

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

10000/120/1040

G/100/A

Office Only (Misc. Documents)

Feb. 1944 - Apr. 1945

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

COPY INCOMING SIGNAL

(19)

FROM: 15 ARMY GROUP

121530B

TO : AFHQ

APRIL
22/10
TOP SECRET

INFO: ALCOM
5 ARMY
6 ARMY

ROUTINE

REF : O-320B

12 April 45

THIS ANSWERS YOUR PX 58661 CITE FHGDQ OF 11 APRIL (.)
OUR PLAN FOR FUTURE TREATMENT OF PATRIOTS BRINGS ON
ESTABLISHMENT OF PATRIOT CENTRES FOR THEIR CARE AND
MAINTENANCE PRIOR DISARMAMENT (.) ESTABLISHMENT OF
CENTRES COMPLETELY CONDITIONAL ON ADEQUATE SUPPLY
OF FOOD AND CLOTHING (.) ANTICIPATE NEED FOR SOME OF
THESE CENTRES WILL OCCUR IN NEAR FUTURE AS OUR ARMIES
ADVANCE (.) INITIAL INCREMENT OF PARTISANS ALREADY OVER-
RUN BY 5TH ARMY AND NEED CARE (.) ACCORDINGLY REQUEST
VERY URGENTLY AUTHORIZATION TO PROCEED UNDER PROVISION
PARA 3 OF YOUR F H C C T F 26918 OF 14 FEBRUARY

DIST

Copy No 1 & 2	Info-Action - CA Section (2)
3	Info - A/President
4	Chief Commissioner
5	Exec Commissioner
6	Econ Sec
7	Land Forces
8	File

WB 22 April

SD Distr

TOP SEC Misc file ←
'Q' (Action)
8089

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

COPY INCOMING SIGNAL

(18)

FROM: AFHQ SIGNED SACMED CITE FHQDM

111950B

TO : 15 ARMY GROUP

TCP SECRET

INFO: ALLIED COMMISSION
5TH ARMY
8TH ARMY

ROUTINE

REF : FX 58661

11 Apr 45

REF 15 A GROUP'S 0316B DATED 10 APRIL (.)

SEE OUR F 57979 OF 10 APRIL TO 15 A.G. ONLY AND

OUR F 57980 OF 10 APRIL TO ALLIED COMMISSION ONLY (.)

AWAITING C C S APPROVAL BEFORE ORDERING IMPLEMENTATION

(.) IF THIS IS PREVENTING YOU FROM TAKING ANY ACTION

WHICH YOU CONSIDER SHOULD BE TAKEN NOW (.) YOU SHOULD

REPORT SEPARATELY THOSE MATTERS REQUIRING IMMEDIATE

ACTION

DIST

Copy No 1	Info-Action	CA Sec
2	Info	A/President
3		Chief Comm
4		Ex Comm
5		Econ Sec
6		Land Forces SC
7		File

ws 22 April

SD Dist

TOPSEC Misc File ←

'Q' (Action) 8088

WLS

COPY INCOMING SIGNAL

(17)

FROM: AFHQ SIGNED SACMED CITE FHGDS

101659B

TO : ALCOM

TOP SECRET

REF : F 57980

ROUTINE

10 Apr 45

SD Dist
TOPSEC misc file ←
'Q' (Action)

YOUR 4769 OF 4 APRIL 45 (.)

1. FOOD AND CLOTHING SCALES FOR ITALIAN PARTISANS IN N I T A L Y IS SUBJECT (.)
2. PROPOSED FOOD AND CLOTHING SCALES FOR PARTISANS IN NORTHERN I T A L Y SUBMITTED TO C C S IN N A F 912 WHICH WAS PARAPHRASED TO YOU IN OUR F 56424 OF 7 APRIL (.)
3. OUR INTENTION IS TO ISSUE FULL ITALIAN ARMED FORCES RATION SCALE FROM ARMY AND M M I A STOCKS (.) REPAYMENT OF CIVIL ELEMENT OF RATION SCALE BEING MADE IN BULK TO THE ARMY BY A C (.)
4. INSTRUCTIONS WILL BE ISSUED REGARDING POLICY FOR HANDLING OF ITALIAN PARTISANS AS SOON AS C C S APPROVAL HAS BEEN RECEIVED (.) IN THE MEANTIME N A F 864 AND N A F 912 SHOULD FORM THE BASIS FOR YOUR PLANNING AND PREPARATION (.) NO ISSUES HOWEVER WILL BE MADE TO PARTISANS PENDING FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS (.)

NEW SUBJECT

5. CIGARETTES FOR PATRIOTS IS SUBJECT (.)
6. RECRET CANNOT AUTHORISE ISSUE OF ALLIED CIGARETTES TO PATRIOTS (.) IF ITALIAN GOVERNMENT WILL MAKE AVAILABLE SUPPLIES OF ITALIAN CIGARETTES FOR ISSUE BY ALLIED FORCES TO PATRIOTS WE WILL ARRANGE FOR ISSUED PROPOSED BY YOU TO BE MADE (.) SUGGEST CIGARETTES BE FURNISHED THROUGH M M I A CHANNELS

DIST

5. Econ Sec
6. Land Forces SC
7. File

Copy No 1 -
2
3
4

ACTION: CA Section 8087
INFO: A/President
Chief Commissioner
Executive Commissioner

ws 22 April

G.O.I.

1. Thank you for showing me this
 2. May I also see
 - (a) the letter mentioned in para 3. a. (3)
 - (b) the instructions of implementer
- when available

3. c (1), (4)

14 Mar

W.D.
Col.

Sgt Davies

Please show above to
Sgt Pridley.

Col Pridley

Sir:

Please see para ①
attached file (20/26)



80865

Davies

15 Mar

TOP SECRET

Ref: 3201/206/EC.

10 March 1945.

SUBJECT: Patriot Problem in N. ITALY.

TO : VP, CA Section.

1. In reply to your letter TS/16/18/CA of 5 March 1945, herewith for your retention copy of JPS Study No. P/265 (Final).

2. In accordance with Conclusion 7(c) of the Minutes of SACRED's Political Conference of 20 February 1945, (copy forwarded you under this office letter 3201/190/EC of 28 February) the last sentence has been deleted from para 6 of JPS Study No. P/265 (Final).

Lighter
Chief Staff Officer,
to the Executive Commissioner.

Copy to: SO to CC (With copy of JPS Study No. P/265)
Pol Adv (Final and to note para 2 above)
Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA) ()

COPY

COPY

COPY

(168)

P/265 (Final)

TOP SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff.

18 February 1945

INTERIM REPORT ON MEASURES TO DEAL WITH
PATRIOT PROBLEMS IN NORTHERN ITALY.

Cover Note by MJPS.

1. In accordance with terms of reference received from Chief of Staff on 16 February 1945, we have prepared the attached interim report on measures to deal with patriot problems in Northern ITALY.
2. In the time available it has not been possible to consult 15 Army Group, Allied Commission, or NCIA.

(Sgd) G. L. EBBELE
Brig. General, U.S.A.,
G-3 Plans.

Representatives concurred in
conference but the time
factor has prevented signature
being obtained

L.T. PANCHURST,
Air Commodore
MAAF Plans

W.A. ADAIR
Commander,
Staff Officer, Plans

DISTRIBUTION:

List "A" plus,
CG, 15th Army Group
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Commander SOM
British Resident Minister
US Political Adviser
A/C of S, G-5

TOP SECRET.

- P/265 (P1M1)

TOP SECRET.

18 February 1945

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff.

INTERIM REPORT ON MEASURES TO DEAL WITH PATRIOT FORCES
IN NORTHERN ITALY.

OBJECT.

1. To examine all plans that have been made for dealing with patriots on the occupation of Northern ITALY and to submit recommendations regarding further measures required to provide for:

- a. The rapid disarmament and absorption into civil life of the Italian Armed Forces of all Italian patriots as the Allied forces advance.
- b. The prevention of fighting between patriots and Fascist forces remaining behind when the Germans withdraw.
- c. The prevention of fighting between Slovans and Italian patriots in North-eastern ITALY, which would prejudice the security of supply through TRIESTE and VERONA GIULIA to AUSTRIA, and also aggravate the political problems of future frontier settlement.

MEASURES ALREADY TAKEN.

2. Current Special Operations Policy.

Instructions for the support of Italian resistance throughout Northern ITALY were issued by this Headquarters in a directive dated 4 February 1945 as 15th Army Group, when the following policy was established:

- a. Indiscriminate expansion of patriot forces to be discouraged.
- b. Supply to be concentrated largely on non-warlike stores and arms to be supplied only on a selective basis for special tasks.
- c. Preparations to be made for the post-liberation period.

3. Occupational Plans.

The following measures have been taken to prepare for the occupation of Northern ITALY.

a. BY AFHQ.

(1) An Operation Instruction

b. The prevention of fighting between patriots and Fascist forces remaining behind when the Germans withdraw.

c. The prevention of fighting between Slovans and Italian patriots in North-eastern ITALY, which would prejudice the security of supply through TRIESTE and VENEZIA GIULIA to AUSTRIA, and also aggravate the political problems of future frontier settlement.

MEASURES ADOPTED.

2. Current Special Operations Policy.

Instructions for the support of Italian resistance throughout Northern ITALY were issued by this Headquarters in a directive dated 4 February 1945 to 15th Army Group, when the following policy was established:

- a. Indiscriminate expansion of patriot forces to be discouraged.
- b. Supply to be concentrated largely on non-warlike stores and arms to be supplied only on a selective basis for special tasks.
- c. Preparations to be made for the post-liberation period.

3. Occupational Plans.

The following measures have been taken to prepare for the occupation of Northern ITALY.

a. BY AIR.

- (1) An Operation Instruction "Occupation of Northwest ITALY" was issued on 24 December 1944 to 15th Army Group. This was supplemented by telegram # 26918 of 14 February 1945, giving directions as to collecting, disarming, feeding, clothing and paying patriots and for their medical care. 15th Army Group have been requested to forward their plans, based on these instructions, as soon as possible.
- (2) The covering approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the scales of food and clothing, envisaged in the instructions given to 15th Army Group, has been asked for in MAP 864 dated 15 February.
- (3) A letter is being dispatched to AMIA, copy to 15th Army Group, which lays down a general policy for the introduction of patriots into the Italian Army to fill, as far as possible, the 45,000 existing vacancies under the present ceiling, and instructs AMIA to form reconnaissance companies of a strength of 500 each from patriot bands for employment with the five Italian combat groups. (Patriots are now filtering through the lines at a rate of about 500 per week)

and it is anticipated that on the occupation of Northern ITALY it will be possible to absorb about 10,000 patriots in this manner into the Italian Army). Depending on the success with Italian combat groups, the use of Italian patriot reconnaissance companies with British and U.S. divisions is also envisaged.

b. By 15th Army Group in conjunction with Allied Commission.

It is understood that the following measures have been taken:

- (1) Messages giving detailed anti-search instructions have been prepared for issue to patriots when a German withdrawal becomes evident.
- (2) Discussions are in progress to determine suitable areas for the establishment of patriot reception centres.
- (3) Detailed arrangements are being made for liaison, in the period immediately following liberation, between AMG officers and LAs with patriot bands.

c. By Allied Commission.

A special procedure, additional to the normal processes of establishing Allied Military Government, is planned for dealing with patriots. This involves:

- (1) The provision of regional and provincial patriot teams, each consisting of one AMG "patriot" officer and one Italian military officer, to be joined once the area for which they are responsible is liberated, by a local CLG representative. The immediate duty of these teams will be to contact local patriot leaders.
- (2) The establishment of patriot committees to help AMG officials to discriminate between genuine and bogus patriots.
- (3) The provision of staffs for patriot reception centres.
- (4) The provision of mobile Italian Army recruiting agencies.
- (5) Local re-employment of patriots as far as possible through patriot committees.
- (6) Reporting by local committees of "unemployable patriots" to central AMG authority.

- (3) Detailed arrangements are being made for liaison, in the period immediately following liberation, between AMG officers and LOs with patriot bands.

2. By Allied Commission.

A special procedure, additional to the normal processes of establishing Allied Military Government, is planned for dealing with patriots. This involves:

- (1) The provision of regional and provincial patriot teams, each consisting of one AMG "patriot" officer and one Italian military officer, to be joined once the area for which they are responsible is liberated, by a local GLNI representative. The immediate duty of these teams will be to contact local patriot leaders.
- (2) The establishment of patriot committees to help AMG officials to discriminate between genuine and bogus patriots.
- (3) The provision of staffs for patriot reception centres.
- (4) The provision of mobile Italian Army recruiting agencies.
- (5) Local re-employment of patriots as far as possible through patriot committees.
- (6) Reporting by local committees of "unemployable patriots" to central AMG authority.

3. Summary of Present State of Action.

In general, plans for Northeastern ITALY are now well advanced. Plans for Northeastern ITALY are only commencing but the same procedure will be adopted, subject to modifications as necessary in view of the obvious difficulty.

FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED.

4. To meet the object stated at paragraph 1 above, the following additional measures are recommended:

2. The Establishment of Closer Links between the GLNI and the AMG Government.

There will be advantages in representatives being credited from each of these organizations to the other, though the nomination of suitable persons will represent a difficulty. In this connection an exchange of missions between SACRED and the GLNI has also been considered, but as our object is now to play down the patriots, such a course does not appear desirable.

-3-

b. Informal Agreement as to Suitable Italians for Military Government Positions.

There will be advantages if the ROSS Government and the CLNAI can be induced to agree on lists of suitable candidates for employment as Prefects, etc., under AMG. SACRED could then undertake that, when instituting an Allied Military Government, agreed nominees would be considered for such appointments.

5. In regard to the object of paragraph 1 b, we have assumed that this refers to riots and not to normal operations of war against Fascist formations which may be complying with German orders. In our opinion, the danger of armed disturbances developing between Fascists and patriots is small and the real danger is that of strife among patriots of diverse political opinions. The measures already taken, supplemented by those suggested at paragraph 4, should deal with this contingency.

6. In regard to the object given at paragraph 1 c, the best insurance will be the speedy occupation of vital areas and the establishment of stable government. Decisions remain urgently required, therefore, as to what form of government is to be imposed, and in what areas it is to be established, in the disputed portions of Northeastern ITALY. ~~Subject to any agreement that may have been made at the CLNAI Conference, we remain of the opinion that tripartite government for Venezia Giulia up to the 1939 frontier will present the best solution.~~

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL

Land Forces Sub Com, AG
(M.M.I.A.)

23/4/45
22 Feb 45

H.Q., A.C. for Executive Commissioner

1. I have it on good authority that the French are proposing to send Moroccan troops into PIEDMONT when the Germans evacuate North ITALY.

2. I consider that this would be disastrous as it would:-

(a) exacerbate feeling between ITALY and FRANCE

(b) be bound to lead to clashes between not only the official Italian Army but also the virile patriots of the North.

(c) increase enormously the difficult situation we will in any event have to cope with.

3. Particularly with the record of VICHY France in the war, I do not see that the French have any right to invade ITALY; nor I suggest is their assistance necessary to liberate ITALY - in fact the reverse.

4. I would therefore very strongly urge that, if what I say in para 1 is true, no French troops, white or black or yellow, be permitted to enter ITALY.

L. Browning

Major General,
M.M.I.A.

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(b) be bound to lead to clashes between not only the official Italian Army but also the virile patriots of the North.

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4. I would therefore very strongly urge that, if what I say in para 1 is true, no French troops, white or black or yellow, be permitted to enter ITALY.

L. Browning

Major General,
H. M. I. A.

*only seen by
2 1/2 of GI.*

[Signature]

8080

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Originator's Reference: FX 31016

Date/Time of Origin: FEB 211500A

Message Centre No: D/2813

Date/Time Rec'd: FEB 220900A

Precedence: PRIORITY

FROM: AFHQ SIGNED ALEXANDER CITE FHGCT

TO: AGWAR FOR COMBINED C.O.S. AND AMSSO FOR BRITISH C.O.S. REPTD SHAFT
ALCOM MEIA 15 ARMY GROUP

TOP-SECRET

TOP SECRET

This is NAF 868. Para 4 NAF 773 and para 3 FAN 448 are references.

1. Breakdown of international commitment of 124000 provides for ceiling of 55000 in respect of Carabinieri. This ceiling now full and strength fully engaged policing liberated ITALY.

2. Considered problem maintaining public order in thickly populated industrial areas of north when liberated will necessitate (a) redistribution of present Carabinieri strength throughout ITALY involving withdrawal CCRR personnel from base areas for duty in the north.

