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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

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
INT /114/1 PROPAGANDA

Opened May 28, 1945 - Closed Dec 31, 1945

MAY 1985 - DEC 1945

1623

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Folio 40, AF2/INT/1071 926
of 13 Dec 45, transferred to
file INT/221.

1959

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PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH
Film Section

7 December 1945

To : Ministry of War - Press Office - Att. Ten. Bessi
cc : Land Forces Sub Com, A. C. (NMIA)

G

APR 1946
58/12

1. With reference to your correspondence regarding the distribution of the Italian film "La nostra guerra" by PWB, AFHQ, Film Section, this office is very sorry to inform you that film distribution ceased on November 24, therefore it will not be possible anymore for this Section to take care of the distribution of your picture.

P. Levi
P. Levi Capt. AC.

10/12/45

817

1958

1625

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GS (I) Int/114/1
38
70, 11, 13, 17 NW

Signor Ministro, Signori :

Anzitutto desidero ringraziarla dell'invito fatto questa sera a me ed ai miei ufficiali e per le gentili espressioni nei nostri riguardi. Come Lei a detto, questa riunione segna un altro passo avanti nell'evoluzione dell'Italia e del suo nuovo Esercito dopo le giornate tristi ed oscure della recente guerra.

Noteremo che ho usato il termine "nuovo Esercito". Lo faccio di proposito. Dopo l'armistizio del mille nove cento quaranta tre fu organizzata una Forza Armata Italiana Forte di oltre tre cento mila uomini; ed i suoi considerevoli sforzi e contributi, sia di sangue che di lavoro, per la vittoria degli Alleati, sono stati pubblicamente elogiati dallo stesso Comandante Supremo Alleato, il Maresciallo ALLEXANDER.

Loro stanno attualmente procedendo alla trasformazione di questa forza in un nuovo Esercito. Ciò costituisce un vasto problema. Le cose si prospettano in modo completamente diverso. Come si sta verificando in altri Paesi, la loro organizzazione per la pace dovrà essere riformata con un Esercito ridotto di molto rispetto a quello del mille nove cento nove.

Non si tratta di definire piani per il domani o per il giorno dopo, ma per un lontano futuro. Come già mi risulta, loro hanno raccomandato col deciso proposito di propugnare un nuovo spirito, nuove idee e principi di progresso, tali da eliminare le debolezze del passato.

Si e' già fatto molto nel campo del ringiovanimento. Ma sono certo che loro converranno con me, che rimane molto da fare. Sotto tanti aspetti l'evoluzione deve necessariamente essere graduale. Non si può avere un intero esercito in poche settimane. Ma l'importante e' che si sia iniziato bene, che loro sappiano ciò che...

1956

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Come per il passato, Loro avranno in questo grande compito la più fattiva collaborazione e tutta la buona volontà della mia organizzazione. Noi, come Loro, ci auguriamo un futuro migliore, in cui vi sarà un Esercito Italiano che veramente rappresenti il suo popolo, e che sarà efficiente, sereno, in continuo progresso e dotato di un nuovo spirito conforme agli ideali della democrazia.

Come lei dico, ciò comporta per loro un grave peso. Ma loro devono anche riconoscere^K che ciò vale per tutte le Nazioni di questo mondo post-bellico. Ci si deve impegnare con serietà^K. E laboriosità, tanto per la conquista della pace, quanto per il conseguimento della vittoria in guerra. Ciascuno deve dare il proprio contributo per il bene comune e per assicurare un mondo migliore. Io so che loro faranno effettivamente la propria parte in questo difficile compito comune.

Personalmente ed a nome del mio Conrado Anglo-Americano^{Ch} approfitto di questa occasione per ringraziare lei, caro Ministro, i suoi predecessori, Gen. Orlando e Conte Casati, e tutti i suoi ufficiali per la piena collaborazione dataci nello svolgimento dei nostri compiti dall'armistizio in poi. Senza tale collaborazione si sarebbe potuto compiere ben poco. I risultati ottenuti ma sono una conferma^{Ch} di un augurio per la continuazione delle nostre cordiali relazioni.

Il destino mi condusse in Italia sia durante la guerra quattordici - diciotto^K che nella recente. Sono molto soddisfatto^K che ciò sia accaduto e che mi siano stati affidati i compiti^K che mi sono toccati nei riguardi dell'Italia. Nessuno avrebbe potuto essere condannato dal personale del suo Conrado, sia Britannico che Americano, più di quanto lo sono stato io; nessuno avrebbe potuto ricevere maggiore buona volontà e cooperazione di quanto io o ricevuto da loro.

Auguro loro la migliore fortuna per il futuro. Confido^K che loro sapranno superare tutti gli ostacoli ed infine riuscire. Grido che stia sorgendo l'alta di una nuova era per il nuovo^{Esercito} Esercito Italiano.

Auguro ogni successo^{Ch} a lei ed all'Esercito Italiano.

1954

1628

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dataci nello svolgimento dei nostri compiti dall'armistizio in poi. Senza tale collaborazione si sarebbe potuto compiere ben poco. I risultati ottenuti non sono una conferma ed un augurio per la continuazione delle nostre cordiali relazioni.

Il destino mi condusse in Italia sia durante la guerra quattordici-diciotto che nella recente. Sono molto soddisfatto che ciò sia accaduto e che mi siano stati affidati i compiti che mi sono toccati nei riguardi dell'Italia. Nessuno avrebbe potuto essere coadiuvato dal personale del suo Comando, sia Britannico che Americano, più di quanto lo sono stato io; nessuno avrebbe potuto ricevere maggiore buona volontà e cooperazione di quanto io o ricevuto da loro.

Auguro loro la migliore fortuna per il futuro. Confido che loro saranno superare tutti gli ostacoli ed infine riuscire. Credo che stia sorgendo l'alba di una nuova era per il nuovo ^{Esercito} ~~Paese~~ Italiano.

1954

Auguro ogni successo a lei ed all'Esercito Italiano.

L. Browning.
Major General
Ufficiale Generale Comandante la
Missione Militare per L'Esercito
Italiano

R O M A

16 Novembre 1945

1629

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

37

Subject: Anti Italian Army Propaganda.

Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C.
(M. M. I. A.)

ROME.

DET/114/1.

24 Oct 45.

To: ALLIED COMMISSION (For Lt. Col. Thomas G. MARCH, Director,
Public Relations Branch).

It would be appreciated if at the next Allied Publications Board Meeting you would mention the frequent attacks made on the Italian Army by certain sections of the Italian Press with a view to devising some means of counteracting the effects of these attacks.

This H.Q. takes a serious view of the matter and, though justified criticism is not resented nor is undeserved praise expected, it is felt that everything possible should be done to present a fair picture of the Italian Army at a time when its morale and prestige are of great importance.

L.M. J. Jr. Col
Major General
M. M. I. A.

r3d

1952

1630

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

SUBJECT: Proclamation by the Committee
of Military Agitation

LAND FORCES SUB-COM, A.C. (MMIA)

INT/114/1

18 Oct 45

TO : OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER, A.C.

Ref your 612/HC of 12 Oct 45.

1. The proclamation in question is by no means an isolated instance of anti-militaristic propaganda. Articles of a similar nature have frequently appeared in the Italian Press, particularly in the "Voce Repubblicana" as the Italian Army is suspected, not entirely without reason, of having strong monarchist tendencies.
2. With regard to the sentiment expressed that "We all want to go home", a most understandable wish, it is pointed out that the 1913-1918 Classes inclusive have already been demobilised and further demobilisation will take place in due course (i.e. 1919 Class in Nov).
3. In view of the policy of freedom of speech and of the press the publishers of this proclamation should only be proceeded against if it is considered that this proclamation constitutes an incitement to mutiny. This HQ is not entirely satisfied that it does constitute such an incitement nor that any action would be worth-while in this case, particularly as the inevitable reply would be that the Allies take suppressive action solely because they support the House of Savoy.

L.B.

Major General
MMIA

WS

1950

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Executive Commissioner

(35)

Ref: 612/EC

G. (1)

12 October 45

SUBJECT: Proclamation by the Committee of Military Agitation

TO : Land Forces Subcommittee, AC, (MMIA)

1. Attached please find copy of a poster which was put up all over Venice about 15/16 September 1945.
2. We would be grateful for your comments on this.

B. Sampson

Ja Chief Staff Officer
To Executive Commissioner

1948

C O P Y

APPENDIX "D" TO 13 CORPS MONTHLY

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 2

Poster put up all over Venice, about 15/16 Sep 45

The poster is very well printed and surmounted by an Italian tricolour.

It is presumably connected with the recent soldiers' demonstrations in Emilia and Romagna. The movement has appeared so far only among Italian Service troops.

LIBERTY

FRATERNITY

EQUALITY

The Voice of the Italian Soldiers

Brothers, listen to the cry of pain which goes up from our brothers who are still under arms, constrained to support that traitorous House of Savoy which is now trying with underhand manoeuvres to regain power. WE DO NOT WANT our fate to be in the hands of a man who has shown himself unworthy of leading us, who flung us into the slaughter of this disastrous war, and then betrayed us in the most critical moment. WE DO NOT WANT for our leader a man who by tradition is the patron of the people's enemies. We soldiers no longer want to be exploited by war-mongering generals, and by ambitious and unscrupulous officers.

WE WANT and we have the right to have, that holy liberty for which suffered our brothers who are now returning from German prison camps, and our partisans behind the enemy lines, and our families under the Nazi-Fascist oppression.

WE ALL WANT TO GO HOME to reconstruct our Italy, our beloved Italy which will be republican, because the monarchy is a synonym of tyranny, of oppression of the people and continual warlike adventures, and must disappear from the constitution of our country.

We also want our liberty not to be menaced again: if we wish to safeguard the prosperity and safety of our children LET US DO AWAY ONCE FOR ALL with militarism and those who sustain it.

Once more the fate of the country depends on us! This is the moment to speak clearly and to act. Our fallen call for justice and justice will be done.

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Long Live the Italian Republic.

Down with the criminal Fascist King.

Down with militarism once and for all; it is the promoter of wars, of disorders and of bloodshed.

The Committee of Military Agitation
(The Italian Soldiers)

CS 4th - 1st 1946

(34)

Goe

This newspaper is Anti-King, Pined and everything else. It presents always a distorted view for the consumption of its readers, a scandal sheet. But we must admit that even what is said is partially and maybe true.

I can see where we can do nothing about such attacks. Even the British Command has been slandered in the article by S. Sprigg. That seems to be one of the blessings of democracy.

The difference here is that the criticism is not for the purpose of securing a correction, but for pure spite.

(K)

Yes a rotten business, 1946
as you say, it is one of
the penalties of democracy
& the freedom of the Press

d.B. 20/4/46

1635

TRANSLATION

From la VICE RE... Sept 7th GOC
CARES AND SINCURES OF THE MINISTRY OF WAR

C.A.C.F.I.C. vegetates at Cesano di Roma...

When the people want to ...

Umberto wants to lead them...

Together with... St. Paul Jacini he attends
the magnificent re-birth of the Army...

Where St. Paul is not concerned...

The black market is...

[Handwritten signature]
1946

At Cesano di Roma, where the C.A.C.F.I.C. (a misleading sounding group of initials which only mean R.I.T. Ing. Centre for It. Combat Forces) vegetates, today it seems as if one relived the first days of the war. Packs of soldiers, wearing every conceivable form of dress or even civilian clothes, dirty, hungry, loaded with an assortment of parcels or bundles are seen arriving uninterruptedly.

"Re-called" as the fascists used to call them? Some of them, yes. The only difference is that on the call-up card the King's heading has been over-printed with that of the Lt. Gen. of the Realm. Most of them have returned from the Balkans, from disbandment, have been sent by the disbanded mob centres, are ex-co-operators. The latter, after three or four years of service either in Africa, in prison camps or in co-operation with the Allies, were sent home on 60 days leave by the Ministry of War and have now been presented with the pleasant surprise of having to return after only 14 days.

The reception they get when they reach Cesano is the traditional one: they sleep, they get dressed, they get covered according to the mercy of the most pious Minister Jacini, often in the open!

Only one hope smiles at these eternal wonderers: release, but every two or three days they get pecked and despatched North or South. The Combat Groups demand reinforcements. (These Groups won honours in the liberation campaign but, is it true that when they were formed Umberto di Savoia Pescara entrusted one of his most faithful with the mission of taking charge of them once the war was finished in order to rid the country of the so-called national unity dissolving currents?) However there is one person at least, probably the only one ¹⁹⁴⁶ is enthusiastic about Cesano. And that person is, The Lord be praised, the one and only, the saintly Minister Jacini, who during a visit, some months ago, to the "Centre", said he had felt moved by the three clicks of the "Shun" with which he was received. Afterwards he spoke of the re-birth of the Army and of democratic style. Very debatable this democratic style of his since: 1) he generously granted Officers, NCOs

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At the close of that unforgettable day, the Minister ended his sermon by stating, between one quotation of St. Paul's and another, that he felt moved by the reception he had been the object of and even more by the magnificent sight of the resurrection of the army which he had witnessed during the short hours spent at Cesano.

Perhaps he was not aware of the market activities carried out by the C.A.C.F.I.C. HQs (such is said of a lorry load of "Milit" cigarettes assigned to the troops and sold complete in Rome, of fuel depots of the "Piceno" Div. stationed in Cesano and found in town ready to feed

the black market and it is even known that in Rome the little public service passenger vans used to run and possibly still run on "Piceno" petrol), of the lorries detached for "service" carrying out black market activities all over Italy, of the profits made by the military stores, capable of selling even their souls?

All these are realities, if not altogether metaphysical, with which St. Paul will have nothing to do, but, let us quote Minister Jacini: "at times it is best to close one eye". It would be necessary to bandage both eyes of the Italian people who, out of their own pockets have paid and are paying for armistice and military expenses that which others ("Piceno" Div. for example) are profiting, feeding the black market and encouraging administrative and fiscal corruption to such an extent that, unless many gold braided, long-fingered persons are sent home soon, the results of the national loan threaten to be totally absorbed by the Ministry of War's budget.

And then one must again put one's finger in that national wound of the inefficiency of the various Commands so well known universally that Minister Jacini has not yet deemed it advisable to take some far reaching exemption measures.

