

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(d) 5 Army Capt. HANLEY S/C "A" 15 Army Gp.

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2. DESIGNATION

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No reports received of serious desertion.

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Very little desertion.

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2. DESERPTION (Continued)

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The eventual limits will probably be defined in the West by a North-South line through but exclusive of TURIN and in the East by a North-South line through but exclusive of UDINE.

(b) Specialist Units such as Sigs and Engrs must be kept up to strength but otherwise 15 Army Gp. is prepared to accept a certain amount of wastage.

(c) The main difficulty in granting leave and demobilization is transport. Could MMIA press AFHQ for more Tpt. facilities for leave. For example the allotment for Sarinians is for 50 per month over all which works out at approx 2 per month for Admin Div.

4. COMBAT GROUPS

(a) Maj. MORIAN, CHISD (Br) 15 Army Gp.

Capt. H. FLEY S/C ^{WAD} 15 Army Gp.

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(55) 5

- 3 -

4. COMBAT GROUPS (Continued)

(b) Capt. HAMLEY S/C "A" 15 Army Gp.

Positions of Combat Gps on 7 May were as follows :-

- PRIMI - DOZZA near IMOLA (NW of FAENZA)
- CREMONA - VILLANVA di CHIESO area near BOVIGO
- LEGHANO - ERESCLA
- PULGORE - BOLOGNA doing security duties.
- MANTOVA - Radda in CHIANTI.

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The matter was brought up by Col. NEGAMI Min of War Liaison Officer at 15 Army Gp.

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(a) Mal. MORAN GII SD (Pr) 15 Army Gp.

This matter is being handled on a very high level. C(SH)

15 Army Gp sent a signal to both armies asking that Territorial H.Q.'s be permitted to open up as soon as conveniently possible.

8 Army replied that they did not want them before 10 May and would inform 15 Army Gp how soon after that date it would be possible for them to open up.

(b) Lt. Col. DRESSER GSD (American) 15 Army Gp.

No reply had yet been received from 5 Army but 15 Army Gp had sent another signal pressing for a reply.

The matter was brought up by Col. NEGRONT Min of War Liaison Officer at 15 Army Gp.

6. TREATMENT OF "REPUBLICAN" ITALIANS

Mal. RUSOE GIII IT' (B) 15 Army Gp.

These are being treated in the same way as the German Itps, that is units have been told to stand fast until ordered to move into the concentration area near BOLOGNA. They will probably be demobilized and returned to their homes except units of special interest such as 10 MAS and undesirable individuals.

7. INTELLIGENCE POLICY

Mal. RUSOE GIII IT' (B) 15 Army Gp.

The policy is to hand more and more of the political and internal security work over to the Italian Government and S.I.M. except in so far as it directly affects Allied interests.

8. FURTHER POINTS 15 ARMY GROUP

(a) Maj. MORGAN GILSD (Br)

G(SD)

Can M-1A inform 15 Army Gp as soon as possible what is to be done with the Bandia Matolla and "P" Rocce Squadron?

(b) No Italian troops are to be used in Austria in accordance with instructions from AFHQ.

(c) Capt. HARLEY S/C "A"

231 Admin Div will move on 15th May probably to VERONA.

805 Transit Camp will move on the same date probably to BOLIGNA.

It is therefore most urgent that 801 Transit Camp be formed at AREZZO by May 15th.

(d) 230 Admin Div has been called fwd. to FLORENCE under 2 Dist.

Personnel for 2 Dist should be routed to 5 Army as it is planned to use 5 Army Transit Camp which will probably be handed over to 2 Dist.

(e) Can Capt. HARLEY have a new MMIA Staff List please?

9. FURTHER POINTS 2 DISTRICT

Maj. HIRD MMIA LG

It has been reported that the civilian labour will be sufficient to work the port of GENOA. If therefore the Italian Army Units under 2 Dist are left at LEGHORN it would be better for 230 Admin Div to remain in FLORENCE rather than to move further North. Maj. HIRD is dealing with this matter.

10. FURTHER POINTS 59 AREA

Capt. FRITCHARD S/C "C"

(a) No. 1 Guard Regt. is not moving fwd with the main body of 59 Area but will probably move later.

GSD

805 Transit Camp will move on the same date probably to RIGONA.

It is therefore most urgent that 801 Transit Camp be moved at AREZZO by May 15th.

- (d) 230 Admin Div has been called fwd. to FLORENCE under 2 Dist. Q

Personnel for 2 Dist. should be routed to 5 Army as it is planned to use 5 Army Transit Camp which will probably be handed over to 2 Dist.

- (e) Can Capt. HARLEY have a new MMIA Staff List please? A

9. FURTHER POINTS 2 DISTRICT

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10. FURTHER POINTS 59 AREA

Capt. PRITCHARD S/C HQ

(a) No. 1 Guard Regt. is not moving fwd with the main body of 59 Area but will probably move later. For the moment they pass under 71 Sub Area for admin. QSD

(b) Reinforcements. There is a tendency for the number of rifles which arrive to be less than that requested. A

11. FURTHER POINTS 1 DISTRICT

Capt. BOURNE MIA 10

(a) The further allocation of tpt to Italian Units which has been agreed to will be very welcome. For example, 521 Guard Bn H.Q. in PERUGIA has detachments in PESARO, RIMINI, SAN SEVERO, FOLIGNO and TERNI. The total H.Q. tpt consists of 1 x 3 tonner and 2 M/Cs. This is a typical example. Q

(b) Could 802 BRD ORVIETO be taken away from 209 Admin Div and administered from ROME as 209 Admin Div is moving from PERUGIA to CESENA. Q

Capt. CRAIG, 802 BRD, has no objection.

12. FURTHER POINTS 802 BRD. ORVIETO

Capt CRAIG

(a) 802 BRD has been informed that 2 Guard Bns. are to be formed there. May they be informed how long these Bns are expected to remain there, what training is intended and whether any British officers will be attached? C(SD)

The Italian Commandant has already written to 209 Admin Div asking for Italian officers to form these Bns.

(b) 228 Admin Div has asked for 1000 men to replace discharged of which 750 are specialists. 231 Admin Div have asked for 3000 men for the same reason chiefly specialists. 5137

802 BRD will be unable to meet anything like these demands for specialists, nor have they the facilities for training specialists.

(c) 50 of the 100 drivers from TRAMI are to be sent to 266/1 MT Coy and of the remaining 50 a certain number are due for discharge. A

(d) Col. GATTA has replaced Lt Col PARADIA as Commandant of the BRD. He is an excellent man and it is felt that the Italians could take over the BRD entirely at any time. A

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(d) Col. GATIA has replaced Lt Col PARADIA as Commandant of the BRD. He is an excellent man and it is felt that the Italians could take over the BRD entirely at any time. A

(e) What is the policy now with regard to the British members of the BRD? Maj. TUNKATE is in Release Group 7. A

13. FURTHER POINTS GARIBOLDI DIVISION

Maj. MISKIN

(a) The British officers attached will all be leaving shortly with the exception of Maj. GRIBBLE who is remaining for the time being.

(b) The "GARIBOLDI" is one of the best regts. that Maj MISKIN has ever come across of any army. Col RAVNICH is a splendid commander and the men would follow him anywhere.

The morale is very high indeed.

14. NOTE ON LEAVE

All Italian soldiers that I spoke to were delighted at the prospect of leave but with ut exception they spoke of the difficulties of getting to their homes. Some of them have had to walk most of the way. There is therefore a strong temptation for the soldier, if he hears of transport, to go off home without waiting for permission. Would it be possible for areas etc. who have empty transport going North to inform BMD's and other large centres of Italian Tia?

13 May 1945

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GII (I) Liaison

5106

14.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

1184

C of S. I would very much like GOC. to see this report, which gives valuable information. Building all Hqs. in the move, I feel this will be done good. *W. C. C.*

POINTS FROM TOUR OF GIII (I) LIAISON IN FWD AREA
APRIL 22 TO 28

Action Branch

1. MORALE OF TROOPS

Morale of the Groups is very high. Desertions very few. Morale of Service Troops is not so high as they suffer by comparison with the Combat Troops and do not get British Mail.

GSI

2. CENSORSHIP IN REAR AREAS

Maj. CARMICHAEL: Could the Field Postcard be issued as soon as possible. It is most urgently required.

Q

Capt. NEWSTEAD, GIII (I) (B) 6 ARMY: Could another censorship section be set up in FLORENCE or ANCONA or even further NORTH, as well as ROME and NAPLES? This would solve to some extent the transport problem of the Italian Civil Post Office which now distributes censored mail entirely from NAPLES.

USI

3. COUNTER-MEASURES IN FORM OF PROPAGANDA TO FORESTALL DESERTION

Capt. NEWSTEAD GIII (I) (B) 6 ARMY: Suggested explanatory articles on leave and demobilization in "La Patria" on lines of Aldridge's articles in "UNION JACK".

A

4. PATRIOTS

Maj. COLQUHOUN GII CIVIL LIAISON 8 ARMY

1125

(a) Can Ranks and Temporary Ranks for patriots be implemented as soon as possible? This is most urgent as it affects pensions and pay. Maj. COL. BUCHAN got the impression from FALABRO, Under-Sec. of State for War, that Mails were sitting on this problem.

(b) Desertion: If the patriot leader is good and if short leaves are granted for patriots to see their families when liberated there is little or no desertion. Desertion is a

as soon as possible. It is most urgently required.

Capt NEWSTAD, GILL 'I' (B) 8 ARMY: Could another censorship section be set up in FLORENCE or ANCONA or even further NORTH, as well as ROME and NAPLES? This would solve to some extent the transport problem of the Italian Civil Post Office which now distributes censored mail entirely from NAPLES.

3. COUNTER-MEASURES IN FORM OF PROPAGANDA TO FORESTALL

DESERTION

Capt NEWSTAD GILL 'I' (B) 8 ARMY: Suggested explanatory articles on leave and demobilization in "La Patria" on lines of Alldridge's articles in "UNION JACK".

4. PATRIOTS

Maj. COLGUCHUM GILL CIVIL LIAISON 8 ARMY

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(b) Desertion: If the patriot leader is good and if short leaves are granted for patriots to see their families when liberated there is little or no desertion. Patriot discipline is very good though it differs considerably from army discipline.

(c) It is intended to nominate all 5 Recce Bns. Libero's Band has been nominated as the third. There are still considerable numbers of patriots to be regularized. These are apt to become a problem only if not organized.

4. PATRIOTS (Cont'd)

(d) Relations between the Poles and the Banda Mailella are not good. The Poles keep all the Banda Mailella's transport for their own use.

Lt. Col. DRAM, C-1 SD 6 Army

As long as the Banda Mailella remains under the Polish Corps the transport can be allocated whenever the Corps wishes and 6 Army cannot interfere.

Maj. CAREN-MONT

(a) As Garibaldi has done splendidly throughout.

(b) The Banda Mailella is very good in the battle but rather troublesome to control when they are out of the line.

(c) There are considerable numbers of patriots prepared to volunteer into the Groups but the wastage has been too small to absorb them.

Capt. WILIE GILL 'I' SO HU (FANGL)

The Patriots have been very useful in collecting information and giving locations of minefields, booby traps etc. and acting as guides.

5. "I" SECTIONS IN COMBAT GROUPS

Capt. WENSLAND GILL 'I' (S) 6 Army

The F.S. Sections are very keen but still rather inexperienced. They have caught several agents. They are working hard to make the Groups more security minded.

No political work is passed to the F.S. Sections. Each F.S. Section has a British F.S. N.C.O. attached during ops to act as adviser. He passes back any cases beyond the scope of the Group F.S. Sections.

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No political work is passed to the F.S. Sections. Each F.S. Section has a British F.S. M.C.O. attached during ops to act as adviser. He passes back any cases beyond the scope of the Group F.S. Sections.

