

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

ACC

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G/21/14

opened Jan
June - July

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G/21/14 Weekly Liaison Log ADV HQ MMIA
Opened June 17, 1944 - Closed July 4, 1944
June - July 1944

SECRET

Army Sub Commission MHA (Adv)

4 Jul 44

MEMO for Col KHR MHA, and "C" Office

1. Conference on Italian Army

(a) Everyone was in favour of sending off another signal to AFHQ, pointing out the impracticability of demobilising 55,700 (AAI estimate) by 31 Jul, and stating that no action was being taken pending their reply to AAI 1605/50/3/8(SBL) of 13 June. They had already sent a signal to AFHQ passing on the information given in your long one showing that bulk of personnel were in SARUNIA.

(b) It was decided however to indicate the maximum that it was considered could be demobilised on the Mainland and in SICILY and figure of 35,000 was arrived at on following basis

Italian Adm	10,000
SICILY	1,300
Concedati harvesting	7,000
Int Sec	7,000 (FRUITI suggested)
58 units working for Allies	6,000
Miscellaneous	3,700
	35,000

(c) Remainder to be rationed in SARUNIA until shipping available to bring them over, after outstanding serials for Allies - estimated that transfer would NOT be complete until December.

(d) Signal in accordance with above sent to AFHQ.

(e) NO action by MHA in meantime other than reduction of Italian Adm as ordered by AAI.

2. De-restriction of areas for concedati etc.

I stressed at above Conference that the figure of 35,000 would only be possible if the maximum de-restriction was granted i.e. concedati allowed to return to FOGGIA and MAFIA and Army areas. USI AAI are NOT being very helpful about this so GND are chasing them again pointing out its urgency.

3. Conference on Command & Adm of Italian Army Formations and Units (Review of ESO/42A).

AFHQ passing on the information given in your letter to the bulk of personnel were in SALONIKA).

- (b) It was decided however to indicate the maximum that it was considered could be demobilized on the Mainland and in SICILY and figure of 35,000 was arrived at on following basis

Italian Adm	10,000
SICILY	1,300
Coagdati harvesting	7,000
Int Sec	7,000 (AFHQ suggested)
5% units working for Allies	6,000
Miscellaneous	3,700

	35,000

- (c) Reminder to be rationed in SALONIKA until shipping available to bring them over, after outstanding serials for Allies - estimated that transfer would NOT be complete until December.

- (d) signal in accordance with above sent to AFHQ.

- (e) NO action by MILA in meantime other than reduction of Italian Adm as ordered by AAI.

2. Re-restriction of areas for commando etc.

I stressed at above Conference that the figure of 35,000 would only be possible if the maximum de-restriction was granted i.e. coagdati allowed to return to FUGLIA and MARONE and Army areas. GSI AAI are NOT being very helpful about this so GSI are chasing them again pointing out its urgency.

3. Conference on Commando & Adm of Italian Army Formations and Units (Davidson of HSB/AIA).

Left to be sent to AFHQ agreed by all concerned (Brigs STAYNER, HAMILTON, ARTHUR, ED, A. Q(AE) etc as per para 1) embodying all AIA suggestions.

4. Availability of second extra 'lift' for 11,000.

In view of above it was thought necessary to alert and nominate units for personnel for List 3 - units in List 7. AAI very gratified with your prompt reply. Now want to know if they will include any specialists.

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5. Internal Security Cellars

Although the figure in AAI 1605/50/3(a(SDI)) of 19 Jun is 93,733 it is not envisaged that more than 5 Divs of 10,000 or perhaps equivalent total of smaller divs. will be used. The higher figure covers an allowance for rfts, sick, etc

Sheet 2

as shown in Remarks column. Therefore SHK must be prepared to draft part of balance to under command Allies until ceiling of employed is reached. Hence request in para 4 above.

6. List 2

This cannot be re-drafted until ALI know decision on ceiling of Italian Army and can share out troops available by categories accordingly. In the meantime any availabilities should be reported to ALI who will allot and keep check.