But why mention all these things and others such as the despair of the soldier always waiting? Why mention the other stations of the C.A.C.F.I.C., such as Bracciano where recruits of the 102nd. Arty. Regt. last June swore an oath of allegiance to... the King? Why mention such things if Minister Steiano Jacini is satisfied?

Frank

For the translation
S/Sgt. F.M. DeJuan.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020Spoke Maj. Leacacos, P.R.O. Sept. 11th

He says that it is only possible to deal with these matters as individual cases i.e. to send a letter to the paper concerned giving true explanation which it will almost certainly print. There is now no censorship and it is both undesirable and impossible for Public Relations to send, so to speak, a directive to the Italian press asking them to be just in their dealings with the Italian Army. It is undesirable because it would certainly give rise to allegations that the Allies were supporting reactionary monarchist tendencies. If on the other hand a press conference or something of the kind were held it is extremely likely that the papers would twist the answers to suit their own ends and it would be difficult to manage such an affair in such a way as to prevent it from becoming polemical & acrimonious.

1943

In view of the above I raised this matter at Esce Com meeting where Mr Stewart Brown & Biggish were present. My refusal to order the press, so we must get M of W to bring pressure to bear

APM
24/10

R.B.A. Groun Rames
Capt
G.H.I.

1639

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

A-10
G

~~SECRET~~

G-III (1) Plans after

Go & see P. R. O. A.C. personally &

Say we deprecate the deliberate

Crying down of the Italian army
in ITALY'S own interests.

We don't ask for boosting the
army, but we do ask for fair
play & a sense of responsibility

- bidity in the Press as a co-
-rollary to its freedom

ask P.R.O. to put this over
to the Press as well as the

1941

Can

K.B.

11 Sep

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

We don't ask for
 anything, but we do ask for fair
 play & a sense of responsibility
 in the Press as a co-
 -ordinating to its freedom
 ask P.D.O. to put them on
 the Press as well as the
 Can

K.B.

11 Sep

1941

164

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

Inter-Office Memo

EF 7 Sept

FROM : G(SD)

TO : 'A'

Ref att.

1. JACINI had already complained to ARPINATI (Undersecretary to the P.M.) about the article in UNITA, on the grounds that it is an incitement to the tps to disobey and mutiny. NOT a very strong complaint, I gather, but he has promised to follow the matter up.
2. LOURARDI's comment on the resignation of GERVASONI was "good - one less colonel to sack!". This is obviously an unsound comment: will you please accept action.
3. Action against the culprits (tps) has already been taken by General GERICA and by 209 Div; the latter has recommended to DIA LO 1 District that units in the PUGLI district NOT now fully employed be moved away or disbanded and I have taken this up with AFHQ.

1939

LMZ

30 Aug 45.

Lt.-Col.
GS.

I will speak GOC in return

WP
7 Sep.

1642

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

PERSONAL.

Lt-Col. B. W. WEBB CARTER,
Comd 51 British Liaison Unit,
C.M.F.

Al/Ut.

23 Aug 45

Dear

Colonel

I enclose a copy of "L'UNITA" which has caused a stir here. The immediate re-action has been the resignation of Col. GERVASONI, Comd. 21 REGT, who is one of our best Officers. His point is that the Government is apparently taking no action about this political demonstration by Italian soldiers, mainly directed against their Officers. He therefore does NOT wish to remain a servant of such a Government. I must confess that I see his point.

Generale PREMIERI is, I believe, forwarding on GERVASONI's resignation asking that it be NOT accepted, but it is quite possible that others may follow GERVASONI's example.

I think the unfortunate officers require some form of re-assurance from their Government that they will NOT be penalised for attempting to do their duty.

I don't know if MEMA can do anything about it. I think this is a serious matter.

Yours

love

Brian Webb Carter

1937

Colonel W. PIDSLEY, DSO, OBE, MC,
LAND FORCES SUB COMM. A.C. (M.M.I.A.),
ROME.

G.S.O.I.

I have not yet shown to G.O.C. Suggest
you I Branch may be able to present a
clear picture - which I should also like to
see as the "A" interest is considerable

25 Aug.

W.P.C.

yes.
G.T.I.
P.C. 4/12
J.H.

- GOC ~~yes. If you approve I will take action on para 3~~
- G.O.C. (thugh ASD)
- ① This is a copy of the Italian Director of Welfare's report to his own Ministry for July. 10/sep
 - ② Much of it is out of date. all of it is already well known. Generally it confirms our own opinions
 - ③ The only important matter not already being dealt with is the possibility and desirability of inducing the Italian press to pay off its present distinctive criticism of the Italian Army.
 - ④ This is a Italian Govt affair which you may wish to discuss with the Minister first.
(see also attached press extracts and my remarks thugh ASD.)
- WSP 1935
10 Sep

Translation

From M of W (Welfare)
to Minister of War

ref. 07168/B.S.

27 Aug. 1945

Excerpt of the reports on the morale of the troops during the month of July 1945.

Excerpt of the reports of HQs

MORALE the morale of the troops is influenced by a strong feeling of fatigue which is spreading out especially among senior classes, some of whom have been serving for seven, eight, nine years and see in their home towns men of very young classes that should be in the army.

This ill feeling, which is spreading also among Emergency Reserve officers has been but poorly checked by the moral action that has been taken to counteract it. Soldiers, in this grey and uncertain situation, although they continue to do their duty and are disciplined, show an impatience which can no longer be overlooked.

It is therefore desirable that discharge of senior classes should take place as soon as possible.

GENERAL CAUSES

OF DEPRESSION : Senior classes that have not been discharged

- the feeling that those who evaded military service are now living undisturbed and can resume civilian activities
- family allowances and wages which are inadequate to meet the actual cost of living especially for those who have a family.
- The slowness and irregularity of the military postal service, causing all ranks to avoid availing themselves of it whenever possible.

Notes of this Office

This matter is well known and it has already been pointed out in previous reports, and discussed during meetings at Rome with the C/Os of higher formations. The measures that can be taken, will not be sufficient to improve the morale of the troops.

*Don't plan all
fixed.*

This matter is already known

1934

id.id.

id.id.

I am under the impression that Milit. Postal Service is speedier than the civil one

1845

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Review plan all fixed.

men of very young classes that should be in the Army. This ill feeling, which is spreading also among Emergency Reserve officers has been but poorly checked by the moral action that has been taken to counteract it. Soldiers, in this grey and uncertain situation, although they continue to do their duty and are disciplined, show an impatience which can no longer be overlooked. It is therefore desirable that discharge of senior classes should take place as soon as possible.

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- The slowness and irregularity of the milit. postal service, causing all ranks to avoid availing themselves of it whenever possible
- reduction of the allowance for mess improvement from 10 lire to 5 lire.
- + the issue of soap which is not sufficient to meet requirements
- the cancelling of the issue of tobacco on re-payment and the reduction of the free issue
- the fact that it is almost impossible for the Sardinian troops to enjoy leave owing to lack of transport.
- the persistent deficiency of clothing and foot wear. Sabauda Div Hq inform us that it is impossible to issue the kit recalled Milit. personnel who wear clothing and footwear of their own property.
- the continuous propaganda led by almost all the Press against the Army.

This matter is already known

1937

id.id.

id.id.

I am under the impression that Milit. Postal Service is speedier than the civil one

The disorder of the uniform of our soldier, and the tolerance in allocating him to wear the strangest of clothing (which is a consequence of irregular issues) discredit our Arms Forces and facilitate the propaganda that a great part of the Press leads against them

PARTICULAR CAUSES OF DEPRESSION.

Piceno H.Q. DIV. remark that; owing to the disbandment of Raviscanina, Astroni, and Tr. sinone Camps, masses of disordered and undisciplined men report to Cesano Centre and any effort made by the officers to organize and discipline these men is nullified by the constant coming and going of soldiers who cause disorder in the units.

PROPOSALS AND REQUESTS

CP UNITS UNDER CURAND: react with adequate means and without losing time against the spreading of the campaign against the Army.

- Lay down a system of efficient transport between the mainland and the islands and improvement of transport on the mainland.

- make a greater and more adequate issue of clothing items

- increase the monthly issue of soap to improve hygiene of the troops

- increase the wages of officers and NCOs which are at present below the standard wages of the various categories of workers and employees

- Take severe action against deserters and absentees.

- increase the issue of cigarettes and again issue tobacco on repayment.

- value and acknowledge the service of the Admin. Divs and Combat Groups now being disbanded.

- increase to 10 Lire the messing improvement allowance.

- increase welfare funds.

SPECIAL REMARKS OF

SOME Hqs : Concerning the economical position of officers and NCOs, Mantova Combat Group Hq informs us that "Wages of Officers are ridiculous and are inferior to the wages of workers and employees.

For instance: It is noticed that the

These matters have already been pointed out in the previous reports. Very little, almost nothing has been done to solve them and this is deprecated by Hqs and units U/C that do not realize the difficulties handicapping the Central Branches. But whereas officers can easily understand this, soldiers generally do not, owing to lack of education and to the propaganda that is carried out by agents who operate with very doubtful intentions.

1932

- increase the monthly issue of soap to improve hygiene of the troops
- increase the wages of officers and NCOs which are at present below the standard wages of the various categories of workers and employees
- Take severe action against deserters and absentees.
- increase the issue of cigarettes and again issue tobacco on repayment.
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- increase to 10 Lire the messing improvement allowance.
- increase welfare funds.

SPECIAL REMARKS OF

SOME HQs : Concerning the economical position of officers and NCOs, Mantova Combat Group HQ informs us that "Wages of Officers are ridiculous and are inferior to the wages of workers and employees."

For instance: We noticed that the work contract for industrial workers of Liguria (published in issue n. 77 of the newspaper "Lavoro Nuovo" dated 1st of August) allows each employee 3000 lire monthly as "contingency allowance" 8000 " " as minimum wages. The same wages are laid down for labourers. My General 2nd in command, draws a monthly pay of lire 11600: our Chief of Staff (who has 3 sons) 10216 and whereas a/m employees and labourers live with their families, officers and NCOs who are married are away from their kith and kin and must provide for themselves and for their family.

1932

Piceno Div.Hq warns us as of the consequences of circ.558 concerning the discharge from the Army due to special family reasons. A/Hq remark "a worrying exodus of military personnel and particularly of young soldiers".

This is due to the extreme ease with which the Communes, Doctors and the C.C.R.R. themselves grant certificates allowing the poor conditions and earning impossibility of families of military personnel serving in the Army, etc.

Piceno Div.Hq reports moreover the insufficient screening action of the military Districts, who generally send to the Camp military personnel having the right to be discharged, repatriated PWs and even war disabled personnel that(having their families out of Italy - especially in Northern Africa -) cannot be discharged from the Army.

GENERAL NOTES OF THIS OFFICE :

- Higher Formation Hqs do their best to keep up the morale of personnel under command; but if we want their work to be really efficient it is necessary that the problems and difficulties reported by them should be taken into consideration by the Central Branches with a greater interest.

The soldier is tired of promises, articles in the press and idle talk; he wants facts. He regards with suspicion not only his officers (whom he thinks are the cause or the victims of this general situation) but also politicians in general; he no longer relies upon the leading classes and therefore he looks forward to a revolutionary system which may change the state of things (without worrying about consequences). Commanding officers agree that there is still time to prevent the total disintegration of discipline, by solving the main problems thus :-

- ending the Press campaign against the Army,
- unbalancing the importance of the contribution of Units of the Army to the liberation,
- granting the war disabled, wounded and sick personnel admitted to hospital the respect and fair dealing they are entitled to,
- improving the equipment,
- discharging senior classes, calling up younger personnel and putting an end to all unlawful privileges.

- The problem pointed out by Piceno Div. concerning military personnel to be discharged and who cannot reach their families, is a general problem and I have already informed the Hqs and the Recruiting Directorate and the Cabinet of W.V. with letter 06640/BS dated 10 Aug.45. Piceno Centre is not suitable to admit these men who feel strongly against being subjected to further delays and since I have been informed that several

Unfortunately the truth of this remark has been noted by this office on examining applications in favour of military personnel and their families. Repatriands and circullars are useless : it is a question of civil education.

It should be borne in mind that Districts have an enormous work to carry out and very few means available. The insufficiency of means is well known to Central Authorities.

out of Italy - especially in Northern Africa -) cannot be discharged from the Army.

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- improving the equipment,
- discharging senior classes, calling up younger personnel and putting an end to all unlawful privileges.

- The problem pointed out by Piaceno Div. concerning military personnel to be discharged and who cannot reach their families, is a general problem and I have already informed the NCAs and ORs Recruiting Directorate and the Cabinet of M.E. with letter 06640/RS dated 10 Aug. 45. Cesano Centre is not suitable to admit these men who feel strongly against being subjected to further delays and since I have been informed that several thousands of men are involved I think it would be advisable to keep them at the units on whose strength they are or to form units or depots where same military could be employed and assisted. Sick, war disabled and convalescent personnel should be admitted to special medical establishments.

Gen. Tamassia.

1650

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

Subject: Publication.

Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C.
(M. M. I. A.) DFT/114/5
3 Oct 45

To: MINISTRY OF WAR.

Reference your letter 312118 of 29 Sept 45.

We thank you for the copy of your publication
"CEPALONIA" which you kindly sent us.


R. G. A. G. R.
Major General
M. M. I. A.

AGR/r30

1929

1651

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020



Roma, 29 settembre 1947

Ministero della Guerra
STATO MAGGIORE R. ESERCITO
SEZ. AUTON. COLLEG. ALIATI C.A.

THE LAND FORCES SUB
COMMISSION A.C. (M.H.I.A.)

E C M A

Disposto
Per 312418 *Allegato*

Richiesta al f. del
Per 1 *Per* 1

Oggetto: Pubblicazione -

G(I)

Si invia in omaggio una copia
della pubblicazione "Cefalonia" compi-
lata dal Ten.col. Giuseppe Moscardelli
di questo S.M. per incarico dell'Uffi-
cio Storico.-

d'ordine
IL CAPO SEZIONE
(T.Col. E. Sansone)

E. Sansone

1652

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

Confidential

32

Land Forces Sub Com, A.C. (MMIA)

DET/114/

to Sep 45

To : Archives A.C.
Attention Capt. DUFF
(British - War Office, LONDON)

Herewith War Ministry and MMIA notes on Italian Army together with GOC's draft broadcast at Appxs A, B and C respectively. The broadcast has not yet been made.