Capt. WILDE GIII 'I' (B) SO HM (FRIULI)

(a) Very satisfied with performance of 'I' Section. Comparable with that of a British Div.

(b) The chief trouble is communications in getting the information back in time to be of use, but the 'I' personnel are fully aware of the urgency of getting fresh information back and to the flanks.

5. "I" SECTIONS IN COMBAT GROUPS (Cont'd)

OSI

(c) The German interrogator is rather too young and inexperienced and his German is not quite adequate but he is very keen. During the latest ops the German interrogator from Corps was able to come down and help, so that on the whole the situation was satisfactory.

OSI

(d) The Italian GHI "I" is very intelligent and capable and the Italian P.S. Officer is technically very sound but rather restless.

OSI

(e) The enemy Order of Battle was kept very well indeed, quite as good as a British Div and much useful identification was passed back to Corps. For example the "I" Section, on being informed that there were 2 dead Germans in a minefield on their own initiative retrieved the bodies and obtained a very interesting identification.

OSI

(f) The Group from the Co. under downwards is becoming quite alive to the usefulness of Intelligence work. For example in spite of rumours, unconfirmed, of atrocities committed on captured Gruppi soldiers by the enemy they continued to take prisoners and hand them over for interrogation.

OSI

(g) The enemy have been using captured Italian soldier paybooks for their agents crossing the line.

5193
OSI

(h) At first the Intelligence personnel were over-credulous but with experience they have improved considerably and now grab their information.

OSI

(i) The Italian Intelligence L.O.'s of the Nucleo "I" have been extremely useful. They already have experience of British Intelligence methods.

OSI

(j) The "I" sections in the Groups are organized in exactly the same way as in a British Division.

Capt M.G.E. GHI "I" 53 HM (PUB. 1)

OSI

The "I" Section was very keen and produced better results than the "I" Section. They were not

useful identification was passed back to Corp. For example the 'I' Section, on being informed that there were 2 dead Germans in a minefield on their own initiative retrieved the bodies and obtained a very interesting identification.

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5193

OSI

(h) At first the Intelligence personnel were over-credulous but with experience they have improved considerably and now grade their information.

OSI

(i) The Italian Intelligence L.O.'s of the Nucleo 'M' have been extremely useful. They already have experience of British intelligence methods.

OSI

(j) The 'M' sections in the Groups are organized in exactly the same way as in a British Division.

Capt MCGEE GILL 'I' 53 HLU (FLETCHE)

OSI

The 'M' Section was very keen and produced better results than might have been expected. They were not however up to British standard. There was a tendency to be too watertight and not pass on information. The Group is very apt to talk insecurely but this is improving gradually. The chief difficulty is in fact the Italian character, but within this limitation their work was good.

6. ITALIAN SECURITY

Capt NEMSTED GIII 'I' (3) 8 ARMY

(a) Careless talk is the besetting sin. OSI

(b) Posters: 8 Army are already having Security OSI
posters printed by PWs. These are designs that
were put forward by Gramsc.

(c) Security Propaganda: Suggested a weekly OSI
Security paragraph in "La Patria". E.g. Ex-
plaining the reasons for not carrying civilians
in military transport, that suspects can be car-
ried through controls by military vehicles, thus
making it more difficult to catch agents.

This failing is very widespread among Italian
Troops.

POINTS FROM Security Reports

(a) The practice of using civilians and leave per- OSI
sonnel for conveying letters is very widespread but
most of the letters intercepted have proved to be
purely private matters.

(b) Italian girls who go out with Allies have been OSI
threatened by Italian combat troops and others - in
particular at Ravenna. In some cases this proved to
be more showing off on the part of newly-joined sol-
diers.

(c) Folgore Group, particularly the Nembo, show a OSI
tendency to boast and give away plans.

(d) There is evidence that the Germans are using OSI
captured Italian paybooks for long range patrols.

(e) Combat troops persist in carrying civilians on OSI
military transport in spite of the prohibition.

(f) Envelopes stolen from 1st P.M.C. proved to OSI
have been stolen for fishing purposes.

7. POSSIBILITY OF ITALIAN TROOPS MAKING OFF WITH ARMY VEHICLES

5192

This failing is very widespread among Italian
Troops.

POINTS From Security Reports

(a) The practice of using civilians and leave personnel for conveying letters is very widespread but most of the letters intercepted have proved to be purely private matters.

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(f) Explosives stolen from 127 P.M.C. proved to have been stolen for fishing purposes.

7. POSSIBILITY OF ITALIAN TROOPS MAKING OFF WITH ARMY VEHICLES

Capt NEWSTEAD GILL 'I' (B) 6 ARMY

The check points for Italian troops at Army Rear Bdy are manned by Italian personnel. Normally this works very well, but should Italian troops make off with military vehicles from the South to visit their families in the North it is quite possible that the check points might be overrun. It is doubtful whether Army could spare additional British Cdr personnel.

The British Cdr check Italian troops going out of Army Areas.

FURTHER POINTS FROM CAPT NEWFIELD GILL 'I' (B) 3 ARMY

(1) There is a rumour among Italian troops that they are going to be used in the Far East. This is causing some dependency.

GSI

(2) Would it be possible to tie up the leave policy at Army Group level so that decisions should apply to both armies. At the moment there are discrepancies.

A

Note: Maj CARSW-WENT is dealing with this matter. He does not think that Army Group can lay anything down but that the two armies must agree on a policy between themselves.

FURTHER POINTS FROM LT. COL. INGHAM G-1 SD 8 ARMY

(1) NE's of Combat Groups

Many suggestions have come in from Corps to some extent disagreeing with one another.

GSD

8 Army will sort these out as quickly as possible and put up a suggestion.

However this may take some time owing to operations.

The general principle will be that operational necessities must be found but that anything that is not absolutely necessary will not be considered.

FURTHER POINTS FROM PRIOLI

(1) Could Hospitals down south hold clothing to re-equip cured combat troops? In cases of wounds these patients are often discharged without battle dress and hospitals apply to the Groups to send down clothing. Major CARSW-WENT has written a letter asking that hospitals be authorized to hold 5% clothing of combat patients held.

329

(2) Militia casualties have not been received since approx 15 Mar. Major CARSW-WENT is dealing with this.

(3) Prioli carried out a most gallant action against prepared positions across the SANGRO.

GII(Cps)

FURTHER POINTS FROM LT. COL. INMAN G-1 SD 8 ARMY

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(2) Milit. cigarettes have not been received since approx 13 Mar. Major CARM-HENT is dealing with this.

(3) Friuli carried out a most gallant action against prepared positions across the SENIO.

CII(Ops)

FURTHER POINTS FROM FOLGONE

- (1) Lt. Col. TAYLOR was very sorry that Maj MONICO was taken away. He was most useful to them as he was bi-lingual and extremely good at dealing with situations requiring tact.
- (2) Lt. Col. TAYLOR is most anxious to have Francesco Colonna attached to the HQU as a Liaison Officer. He is completely bi-lingual and is very good at translating and interpreting quickly complicated army matters. Lt. Col. TAYLOR knows Francesco Colonna personally and feels that he is exactly the man they require. May Lt. Col. TAYLOR be informed if this would be possible?

FURTHER POINTS FROM MAJOR CAHEN-BERT

- (1) May he be included in distribution list of AFHQ Censorship extracts. He does not see these at all and feels that he ought to do so.
- (2) 8 Army most interested in Italian Army Welfare. 4 mobile canteens already working. 12 women volunteers under the Duchessa Visconti are working. She is also taking on a proportion of female partisans.
- (3) The Italians when they opened their canteens threw them open to all Allied troops. It was explained to them that the question of canteens being reserved for certain sections of troops was a supply question but that their gesture was much appreciated. These canteens are now only for Italians.
- (4) Co-operators have been used by 1 Dist. They have come into contact with Italian Army personnel which should be avoided whenever possible because of the different treatment of co-operators.
- (5) FRIULI and FOLGONE will be resting probably until 5 May.

5290

FURTHER POINTS FROM MAJOR CACCHIA-IRBIT

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30 APRIL 1945

Distribution:

C of S
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GSD
GSI
A
Q

MAIL TO BEAR EIGHTH MAY

cc1.

R. S. A. Green - Rome

Captain
GIR 'I' (L)

CONFIDENTIAL

POINTS FROM TOUR OF GILL (I) LIAISON IN FWD AREA
APRIL 22 TO 28

Action Branch

1. MORALE OF TFS

Morale of the Groups is very high. Desertions very few. Morale of Service Troops is not so high as they suffer by comparison with the Combat Tps and do not get British M&AFI.

CSI

2. CENSORSHIP IN REAR AREAS

MAJ GALEW-HUNT: Could the Field Postcard be issued as soon as possible. It is most urgently required.

Q

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GBI

3. COUNTER-MEASURES IN FORM OF PROPAGANDA TO FORESTALL DESERTION

Capt NEWSTEAD GILL 'I' (B) 8 ARMY: Suggested explanatory articles on leave and demobilization in "La Patria" on lines of Aldridge's articles in "UNION JACK".

A

4. PATRIOTS

MAJ. COLQUHOUN GILL CIVIL LIAISON 8 ARMY

(a) Can Ranks and Temporary Ranks for Patriots be implemented as soon as possible? This is most urgent as it affects pensions and pay. MAJ. COL QUHOUN got the impression from PALERMO, Under-Sec. of State for War, that M&AFI were sitting on this problem.

(b) Desertion: If the patriot leader is good and if short leaves are granted for patriots to see their families when liberated there is

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GBI

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(c) It is intended to nominate all 5 Recce Bns. Libero's Band has been nominated as the third. There are still considerable numbers of patriots to be regularized. These are apt to become a problem only if not organized.

GBD

4. PATRIOTS (Cont'd)

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Lt. Col. IRWIN, G-1 SD 8 ARMY

As long as the Banda Melella remains under the Polish Corps the transport can be allocated whenever the Corps wishes and 8 Army cannot interfere.

MAJ. C. J. HAN-HUNT

(e) 2d Garibaldi Bde has done splendidly throughout.

(f) The Banda Melella is very good in the battle but rather troublesome to control when they are out of the line.

(g) There are considerable numbers of patriots prepared to volunteer into the Groups but the wastage has been too small to absorb them.

Capt. WILKIE GILL '1' SO HQU (PRINCE)

The Patriots have been very useful in collecting information and giving locations of minefields, booby traps etc. and acting as guides.

5. "I" SECTIONS IN COMBAT GROUPS

Capt NEWLAND GILL '1' (S) 8 ARMY

The P.S. Sections are very keen but still rather inexperienced. They have caught several agents. They are working hard to make the Groups more security minded.

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GSI

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out. OSI
- (b) The Banda Matella is very good in the battle
but rather troublesome to control when they are
out of the line. OSI
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message has been too small to absorb them. A

Capt. WILHE GILL 'I' 50 HU (FRULLI)

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inexperienced. They have caught several agents. They
are working hard to make the Groups more security mind-
ed. OSI

No political work is passed to the F.S. Sections.
Each F.S. Section has a British F.S. N.C.O. attached
during ops to act as adviser. He passes back any cases
beyond the scope of the Group F.S. Sections. OSI

Capt. WILDE GILL 'I' (B) 50 HU (FRULLI)

- (a) Very satisfied with performance of 'I' Section.
Comparable with that of a British Div. OSI
- (b) The chief trouble is communications in setting
the information back in time to be of use, but the
'I' personnel are fully aware of the urgency of get-
ting fresh information back and to the flanks. OSI

5. "I" SECTIONS IN COMBAT GROUPS (Cont'd)

(c) The German interrogator is rather too young and inexperienced and his German is not quite adequate but he is very keen. During the latest ops the German interrogator from Corps was able to come down and help, so that on the whole the situation was satisfactory.

OSI

(d) The Italian GIII 'I' is very intelligent and capable and the Italian F.S. Officer is technically very sound but rather tactless.