(b) Increase of 10000 in CCRR ceiling to facilitate this redistribution over the extended area in which police duties will become necessary when northern provinces are occupied.

3. To cover the suggested CCRR increase, approval is sought to an increase in the over-all ceiling of the Italian military forces by raising the international commitment from 124000 to 134000.

N.B. This message will not be distributed outside British or U.S. Govt departments or Hq or re transmitted even in cipher without being heavily paraphrased.

Dist

over

TOP SECRET

8079

0121

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

INCOMING MESSAGE

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE READER

Dist

Info-Action - P Safety SC

L Forces SC

Info - A/President

Chief Commissioner

Ex Com

CA Sec

File

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

This is the 333. This is the 333. This is the 333.

TOP SECRET

1. The purpose of this message is to inform you of the results of the meeting held on 12/10/50.

2. The meeting was held in the presence of the following persons: [List of names]

3. The meeting was held in the presence of the following persons: [List of names]

4. The meeting was held in the presence of the following persons: [List of names]

5. The meeting was held in the presence of the following persons: [List of names]

6. The meeting was held in the presence of the following persons: [List of names]

7. The meeting was held in the presence of the following persons: [List of names]

TOP SECRET

8. The meeting was held in the presence of the following persons: [List of names]

9. The meeting was held in the presence of the following persons: [List of names]

10. The meeting was held in the presence of the following persons: [List of names]

11. The meeting was held in the presence of the following persons: [List of names]

12. The meeting was held in the presence of the following persons: [List of names]

13. The meeting was held in the presence of the following persons: [List of names]

14. The meeting was held in the presence of the following persons: [List of names]

15. The meeting was held in the presence of the following persons: [List of names]

16. The meeting was held in the presence of the following persons: [List of names]

8078

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Land Forces S/C

(13)

ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME

AFHQ SIGNED SACRED

P-27859

MSO/16

TOP SECRET

ROUTINE

CITE FMCT

FEB 16/1151

TOP SECRET.

The following is paraphrase of our P-26918 to 15 Army Group furthering our Operation Destruction dated 21 December 44 and Administrative Instruction dated 25 January 45 on occupation of Northwest Italy.

1. Occupation of Northwest Italy may take place earlier than thought due to Russian successes.

2. Subject to approval of Combined Chiefs of Staff the following policy in dealing with the Partisans is proposed by SACRED. Recognition of assistance to Allied cause will be basis of treatment together with necessity that they be disarmed, disbanded, placed in employment as quickly as possible. Unless and until they are taken into existing categories of Italians they will not yet not be treated as belonging to any existing category. Areas of assembly will be specified as soon as arrangements for reception can be made. These areas must be selected considering suitability from Partisan viewpoint as well as other factors. Disarmament of Partisans will take place on entering reception areas. Paragraphs three, four and five outline assistance, after disarmament, that will be rendered them until final disposition has been made. The Allied Commission will be responsible for the final disposition

TOP SECRET.

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TOP SECRET

FEB 16/1543

/continued....

8078

TOP SECRET

THE CASE P-27559 of 16 FEB 1945 (continued).

3. During phase 1 Army Headquarters (together with Allied Military Government of the Army Headquarters) will feed and clothe partisans in areas concerned; Armies will supply necessary food and clothing for this purpose as follows;

a. Italian Military Forces ration scale as modified later in detail will apply.

b. Minimum essential scale of clothing will be issued from military sources.

4. Italian Government will be responsible for pay. Necessary arrangements with the Italian Government will be made by the Allied Commission who will notify 15 Army Group of arrangements including rate of pay.

5. United States and British will assist Italian Military who will be responsible for hospitalization.

6. Amplification of paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 will be furnished later in a detailed Administrative Memorandum. Approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff is being requested for issue of rations and clothing outlined in paragraphs 3 a. and b.

DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION: Executive Commissioner

INFO: A/President

Chief Commissioner

~~Attendant~~

Land Forces 5/c

Political Section

CA Section (2)

SD Distr

TOPSEC Misc File

sources.

4. Italian Government will be responsible for pay. Necessary arrangements with the Italian Government will be made by the Allied Commission who will notify 15 Army Group of arrangements including rate of pay.
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DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION: Executive Commissioner

INFO: A/President

Chief Commissioner

~~Attaching~~

Land Forces 5/c

Political Section

CA Section (2)

ECON. SEC. (2)

Distribution by C.C.

TOP SECRET

8077

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

TOP SECRET. (12)

MMIA LO att. Rear Hill
Lighter Army

9 Feb 45.

MM/101/5.

To: DA & QMG

HQ MMIA - ROME.

2) Ref reverse.

2) Attached letters arrived for you after your departure from Eighth Army today.

Богданович

Plan

[Handwritten signature]

14 Feb

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

106 907

SUBJECT:- Particulate - PAVENNA Area;
Organization of OSI (CL)

WH 2551. The 0.3 A ^{CP} ~~CPM~~

Eighty Seven

25 26 27

6/14/2015

Major B. CAREW-HUNT,

NSCIA. 10, Rear, EIGHTH Army.

220pi ~~Life~~ ~~of~~ ~~James~~ ~~Arthur~~ ~~Leitch~~

Attached copies of *Light* from *Antony* to *Henry*

1. Organisation and functions of GSI(CE)
2. Partisan Operations in the RAVENNA Area

are forwarded for information.

A. Colymbus major

Lieut Colonel,
General Staff Intelligence.

1 Copy for Col Poaker

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

(12A)

COPY

TOP SECRET

Headquarters,
NORTH ARMY.

M 526 CL

1 Feb 45

HQ 5 Corps
13 Corps
1 Can Corps

COPY TO: AFHQ
15 Army Gp
10 Corps

Attached is a detailed account of Partisan operations in the HAVENNA area.

On the subject of the handling of partisans and of the control and co-ordination of their activities with those of our own troops these operations offer a number of lessons which may prove of use when our advance brings us into contact with the Partisan Groups in the North.

(Sgd) G.A. THOMAS

Brigadier

RM 5 Corps
13 Corps
2 Cdn Corps

Copy to: AFHQ

13 Army Gp
10 Corps

N 526 CL

1 Feb 45

Attached is a detailed account of Partisan operations in the NAVEHMA area.

On the subject of the handling of partisans and of the control and co-ordination of their activities with those of our own troops these operations offer a number of lessons which may prove of use when our advance brings us into contact with the Partisan Groups in the North.

(Sgd) G.A. THOMAS

Brigadier,
General Staff,

8076

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

TOP SECRET

U 528 UL

PARTISAN OPERATIONS

in the RAVENNA Area, 10 Sep - 7 Dec 44

PREAMBLE

The operations, an account of which is attached, had their origin in an debilitated mission carried out by OSS for GSI at this HQ.

The planning and development of the operations was carried out by O.C. O.S.S. Det Eighth Army and O.C. O.S.S. Maritime Unit, with the co-operation of African Coastal Flotilla (Northern Adriatic), and D.A.F. Co-ordination was the responsibility of GSI (Civil Licenses) at Army. At a later stage the control and development of the operation was delegated to HQ 1 Cdn Corps.

COMMENTS

1. Communications

(c) W/T

The whole success of this operation was founded on W/T communications. The W/T operators were supplied by OSS Maritime Det and OSS Eighth Army Det, and were trained by OSS Eighth Army Det. Without W/T communication no contact could have been made with the partisans, no arms or supplies delivered, and no information passed or co-ordinated plan put into operation. Signal communications worked very smoothly throughout, due to the training and handling of the operators. At one moment the amount of intelligence traffic was so unexpectedly large that the code books ran out and it was difficult, owing to weather, to get more in. Only mutual confidence between the radio operators and the control at this juncture prevented the operators, the set, and all the partisans from coming down into our lines.

responsibility of CSI (Civil Liaison) at Army. At a later stage the control and development of the operation was delegated to HQ 1 Cdn Corps.

OCULEMENTS

1. Communications

(a) W/T

The whole success of this operation was founded on W/T communications. The W/T operators were supplied by OSS Maritime Det and OSS Eighth Army Det, and were trained by OSS Eighth Army Det. Without W/T communication no contact could have been made with the partisans, no arms or supplies delivered, and no information passed or co-ordinated plan put into operation. Signal communications worked very smoothly throughout, due to the training and handling of the operators. At one moment the amount of intelligence traffic was so unexpectedly large that the code books ran out and it was difficult, owing to weather, to get more in. Only mutual confidence between the radio operators and the control at this juncture prevented the operators, the set, and all the partisans from coming down into our lines.

A total of 339 messages were passed from the set to the control.

(b) Sea and Air

This was always extremely uncertain due to moon and weather conditions, and outside factors, such as unexpected German movements near the pin-point, and mistaken signals. It is anticipated that more use can be made of the partisans' own rowing boats in operations in the coastal sector of the Venetian. The prevalence of mines near the coast between the COMMACHIO and VENICE, as well as the oncoming winter storms, will make boating by PTBs increasingly difficult throughout the winter.

8073.....

- 2 -

2. Co-ordination

A central planning and co-ordinating body at Army is essential, with operations which include two (SS Data, Navy and DA), as well as the formations operating in the area and the possible participation of such units as PFA and 139 (formerly "1" Force.).

3. Liaison

With forces in which tactical handling is as important as it is with guerrillas, liaison is essential and a personal visit by an Allied Officer is important. It is later stated the presence of a Canadian L.C. from the Corps would it possible to obtain close co-ordination with operations by our troops.

The job of an L.C. in these circumstances is not an easy one. He should be responsible for maintaining to the maximum the efficiency of the troops, and the situation, conditions in the area, and the situation of the troops in the area, and what will happen after liberation. Unless informed on these points, guerrillas may find themselves in a position to not immediately understand the situation. By explaining the situation, guerrillas may find the Allied cause, showing how this helps them to the credit of Italy, pointing out facts about training, equipment, and the Italian effort, misunderstanding and possible differences due to the Italian effort may be avoided, and the best out of the situation may be the best out of the situation.

The visit of the L.C. to the Army HQ is essential for the success of the operations. The whole, and his interview with (SI(L) about the situation, and with the L.C. on behalf of the Committee of National Liberation, all proved their value later.

4. Intelligence

Information from civilians requires careful checking. The arrival of an Allied Intelligence Officer with large scale maps, photographs, and a town plan of R.V.M. resulted in an

of Cannon L.C. from the Corps and it possible to obtain close co-ordination with operations by the troops.

The job of the L.C. in these circumstances is not an easy one. He should be well trained for explaining to the prisoners the difficulties of supply, the situation, conditions in liberated Italy, situation of the Italian Army, and what will happen after liberation. Unless informed on these points, prisoners may have difficulties because they do not immediately understand and taken on operations "to the front". By explaining how best prisoners may help the Allied cause, showing how this help redounds to the credit of Italy, pointing out facts about training, equipment, and the Italian civilian, misadventures and possible difficulties can be discussed and may be avoided, and the best set out of the services when they meet our advancing forces.

The visit of the L.C. to Army HQ is much for the success of the operations of the L.C. and his interviews with OSI (L) about many events, and with the AG on behalf of the Committee of National Direction, all proved their value later.

4. Intelligence

Information from civilians requires careful checking. The arrival of an Allied Intelligence Officer with large scale maps, photographs, and a town plan of Ravenna resulted in an immediate investigation. By detailed interrogation and cross-checking, it was possible to reduce exaggerations and inaccuracies to a minimum. All information was sifted and collated before being passed on, and there is no doubt that a high degree of reliability was obtained. German batteries were engaged within a few hours of moving into new positions, and independent reports confirmed that the Germans could not fire of the extraordinary accuracy of our artillery fire. "Provided of the intelligence provided will be found at Appendix 10".

3/

5. Deliberation of the Situation

It is essential that Command of partisans behind the lines who have been organized and supplied under army direction, should be directed at the right moment to the formation and later the units which will meet them on the ground. Units on the ground should be fully informed in time of what they are meeting, and preparations made for supplies. For example, during the period 4 - 6 Dec when ammunition was urgently required and the army S.79 Bomber was trying to fly it in - unsuccessful - fully owing to extremely misty weather - command had not been delegated to bridge or lower, and it was left to PPA to contact the partisans on their own initiative and get the ammunition in by finding a land route.

6. Action

It is not considered that a complicated operation, such as the occupying of Saint-Liberte and Le Gille and blowing the bridge at Saint-Liberte to prevent German armor counter-attacking can normally be carried off. Since the partisans were not able to blow this bridge the idea of these villages became a useless one, indeed, a liability, for the German counter-attack took them right down to the canal if way to Ravanne.

As the Command L.L. concludes in his report: "All our most successful actions were those in which forty or fifty partisans fought for five minutes and then retired into the night or into the woods. On a number of occasions we attacked the enemy in prepared positions and held ground for a limited length of time, but in every case I felt that it was too difficult. The partisan attack on POKA CORPORA through the enemy line was very brilliant and successful. The partisans were driven in their positions and they had time to carry out their final operations. For that reason the partisan day to consider success, but it was very hard in the extreme and most easily have cost us great experience elsewhere. Partisans are very brave and do the job".

Run to the station, however, the verdict in a year of this kind of direct action, however, is personally, the partisans

6. Activities

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7. Partisan Leadership and Organization

A Partisan Movement in the present situation in Italy can draw on the virtually unlimited resources of the Italian people and facilities to put W/T on the air and supply arms. At least a skeleton of a Partisan Movement exists in this case it was the Military Council (28 April 1944) of the Italian Committee of National Liberation, the first step in the formation of a Partisan Movement. The official representative of the Committee. The importance of a good organization will increase as we proceed further North in the Po Valley, where Fascist activity and German counter measures drive Partisan activity into the mountains.

TOP SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Early in September a party of Italian "San Marco" Marines, run by OSS Maritime Unit, were landed "blind" by LTB North of Rimini CORSIANI with the task of getting through to ECUARI an Italian engineer who had previously provided plans of the GOTHIC line. The engineer thought that he could contact members of the Committee of Liberation who would in turn put him in touch with FODD firms working on the ADICE defences. The whole party with any plans were to be evounded in 5 days; it included a wireless operator known as radio ELIUD, with a set working back to OSS Detachment at Army HQ. The engineer set to Rimini but returned to the coast without having accomplished his mission. In the meantime the landing party had, with considerable difficulty, contacted the local partisans who consisted of 200 local peasants hiding out in the marshes and armed with one Italian MMG and a few rifles and shot guns. The land was part of 28 GLE HQ organised by the Committee of Liberation in RAVENNA and put under the command of an Italian officer Lieut Arrigo BOLLETTI (now a Major in the EUCW).

On our instructions the partisans began to collect intelligence in RAVENNA Province and supplies were promised. A tented camp was set up on an island in the marshes, the set being defended by the solitary machine gun.

Owing to continual bad weather it was not possible to make a landing before the end of the dark period. The OSS party was not equipped for a protracted stay and finally came down to Rimini by fishing boat on 11 Oct with a detailed intelligence report of the area. But they left behind the wireless operator, although suffering from malaria, in order to keep alive the flow of intelligence. Daily reports were received of coastal traffic to Rimini CORSIANI and had already resulted in the sinking by RAF of several barges.

The partisans and the wireless operator who were "living up to their names in water" became steadily more discouraged.

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US Radio BICORP with a set working, back to CSS Detachment at Army HQ. The courier got to RIMINI but returned to the coast without having accomplished his mission. In the meantime the landing party has, with considerable difficulty, contacted the local partisans who consisted of 200 local partisans hidden out in the marshes and armed with one Italian HMG and a few rifles and shot guns. The band was part of 28 GAP Bde organized by the Committee of Liberation in RAVENNA and put under the command of an Italian officer Lieut Arnigo BOLDRINI (now an officer Major BULOW).

On our instructions the partisans began to collect intelligence in RAVENNA Province and supplies were promised. A contact group was set up on an island in the marshes, the set being defended by the solitary machine gun.

Owing to continual bad weather it was not possible to make a landing before the end of the dark period. The CSS party was not equipped for a protected stay and finally came down to RIMINI by fishing boat on 11 Oct with a limited intelligence report of the area. But they left behind the wireless operator, although suffering from malaria, in order to keep going the flow of intelligence; daily reports were received of coastal traffic to RORIC CURSINI and had already resulted in the sinking by DAF of several barges.