NOTE:- 1922 call-up will wait watching - THURP told me ST. AA CAMPBELL had already drafted some 700 to RB.

7. ACC units ex Int Sec. Home

No action by MIL. yet until Int Sec situation is sorted out.

8. Int Sec. Formations providing guard units for Allies

(a) SHK can be informed, if they do not already know, that all Guard units for Allies will eventually be found from Int Sec funds. Hence 503 and 504 Guard Bns are NOT going to relieve THURP and MARCOVA Bns.

(b) SHK should be asked to make out RL and organise Int Sec Divs on a basis of a number of Guard Bns (suggest about 24 of 100 and 840 men each as for RH 7/2). Can be either inf or arty but we do NOT want big HQ or bits and pieces.

9. OTHER BN

Is going to be offered to RB or someone for guard duties only, and will therefore presumably eventually be absorbed into an Int Sec Div.

10. Traffic Control Corps

Will probably be moved, two to ALI one to RB.

11. Kings Coy

Have told them this has been assigned to FICERO Div and is available for guard duties.

12. A.B.D. or Central Art Unit

Will eventually be set up when we have got our house more in order and have some bodies to spare. Allied staff probably from outside MIL.

13. Extra Art Unit for CIL

(a) Have agreed with ALI a forward holding of 50 for CIL, to be set up as soon as RB/20's are fixed and units brought up to strength.

No action by MILA yet until Int Sec situation is sorted out.

8. Int Sec Operations providing Guard Units for Allies

- (a) SEME can be informed, if they do not already know, that all Guard units for Allies will eventually be found from Int Sec funds. Hence 503 and 504 Guard Bns are NOT going to relieve PICARD and MANTOVA Bns.
- (b) SEME should be asked to make out RE and organize Int Sec Divs on a basis of a number of Guard Bns (suggest about 24 officers and 340 men each as for RE 7/3). Can be either inf or arty but we do NOT want big HQs or bite an piece.

9. GUARD BN

Is going to be offered to RE or someone for guard duties only, and will therefore presumably eventually be absorbed into an Int Sec Div.

10. Traffic Control Coy

Will probably be moved, two to AAI one to RE.

11. Lines Coy

Have told them this has been assigned to PICARD Div and is available for guard duties.

12. A.I.U. or Central Art Unit

Will eventually be set up when we have got our house more in order and have some bodies to spare. Allied staff probably from outside MILA.

13. RE's A.I.U. Unit for CIL

- (a) Have agreed with AAI a forward holding of 5% for CIL, to be set up as soon as RE/FO's are fixed and units brought up to strength.
- (b) Met Capt GILBERT today who is AAI (ex 3 Army) LC with CIL and will eventually be taken on our staff when we permits. Told me he was getting the RE's gradually sorted out and would report latest poem of strengths plus and minus, didn't us know about Gen de STERLING' HQ which he said was NOT yet functioning when he left CIL 10 days ago.

14. C.I.L.

5485

- (a) Have just received 170 Allied lorries and are now quite well off.
- (b) the Bn of REMSO which has been allotted a special task is the one (1357) which has been on the mainland all along and in the WEIL Div.

15. COLOMBIAN UNITS IN SARDINIA

Col SIMONS apparently signalled that Serial 175 - 1 Bn Presidario had been dissolved. Could FOX please find out, if he has NOT already done so, where the men have gone to, and what other regts have been carried out, of COLOMBIAN units (other than drivers which we ordered).

16. Shipment of Vehicles ex Sardinia

As trying to get them to give us a lift for at least 200 vehicles which must be ready and waiting to come over.

17. AI and 16A Liaison Directorate

AI say that those have NOT yet arrived but GOC say that they have heard that they are in Sardinia. An investigation. Will probably be assigned to Region IV for AMELIO area.

If NOT arrived and no explanation from Col SIMONS, suggest you signal him and ask for it. He promised to send them at once, 3 weeks ago.