OSI

(e) The enemy Order of Battle was kept very well indeed, quite as good as a British Div and much useful identification was passed back to Corps. For example the 'I' Section, on being informed that there were 2 dead Germans in a minefield on their own initiative retrieved the bodies and obtained a very interesting identification.

OSI

(f) The Group from the Commander downwards is becoming quite alive to the usefulness of intelligence work. For example in spite of rumours, unconfirmed, of atrocities committed on captured Gruppi soldiers by the enemy they continued to take prisoners and hand them over for interrogation.

OSI

(g) The enemy have been using captured Italian soldier paybooks for their agents crossing the line.

OSI

(h) At first the intelligence personnel were overcredulous but with experience they have improved considerably and now grade their information.

OSI

(i) The Italian Intelligence L.O.'s of the Nucleo 'I' have been extremely useful. They already have experience of British intelligence methods.

OSI 51

(j) The 'I' sections in the Groups are organized in exactly the same way as in a British Division.

OSI

Capt M. GILL 'I' 53 Bn (P.O. 1000)

The 'I' Section was very keen and produced better results than might have been expected. They were not

OSI

OSI

(f) The Group from the Commander downwards is becoming quite alive to the usefulness of intelligence work. For example in spite of rumors, unconfirmed, of atrocities committed on captured Gruppi soldiers by the enemy they continued to take prisoners and hand them over for interrogation.

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(i) The Italian intelligence L.O.'s of the Nuclear "I" have been extremely useful. They already have experience of British intelligence methods.

OSI

(j) The "I" sections in the Groups are organized in exactly the same way as in a British Division.

OSI

The "I" Section was very keen and produced better results than might have been expected. They were not however up to British standard. There was a tendency to be too watertight and not pass on information. The Group is very apt to talk insecurely but this is improving gradually. The chief difficulty is in fact the Italian character, but within this limitation their work was good.

Capt M. GAZ GHI "I" 53 MU (FOLIO 2)

6. ITALIAN SECURITY

Capt NEWSTEAD GIII 'I' (B) 8 Army

- (a) Careless talk is the besetting sin. OSI
- (b) Posters: 8 Army are already having Security posters printed by PWB. These are designs that were put forward by Germans. OSI
- (c) Security Propaganda: Suggested a weekly Security paragraph in "LA LAVORIA". 6.8. Ex-plain the reasons for not carrying civilians in military transport, that suspects can be carried through controls by military vehicles, thus making it more difficult to catch agents. OSI

This failing is very widespread among Italian Troops.

POINTS FROM Security Reports

- (a) The practice of using civilians and leave personnel for conveying letters is very widespread but most of the letters intercepted have proved to be purely private matters. OSI
- (b) Italian girls who go out with Allies have been threatened by Italian combat type and others - in particular at RAVENNA. In some cases this proved to be mere showing off on the part of newly-joined soldiers. OSI
- (c) Folgore Group, particularly the Nembo, show a tendency to boast and give away plans. OSI
- (d) There is evidence that the Germans are using captured Italian paybooks for long range patrols. 51
- (e) Combat type persist in carrying civilians on military transport in spite of the prohibition. OSI
- (f) Explosives stolen from 187 P.M.C. proved to have been stolen for fishing purposes. OSI

7. POSSIBILITY OF ITALIAN TYS MAKING OFF WITH ARMY VEHICLES

Capt NEWSTEAD GIII 'I' (B) 8 Army

This failing is very widespread among Italian Troops.

POINTS FROM SECURITY REPORTS

- OSI
- (a) The practice of using civilians and leave personnel for conveying letters is very widespread but most of the letters intercepted have proved to be purely private matters.
- OSI
- (b) Italian girls who go out with Allies have been threatened by Italian combat troops and others - in particular at RAVENNA. In some cases this proved to be mere showing off on the part of newly-joined soldiers.
- OSI
- (c) Folgore Group, particularly the Nembo, show a tendency to boast and give away plans.
- OSI
- (d) There is evidence that the Germans are using captured Italian paybooks for long range patrols.
- OSI
- (e) Combat troops persist in carrying civilians on military transport in spite of the prohibition.
- OSI
- (f) Explosives stolen from 127 F.A.C. proved to have been stolen for fishing purposes.

7. POSSIBILITY OF ITALIAN TROOPS MAKING OFF WITH ARMY VEHICLES

Capt NEWSTEAD GILL 'I' (B) 6 Army

The check points for Italian troops at Army Rear Bay are manned by Italian personnel. Normally this works very well, but should Italian troops make off with military vehicles from the South to visit their families in the North it is quite possible that the check points might be overrun. It is doubtful whether Army could spare additional British GMP personnel.

The British GMP check Italian troops going out of Army Area.

FURTHER POINTS FROM CAPT NEWSTEAD GILL 'I' (B) - ARMY

OSI

- (1) There is a rumour among Italian troops that they are going to be used in the Far East. This is causing some dependency.
- (2) Would it be possible to tie up the leave policy at Army Group level so that decisions should apply to both armies. At the moment there are discrepancies.

A

Note: Maj CAREW-HUNT is dealing with this matter. He does not think that Army Group can lay anything down but that the two armies must agree on a policy between themselves.

FURTHER POINTS FROM LT. COL. IRVAN G-1 SD 8 ARMY

(1) MS's of Combat Groups

GSD

- Many suggestions have come in from Corps to some extent disagreeing with one another.
- 8 Army will sort these out as quickly as possible and put up a suggestion.
- However this may take some time owing to operations.
- The general principle will be that operational necessities must be found but that anything that is not absolutely necessary will not be considered.

FURTHER POINTS FROM PRIULLI

5105

- (1) Could hospitals down south hold clothing to re-equip combat troops? In cases of wounds these patients are often discharged without battle dress and hospitals apply to the Groups to send down clothing. Major CAREW-HUNT has written a letter asking that hospitals be authorized to hold 5% clothing of combat patients held.
- (2) Military cigarettes have not been received since approx 15 Mar. Major CAREW-HUNT is dealing with this.
- (3) Priulli carried out a most gallant action against prepared positions across the SENIO.

OSI(Corps)

FURTHER POINTS FROM LT. COL. IRVAN G-1 SD 8 ARMY

(1) M3's of Combat Groups

Many suggestions have come in from Corps to some extent disagreeing with one another.

8 Army will sort these out as quickly as possible and put up a suggestion.

However this may take some time owing to operations.

The general principle will be that operational necessities must be found but that anything that is not absolutely necessary will not be considered.

FURTHER POINTS FROM FRIULI

(1) Could Hospitals down south hold clothing to re-equip cured combat troops? In cases of wounds these patients are often discharged without battle dress and hospitals apply to the Groups to send down clothing. Major GAREN-HUNT has written a letter asking that hospitals be authorized to hold 5% clothing of combat patients held.

(2) Milit cigarettes have not been received since approx 15 Mar. Major GAREN-HUNT is dealing with this.

(3) Friuli carried out a most gallant action against prepared positions across the SMO.

011(0rs)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

1206

5135

FURTHER POINTS FROM FOLLOW-UP

- (1) Lt. Col. TAYLOR G-1 was very sorry that Maj MONICO was taken away. He was most useful to them as he was bi-lingual and extremely good at dealing with situations requiring tact.
- (2) Lt. Col. TAYLOR is most anxious to have Francesco Colonna attached to the HQU as a Liaison Officer. He is completely bi-lingual and is very good at translating and interpreting quickly complicated army matters. Lt. Col. TAYLOR knows Francesco Colonna personally and feels that he is exactly the man they require. May Lt. Col. TAYLOR be informed if this would be possible?

FURTHER POINTS FROM MAJOR GARDEN-HUNT

- (1) May he be included on distribution list of AFHQ Centerality extracts. He does not see these at all and feels that he ought to do so.
- (2) 8 Army most interested in Italian Army Welfare. 4 mobile canteens already working. 12 women volunteers under the Duchessa Visconti are working. She is also taking on a proportion of female partisans.
- (3) The Italians when they opened their canteens threw them open to all allied troops. It was explained to them that the question of canteens being reserved for certain sections of troops was a supply question but that their gesture was much appreciated. These canteens are now only for Italians.
- (4) Co-operators have been used by 1 Dist. They have come into contact with Italian Army personnel which should be avoided whenever possible because of the different treatment of co-operators.
- (5) FRUHLI and FUSCOGGI will be resting probably until 5 May.

24 June - Rome

Lt. Col. TAYLOR be examined if this would be possible?

FURTHER POINTS FROM MAJOR CACER-HUNT

OSI

(1) May be included on distribution list of AFHQ Censorship extracts. He does not see these at all and feels that he ought to do so.

A

(2) 9 army most interested in Italian Army Welfare. 4 mobile canteens already working. 12 women volunteers under the Duchessa Visconti are working. She is also taking on a proportion of female partisans.

Q

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A

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(5) FRIVOLI and POLICCHI will be resting probably until 5 May.

30 April 1945

Distribution:

- C of S
- GSO 1
- GSD
- GSI
- A
- Q

MAIL ROOM NEAR BIRMINGHAM

cel.

R. S. A. Green - Rumer
Captain
GIII 'I' (L)

15 Apr 45

NOTES FOR G III (I) LIAISON

1. G III (I) LIAISON will visit:
 - (a) Italian Combat Groups and Hqs.
 - (b) Italian Div Hqs.
 - (c) GSI Staffs 15 Army Group, Corps and Districts.
2. All visits will be subject to the approval of the senior HQ concerned.
3. All points raised by junior Hqs will be passed by G III (I) Liaison through next senior formation.
4. Has the officer at the Combat Div HQ organized a good system of 'I' work in the Div and is the G III (I) of the Hq satisfied?
5. State briefly what type of information is received on the enemy and how is it passed. i.e. Is the 'I' section in the Combat Group pulling its weight?
6. What situation maps are kept showing enemy positions, identifying formations, etc?
7. What is the procedure in the Groups for handling PW and captured enemy documents?
8. Do Bn Int officers submit daily Int Sitreps to Gp HQ? What are they like?
9. Is there an official officer interrogator in the Combat Groups? Who is he? Has he a good knowledge of the German Army? Is useful information obtained?
10. Do Bn and Gp Int officers keep their COs up to date on all current 'I' matters?
11. What is the standard of the FES work? Do they know ⁵¹⁰³ their functions? What results have they had up to date?

What is the security like in the Groups of:

 - (a) Information
 - (b) Documents
 - (c) PW and Line.
12. Do Italian Int Officers give talks and lectures to their men on security? Is the Gp well supplied with 'I' pamphlets and security posters?

- 1210
5. State briefly what type of information is received and how is it passed, i.e. is the 'I' section in the Combat Group pulling its weight?
 6. What situation maps are kept showing enemy positions, identifying formations, etc?
 7. What is the procedure in the Groups for handling PW and captured enemy documents?
 8. Do Bn Int officers submit daily Int Sitreps to Cp HQ? What are they like?
 9. Is there an official officer interrogator in the Combat Groups? Who is he? Has he a good knowledge of the German Army? Is useful information obtained?
 10. Do Bn and Cp Int officers keep their COs up to date on all current 'I' matters?
 11. What is the standard of the PSS work? Do they know their functions? What results have they had up to date?
S.I.C.S.
What is the security like in the Groups of:
 - (a) Information
 - (b) Documents
 - (c) RT and Line.
 12. Do Italian Int Officers give talks and lectures to their men on security? Is the Cp well supplied with 'I' pamphlets and security posters?
 13. What is morale like in the Divs? How does morale in the Italian Combat Groups compare with Allied formations?
 14. How is the Unit censorship carried out?
 15. Are GSI/G2 staffs at Army, Corps and Army Group satisfied with the information obtained through Italian sources?
 16. Are there any special problems in connection with the Italian Army which:
 - (a) G III (I) Liaison could solve on the spot, or
 - (b) bring back to GSI BRIA.

Circs (2).
File
CIV.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

TRANSLATION.