Also att are copy 3-monthly report dated Jan 15 1945 and copy letter TS/2/4 of 1 Jan 1945 subject Italian Army strength.

You have already had copies of the basic documents of October 25 1944 and Nov 15 1944 together with the supply instructions, details of the territorial organization in Italy, copy monthly reports and notes on patriots. The September order of battle is now being published, a copy will be available here for you as from Tuesday 2 Oct.

It is to be noted that the British feed most of the Italian Royal Navy and Italian Royal Air Force in addition to the greater proportion, now, of the Army. The figures for 15 Sep appear in our letter SI/136 dated 25 Sep 45 copy att.

for G.S.O.I.
M.M.I.A.

27

jo

1926

1653

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020



From: Brig. F. Thornton,
D.D.M.I. (I).

The War Office,

Whitehall,

S.W.1.

2 September, 1945.

(31)

Dear Langley.

I am replying to your letter of 24th August, as Sinclair has now left the appointment of D.M.I.

You may have heard by now through other channels that the War Office have not been able to sanction your proposed broadcast, as it was considered unsuitable that officers on the active list should give broadcasts about foreign armies.

This decision had nothing to do with the merits of the text you submitted, and I understand that there would be no War Office objection if a somewhat similar broadcast were to be made anonymously by a B.B.C. announcer.

Yours ever

Frank Thornton

Major-General L. Browning,
C.B., O.B.E., M.C.,
Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C.,
(M.M.I.A.)
ROME.

P.S. We do not yet know why you have become D.M.I. I am only a "lounge lizard" for a few days.

[Handwritten signature]
To note & file
15. 9. 45

1654

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

SUBJECT: Authorization for the showing
of the Ministry of War film "La Nostra Guerra"

30

LAND FORCES SUB COM, A.C. (LANTA)


INT/114/1.

5 Sept 45

TO : MINISTRY OF WAR

1. The Italian film "La Nostra Guerra", edited by the Ufficio Stampa - Ministry of War has been passed by the AFHQ film censor for exhibition to the general public.

2. Please quote this letter as official authority when necessary.


Major General,
M. M. I. A.

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1923

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

29
Roma, 11 18 agosto 1945

Caro Selby,

le mando l'elenco delle riprese
effettuate dai nuclei cinematografici, che
mi ha richiesto.

Cordiali saluti

B. Lamon

Al Maggiore
F.R. Selby
Land Forces Sub Commission
A.C. (M.M.I.A.)
(Via Veneto - Roma)

File on INT/114/1 13

ATTIVITA' NUCLEI CINEMATOGRAFICI
Pellicole girate

- 1°) nucleo - (Gruppo Cremona) - Addestramento del gruppo di combattimento Cremona
- Passaggio per Roma del Gruppo diretto in zona di operazione
 - Azioni belliche nel Settore Adriatico
 - Attacchi di Fanteria - artiglieria in azione - feriti - prigionieri
 - Consegna di ricompense al V.M. distribuiti dal Maresciallo Alexander a Forlì
 - Festa dell'Artigliata e del Genio
 - Ingresso del Gruppo di Combattimento a Cremona
- 2°) nucleo - (Gruppi Friuli) - Poche riprese di scarso interessamento
- 3°) nucleo - (in sede)
- Albania - visita del Sottosegretario alla Guerra Avv. Palermo
 - Brisighella : scioglimento battaglione partigiani Maiella
 - Cesano : manifestazioni militari
 - Alcune riprese per rifacimento
 - Documentario : La nostra guerra.-

Major General L. BROWNING, CB, OBE, MC,
Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C.,
(R.M.I.A.) R O M E

IME/IIA/I

24 Aug. '45.

My dear

On return from a visit to England I have
seen your letter of 15 July to my G.S.O.I., Lt. Colonel
Ingledow.

As regards further news about the Italian
Army: I enclose herewith Appendix 'A' which gives what
the Italian Ministry of War have produced for me, and
Appendix 'B' which is a shorter resume of Appendix 'A'.

As regards a broadcast by myself, I attach
a proposed one at Appendix 'C'. The Foreign Office in
London have seen my proposed broadcast at Appendix
and were very keen for me to give it. They then asked
the War Office if they had any objection. The Foreign
Office also were most anxious that I should give this
broadcast over the proper B.B.C. wave-length instead of
on a private one, and also that I should give it in
English and Italian, which I can do and would like to do.
I might say that I have broadcast before.

Perhaps you would let me know what you are
doing about all this. I feel that now is the time to
give this broadcast and not at some future date when
interest may have evaporated considerably.

On return from a visit to England I have seen your letter of 18 July to my G.S.O.I., Lt. Colonel Ingledew.

As regards further news about the Italian Army, I enclose herewith Appendix 'A' which gives what the Italian Ministry of War have produced for me, and Appendix 'B' which is a shorter resume of Appendix 'A'.

As regards a broadcast by myself, I attach a proposed one of Appendix 'C'. The Foreign Office in London have seen my proposed broadcast at Appendix 'D' and were very keen for me to give it. They then asked the War Office if they had any objection. The Foreign Office also were most anxious that I should give this broadcast over the proper B.B.C. wave-length instead of on a private one, and also that I should give it in English and Italian, which I can do and would like to do. I might say that I have broadcast before.

Perhaps you would let me know what you are doing about all this. I feel that now is the time to give this broadcast and not at some future date when interest may have evaporated considerably.

I could do a recording at anytime for your use in London perhaps.

Yours

A.B.

Captain A.C. DUNCAN,
Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office,
Centre Block,
Rush House, Aldwych,
LONDON W.C.2

Copy to:

Miss Bridget Maxwell, British Embassy, Rome.
M.O.I. (Mr. Bernard Seven)
B.B.C. (Italian Region).

eco.

Appendix 'A' to
MIA letter DOW/114/1
dated 24 August 45.

(a) DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED IN THE BUILDING OF THE ARMY.

The disastrous events which quickly followed the signing of the Armistice with the Allies left Italy, or at any rate that small part of it, under the control of Marshal BADOLIO, with practically no army. On September, 8th 1943 owing to lack of clear orders and complete mental and physical demoralisation, the greater part of the Italian Army disintegrated. The physical and mental structure of the army which, under Fascian and totalitarian discipline, kept the army together, crashed like a house of cards. The difficulties encountered in the reconstruction of the Italian Army under Allied auspices and primarily for Allied employment were vast. A moral, material and financial breakdown had taken place. The army had lost most of its better units, better leaders, nearly all its equipment, guns, tanks, clothing and ammunition. In North Africa and Sicily - not to mention whole divisions squandered uselessly in Russia and the Balkans. Destruction caused by war, requisitioning by the Germans, the few remaining industries in the North in German hands. Soon after the Armistice - Italy declared war on Germany and expressed a desire to form a motorised corps to fight alongside the Allied Armies in Italy. The difficult task of reforming the Ministry of War, the reorganisation of the Territorial layout and the mustering and ¹⁹⁴³ ~~1944~~ of new combatant units, the organisation of auxiliary units and the services was immediately undertaken with the scanty material at hand. By the beginning of December 1943, the motorised group known as the Italian Liberation Corps, consisting of four Battalions and four

Italian Army under Allied auspices and primarily for Allied employment were vast. A moral, material and financial breakdown had taken place. The army had lost most of its better units, better leaders, nearly all its equipment, guns, tanks, clothing and ammunition in North Africa and Sicily - not to mention whole divisions squandered uselessly in Russia and the Balkans. Destruction caused by war, requisitioning / the Germans, the few remaining industries in the North in German hands. Soon after the Armistice - Italy declared war on Germany and expressed a desire to form a motorized corps to fight alongside the Allied Armies in Italy. The difficult task of reforming the Ministry of War, the reorganization of the Territorial layout and the mustering and ¹⁹⁴⁸ ~~holding~~ of new combatant units, the organization of auxiliary units and the services was immediately undertaken with the scanty material at hand.

By the beginning of December 1943, the motorized group known as the Italian Liberation Corps, consisting of four Battalions and four Artillery Batteries, had been trained and equipped with Italian equipment and was in the line. The strength of these units was gradually increased until the Italian Liberation Corps reached a total strength of 25,000 men including the famous "ROMEO" Parachute Bde, brought over from Sardinia.

(b) Details of the Army Group by Group.

When hostilities ceased the strength of the Italian Army was 17,700 officers and 535,340 O.R., of which 54,000 were Carabinieri. This Army consisted of the following set-up :-

The Ministry of War and General Staff.

Five Combat Groups, each 10,000 strong - completely equipped with

British arms and equipment and fed on British rations.

195,000 auxiliary troops (20% with the Operational Armies divided up as

follows : -

One Div. with Fifth Army.

One Div. with Eighth Army.

One Div. - classed as an Army Corps controlling Italian troops under the U.S. Peninsular Base Section.

One Div. with the U.S. Air Force.

Three Divs. under command of 1 and 3 British District H.Qs.

Various Units under Allied Garrison in SICILY AND SARDINIA and twenty-five Special Coys under command of the Allies in COSICA.

The "ACQUA", "SABUDA" and "CALABRIA" Divs were taking care of the Internal Security in SICILY and SARDINIA.

All arms and specialists have taken part in the Allied war effort. They consist of :

(a) Infantrymen who constituted the mass of combatant forces in every field and with a great variety of duties.

(b) Grenadiers men of great physical fitness and a long established tradition.

(c) Arditi specially trained for war at close quarters and hard to hand fighting - mainly volunteers.

(d) Bersaglieri. troops of great mobility, suitable for rapid transfer and highly trained for intense and prolonged effort. These men wear the characteristic

1916

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hand to hand fighting - mainly volunteers.

(d) Bersaglieri, troops of great mobility, suitable for
rapid transfer and highly trained for instance and pro-
longed effort. These men wear the characteristic
plumes in their hats or on their helmets.

(e) Alpini trained to live and fight in the highest
mountain regions.

(f) Parachutists who have given an excellent account of
themselves, as only as specialised infantry in the
line, but also in small groups of saboteurs dropped
by parachute behind the line to assist patriot
formations, supply intelligence information and carry
out specialised sabotage.

1662

(g) Cavalry - transformed in Pack Transport Units for the supply of troops in the mountains inaccessible to motor transport. These units have done excellent work and have often worked under enemy fire, sustaining heavy casualties.

(h) Artillery, forming pack Artillery Units, Ack-Ack and Anti-Tank units and light mountain Artillery Batteries.

(i) Engineers, who have given ample proof of their work with their pioneers in defence constructions, roadbuilding, repair and maintenance of Allied L of C and airlifting units.

(j) Carabinieri, who normally wear the characteristic Napoleon hats have satisfactorily carried out their duties as military police, P.S. Sections, etc.

(c) Development of the Army.

Since September, 1943 the Italian Army has grown and developed by leaps and bounds. The first problem to be tackled was the formation of Service Units, the setting up of the Territorial organisations for dealing with call-ups, re-calls, demobilisation of older classes and unfit personnel, pack tpt. coys. etc.

From the Italian Liberation Corps the first two Combat Groups - the "LIGURIO" and "FOLGORE" were re-formed, re-equipped with British arms and equipment and trained in British methods. Four more Groups were formed, armed and trained for combat under command of General ALEXANDER's Armies.

1917

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1917
From the Italian Liberation Corps the first two Combat Groups - the "LEGNANO" and "FOLGORE" were re-formed, re-equipped with British arms and equipment and trained in British methods. Four more Groups were formed, armed and trained for combat under command of General ALEXANDER's Armies. These Combat Groups formed a fighting force of some 55,000 men.

At the same time auxiliary units were increased. In December 1944 their strength had reached 160,000 men (20% with the operational units) and by April 1945, 195,000 men formed the bulk of Service Units working almost entirely for the Allied war effort.

(d) Equipment in Use.

Immediately after the armistice, by means of search and recovery of Italian materials it was possible completely to equip the 1st Motorised Bde. which, in the line, proved to the Allies the ultimate possibilities of the Italian Army.

- 4 -

Later this P.O. was increased and converted into the Italian Corps of Liberation, still equipped and supplied with Italian materials with the exception of rations and fuel which were supplied by the Allies. In addition, at the beginning and where possible, the first units formed at the request of the Allies (Eng. units, pack bgt. units, stretcher bearers, pioneers, etc.) were also equipped with Italian materials. These units have been gradually supplied and equipped by the Allies with the exception of arms and ammunition which continues to be supplied by the Italian Administration.

Lastly the Combat Groups are completely equipped and supplied by the British.

At the present there are three types of equipment in use:-

- (i) British for troops under British control (BR-ITL)
- (ii) American for troops under American control (US-ITL)
- (iii) Italian for all the remaining troops (Internal Security Divs, Territorial H.Qs. and units, service units, etc.)

whose requirements are met with :-

- (i) Stocks in military dumps
- (ii) Salvage and recovery materials
- (iii) Allied assistance for unobtainable items.

(e) Transport and Supplies. (organisation and means)

(i) We have :-

a central organisation: It is based at the Ministry of War (General Directorate) and supplies the warehouses of the various services drawing their stocks either from Italian production or from Allied sources, with railway or maritime transport with vehicles of a

Administration.

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(i) We have :-

a central organisation: It is based at the Ministry of War (General Directorate) and supplies the warehouses of the various services drawing their stocks either from Italian production or from Allied sources, with railway or maritime transport with vehicles of a Special Transport Coy.

a local organisation: bases at the Mil. Territorial H.Qs which provide for the requirements of the units in the territory under jurisdiction employing railway transport exceptionally and vehicles of the Special Administrative Transport Coys. (one for each Territorial H.Q.) and, finally, animal transport (whenever possible for light loads over a short distance). Combat Groups and other units of the Administrative Divs are also supplied by the same organisation employing their own transport (road).

(II) MEANS.

(a) At present about 5,500 motor vehicles of the Italian W.D. are on the road. Most of them have been obtained through recovery after the liberation of the National territory. They have been maintained in running order employing every form of resourcefulness and using parts obtained from the dismantling of unserviceable vehicles. They are insufficient to meet requirements.