For SHILLING. Have any arrangements been made with AI to train other personnel with these Coy while they are waiting? AI 10733 of 9 June refers. If NOT suggest you talk to them about it and take advantage of the opportunity.

18. Ar. Gelling

Nothing yet received from AFHQ by AI. so they are being asked again to fix earliest.

19. Radio Group for AI. If moved to AI.

The decision will have to be made at 1st Hq so as not pushing yet. Feel that matter would be better referred to AI by letter from GOC. Suggest that FLUING drafts if considered at all feasible or possible. GOC agrees.

20. 5,000 men for AI. From AI.

(A) There has been a slight hitch over this as the ARMY is apparently NOT keen to volunteer except for fighting. Enrollment was being started yesterday on a voluntary basis, after inserting notice in the papers.

(b) GOC obtained legal opinion that men could be compulsorily enrolled, if the necessary decree was published. I expect that we shall have to resort to this.

(c) Have instructed on Col GARCIA (AI. top here) that they have priority. AI say is being very active here on Col GARCIA's orders.

21. Shilling for AI.

Chief of Staff 210 Div called here yesterday on AI's instructions wanting to enroll 360 multibars rifle. Told him that application should be made to AI by 5 Army, and sent VAN a note to this effect. Informed AI, who are going to dig out some of the multibars rifle who are still unaltered in AI area.

that they are in ~~XXXX~~. An investigation. Will probably be assigned to Region IV for ~~XXXX~~ area.

If not arrived and no explanation from Col ~~XXXX~~, suggest you signal him and ask for ~~XXXX~~. He promised to send them at once. 2 weeks ago.

Col. Williams. Have any arrangements been made with ~~XXXX~~ to train other personnel with these Coys while they are working? ~~ALL 2/7/38~~ of 9 June refers. If not suggest you talk to them about it and take advantage of the opportunity.

13. Adv. Collins

Nothing yet received from ~~XXXX~~ by ~~ALL~~. so they are being asked again to fix earliest.

19. Radio Comm. for ~~XXXX~~ if moved to ~~XXXX~~

The decision will have to be made at Adv Hq so as not pushing yet. Feel that matter would be better referred to ~~ALL~~ by letter from GOC. Suggest that ~~FLYING~~ drafts if considered at all feasible or possible. GOC agrees.

20. 5,000 men for ~~XXXX~~ from ~~XXXX~~ area

(A) There has been a slight hitch over this as the ~~XXXX~~ Army is apparently not keen to volunteer except for fighting. Enrollment was being started yesterday on a voluntary basis, after inserting notice in the papers.

(b) GOC obtained legal opinion that men could be compulsorily enrolled. If the necessary decree was published. I expect that we shall have to resort to this.

(c) Have impressed on Col ~~XXXX~~ (~~XXXX~~ rep here) that ~~XXXX~~ have priority. ~~XXXX~~ rep is being very active here on Col ~~XXXX~~'s orders.

21. Volunteer ~~XXXX~~ for ~~XXXX~~

Chief of Staff 210 Div called here yesterday on ~~XXXX~~'s instructions wanting to enroll 360 volunteers rifle. Told him that application should be made to ~~ALL~~ by 5 Army, and sent ~~VAN~~ a note to this effect. Informed ~~ALL~~, who are going to dig out some of the volunteer rifle who are still unallocated in ~~XXXX~~ area. They had heard nothing about it from 5 Army.

ARG

Lincoln
Lt Col 5484
GS

Subject :- No.1 Weekly Liaison Log
For Period 14/13 June 44.

Army Sub Commission, A.C.C.,
Rear H.Q. (M.M.I.A.),
LEGNARE (LECCE).

GI
copy 3
Army Sub Commission, A.C.C.,
Rome Detachment (M.M.I.A.),
ROME.
Ref :- C.110.
26 Jun 44.

The following is the daily liaison log for the period 14/13 June 44.

Wed. 14 June.