FROM: War Ministry

REF: 107190/1/4.

TO: S.S. Generale

DATE: 30 March 1945

M.M.I.A. for info.

SUBJECT: Operational contribution given to the Allies
in the month of February 1945 by Patriot
formations.

Reference letter 307293/GA dated 27 December 1944, of
this Ministry.

We forward enclosed:-

- monthly report on the operational activities of the patriots;
- situation of the patriot formations operating on the 5th. Army front.

Sgd. IOMBARDI

Col.

C. DANIN CPL.

[Handwritten signature]

[Handwritten signature]

5167

MMI
100/105
2/4

TRANSLATION.

WAR MINISTRY

Cabinet

SUBJECT: Operational contribution given to the Allies by
Patriot formations during the month of February 1945.

OPERATIONAL CONTRIBUTION GIVEN BY PATRIOT FORMATIONS

Numerous formations have operated with Allied and Italian
troops during the month of February.

Of their activities ^{reports have been received to the} ~~have been received to the~~ information
regarding the activity of the 28 Garibaldi Brigade "Mario Gordini",
the 30 Garibaldi Brigade "Biancamano", and the loss of the
"Banda della Marella", in the months of December and January.

1) - Garibaldi Brigade "Mario Gordini"

The Brigade, ^{having moved to} ~~located at~~ the line held by the "Cremona"
Group in the sector between the villages of S. Alberto and S. Balladara
(583548) ^{on 4} ~~the~~ the 12th. January, was placed under the tactical command of
of that Group w.e.f. from 19th. February.

- Commandant: Bulow (Lieut. Mario Boldrini, Reserve, - Gold medal)
- Strength: 420 men and one woman, split up into 12 Companies.
- Operational activities carried out between 12/1 and 28/2:-

- Patrols, hand to hand fighting, and counter-attacks intended to:-

- . occupy advanced positions on the left causeway of
the Reno and organise observation posts;
- . contain enemy attacks.

- Action for the assistance of civilians resident in occupied
area to facilitate passage through the lines.

During the above mentioned actions the localities of:-

- la Scorticata (579544)
- C. Guardia (529527)

were occupied.

In particular it must be pointed out:-

5101

- on the 25th. January elements of Company 4 rescued a South-African pilot who baled out in German occupied territory;
- on the 26th. and 27th. January 50 civilians were helped to pass through the lines to avoid being rounded up by the Germans;
- on the 21st. February a large German patrol attempted to surprise an advanced position; the speedy reaction of the position inflicted seven dead on the enemy;
- on the 25th. February a patrol rescued 3 English pilots who fell in German occupied territory.

On many occasions the Allied Authorities have expressed their pleasure with the boldness displayed by the formation in the carrying out of tasks entrusted to them.

On the 4th. February General MacCreery decorated Lieutenant Boldrini with the Gold medal.

2) - 32 Garibaldi Brigade "Bianconcini"

- Commandant: COLINELLI Libero (ex Dozer).
- Strength: since November about 1000 men (500 enlisted in the Army)
- Operational Activities carried out:-
 - . October 1944: liberation of the areas of Visignano, Verdignano, Piancaldoli, Monte La Fine.
 - . January 1945: liberation of Borgo Tassignano.
- + Losses inflicted on the enemy: over 1000 dead.
- At present it is under the command of the 6th. British Armoured Division.

3) - Banda della Maiella;

The losses suffered in war operations in the months of December 1944 and January 1945 have been:-

- Dead 17 (incl. 1 officer).
- Wounded 51 (incl. 1 officer).
- Missing 1

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

et

FORMAZIONI PARTIGIANE IN LINEA SUL FRONTE DELLA V^a ARMATA
(situazione riferita al 10 marzo)

N o m i n a t i v o	
della formazione	: del comandante
"Modena"	:
	:
	:
	: Armando
	:
"Bologna"	:
	:
	: capitano Pietri
	:
	:
Gruppi patrioti "P"	:
	:
	: Pippo
	:
	:
	:
	:
	: Villa
	:
	:
	:
	:
	: Totale dei pa
	: giani in line
	: con la V ^a Arm
	:
	:

5179

1215

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

File D
10.

FROM: NMIA
TO: SC ELL
SI ELL
SR ELL
SS ELL

01 1440 A

INFO: S ARMY

INT: 01

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR NMIA LO's (.) REF OUR I 162 OF 16 JAN AND OUR INT 183 OF 21 FEB (.)
REQUEST WEEKLY BIRTHS ON COMBAT OF ACHIEVEMENTS BE CLASSIFIED SECRET
AND NOT RPT NOT TOPSECRET REF DATE OF THIS SIGNAL

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

AUTHENTICATED [Signature]

cgl.

5178



SEGRETO

STATO MAGGIORE R. ESERCITO

UFFICIO OPERAZIONI
E ADDESTRAMENTO

N. 2197 *noi.* Op.

Allegati 1 relazione (con 1 lucido)

P.M. 1800, li 23

marzo 1945

Risposta al foglio N.

OGGETTO: contributo operativo dato agli Alleati nel mese di febbraio

*45 da parte di unità e reparti del R. Esercito.

Operational assistance given to the Allies in February by units of Italian Army

ALLO STATO MAGGIORE GENERALE - Uff. Oper.

e, per conoscenza:



ALLA LAND FORCES SUR COMMISSION A.C. (MELA)
ALLO S.M.R.E. - Ufficio Storico

P.M. 1800
P.M. 1800

R.O.M.A.
S.E.D.E.

51

Riferimento foglio 307293/CA 313-II-11 in data 27 dicembre 1944
del Ministero della Guerra - Gabinetto, si trasmette, in allegato, la relazione mensile sull'argomento specificato in oggetto.



IL GENERALE ADDETTO
(Giorgio Iannini)

Ghiubli

OGGETTO:

contributo operativo dato agli Alleati nel mese di dicembre
1945 da parte di unità e reparti del R.Esercito.
*Operational assistance given to the Allies in
February by units of Italian Army
in Ministry of War - Gabinetto*
P.M. 3800
P.M. 3800

e, per conoscenza:

ALLA LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION A.C. (MOTIA) R.O.M.A.
ALLO S.M.R.E. - Ufficio Storico S.E.D.E.

51

Riferimento foglio 307293/CA in data 27 dicembre 1944
313-II-11
del Ministero della Guerra - Gabinetto, si trasmette, in allegato, la relazione mensile sull'argomento specificato in oggetto.



IL GENERALE ADDETTO
(Giorgio Luzzi)

Ghivelli

SECRET

MM
INT/102
DATE: 2/3

SECRET

SECRET

SEGRETO

STATO MAGGIORE REGIO ESERCITO
UFFICIO OPERAZIONI E ADDESTRAMENTO
Sessione Operazioni

N° 2197/Op. di prot.

P.M. 3800, 11.23 marzo 1945

OGGETTO: contributo operativo dato agli Alleati da parte di unità e reparti del R. Esercito nel mese di febbraio 1945.

I) - GRUPPO DI COMBATTIMENTO "CREMONA"

Carta topografica (edizione inglese):

- 1:25.000 (Alfonsine - S. Alberto - Mandriole)
- 1:100.000 (Foglie 89 - Ravenna).

a) - Dipendenza.

V Corpo d'Armata inglese: dalle ore 0600 del 16 febbraio.

b) - Schieramento.

Dal 21 febbraio il settore del Gruppo è stato contratto sulla sinistra fino al canale di bonifica destro del Reno perchè il III/22 e la 6° cp. del II/22 sono stati sostituiti dal 12° Lancieri.

c) - Notizie sul nemico.

- 1) - Per il ritiro della 16° divisione SS. la 42° divisione Jäger ha ampliato il suo settore: a sud fino alla ferrovia Ravenna-Alfonsine compresa; e a nord-est fino alla riva ovest delle Valli di Comacchio.

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5170

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La 710° divisione (schierata a sud delle Valli di Comacchio) è stata, in un primo tempo sostituita, dalla 114°

./.

divisione e, spostatasi questa nel settore a N.W. di Porretta Terme, da altre unità non ancora precisate.

2) - Accentuata attività lavorativa per il rafforzamento dei lavori campali.

3) - Notevole l'attività propagandistica con lancio di manifestini e radio-trasmissioni.

4) - Attività operativa del Gruppo

1) - Azioni di pattuglie e contrasalti tendenti a :

- mantenere le posizioni avanzate attaccate dal nemico;
- infliggere perdite al nemico e disturbarne l'attività lavorativa;
- conoscere le intenzioni del nemico;
- precisare la consistenza e la natura dei lavori e catturare prigionieri;
- raccogliere informazioni.

51.5

2) - Contrattacchi e contrasalti contro azioni nemiche diurne e notturne :

- nei giorni 1 e 2 febbraio, il nemico, dopo intensa preparazione di artiglieria, attaccava energicamente impegna-
quando quasi tutto il settore del 22° fanteria.

L'azione iniziata alle ore 20 del giorno 1 terminava verso le ore 11 del giorno 2;

- nella notte tra il 5 ed il 6, grosse pattuglie nemiche tentavano infiltrarsi nel settore del 22° reggimento ed in corrispondenza della linea di contatto tra questo set-

d) - Attività operativa del campo1) - Azioni di pattuglie e contrassalti tendenti a:

- mantenere le posizioni avanzate attaccate dal nemico;
- infliggere perdite al nemico e disturbarne l'attività lavorativa;
- conoscere le intenzioni del nemico;
- precisare la consistenza e la natura dei lavori e catturare prigionieri;
- raccogliere informazioni.

5178

2) - Contrattacchi e contrassalti contro azioni nemiche diurne e notturne:

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- nella notte tra il 5 ed il 6, grosse pattuglie nemiche tentavano infiltrarsi nel settore del 22° reggimento ed in corrispondenza della linea di contatto tra questo settore e quello contermino del 2° fanteria mentre altra forte pattuglia attaccava le nostre posizioni di Podere Barrozi (502518) e Casa Matteucci (505518). Verso le ore 7

.../...

del 6 un violento attacco, con l'impiego di lanciafiamme, veniva effettuato contro il presidio di Casa Ferraresi (635536);

- nella notte sul 21, violenta azione contro un nostro posto avanzato a nord di Casa Ferraresi (635551) e contro il caposaldo di questa località;
- la notte sul 28 colpo di mano su un posto avanzato del II/22°.

In tutte le azioni i reparti impiegati hanno sempre risposto decisamente, prima contenendo il nemico poi trattandolo ed infliggendogli sempre perdite.

3) - Lavori difensivi consistenti:

- nella posa di campi minati;
- nella rimozione di mine;
- nel riattamento e manutenzione della rete stradale (5173) cui sono stati impiegati anche 300 operai civili);
- nella costruzione di tre ponti Bailey di cui uno lungo 45 metri e di un ponte su barche da 3 t. lungo metri 30.

L'attività degli artiglieri per il mantenimento in efficienza della rete stradale è stata veramente encomiabile specialmente durante il periodo di pioggia ed intenso traffico fino dovuto al cambio dei battaglioni in linea.

4) - Difesa controaerea della città di Ravenna.

Il VI Gruppo del 7° artiglieria è rientrato il giorno 27 dalla zona di Numana (Ancona), dove trovavasi in addestramento.

In tutte le azioni i reparti impiegati hanno sempre risposto decisamente, prima contenendo il nemico poi contrastandolo ed infliggendogli sempre perdite.

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L'attività degli artiglieri per il mantenimento in efficienza della rete stradale è stata veramente encomiabile specialmente durante il periodo di pioggia ed intenso traffico dovuto al cambio dei battaglioni in linea.

4) - Difesa controaerea della città di Ravenna.

Il VI Gruppo del 7° artiglieria è rientrato il giorno 27 dalla zona di Numana (Ancona), dove trovavasi in addestramento, e si è schierato nella zona di Ravenna in difesa o.s. della città.

