

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Major J.A.G. Gribble
Br Tg Increment with GARIBALDI Regt.

54 AREA

C M Forces.

Monday 13th August 45.

LD

Dear General Browning.

MMIA - 'C'
6/30/6
16/8

Herewith the fournightly report that you asked me to submit about the activities of the GARIBALDI Inf Regiment, it covers the period between 24th of July when the last Letter was forwarded to you till the 13th Aug 45.:-

1. The week end before last the Regiment was called out for the First Time in its Internal Security Role by Orders from the ITALIAN Command at BARI.

The trouble started at a large hill village called MATERA where fourteen(14) Communists attacked the local FOOD OFFICE and after destroying Food Ration Cards proceeded to burn the office down. The Prefecture decided that he was unable to cope with the situation, despite the fact that he has five hundred Carabinieri (500) in his area of whom at least one hundred(100) were in MATERA itself.

Orders to move arrived from the ITALIAN H.Q. in BARI the day after the trouble had arisen, and within half an hour of the order arriving a Mixed Battalion of 744 officers and men under command of the 2i.c. of the GARIBALDI Regt. were ready to move. They actually arrived in MATERA within two hours of the Movement Order being received from BARI.

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MATERA.....	301
FERRANDINA.....	294.
MONTALIBANO IONIO.....	44.
IRSINA.....	52.
BERNALDA.....	53
	7365

Page 2 Cont.....

1. Making a total of 744 Detached from the Regiment.

The following conclusions have been drawn from this incident:-

(A). Troops should be asked for immediately, in this case they were not demanded till the day after the incident occurred, consequently time was lost rounding up the Ringleaders, and the Psychological Value of a Flying Column was lost both on the Communists and on the Local People. Telephone communications have not yet been tampered with and with two Mobile Companies always at 30 minutes notice in TRANI there should be no difficulty in reaching any village in our area in an hour to two hours after Movement Orders come through.

(B). The ITALIAN Internal Security Laws not only make the Prefectura responsible for calling out Troops, but for taking Control of them when they arrive on the spot. As in example in this case the Prefectura started frittering his force away by attaching small parties of ALPINI to each Carabinieri post (3...4... and 5 men to each) instead of keeping the Force together in order to use it in its Mobile Role. It took a very strong order from General BOSCELLI the ITALIAN Commander at Territorial H.Q. BARI before this practice ceased. It was not a nice situation for Major BERIO the 2i.c. of the GARIBALDI Regt to find himself in as the Commander of the force, as he was not really able to control all these small Posts and if Firing commenced at any of them his responsibility would have been very heavy. The practice of having a civilian controlling Troops is not a commendable one.

(C). The Carabinieri themselves are quite good and are willing to carry out any orders they receive, the breakdown in the system is that their Officers and Particularly their Senior Officers will not accept any Kind of Responsibility when it comes to dealing with even the smallest incident, this is

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2. GENERAL PROBLEMS.

A. No answer has yet been received from AFHQ concerning White Scout Cars and a Dingo for the use of the Mobile Column, or wireless sets in case line breaks down. This Signal Ref No M36 was forwarded on 17 July 45 to H.Q. 54 Area and to the MEIA LO BARI. I have also checked that it has reached H.Q. Disthree, so the hold up seems to be at AFHQ.

7364

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Page 3 Cont..

B. It is understood from a signal seen at 54 Area that the Garibaldi Regt will be taking over from a Regiment in a Gruppo Di Combattamenti in the near future. This fact was known to Col Ravnich, Major Valli my Interpreter and myself alone. However Movements in an unsecure telephone message, and a letter from an Officer in the Gruppo di Combattamenti have made this common knowledge, and stresses the fact that Security generally speaking is not good. There are several problems to be considered about this proposed move, none of them very serious but important from the Administrative Side:- (a) The Garibaldi Inf Regt was originally reformed as an Infantry Regiment in a Gruppo di Combattamenti complete with 3 Mortars and A/Tk Guns, Wireless and British Weapons. Since then it has again been reformed as a Guard Bn consequently it is now Armed with ITALIAN weapons and specialist Platoons have been disbanded. However all men have had Training with BRITISH weapons and the reforming of Specialist Platoons would not take more than a day, tho a short period of Intensive Training will be required as a Refresher. Transport forms one of our main problems, as we are only entitled to 35 Trucks and 39 Motor Cycles. All these are old, and replacements and New trucks are practically impossible to obtain. Today there are 5 Trucks off the road waiting repairs and one B.L.R.d and 10 of the M/Cs out of a total of 39. It is doubtful if 5% of these vehicles will stand a journey of over 300 miles.

Replacement of clothing also forms a problem as that has to be done thro the MMIA LO at BARI and he only holds stocks of Green Dyed Battledress, so this matter is being left till we come under a Gruppo Di Combattamento for Admininstration. Despite this the general Turn out of the Regiment is Commendable, and has been commented on very favourably by several People. (b) STRENGTH. A report of the Unit strength is as follows:-

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(b) STRENGTH. A report of the Unit strength is attached to this letter as Appendix "A"

(c) GENERAL. Extreme heat and Dust have been the main problems since my last letter, morale is still high and there have been very few cases of sickness. The idea of a large Canteen and Writing Rooms for the Regiment has had to be given up despite the fact that we managed to Requisition a very good ex Toc H club for them in Trani. The main Problem was the Furnishing of it. An excellent Wall Newspaper has been produced by the Regiment and I will Forward a copy of it to you directly it is in Print. *JA 2.3.46 17363*

in the Field 13 Aug 45.

J.A.G. Gribble Major Regt
Brit Tg Increment Garibaldi Inf Regt

GARIBALDI INF REGT.
.....
STRENGTH RETURN.
.....

War Establishment Strength.	OFF 115.	N.C.Os 180	O.R.s 2470	Total 2765
STRENGTH 15/7/45.	103.	172	1056	1752 1331
STRENGTH 5/8/45.	94.	193.	1465	1752
STRENGTH INCREASE.				
Returned Hospital	-	2.	26.	28
Returned Leave.	6.	14.	91	111.
Sent from other Units.	<u>1</u> 7	<u>12.</u> 33	<u>407.</u> 524	<u>425.</u> 564
STRENGTH DECREASES.				
Hospital.	1	3	36	40.
Released from Army.	15	8	72.	95.
Transferred to other Units.	-	1	7	8.
	<u>16</u>	<u>12.</u>	<u>115</u>	<u>143.</u>

In the Field
13.8.45.
C M Forces.

J.A.G. Gribble Major.

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0 i.c. Garibaldi Inf Regt Brit Increment

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In the Field
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