The partisans and the wireless operator who were "living up to their knees in water" became steadily more discouraged as supplies failed to arrive. On night 16/17 Oct, first day when moon and weather conditions finally made operations possible, two tons of guns and supplies from CSS and Army resourced were landed. The CO, CSS Det Eighth Army and C.2 (CL) accompanied the expedition and presented the partisans of the shore with a congratulatory message from the G.I. and the wireless operator with a sleeping bag and a pair of tin lunch rubber boots.

What was at this time considering the possibilities of a landing by sea behind the enemy lines. It was decided to send in a Recon party from RIM to investigate the possibilities of landing and operating. Japs in the RORIC CURSINI area and elsewhere. The partisans, through the CSS unit, had arranged a reception in this area on 13 Oct, but the landing

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was unsuccessful owing to bad weather, as were subsequent attempts at our usual landing place N of PORTO CORSIKI.

In the meantime the partisans had located two missing OSS groups who had been dropped in the area by parachute on 4 Nov, and whose wireless sets had been put out of action by the drop. They also reported that they would shortly be receiving from the Committee of Liberation in RAVENNA an American pilot whom OSS had, on the request of 12th Air Force, asked the partisans to locate. He was shortly afterwards joined by a British pilot who had also bailed out in the area. On 28 Oct a detachment of 300 of BULG's partisans of the 28 GAP Bde, under the impression that we were about to enter RAVENNA, marched down STUTTGART road and reached our lines safely while German raids were in progress. These were distributed by the partisan IC with PORTERFORCE machine units and did useful work as guides and patrols, particularly with PFA and 27 L.

Intelligence showed a steady improvement. Many targets were engaged by PFA; successes included several bridges sunk and an ammunition dump blown up. In the dark period in the middle of Oct no other efforts were made to get in supplies but were prevented by weather or misfires (e.g. the HVB (active) involved in submarine acts).

Since the partisans were still very impatient a further attempt was made on a busy night on 3/4 Nov during the moon period; it was decided to infiltrate the G3(OL) to co-ordinate partisans behind the enemy lines with operations by the forward troops, and also improve the intelligence service. Unfortunately the Italian HVB stuck in the entrance of SANTESSA harbor and subsequently caught fire.

Weather conditions were not again suitable for ten days. The situation was now serious since the ciphers (and time table) had run out and the partisans were threatening to cross the lines if their supplies did not arrive. On the nights of 16/17 Nov and 17/18 Nov a renewed attempt was made to infiltrate the G3 (OL) and another OSS wireless operator with the ciphers. Lights at PORTO CORSIKI were mistaken for the partisan signals and the HVB, which was badly hit, was subsequently sunk.

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Since the portisans were getting very impatient a further attempt was made on a busy night on 3/4 Nov during the moon period; it was decided to infiltrate the G3 (CL) to co-ordinate portisans behind the enemy lines with operations by the forward troops, and also improve the intelligence service. Unfortunately the Italian HMB stuck in the entrance of SALTOMARINA harbour and subsequently caught fire.

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Correlation operating in the area, it was decided at the request of Canadian Corps, to send in Capt D. HEALY as representative of Can Corps HQ.

On the night of 22/23 Nov, on the second attempt, BULOW got through in his run-boat, taking with him Capt HEALY, a reserve OSS operator and some essential supplies. On the following night the LBS operation was finally brought off and 4 tons of arms, explosives and supplies, including medical supplies and instruments, were landed. Owing to thinning out of German lines, the coast it was possible to fire signals at every 1/2 km for a distance of 3 miles. The boat returned with two escaped Allied PW and two German deserters.

With the arrival of Capt HEALY intelligence showed an immediate and startling improvement. As a result of the advance up to the front it was now possible to spot targets for the artillery as well as for bombing, and the area covered by the intelligence net-work was extended inland to cover the front as far as BREMEN. Gun positions, troop concentrations etc, were daily observed and results of fire observed if possible. The OSS link for the next fortnight was dealing with 1,000 to 1,500 troops in the KAVENNA party alone in addition to handling messages from other sets in enemy occupied territory. The information was particularly valuable since during most of this period the weather made air reconnaissance impossible.

That so close a watch could be kept on German activity was largely due to the enemy allowing elderly peasant women to move about the countryside. These women were in fact the Partisans' "transmission" they carried, concealed about their persons, sketches, intelligence, etc. Reports, marked maps, and mail, and returned to their point of departure with orders from BULOW. Information was, as far as possible, checked and cross-checked by Capt HEALY before being passed to us.

On 29 Nov command of the Partisans in the KAVENNA area was passed from Army to Can Corps and on the following day the base station was moved from Army to Canadian Corps. Owing to the shortage of equipment and personnel this involved moving the entire OSS station which was also working two other sets in enemy territory.

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Capt HEALY reported further supplies were urgently required if the portisans were to be used in an operational role. The food situation was satisfactory since supplies were regularly obtained from local civilians who also provided beasts for transport, but the portisans were living under very difficult conditions. The men were half naked and had no means of keeping dry. At night, groups of twenty or thirty would huddle together under a heap of straw under a tarpaulin and try to get a few hours rest. The portisans had a doctor but only a small amount of medical supplies sent in on the first landing when there were very few portisans. All weapons were clean and in working order, but the only incident was brilliant time, and Sam was in rather slight supply, particularly as expenditure is always heavy in partisan warfare since the men, not being trained soldiers, have no idea of conserving ammunition.

Arrangements were made to land the necessary supplies by MTB but owing to weather conditions this was not possible, though a row-boat was sent down on 25/26 Nov and returned with supplies on the night 27/28. D.R. 1114 on a successful drop on the night of 1/2 Dec when 5 planes dropped arms and supplies. Two of the containers with the mortar and a large amount of the ammunition were destroyed owing to the portisans not opening. Attempts were made to supply ammunition in improvised containers by our own It 1114 "3" row-boat but owing to heavy mist the signal lights could not be seen.

Another OSS group with wireless set a fifteen seat in with Capt HEALY to contact portisans near the mouth of the PC. On the way to his area this agent reported that he had met a S.M.F. pilot who had been downed near PORTO GARIBOLDI and was then routed south by portisans. The pilot was directed to BUCCHI's headquarters and then a further report was received to Capt HEALY and to work out in the various raids.

HQ Canadian Corps passed daily signals to the portisans and kept them informed of the air support available for any targets by them.

The small experimental rail which had been planned on a German duty, it was carried out 25 Nov by German 8 men and 1

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An other OSS group with wireless set in had been sent in with Capt HEALY to contact partisans near the mouth of the PO. On the way to his area this agent reported that he had met a SALT pilot who had informed him that PORCO CORSIANI was then routed south by partisans. The pilot was directed to BULOW's headquarters and then a further report was received to Capt HEALY and took part in the various raids.

HQ Canadian Corps passed daily airtels to the partisans and kept them informed of the air support available for any targets by them.

The SALT experimental raid which had been planned on a German outpost was carried out 25 Nov on a German 8 man patrol on the road from PORCO CORSIANI to RAVENNA; 1 German was killed, and the only reprisals taken appear to have been systematic looting throughout the area. On 29 Nov the partisans began a preliminary attack on PORCO CORSIANI with the object of testing out the paratrooper. Capt HEALY and Lieut J.C. BIRDELL, the SALT pilot, both took part in this attack, with BULOW in command. As a result 2 MGs were silenced and an unknown number of casualties inflicted; the partisans then withdrew and the capture of PORCO CORSIANI was reinforced from RAVENNA. Lieut BIRDELL distinguished himself in this action by his steadiness and the discipline he showed for his personal safety while helping a wounded company commander across a trench and swept by enemy fire.

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The partisan forces were now divided into two groups of 300 each with the following plan:

Group A. To occupy S. ALBERGO and LA GIELLA South of LAKE OSSAUGHIC, blow the bridge at 512513, and then move in small groups towards ALFONSIUM and LEZZANO to ambush enemy withdrawing on Route 16.

Group B. This was to be the main effort. To occupy or block enemy in IMBROLO and POMO CORSIUM, then move South to ambush enemy withdrawing between the 500 and 5541.

Capt HEALY was ordered to start operations on 2 Dec. On the nights 1/2 Dec and 2/3 Dec ambush parties began to operate across Route 16, and B and W of M. VILLA. Casualties inflicted on the enemy in those nights were 3 killed, 6 wounded and 2 PW of 114 Div.

On 3 Dec the partisans of LEZZANO were attacked by a scratch German force made up of supply personnel from units at S. ALBERGO. They were easily beaten off and when later in the day a strong German patrol intervened, the partisans retired in good order. They claim to have killed 34 Germans in this action.

At first light of 4 Dec, 300 partisans attacked POMO CORSIUM, and by 1030 had occupied the Southern bank of the canal against little resistance, and reported 75 Germans killed on the V bank. Many German dead were found in the streets.

By the afternoon of 5 Dec partisan forces surrounding POMO CORSIUM set entangled in thick minefields and had many casualties. Meanwhile there was a rumor that the German was escaping by sea; this proved unfounded, but Capt HEALY reported that he would not allow the partisans to make a second attack on prepared positions, particularly as there was now a serious shortage of ammunition.

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Capt HEALY was ordered to start operations on 2 Dec. On the nights 1/2 Dec and 2/3 Dec ambush parties began to operate across Route 10, and B and C of RAVENNA. Casualties inflicted on the enemy on these nights were 3 killed, 6 wounded and 2 PW of 114 Div.

On 3 Dec the partisan IIR of 15324NO were attacked by a scratch German force made up of supply personnel from dumps at S. ALBERNO. They were easily beaten off and when later in the day a strong German patrol intervened, the partisans retired in good order. They claim to have killed 34 Germans in this action.

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By the afternoon of 5 Dec partisan forces surrounding PORTO CORSINI got entangled in thick minefields and had heavy casualties. Meanwhile there was a rumour that the garrison was escaping by sea: this proved unfounded but Capt HEALY reported that he would not allow the partisans to make a second attack on occupied positions, particularly as there was now a serious shortage of ammunition.

A series of 6 blocks were instituted on the roads CASAL BRESCHI - PORTO CORSINI, RAVENNA - PORTO CORSINI. That day Lieut BUDDELL came down from PORTO CORSINI to RAVENNA, leaving 12 German PW who had been captured in the day's operations: and PPA patrols, which had arrived in the area at 10,000 rounds of SA to the partisans by running boat along the canals.

At first light on 3 Dec S. ALBERNO was attacked and was occupied by the afternoon. LA CASSINA, MADRIGLE and LA CILLA were occupied by evening. MADRIGLE was occupied without fighting. A group of partisans entered the village and fixed actions in German ammunition that the place was surrounded by

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- 6 -

partisans, the Allies only ten miles away, and calling on the Germans there to surrender. 14 Germans surrendered while the rest, some 15, dispersed.

At SAN ALBERTO the situation became confused. The village had been occupied against German opposition and with some casualties on both sides. It was found, however, impossible to blow the bridge at 512513, owing to not being able to find the fuses and charges, and the machinery to set it off. The German counter-attack which developed later in the afternoon consisted of about 5 SP Luns, a few armed cars and some motorized infantry; the partisans, who were armed only with Stens and rifles with a few MGs, were thrown into some confusion, and by the morning of 8 Dec had had severe casualties. BULOW, who was directing operations in this area, was wounded in the stomach, succeeded in making and orderly withdrawal in the stomach, succeeded in making and along the 45 Northline, and, to avoid reprisals had ordered the evacuation of the villages North of the canal by the civilian population. Even so, the reprisals that the Germans have taken up to date against SAN ALBERTO have totalled 72 villagers killed. The German armor finally retired, abandoning the attempt to relieve PORTO CORSINI from the north, largely as the result of a very courageous act by the OSS assistant wireless operator ALBERTO, who took three Teletype lines and placed them on the road CASAL BORSETTI - PORTO CORSINI, blowing up a German half track filled with troops. The fact that the enemy, at a time when a major attack was going on on the Corps front, saw fit to detach a small armored force to deal with the partisans shows that the vicious and unexpected attack of some 600 irregulars on his flank was not without effect.

During the main operations 3 Dec - 8 Dec, 27 German PW were taken by the partisans, and 37 dead were counted on the ground. But, it is certain, according to various accounts, that a much larger number were in fact killed and wounded. Capt HEALY's estimate is 75 - 125 killed and 30 - 50 wounded. Other non-avalancheurs during this period include:

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confusion, and by the turning of a Dec had had severe casualties. BULOW, who was directing operations in this area, and was wounded in the stomach, succeeded in making and orderly withdrawal on to the line of the canal running along the 45 Northing, and, to avoid reprisals had ordered the evacuation of the villages North of the canal by the civilian population. Even so, the reprisals that the Germans have taken up to date against SANI, LIBERIO have totalled 72 villages sacked. The German armor finally retired, abandoning the attempt to relieve PORIO CORSONI from the north, largely as the result of a very courageous act by the OSS assistant wireless operator HALLIDAY, who took three Teller mines and placed them on the road CASAL BORSETTI - PORIO CORSONI, blowing up a German half track filled with troops. The fact that the enemy, at a time when a major attack was going on on the Corps front, saw fit to detach a small armoured force to deal with the partisans shows that the vigorous and unexpected attack of some 800 irregulars on his flank was not without effect.

During the main operations 3 Dec - 6 Dec, 27 German PW were taken by the partisans, and 37 dead were counted on the German side; but, it is certain, according to various accounts, that a much larger number were in fact killed and wounded. Capt HALLIDAY's estimate is 75 - 125 killed and 30 - 50 wounded. Other accomplishments during this period include:

Three small bridges on the rd. 444 N. of RAVENNA saved from demolition, and the charges stacked some way away.

Mines buried in RAVENNA, and shown by partisan guides to our own eyes entering the town.

An important SD agent, whose safe house had been requested by OSI(b) during BULOW's visit to HQ Eighth Army, was handed over with his W/T set to the PSS in RAVENNA. Largely as a result of BULOW's interview with AG during this visit, a valuable collaboration was obtained from the local authorities and the civilian population.

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On 7 Dec the bulk of the prisoners were withdrawn to
 the main camp of Canadian Corps, where they were retrained
 and re-equipped. Some 400 new co-operating successfully
 with our troops in the coastal sector. Of these 300 were at
 the moment in the line and have already captured a number
 of prisoners, including 7 saboteurs.

H.Q. EIGHTH ARMY.
 4 Jan 45.

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Appendix "A"

MESSAGES RELATING WITH OPERATIONS

<u>Date & Time:</u>	<u>From:</u>	<u>To:</u>	<u>Message:</u>
24 Nov 0930	Partisans Control		Germans attempting to destroy Partisans in area of 534521 S.M.T. ALBERTO nr SRENOLE BOCCA TREMOITE 524571 using launches in VALLI DI COLACCHIO. Send aircraft if possible. URGENT. HEALY.
24 Nov 1600	Partisans Control		8 men patrol regularly rd RAVENNA - FORTIC CORSTINI - RUTTA MARINA - RAVENNA. Will ambush and destroy. Inf Coy in small ops E and N of RAVENNA. Partisans will harry and destroy isolated elements wherever ambush is possible. HEALY.
24 Nov 1900	Partisans Control		Inf Coy in small ops E and N of RAVENNA. Partisans will harry and destroy isolated elements wherever ambush is possible. HEALY.
24 Nov 1900	Control	Partisans	For HEALY from KINGSBILL. If possible render ineffective demolition charges on hrs route of adv. Removal would excite suspicion and defeat object. Suggest cutting wires and fuses and setting charges. Advise if practicable.
25 Nov 1130	Partisans Control		Ambush 009420 two killed. Systematic looting throughout area.
26 Nov 1100	Partisans Control		Enemy has strong ops on hrs prepared for dep. Impossible to remove or damage charges. If could wait particular hr we can destroy charges but could only hold for short time with air support from tankers. We are laying rafts to improve foot hr for the passage of inf and hiding them under straw stacks.

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24 Nov 1960 Partisans Control
 - FOMC CORSENI - PONTA MARINA -
 RAVENNA. Will ambush and destroy.
 Inf Coys in small EPS E and N of
 RAVENNA. Partisans will harry and
 destroy isolated elements wherever
 ambush is possible. HEAVY.

24 Nov 1960 Control Partisans
 For HEAVY from KINGSWILL. If
 possible render ineffective
 demolition charges on bry route
 of adv. Removal would excite
 suspicion and defeat object.
 Suggest cutting wires and fuses
 and setting charges. Advise if
 practicable.