...//...

e) - Perdite subite ed inflitte :

Perdite subite :

- morti : 37 (di cui 3 ufficiali)
- feriti : 55 (di cui 4 ufficiali)
- dispersi : 29

Perdite inflitte accertate :

- morti : 21
- feriti : 26
- materiali catturati :
 - . 1 fucile automatico Beretta
 - . 5 Maschinengewehr
 - . 6 Bazookas
 - . 2 pistole automatiche
 - . materiali vari.

f) - Episodi salienti di valore.

- s. ten. MASSUCCIO Giovanni del 21° fanteria : 51
Comandante di un posto avanzato, particolarmente esposto e completamente isolato oltre un corso d'acqua, benchè ferito durante un violento e prolungato bombardamento avversario, manteneva il plotone saldo e pronto alla reazione, sosteneva con calma e decisione il successivo attacco del nemico, che volgeva in fuga con il pronto e preciso intervento delle proprie armi automatiche e con lancio di bombe a mano.

- fante RUSTICELLI Armando del 21° fanteria :
Durante un attacco tedesco, avvertito l'inceppamento di due mitragliatrici del proprio caposquadra, di iniziativa provvede alla sostituzione delle due armi in linea, attraversando

- morti : 21
- feriti : 26

- Materiali catturati :

- . 1 fucile automatico Beretta
- . 5 Maschinengewehr
- . 6 Bazookas
- . 2 pistole automatiche
- . materiali vari.

f) - Episodi salienti di valore.

- s. ten. MASSUCCIO Giovanni del 21° fanteria :

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Comandante di un posto avanzato, particolarmente esposto e completamente isolato oltre un corso d'acqua, benché ferito durante un violento e prolungato bombardamento avversario, manteneva il plotone saldo e pronto alla reazione, sosteneva con calma e decisione il successivo attacco del nemico, che volgeva in fuga con il pronto e preciso intervento delle proprie armi automatiche e con lancio di bombe a mano.

- fante RUSTICHELLI Armando del 21° fanteria :

Durante un attacco tedesco, avvertito l'inceppamento di due mitragliatori del proprio caposaldo, di iniziativa provvedeva alla sostituzione delle due armi in linea, attraversando a tale scopo zona intensamente battuta da mitragliatrici e da mortai avversari.

.../...

- s. ten. BELLINI Carlo del 22° fanteria :

Comandante di un caposaldo avanzato, resisteva per ben 7 ore a violenti reiterati attacchi nemici effettuati con appoggio di artiglierie e mortai. Ridotto il presidio ad un pugno di uomini, rispondeva alle ripetute intimidazioni di resa col fuoco delle proprie armi e sosteneva con l'esempio del suo valore i propri dipendenti costringendo il nemico a desistere dall'attacco.

- sergente DAVI' Dante del 22° fanteria :

Comandante di squadra cannoni da 6 libbre, durante un forte attacco tedesco, viste le sensibili perdite subite dal reparto del caposaldo, riuniva i pochi uomini di cui disponeva e si lanciava risolutamente al contrassalto contribuendo validamente a stroncare l'attacco nemico.

- cap. magg. MACI' Livio del 22° fanteria :

Comandante di nucleo mortai, già promosso al grado superiore per essersi distinto in precedenti azioni, durante un violento attacco nemico si prodigava personalmente a servizio dell'arma: ferito ad un braccio, persisteva nella sua azione incitando i compagni all'accanita resistenza.

517-

- il 1° plotone della 7° compagnia II/22° :

Attaccato e quasi accerchiato da forze preponderanti che sottoponevano il caposaldo ad intenso fuoco di mortai, artiglieria ed armi automatiche, resisteva per circa 7 ore pur essendo ridotto dal fuoco nemico a pochi uomini validi. Alle ripetute intimidazioni di resa rispondeva con fuoco dalle armi e col lancio di bombe a mano, finché il nemico era co-

1 2 2 7

sempio del suo valore i propri dipendenti costringendo il nemico a desistere dall'attacco.

- sergente DAVI' Dante del 22° fanteria :
Comandante di squadra cannoni da 6 libbre, durante un forte attacco tedesco, viste le sensibili perdite subite dal reparto del caposaldo, riuniva i pochi uomini di cui disponeva e si lanciava risolutamente al contrassalto contribuendo validamente a stroncare l'attacco nemico.

- cap. magg. MACII Livio del 22° fanteria :
Comandante di nucleo mortai, già promosso al grado superiore per essersi distinto in precedenti azioni, durante un violento attacco nemico si prodigava personalmente a servizio dell'arma: ferito ad un braccio, persisteva nella sua azione incitando i compagni all'accanita resistenza. 517-

- il 1° plotone della 7ª compagnia IX/22° :
Attaccato e quasi accerchiato da forze preponderanti che sottoponevano il caposaldo ad intenso fuoco di mortai, artiglieria ed armi automatiche, resisteva per circa 7 ore pur essendo ridotto dal fuoco nemico a pochi uomini validi. Alle ripetute intimidazioni di resa rispondeva con fuoco delle armi e col lancio di bombe a mano, finchè il nemico era costretto a desistere dall'attacco.

- fante CELLI Ignazio del 21° fanteria :
Ardito, esperto guastatore, sempre primo dove maggiore era il pericolo, si offriva volontario per una rischiosa azione

..//..

di pattuglia. Incontrato un campo minato sotto le postazioni nemiche si spingeva avanti per riconoscere ubicazione e tipo. Perduto il piede sinistro per l'esplosione di una mina invitava stoicamente i compagni a non preoccuparsi di lui ed a sottrarsi al fuoco nemico che in seguito allo scoppio si era scatenato violento. Più tardi durante il trasporto di medicazione, conscio del suo stato si rammaricava con un ufficiale di non poter essere più in grado di combattere contro l'odiatto tedesco.

Bell'esempio di profondo amor patrio e di spirito di sacrificio.

- s. ten. GEBBIA Antonio del 21° fanteria :

Comandante di plotone fucilieri, ultimato l'attacco ad una postazione nemica fortemente presidziata, volontariamente, e per ben due volte, sotto forte reazione di mortai nemici, si portava in zona battuta per soccorrere e portare a spalla nelle nostre linee due militari del suo plotone gravemente feriti dimostrando sprezzo del pericolo, sentimenti di umanità ed attaccamento ai suoi uomini.

- sergente SCARSAOLI Giuseppe del 21° fanteria :

517
Comandante di squadra fucilieri durante l'attacco sferrato contro una munita postazione nemica, dimostrava eccezionali doti di ardimento trascinando contro l'orte reazione nemica di armi automatiche, i suoi uomini.

Perito gravemente da scheggia di mortaio alle gambe ed alle braccia continuava ad incitare i suoi soldati dando luminoso

esempio di alto spirito militare.

un ufficiale di non poter essere più in grado di combattere contro l'odiatore tedesco.

Bell'esempio di profondo amor patrio e di spirito di sacrificio.

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- sergente SPANSAOLI Giuseppe del 21° fanteria : ⁵¹⁷

Comandante di squadra fucilieri durante l'attacco sferrato contro una munita postazione nemica, dimostrava eccezionali doti di ardimento trascinando contro forte reazione nemica di armi automatiche, i suoi uomini.

Ferite gravemente da scheggia di mortaio alle gambe ed alle braccia continuava ad incitare i suoi soldati dando luminoso prova di sereno coraggio e di alte virtù militari.

- fante FAGGIOLI Armando del 21° fanteria :

Di sentinella ad una postazione avanzata attaccato da forte pattuglia nemica vista cadere ferito il compagno raccoglieva l'arma automatica sfuggita dalle mani di questi e continuava

va a far fuoco contro l'avversario che era costretto a ritirarsi.

Al termine dell'azione, ferito egli stesso, si preoccupava della sorte del compagno.

Esempio di cameratismo e di attaccamento al dovere.

- maggiore BUONGIOVANNI Alberto Com/te del II/22° ftr. :
Comandante di un battaglione fucilieri assolveva il suo compito con perizia, calma, fermezza e coraggio, tenendo alto anche in momenti duri lo spirito dei propri uomini provati da numerose azioni e da snerpanti servizi di "linea" a causa di un'eccezionale scarsità di forza del reparto.

- sergente MANDORLA Umberto op. mortai 22° fanteria :
Durante il tiro di artiglieria e di mortai nemici, raggiungeva per primo le postazioni assegnate alla sua squadra, attraversando zona intensamente battuta dal fuoco avversario.

Perito, in successivo combattimento, da scheggia ad una gamba, si rifiutava di essere avviato al posto di medicazione rimanendo quantunque dolente e menomato, sul posto insieme ai compagni della sua squadra, accorrendo là ove maggiore si presentava il pericolo.

5170

- fante RONDONI Pietro op. mortai 22° fanteria :
Chiedeva con insistenza di abbandonare il posto che occupava in furia per far parte di una squadra mortai. Durante un concentramento di fuoco di mortai nemici sulle postazioni, si distingueva per coraggio e serenità ed era

Comandante di un battaglione fucilieri assolveva il suo compito con perizia, calma, fermezza e coraggio, tenendo alto anche in momenti duri lo spirito dei propri uomini provati da numerose azioni e da unervanti servizi di "linea" a causa di un'eccezionale scarsità di forma dei reparti.

- sergente MANDORIA Umberto cp. mortai 22° fanteria :

Durante il tiro di artiglieria e di mortai nemici, raggiungeva per prime le postazioni assegnate alla sua squadra, attraversando zona intensamente battuta dal fuoco avversario.

Ferito, in successive combattimenti, da scheggia ad una gamba, si rifiutava di essere avviato al posto di medicazione rimanendo qualunque dolente e menomato, sul posto insieme ai compagni della sua squadra, accorrendo là ove maggiore si presentava il pericolo.

5170

- fante RONDONI Pietro cp. mortai 22° fanteria :

Chiedeva con insistenza di abbandonare il posto che occupava in furia per far parte di una squadra mortai. Durante un concentramento di fuoco di mortai nemici sulle postazioni, si distingueva per coraggio e serenità ed era di costante esempio ed incitamento ai compagni.

S.A.R. il Luogotenente del Regio, in occasione della sua visita al Gruppo ha decorato al valore, sul campo, 4

...//...

ufficiali e 14 sottufficiali e truppe.

g) - Riconoscimenti ed elogi di autorità alleate.

Il generale C. FOULKES, comandante del I C.A. canadese, in occasione del trasferimento della sua G.U. ha espresso il suo compiacimento per il soddisfacente grado di addestramento dei reparti e per l'ottimo comportamento dimostrato in ogni occasione.

II) - GRUPPO DI COMBATTIMENTO "FRIULI"

Carta topografica (edizione inglese) :

- 1:25.000 (Tessignane - Castel Bolognese - Castel Senio - Bristghella
- 1:100.000 (foglio 99 - Faenza).

a) - Dipendenza.

Dalle ore 10 del giorno 9 alle ore 06.00 del 13 febbraio dal V C.A. britannico, dopo tale ore dal II C.A. Polacco.

b) - Schieramento.

Il Gruppo ha dalle ore 10.00 del giorno 9 febbraio sostituito in linea la 5^a divisione "Kresowa" sulla dorsale tra i fiumi Senio e Lamone (attestato al Senio tra le località di Rivola e Cuffiane compresa) con 3 btg. in 1^o scaglione (vedi lucido allegato).

c) - Notizie sul nemico.

- 1) - Secondo informazioni avute da prigionieri risulta che nel settore si trovino truppe della 715^a divisione di

addestramento dei reparti e per l'ottimo comportamento dimostrato in ogni occasione.

II) - GRUPPO DI COMBATTIMENTO "FRIULI"

Carta topografica (edizione inglese) :

- 1:25.000 (Tessignane - Castel Folognese - Castel Senio - Brischella)
- 1:100.000 (foglio 99 - Vienna).

a) - Dipendenza.