- (i) Col. PIDSLEY, Lt Col HOWARD and Major DOBBS left NAPLES at 0830 hrs and arrived in ROME at 1545 hrs. Col PIDSLEY established himself at the GRAND HOTEL, Piazza d'Esedra and HOWARD and DOBBS at the FLORA HOTEL, Via Vittorio Veneto.
- (ii) The AOC advanced party were contacted at the former Ministero delle Corporazioni, Via Vittorio Veneto and Col PIDSLEY was informed that the whole of the seventh floor of the building totalling 60 rooms had been booked for MMIA.

Thurs. 15 June.

- (i) A plan of the accommodation allotted to MMIA was obtained and a provisional allotment of rooms was made by Col PIDSLEY.

The Camp Commandant agreed to begin furnishing the rooms immediately starting with General BROWNING's and to install telephones as soon as possible.

- (ii) HOWARD contacted General TAMASSIA, commanding the Italian territorial units of the ROME Garrison and Colonel PACINOTTI, Chief of Staff to General BENCIVENGA, the acting commander of the Italian Armed Forces in ROME.

For the organisation of the unofficial ROMAN COMMAND see Appendix 'A'.

Fri. 16 June.

- (i) HOWARD contacted General BENCIVENGA and General ODIERNE, the unofficial representative of SMRE to clarify the immediate problems confronting the Roman Command.

- (ii) Col PIDSLEY and HOWARD went to see General BERARDI unofficially in ROME as a result of which a conference was held on
- (a) the status of the BENCIVENGA Command
and (b) the immediate problems confronting it.

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- (a) the status of the BENCIVENGA Command
- and (b) the immediate problems confronting it.

Present were :-

General BERARDI
General ODDONE
Colonel PIDSLEY
Colonel PACINOTTI
Colonel BAIZANI
Colonel PALLAVICINO
Lt Col HOWARD
Lt Col SAMPO

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For the results of this conference see Appendix 'B'.

(iii) Col PIDSLEY sent General BROWNING signal No. SD 501.

Sat. 17 June.

(i) Col FIBSLEY and HOWARD attended a Requiem Mass for the repose of the souls of the members of the Italian Army Underground Movement in ROME shot by the Germans.

General BERARDI was present.

(ii) Col FIBSLEY saw General JOHNSON, Allied Garrison Commander ROME.

(iii) A conference was held at which the same problems dealt with the previous day were gone in to in greater detail. Present were :-

General BENCIVENGA
General ODDONE
Colonel FIBSLEY
Colonel PACINOTTI
Colonel BALZANO
Lt Col HOWARD
Lt Col SAN RO
Capt GIUSTINIANI (Interpreter).

for results of this conference see Appendix 'C'.

(iv) Col. PETIT, G 4 ROME Area Command, informed DOBBS that R.A.C. required urgently 100 reinforcements for 1004 and 1005 Italian M.T. Companies. The 30 men recently received from NAPLES were useless. Col. EDWARDS, Region IV, informed DOBBS that he required 50 Italian drivers for the unit under his command. DOBBS saw Col. PACINOTTI and instructed him to gather together all Italian Military personnel who could be classified as good drivers.

Sun. 18 June.

(i) Col. FIBSLEY saw Colonel FISKE (ACC) and General JOHNSON, Military Commander of ROME to fix the points raised at the Friday and Saturday conferences.

(ii) General BROWNING and Capt. CHAYTOR arrived RM from NAPLES.

2. The Roman Set-Up.

On arrival in ROME it was soon obvious that the position of the military organisation shown in Appendix 'A' was a delicate one. It appeared that General BENCIVENGA owed his position to the fact that he commanded the underground movement (Forze Clandestine) in ROME and to the fact that for a very short period he had been nominated Military Governor of the City by AAI prior to the entry of the Allies. As soon as Prince DORIA became Syndaco he

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The question of whom amongst the patriots, Officers or men, actually did a good job of work in ROME, as opposed to those who merely drank vermouths discreetly in civilian clothes, will need some going into and is being

(3)

dealt with now by committees of the appropriate rank.