25 Nov 1130 Partisans Control
 Ambush 009420 two killed.
 Systematic looting throughout
 area.

26 Nov 1100 Partisans Control
 Enemy has strong ops on bry
 prepared for dem. Impossible to
 remove or damage charges. If Comd
 wants particular bry we can destroy
 charge but could only hold for
 short time with air support from
 tankers. We are being left to
 improvise feet bry for the passage
 of inf and hiding them under straw
 stacks.

26 Nov 1700 Partisans Control
 Impossible for partisans to move
 from RUSSI-RABO CAVALLIO-LEZZANO-
 RAVENNA. No come here and NW of
 SAINT ALBERTO in marshes. Plan 300
 partisans destroy away area SAINT
 ALBERTO then move in small EPS tow-
 ards ALBOSINO LEZZANO to ambush
 enemy withdrawing along Route 16 and
 other routes. 300 here will destroy
 enemy MADRIOLLE and FOMC CORSENI
 then move S to ambush forces with-
 drawing from area between sea and
 5541. If we can clear N bank R.
 UNWILL for sea and provide boats for

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Date & Time: From: To:

Message:

ferrying can you reinforced us with some of LOISKI's cars - devils or one inf coy. Our main effort will be along Route 10 and from area 5541 to see. Partisans will have large labour gangs for rd clearance. Early 123 advice and mine detectors required.

26 Nov 2200 General Partisans From ITALY From ITALY. Your people now in cond sector. They will tie up plan with you.

28 Nov 1000 Partisans Control If Cond wants inf br built at night what sig will be given. Warn all tps that partisans will wear craband on left sleeve. As attack develops mines will be buried where possible.

28 Nov 1400 Partisans Control Have D.P. stop indiscriminate strafing boats and craft in VALLI DI OGLIO. Germans use motor launches excel. Strafing hampers partisan activities and is causing casualties.

28 Nov 1500 Partisans Control 70 enemy 5545 thought to be covering forced against partisans. General impression that enemy fears your attack toward RUSSE and is now preparing withdrawal. Many tps have left PAVENNA. Details in two hours.

28 Nov 1700 General Partisans From KINGSBURY. Local attack by nightbears to capture br 4328 tonight therefore br bldg not feasible. General. Original date and plan of attack stands unless weather puts it off.

28 Nov 1000 Partisans Control If could want inf to built at night what sig will be given. Warn all tps that partisans will wear armbands on left sleeve. As attack develops mines will be marked where possible.

28 Nov 1400 Partisans Control Have DLT stop indiscriminate strafing bombs and craft in VALLI DI COLLECCO. Germans use motor launches excel. Strafing hampers partisan activities and is causing casualties.

28 Nov 1500 Partisans Control 70 enemy 5545 thought to be covering force against partisans. General impression that enemy fears your attack towards RUSSI and is now preparing withdrawal. Many tps have left RAVENNA. Details in two hours.

28 Nov 1700 Control Partisans From KINGSMILL. Local attack by neighbors to capture br 4328 tonight therefore br 4328 not feasible. General. Original date and plan of attack stands unless weather gets worse. Plan to cut Route 10 N of RUSSI and turn SE to RAVENNA.

29 Nov 0800 Partisans Control Before morning partisans will attack P. COUSINI. Object to destroy enemy there and to recover strength of our forces which will come to his assistance.

29 Nov 0945 Partisans Control Enemy forces P. COUSINI retreated. German report 2 to our attack. We killed 2 MGs and inflicted cas. Details not yet available.

3/

6382

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1 Dec 0800 Control Partisans 308 requests you keep Burma actively involved E and HE of RAVPM. until our ops begin.

1 Dec 1200 Partisans Control Destruction of br 512513 will drive 200 of enemy just arrived in S. 113000 into our ambush. Can you beat.

1 Dec 1700 Partisans Control 3 ambush parties will operate tonight E and HE of RAVPM.

2 Dec 1200 Partisans Control Partisans night 1/2 Dec inflicted following one 2 enemy killed, 6 wounded, 2 captured alive. (was one 1 wounded.

2 Dec 1300 Partisans Control Partisans took two prisoners 3048. Col Harold BICOMPP(?) nr 1041 GR. 114 J. R. Sir KUHLE (TCO (1) nr 7574 spec unit.

3 Dec 0845 Partisans Control Partisan night 2/3 Dec. Enemy killed 1. Other results unknown.

3 Dec 1100 Control Partisans 600 1st Div wants to know how long partisans could hold br 40398 and 21380. Cp planned 72 hrs. How many hrs warning necessary to info partisans that trap. If does to hold hrs can they be delayed and covered.

3 Dec 1100 Partisans Control Partisans going into action last night 3 of Dec with six villages and later in action. Carrying out Com's orders with regard to 18-10 tel enemy and highway 10.

✓

- 4 -

Date & Time: Even:

At:

Message:

3 Dec 1700 Partisans Control

Party reacted strongly to attack of 350 partisans on Highway 16 between MIZZAN and ALPUSI. At night 2/3 Dec. Partisans inflicted fairly by a.s. Details later. We are going first out but please send us with our ICS and more grenades. Does GSI(b) partisans want ALPUSI DINC alive.

Comment: Referring Dinc on above agent when it was known the Germans planned to leave behind in R. V. with 7/7 set. BULOW had been instructed by GSI(b) Eighth Army during his visit to capture and hold him.

3 Dec 1700 Control Partisans

KINGSKILL to W. H. V. attack going well. Approx front line 484318 to 470340 to 435343 along railway to 390330 down LADUE. This occurs at night. Last 11, it today SW of P. H. Za. Believe all enemy will move R. V. H. A. tomorrow. Unless the partisans.

3 Dec 1700 Control Partisans

If possible request REF. JUL 21M alive.

3 Dec 2030 Partisans Control

Impossible to ascertain anything concerning the 400390 and 413386. The few partisans from P. H. A. CALLE ones have been incorporated into a new fighting unit between MIZZAN and ALPUSI along Highway 16.

4 Dec 0800 Partisans Control

Partisans attacked at first light REF. CURSI and 40847 and 40847.

BULOW had been instructed by
GSI(b) Eighth Army during his
visit to capture and kill him.

3 Dec 1700 Control Partisans

KINGSBILL to MILLY. Attack
along wall. Approx front line
484318 to 470340 to 483343 along
railway to 390330 down LAMMIE.
Neighbours attacking first 11, it
today SW of RUTZ. Bullock all
enemy will leave RUTZ. A tonight
and tomorrow. Unless the
partisans.

3 Dec 1700 Control Partisans

If possible request RUTZ. IN
alive.

3 Dec 2030 Partisans Control

Impossible to guarantee anything
concerning his 40398 and 413380.
The few partisans from EACMA
CALLO area have been incorporated
into column now moving enemy between
MEZZAK and ALPENS along
highway 10.

4 Dec 0800 Partisans Control

Partisans attached at first light
FARO COUSINI and 588447 and
580426. Details later.

4 Dec 1030 Partisans Control

Have blocked 73 enemy from
COUSINI.

4 Dec 1220 Partisans Control

Partisans report L.V. V. evacuated
at 0700 hrs. In being built (ve)
WILL on Route 10.

4 Dec 1330 Partisans Control

Boat with two wounded and one Dr
pilot will be sent to 00500 at
1500 hrs local time.

5/

- 5 -

Date & Time: From:

To:

Message:

4 Dec 1430 Partisans Control

Enemy sent reinforcements from
Ravenna 1000 hrs. 1500 hrs
German column moving North from F.
CARSTI into our ambushes. 57337;
- Carstini 5444.

4 Dec 1700 Control Partisans

In Ravenna 57337. Civil approach-
ing from W at 532385. Civil going
to cut Route 16 now at 50800
PUS. 4639.

4 Dec 2200 Control Partisans

Partisans in holding role from
there to coast of VALLI DI OLLACCHIA
depending on line enemy reports.
Partisan army to assemble nearest
Ravenna. Partisans our side of the
line now assembling under Capt
Mitland 27 Engineers. Request
planning conference at Ravenna as
soon as convenient for Bulow his
officers and you. Suggest you turn
over majority of arms to Partisans
to be left behind enemy lines as
arms and equipment to be issued in
Ravenna. Take record of supply
landing point in VALLI DI OLLACCHIA
for Partisans W of S. S. LIBERTY and
collect small boats on coast VALLI
DI OLLACCHIA for ferrying supplies.

5 Dec 0715 Partisans Control

Partisans lost two packets of
enemy in Ravenna. One of 100 in
fort and other of 10. 2 Sqd
CPL and Partisans charged them.

5 Dec 1015 Partisans Control

Send Lt. JAMES DI Santa Maria
pilot and 11 prisoners to G. S. Int.
Can Corps. Send other 10 and
3 horses to G. S. Int. 1000 hrs

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5 Dec 2200 Control Partisans
 there to cause of VALDI DI CCLACCHIA
 depending on line enemy accepts.
 Partisan army to assemble soonest
 RAVENNA. Partisans our side of the
 line now assembling under Cyt
 Maitland 27ancers. Request
 planning conference at RAVENNA as
 soon as convenient for BULW his
 officers and you. Suggest you turn
 over majority of arms to partisans
 to be left behind enemy lines as
 arms and equipment to be issued in
 RAVENNA. Make piece of supply
 landing point in VALDI DI CCLACCHIA
 for partisans W of SAN ALBERTO and
 collect small boats on coast VALDI
 DI CCLACCHIA for ferrying supplies.

5 Dec 1715 Partisans Control
 Partisans located two pockets of
 enemy in RAVENNA. One of a in
 fort and another of 10. 250
 271 and partisans engaged them.

5 Dec 1815 Partisans Control
 Sent in Lt BULL in South African
 pilot and 11 prisoners to S.E. Int.
 Gen Corps. Saw enemy guard and
 3 lorries to S. 2nd PRINCE WITTI
 Not found. 25 W 5735. Lorrys to
 report 1300 hrs.

5 Dec 1300 Partisans Control
 Last night tried to take academy
 in authority in RAVENNA disposed to
 help. For CCI(1) 9 hrs.
 RAVENNA. DIRM is alive and in
 RAVENNA jail.

/.....

8067

Date & Time: From: To:

Message:

5 Dec 1300 Partisans Control

If you can provide me support assistance Highway 16 will be cleared to HUEZAL in 24 hrs. Population of HUEZAL approx 4000 all arms is instr.

5 Dec 1300 Partisans Control

Coordinating with CURSINI. Cursons there withdrew towards CASAL CURSINI now strongly held by us. LA CASSETTA 6054 cars. MUNDISIDE cars. San ALBERTO falling. LA OLLA 5031 cars.

5 Dec 1300 Control

Partisans D. You own SAN ALBERTO and CURSINI. Advise that enemy escaping. Letter by boat. Can you confirm.

5 Dec 1345 Partisans Control

Sitrep. 5 Dec. Enemy blocked in LA REC CURSINI but I will not authorize second assault on prepared defenses. Will let enter 90 on ice for FALSA or my regular type. Only 110 strong attacked SAN ALBERTO first light. If you can get Browning into through today will exploit W or S. no Comd instructs.

5 Dec 1530 Partisans Control

Fighting through thick mine for P. CURSINI. Two heavy strong pos still held in. ut. Progress slow but P. CURSINI should be ours by last light.

5 Dec 1800 Partisans Control

We don't know the situation. CURSINI. SAN ALBERTO was falling. 1200 cars. Confirmation that town is in our hands expected 1000 hrs.

0161

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3 Dec 1300 Control Partisans D you own SA ALBERTO and PERO
CORSINI. Think that enemy
escaping, latter by boat. Can you
confirm.

3 Dec 1345 Partisans Control Sitrep. 5 Dec. Enemy blocked in
PORTO CORSI. But I will not
authorize second assault on
prepared plans. Will let rest
SC on ice for PERSI or any
regular type. Call 110 strong
attacked SA ALBERTO first in it.
If you can get breaking also
through today will exploit W or
SA, as Com instructs.

3 Dec 1630 Partisans Control Fighting through thick line of
P. CORSI. Two heavy strong are
still holding out. Progress slow
but D NTO CORSI should be done
by last light.

3 Dec 1800 Partisans Control We don't know the situation in
CORSI. SA ALBERTO was falling
1200 hrs. Confirmation that there
is in our hands expected 1000 hrs.
Some heavy may have left by sea
last night but we are still
killing people we are sure some
from there.

3 Dec Partisans Control CASAL CORSI - still German
Partisans have been killed but
CORSI is there and also
BORSETTI and ALBERTO.

7/.....

Adm

- 7 -

Date & Time: From: To:Message:

5 Dec Cdm Corps 8 Army

2 enemy strong points holding out in CURSINI. Partisans of the line. S. ALBERGO - situation vague. C. BORSATTI and MANDRIOLI 5852, LA COSILLA 6050 and LA CILLA 5051 all in our hands. HEAVY can get 100 tons 401 13 capacity. 5th escaped officer brought in 12 PW.

6 Dec 1200 Control

Partisans Control
 Partisan Garban passed this area
 SAN ALBERGO 6 Dec HIRSCH. GABE
 7 Dec GLASS. SCHER.

6 Dec

Partisans Control

Large punitive raid near ALBERGO towards C. BORSATTI. 5 by tanks, IV say "fighters". Some SAs. Inf with 3" mortars, drove partisans out of ALBERGO.

6 Dec

Partisans Control

All roads out of CURSINI blocked by partisans.

637/29 CALABIA-KARLINA }
 612441 } rd
 624441 en canal } blocks
 634480 }
 C.A.S. BORSATTI } road blocks
 624533 }
 614596 }
 MANDRIOLI }
 Fighting at ALBERGO

512510 LA CILLA
 C. PUOVA 567484 } strong
 Bridge over canal 595454 } points
 Mouses 595454 }
 Many Germans in woods 59 - 60
 lastings.

5 ALBERGO 5044 concentration of
 5044 concentration of

10163

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6 Dec Partisans Control Large punitive raid near ALBERTO towards C. BERSITTI. 5 to tanks, PW say "blitz". Some SIS. Inf with 3" mortars, drove partisans out of ALBERTO.

7 Dec Partisans Control All roads out of GERSINI blocked by partisans.
637429 COLLELLA-MANILLA }
612741 }
629450 on canal }
630460 }
649 BERSITTI }
620533 } none blocks
614556 }
MANDEKILL }
Fighting at ALBERTO }
512510 L. CILLA }
C. MANIA 507482 } strong
Bribe over canal 595430 } points
Houses 595480 }
Many Germans in woods 59 - 60
Lasting.
S ALBERTO 5.4% concentration of
3-400 in ambush. Came South to
Arrese Auto 16. Detection
strong - mortars etc. Ambush now
established at LA CILLA. (20)/9
100 Gp for Partisans - BULOV etc.

8 Dec Partisans Control Yesterday partisans KO'd half-track between C BERSITTI and GERSINI by moving German mines.

8066

SECRET

EXAMPLES OF MESSAGES RELAYED WITH INTELLIGENCE

Date & Time: From: To:
19 Sep 1700 Partisans Control

Message:

Bomb the petrol dump under the vines on the east side of route 07 from point 02405 to 00300 by 150 metres deep. Scale 1:25,000. Bomb the four houses west of the road and 100 metres south of the river at point 61305. Scale 1:100,000. There are two explosives. In the first white house north of the river and west of the road there is a German TQDF headquarters.

21 Oct 1000 Partisans Control

At point 025401 on the south bank of the canal back workers are unloading grain and rice. On the south bank beneath the Church there is a large lake with a dam. Bomb immediately. Scale 1:25,000. R. 1700.

23 Oct 1300 Partisans Control

There are 7-100 m. vines at 075018 150 metres north of S. 115 1000 - H. 115 1000. vines along the first rows of the edge of the vineyard. At the end of the path in the vineyard are two 2 m. vines. Scale 1:25,000. R. 1700.

23 Oct 1700 Partisans Control

Two Coy of the 329th Regt of the Parachute Div is in the area.

24 Oct 1430 Partisans Control

Approx 700 Germans billeted in houses at S. 115 1000. Bomb the two-story house with the

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21 Oct 1900 Partisans Control

At point 32841 on the south bank of the canal dock workers are building and using. On the south bank there is a church there is a large house with many. Sub immediately. Scale 1:25,000 RAVI.

23 Oct 1300 Partisans Control

There are 7-10 houses at 373518 150 metres south of S. All RUC - RA DRILL road situated near the first rows of vines along side of the path on the edge of the vineyard. At the end of the path in the same vineyard are two 20 mm AA guns. Scale 1:25,000 RAVI.

23 Oct 1700 Partisans Control

The Coy of the 3290th Regt of the Airborne Div is in the DRILL.