Dalle ore 10 del giorno 9 alle ore 06.00 del 13 febbraio del V C.A. britannico, dopo tale ore dal II C.A. Polacco.

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c) - Notizie sul nemico.

- 1) - Secondo informazioni avute da prigionieri risulta che nel settore si trovino truppe della 715^a divisione di fanteria e della 90^a divisione motorizzata granatieri; è probabile però che quest'ultima sia stata recentemente sostituita da altra grande unità.
- 2) - Il nemico è stato molto attivo con pattuglie numerose ed agguerrite ma i risultati da esso ottenuti sono stati

...//...

nulli. Ha fatto largo uso di mortai impiegando con parsimonia l'artiglieria.

Da informazioni avute risulta che tutti i trasporti sono effettuati a soma e con carreggio per mancanza di automezzi e carburante.

d) - Attività operativa del Gruppo.

E' stata caratterizzata da una intensa attività di pattuglie, in totale 245, con compiti vari di appostamento, ascolto, sicurezza, collegamento.

Nell'assolvimento di questi compiti le pattuglie hanno sempre dimostrato iniziativa, spregiudicatezza e coraggio riportando preziose notizie ed infliggendo perdite al nemico.

In particolare :

- nella giornata del 24 e nella notte sul 25 Febbraio venne re impiegate forti pattuglie per constatare l'entità della occupazione nemica in alcune località sulla riva sinistra del fiume Senio; venivano occupate due posizioni già meta di pattuglie nemiche e dalle quali si controllavano e disturbavano le nostre posizioni di V.Zacchia e C.Berlanfusa;

513

- il giorno 27, il nemico, (che aveva già in precedenza inutilmente tentato a varie riprese con pattuglie di 20 - 30 uomini di rioccupare dette posizioni) attaccava con un centinaio di uomini appoggiati dal fuoco di armi automatiche, di mortai e dell'artiglieria. L'attacco si protrasse per circa un'ora dopo di che il nemico era costretto a ripiegare subendo perdite.

d) - Attività operative
 E' stata caratterizzata da una intensa attività di pattuglie, in totale 245, con compiti vari di appostamento, ascolto, sicurezza, collegamento.

Nell'assolvimento di questi compiti le pattuglie hanno sempre dimostrato iniziativa, spregiudicatezza e coraggio riportando preziose notizie ed infliggendo perdite al nemico.

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- nella giornata del 24 e nella notte sul 25 febbraio vennero impiegate forti pattuglie per constatare l'entità della occupazione nemica in alcune località sulla riva sinistra del fiume Senio; venivano occupate due posizioni già meta di pattuglie nemiche e delle quali si controllavano e disturbavano le nostre posizioni di V.Zacchia e C.Berlanfusa;

510

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In tutte queste azioni il contegno dei reparti è stato improntato a fermezza e decisione; intensa ed efficace l'azione

...//...

ne dei mortai e delle artiglierie.

1) - Perdite subite ed inflitte.

Perdite subite :

- morti : 18 (di cui 2 ufficiali)
 - feriti : 57 (di cui 2 ufficiali)
 - dispersi : 7 (di cui 5 probabilmente
 caduti ed uno travolto
 dalla corrente del fiume
 Senio).

Perdite inflitte :

- non si sono potute esattamente controllare, ma, secondo informazioni di civili che hanno attraversato le linee, sono da ritenersi considerevoli; due prigionieri catturati.

2) - Episodi salienti di valore.

- Comportamento del s. ten. ftr. s.p.e. PALCO Francesco e del
 fante FONTANA Giuseppe (decorati rispettivamente di medaglia
 d'argento e di bronzo alla memoria) :

« Usciti di pattuglia notturna reagivano energicamente contro
 elementi nemici che li avevano fatti oggetto del loro 546.
 Messa in fuga la pattuglia attaccante, udendo lamenti e grida
 di aiuto da parte di nemici feriti si avvicinavano ad
 essi per catturarli, ma nel tentativo rimanevano vittime
 di una mina nemica. »

- Comportamento della pattuglia al comando del s. ten. granatieri
 COPPOLA :

dalla corrente del fiume Senio).

Perdite inflitte :

- non si sono potute esattamente controllare, ma, secondo informazioni di civili che hanno attraversato le linee, sono da ritenersi considerevoli; due prigionieri catturati.

f) - Episodi salienti di valore.

-Comportamento del s.ten.ftr. s.p.e. FALCO Francesco e del fante FONTANA Giuseppe (decorati rispettivamente di medaglia d'argento e di bronzo alla memoria) :

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- Comportamento della pattuglia al comando del s.ten.granatiere COPPOLA :

"Portatasi in zona nemica per accertare la consistenza della difesa, e fatta segno a forte reazione di armi automatiche e mortai ripiegava soltanto dopo aver brillantemente assolto il suo compito. Il caporale BRT Angelo ferito

...//...

da scheggia di mortaio respingeva ogni offerta di aiuto continuando nell'operazione iniziata e rientrando unitamente ai rimanenti della pattuglia."

-- Comportamento della pattuglia al comando del s. ten. dei Granatieri CAN :

"Raggiunta una località fortemente presidata dal nemico e fatta segno al fuoco di mortaio continuava nel suo compito sinchè non giungeva a contatto di un forte nucleo nemico che tentava di catturarla. Mentre assolto il proprio compito si disimpegnava l'ufficiale e 4 soldati venivano feriti, ciononostante la pattuglia rientrava al completo nelle linee infliggendo perdite al nemico."

In occasione di una sua visita al gruppo di combattimento S.A.A.R. il Luogotenente del Regno ha concesso "motu proprio" le seguenti decorazioni sul campo :

- medaglie d'argento :
 - alla memoria : ufficiali 2 truppa 5108
- medaglie di bronze :
 - a viventi : ufficiali 2 truppa 2.

III) - GRUPPI DI COMBATTIMENTO "LEGNANO" - "POLCORE" - "MANTOVA":

1 2 3 9

nemico e fatta segno al fuoco di mortai continuava nel suo compito sinchè non giungeva a contatto di un forte nucleo nemico che tentava di catturarla. Mentre assolto il proprio compito si disimpegnava l'ufficiale e 4 soldati venivano feriti, ciononostante la pattuglia rientrava al completo nelle linee infliggendo perdite al nemico."

In occasione di una sua visita al gruppo di combattimento S.A.R. il Luogotenente del Regno ha concesso "nota proprio" le seguenti decorazioni sul campo :

- medaglie d'argento :
- alla memoria : ufficiali 2 truppa 5133
- medaglie di bronzo :
- a viventi : ufficiali 2 truppa 2.

III) - GRUPPI DI COMBATTIMENTO "LEGHANO" - "VOLGORE" - "MANTOVA":

In addestramento rispettivamente nelle zone di :

- Radda
- Ascoli Piceno
- S. Giorgio del Sannio.




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
MAPS AND CHARTS TOO LARGE TO FILM
ON ONE EXPOSURE ARE FILMED CLOCKWISE
BEGINNING IN THE UPPER LEFT CORNER,
LEFT TO RIGHT, AND TOP TO BOTTOM.

SEE DIAGRAMS BELOW.




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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020




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
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SCNERAMENTO I.C. & FRULI ALLA DATA 1-3-45

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

11/87
C. Rosen

1/88

Brisighella 88

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11/35

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

Brisighella

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11/87

Gmendo 87-1
Zona FORLI

Scale 1:25 000

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

FROM MMIA
TO 52 BLU
53 BLU

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INT 183

SECRET

REQUEST YOU SUBMIT WEEKLY SITREPS ON COMBAT GPS ACHIEVEMENTS (.) REQUIRED
FOR INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE OF OTHERS

PRECEDENCE IMPORTANT

AUTHENTICATED

W. B. Kelly
[Signature]

ogl

5183

INT/105



STATO MAGGIORE R. ESERCITO

V/g.a.

UFFICIO OPERAZIONI

N. 1539

prot. op.

P.M. 3800, 16 febbraio 1945

Allegati: 1 relazione

OGGETTO: lucido

Risposta al foglio N. 17/2

Contributo dato dall'Esercito alle operazioni degli alleati.-

AL MINISTERO GUERRA - Gabinetto -

ALLO S.M.GENERALE - Uff. Operaz. -

P.M. 3800

P.M. 3800

e, per conoscenza:

ALLA LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION A.C. (M.I.A.)

ALLO S.M.R.E. - Ufficio Storico -

R O M A
S E D E

Riferimento foglio 307293/CA in data 27 dicembre '44 del Ministero della Guerra - Gabinetto-

Si trasmette, in allegato, la relazione mensile sull'argomento specificato all'oggetto e relativa al mese di gennaio 1945.-

IL GENERALE ADDETTO
- Alessandro Santi -

5162

STATO MAGGIORE REGIO ESERCITO
- Ufficio Operazioni -

SECRET

CONTRIBUTO DATO DALL'ESERCITO ALLE OPERAZIONI DEGLI ALLEATI
(mese di gennaio 1945)

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GRUPPI DI COMBATTIMENTO

Il Gruppo di Combattimento "Cremona"

Riferimento carta 1:25.000 - Ediz. inglese - Foglio 89 - Tavolette di: Al
fonsine - S. Alberto - Mandriole.

Il gruppo di combattimento si è trasferito nei giorni 10 - 12 gennaio,
dalla zona di Ascoli Piceno in quella di Ravenna, dando subito il cambio
ad unità della 1^a divisione canadese; il comando del "Cremona" assunse
la responsabilità del settore dalle ore 0600 del giorno 14.

- Dipendenza:

1^o Corpo d'Armata Canadese.

- Schieramento:

Il settore assegnato inizialmente al gruppo "Cremona" era quello
preso fra la ferrovia Ravenna-Alfonzina ed antistante al Fosso Vetre e
F. Reno, sblo il mare. Lo schieramento assunto è illustrato nello schizzo
al 502000 allegato (5 battaglioni di ftr. su 6 oltre le unità partici-
ne in 1^o scaglione); i gruppi del 7^o reggimento artiglieria, ad eccezio-
ne del VI gruppo o.s. ancora in addestramento, dopo aver eseguito dal
12 al 15 tiri di taratura a Porto Corsini, si schierarono, partecipando
con tiri di disturbo, sbarramento ed appoggio alle operazioni.

Successivamente, poiché il settore era eccessivamente ampio per la for-
za del gruppo "Cremona", il comando del 1^o Corpo Canadese dispose che
esso venisse ristretto.

Gruppo di Combattimento "Cremona"

Riferimento carta 1:25.000 - Ediz. inglese - Foglio 89 - Tavole di: Alfonsine - S. Alberto - Mandriole.

Il gruppo di combattimento si è trasferito nei giorni 10 - 12 gennaio, dalla zona di Ascoli Piceno in quella di Ravenna, dando subito il cambio ad unità della I^a divisione canadese; il comando del "Cremona" assunse la responsabilità del settore dalle ore 0600 del giorno 14.

- Dipendenza:

I^o Corpo d'Armata Canadese.

- Schieramento:

Il settore assegnato inizialmente al gruppo "Cremona" era quello preso fra la ferrovia Ravenna-Alfonsine ed antistante al Fosso Vetro e F. Reno, sino al mare. Lo schieramento assunto è illustrato nello schizzo al 503000 allegato (5 battaglioni di ftr. su 6 oltre le unità partigiane in I^o scaglione); i gruppi del 7^o reggimento artiglieria, ad eccezione del VI gruppo c.a. ancora in addestramento, dopo aver eseguito dal 12 al 15 tiri di taratura a Porto Corsini, si schierarono, partecipando con tiri di disturbo, sberremento ed appoggio alle operazioni.