An improvement of the situation is to be expected due to :

- (i) The new repair organisation now in force.
- (ii) The return to the Italian of all ex-Italian military vehicles however recovered.
- (iii) The reactivation of the industries in the North.
- (iv) A strict control over the assignment of vehicles and over motor traffic.

(b) About 1,200 carts of various types (animal drawn) are now being issued for light loads over a short distance. They supplement the above all in order to reduce wear and tear and to save fuel.

(c) Non-political aspect of the Army.

The policy that the Army should be without any above political controversy is enforced in the new Italian Democratic Army. This is an old tradition of the Italian Army.

The Army is meant to serve the Nation and is not a political party.

This policy is not meant to deny the soldier-citizen the right to have a political idea, but refuses him the right to belong to a political party or carry out political propaganda as long as he forms part of the Army.

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The Army is meant to serve the Nations and is not a political party. This policy is not meant to deny the soldier-citizen the right to have a political idea, but refuses him the right to belong to a political party or carry out political propaganda as long as he forms part of the Army. It is not quite correct to say that the Army should be non-political. It would be more suitable to say that it should be "non-party".

271
Major General L. BROWNING, CB, OBE, MC.,
Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C.,
(M.M.I.A.) R O M E

INT/II4/I

24 Aug. '45.

My dear

I forgot when I saw you at the War Office the other day to say that when I was at the Foreign Office they told me that they were most anxious for me personally to give a broadcast on the Italian Army as soon as possible. They had a copy of a suggested broadcast which I had written out and which I attach hereto. They asked me to ask you to push it along at the War Office and as a matter of urgency, so I hope you will do so on receipt of this letter.

I might add that the chap who is dealing with all the business with the B.R.C. is Captain A.C. DUNCAN, Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office, Centre Block, Bush House, Aldwych, London, W.C.2 (Pho 7911) Temple Bar 1581

It was so nice seeing you again and that you are flourishing.

Au revoir.

Yours

L.B.

1670

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

I forgot when I saw you at the War Office the other day to say that when I was at the Foreign Office they told me that they were most anxious for me personally to give a broadcast on the Italian Army as soon as possible. They had a copy of a suggested broadcast which I had written out and which I attach hereto. They asked me to ask you to push it along at the War Office and as a matter of urgency, so I hope you will do so on receipt of this letter.

I might add that the chap who is dealing with all the business with the B.B.C. is Captain A.C. DUNCAN, Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office, Centre Block, Bush House, Aldwych, London, W.C.2 (Photo 191)

It was so nice seeing you again and that you are flourishing.

An revoir.

Yours
L.B.

Major General J.M. SINCLAIR, CB, CBE.,
D.M.I.
War Office,
L O N D O N.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

Subject:- Italian Army - Broadcast.

LAND FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)

INT/114/1

16 Aug 45

Capt. A.C. Duncan,
Political Intelligence Dept of Foreign Office,
Centre Block,
Bush House, ALDWYCH,
LONDON, W.C.2.

I acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 3 Aug 45, and in reply have to state that Gen. BROWNING has been in LONDON for the last fortnight and has probably got in touch with you. He returns to this Headquarters during the coming week, when I hope to send you a fuller reply.

Lt-Col.

G.S.

1909

Copy to: M.O.I.,
Miss Brigid Maxwell,
Press Attache's Office, R32E.

18/8

11672

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

Telephone:
TEMPLE BAR 1581

POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT
OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE,
CENTRE BLOCK,
BUSH HOUSE, ALDWYCH,
LONDON, W.C.2

3rd August, 1945.

To: Lt. Col. S.M. Ingledon, G.S.O.I.,
H.Q. Land Forces Sub-Commission (AC) M.M.I.A.,
From: Capt. A.C. Duncan, Italian Region, P.I.D.,

Reference my memorandum of the 18th July, would you
please let me know what it has been possible to arrange:

- (1) In regard to material requested in para.1.
- (2) In regard to General Browning's broadcast.

Annals Duncan

cc. M.O.I.
Miss Brigid Maxwell,
Press Attache's Office, Rome.

File
INT/114/1 190
(Folio 24)

1673

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

Telephone
TEMPLE BAR 1581

POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT
OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE,
CENTRE BLOCK,
BUSH HOUSE, ALDWYCH,
LONDON, W.C.2

18th July, 1945.

To: Lt. Col. S.M. Ingledon, G.S.O.I.,
H.Q. Land Forces Sub-Commission (AG) M.M.I.A.,

From: Capt. A.C. Duncan, Italian Region, P.I.D.,

Thank you for your memorandum INT 114/1 dated July 11th.

1. The notes which you enclose have already been used by the B.B.C. but we would welcome further news about the Italian Army, under the following headings:-

- (a) Details of difficulties encountered in the build-up of the army.
- (b) Details of army group by group, character study of typical
- (c) Regular news of its development. (soldiers.
- (d) Equipment.
- (e) Transport and supply.
- (f) Non-political outlook.
- (g) Any further points of interest.

2. The B.B.C. and ourselves feel that it would be an excellent idea for General Browning to broadcast over the B.B.C. Would you ask the General to write a talk of anything between 400 and 1200 words. This he could give in Rome over a private wavelength.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Radio Department, Press Attache's office so that the necessary arrangements can be made.

3. As P.W.B. has now ceased to exist could the material mentioned in para 1 please be sent to me c/o Press Attache, British Embassy, Rome.

copies to:

Miss Brigid Maxwell, Press Attache's Office, British
Embassy, Rome.

M.O.I. (Mr. Bernard Bevan)
B.B.C. (Italian Region).

Capt. Duncan
Capt.

1906

COPY INCOMING SIGNAL

FROM: DISTWO

TO : 5 ARMY
DISTONE
DISTTWO
66 AA HDE
60 SUB AREA

INFO: 6 SA ARMED DIV
59 AREA
7 AGRA
151 SUB AREA
215 SUB AREA

REF : SDI/1636

AFHQ
ALCCA
AMG PIEDMONT
AMG LOMBARDIA
RESTMOVES

EASTMOVES
SOUTHMOTES
HQ BTA
AMG LIGURIA

SECRET

FURTHER TO MY SDI/1616 OF 30 JULY SET TO ALL (.) FOLLOWING ADJUSTMENT
OF ADMIN RESPONSIBILITIES IN NORTH ITALY ORDERED BY AFHQ
AS FOLLOWS (.)

- 1 (.) DISTWO TO TAKE OVER PRESENT RESPONSIBILITIES OF DISTONE NORTH OF
SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF COMPARTIMENTO OF EMILIA VIZ EL7 AREA ON 30 AUGUST
214 SUB AREA (CONVERTED TO EL8 SPECIAL AREA) ON 31 AUGUST (.) NECESSARY
INSTRUCTIONS BY DISTONE AND DISTWO ARE BEING ISSUED SEPARATELY (.)
- 2 (.) DISTONE AND DISTWO TO HAND OVER PRESENT RESPONSIBILITIES SOUTH OF
SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF COMPARTIMENTO OF EMILIA TO DISTTWO ON 20 AUGUST (.)
DETAILS OF TRANSFER AFFECTING ^{HQ} 66 AA HDE WILL BE ISSUED SEPARATELY BY
DISTWO (.)
- 3 (.) TRANSFER OF PRESENT RESPONSIBILITIES OF 5 ARMY TO DISTWO ¹⁹1951
ORDERED BY AFHQ IN A SEPARATE ORDER WHICH WILL BE NOTIFIED IN DUE COURSE (.)
- 4 (.) DISTONE BEING DISBANDED REF 15 SEPTEMBER 1945 (.)
- 5 (.) 210, 216 AND 71 SUB AREA BEING RELIEVED OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES
BY DISTTWO 31 JULY AND DISBANDED 15 AUGUST

011706 B

23

AS FOLLOWS (.)

- 1 (.) DISTRO TO TAKE OVER PRESENT RESPONSIBILITIES OF DISTONE NORTH OF SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF COMPARTIMENTO OF EMILIA VIZ 217 AREA ON 20 AUGUST 214 SUB AREA (CONVERTED TO 218 SPECIAL AREA) ON 31 AUGUST (.) NECESSARY INSTRUCTIONS IN DISTRO AND DISTRO ARE BEING ISSUED SEPARATELY (.)
- 2 (.) DISTONE AND DISTRO TO HAND OVER PRESENT RESPONSIBILITIES SOUTH OF SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF COMPARTIMENTO OF EMILIA TO DISTROES ON 20 AUGUST (.)
DETAILS OF TRANSFER AFFECTING ^{HQ} 56 AA Hqs WILL BE ISSUED SHORTLY BY DISTRO (.)
- 3 (.) TRANSFER OF PRESENT RESPONSIBILITIES OF 5 ARMY TO DISTRO ¹⁹ ~~19~~ ¹⁹ ~~19~~ ORDERED BY AFHQ IN A SEPARATE ORDER WHICH WILL BE NOTIFIED IN DUE COURSE (.)
- 4 (.) DISTRO BEING DISBANDED MAY 15 SEPTEMBER 1946 (.)
- 5 (.) 210, 216 AND 71 SUB AREA BEING RELIEVED OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES BY DISTROES 31 JULY AND DISBANDED 15 AUGUST

Info-Action: Exec Com E
Info: * * *
Land Forces *

TO DISTRIBUTION:

Action: C/I
Info: A (Two)
Q (Three)
MOV (Two)
RE
X
ST (Two)
I
Sigs Office

WS 04 AUG 45

1676

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

MEMORANDUM

LAND FORCES SUB-COM, AG (MEMA)

INT/114/1

3 Aug 45

TO : Lt. Col. SANSOME
Officio C.A.
MINISTRY OF WAR

Ref our telephone conversation.

1. Herewith attached is questionnaire regarding information requested by the B.L.C., LONDON.
2. Will you kindly see that the branches concerned at the War Ministry supply this information as soon as possible.


Major
G. S.

1903

1677

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

SUBJECT: Publicity for Italian War Effort

LAND FORCES SUB-COM, AG (MMIA)

INT/114/1

July 45

TO : I.M.C., AMHQ

1. With reference to Minute No. 9 of your "Informal Routing Slip" dated 23 July 45, the following correspondence is forwarded:-

Public Relations Branch "Press Release" - For Release 10 June 45

378/21/PRB

Booklet - L'Esercito Italiano per la Guerra di Liberazione.

2. May this HQ please be informed as to particular information required in addition to that attached.

**Major General
MMIA**

1902

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

A20 394

PUBLIC RELATIONS BRANCH

375 /21/PR3

Press Release - For Release 10 June 1945

Re-created out of the confusion and chaos of 18 months ago, a brand-new, efficient and compact Italian Army has arisen which has made invaluable contributions to the Allied war effort both in support of military lines of communications and in the final assault on the Nazi lines in Italy, the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission said today in a special report.

The sub-commission's report, which summed up the history of the Italian Army's re-organization under joint Italian and Allied leadership, paid tribute both to the tremendous saving in Allied manpower made by Italian service troops and to the valiant battle record of the four combat groups which participated in the fighting with the 8th Army in April.

The strength of the Italian Army was publicly revealed for the first time as consisting of more than 300,000 officers and men. Apart from Combat Groups, thousands of troops were used to guard import installations. The service troops numbered 175,000 and worked directly under Allied Commands. Port labor battalions have broken many records in the unloading of Allied ships. Road construction units have maintained vital communications under enemy fire to allow armored forces to advance.

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The strength of the Italian Army was publicly revealed for the first time as consisting of more than 300,000 officers and men. Apart from Combat Groups, thousands of troops were used to guard import installations. The service troops numbered 175,000 and worked directly under Allied Commands. Port labor battalions have broken many records in the unloading of Allied ships. Road construction units have maintained vital communications under enemy fire to allow armored forces to advance without delay. Mine clearance companies have lifted nearly 600,000 mines.

The Land Forces Sub-Commission, which also has the title of Military Mission to the Italian Army, is headed by Major General Langley Browning (3). It is the agency which from the beginning has been responsible, with the Italian Ministry of War, for re-organizing and re-disciplining the Italian Army. General Browning said in his report:

"Great credit must go to the officers of the Italian War Ministry and General Staff under the good leadership and untiring

efforts of H.E. Count Casati - the War Minister. Many cross-currents have tended to hamper and even divert the re-creation of this truly national army. The task of the Minister of War has been a heavy one. Yet, with true patriotism, he has overcome all difficulties and has undoubtedly succeeded in restoring much of the prestige of the Italian Army in the eyes of the United Nations."

In the new Order of Battle of the Italian Army appear hundreds of Italian units, Combat Groups, Guard Battalions, Service Units, Territorial Headquarters. These units represent Italians from every walk of life, and every part of Italy - hardened soldiers repatriated from the Balkans, Patriots, Grenadiers, Bersaglieri, Alpine Troops, Parachutists, Assault troops - many of whom have seen fighting in the Balkans, in Africa, on the Garigliano, at Cassino, on the Gothic line, and in the final assault, whilst others have seen serving the Allied Armies in the Ports, on the roads or with their mules.

The birth of the new Italian Army goes back to September 8, 1943. A new Italian Army was essential to the smooth-running of, and assistance to, the Allied war effort and for the internal security of both the Allied Armies and the Civilian population.

Work of reconstruction was started at once. The Italian Ministry of War and General Staff sought out Generals and staff officers from all quarters in order to set up the vital administrative machinery necessary for the formation of an Army.

The first Italian formation chosen to fight with the Allies was concentrated in Apulia for re-organization and training.

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The first Italian formation chosen to fight with the Allies was concentrated in Apulia for re-organization and training. Fitted throughout with Italian arms and equipment, this first Motorized Group became known the Corps Italiano di Liberazione (C.I.L.). Overcoming great difficulties owing to shortage of equipment and arms, the corps was ready for battle by December 1943, when it went into the line under command of the American 5th Army.

This C.I.L., made up of Infantry, Bersaglieri, Alpini, Parachutists and Artillery men, handicapped by poor equipment and lack

of modern arms, with very little transport, met the enemy for the first time at Monte Lungo, sustaining heavy casualties. In this action, the C.I.L. gave a good account of itself and won the praise of General Mark W. Clark, then commanding general, 5th Army, who said:

"This action shows the determination of Italian soldiers to liberate their country from German domination, a determination which may well serve as an example to the oppressed peoples of Europe."