24 Oct 1430 Partisans Control

Approx 700 Germans billeted in houses at 3427 1111111. Bomb the storey house with the perimetric roof at 54453 200 metres North of the railroad and 20 metres west of the road. The house is surrounded by a small wood of very high trees and is a German HQ and check point (insert see indicated by 17 telephone lines providing it). There is a large area in front of the house. The house is the main.

2/.....

Date & Time: From: To:

24 Oct 1700 2 PRTISMS Control

Message:

An am am located under the
traces of 11.515 in the Memorial
Park of SAMP, ALBERTO. Scale
1:100,000

25 Oct 1730 2 PRTISMS Control

Memorial Park of SAMP, ALBERTO is
in a corner of rectangle 100 metres
long 120 30 metres wide
containing small eypress trees
and surrounded by a hedge.

26 Oct 2130 2 PRTISMS Control

Memorial Park of SAMP, ALBERTO is
in a corner of rectangle 100 metres
long 120 30 metres wide
containing small eypress trees
and surrounded by a hedge.
located at 520520 100 metres
west of the public gardens
between the 37 small groups of
houses on the north side of the
road. These houses are West of
the crossroads.

24 Oct 1500 2 PRTISMS Control

From a trustworthy German we
we learned that a fort located
with cannon and gun will have
RAVENNA and area for VENTURA
tenfold at 210 hrs local time.

25 Oct 1100 2 PRTISMS Control

There 3 wagon loads of war
material, horses and type in 2
large bamboo cracks at point
625457 - 100 metres south of the
only house on the edge of the
pine wood. August be bin.

26 Oct 1800 2 PRTISMS Control

The SAMP, ALBERTO - RAVENNA rd
is flanked with 20 m of water
where it crosses the L. ALBRE
river (547475). A small island in
the area is covered by the
following points: 520349 -
520349 - 520349 - 520349. The
field is 100 metres

24 Oct 1960 Partisans Control

27 Oct 1100 Partisans Control

28 Oct 1600 Partisans Control

30 Oct 1300 Partisans Control

Location at 511520 100 metres west of the Public Gardens between the two small groups of houses on the north side of the road. These houses are west of the crossroads.

From a trustworthy German officer we learned that a unit located with common and can will leave BARRICADE and head for VENEZIA tonight at 2100 hrs local time.

There 3 wagon loads of war material, horses and men in 1 large timber docks at point 515407 - 100 metres south of the only house on the edge of the pine wood. Request bombing.

The SLOVAKIA - RAVENNA rd is filled with 20 cm of water where it crosses the L. L. RIVER (547475). Airstfield in the area bordered by the following points: 550349 - 550349 - 550349 - 550349. The field is 400 metres long and 50 metres wide continuing along the R. R. and the R. R. River for 100 m.

Battery of 5 - 105 mm cannon emplaced with branches located at 511402 on the W bank of the canal west of the rd. 30-10 1:25.

3/...

- 3 -

Date & Time: 11 Oct 1130

To:

11 Oct 1130 Partisans Control

Message:

Two 14.5 mm guns at 525338
SAG 14.5 mm gun at 531358
Two 14.5 mm guns at 555371
Scale 1:10,000

31 Oct 1130 Partisans Control

Large cone of munitions in the
Cala Vela Lighthouse at 537-27. 3-75mm
guns and 30 mm at 5553-8. Four
14.5 mm guns and 10 mm at
547300. Scale 1:10,000

1 Nov 1130 Partisans Control

Cone of the 40 mm guns among the
houses 1' of the rd at the 100m
552410. Scale 1:25,000.

1 Nov 1130 Partisans Control

General HQ located in a house at
255510 in the locality of 57134
57134. The house is an isolated
one in the SW corner of the
chale formed by the X-rd and is
surrounded by a small wood con-
taining small trees. The General
Staff lives in two large blocks
200 metres N of the Staff HQ in
the first block across the rd.
Several other ls can be found at
Staff HQ during the night.
Sheet 30 Scale 1:100,000

4 Nov 1130 Partisans Control

Ammunition and other pieces of
unknown calibre at 570405 and
573404 in the middle of the vine-
yard and on the E side of the rd.

4 Nov 1300 Partisans Control

Crane loading war material on
rafts along the SE bank of the
canal at 511433 Scale 1:25,000.
Continuous belt of barges
operated with boats in the
canal of 511433. General

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1 Nov 1130 Portisane Control

houses! of the rd at the E. end
052415. Seale 1:25,000.

German HQ located in a house at
230516 in the locality of OTI SA
VA. The house is an isolated
one in the SE corner of the
mule formed by the X-roads and is
surrounded by a small wood cop-
picing hill trees. The German
Staff lives in two large blags
200 metres SE of the Staff HQ in
the first blags across the rd.
Several Germans can be found at
Staff HQ during the night.
Sheet 88 Seale 1:25,000

4 Nov 1930 Portisane Control

Air dump and arty pieces of
unknown calibre at 570405 and
570506 in the middle of the vine-
yard and on the E side of the rd.

4 Nov 1300 Portisane Control

Crane loading war material on
rafts along the SE bank of the
canal at 611432 Seale 1:25,000.
Continuous belt of barges
equipped with nets in the
canal of 1000 0.450 I. German
continue storing war in the
canal. 111415A 597.29 Seale
1:25,000

7 Nov 1940 Portisane Control

Heavy losses were inflicted on
the 1st Army at Portisane in 1940
A.M. Following the bombing the
survivors moved to a new position
600 metres NW of 201200 SE, RI in
the houses at 604300 along the
bank of the OTI River. Seale
1:25,000

.....

8064

Date & Time: From:

To:

8 Nov 1930 Partisans Control

Message:

Dead and strewn immediately the
refuge at 029451 along the S bank
of the canal 150 metres W of the
Lighthouse as the Germans are
making preparations to leave
tonight.

11 Nov 2030 Partisans Control

There are 3 units loaded with
war material loaded on the S
bank of the canal at 011433
Scale 1:25,000.

24 Nov 1430 Partisans Control

There are 30 anti tanks between 574388
and 570300. Two 150 mm guns
(howitzers) between 553397 and
554398. Trees cut down and
of fire cleared in vine yard
of 570369 ten MGs in posn there
now. Nov 22 one FA arty unit
left RAVENNA for area N of LO
SPAIN 575423.

25 Nov 0600 Partisans Control

Presence in RAVENNA of one bn
Alpin tps wearing oak leaf on
sleeve confirmed. Approx one p.
in houses 553418 and patrol into
RAVENNA by day. These tps say
they were chosen to defend
RAVENNA. Total strength esti-
mated 35. All in city except one
pl. Scale 1:25,000.

25 Nov 1700 Partisans Control

Four tanks in action between
570392 and 570393. HQ and the
Barracks villa CALLE MARI 553386
attacked. Recommend bombing.
Urgent.

25 Nov 1700 Partisans Control

Arty halted for few hrs at
550390. Estimated 40 guns.
Bomb now.

and 578398. Two 150 mm guns (howitzers) between 573397 and 574398. Trees cut down and fire cleared in vine yard at 578399 ten Hqs in position there now. Nov 22 one fd arty unit left RAVENNA for area N of LC SANALIMA 573423.

25 Nov 0600 Partisans Control

In place in RAVENNA of one bn Alpine tps wearing oak leaf on sleeve confirmed. Approx one in houses 575418 and patrol into RAVENNA by day. These tps say they were chosen to defend RAVENNA. Total strength estimated 370. All in city except one pl. So-12 1:25,000.

25 Nov 1700 Partisans Control

Four guns in position between 578392 and 578393. HQ and tks hidden villa CALLIGARI 573380 approx. Decoded bombing report.

25 Nov 1700 Partisans Control

Arty halted for few hrs at 580390. Estimated 40 guns. Bomb now.

26 Nov 1400 Partisans Control

Enemy attacking CORIO CORSIHI 573441 twenty. COLONIA MARINA 577428, CORIO CORSIHI 574394 to sea, twenty supported by nine fd guns with in r serve 300 Alpine tps plus 100 remnants of units which in v withdrawn. S ALLERT 574520 - 30 Alpine, 575418 - 40 Alpine. V view from center but no observation is that of progress to hold line of river CORIO CORSIHI UNITI with deling forces to gain time to complete defenses on river LAGONE.

5/

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Date & Time: From: To:
20 Nov 1300 Partisans Control

Message:

All AA guns area EASTIA 310570
S 314610 306579 moved night of
24/25 Nov. Few AA by NGA
remain. Enemy tps concentrated
in N 3331 433332 before taking
up posn. Bomb with everything
available now.

23 Nov 1630 Partisans Control

Urgent. Shell on bomb 8 vms
485438.

27 Nov 2300 Partisans Control

0 guns at 373368. Shell
barrage at 1800 hrs. One gun
50483731. Two guns 553398.
7 NGA which were at 572367 zone.
4 guns 501360. After shelling
of area 507370 to 575373 enemy
abandoned the posns there.
Present whereabouts unknown.
The patrolling NE from 504377
firing towards front. Still
300 enemy between Mavreda and
sea. Four arty fire drove a gun
from former posns area 578376 to
574370. Civilians evacuated
from all houses N of PIVL. Firing
and L of Erating 62. Enemy said
if fighting would take place
there within a few days.

20 Nov 1130 Partisans Control

SC by the time weapons hidden was
373440 to 380439 to 380434 to
374437. General and his HQ in
3 houses at 377442. Bomb now.

26 Nov 1700 Partisans Control

Gun AC a south of house 574537
35. 3 ft guns house 2 of rd
509359. 3 guns 572303. Gun
and 40 mm house 509539. 33.
8 guns 562374. 4 guns 542370.
CP tower surrounded by houses

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23 Nov 1130 Partisans Control

23 Nov 1700 Partisans Control

50933731. Two guns 553368.
7 HQs which were at 572367 conc.
4 guns 501380. After shelling
of area 557370 to 575373 enemy
abandoned his posts there.
Present whereabouts unknown.
The patrolling NE from 504377
firing towards front. Still
300 enemy between RAVENNA and
sea. Your arty fire drove them
from mortar posts area 578370 to
574370. Civilians evacuated
from all houses. If of PIRRE UNIT
and D of Existing 52. Enemy said
by fighting would take place
there within a few days.

50 by the end wasps hidden wasps
375440 to 380430 to 380434 to
374437. General and his HQ in
3 houses at 377442. Bomb now.
Gun 40. A south of house 57437
38. 3 f1 guns house D of rd
509369. 3 guns 572393. Gun
and 40 enemy house 509539. 13.
5 guns 502374. 4 guns 512376.
of tower surrounded by houses
535477. This left night of
Nov 27/28 direction ALPAC 12.
Mortars and HQs 573370 and all
guns have been destroyed or
driven out by your arty. 50
enemy 573367. 70 enemy between
571387 and 573366 in houses
bet. sides rd. Enemy evacuating
RAVENNA. No enemy remaining
between RAVENNA, PIRRE and PIRRE
RAVENNA. Shell rd. Given at
1800 hrs. Gun crews landed guns
yesterday. Maximal weight of
shells requested.

8063

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Date & Time: From: To: Remarks:

28 Nov 1700 Control Partisans Control Br 333337 Weight of br and type of construction 333337 required.
Solid earth banks. Span approx 10 metres. River bed proper 5 metres. Height of br 5 metres. Average depth of water 1 to 1 1/2 metres.

29 Nov 1000 Control Partisans What lines are there in and just outside PORTO CORSIKI. Installations of the quays. The state of fort installations.

29 Nov 1300 Partisans Control Sheet 89 III IV and 89 IV 87 10 and 11 Nov. Estimated 2000 may ALPUSINE area left for 4 nights of 12/12 and 13 Nov. On the end half track moved in direction of PERAZA. Still considerable live-ness 1000 hrs. Until first light all weapons left ALPUSINE 27 of Nov for PERAZA. Estimated 600 enemy some wearing helmets head of silver colored on left breast left for 1000. CALVITE 300333 1300 hrs 28 Nov. More very low many were weeping others drunk and all said they were tired of war. Observer thought they were very young. 300 installations were sent back to PERAZA. Same day.

29 Nov 1930 Partisans Control Can you hear and strike area 623333 and "L.P. DUBOIA" VIBUCHI 623333 and br 623333 list of existence and radio towers with working can fire. Suggest

State of Fort Installations,

20 MAY 1930 PARTICLES COLLECTED

3C446V-1500 Tertierus Control

2000X COURSE, PRO-KWATER FILLED
UP AND ENTERING TO PORT, HILLOCK,
MC BLADE SHIP. ALL PORTHOLE
INSTALLATIONS APPEAR TO BE LOG-
RATED. PORT COURSE BEARING
003 ON 0001 TO APPROX 01235
SPAN WITH RELATIVE LINE. SUR-4-

10

71

Date = 11.11.2011

100

U5376:

Circle of mines from 023452 to 024453 to 024453, and from 025455 to 027455 to 026457. Town started off by mine field 028450 to 035453. Mines in central bank beside rd from 044440 to 028450. Ex of nature unknown. Ex of anti-personnel may be to blow canal bank down. Unknown known about mine in town itself. Ex of north to canal PERSONNEL NO MINES. Bridges mined 042434 and 023452. Can you bomb bridge by FABRICK VESCHIA and arrive adjacent building which now contains 06 or 70 Krauts.

1. Intelligence. Pushchino; Hacked increased movement 24/25 of Nov. Heavy weapons plus four "0" being dug from 20 to 250 yds East of rd SRIC between 304+37 and 430+55. German General commanding troops moving via leaves on road. Howling in Via Vittoria. Contact with his staff. Approx location 37841. Heavy troops left LAGHA CAVALLIO night 20/27 of Nov. Above mentioned German RG moved from LAGHA CAVALLIO to PUSHCHIN. About 8000 men. Heavy weapons from LAGHA CAVALLIO to 30451 to 43051 and north towards Pushchino. More details not yet available.

2 Dec 1936 Portland Central Artillery and two Forts at
Vill Vie.
550337. Ports and at 558373 and
560377 and houses between
595 and 1077C. The
Parasol 1 563351

-8-

Date & Time From: To: Location:

2 Dec 2100 Partisans Control (Contd)

Comment: Civilian subsequently interned. confirmed that the village, which was in fact a death-struggle of street-fighting, took place at the time reported and was heavily shelled, though casualties were light.

3 Dec 0800 Partisans Control

Strike everything moving on all rails between stations 43 and 54 and between stations 33 and 44. Curious moving personnel and equipment in columns covered by 100's of refugees. High exen. Cattle. Farm carts.

4 Dec 1000 Partisans Control

Dumb from 023453 to 030400 Nov.

4 Dec 1030 Partisans Control

British in LUGGANA. RAILWY to all BICOTA 1340.

Comment: CSS operators.

10 1 7 9

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

(11A)

SUBJECT : Organization and Functions of
SSI (Civil Liaison), EIGHTH ARMY

SECRET

Main Headquarters
Eighth Army, CMF

M 502 CL

17 Dec 44.

BGS(I) Adv HQ 15 Army Gp (2)

Copy to : G.2.(I) 5 Corps
10 Corps
13 Corps

1 CM Corps

2 Polish Corps

AC of S, C-2, Fifth Army

CO, Co "D" 237th Regt CSS (Prov), APO 512, US Army

Comd., 1 Special Force, c/o 2 District, CMF

I.S.9. c/o 2 District, CMF

Lt-Comdr Vozzitt, African Coastal Flotilla (H. Adriatic)

BGS

G.1.(Ops)

G.1.(FI 24)

G.2.(I)(b)

SCAG, AHC

SC, OSS Det Eighth Army

SC, OSS Maritime Unit,

Eighth Army.

1. Attached is a paper on the organization and functions of the Civil Liaison Section of CSF at this HQ. The section was reorganized in Feb 44 to meet the needs of the Italian campaign and it has been thought worth while to set out its development and present functions.

2. Its purpose is to exploit the help which the population of a friendly country can give the army as a source of intelligence and for irregular operations:

a) On the intelligence side it has been found that information from civilians, if they are handled in a friendly manner and interrogated by trained officers, British and Italian, can be accurate and detailed: to obtain this full value, on the intelligence side, it is necessary to obtain the full value

2 Polish Corps
 A.C. of 5, 0-2, Fifth Army
 CO, Co. 207th Regt OSS (Prov), A.O. 512, US Army
 Comd., 1 Special Force, c/o 2 District, CMF
 I.S.E. c/o 2 District, CMF
 Lt. Colonel Kountz, African Coastal Flotilla (N. Adriatic)

BGS

C.I. (Ops)

G.I. (Plans)

C.I. (I) (h)

SCAG, AMB

CO, OSS Det Eighth Army

CO, OSS Maritime Unit,

Eighth Army.