Suocessivamente, poiché il settore era eccessivamente ampio per la forza del gruppo "Cremona", il comando del I^o Corpo Canadese dispose che esso venisse ristretto, portandone il limite ovest a C. Lotti (4950) - S. Maria (4949) C. Barbarella (5147), località comprese; il 2^o fanteria, il 23 gennaio venne pertanto sostituito dalla 2^a brigata canadese e si schierò a destra del 22^o fanteria, inserendo il III battaglione fra

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il I/22° e le formazioni partigiane schierate nella zona fra S. Alberto e Mandriole e sostituendo con il II battaglione il III/22°.

In primo scaglione risultano così nell'ordine, dalla sinistra del settore il I/22° - I/22° - III/21° - unità partigiane - II/21°.

- Notizie sul nemico

Le forze nemiche schierate in corrispondenza del settore del gruppo "Cremona" appartengono alla 42° divisione Jager ed alla 710° divisione tedesca; esse, oltre a grande attività operativa, hanno svolto notevole attività lavorativa, intesa a rafforzare le posizioni occupate e particolarmente la linea Pozzo Vetro - Pozzo Vecchio e P. Reno e la serie di caposaldi ed essa antitattica. L'avversario nei suoi frequenti colpi di mano ha fatto largo impiego di mortai.

Nessun indizio di un eventuale ripiegamento avversario.

- Attività operativa

E' stata caratterizzata:

- a) da intensa attività di pattuglie ed attacchi nemici tendenti:
 - ad occupare posti avanzati in prossimità dell'argine destro del fossi Vetro e Vecchio;
 - a saggiare le capacità e volontà di reazione del "Cremona";
 - a causare perdite tali da abbassare il morale dei nostri reparti.
- b) da azioni notturne e contrattacchi del gruppo di combattimento per mantenere o rioccupare posizioni, per assumere informazioni e disturbare l'attività difensiva del nemico.

Casa Baronio (488500) Casa Morini (485497) Casa Toschi (483493) Casa Riccibitti (482490) Casa Mercatelli (478479) Casa Lolli (491501) Casa Cissol (494511) Podere Adele (503516) Podere Bastogi (502518) Casa Martini (497513) sono state obiettivi di continui attacchi e con-

5100

cremona" apparsa, oltre a grande attività operativa, hanno svolto notevole tedesca; esse, oltre a grande attività operativa, hanno svolto notevole attività lavorativa, intesa a rafforzare le posizioni occupate e partecolarmente la linea Fosso Vetro - Fosso Vecchio e F. Reno e la serie di capozaldi ad esse antistante. L'avversario nei suoi frequenti colpi di mano ha fatto largo impiego di mortai. Nessun indizio di un eventuale ripiegamento avversario.

- Attività operativa

E' stata caratterizzata:

- a) da intensa attività di pattuglie ed attacchi nemici tendenti:
 - . ad occupare posti avanzati in prossimità dell'argine destro del fossi Vetro e Vecchio; 5100
 - . a saggiare le capacità e volontà di reazione del "Cremona";
 - . a causare perdite tali da abbassare il morale dei nostri reparti.
- b) da azioni notturne e contrattacchi del gruppo di combattimento per mantenere o ricoccupare posizioni, per assumere informazioni e disturbare l'attività difensiva del nemico.
 - Casa Baronio (488500) Casa Morini (485497) Casa Toschi (483493) Casa Riccibitti (482490) Casa Mercatelli (478479) Casa Lolli (491501) Casa Giasol (494511) Podere Adele (503516) Podere Bastogi (502518) Casa Martini (497513) sono state obiettivi di continui attacchi e contrattacchi da ambo le parti.
 - Particolarmente violenti gli attacchi nemici contro l'ala sinistra del I/21° e destra del I/22°, effettuati la sera del 16 e quello della notte sul 17 nel settore del II/22° contro Casa Lolli e Casa Giasol, che furono perdute e successivamente ricoccupate dalle nostre truppe. Il 26 furono occupate Chivico Scirocca (582558), sulla riva

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sinistra del Reno, e casa del Diavolo (591556) da parte del III/22°.

Il mattino del 30 gennaio ebbe luogo un'attacco contro C.Lolli (191501), effettuato dal 3° plotone della 6° ep. (II btg.) del 22° rgt.ftr. col concorso di 5 carri armati e dell'artiglieria del gruppo di combattimento e di quella canadese; il plotone, raggiunta C.Lolli, che era stata temporaneamente sgombrata dai tedeschi, fu qui investito da un micidiale fuoco di armi automatiche proveniente da postazioni, situate a breve distanza dalla Casa, ben protette e mascherate, che erano sfuggite alla nostra neutralizzazione, nonché da un violento tiro di repressione di artiglierie e mortai dell'avversario. Il plotone, avendo subito perdite eguali al 65% della sua forza, fu costretto a ritirarsi nonostante il valoroso comportamento del suo comandante e di tutti indistintamente i suoi uomini.

- I reparti artiglieri del 144° btg. genio hanno svolto intensa attività per:
 - posa mine e campi minati;
 - costruzione di reticolati;
 - gittamento di due ponti Bailey;
 - riattamenti stradali;
 - costruzione di nuove strade;
 - approntamento per la demolizione di quattro ponti.

Durante la posa di un campo minato in zona antistante un osservatorio di prima linea, un plotone della 13° ep. artigieri, dopo aver subito un concentramento di fuoco di mortai, veniva attaccato dal nemico; sistematosi nell'interno dell'osservatorio, rispondeva con il fuoco delle proprie armi opponendo un'accanita resistenza; rifiutava reiterate intimazioni di resa, finché, esaurite le munizioni, veniva sopraffatto.

- Perdite subite ed inflitte

- Perdite subite

stria neutralizzazione, nonché da un violento tiro di repressione di artiglierie e mortai dell'avversario. Il plotone, avendo subito perdite eguali al 65% della sua forza, fu costretto a ritirarsi nonostante il valoroso comportamento del suo comandante e di tutti indistintamente i suoi uomini.

- I reparti artiglieri del 144° btg. Genio hanno svolto intensa attività per:
 - posa mine e campi minati;
 - costruzione di reticolati;
 - gettamento di due ponti Bailey;
 - riattamenti stradali;
 - costruzione di nuove strade;
 - approntamento per la demolizione di quattro ponti.

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Durante la posa di un campo minato in zona antistante un osservatorio di prima linea, un plotone della 13° cp. artiglieri, dopo aver subito un concentramento di fuoco di mortai, veniva attaccato dal nemico; sistematosi nell'interno dell'osservatorio, rispondeva con il fuoco delle proprie armi opponendo un'accanita resistenza; rifiutava reiterate intimidazioni di resa, finché, esaurite le munizioni, veniva sopraffatto.

- Perdite subite ed inflitte

- Perdite subite:

- morti	: 14	(di cui 2 ufficiali)
- feriti	: 147	(di cui 6 ufficiali)
- dispersi	: 55	(di cui 2 ufficiali)

- Perdite inflitte:

- morti	: 6
- feriti	: 5

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Queste perdite sono soltanto quelle accertate; in realtà esse debbono essere state notevolmente superiori perchè fu osservato dopo la azione davanti alle linee un intenso movimento di portaferiti, specie dopo l'azione su Casa Lolli.

Sono stati inoltre catturati:

- 4 Bazookas
- 1 fucile mitragliatore
- 3 fucili con cassetta munizioni

- Episodi salienti di valore

- Comportamento di una pattuglia della 2^a cp. del I/21^o ftr. al comando del serg. magg. SCARU Francesco di Giuseppe - distretto di Oristano - classe 1916, durante lo scontro con pattuglie avversarie solto più di una volta a Casa Riccobitti il 14 gennaio.

Il sergente maggiore dimostrando freddezza e presenza di spirito ordinava ai suoi uomini di asserragliarsi entro la casa e delle finestre di essa rispondeva coi Thompson al fuoco della pattuglia avversaria uccidendo un tedesco.

Riusciva, conservando la massima calma, ad informare a mezzo telefono il comando della compagnia tenendolo costantemente aggiornato dello svolgimento dell'episodio.

Al sopraggiungere della pattuglia di soccorso, approfittando del momentaneo smarrimento dell'avversario, saltava insieme ai propri uomini dalle finestre della casa e si apriva la strada col lancio di bombe a mano, ricongiungendosi con la seconda pattuglia.

- Comportamento dell'intero plotone della 6^a cp. II/22^o ftr. impiegato nell'azione di Casa Lolli, nonché quello singolo del s. tenente RINALDI Roberto, che ferito per ben due volte rimaneva sul posto fino al termine dell'azione, incorando e sostenendo con l'esempio i propri compagni.

5158

- Episodi salienti di valore

- Comportamento di una pattuglia della 2^a cp. del I/21^o ftr. al comando del serg. magg. SCARU Francesco di Giuseppe - distretto di Cristano - classe 1916, durante lo scontro con pattuglie avversarie molto più numerose a Casa Riccobitti il 14 gennaio.
- Il sergente maggiore dimostrando freddezza e presenza di spirito ordinava ai suoi uomini di asserragliarsi entro la casa e dalle finestre di essa rispondeva coi Thompson al fuoco della pattuglia avversaria uccidendo un tedesco.
- Riusciva, conservando la massima calma, ad informare a mezzo telefono il comando della compagnia tenendolo costantemente aggiornato dello svolgimento dell'episodio. 5158
- Al sopraggiungere della pattuglia di soccorso, approfittando del momentaneo smarrimento dell'avversario, saltava insieme ai propri uomini dalle finestre della casa e si apriva la strada col lancio di bombe a mano, ricongiungendosi con la seconda pattuglia.
- Comportamento dell'intero plotone della 6^a cp. II/22^o ftr. impiegato nell'azione di Casa Lolli, nonché quello singolo del s. tenente SINGALE Roberto, che ferito per ben due volte rimaneva sul posto fino al termine dell'azione, incurando e sostenendo con l'esempio i propri dipendenti.
- Comportamento del plotone della 13^a cp. artieri, innanzi citato.
- Comportamento del s. tenente VALLI del 21^o ftr., che, dopo aver sostenuto con una pattuglia un combattimento e respinto per oltre 3 ore attacchi nemici, assumeva volontariamente il comando di altra pattuglia incaricata della conquista di Casa Riccobitti e del ricupero della salma

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di un caduto e di due feriti lasciati in una precedente azione sul terreno. Sotto intensissima di fuoco di armi automatiche nemiche, trascinava con l'esempio i componenti della pattuglia all'attacco del posto che conquistava con un travolgente assalto.

Ferito al braccio destro, rimaneva al proprio posto di combattimento e proteggeva, con altro militare, l'ordinato ripiegamento della pattuglia attaccata da forze superiori.

- Comportamento del fante NARDI Dante ex partigiano, volontario audace in ripetute azioni di pattuglie.

Ferito da schegge di mortaio alla gamba destra rientrava al reparto subito dopo la prima medicazione e, volontariamente, partecipava ad una nuova azione di pattuglia dimostrando le sue ottime qualità di combattente nonostante la sofferenza infertagli dalla ferita.

- Comportamento del fante FONTANELLA Pierino del 21° ftr., il quale, di sentinella ad un posto avanzato di compagnia, sventava con scariche di fucile mitragliatore un colpo di mano che l'avversario, approfittando della densissima nebbia, tentava sul caposaldo. Ferito gravemente in varie parti del corpo da schegge di bombe a mano, continuava a tener testa al nemico costringendolo, con lancio di bombe a mano, a ripiegare dopo avergli inflitto perdite.

5157

- Riconoscimenti ed elogi di autorità alleate

- Il comandante del 15° gruppo di armate, quello dell'8° armata e quello del 1° corpo d'armata canadese, hanno espresso il loro compiacimento per l'aggressività, la decisione e l'enciclabile comportamento delle truppe del gruppo "Cremona" durante queste prime azioni.

In particolare, nel dispaccio inviato dal generale Mark Clark al comandante dell'8° armata in merito al comportamento del gruppo di combattimento "Cremona" era detto:

- Comportamento del fante NARDI Dante ex partigiano, volontario audace in ripetute azioni di pattuglie.