After four months in the line, the C.I.L. passed to under command 8th Army and took part in the brilliant action which seized the height of Monte Carrone on March 31, 1944. After months of patrol work and holding, Pilottrano was captured by the "Nembo" parachutists, sustaining over 300 casualties. Many brilliant actions were to follow before the C.I.L. was pulled out of the line in August, 1944.

Behind the fighting line, the Italian Army was by no means inactive. A far greater number of Italian troops were working and co-operating for the Allied War effort. Labor battalions, 1900 road construction units, mine clearance units, signal and line telegraph companies, docks operating companies had been formed and put to work on the maintenance and safe-guarding of the Allied lines of communications.

Italian mule pack transport companies were carrying supplies and ammunition right forward in the mountainous regions of the

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Italian mule pack transport companies were carrying supplies and ammunition right forward in the mountainous regions of the Apennines, where no vehicles could move. Much work had to be carried out under enemy shell fire and many casualties were sustained. Recognition and praise was freely given by Allied commanders employing these units.

At the Ministry of War, hard work and loyal cooperation was being given by the Italian staffs. Difficulties of equipment, transportation and documentation were daily problems. Italian staff procedure had to be changed to conform with Allied procedure and directives. The Italian Territorial lay-out was put into effect as territory was handed over to Italian administration.

Call-ups and recalls to the colors were re-started.

Allied equipment and material, however, were not available to maintain a large Italian fighting force. Allied commitments in Europe and in the Far East being very heavy.

Finally, in response to the strong desire of the Italian nation and the Army for a greater representation of Italian fighting troops in the line, and the successes of the C.I.L. combined with the work of the service units, brought about the decision of the Allies in July, 1944 to form six Italian combat groups to be employed in combat with the Allied armies. British arms and equipment for these groups were made available and Italian and British staffs set to work.

The work of re-equipment, organization, training in British methods and clothing in khaki battle dress was initiated by a relatively small staff of British and Italian personnel. Units were formed, training pamphlets and manuals were translated into Italian, training schools were opened and bi-lingual Italian officers and non-commissioned officers were found, trained and instructed. The vast task entailed was carried out by hard work and loyal cooperation of the Italian staffs and British instructors.

Towards the end of 1944, five months after its formation, first Italian combat group - the "Cremona" - went into the line under the command of the 8th Army, having been completely re-formed, re-equipped and trained in British arms and methods - an achievement of original character and considerable speed.

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During the last great assault of the Armies in Italy, the Italian Combat Groups - CREMONA, TRIULI, LEGHANO, and POLACHE - all played their part. The "TRIULI" sustained 500 casualties in the attack on Bologna - units of the "LEGHANO" were amongst

the first to enter the city. The "CAMIONA", for example, pursued the enemy across the R. SANTERO, and won the praise of the Commander of the 5th British Corps who said:

"You and your Group have admirably carried out operations assigned to you and your officers and men have shown great courage and zeal during the recent fighting."

In addition to the praise given by the Commanding Generals of 15th Army Group and of the 5th and 8th Armies, the Supreme Allied Commander himself, Field Marshal Alexander, under whose over-all command the more than 300,000 Italian soldiers operated, has always been the first to appreciate the good work of the Italian Army, and has said so publicly on many occasions, the report concludes.

PASSED FOR PUBLICATION BY FIELD PRESS CENSOR

Distribution B and C.

1899

1087

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

nm/12

[Handwritten signature]

[Handwritten initials and circled 'A']

INFORMAL ROUTING SLIP
ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Subject Publicity for Italian War Effort

Date 12 July 1945

No.	From	To	Date	
5.	PRO	<i>Inc</i> AC	12 July	For action suggested in minute #4. <i>Kenneth W. Clark</i> KENNETH W. CLARK, Colonel, G. S. C. Deputy PRO.
6.	INC	AC	13 July 1945	For action as indicated in minute #4. For the Chief, INC Section: <i>James F. Marnane</i> JAMES F. MARNANE, Major, Inf., Executive Officer.
7.	AC PRO	INC	16 July 1945	1. AC PRO not technically competent to release material on Partisan aid to Allied war effort. Patriots Branch, AC, deals with Partisans only in stage prior to return to civil life. Partisan details, as indicated in these minutes, in files of Spec Ops and 2-3, AFHQ. 2. Long story on aid given by Italian Army already released by AG 10 June 1945. 3. Likewise, impossible to release material on Italian Air Force or Navy since operational data not at this Hq. 1897 For the Director <i>John P. Leacocks</i> JOHN P. LEACOCKS Major, Hq. Executive Officer PRB AG
8.	PRO	INC	23 July 1945.	Ref above. As neither AC or PR are in a position to supply sufficient data (vide Minute 7) it is suggested that all the relevant material can be obtained from:

contd....

1688

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

INTERNAL ROUTING SLIP

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERSSubject: Publicity for Italian War Effort.Date 23 July 1945.

No.	From	To	Date
			(i) Colonel Negroni, Chief of Italian Military Mission at 15 Army Group (Italian Army) (ii) Colonel Riopé, Section Chief of G-3, Special Ops at 15 Army Group (Partisans). Information from these two sources would provide a complete and accurate picture of the Italian War Effort. Such material could subsequently be collated and released to Press and Radio by PR, AFHQ. <i>P. R. Astley</i> P. R. ASTLEY. Colonel. P. R. O. A. F. H. Q.
9	INC	MMIA AC ROME	Can you arrange to supply data for collation and release to Press and Radio by P. R. A. F. H. Q. <i>A. C. W. Hobson</i> A. C. W. HOBSON Colonel Chief INC. 1895

785020

1689

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

Classification

COORDINATING ROUTE SLIP
(Staff Minute Sheet)
ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

19
4/150/6

File No. GBI/OI(CS)/101.3

Date
Originated: 24 June 1945

SUBJECT PUBLICITY FOR ITALIAN WAR EFFORT

Number each memo or minute consecutively. Fill in each column, initial action, draw 1 line across the sheet. Use entire width of sheet for long memoranda.

No. of Origin Pass To Date Has attached paper been coordinated with all concerned?

3. INC Br. RESMIN 2 July Noted.

Incl:
n/c

A. J. McChrystal
A. J. McCHRISTAL
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
Chief, INC Section

4. Br. ReMin P.R.O. 9 July Please see Min 2.
Can you please arrange for this information to be released.
We suggest that the best method would be for P.R.O. A.C. to discuss with the Press Dept, the British Embassy, and arrange release together of what the Embassy consider suitable.

1893

A. Russell

No. Incls

No. App

Classification

396

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

INTERNAL ROUTING SLIP

FILE: GRI/CI(04)/101.3

DATE: 24 June 1945

SUBJECT: PUBLICITY FOR ITALIAN WAR REPORT

Fill in each column, initial action, and draw a line across the sheet just below initials. Number each memo consecutively in first column. Use entire width of sheet for long memos.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE	
1.	G-2 CI	G-3 (Special Ops.)	24 June 1945.	Reference telephone conversation Col. King - Col. Hunt - Can you say what sort of information can be released on Partisan activity? Please notify British Res.Min. who will arrange release through PRO. For the A. C. of S., G-2., <i>D. W. S. Hunt</i> D. W. S. HUNT, Colonel, G.3, G-2 CI Section.
2.	G-3	Br RESMIN THRU ✓ INC	26 June	1. Information that shows how Partisan activity aided the Allied armies may be released for publication as well as the fact that they were supplied, directed, and led by Allied officers; however, amount of supplies dropped, number of Allied officers in the field, and detailed methods or technique of communications, supply or tactics should not be published. 2. Under no conditions should the names of the Allied agencies concerned (SOE and OSS) be mentioned. FOR THE AC of S, G-3: <i>GEO. L. KING</i> GEO. L. KING Colonel, G.S.C. Chief, Sp Ops Sec., G-3.

SLMcK/lth/Sp O

1691

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

COPY

Office of the Resident Minister,
Central Mediterranean,
A. P. H. Q.

45/150/6

15th June, 1945.

TO : Chief of Staff
From : Mr. A. Russell.
Subject : Publicity for Italian war effort

1. In order to stimulate interest and sympathy in Italian events, the Foreign Office are anxious for the release to the British press and British Broadcasting Corporation of as much information as possible regarding the performance of the Italian armed forces and their contribution to the Allied war effort.

2. His Majesty's Embassy in Rome have requested me to ask you whether you would now be prepared to release information of this nature which has previously been withheld for operational reasons. H.M. Embassy suggest, if you agree, that they might get this information direct from the Navy, Land Forces and Air Sub-Commissions.

3. H.M. Embassy have also asked whether you will give authority for the use of any material which S.O.(M) are able to provide regarding the activities of Italian patriots.

4. H.M. Embassy suggest that a further useful source of information might be the Allied Screening Commission who have a vast amount of data concerning the care and assistance given by Italian peasants and others to our escaped prisoners of war in Italy. Hitherto there has been a ban on the publication of any such material but perhaps the moment has come when this may now be lifted.

5. Presumably the normal channel for the release of such information would be the Public Relations Officer either at A.P.H.Q. or at the Commission, but H.M. Embassy state that if their Press Department could be of any assistance in the matter they will be only too glad to help. 1890

6. I should be most grateful for your advice on this question.

(Sgd)

Deputy Resident Minister.

1692

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

19
W
SUBJECT: Films on Activities of Italian Army.

Land Forces Sub Comm. A.C.
(M.M.I.A.) ROME.
WEL/B/2.

10 July '45.

To : Ministry of War
Ufficio Stampa.

1. It is necessary that the Italian Army Film should be cleared by AFHQ military censorship and by A.C., and these clearances may be obtained from International News Censorship (INC) and from Public Relations Section, A.C. respectively.
2. After the clearances have been obtained, Capt Pilade Levi of PWB should be approached to arrange distribution.
3. Your attention is drawn to para. 4. of this HQ letter IMF/114 of 17 April: please state when a representative of this HQ will be able to see the completed film.

Internal:- "G"
"A"

WEL/B/2
1889

WEL/B/2
Capt.,
Belmare,
M.M.I.A.

1693

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH
UNIT No. 8 - APO 512

(18)

*Int 14/1
9 July 45*

6 July 1945

G. (I)

Subject: Film on Activities of Italian Army

To : Land Forces Sub Com. (MMIA)

1. If the Italian Army Film has been cleared by AFHQ military censorship and AC it will be distributed by PWB.
2. The clearances should be obtained from INC and the Public Relations Section of AC.
3. I would suggest that after clearances have been obtained, Mr. G. Stewart Brown, Public Relations Director of AC, take up the matter directly with Captain Pilade Levi of PWB, who will arrange distribution.
4. The PWB Film Production Section has been abolished and therefore could not assist in production.

See 10/10/45

Russell Barnes

RUSSELL BARNES
Director, PWB-AFHQ

1888

*See
above*

*M of W informed
WEL/3/2 16 July 45*

690930

B

Major General L. BROWNING, CBE, OBE, MB,
Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)
R O M E.
Int/114/1

14 July, 1945.

My dear

Reference your letter of 5 July in connection with the B.B.C. build-up of the prestige of the new Italian Army, we sent the attached to Captain A.C. DUNCAN in London.

As you see I have suggested that I should give a broadcast myself on this matter! It would give me amongst other things a very good reason for having a trip home! But apart from that I know that it is considered of more interest if a talk is made personally instead of just read out as a statement. I have broadcast before for the B.B.C. I have therefore drafted out a possible short talk for the B.B.C. on the Italian Army, of which I enclose 2 copies. You may perhaps send these personally to DUNCAN yourself as a suggestion. I reckon it would take me about 10 minutes to deliver this statement on the radio. I could of course expand it and include such things as the excellent Anglo-American cooperation in M.M.I.A. (where we are completely integrated to all ranks) which made this possible, some remarks on the quality of the Italian officer and man (the officer and N.C.O. is on the whole pretty bad but the man has great potentialities if properly led) etc. Anyway I leave that to you and if the B.B.C. want me to broadcast I would like to do it in London and not from Naples! and not before 28th in view of certain commitments here.

Your brother Henry left us on route for home a few days ago. We were all very sorry to lose him. He did an excellent job and we all liked him immensely.

With best wishes.

Yours

A.B.

1885

1695

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

I have therefore drafted out a possible short talk for the B.B.C. on the Italian Army, of which I enclose 2 copies. You may perhaps send these personally to DUNCAN yourself as a suggestion. I reckon it would take me about 10 minutes to deliver this statement on the radio. I could of course expand it and include such things as the excellent Anglo-American cooperation in M.M.I.A. (where we are completely integrated to all ranks) which made this possible, some remarks on the quality of the Italian officer and man (the officer and M.C.O. is on the whole pretty bad but the man has great potentialities if properly led) etc. Anyway I leave that to you and if the B.B.C. want me to broadcast I would like to do it in London and not from Naples! and not before 28th in view of certain commitments here.

Your brother Henry left us en route for home a few days ago. We were all very sorry to lose him. He did an excellent job and we all liked him immensely.

With best wishes.

Yours

H.B.

1885

Major The Hon. Hubert HOWARD,
C.I.O.,
D Section,
P.T.B.
MILAN.

/ago

1696

COPY

DRAFT FOR SHORT B.E.C. TALK ON THE ITALIAN ARMY

I have been asked to tell you something about the new Italian Army, as I have been head of the Anglo-American Mission formed to recreate and reorganise the Italian Army during the past year and a half under the orders of Field Marshall Alexander.

This Army had reached a total of over 300,000 by the time the Germans surrendered, including 5 fighting divisions, and it has no doubt over the Germans there.

The creation of the Army represents, I think a unique feature in the history of war, formed as it was in war out of a defeated nation, and determined that they would do their best to "earn their passage" (as the Prime Minister put it) and they cooperated with us wholeheartedly to overcome the very considerable difficulties involved in this unusual task.

The birth of this Army goes back to early Sept. 1943. Conditions at that time were chaotic. Morale was at zero. There was no Ministry of War, no organisation, hundreds of thousands of Italian soldiers milling about. There were 800,000 soldiers in Sardinia alone, no supply organisation, no records, nothing. We had to start from zero, but it was the Italian who had to do the job although of course we supplied the direction and initiative. A new Ministry of War was organised at LECCE in the heel of Italy, Prisoner of War Generals and staff were brought from England, clerks were organised, typewriters produced, etc. and soon this central organisation was starting to function. Information was obtained as to the number and location of troops in our part of Italy and these were organised into formations under Italian Generals.