It should be remembered that during the recent months of the occupation of Rome by the Germans a small reign of terror existed and that during this time certain bands of partisans, assisted the Allied cause loyally and effectively. At least 60 and possibly 200 Officers or men were caught by the Germans and shot for their participation in the Forze Clandestine. Whilst at present it is difficult to estimate the exact value of the movement there is no doubt that some of the senior officers feel that they have been fighting under unpleasant conditions and that something more than a ruthless divorce from army rations is due to them and their men.

3. Problems facing the Temporary Italian Military Authority in Rome.

- (i) The rationing of approximately 35000 personnel in or connected with the Armed Forces, most of whom originally received army rations.
- (ii) The examination and classification of Officers and men into
 - (a) useful partisans
 - (b) useless partisans
 - (c) useless Allied sympathisers.
 - (d) harmless Republicans i.e. hospital staffs, clerks at district (depots etc.
 - (e) Republicans
 - (f) dangerous Republicans
- (iii) Accommodation in Rome for essential garrison requirements and for the arrival of the Ministry and SARE.
- (iv) The collection and concentration of disbanded units partisans and others.
- (v) The problem of the officers, approximately ⁹⁰⁰⁰ 1000 of them, almost all wanting to know what job they can get.

4. Problems facing MMIA in Rome.

- (i) The fixing of a ration ceiling civilian and military to meet the needs of the Rome command.
- (ii) Ensuring that the "take-over" between BENIVENGA and the new regime is accomplished smoothly and without injustice.
- (iii) Establishing the position of MMIA as the correct channel of communication in regard to the Italian Army.
- (iv) Ensuring that Officers and men of the Clandestine Forces who have behaved well during the occupation do not get a raw deal now.

5. Accommodation.

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- (iv) The collection and concentration of disbanded units partisans and others.
- (v) The problem of the officers, approximately ⁹⁰⁰⁰ 10000 of them, almost all wanting to know what job they can get.

4. Problems facing MMTA in Rome.

- (i) The fixing of a ration ceiling civilian and military to meet the needs of the ROME command.
- (ii) Ensuring that the 'take-overs' between BENIVENGÀ and the new regime is accomplished smoothly and without injustice.
- (iii) Establishing the position of MMTA as the correct channel of communication in regard to the Italian Army.
- (iv) Ensuring that Officers and men of the Clandestine Forces who have behaved well during the occupation do not get a raw deal now.

5. Accommodation.

(a) The principle has been accepted by General BROWNING that MMTA comes under the roof of the ACC building, the Ministero delle Corporazioni, and on the seventh floor.

(b) Lt Col. HOWARD will make enquiries in Rome to find out if any suitable accommodation is likely to be available at a later date for an 'A' mess inside and a Rest House outside the city.

6. Personalities.

(a) General BENIVENGÀ is a man of well over sixty. He is said to

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(4)

have had a good record in the last war and is believed to hold a C.B.

On leaving the army after the last war he branched into journalism for which he is probably mistrusted by the orthodox generals.

He gives the impression of being rather a fine old man decaying rapidly. During the occupation he had a narrow escape when the Nazi-facists threw hand-grenades at his house.

(b) General ODDONE is a quiet and reserved man who gives the impression of competency and character.

He is said to have been marked down for execution by the Germans.

(c) Colonel PACINOTTI is a pleasant soft-spoken officer with a clear brain. He should make a good chief of staff for the Rome Command and it is worthwhile considering his retention in this position for various reasons.

(d) General TAMASSIA makes no impression of any kind whatsoever.

7. General Remarks.

(a) Morale. The morale of the Romans is remarkably high considering the small reign of terror in which they have lived for the last nine months, the food shortage and the overcrowding of the city by refugees. Their relief at the entry of the Allies is obvious and a pro-Ally feeling should last unless destroyed by bad behaviour on the part of Allied soldiers visiting the city.

(b) Food situation. The food situation is rapidly becoming critical although a casual visitor might not notice any signs of strain in the people themselves. The reasons for the shortage are the difficulties of transportation, the heavy demands made on communications by the fighting forces and the great surplus of refugees living in the city at present.