Perito da schegge di mortaio alla gamba destra rientrava al reparto subito dopo la prima medicazione e, volontariamente, partecipava ad una nuova azione di pattuglia dimostrando le sue ottime qualità di combattente nonostante la sofferenza inferagli dalla ferita.

- Comportamento del fante PONTANELLA Pierino del 21° ftr., il quale, di sentinella ad un posto avanzato di compagnia, sventava con scariche di fucile mitragliatore un colpo di mano che l'avversario, approfittando della densissima nebbia, tentava sul caposaldo. Perito gravemente in varie parti del corpo da schegge di bombe a mano, continuava a tener testa al nemico costringendolo, con lancio di bombe a mano, a ripiegare dopo avergli inflitto perdite.

5157

- Riconoscimenti ed elogi di autorità alleate

- Il comandante del 15° gruppo di armate, quello dell'8° armata e quello del 1° corpo d'armata canadese, hanno espresso il loro compiacimento per l'aggressività, la decisione e l'encomiabile comportamento delle truppe del gruppo "Cremona" durante queste prime azioni.

In particolare, nel dispaccio inviato dal generale Mark Clark al comandante dell'8° armata in merito al comportamento del gruppo di combattimento "Cremona" era detto:

"Prego esprimere al Generale Primieri il mio compiacimento per il soddisfacente comportamento del gruppo "Cremona" nelle sue operazioni iniziali.

Il compiacimento in modo particolare per l'aggressività e la decisione dimostrate dal gruppo nel mantenere le sue posizioni contro gli attaccanti nemici.

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Seguirò le operazioni del gruppo con grande interesse nella previsione dell'importante compito che avrà nelle future operazioni."

II) Gruppo di Combattimento "Friuli"

Il gruppo si è trasferito nell'ultima decade del mese dalla zona di Radda in quelle di Forlì-Forlimpopoli, in attesa di entrare in linea.

III) Gruppi di Combattimento "Legnano" - "Polgore" - "Mantova"

In addestramento ed organizzazione rispettivamente nelle zone di Radda, Ascoli Piceno e S. Giorgio del Sannio.

TRUPPE IN BALCANIA

Nessuna notizia è pervenuta circa le operazioni delle unità della divisione "Garibaldi"; sono stati segnalati soltanto i seguenti trasferimenti:

- comando divisione "Garibaldi": Bileca
- I^a brigata : Ratay

Le altre brigate dovrebbero essere ancora:

- la II^a, in zona di Gacko
- la IV^a, in zona di Cevo

5155

P A T R I O T I

Numerose formazioni partigiane hanno operato durante il mese di gennaio con le truppe alleate; la brigata "Eniella", dopo un periodo di riposo, è ritornata in linea nel settore a sud del Senio.

Si riportano alcuni dati relativi ad azioni di formazioni partigiane nel mese scorso, di cui si sono avute notizie dettagliate soltanto re-

In addestramento ed organizzazione rispettivamente nelle zone di Radda, Ascoli Piceno e S. Giorgio del Sannio.

TRUPPE IN BALCANIA

Nessuna notizia è pervenuta circa le operazioni delle unità della divisione "Garibaldi"; sono stati segnalati soltanto i seguenti trasferimenti:

- comando divisione "Garibaldi": Hileca
- I^a brigata : Ratay

Le altre brigate dovrebbero essere ancora:

- la II^a, in zona di Gacko
- la IV^a, in zona di Cevo

5156

P A T E I O T I

Numerose formazioni partigiane hanno operato durante il mese di gennaio con le truppe alleate; la brigata "Maliella", dopo un periodo di riposo, è ritornata in linea nel settore a sud del Senio.

Si riportano alcuni dati relativi ad azioni di formazioni partigiane nel mese scorso, di cui si sono avute notizie dettagliate soltanto recentemente.

- Azioni di formazioni della divisione patrioti "Modena" per la conquista di M. Belvedere (fine di ottobre-novembre 1944).
(riferimento carta 1:25.000 - Foglio 97 - Tavolette I S.M. e II N.E.)
- Una prima azione, tendente all'occupazione di M. Belvedere - M. Gorgo

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resco - Ronchidoso e Garge (N. Torrente Silla), fu svolta alla fine di ottobre '44 da una formazione di 200 partigiani della VII^a brigata "Garibaldi" e della 64^a brigata, al comando del comandante della VII^a brigata; detta formazione, una volta occupate le posizioni anzidette, doveva essere sostituita da truppe americane. A causa della fitta nebbia sopraggiunta, del mancato appoggio dell'artiglieria, di deficienza nel coordinamento dell'attacco, nonché della scarsa conoscenza del terreno, boscoso e montagnoso, l'azione non riuscì, nonostante il coraggioso comportamento dei patrioti.

Furono però inflitte all'avversario le seguenti perdite:

- morti : 1
- prigionieri: 13

- Il 23 - 24 novembre l'azione fu ripetuta da tre compagnie americane, rinforzate ognuna da 60 partigiani, 10 autoblaste e carri armati, mentre una formazione di 100 partigiani con pezzi da 37 mm ed una compagnia mortai, al comando del comandante della divisione partigiana "Mofena", provvedeva alla sicurezza del fianco sinistro del dispartitivo di attacco. Dopo un successo iniziale anche questa azione fu stroncata da poderosi contrattacchi avversari, appoggiati da forte fuoco di mortai ed artiglieria. La formazione partigiana di sicurezza inflisse al nemico le seguenti perdite:

- morti : 20
- prigionieri : 33

lamentando a sua volta 20 feriti e 7 dispersi.

- Azioni di formazioni partigiane del Ravennate

- Occupazione di Porto Corsini - L'azione fu condotta esclusivamente da forze partigiane (345 uomini) di varie formazioni di Ravenna, Alfonse e Porto Corsini, agli ordini del comandante Bruno (Pasta).

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scenza del terreno, boscoso e montagnoso, l'azione non riuscì, nono-
stante il coraggioso comportamento dei patrioti.

Furono però inflitte all'avversario le seguenti perdite:

- morti : 1
- prigionieri: 13

- Il 23 - 24 novembre l'azione fu ripetuta da tre compagnie americane,
rinforzate ognuna da 60 partigiani, 10 autobombe e carri armati,
mentre una formazione di 300 partigiani con pezzi da 37 m/m ed
una compagnia mortai, al comando del comandante della divisione parti-
giana "Modena", provvedeva alla sicurezza del fianco sinistro del dispo-
sitivo di attacco. Dopo un successo iniziale anche questa azione fu
stroncata da poderosi contrattacchi avversari, appoggiati da forte
fuoco di mortai ed artiglieria. La formazione partigiana di sicurezza
si inflisse al nemico le seguenti perdite:

- morti : 20
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lamentando a sua volta 20 feriti e 7 dispersi.

- Azioni di formazioni partigiane del Ravennate

- Occupazione di Porto Corsini - L'azione fu condotta esclusivamente
da forze partigiane (345 uomini) di varie formazioni di Ravenna, Al-
fonisine e Porto Corsini, agli ordini del comandante Bruno (Pietro
Gaudenzi), fra il 3 ed il 10 dicembre '44.

La cittadina fu occupata ed il presidio tedesco completamente annien-
tato.

Perdite inflitte : 61 morti
5 feriti accertati

Perdite subite dai par-
tigiani : 3 morti
5 feriti

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- Battaglia delle Valli (per l'occupazione di S. Alberto - Mandriole - Casal Borsetti).

L'azione, svolta fra il 3 ed il 6 dicembre, fu diretta dal noto Bulow ed effettuata da 724 partigiani di formazioni varie del Ravennate; la reazione tedesca fu violenta fin dall'inizio. Mandriole fu inizialmente occupata, ma un forte contrattacco tedesco appoggiato da violento fuoco di mortai e da carri "Tigre" costrinse i partigiani, scarsamente ed inefficacemente armati, a ritirarsi; essi furono sostituiti nel pomeriggio del 6 da formazioni alleate sopraggiunte:

Perdite inflitte :	49	morti
	23	feriti
Perdite subite :	6	morti
	13	feriti

- Un'aliquota, non precisata, delle formazioni del Ravennate, dopo le operazioni susdette è rimasta in linea con le truppe alleate ed è attualmente inserita nello schieramento del gruppo di combattimento "zona", fra S. Alberto e Mandriole.

TRUPPE AUSILIARIE

5154

- Reparti salmerie e pionieri hanno operato a fianco dei reparti alleati in rischiosi compiti, spesso sotto il tiro di artiglierie e dei mortai nemici ed in condizioni meteorologiche molto avverse.

Le loro perdite in combattimento nel mese di dicembre sono state le seguenti:

- morti	:	19
- feriti	:	40
- dispersi	:	3

te ed inefficacemente armati, e ritirarsi; essi furono sostituiti nel
posseriggio del 6 da formazioni alleate sopraggiunte:

Perdite inflitte :	49	morti
	23	feriti
Perdite subite :	6	morti
	13	feriti

- Un'aliquota, non precisata, delle formazioni del Havenate, dopo le
operazioni anzidette è rimasta in linea con le truppe alleate ed è at-
tualmente inserita nello schieramento del gruppo di combattimento "Gra-
mona", fra S. Alberto e Mandriole.

TRUPPE AUSTRIANE

5154

- Reparti salmerie e pionieri hanno operato a fianco dei reparti alleati
in rischiosi compiti, spesso sotto il tiro di artiglierie e dei mortai
nemici ed in condizioni meteorologiche molto avverse.

Le loro perdite in combattimento nel mese di dicembre sono state le se-
guenti:

- morti	:	19
- feriti	:	40
- dispersi	:	3

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Alla data del 31 gennaio 1945 le truppe italiane impiegate a vantag-
gio e concorso degli alleati, escluse le formazioni dei patrioti, erano
le seguenti:

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

- Unità combattenti	10.392
- Unità in approntamento	38.699
- Salmerie	9.518
- Servizi retrovie	25.640
- A dispos. AA.	107.931
- Difesa c.d.	256

{ 210^a divisione
 { 228^a divisione
 { 231^a divisione

{ Guardia
 { manovranza
 { lavori genio

Sono inoltre da computarsi:

- Reparti italiani in Egitto (elementi divisioni "Cyneo" e "Regina")	circa 5.100
- Reparti prigionieri italiani in Francia	30.000
- Reparti prigionieri italiani in Africa Orientale, ora cooperatori	nr. 25.000

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1267

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

- A dispos. Al.	{ Guardia manovalanza lavori genio	107.951
- Difesa c.a.		256

Sono inoltre da computarsi :

- Reparti italiani in Egitto (elementi divisioni "Quoso" e "Regina") circa	6.100
- Reparti prigionieri italiani in Francia	30.000
- Reparti prigionieri italiani in Africa Orientale, ora coope- ratori	nr. 25.000

5153

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1288

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

LMOT 9 LMR NR 6770

ATTN: JAP

38/20 9

FROM LO 31 DLB 288948

4743

TO W H I A

QCY CR24 BT

CR/21 YOUR 1/162 OF 15 RECEIVED YESTERDAY I ~~IMPOSSIBLE~~ IMPOSSIBLE THAT
BITREP CAN REACH YOU BEFORE ABOUT 27 JAN. SUGGEST FORTNIGHTLY
BITREPS WOULD SUFFICE IN FUTURE

BT

SENT NR 6770 AT 1130Z WT 23 K

5152

RE NR 6770 DEL 1130 (X)

1269

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

28/1-4

1954

15 1954

8 APR 1954 50 214 51 214

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1954

FOR 1954 JAN (.) 1954 FEB 1954 MARCH 1954
APRIL 1954 MAY 1954 JUNE 1954
JULY 1954 AUGUST 1954 SEPTEMBER 1954
OCTOBER 1954 NOVEMBER 1954 DECEMBER 1954

5151

1954

| 1 2 7 0 |