The primary need at that time was for Service Units, such as Labour Battalions, Dock Companies, Engineer Units, Bridge Building Units etc., and these soon started to take shape, being formed gradually into divisions which came under the command of the Allied District or Army Commanders. Literally hundreds of units were formed in this way and eventually these Service Units reached the imposing total of nearly 200,000 - a great contribution to the war effort.

While all this was proceeding, an Italian fighting formation was being organised. This became known as the "Corpo Italiano Liberatorio" or C.I.L. for short. It was a very "mixed bag" and was collected and organised under very great difficulty. It was composed of all kinds of soldiers - Infantry, Bersaglieri, Alpini, Granatieri, Parachutists, Artillery men etc. - and was equipped with such Italian equipment as could be found. Nevertheless, it did very well in action and gave a good account of itself. It moreover showed that, given proper direction and assistance, the Italian soldier could be of great value to us as fighting men.

1887

at that time were chaotic. Morale was at zero. There was no Ministry of War, no organisation, hundreds of thousands of Italian soldiers milling about. There were 200,000 soldiers in Sardinia alone, no supply organisation, no records, nothing. We had to start from zero, but it was the Italian who had to do the job although of course we supplied the direction and initiative. A new Ministry of War was organised at LECCE in the heel of Italy, Prisoner of War Generals and staff were brought from England, clerks were organised, typewriters produced, etc. and soon this central organisation was starting to function. Information was obtained as to the number and location of troops in our part of Italy and these were organised into formations under Italian Generals.

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1887

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The next development was the formation of the fighting divisions, about the middle of 1944. Authority was obtained from the British Government to organise and equip throughout with British equipment a number of such divisions. Time was short as they were urgently needed. We therefore had to design an establishment for these Divisions as a compromise between a tactical organisation which the Italians had been used to working on and an organisation which suited the British weapons and equipment that the British provided. British training schools, through interpreters, trained Italian instructors, who in turn went back and trained their own units; British Liaison Units were appointed to each division (commonly known as "Combat Groups" or "Gruppi"); mechanics were trained and so on. The language question, was, of course, one of the greatest difficulties. But the Italians are very interested in, and quick to pick up, new mechanisms and they were delighted to have this chance of shedding their blood in the liberation of their country. And so, the first of the Gruppi became ready for action in 5 months.

E/.....

Other Gruppi crystallised progressively and at the time of the German surrender 4 of them had fought valiantly, while the fifth was just about to go into the line. The Allied Commanders were full of praise for the fighting qualities of these Gruppi. Field Marshal Alexander, who has always taken the greatest personal interest himself in this Army, has publicly praised them on many occasions; and as a further example, the G.O.C. 5 British Corps issued an order to the day to the G.O.C. "Cremona" Gruppo saying "You and your Group have admirably carried out operations assigned to you, and your officers and men have shown great courage and zeal during the recent fighting".

I should have mentioned earlier that the Service Units I referred to, included many mule companies, lorry companies etc., working under fire in the forward area. In any event, this new Italian Army fighting with us in Italy sustained 8,000 casualties, composed of about 2,000 killed, 5,300 wounded and 700 missing. Incidentally, the Italian Army suffered another 3,000 casualties in driving the Germans out of Corsica and a further 32,000 in fighting the Germans in the Balkans, Dalmatia etc. - a grand total of about 43,000 casualties including 17,000 killed.

All this could not have been possible unless the Allies had supplied this new Italian Army with vast quantities of rations and equipment of all sorts which was lacking to them. As you know, the main manufacturing facilities are in the North and this was held by the Germans. Nevertheless, a large salvage and repair organisation was set up so as to save Allied shipping and resources. Old boots and old Allied battle-dress, for example, was put at the Italian Army's disposal, where it was pulled to bits in some 30 factories and renovated for use by the troops. This developed into one of the biggest old clothing and old boots business in the world, I suppose. The output of renovated old boots, for instance, was, at the time of the German surrender, at the rate of 90,000 pairs of boots per month or one million per year. Despite this, of course, the Allies had to supply a large part of the rations and of the equipment necessary. I don't propose to weary you with statistics or details but I am sure you can imagine from what I have said what a vast business it has been creating this new Italian Army of over 300,000 out of nothing, in such a short space of time. I think the Italian deserve great credit for the way they put their backs into it and really got it going. One thing that helped us considerably was the capture of Rome, with the original War Ministry Building, complete with records, intact - but that was not until much later.

I hope I have been able to give you some idea of the part played by the new Italian Army. The point is, was it worth while? Has it paid a dividend? To those questions the answer is undoubtedly - Yes. It saved Allied manpower, Allied shipping and Allied resources. It enabled Allied Divisions to be taken from Italy for the Western Front; it raised Italian morale; it gave Italy a new confidence, a new hope for the future, and a foundation on which they will build their smaller and better Army. The officers and men have worked and fought with the many other nations, whose soldiers, under the genius and guiding hand of Field Marshal Alexander, have combined in the

about 43,000 casualties including 3,000 killed.

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Forwards

Major General.
G.O.C. Military Mission
to the Italian Army.

JW

1700

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

Subject:- Italian Army - Prestige

HQ LAND FORCES SUB-COMMISSION (AC),
M.M.I.A.

INT/114/1.

11 Jul 45.

Capt. A.C. Duncan,
Political Intelligence Dept
of the Foreign Office,
Centre Block,
Bush House,

Aldwych, LONDON, W.C.2. (despatch through Central Service Desk, PWB, Via Veneto,
ROME)

Reference Capt. Hubert Howard's letter dated 5 July 45.

1. Attached herewith are some notes on the Italian Army which have already been passed for publication by the PWB Press Censor.
2. I am directed to state that Major-General L. Browning CBE CBE AO, GOC MIA, would be delighted to deliver a talk on the B.B.C. if it could be arranged. This would be eminently appropriate because as you will see from para. 4 of the Appendices MIA is the agency which, from the beginning, has been responsible with Italian Ministry of War for reorganising and redisciplining the Italian Army, which played so important a role in the Italian campaign.

J.M.Z.

Lt-Col.
G.S.

1882

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH
FIFTEENTH ARMY GROUP

D SECTION
MILAN

5th July 1945

O.C. Military Mission to the Italian Army
Allied Commission
Via Vittorio Veneto
Rome

Dear Sir,

I have had a message from the officer who acts as liaison between the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office and the B.B.C. requesting for information about the Italian Army.

I understand the B.B.C. wishes to help to build up the prestige of the Italian Army but has no material on which to base its talks. I should be very grateful if this material could be provided and at the same time any directions with regard to the way in which it should be used.

This material should be addressed to:

Captain A.C. Duncan,
Political Intelligence Department
of the Foreign Office,
Centre Block,
Bush House,
Aldwych, London W.C.2.

and delivered to the Central Service Desk, PWB, Via Veneto 188, for forwarding.

Yours sincerely

(Major) Hubert Howard

Hubert Howard
C.I.O. D Section

Copy to:
Captain Duncan
P.I.D. London
~~C.I.O. Washington~~
~~Rome Archives~~

091400

1702

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

SUBJECT: Film on Activities of Italian Army

Land Forces Sub Com. AC (MILA)

Int/114/1


4 July 45

FEB. AFEL

Further to our Int/114 of 17 Apr 45.

1. The Photographic Section of the Ministry of War have now produced the film on the activities of the Italian Army referred to in our letter under reference. Difficulties are being experienced by the Ministry of War in obtaining approval for the distribution of this film to civilian cinemas throughout ITALY.
2. It is requested that the necessary steps be taken to authorize the circulation of this film and that FSB Film Production Section be asked to give all the assistance required for a wide distribution.
3. It is considered that this film will have a good propaganda value and any assistance given by your various sections will be much appreciated.

CS/twa


Major General
MILA

Copy to: FSB for Film Production Sec.
Ufficio Stampa Ministry of War.

1880

Internal: Welfare.

A7/1

LA RICOSTRUZIONE DELL'ESERCITO NEL PENSIERO DEL MINISTRO JACINI

Un redattore dell'agenzia «Orbis» ha chiesto al nuovo ministro della guerra on. Stefano Jacini quali saranno le direttive che il nuovo governo seguirà nella ricostruzione dell'esercito e nella assunzione delle forze partigiane. L'on. Jacini ha testualmente dichiarato: «Nel succedere ad Alessandro Casati, la cui opera ricostruttrice non potrà essere adeguatamente valutata se non dalla generazione venuta, io non posso aver altro fine che di condurre ad estenderla, sotto la guida decisa e lungimirante del mio vecchio amico e compagno d'arme Ferruccio Parri.

La ricostruzione dell'esercito non è opera di un giorno: essa deve avvalgersi di piena intesa con gli alleati, nel quadro tracciato dalle condizioni dell'armistizio, allargato però ed integrato man mano che la nostra posizione nei confronti delle nazioni unite si andrà consolidando.

In questo piano rientrano la valorizzazione e la parziale incorporazione delle forze partigiane che un così decisivo contributo hanno dato alla resistenza contro l'invasore ed alla liberazione del suolo nazionale. Questa forza, io lo conosco: sono stato infatti nell'Ossola mentre essi combattevano, ho stretto amicizia con i loro migliori esponenti, ho avuto parenti strettissimi tra i loro Caduti gloriosi. Essi sanno di trovare in me un deciso sostenitore delle loro ri-

vendicazioni legittime e delle loro aspirazioni più sane; di quelle cioè che non sono dettate da motivi egotistici ma dall'interesse superiore del paese.

Tener alto nell'esercito la fede in se stesso, il culto delle migliori tradizioni che non sono di classe o di parte, ma schiettamente democratiche; ridare al paese l'orgoglio e la fiducia nella sua forza armata; tener alto nei cittadini il culto dell'esercito presidi della libertà delle nazioni».

Il Popolo

27 June 45

Wed

1879

11704

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

TOP SECRET

SUBJECT : Discipline IOGs - Anti Regular Army Propaganda.

LAND FORCES SUB-COM, A.C. (MMIA)

INT/114/1

20 June 45

TO : 50 HLU

1. The delay in answering your C/IS of 28 May 45. is regretted.
2. General Browning, whilst agreeing that Signor TOGLIATTI's action in writing to the Unita in the terms of his letter was irregular and the insinuations contained in it deplorable, considers that it is not possible for this HQ to take the matter up. Furthermore the wording of the letter is, as you are aware, carefully indefinite.
3. The Italian War Ministry are aware of the implications of Signor TOGLIATTI's letter, and must be responsible for taking any action in this case.

H. AC. Howard
4-606
for Major 1878,
MMIA.

Copy to: C-3 (Br Insr) HQ Fifth Army

jw

1705

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

13

1877

**RISORSE MILITARI
LIBERAZIONE
ESERCITO
DI LIBERAZIONE**

Se esulta e grave è stata la catastrofe che si è abbattuta sul Paese con 18 settembre 1943, nondimeno, cessato il primo momento d'incertezza e comprensibile smarrimento, la Nazione dimostra per chiari sintomi nei più vari campi e settori la sua volontà di ripresa e di ricostruzione. Per quel che concerne l'Esercito, la data dell'8 settembre se da un lato segna il dissolvimento del vecchio esercito, dall'altro registra la nascita del nuovo organismo militare.

In tutti questi mesi, qua e là attraverso notizie sia pure incomplete ed addirittura monche abbiamo potuto seguire, a fianco della armata alleata, la marcia e le azioni belliche delle nostre unità: i nomi di Monte Lungo, Monte Marone, Follonico — tanto per accennare alle località più note — hanno finito con il divenire familiari. Oggi che la guerra è terminata, gli Stati Maggiori seguono il naturale riserbo nell'andamento delle operazioni militari una relazione della Sottosegretaria per le Forze armate terrestri della Commissione alleata — ossia della Missione militare presso l'Esercito italiano — dà un'ampia testimonianza del contributo dell'Esercito di liberazione alla guerra contro il comune nemico.

Il compito della ricostruzione era in quell'ormai lontano autunno del 1943 assai arduo e difficile: esso non soltanto nel dicembre di quello stesso anno la prima unità del Corpo Italiano di Liberazione (C.I.L.) entrarono in campo. Insufficienti le armi, i vestiti, le razioni dei veterani: ma c'era in quei primi animosi volontari e soldati — una decisa volontà di batterli, di dimostrare all'Italia, agli Alleati, al mondo il nostro concreto apporto alla guerra di liberazione. Quanto grandi, di quei primi combattenti, sia a dimostrare l'elogio del generale Mark W. Clark allora comandante della 5^a Armata, il quale a proposito dell'azione di Monte Lungo dichiarava: « Questa azione è una prova della volontà dei soldati italiani di liberare il loro paese dalla dominazione tedesca, volontà che più belissimo servizio d'esempio ai popoli oppressi di Europa ». A quel primo gruppo, se ne aggiunsero altri: soldati di ogni grado e di ogni arma conflui-

1706

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

1877

...alleati, la ... e le ...
... di Monte Lungo, Monte Marro-
... Filotiana — tanto per accen-
... alle località più note — han-
... finito con il divenire familiari.
Oggi che la guerra è terminata, gli
Stati Maggiori sciogliono il natu-
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operazioni militari: una relazione
della Staffa commissionata per le For-
ze armate terrestri della Commis-
sione alleata — ossia della Misio-
ne militare presso l'Esercito italia-
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no verso i centri di raccolta da
ogni parte d'Italia, sia pure su-
perando innumerevoli pericoli, al-
francino infine le linee nemiche. Il
piccolo C.I.L., ormai incapace di
accogliere nei suoi quadri le nuo-
ve energie, era trasformato nel
quartier generale di combattimen-
ti di ufficiali in prima linea a
fianco degli Alleati. Le difficoltà
in conseguenza aumentavano ulle-
riormente: che occorreva superare
il grave inconveniente di equipag-
giare, addattare i reparti italiani
ai metodi ed alle armi britanniche.
Anche questa volta se ne veniva
accorto, però in un tempo relativa-
mente breve: nelle ultime azioni
belliche sul fronte italiano era an-
cora la Granata Inglese, a distri-
guersi in un attimo a sud del Po
di Primiero. Soltanto la creazio-
ne delle unità impediva l'altorlo-
re ingresso in campo delle nuove
unità.