1. Attached is a paper on the organization and functions of the Civil Liaison Section of OSI at this HQ. The section was reorganized in Feb 44 to meet the needs of the Italian campaign and it has been thought worth while to set out its development and present functions.

2. Its purpose is to exploit the help which the population of a friendly country can give the Army as a source of intelligence and for irregular operations:

a) On the intelligence side it has been found that information from civilians, if they are handled in a friendly manner and interviewed by trained officers, British and Italian, can be accurate and detailed: to obtain the full value, an interview must be carried out as far as possible by the unit or formations interested: officers have therefore been placed with almost all units which it is likely to benefit from civilian information.

b) Conditions in enemy occupied Italy at present approximate those of civil war between the Fascist collaborating with the Germans and the mass of the population, the active element of which is represented by the partisan movement.

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b) contd.

For the Army to obtain full value from these conditions both for intelligence and for operations it has been found necessary to have an organization within the Army which is responsible for the encouragement of partisans both behind the enemy lines on the Army front and immediately they are over-run by our troops. The working of this organization is as far as possible decentralised to formations and units.

3. Experience has shown that the exploitation of the civilian population on both sides of the line as a source of intelligence, and their employment as partisan auxiliaries with the Army, are so closely connected that unified control at Army Headquarters is necessary.

J. H. H. H.

Lieut-Colonel,
General Staff Intelligence.

SECRET

IN 502 CI

14 Dec 44

Organization and Functions of
CSI (Civil Liaison), EIGHTH ARMY.

1. ORGANIZATION

CSI (Civil Liaison) is organized as follows:

a) British Personnel

GSC 2 } At Main HQ
GSC 3 } EIGHTH ARMY

Five IOs (Intelligence Officers) att respectively to 5 Corps,
10 Corps, 13 Corps, 1 Canadian Corps, 2 Polish Corps.

Three Partisan IOs att respectively to 5 Corps,
1 Canadian Corps, 2 Polish Corps.

b) American Personnel

CSI (CI) is responsible for Liaison with the following
American units operating under Eighth Army:

OSS Detachment at Eighth Army (American spy-operating
unit)

OSS Maritime Unit (American-run unit of Italian "Sea
Marine" Marine's Detachment).

c) Italian Personnel

Attached to CSI (Civil Liaison) is NUCIMO "II", which is
an Italian liaison group responsible for administering Italian
intelligence liaison Officers of formations and units.

2. FUNCTIONS

Five IOs (Intelligence Officers) att respectively to 3 Corps, 10 Corps, 13 Corps, 1 Canadian Corps, 2 Polish Corps.

Three Partisan IOs att respectively to 3 Corps, 1 Canadian Corps, 2 Polish Corps.

b) American Personnel

OSI (OI) is responsible for liaison with the following American units operating under Eighth Army:

OSS Detachment att Eighth Army (American exp-operating unit)

OSS Maritime Unit (American-run unit of Italian "San Marco" Marine saboteurs).

c) Italian Personnel

Attached to OSI (Civil Liaison) is "LIGGIO" "1", which is an Italian liaison unit responsible for administering Italian Intelligence Division Officers at formations and units.

2. FUNCTIONS

The Functions of OSI (OI) fall into the following main headings:

- a) Civilian Interrogation
- b) Liaison with "Secret Societies"
- c) Partisans

OSI (OI) is not concerned with questions of civil administration in liberated Italy, Security or relations with the regular Italian Army.

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3. CIVILIAN INTERROGATION

GSI (CI) is responsible for the IX interrogation, in the Army area and in 13 Corps areas, of persons who have military information of interest to the Army, and are POW enemy PW, i.e. civilians in the forward areas, refugees from GSI, escaped PW etc.

For this purpose the following organization has been set up :

a) GSI (CI) at Corps HQ

A British officer is attached to GSI at each Corps (including 19 Corps and 13 Corps). He normally sets up an office in the nearest town to Corps HQ and is responsible for :

(i) Interrogating prisoners from EOT. These are usually concentrated at the Corps PW Camps.

(ii) Finding civilians in the area with military information, i.e. former POW workers, who have proved a valuable source of intelligence for enemy defenses, former interpreters at German HQs, partisan leaders, local engineers etc

In most cases officers are assisted by an Italian officer. Information reports prepared by the standard Civil

questionnaires issued by GSI (CI) at the HQ or by GSI at the Corps to which the officer is attached.

Copies of all reports are passed to the Corps interested, and to GSI (CI) at the HQ which is responsible for passing them to branches of Eighth Army concerned. These branches are responsible for further dissemination, e.g. to MAPU, MAP troops, etc. Information on Partisans is collected by GSI (CI) and incorporated in Prison Summary.

b) GSI (CI) Officer at the Army Reserve Interrogation Post

GSI (CI)

officer in the nearest town to Corps HQ and is responsible for:

- (1) Interrogating prisoners from POWs. These are usually concentrated at the Corps PW Camp.
- (2) Finding civilians in the area with military information, e.g. former POW workers, who have proved valuable sources of intelligence for enemy defenses, former interpreters at German HQs, partisan leaders, local engineers etc.

In most cases officers are assisted by an Italian officer.

Interrogation reports are prepared in standard Civil Liaison pattern and in accordance with instructions and guidelines issued by GSI (CI) at this HQ or by GSI at the Corps to which the officer is attached.

Copies of all reports are passed to the Corps interested, and to GSI (CI) at this HQ which is responsible for passing them to branches of High Command concerned. These branches are responsible for further dissemination, e.g. to MAPU, DAF targets, etc. Information on prisoners is collected by GSI (CI) and incorporated in Prisoner Summary.

b) GSI (CI) Officer at the Army Reserve Interpretation Post

A GSI (CI) officer is attached to the Army RHP for the interrogation of prisoners who have, for one reason or another, not been interrogated by Corps Civil Liaison sections.

c) Italian Intelligence Liaison Officers

Interrogation below Corps level is carried out by Italian officers. Some 100 officers are at present employed and are attached to five, six, nine, twelve, and in some cases 18 units, AGRA, etc. Officers are volunteers and are very carefully selected for their knowledge of English, fluency and capacity for sitting in. British units. They are given a short interrogation course before attachment.

3/.....

- 3 -

c) contd.

No officers are taken on until they have been vetted by British Security and by the Italian military authorities. They are administered and paid by the Italian Headquarters, Nucleo 110 and OSI (OL) at this HQ, under an Italian Lieutenant-Colonel.

In addition to the accompanying civilians, officers at units are responsible for:

- (i) Receiving orders from the local population, as required. Partisans, if available, are normally found to be most satisfactory.
- (ii) Liaison with partisan leaders in their unit area. If it is desired to employ Partisans actively as patrols etc, officers are responsible for running them at unit level in conjunction with the British Partisan Liaison Officer at Corps.

d) Liaison with SIM/OSDIO and PWB

SIM/OSDIO is responsible for long-term interrogation of civilians, w.e. conditions in areas of Northern Italy not primarily of interest to this Army, economic subjects etc. At some OSI (OL) Corps sections in Italy a SIM/OSDIO officer is attached for interrogation of civilians of interest to SIM/OSDIO and for routine work, if necessary, to ROH for more detailed interrogation.

Liaison is maintained by OSI (OL) officers with PWB interrogators and is exchanged in interrogation of civilians on political and propaganda subjects.

4. Liaison with "SECRET SOCIETIES"

OSI (OL) is responsible for liaison with "secret societies" operating in the Army area, i.e. the "secret societies" through Ops(5) at HQ with organizations of this nature which have no representatives with Army. The emphasis of communication between Corps and the "secret societies" is on the communication between

- (11) Liaison with partisan leaders in their unit area. If it is desired to employ partisans actively as patrols etc, officers are responsible for running them at unit level in conjunction with the British Partisan Liaison Officer at Corps.

c) Liaison with SIM/OSDIO and PMA

SIM/OSDIO is responsible for long-term interrogation of civilians, e.g. in conditions in areas of Northern Italy not primarily of interest to this army, economic subjects etc. At some GSI (CL) Corps sections in Italy SIM/OSDIO officer is attached for interrogation of civilians of interest to SIM/OSDIO and in routine cases, if necessary, to ROM for more detailed interrogation.

Liaison is maintained by GSI (CL) officers with PMA interrogators who are engaged in interrogation of civilians on political and propaganda subjects.

4. LIAISON WITH "SECRET SOCIETIES"

GSI (CL) is responsible for liaison with "secret societies" operating in the Army area. It has a small communication through GSI (B) at unit level with organizations of this nature which have no representatives with army. The channel of communication between Corps and the "secret societies" is through GSI (CI) unless the "secret societies" have representatives in the Corps area.

c) 2077th Regt OSS

- (1) OSS Detachment at Eighth Army

OSS is an American organization, a detachment of which has been allotted to Eighth Army. This unit (CO Capt A.F. THURLE, US) is responsible for operations in Italy. Agents behind the enemy lines in the Army front. Planning of operations is undertaken jointly by Capt A.F. THURLE and GSI (CI). The tasks of agents and the area which they are to cover are selected by GSI (CI) Eighth Army. The agents themselves and all special equipment and supplies are provided by the OSS organization. Supplies are provided by Army.

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4.(c)(1) contd.

- 4 -

administration of the agents and technical arrangements for their introduction into EOR are the responsibility of the OSS Detachment commander.

Personnel are all trained agents who have been vetted for security and have usually operated before. They normally work in groups with W/T and are dropped by parachute or landed from the sea; it has been found that only in exceptional cases is it possible to infiltrate agents with W/T across the lines and that short term agencies in the enemy forward area is best carried out by the Partisan Liaison Officer organising a courier service between partisans on this side of the line and local resistance movements in enemy territory (see para 5 below). However, for a particularly important job, requiring a trained agent, OSS will provide a single spy if available.

OSS Detachment is located within easy reach of Liaison Headquarters EIGHTH ARMY, and reports are sent direct to a control which moves with the Detachment. Requests for amplification of their reports or for cross-checking of reports from other sources can therefore be transmitted to agents with a minimum of delay. The control is also in regular contact with OSS Headquarters at SHAW and that information can also be requested from OSS operations in Northern Italy and controlled by the Eighth Army Detachment.

Though the agents are trained primarily for intelligence, they are frequently based on partisan bases and consequently become the link for the supplying etc of the band with which they are living. If, by the time we approach their area, the partisan base has developed sufficiently to be of operational interest, it may be possible to establish a control at Corps HQ. At present, however, owing to limitations of personnel and equipment, this involves moving the whole station and can therefore only be undertaken in exceptional cases and for a limited

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local resistance movements in enemy territory (see para 5 below). However, for a particularly important job, requiring a trained agent, OSS will provide a single spy if available.

OSS Detachment is located within easy reach of Main Headquarters EIGHTH ARMY, and agent's reports direct to a control which moves with the detachment. Requests for amplification of their reports or for cross-checking of reports from other sources can therefore be transmitted to agents with a minimum of delay. The control has also regular contact with OSS Headquarters at SHAN as that information can also be requested from OSS agents in Northern Italy not controlled by the Eighth Army detachment.

Though the agents are trained primarily for intelligence, they are frequently based on partisan bands and consequently become the link for the supplying etc of the band with which they are living. If, by the time we approach their area, the partisans have developed sufficiently to be of operational interest, it may be possible to establish a control at Corps HQ. At present, however, owing to limitations of personnel and equipment, this involves moving the whole station and can therefore only be undertaken in exceptional cases and for a limited period of time.

(11) OSS Maritime Unit

This unit (OC Lieut KELLY, US Naval Reserve) is composed of 14 Italian Sea Mare Marines under OSS command. The boats from which the unit operates (MTBs, M/Ls etc) are controlled and manned by the Navy (African Coastal Flotilla (M. Adriatic)), through whom all operations have to be laid on, and who are responsible for their coordination with other naval and air operations in the ADRIATIC.

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4.(c)(ii) contd.

- 5 -

Personnel are selected and demolition experts and are trained primarily for landing behind the enemy lines on objectives in the coastal area. Owing to the security of north-walls, sabotage targets on the coast, the unit has recently been employed mainly for infiltration and sabotage. Members of the Maritime Unit have also been used as agents.

b) I.S.9 (formerly "Mar Force")

Mar Force is maintained with I.S.9, particularly in connection with operations by the OSS Maritime Unit. I.S.9 also collects reports from African Coastal Forces (North Africa) for the execution of escaped allied PW. If possible, operations are co-ordinated, e.g. boats being used for OSS Maritime Unit can take off escaped PW on the return journey. Prisoners are encouraged to collect escaped PW for subsequent execution.

c) I Special Force

This is the British equivalent of OSS. It, as is hoped, is detached from I Special Force. It, as is it will be dealt with by OSI (CI) if any is similar way to the OSS Unit. I Special Force has contact with, and to some extent control over, normal prisoners held North of the PW.

5. PRISONERS

a) In Enemy Occupied Territory

OSI (CI) is responsible for the collection and supplying of prisoners operating behind the lines on Eighth Army front (Prisoners further North are run by the various "secret societies" working under OSI) and for the collection and classification of intelligence concerning them.

Intelligence

connection with operations in I.S.9, particularly in also calls on boats from African Coastal Flotilla (North Atlantic) for the evacuation of escaped Allied PW. If possible, operations are coordinated. A.L. boats being used for OSS Maritime Unit can take off escaped PW on the return journey. Partisans are encouraged to collect escaped PW for subsequent evacuation.

c) 1 Special Force

This is the British equivalent of OSS. It, as is hoped, is an attachment from 1 Special Force, seems up shortly, it will be dealt with by GSI (CI) in any in a similar way to the OSS Det. 1 Special Force has contact with, and to some extent control over, several partisan bands North of the PC.

5. PARISANS

a) In Enemy Occupied Territory

GSI (CI) is responsible for the exploitation and supplying of partisans operating behind the lines or Light Army Front (partisans further North are run by the various "secret societies" working under A.L.) and for the collection and dissemination of intelligence concerning them.

Intelligence

Information about partisans is derived mainly from:

- (i) Civilians indoctrinated by Corps CI sections
- (ii) Leaders of partisan forces who have already been over-run and leaders of the Committee of National Liberation in recently occupied towns. They are also indoctrinated by Corps CI section.
- (iii) W/T sets directly operating behind the lines
- (iv) Messengers from partisan bands in enemy occupied territory
- (v) Captured German documents
- (vi) PW

All such intelligence is incorporated in a Partisan Summary issued periodically. The following sections are included in each issue of the summary:

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5.(c) contd.

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Partisans (c) In enemy occupied Territory (contd)
Communications

Communications are the main factor in the organization, amplifying and proper tactical employment of partisans in enemy territory. Whenever possible, OSS sets with operators are sent in either by air-drop or by land; without W/T communication it is usually impossible to organize the exploitation of partisans on any considerable scale.

It, however, in W/T communication exists, Partisan Liaison Officers at Camps are responsible for organizing a courier service from partisans on this side of the line to contact resistance groups in enemy territory. By this means an intelligence service can be built up and specific orders or general instructions transmitted to partisans; in particular, it is important that partisans should know when our arrival is imminent, so that they can act without fear of heavy reprisals.

General instructions can also be passed through PWE Eighth Army radio (which in any case transmits the "Allied Comette" treatable message from Field Marshal Alexander's Headquarters to all partisans in occupied territory) or by dropping leaflets.

Uses

- (i) Harassing attacks on C by small scale sabotage on the main attacks on isolated German and Fascist. In view of German reprisals, this activity dies down as soon as the German occupy a partisan area in any force. There is usually sudden recrudescence of this activity just before the Germans evacuate, when the fear of reprisals is less.

- (ii) Provoking intelligence: particularly bombing targets for W/T set in the area. Alternatively, intelligence may be transmitted by a service of partisan couriers from this side of the line.

Services provided by the line of the line to contact resistance groups in enemy territory. By this means an intelligence service can be built up and specific orders or general instructions transmitted to partisans; in particular, it is important that partisans should know when our arrival is imminent, so that they can act without fear of heavy reprisals.

General instructions can also be passed through PWB Eighth Army radio (which in any case transmits the "It's a Combat" program) addressed from Field Marshal Alexander's Headquarters to all partisans in occupied territory) or by dropping leaflets.