(c) The City of Rome. The City of Rome presents a remarkably undamaged contrast to the shattered towns laying along the line of fighting from FOMIA North.

The Romans are grateful that their city has been spared which they attribute, rightly or wrongly, largely to the intervention of the Pope.

(c) Colonel PACINOTTI is a pleasant soft-spoken officer with a clear brain. He should make a good chief of staff for the Rome Command and it is worthwhile considering his retention in this position for various reasons.

(d) General TAMASSIA makes no impression of any kind whatsoever.

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(c) The City of Rome. The City of Rome presents a remarkably undamaged contrast to the shattered towns laying along the line of fighting from FORLÌ North.

The Romans are grateful that their city has been spared which they attribute, rightly or wrongly, largely to the intervention of the Pope.

H.A. Howard 5480

Lt Colonel,
Army Sub Commission, A.C.G.,
Advanced M.I.A.

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Table showing temporary Italian Military Command
in ROME.

General BENCIVENGA (*)

Legal Governor of ROME for interim period between withdrawal of the Germans and entry of Allies (Appointed by Fifth Army). Now recognised by agreement BERARDI-FIDLEY as temporary Military Commander of Italian Armed Forces in ROME (not under command of Allies) until position systemised by arrival of Ministry of War and SMREL.

Colonel PACINOTTI (*)
Chief of Staff and Liaison.
BENCIVENGA - ODDONE.

Lt Col. DE PETRO (*)
Capo della Segreteria.

General TAMASSIA (*)
Commander of ROME Garrison
(Depots, Hospitals etc.)

Colonel BAIZAN
LECCE representative of
Ministero della Guerra.

Colonel SAMPO
LECCE representative of
SMREL

General GIROTTI (*)
At disposal ODDONE for
examination of personnel.

General CARATTI (*)
Arty services and salvaging
of war material.

(*) Officers engaged in clandestine front movement in ROME prior to arrival of Allies

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APPENDIX 'A'.

Table showing temporary Italian Military Command
in ROME.

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Legal Governor of ROME for interim period between withdrawal of the Germans and
entry of Allies (Appointed by Fifth Army). Now recognised by agreement BERARDI-
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under command of Allies) until position systemised by arrival of Ministry of War
and SMRE.

Colonel PACINOTTI (*)
Chief of Staff and Liaison.
BENIVENGA - ODDONE.

Lt Col. DE PETRO (*)
Capo della Segreteria.

RAIZAN
representative of
della Guerra.

Colonel SANIPO
LEONE representative of
SMRE

General ODDONE (*)
Semi-representative of SMRE and
carrying out task of examining
records of all Army personnel
remaining in ROME during German
occupation.

General CARATTI (*)
Arty services and salvaging
of war material.

General CORTELLI (*)
Engineer services and
communications, radio etc.

Officers engaged in clandestine front movement in ROME prior to arrival of SMRE

APPENDIX 'B'

Results of Conference held at ROME at
1830 hrs on Fri. 16 Jun 44.

1. Present were Generals BERARDI, CEDONE, Colonels PIDSLEY, PACINOTTI
BALZANI, PALLAVICINO, Lt-Cols. HOWARD and SAMPO.
2. (i) General BERARDI stressed his clandestine position in ROME
stated that he had come only to see the Italian Division North of NAPLES
and to see General CLARK. He stated he was not aware of the exact position
of General BENCIVENGA and he had therefore to proceed discreetly. He had
made a personal call on General BENCIVENGA who was an old comrade in arms.
(ii) Colonel PIDSLEY outlined his position in ROME as representative
of General BROWNING.
3. It was agreed that :-
 - (i) With the agreement of General BROWNING it was essential to press
for the early arrival of
 - (a) an advance party from MEIA.
 - (b) an advance party of about 10 officers headed by General
ADILIA invested with complete authority by SMRE.
 - (c) an advance party of about 10 officers from the Ministero
della Guerra also invested with complete authority.
 - (ii) General BENCIVENGA, with the set-up outlined in Appendix 'A',
would continue to act as the temporary commander of the Italian Armed Forces
in ROME pending the gradual regularization of the position with the arrival
of the Ministero and SMRE.
 - (iii) The immediate and urgent problems facing the Italian Military
Authorities in ROME would be dealt with by General BENCIVENGA and Col.
PIDSLEY.