1707

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

INT/114/1

Lt. Col. S.M. INGLEDEN

Military Mission to the Italian Army

C.M.F.

8 June 45

Dear


Lt. Col. Howard, MMIA Senior Liaison Officer, who has been visiting our LO's and Allied and Italian HQ's up North tells me that urgent steps are necessary to remedy the ignorance amongst the northerners of the war effort of the Italian Army.

General Browning is very keen that a propaganda campaign on the Italian Army is started at once in newspapers up North and Lt. Col. Howard says that you are the right man to see that articles and features appear in the northern papers.

I am enclosing an English and Italian version of an Article which has been produced by us and edited by P.R., A.C. for general release. We would much appreciate your using this to open a campaign for spreading the gospel and so easing the present feeling of distrust which the northerners have for the Italian Army.

Yours,

1876



Captain IBOLANI
Press Feature Service
P.W.B. Unit 16
C.M.F.

Copy - Rec 5/100

1708

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

orto aman o-cristiani

motorizzato e composto di fanteria, artiglieri, alpini, paracadutisti e artiglieri. Poi si decise la costituzione di sei gruppi di combattimento da utilizzare in prima linea insieme con le armate alleate.

Verso la fine del 1944, cinque mesi dopo la sua formazione il primo gruppo di combattimento italiano — la « Cremona » — andò al fronte sotto il comando dell'8. Armata, dopo essere stato completamente riformato, riequipaggiato e addestrato all'uso delle armi e dei metodi inglesi; questa opera, unica nel suo genere, fu compiuta con una rapidità veramente notevole. Presto altre unità di combattimento furono pronte; e col marzo 1945 quattro gruppi erano in linea e la « Cremona » aveva già ottenuto dei successi in un attacco a sud del Po di Primaro dove fece prigionieri più di 200 tedeschi.

Durante l'ultimo grande attacco delle armate alleate in Italia i gruppi di combattimento italiani — Cremona, Friuli, Legnano e Folgore — ebbero tutti la loro parte. La « Friuli » ebbe 500 perdite nell'attacco a Bologna; alcune unità della « Legnano » furono tra le prime ad entrare nella città.

Il rapporto conclude rilevando che, oltre agli elogi rivolti dai generali comandanti del 15. gruppo di armate e della 5. e 8. armata, lo stesso Comandante supremo alleato, Maresciallo Alexander, sotto il cui comando generale hanno operato più di 300.000 soldati italiani, è sempre stato il primo, come ha avuto occasione di dire pubblicamente a più riprese, ad apprezzare l'efficace attività svolta dall'Esercito Italiano.

Un esercito italiano è risorto dal caos

La Sottocommissione per le Forze armate terrestri della Commissione alleata, in una speciale relazione, comunica che dalla confusione e dal caos di 18 mesi fa è risorto un Esercito Italiano completamente nuovo e compatto che ha dato un contributo inestimabile allo sforzo bellico alleato sia cooperando al mantenimento delle linee di comunicazione militari sia nell'attacco finale dato alle forze tedesche in Italia.

Con questo rapporto, per la prima volta, si rende di pubblica conoscenza l'esistenza dell'Esercito Italiano, che comprende più di 300.000 unità tra ufficiali e uomini di truppa.

La relazione illustra poi come si procedette dopo l'8 settembre 1943 alla costituzione di questo esercito.

La prima formazione fu il Corpo Italiano di Liberazione completamente

1709

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

Al Circolo
Relazione
Leporello
centimenti politici
Veechietti
m. Gruppo Social
membri del Comitato dire
gruppo sono invitati oggi
all'Ufficio Sindacale del
in via Sistina 51
ai Segretari dei Nuclei So
Aziendali. I Segretari dei
e Nuclei Socialisti sono in
con urgenza all'Ufficio Sinda
dell'U. S. R. in via Sistina 51
ritirare il materiale di propa
nda per la giornata pro "Avanti".
Centro Socialista di Cultura e di
educazione politica. Il Consiglio
settivo e convocato per oggi, alle
e 16, in via Gregoriana 41. U. d. g.
municazioni del Comitato e propo
sizione di un congresso a Molinella.
Tutti i Partigiani socialisti resi
nti nella VII zona (Garbatella, Te
sotto, S. Anna, Ortensia) sono con
vinti oggi, alle ore 19.30, al Circo
della Garbatella.
I Partigiani del P. S. I. della
V zona che hanno partecipato al
movimento clandestino nell'organiza
zione del Partito, si presentano per
giurare la loro posizione, sabato 9
arr, alle ore 18, presso la sede del
Partito in piazza del Monte.
Conferenza Cabrini - Domani, alle
e 17.30, alla sede della Direzione
del Partito (via Gregoriana 41), la
compagna prof. Cabrini parlerà sul
tema: "Storia del Socialismo".

FOGRAFI

entario Bucarest - Castello: «La
arica e vittoriosa» e «Documen
rio americano» - Centric: «Una vo
nell'ombra» - Clodio: «Nella»
Cola di Rienzo: «La rivincita di
interior» - Colonna: «Splende
» - Colosso: «Amante» - Cri
allo: «Vicolo cieco» - Dalle Vit
rie: «La rivincita di Montecristo»
Excelsior: «Dove inganno» - Fe
dei: «Missioni creiche» - Flaminio:
occhi neri» - Docum. - Giulio
sear: «La famiglia Sullivan» -
loria: «Il coniugio della paura» -
aperinte: «Archibaldo» - Induno:
Atta conquisca dei dollari» - Iri:
Jevaso dall'isola del diavolo» -
Alia: «Rusanna» - Jovinetti sul
schermo: «Senza volto» - sulla su
a compagnia di rivista Poldos
Jassini: «Campo di fiori» - Mazzini:
sorelle Materassi» - Mouernis
imor sala A: «La rivincita di Mon
terio» - sala B: «L'ispiratrice»
Modernos: «La fidanzata di mio
varito» - con Melvyn Douglas - Na
ionali: «Parzan l'indomabile» -
Iomertano: «Fazio d'amore» - Nuo
di: «Molla brigata vita besta» -
Jassini: «La fidanzata di mio
marito» - con Melvyn Douglas - sulla
no spettacolo ore 21.15 - Olympia:
La fidanzata di mio marito» - con
Melvyn Douglas - Orfeo: «Fiamme
la passione» - Ottaviano: «L'ippo
rinpo» - Palazzo: «Teatro»

Telefono 54.507
Agenzia Via Mario de' Fiori, 51
Telef. 61.446 (Piazza di Spagna)
Agenzia A: V. Basella 142. Tel. 444.830

Torpedone C.I.D.O.

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Prenotazioni: C.I.D.O.
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Via Regina Elena 102 - Telef. 40.757
Wagons Lite Cook - Via Veneto, 111
Telef. 40.423 - Piazza R. Sallustiana 21
Telefono 63.311

LIVORNO - FIRENZE
GENOVA - BOLOGNA
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PARTENZE GIORNALIERE
Pullmann - Torpedoni - Vetture
per ogni destinazione
AGENZIA LANCIO
Piazza Barberia 35 (lato Canova)
Telefono 44.100

MILANO L. 6.000
OGGI ore 19

Arto aman AVANTI o-cristiani

*Italian
Army*

Un esercito italiano è risorto dal caos

La Sottocommissione per le Forze armate terrestri della Commissione alleata, in una speciale relazione, comunica che dalla confusione e dal caos di 18 mesi fa è risorto un Esercito Italiano completamente nuovo e completo che ha dato un contributo incalcolabile allo sforzo bellico alleato sia cooperando al mantenimento delle linee di comunicazione militari sia nell'attacco finale dato alle forze tedesche in Italia.

Con questo rapporto, per la prima volta, si rende di pubblica conoscenza l'esistenza dell'Esercito Italiano, che comprende più di 300.000 unità tra ufficiali e uomini di truppa.

La relazione illustra poi come si procedette dopo l'8 settembre 1943 alla costituzione di questo esercito.

La prima formazione fu il Corpo Italiano di Liberazione completamente

motorizzato e composto di fanteria, artiglieri, alpini, paracadutisti e artiglieri. Poi si decise la costituzione di sei gruppi di combattimento da utilizzare in prima linea insieme con le armate alleate.

Verso la fine del 1943, cinque mesi dopo la sua formazione, il primo gruppo di combattimento italiano — la « Cremona » — andò al fronte sotto il comando dell'S. Armata, dopo essere stato completamente riformato, ricquipaggiato e addestrato all'uso delle armi e dei metodi inglesi; questa opera, unica nel suo genere, fu compiuta con una rapidità veramente notevole. Presto altre unità di combattimento furono pronte; e col marzo 1945 quattro gruppi erano in linea e la « Cremona » aveva già ottenuto dei successi in un attacco a sud del Po di Primaro dove fece prigionieri più di 200 tedeschi.

Durante l'ultimo grande attacco delle armate alleate in Italia i gruppi di combattimento italiani — Cremona, Friuli, Legnano e Folgore — ebbero tutti la loro parte. La « Friuli » ebbe 500 perdite nell'attacco a Bologna; alcune unità della « Legnano » furono tra le prime ad entrare nella città.

Il rapporto conclude rilevando che, oltre agli elogi rivolti dai generali comandanti del 10. gruppo di armate e della 5. e 8. armata, lo stesso Comandante supremo alleato, Marshal Alexander, sotto il cui comando generale hanno operato più di 300.000 soldati italiani, è sempre stato il primo, come ha avuto occasione di dire pubblicamente a più riprese, ad apprezzare l'efficace attività svolta dall'Esercito Italiano.

1875

107/114/1
4

THE ITALIAN ARMY'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE
ALLIED WAR EFFORT AND THE LIBERATION OF ITALY

DEMORALIZATION

On 8 Sep 43, the Italian Army had reached its lowest ebb, except in a few isolated cases, complete chaos reigned. Units disintegrated and dissolved of their own accord. Officers and men went home, Generals and staffs, because of lack of orders, gave in to the state of complete disorganization and lack of discipline in the Army and deserted their posts. The greater proportion of the Army was spiritually and physically demoralized. There was no organized General Staff or Ministry of War.

BIRTH OF THE NEW ITALIAN ARMY

The Italian Armed Forces, after the Armistice, came under the direct command of the Allies. A new Italian Army, reorganized and re-disciplined, was essential to assist and for the smooth-running of the Allied war effort and for the Internal Security of both the Allied Armies and the civilian population.

Under the direction and control of the Allies through the Military Mission to the Italian Army, work of reconstruction was started at once. The Italian Ministry of War and General Staff sought out Generals and staff officers from all quarters in order to set up the vital administrative and directive machinery necessary for the formation of an Army, and on 13 Oct 43, Italy declared war on Germany and became a co-belligerent with the Allies.

The first Italian formation chosen to fight with the Allies was concentrated in Apulia for re-organization and training. Fitted throughout with Italian arms and equipment, this 1 Motorized Group, known to the Italians as the Corpo Italiano di Liberazione (C.I.L.) 1874, overcoming great difficulties owing to shortage of equipment and arms, was ready for battle by December when it went into the line under command of the American FIFTH Army.

This C.I.L., made up of Bersaglieri, Alpini, Parachutists and Artillery men, handicapped by poor equipment and lack of modern arms, with very little transport, met the enemy for the first time at Monte Lungo, sustaining heavy casualties. In this action, the C.I.L. gave a good account of itself and won the praise of General Clark who said, "This action shows the determination of Italian soldiers to liberate their country from German domination, a determination which may well serve as an example to the oppressed peoples of Europe."

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After four months in the line, the C.I.L. passed to under command EIGHTH Army and took part in the brilliant action which seized the height of Monte Marrone on 31 March.

After months of patrol work and holding, Filottrano was captured by the "Nembo" parachutists, sustaining over 500 casualties. General Leese, 8 Army Commander, in a message to the "Nembo", said, "I send you and your troops my best congratulations for the success of the capture of Filottrano after hard fighting." Many brilliant actions were to follow before the C.I.L. was pulled out of the line in August.

SERVICE UNITS

Behind the fighting line the Italian Army was by no means inactive. A far greater number of Italian troops were working and co-operating for the Allied War effort. Labour Bns, road construction units, mine clearance units, signal and line telegraph coys, docks operating coys had been formed and put to work on the maintenance and safe-guarding of the Allied L of C.

Italian mule pack tpt coys were carrying supplies and ammunition right forward in the mountainous regions of the Appenines, where no vehicles could move. Much work had to be carried out under enemy shell fire and casualties were sustained. Recognition and considerate praise was attributed by Allied commanders employing these units.

At the Ministry of War, hard work and loyal cooperation was being given by the Italian staffs. Difficulties of equipment, transportation and documentation were daily problems. Italian staff procedure had to be changed to conform with Allied procedure and directives.

The Italian territorial lay-out was implemented as territory was handed over to Italian administration. Call-ups and recalls to the colours were re-started.

By 1945, the Italian service units working directly for the Allies numbered some 175,000 men. Mine clearance coys had lifted over 530,000 mines. Port labour Bns held the record for the unloading of Allied ships. Road construction units, often working under enemy fire, had maintained vital communications without which the speed of the Allied advance could not have been maintained.

In addition to work done Italian Service Units were replacing Allied manpower, thus contributing further and in an important way to a war effort in which everyone was involved.

Much praise has been given to these vital service units by employing Allied commanders.

THE ITALIAN COMBAT GROUPS

All parties in the Italian Government had been pressing for a greater Italian participation in the Allied war effort. Allied equipment and material however was not available to maintain a large Italian fighting force. Allied commitments in Europe and in the far East were very heavy.

But the strong desire of the Italian nation and the Army for a greater representation of Italian fighting troops in the line and the successes of the C.I.L. combined with the work of the service units brought about the decision of the Allies in July 1944 to form

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This work of re-equipment, WE's, training in British methods and clothing in khaki battle dress was initiated by a relatively small staff of British and Italian personnel. Units were formed on the approved WE's, training pamphlets and manuals were translated into Italian, training schools were opened and bi-lingual Italian Officers and NCO's were found, trained and instructed. The vast task entailed was carried out by hard work and loyal cooperation of the Italian staffs and British instructors.