Uses

- (i) Harassing German I or C by small scale sabotage on all rail tracks in Italy to German and Fascists. In view of German reaction, this activity dies down as soon as the Germans occupy a partisan area in any force. There is usually sudden resurgence of this activity just before the Germans evacuate, when the fear of reprisals is less.
- (ii) Providing intelligence: Particularly bombing targets for any WFF set in the rear. Alternatively, intelligence may be transmitted by a service of partisan couriers from this side of the line.
- (iii) Collecting intelligence: Location of subfields for German troops when contacted.
- (iv) Preventing conditions, usually under conditions, since normally it has been proved impossible for partisans to deal with the Germans of more important installations.
- (v) Subverting allied prisoners.
- (vi) Collecting information on events to be left behind by the Germans after withdrawal.

7/.....

Partisans (a) in enemy occupied territory (contd)

- (vii) Employment in connection with special operations. Partisans provide reception and guides for parties dropping by parachute or landing.
- (viii) Special employment in conjunction with our advance. This is usually only practicable when W/T contact exists and, if possible, a British Liaison Officer is with Partisan HQ.

Supplies

Supplies are obtained from OSS or from army resources or through mail from Special Operations Mediterranean. They may be sent in by air, or all, or the following methods:

- (i) By air drop. This can be arranged through mail, in this case the operation is likely to take some time to arrange, since it has to be co-ordinated with supply drops throughout Northern Italy. Alternatively, the drop may be made by DAF or by an Italian 379 bomber attached to OSS Det at this HQ.
- (ii) By landing carried out by OSS Maritime Unit.
- (iii) By fishing vessels or row-boats sent down by the partisans and manned by them.

Capabilities

The following are some of the factors which limit the employment of partisans in enemy occupied territory:

Supplies

Supplies are obtained from OSS or from army resources or through all from Special Operations Mediterranean. They may be sent in by air, or all, or the following means:

- (i) By air drop. This can be arranged through all, in this case the operation is likely to take some time to arrange, since it has to be co-ordinated with supply drops throughout Northern Italy. Alternatively, the drop may be made by DAF or by an Italian S 79 bomber attached to OSS for at this HQ.
- (ii) By landings carried out by OSS Maritime Unit.
- (iii) By field, vessels or row-boats sent down by the partisans and manned by them.

Capabilities

The following are some of the factors which limit the exploitation and supplying of partisans in enemy territory:

(i) Reception

Though "blind" air-drops and landings are sometimes undertaken they are usually very dangerous.

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Partisans (c) In enemy-occupied territory (contd)

(i) contd

Unless the front is so open that agents can be passed straight through, reception (i.e. light signals etc) has to be arranged. This involves a great deal of detailed preparation and may always be affected by such factors as unexpected German movement, hopping-up etc.

(ii) Moon

Landing operations are only possible in the dark period except in exceptional circumstances when partisans have complete control of a stretch of coast. Air drops normally require a moon.

(iii) Weather

Tide is a most uncertain factor, particularly during the winter and effects sea even more than air operations. Conditions must be good enough between the open sea, and the target for small boats to operate in from rubber boats. In the winter, however, such conditions are rare and at night are frequently obscured by mist which makes it very difficult to see the light signals.

(iv) Priorities

If air drops are laid on through normal channels they are carried out from April and have to wait their turn; in one case an Eighth Army OSS Group had to stand by for over three months to be dropped. In urgent cases, operations can be undertaken from a bomber, but these planes are not really suitable and packing difficulties, which are concentrated in April, are not vital.

See operations have to be co-ordinated with the demands of other agencies and with naval operations in the Adriatic.

(iii) Weather

This is a most uncertain factor, particularly during the winter and affects far even more than air operations. Conditions must be good enough between the open sea and the target for small boats to operate in from rubber boats. In the winter, however, such conditions are rare and at night are frequently accompanied by mist which makes it very difficult to see the light signals.

(iv) Priorities

In air drops are laid on through normal channels they are carried out from APULIA and have to wait their turn; in the case an Eighth Army C33 Group has to stand by for over three months to be dropped. In urgent cases, operations can be undertaken from away with the co-operation of D.P. or by our own bomber, but these planes are not really suitable and packing facilities, which are concentrated in APULIA, are not available.

Sea operations have to be co-ordinated with the commands of other agencies and with naval operations in the ATLANTIC and depend on the availability of aircraft. Planning is not helped by the fact that the C33 Maritime Unit has to be based at ARCONA at a considerable distance from Army HQ.

In view of the above, supply and organisation of partisans in enemy territory is a matter of months and quick or certain results cannot be expected. It is normally impossible to supply partisans with more than personal weapons (mainly Stens or TSMGs), sub-machine-guns, a few Brens and explosives.

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(iv) contd

Partisans are not trained soldiers and, with the weapons at their disposal and lacking a secure ammunition supply, they cannot be expected to engage the enemy on his own terms. Their main advantage is the ability to obtain surprise owing to local knowledge and contacts, with the help of those they can, in favourable country (mountains and marshland), effectively harass the enemy with small arms and trip-mines, attacks on his L of C. Above all, they can provide a basis for an intelligence service in enemy territory.

b) after contact with our troops

GSI (CI) is responsible for the organisation and exploitation of partisans and ordered by our troops and for advising on their employment. Operational control of partisans operating with our troops is decentralised as far as possible.

Uses

- (i) Bringing information e.g. minefields, gun and MG positions, HQs, concentrations.
- (ii) Patrols in conjunction with allied troops.
- (iii) Guides
- (iv) Clearing up snipers. This was particularly useful in FLORENCE and may be so again if the Germans leave. Resist snipers in large towns.
- (v) Picking up German stragglers
- (vi) Assistance to AMG and PS in preserving public order, running check posts and obtaining public services.

Organisation

OSI (CI) is responsible for the organization and exploitation of partisans encountered by our troops and for advising on their employment. Operational control of partisans operating with our troops is decentralized as far as possible.

Uses

- (i) Bringing information e.g. minefields, gun and MG positions, HQs, concentrations.
- (ii) Patrols in conjunction with allied troops.
- (iii) Guides
- (iv) Clearing up snipers. This was particularly useful in FICHERIE and may be so again if the Germans leave Fascist snipers in large towns.
- (v) Picking up German stragglers
- (vi) Assistance to AGS and PS in preserving public order, manning check posts and certain public services

Organization

British Partisan Division Officers

Three officers are at present attached to each Corps in the line; the more officers will shortly be available to help officers already operating.

Duties of these officers are:

- (i) To advise Corps HQ on the employment of partisans, in accordance with General Directive from Army.

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Partisans (b) after contacting our troops continue

- (ii) To liaise with leaders of partisan bands and, if suitable for employment, to allot partisans to units, RS etc.
- (iii) To make arrangements for the supply and welfare of partisans operating with our troops.
- (iv) If the front permits, and with the agreement of GSI(b), to set up courier service linking between partisans under their control and resistance groups in enemy territory with the object of:
 - organising locally recruited service of short term units for reporting on enemy positions, concentrations etc
 - giving instructions to partisans not otherwise in contact with us, particularly as to when they should start active operations; this is normally just before our arrival, in order to 'veto' German reprisals on the civilian population.
- (v) To keep in touch with the G1 Intelligence Officer at Corps level, pass on to him suitable subject for information.
- (vi) To liaise with GSI(b) and WSS on any security problems which may arise from the employment of partisans.
- (vii) To liaise with the Partisan Branch representative about the mobilisation of partisans no longer required. It is essential that clearing should not be premature and should be carried out with the greatest possible tact (if possible speeches etc). Failure in this respect has immediate repercussions on the morale not only of partisans still being used but also of the civilian population.

parties is under their control and resistance groups in enemy territory with the object of:

organizing locally recruited services of short term units for reporting on enemy positions, concentrations etc

giving instructions to partisans not otherwise in contact with us, particularly as to when they should start active operations; this is normally done before our arrival, in order to avoid German reprisals on the civilian population.

(v) To keep in touch with the CI Intelligence Officer Corps in case of any suitable subject for interrogation.

(vi) To liaise with OSI(4) and MSS on any security problems which may arise from the employment of partisans.

(vii) To liaise with the Partisans' Branch representative about the mobilization of partisans no longer required. It is essential that (learning should not be premature) should be carried out with the greatest possible tact (few well speeches etc). Failure in this respect has immediate repercussions on the morale not only of partisans still being used on this side of the line, but also of those operating in enemy territory.

Italian Intelligence Division Officers

These officers are attached to units primarily for interrogation of civilians but are also responsible for running units or work with during the advance.

Arms and Supplies

Arms and supplies for partisans with our troops have been obtained from the Italian Government. All will be provided in the amounts which will be required.

11/.....

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

- 11 -

Partisans (a) after contact with our troops couldQualities

Partisans who wish to continue the fight after liberation are usually anxious to go on operating as a band. In practice, this is impossible however in view of the country may be for operations by air, other forces, since partisans lack any supply or communications organization.

The best results have been obtained by exploiting their knowledge of the terrain and local contacts and employing them as a guide for the allies and short-term units, or to stick up our troops in a very lightly held sector. This is best illustrated by partisans being subordinated to units by the Finnish Liaison Officer, with the removal of the leader of the band.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

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Particulars of the... the right...
labor... the... to go on...
... In practice, this is...
... the country... however
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their knowledge of the ground and local contacts and
employing them as guides and guides in short-term
... to be taken up... in a very highly
... sector. This is best... by...
... and... by the...
... with the... of the leader of the band.

APEX. "A" - PLENOCHIAI

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020APP. "A" - HISTORICAL NOTE

11B

Eight Army on its foundation took over the Western Desert Liaison Officer from Western Desert Force. He was responsible for liaison for intelligence purposes with the local Arab population, operating Arab agents, and for the encouragement of resistance movements in the Western Desert, e.g. the Senussi.

For the Sicilian campaign the name of the branch was changed to Civil Liaison with analogous functions. After Sicily the appointment lapsed owing to the confused conditions immediately following the Armistice, and the rapidity of the advance through Calabria, which made it impracticable to operate through on the Army front. In the meantime under OSI at 10 Corps, skeleton of the present organization was forming owing to the flow of refugees with information, the need to co-ordinate the activities of the various "secret societies" operating in the Corps area, and our first encounter with Italian Partisans at CORRALA, UZZIOLA. The first Italian Liaison Officers were placed with the 7th Arm Div in Oct 43.

As a result of this experience, the Civil Liaison section of Army HQ was expanded in Feb this year and became an integral part of OSI. OSS were requested to transfer to Eighth Army their set element which had worked successfully for 10 Corps, then being into reserve. In July 44 the Italian "bucle" was transferred to HQ to administer the growing number of Italian officers employed by OSI (Civil Liaison).

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As a result of this experience the Civil Liaison section at Army HQ was expanded in Feb this year and became an integral part of GSI. OSS were requested to transfer to Eighth Army their personnel which had worked successfully for 10 Corps, then being into reserve. In July 44 the Italian "Nucleo 41" was formed as a HQ to administer the growing number of Italian officers employed by GSI (Civil Liaison).

8054

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Chief of Staff

TOP SECRET.

(10A)

Ref: 6519/COS.

3 Feb 45.

TO : PA to GOC, Land Forces Sub-Com (MMA).

1. The COS today promised to let General Browning have a copy of:

- (a) Mr. Schott's summary of a report submitted by No. 1 Special Force to 15th Army Group on the partisan situation in N. Italy;
- (b) His own minute to the Chief Commissioner on the same subject.

2. Herewith copy of (b). I find that document (a) was forwarded you on 31. Jan (Ref: 6519/14/COS dated 31. Jan. 45).

/JG.

P. Russell.
PA to COS.

TOP SECRET.

27th January 1945.

Chief Commissioner.

1. I think you should read the report by No. 1 Special Force to 15th Army Group giving an appreciation of the partisan situation in N. Italy. Mr. Schott has made an excellent summary of the report for circulation in the Commission.
2. The report gives an excellent appreciation of the situation and shows a real desire to handle the partisan question in relation not only to its military aspect but to the vital and in many ways, menacing political aspect, which is brought out throughout the document.
3. The writer recommends that our future line of action in support of Italian partisans should be governed by a desire to obtain the greatest measure of assistance in the course of Allied operations in Italy and that this report should be measured against possible and probable disorders which will become a feature of Italian life immediately after liberation - disorders due to divergence between the objectives of the various parties who form the partisans.
4. The report confirms what we know exists throughout Italy, that the Communist Party is the best organised, has definite objectives which are not necessarily pro-allied, has little intention of being tied to the C.L.N.A.I. or the Italian Government, will probably resist A.M.G. and particularly in the North-East, looks to the Russians and to Tito.
5. The writer sees the disappearance of the secret Italian Army operating behind the lines which, from the political point of view, may

menacing political aspect, which is brought out throughout the document.

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4. The report confirms what we know exists throughout Italy, that the Communist Party is the best organized, has definite objectives which are not necessarily pro-Allied, has little intention of being tied to the C.L.N.A.I. or the Italian Government, will probably resist A.N.G. and particularly in the North-East, looks to the Russians and to Tito.

5. The writer sees the disappearance of the secret Italian Army operating behind the lines which, from the political point of view, may be an advantage. It is recommended that the future military use of the partisans should be directed towards sabotage and anti-scorch. This again has considerable political advantages.

6. But the basic problem remains. How to disarm considerable numbers of Communists whose ultimate objectives are not those of the Allied Nations nor the Italian Government and who intend to use force to obtain those objectives: who look to influences outside this country to assist them in imposing a form of government which depends far more from the tyrannical form of Communism backed by force than the more moderate

-2-

form which I for one believe is being evolved amongst the more responsible Communist leaders in this country and particularly those part of and connected with the Italian Government.

7. It is true that the C.L.N.A.I. have agreed to accept Allied Military Government and to obey orders including disarmament, etc., but if the Communists intend to separate themselves from the C.L.N.A.I. then this agreement is practically worthless from their point of view. We shall probably not have sufficient troops to make it possible to implement by force orders to disarm. We are attempting to attract bodies of partisans into the Italian Army which for obvious reasons will make ultimate disarmament easier. If the recommendations of No. 1 Special Force are carried out it is probable that the supply of arms will henceforward be reduced. A firm A.M.G. imposed with great rapidity after occupation and backed by a modicum of troops and a moderate distribution of food will have great effect but the basic problem will remain.

8. I think we should adopt one line of action at once and that is to warn the Italian Government of our appreciation of the situation in the North and consult with them as to the best means of pre-liberation contact with the Communists in the North with the idea of getting them to work in association and cooperation with the Communist Party in Rome who, however revolutionary their objectives, have a certain responsibility in that they are members of the Italian Government. It seems to me that if we can establish this link and impress upon Togliatti and his associates the necessity of bringing

10210

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

Army which for obvious reasons will make ultimate disarmament easier. If the recommendations of No. 1 Special Force are carried out it is probable that the supply of arms will henceforward be reduced. A firm A.M.G. imposed with great rapidity after occupation and backed by a medium of troops and a moderate distribution of food will have great effect but the basic problem will remain.

8. I think we should adopt one line of action at once and that is to warn the Italian Government of our appreciation of the situation in the North and consult with them as to the best means of pre-liberation contact with the Communists in the North with the idea of getting them to work in association and cooperation with the Communist Party in Rome who, however revolutionary their objectives, have a certain responsibility in that they are members of the Italian Government. It seems to me that if we can establish this link and impress upon Togliatti and his associates the necessity of bringing their influence to bear on their friends in the North with the object of obtaining their objective which is presumably the establishment of a Communist Government in Italy, not by force and not by resort to external authorities, we shall have done much to preserve the Communist problem in the North, an internal problem, and to reduce the risk of resort to force. I believe that the example of Southern and Central Italy which hitherto have escaped serious disorders, may be an influence on the North but can only be made so by the exertions of the Italian Government and its Communist elements. I think we should enlist

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-3-

the help of No. 1 Special Force to ensure more political contact between the Italian Government and the C.L.N.M.I.'s in order to exert a moderating influence on all parties and to insist on the political problems in that area being solved by constitutional means. ~~Here is a matter where it seems to me we could be of use. I am sure that the Italian Government is anxious to enlist his services as a member of the Government to prevent the establishment of a military dictatorship in Italy.~~

9. I think this is a matter deserving discussion with the Acting President and possibly at SACRED's Political Conference.

MSL/JC.

M. S. L. J. C.

Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

Copy to: Acting President.
Political Section.

10 2 1 2

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

2. I think this is a matter deserving discussion with the
Acting President and possibly at SACRED's Political Conference.