These problems were :-

- (a) The issuing of some 35,000 rations in ROME to deal with
military, naval and air personnel of all categories
(see Appendix 'C')
- (b) The establishing of channels of communication between
BENCIVENGA - PIDSLEY - FISKE (ACC) and JOHNSON (Military
Commander of ROME AAI)
- (c) The avoidance of further arbitrary requisitioning on the
part of the Allies of Italian Army, Navy and Air Force
property.
- (d) The listing and evacuation of all Italian Army, Navy and

(ii) Colonel PUISLEY outlined his position in ROME as representative of General BROWNING.

3. It was agreed that :-

(i) With the agreement of General BROWNING it was essential to press for the early arrival of

- (a) an advance party from MMIA.
- (b) an advance party of about 10 officers headed by General AURELIA invested with complete authority by SMRE.
- (c) an advance party of about 10 officers from the Ministero della Guerra also invested with complete authority.

(ii) General BENCIVENGA, with the set-up outlined in Appendix 'A', would continue to act as the temporary commander of the Italian Armed Forces in ROME pending the gradual regularization of the position with the arrival of the Ministero and SMRE.

(iii) The immediate and urgent problems facing the Italian Military Authorities in ROME would be dealt with by General BENCIVENGA and Col. PUISLEY.

These problems were :-

- (a) The issuing of some 35,000 rations in ROME to deal with military, naval and air personnel of all categories (see Appendix 'C')
- (b) The establishing of channels of communication between BENCIVENGA - PUISLEY - FISKE (ACC) and JOHNSON (Military Commander of ROME AAI)
- (c) The avoidance of further arbitrary requisitioning on the part of the Allies of Italian Army, Navy and Air Force property.
- (d) The listing and examination of all Italian Army, Navy and Air Force personnel to determine their conduct during the occupation period and the possibility of their incorporation into the present Italian Armed Forces within the ration ceiling prescribed.

4. It was recognised that owing to various unforeseen factors the principles laid down in General BROWNING's letter G 19 of 3 Jun 44 had not been entirely adhered to, but it was agreed that the position would gradually clarify itself as General BENCIVENGA's organisation continued the work it had already begun. 5478

5. General BERARDI asked if he could attend unofficially the requiem mass the following day for the officers and men of the clandestine movement

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(2)

shot by the Germans provided Col. FIDLEY had no objection and General
BENCIVENGA would invite him. Col. FIDLEY and Col. PACINOTI immediately
agreed that he would be welcome.

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APPENDIX 'C'.

Results of Conference held at ROME at
1730 hrs on Sat, 17 Jun 44.

1. Present were Generals BEACIVENGA, ODDONE, Colonels FIDLEY, PACINOTTI, BALZANO, Lt Cols., HOWARD, SAMPO, Capt. GIUSTINIANI (interpreter).
2. Colonel FIDLEY outlined the main points dealt with at the previous days conference with General BERARDI and it was again stressed that the status quo in ROME was to be preserved and that pending the arrival of the Ministero and SMRE, MMIA would regard the BEACIVENGA organisation as the correct channel through which all problems dealing with the Italian Armed Forces in ROME (except those under Allied command) would be dealt with.
3. Colonel FIDLEY outlined how he proposed dealing with the ration problems facing the ROME Military Authorities concerning which he had the previous day received a letter from PACINOTTI stating that all military reserves held by them would be exhausted on 20 Jun 44. The following table sets out this position:

No. of Rations required.	For Whom.	Col. FIDLEY's remarks.
3000 7000	R. Guardia di Finanza) Underground Movement CCTR	Public Safety Sub Commission ACC had intimated that a part of these might be absorbed within their ceiling
1500	Wounded and sick of all categories at present in ROME Military Hospitals.	Civilian rations through ACC would have to be issued until, if ever, they become effective.
2500	Partisan bands (underground movement) not living or having relations in ROME.	Civilian rations through ACC until they become in part or in whole effective. To be concentrated in available barracks and reformed pending this decision.
6000	ROME Garrison personnel (Hospitals Depots, Services etc.)	Civilian rations.
1000 1000	Navy personnel Air Force	Respective Sub Commissions consulted and these would almost immediately be absorbed by Italian Navy and Air Force within their ration ceiling.
2000	Officers and families of officers deceased, missing or prisoners fed at a central mess at the PALAZZO BARBERINI	ACC would be consulted with a view to allowing this mess to purchase the civilian ration scale in order to continue its existence.

3. Colonel FIDLEY outlined how he proposed dealing with the ration problems facing the RMZ Military Authorities concerning which he had the previous day received a letter from PACINOTTI stating that all military reserves held by them would be exhausted on 20 Jun 44. The following table sets out this position:

No. of Rations Required.	For Whom.	Col. FIDLEY's remarks.
3000 7000	R. Guardia di Finanza) Underground CCRR) Movement	Public Safety Sub Commission ACC had intimated that a part of these might be absorbed within their ceiling
1500	Wounded and sick of all categories at present in RMZ Military Hospitals.	Civilian rations through ACC would have to be issued until, if ever, they become effective.
2500	Partisan bands (underground movement) not living or having relations in RMZ.	Civilian rations through ACC until they become in part or in whole effective. To be concentrated in available barracks and reformed pending this decision.
6000	RMZ Garrison personnel (Hospitals Depots, Services etc.)	Civilian rations.
1000 1000	Navy personnel Air Force "	Respective Sub Commissions consulted and these would almost immediately be absorbed by Italian Navy and Air Force within their ration ceiling.
2000	Officers and families of officers deceased, missing or prisoners fed at a central mess at the PALAZZO BARBERINI	ACC would be consulted with a view to allowing this mess to purchase the civilian ration scale in order to continue its existence.
1500	Italian Colonial Police - pro- fascist and disbanded but now being concentrated for security reasons	Civilian rations through ACC
35000	TOTAL	5476

Colonel FIDLEY stressed that he would contact the necessary Allied
Authorities as soon as possible to see about the releasing of rations as stated.
Col PACINOTTI stressed the necessity for keeping the circolo at PALAZZO BARBERINI
going.

(2)

4.

General BENVENUTA asked what would happen to the partisan bands, many of whom had rendered valuable and dangerous services to the Allies. Col. FIDLEY replied that after an examination (Already in progress) of the conduct of officers and men forming part of those bands, SMRE would have to decide whom they wished to keep, demobilising others at present on the strength of the Italian Army in the process, and whom they wished to demobilise. In the meantime those who could not be given leave because their families were not concentrated in the ROME Area would be concentrated in some available barracks and fed on civilian rations. It was agreed that it would be most demoralising for the Italian partisans Movement generally if those who had done well during the occupation of ROME were to be arbitrarily dismissed from the service without thanks or the chance of continuing to serve under arms.

5.

Col. FIDLEY stated that he had seen General JOHNSON that day who had agreed that no requisitioning of Italian Military, Naval or Air Force property should take place without MIA being first consulted.

Col. BALZANO explained that the eventual necessities of the Armed Forces were not yet known, but he hoped the PALAZZO BARBERINI would not be taken in part or the whole.

without thanks or the chance of continuing to serve under arms.

5. Col. FIDLEY stated that he had seen General JOHNSON that day who had agreed that no requisitioning of Italian Military, Naval or Air Force property should take place without MIA being first consulted.

Col. BALZANO explained that the eventual necessities of the Armed Forces were not yet known, but he hoped the PALAZZO BARBERINI would not be taken in part or the whole.

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