Towards the end of 1944, five months after its formation, the first Italian combat group - the "CREMONA" - went into the line under the command of 8 Army, having been completely re-formed, re-equipped and trained in British arms and methods - an achievement of original character and astounding speed. Soon other combat groups were ready and by 2 Mar 45, four groups were in the line and "CREMONA" had already achieved success in an attack south of Po di Primano when over 200 German prisoners were taken.

During the last great assault of the Armies in Italy, the Italian Combat Groups - CREMONA, FRIULI, LEGNANO, and FOLGORE - all played their part.

The "FRIULI" sustained 500 casualties in the attack on BOLOGNA - units of the "LEGNANO" were amongst the first to enter the city.

The "CREMONA", for example, pursuing the enemy across the R. SANTARO, won the praise of the Commander of the 5th Corps who said, "you and your Group have admirably carried out operations assigned to you and your officers and men have shown great courage and zeal during the recent fighting."

SUMMING UP

In reviewing this new Italian Army, it is evident that, out of the chaos and confusion of 18 months ago, a good, efficient new army has been formed. Praise for its soldiers has been generous and well deserved. Field Marshal Alexander himself, when visiting the Italian Reinforcement Centre for the Combat Groups, said, "It is enough for me to see good soldiers to recognize them at once as such, and from what I have seen today, watching you and your work, I know that you are excellent soldiers."

During the final stages of the Great Allied Victory in Italy, Field Marshal Alexander had over 300,000 Italian soldiers under his command. The Field Marshal has always been the first to appreciate the good work of the Italian Army, and has said so publicly on many occasions.

But great credit must go to the officers of the Italian War Ministry and General Staff under the good leadership and untiring efforts of H.E. Count Casati - the War Minister. The task of this staff has been a heavy one, yet throughout, cooperation and loyalty have been the prominent and all important theme.

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The new Order of Battle of the Italian Army produced by the Military Mission to the Italian Army in conjunction with the War Ministry shows hundreds of Italian units, their WE's, strengths and locations. Combat Groups, Guard Bns, Service Units, Territorial HQs, all appear. These units represent Italians from every walk of life, and every part of Italy - hardened soldiers repatriated from the Balkans, Patriots, Grenadiers, Bersaglieri, Alpine Troops, Parachutists, Assault troops - many of whom have seen fighting in the Balkans, in Africa, on the Garigliano, at Cassino, on the Gothic line and in the final assault, whilst others have been serving the Allied Armies in the Ports, on the roads or with their mules.

1717

In 1944, before the Combat Groups were formed, Maj Gen L. Browning, G.O.C. The Military Mission to the Italian Army, expressing his appreciation of the Italian Army, ex-witness of its work said, I think few people realize how well the Italian Army has done. They have, with our help, organized out of chaos an Army of over 300,000 ab initio - with scratch staffs, ex-POW Generals brought from abroad. The C.I.L. has fought well and had many casualties. The Minister for War himself has lost his only son, fighting with the C.I.L. The service and labour portion has done an immense task in repairing communications, dock labour etc thus saving Allied manpower. They have cooperated loyally as co-belligerents (with practically no fuss or friction). I would like people to realize all this and the Italian Army to get its deserved and just need of praise both in the Press and in the minds of the Allies for its valuable assistance to the Allied cause."

Today fighting has ceased in Europe, but the role of this truly national Italian Army continues to be of vital importance to the Italian people. It is above party. It represents worthily the main organized power sanctioned and supported by the Allies for the internal security of Italy, and for the assurance of peace in the great reconstruction which lies ahead.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

1870

1 June 45

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1719

Subject: Discipline IOGs - Anti Regular Army Propaganda.

SECRET

HQ

Land Forces Sub Commission A.C. (M.M.I.A.)

50 British Liaison Unit.

G/TS.

28 May 45.

1. As a result of an article in "L'UNITA" of MILAN - the ITALIAN organ of the Communist party - written by EMILIO ROGLIATTI, Vice President of the Council under Sig BONICCHI, and also one of the founders of the above paper, General SCATTINI GOC FAVOLI has requested this office to make certain representations to both MIA and HQ FIFTH ARMY. The original cutting from this paper is forwarded to MIA and a translation forwarded to FIFTH ARMY. The following represent General SCATTINI's views.

2. It is felt - and there is evidence for it - that the present propaganda by the Communist Party against the ITALIAN Gruppi is undermining discipline within this Gruppo.

(a) There are known to be nuclei of anti-regular Army bodies, incl officers, in this Gruppo. These bodies are outwardly good officers and soldiers, but they are in fact working for the disintegration of the Gruppo.

(b) The deserter rate came down to almost NIL during this Gruppo's three months of active operations. In the past ten days the total number of deserters has risen from 160 to 340 and this increase is NOT believed to be due to change of location, as leave is now granted on a reasonably liberal scale.

3. The major objection to the utterances of ROGLIATTI is NOT that he is head of the Communist Party - freedom of the Press would demand that - but that he is Vice President of the Council and therefore a leading member of the government and senior to the War Minister. Hence his views expressed in the Press assume something like governmental authority and consequently place the GOC of a Gruppo in a very invidious position. In this connection it is pointed out that apart from Allied officials, General SCATTINI can see only the Minister for War and the Chief of the ITALIAN General Staff, both of whom presumably carry less weight than ROGLIATTI.

General SCATTINI is however at present visiting ROGL with the object of seeing the Minister of War, Chief of Staff and possibly General BROWNING, Head of MIA. But he feels that unless some weight is given to his case by Allied authority, he will not get much done.

4. It is felt that the Gruppi are a great deterrent to Communist activity on a possibly disorderly scale. General SCATTINI expresses the view for himself and for the majority of his Gruppo that the Regular Army is NOT necessarily ROYALIST, but is in fact non-party. Finally, he feels that the Gruppi having been formed to assist Allied military operations in ITALY, are now in fact a stabilising influence (ITALIAN) as opposed to a stabilising influence (ALLIED) in the country, but that unless Allied

Hoggins

1720

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In action by British

Major

FEB/58.

5 Army and 100th

Copy to:- G-3 (Br Incr) HQ Fifth Army.

Major,
(A/550 I).

ASH

"IT IS NECESSARY TO DISARM RE-ACTIONARY FORCES".

Our policy will continue to be national unity, which means we pledge ourselves to maintain the principles of freedom and democracy in our country. We have not the slightest intention of staging a "coup de main" against this or that party at the expense of the freedom we have now. We feel certain we can achieve our ends in freedom and democracy because we have the support of the majority of the population for such achievement and it would be criminal on our part to embark on any senseless adventure. If we are asked whether this means disarming and laying down arms my answer is

"My dear friends the Communist Party has never run an army or armed organization; the Communist Party only organizes armed groups to fight for Italian independence and has always put forward the purpose to fuse these groups with those of other parties into one great National Army of Liberation.

Today we want disarmament but first of all we want all reactionary elements to be disarmed. We do not want to see those so called independent groups to carry arms - those so called independent groups among whom we know existed remnants of the old ruling classes who under the monarchial banner aimed at disrupting the national forces and while pretending to fight the Germans were in reality intriguing against us.

If at the head of some "gruppi di combattenti" of the Army there are any generals of a reactionary type who are nursing the illusion that they might be able to make use of the arms entrusted to them by the nation for the purpose of effecting or fomenting some "coup de main" against the advance guard of the democratic forces, we demand that such units be disarmed and such generals removed from office.

"We want the Army to be fundamentally changed, we want fundamental changes in the police forces so that these forces, who should be armed forces in a well ordered state, cannot be used against the people to twist or thwart the will of the people.

Therefore there is no such policy of force in the Communist Party who only wish to pursue a policy of liberty, a policy designed to solve immediate problems confronting us and all workers in the grave and tragic situation we find ourselves. Our directive is one of a national anti-fascist solidarity which means above all else this: That the enormous efforts which confront us in order to start on the reconstruction of the country should fall not on those who have suffered at the hands of fascism but on those who were responsible for it or abetted fascism.

National antifascist solidarity means that we shall not discourage private enterprise but that we shall definitely discourage speculation. We do not wish to see today speculation profiting by the miseries of the people.

National antifascist solidarity means, in addition that we must see the factories re-opening as soon as possible. We know that in order to achieve this we shall require in most cases the assistance of the State and of foreign economical institutions; we shall require coal and some raw materials. Later

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National antifascist solidarity means, in addition that we must see the factories re-opening as soon as possible. We know that in order to achieve this we shall require in most cases the assistance of the State and of foreign economical institutions; we shall require coal and some raw materials. Later on we shall also require loans. Well, we are prepared to collaborate as a whole Italian working class, as a whole Italian nation, with all countries in this immense work of reconstruction of our economical life; but we do not wish to see under this pretext of collaboration for reconstruction of our economical life with foreign economical institutions, our independence sold out and sacrificed.

(Signed) PAUL RO TOGLIATTI.

Extract from "L'UNITA" MILAN 28 May 45
Hansad Hager

TRANSLATION

General BOLOGNA and soldiers of Mantova:

It has been a great pleasure for me to have seen you soldiers of the Mantova Group on the eve of your departure for the front.

I have just returned from the front where I saw among other units the Cremona, Legnano and Friuli Groups, who, as I had foreseen are making a splendid contribution to our present offensive.

I know that you are impatient to get into the front line - a praiseworthy and understandable desire which all good soldiers have - to take part in and to share with the others the honour and glory of the final battles.

I have very much enjoyed my day amongst you soldiers of Italy. From what I have seen today I am sure that you will be the equals in battle of your comrades in the other Groups.

It is enough for me to see good soldiers to recognize them at once as such, and from what I have seen today, watching you and your work, I know that you are excellent soldiers. I am sure that you will fight as valourously as the soldiers of the Folgore, Legnano, Friuli and Cremona are fighting. We will see each other again at the front.

We are now without doubt in the last phase of the war in Europe. The destruction of the German Army in the West is rapidly being completed: the great Russian spring offensive has not yet started and here in Italy our 15th Army Group has just begun what we hope will be the last great battle, to which the Cremona Group has already contributed with valour.

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If you look at the map of Europe you will see that a third and even more of Germany, including Austria, has already been occupied by the Allies - and we know that every day thousands of German soldiers are killed and captured.

Germany is already beaten - there is not the smallest shadow of a doubt about that. It now remains to the isolated garrisons and encircled pockets of what was once the mighty German Army. This may still require some sacrifices and a little time. It is a task which we must face here - a task for which I need jolly good soldiers, well trained

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- 2 -

and well equipped.

I welcome you into my victorious armies - we will go ahead fighting together to liberate this fair land of Italy until the last nazi aggressor has been driven out.

1868

NOTES

CADORENA -

1. Speaking frankly:-

- (a) as one soldier to another
 - (b) as an independent judge of what the Patriots have done and what the I.A. has done to liberate ITALY and help the Allied cause
 - (c) as a friend of ITALY who wishes to see ITALY quickly and properly settled, so that she may again take her place as one of the great nations of EUROPE. That is a British just as much as an Italian interest.
- 2.
- (a) We will leave the sorry past and start with the Armistice
 - (b) A year ago there were 8 million disorganized soldiers; no M. of W.; all orgn. broken down,
 - (c) Within one year a new It. Army has been formed with an organized M. of W; Torr. HQ's; 4 million service tps in units and fms; 5 Combat Gps.

(d) A stupendous feat under incredible difficulties of equipment, transportation, accommodation, data and documents etc. M.W.I.A. has, I admit, controlled and been the driving force but success could not have been achieved without the excellent and whole hearted cooperation and good work of the Italian Mil. authorities themselves. It has been one of the most astounding RISORGIMENTO'S in history and the Italian Mil. authorities deserve the greatest credit for it.

Show the Order of Battle book.

1865

3. What has It. Army achieved ?

Service units

Combat Gps

Tributes by all from P.M. downwards.

4. Perspective of patriot effort

- 2.
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- 1865
- Shew the Order of Battle book.
3. What has It. Army achieved ?
- Service units
Combat Gps
Tributes by all from P.M. downwards.
4. Perspective of patriot effort
- War won by Allies plus I.A. plus patriots.
But Allies mainly.
Patriots did excellently but I.A. just as excellently.
On basis of numbers and total effort I.A. more than Patriots.
5. Coalescing of North and South.
- ITALY is one and indivisible.
Existing I.A. authorized and set up by SACRED who is still supreme.
Can only have on Army - cannot have private armies - that way lies civil wars.
Allies have set up the I.A. but, to give credit for the patriots, are doing their best to recognize the patriot effort.

5. (cont'd) Patriots are being taken into Arm as individuals - by bands means private armies.

Terr. Reg. HQ's set up with 3 staff open to patriots.

CADORNA made COS to show recognition.

Essential to get these Terr. HQ and their authority functioning.

6. Yet, what do I find and what is reported to me?

Patriot attitude (even CADORNA's) is that the patriots liberated ITALY.

I.A. is no good (only Combat Gps)

Senior officers I.A. and M. of W. no good.

Terr. HQ's not being allowed to be set up in North owing to patriot opposition (cf. TRAUCCI).

INTOLERABLE -- holding to ransom.

7. My reply to above

Patriots did NOT liberate ITALY -- the Allies did.

I.A. is good -- not their fault there were not more Combat groups.

Only equipment angle.

Drastic purges of senior I.A. officers (Brigadier Gen. upwards) either from Eputation or inefficiency.

Allied wishes and orders re Terr. HQ's flouted, particularly by TRAUCCI who has charges against him.

Whole patriot attitude is un - patriotic, sectional NOT national as it should be -- completely one sided based on inadequate knowledge.

Majority of Terr. HQ's functioning.

186/

8. CADORNA's own position

Primarily COS, SMRE.

Secondly watching brief to see that Patriots get deserts.

Thirdly -- use great name, influence and experience to sort out matters and bring patriots to proper frame of mind.

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Stress. COS, SMRE - staff offr of Minister of War of the It. Army authorized and ordered by the Allies.

Trust CADORNA, in view of what I've explained (doubtless not known to him before) will accept and take the view I, as PM's rep., have stated.

cc/

L.B.
30 May 45.

1730