M. S. L. 304

Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

LSL/JG.

Copy to: Acting President.
Political Section.

8051

TOP SECRET.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

AFO 394

Office of the Chief of Staff

Copy No. 3

Ref: 6519/14/008.

31 January 1945

SUBJECT: Patriot Situation in N. ITALY.

TO : Distribution Below.

The following, sent to you for information, is the result of a study made by Political Section, HQ AC, of a document giving an appreciation of the patriot situation in N. ITALY:-

"1. From the information contained in this report and that in many others received from British missions in Northern Italy during the last few months, Headquarters, No. 1 Special Force, C.M.F., felt impelled on January 15, 1945 to report to 15th Army Group that there is left to it "no doubt that those who control Communist bands are preparing to seize power by force when the Germans are expelled by the Allies." In particular, Communist-controlled bands in North East Italy were seen to pursue this course by:

- "(a) denying their operational responsibility to SLOVENE and placing themselves under TITO's SLOVENE IX Corps;
 - (b) ignoring the orders of the CLMAG;
 - (c) disarming partisans who will not profess allegiance to TITO;
 - (d) threatening not to cooperate with AMG and not to surrender their arms when North Italy is liberated,"
2. On military grounds it is recommended "that Marshal TITO be requested to prohibit SLOVENE attempts to interfere with the operational control of Italian partisan bands in 15th Army Group territory."
3. (In its initial report on planning for the occupation of North East Italy to AFHQ Allied Commission recommended that an Allied-TITO understanding regarding this region be reached at the earliest possible date, to avoid controversy and possible conflict when the region is liberated).
4. The Slovenes now have indicated a claim on all of North East Italy to the partisans given and they are attempting to obtain a realisation of their

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- "(a) denying their operational responsibility to SLOVENI and placing themselves under TITO's SLOVENE IX Corps;
- (b) ignoring the orders of the CLMIAI;
- (c) disarming partisans who will not profess allegiance to TITO;
- (d) threatening not to cooperate with AIF and not to surrender their arms when North Italy is liberated,"

2. On military grounds it is recommended "that Marshal TITO be requested to prohibit SLOVENE attempts to interfere with the operational control of Italian partisan bands in 15th Army Group territory."

3. (In its initial report on planning for the occupation of North East Italy to AFHQ Allied Commission recommended that an Allied-TITO understanding regarding this region be reached at the earliest possible date, to avoid controversy and possible conflict when the region is liberated).

4. The Slovenes now have indicated a claim on all of North East Italy to the Matissone River and they are attempting to attain a realization of their aspirations by a show of popular support through propaganda, intimidation and forced mobilisation.

5. The Italian Communist leaders in North East Italy, to further personal ambition and in the hope of witnessing an Italian Communist territorial link with the USSR through the Balkans, aid and abet the Slovenes in their activities. This reputedly is done with the agreement of the Slovene IX Army Corps and of the Russian mission attached to the Corps.

6. Similarly in North West Italy, Communist bands showed evidence of:

- "(a) taking, or likely to take, a similar line, hostile to Anglo-American operational control, and to the establishment of AIFG when the North is liberated;
- (b) concealing and storing arms and funds for long term political purposes instead of using them against the enemy."

least to hide its intention of seizing the reins and setting up a regime similar to the Russian. Its leaders in Northern ITALY (ITALO, NARS, MONTI, etc) have been trained in Russia and have seen service with the International Brigades in SPAIN and with Bolsheviks in FRANCE. They declare openly that they wish to lean upon Russia and TITO and will rebel rather than submit to the orders of the Western Allies."

3. It is pointed out in the report that the partisan movement initially was regarded as being of purely military character and so was treated by ALL. The partisans have shown that they will fight well under favourable conditions and, if properly instructed and led, will not cease in carrying out acts of sabotage. The number of partisans grew rapidly after the winter of 1943/44 and with this growth there was a proportionate increase in Allied support. Enormous damage was inflicted on the German and Italian Republican forces, both in loss of life and through acts of sabotage. This led the enemy to make determined efforts early in the current winter, to force the partisans from the hills where, with Allied aid, they might have wintered. The efforts were successful and aided by the hard winter, the number of partisans was reduced, their communications made difficult and they were reduced to operating in bands, engaged in sabotage, rather than as military formations ready to engage the enemy on a large scale, independently or in tactical support of the Allies. The last vestige of hope has been dissipated that the partisan movement might be built into a striking force resembling a secret army (the partisans never have been able to hold territory against enemy determination to seize it). However, even in reduced numbers and in a disorganised state, the very presence of the partisans will continue to tie down the enemy, and they may continue to carry out considerable sabotage--which is the natural outlet for their energies.

2. In the 15 months existence of the partisan movement it has become apparent that politics plays in it a role equally important to that of the military. The partisan formations depend politically upon one or other of anti-Fascist Parties represented in the CLMFI. The latter, as a rallying point for anti-Fascist supporters, is a unifying body and a secret organisation for maintaining the partisans by financing and feeding the bands. As such, it enjoys a limited measure of authority but it has not been able to exercise operational control through its military command, and it has not been able to prevent the several political parties from retaining their identity and continuing their separate activities which include the conduct of party warfare. As a result, "the partisan movement can be considered to be no more or less in its structure than a series of armed political elements fighting for different aims". The aim of the Communists is considered to be not patriotic but for the eradication of all traces of Fascism and for the "elimination of Italy." Those not Communists are inspired by patriotic motives and also with the destruction of Fascism, but lately they have shown themselves to be opposed to the growing Communist power.

7. An estimate of the situation was afforded No. 1 Special Force by General CADORAN, a non-political Italian General who was infiltrated to the CLMFI on the instructions of SACMED, and who established himself as head of the military command of the CLMFI. He wrote in mid-December, 1944, as follows:

"It appears that the Allies continue to consider the partisan war as a normal military campaign, refusing to recognize its predominant political character. It must be stated very clearly that the resistance movement could not have existed without the political organization and that in this partisan warfare the Communist Party is predominant. The encroachment of political factors do not disappear by ignoring them. It is better to give them due consideration.

The Communist Party, which gives the lead, does not try in the least to hide its intention of seizing the reins and setting up a regime similar to the Russian. Its leaders in Northern Italy (ITALO, MARE, MONTE, etc) have been trained in Russia and have seen service with the International Brigades in SPAIN and with Bolshevism in FRANCE.

They declare openly that they wish to lean upon Russia and YUGO and will rebel rather than submit to the orders of the Western Allies."

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9. In the 15 months existence of the partisan movement it has become apparent that politics plays in it a role equally important to that of the military. The partisan formations depend politically upon one or other of anti-Fascist Parties represented in the CLM. The latter, as a rallying point for anti-Fascist supporters, is a unifying body and a secret organisation for maintaining the partisans by financing and feeding the bands. As such, it enjoys a limited measure of authority but it has not been able to exercise operational control through its military command, and it has not been able to prevent the several political parties from retaining their identity and continuing their separate activities which include the conduct of party warfare. As a result, "the partisan movement can be considered to be no more or less in its structure than a series of armed political elements fighting for different aims". The aim of the Communists is considered to be not patriotic but for the eradication of all traces of Fascism and for the "elimination of all elements who actively oppose their intention towards a finally liberated Italy." These not Communists are inspired by patriotic motives and also with the destruction of Fascism, but lately they have shown themselves to be opposed to the growing Communist power.

-3-

10. The Communists are numerically strong. They are well organized and have fought well under fanatical commanders and political commissars. They are a force to be reckoned by any foe, be he Fascist or Allied. Their party is the oldest active anti-Fascist organization. It pays lip service to the CLNAI because the latter is a source of finance and supply, because it thereby retains Allied sympathy, because it thereby is afforded a respectable facade behind which to pursue its activities within a strong program--while, at the same time, it disregards the general directives of the CLNAI and makes little effort to hide its aim and objectives. The report states that:

"Certain of their less discreet leaders have made damaging references to the Allies, whom they branded as enemies of a new socially reconstructed Italy. Against this, they pour poison on the Russians whom they recognize as the true friends of the future Italy. Manifestos issued by the Communist Party organization are becoming more and more violent in their approach to the people and throughout the text there can be seen a reflection of antipathy towards the efforts of the Allies in Italy."

11. In view of the above-described situation, No. 1 Special Force queries the desirability of reconsidering the future policy to be adopted towards the partisans as regards their military supply by the Allies to obtain for them the greatest measure of assistance during the course of military operations, with a minimum of disorder after the total liberation of the country. It is recommended that there be abandoned the hope of using guerrilla bands in tactical support of the Allied armies and that the partisans (including the Communists, since any attempt to discriminate against them would precipitate the hostile reactions already evidenced by them against the Allies) be instructed to limit their activities to sabotage and anti-search. There would be ended the delivery of arms which eventually might be turned against the Allies and a concentration made on the provision of explosives, incendiaries, boots clothing and foodstuffs, and protective arms only."

DSU/jc.

Colonel,
Chief Staff Officer.

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ESM/jt.

Colonel,
Chief Staff Officer.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

TOP SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
AG OPERATIONS DIVISION

DATE 10 November 1944

This information copy to:

Land Forces Sub-Commission (LSCIA)

Allied Commission

ALLIED COMMISSION
Capt. A.C.T.

Initials

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

COPY NO. 4

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TOP SECRET

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

AG 400/105 GGT-0

10 November 1944

SUBJECT: Italian Army.

To : Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies in Italy.

1. Attached as Appendix "A" is a paraphrase of FAN 448 of 8 November 1944, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to this headquarters. This answers our MAF 773.

2. Your comments and recommendations upon the last sentence of paragraph 3 of the appendix are requested.

By command of General WILSON:

[Signature]
LIBERT W. KARR,
Captain, AGD,
Asst Adjutant General.

1 Incl

Paraphrase: Fan 448
dtd 8 Nov 44

COPY TO:

Land Forces Sub-Commission (WIA),
Allied Commission.

AG 400/105
8-1571

17573-134

13 Nov

[Handwritten notes and signatures]
seen by GOC
ad 21/c
AO
13 Nov
present

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

TOP SECRET

PARAPHRASE : - FAN 348, dated 8 November 1944.

FROM : AGWAR, from Combined Chiefs of Staff.

TO : A.F.H.Q.

Reference NAF 773

1. In Fan 387 the issue of British equipment to Italian Combat Divisions is contemplated, provided that such equipment can be supplied without prejudicing requirements on higher priority. Your recommendation that these troops be entirely regarded as for maintenance and initial equipment as a British supply responsibility is agreed.
2. The second paragraph of FAN 387 refers to all equipment of US origin and includes material supplied under Lend-Lease terms to the British. Without the concurrence of SACMED, the US Theatre Commanders will NOT request that equipment of US origin supplied to Italian combat units be returned to US possession before the conclusion of the war with GERMANY.
3. It is confirmed that at present the International commitment will not exceed 124,000. In view of your EX 43062 of 24 October 1944, you are requested to submit details of any suggested increase, together with supporting reasons. Your recommendation is requested as to a target date after which Italian troops included in the International commitment may be expected to be self-supporting.
4. National commitments within the limitations of FAN 391, may be varied within reasonable limits in order to meet operational requirements.
5. The administrative change occasioned by FAN 391 should become effective at the earliest practicable date. This date should be determined by you.
6. All categories of Italian troops should, as nearly as is practicable, receive a common standard of treatment. The supply scales will be those previously established by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
7. Those items of equipment presently available or becoming available in the future should be allocated on an equitable basis (to be established by you, having regard to operational requirements) amongst the units of the three categories.
8. Your remarks are noted regarding FAN 392.

End of paraphrase.

TOP SECRET
8047

Priority - IMPORTANT

FROM: AFHQ signed WILSON Cite PRECOT

TO: AGWAR FOR THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

INFO: SHAET FOR EISENHOWER AND USFOR PASS TO BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF,
TROOPERS, AAI, ACC (FOR ARMY SUB COMMISSION)

Date-Time of Origin
052047Z

TX 92422 This is NAF 773 (.) TOPSEC (.) FAN 387 and FAN 394 are references (.)

1. Because of non availability of such equipment and continuing maintenance, impossible to attempt to equip any such units of Italian combat divisions with either Italian or captured enemy material therefore must accept British equipment offered in Troopers 67588 LSM 5 of 12 Aug (not to all), details of which are at present being worked out between Troopers and ourselves (.) In consequence of divisions receiving British combat equipment, it is considered essential that these troops be regarded entirely as a British national supply responsibility for initial equipment and maintenance and are considered as such in breakdown of ceiling into categories under terms of FAN 394 (.)

2. Para 2 of FAN 387 presumed to refer to US equipment issued through War Department channels and not to equipment of US origin supplied to British under Lend Lease terms

3. Following answers to Para 4 FAN 387 which requested our requirements for auxiliary units for combat divisions, the time required to train after receipt of equipment, and availability of Italian manpower (.)

4. Requirements for auxiliary artillery - NIL (.) For service units as follows:-

A	Type of service.	B	No. and type of units.
	Engineers		3 Field Park Companies

Supply and Transport

of divisions receiving British combat equipment, it is considered essential that these troops be regarded entirely as a British national supply responsibility for initial equipment and maintenance and are considered as such in breakdown of ceiling into categories under terms of FAN 391 (.).

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A. Requirements for auxiliary artillery - NIL(.). For service units as follows:-

A	Type of service.	B	No. and type of units.
Engineers	Supply and Transport	3	Field Park Companies
		3	General Transport Companies,
Medical		1	Motor Ambulance Convoy.
		4	General Hospitals - Total 2,200 beds,
		6	- 100 bed expansion, 1 Advance Depot
Ordnance			Medical Stores.
		1	Mob Laundry Company, 4 Mob Bath Units.
		1	L of C Provost Company
Miscellaneous		2	Transit Camps, 1 Reinforcement Training
			Depot, 1 Graves Registration Unit.

B. Estimated units will be trained and ready for combat 2 months after receipt of full scale of equipment, but this time could be reduced dependent upon scale of training equipment available beforehand (.)

C. There is ample manpower available to meet all requirements we have for Italian military forces (.)

4. The recommended ceiling for the international commitment is 124,000 (.). Under our interpretation of FAN 394 it is assumed that you will confirm or establish this international commitment (.). However, it is considered that the national commitments may be varied within reasonable limits in order to meet operational requirements (.). Breakdown of the present contemplated utilization of Italian military forces (including Naval and Air) into categories follows:
 US commitment - Ninety thousand (90,000), British commitment - 260,000 (Two hundred sixty thousand), international commitment 124,000 (One hundred twenty four thousand), Grand Total 474,000 (Four hundred seventy four thousand) (.). Reinforcements, equivalent to US replacements, are included for all units except Air Force and Navy, and are figured as 5% for service units and 10% for combat units, and will provide a reserve to cover absentees, hospitalization, etc., and allow Italian units to be at authorized strength at all times (.).

5. New policy created in FAN 394 will require certain administrative changes (.). Since supply channels presently established by FAN 338 are operative to cover all strengths it is recommended that the date for the new order of separate responsibilities be set as 15 September 1944 (.). In the event of your approval of this date, it is recommended that Lend Lease procedure within the theatre be utilized until such time as supply action of the separate agencies can be made effective (.).

0 2 2 5

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

national commitments may be varied within reasonable limits in order to meet operational requirements (.). Breakdown of the present contemplated utilization of Italian military forces (including Naval and Air) into categories follows:

US commitment - Ninety thousand (90000), British commitment - 260000 (Two hundred sixty thousand), international commitment 124,000 (One hundred twenty four thousand), Grand Total 474,000 (Four hundred seventy four thousand) (.). Reinforcements, equivalent to US replacements, are included for all units except Air Force and Navy, and are figured as 5% for service units and 10% for combat units, and will provide a reserve to cover absentees, hospitalization, etc., and allow Italian units to be at authorized strength at all times (.).

5. New policy created in FAN 391 will require certain administrative changes (.). Since supply channels presently established by FAN 338 are operative to cover all strengths it is recommended that the date for the new order of separate responsibilities be set as 15 September 1944 (.). In the event of your approval of this date, it is recommended that Lend Lease procedure within the theatre be utilized until such time as supply action of the separate agencies can be made effective (.). The term supply is taken to cover provision of all items of equipment, rations, clothing etc (.).

6. Considered essential all categories Italian armed forces receive common standard of treatment, both regarding rations, personal equipment, clothing and also discipline and administration (.). Recommend existing scales under international basis as most suitable (.). These scales providing ~~804~~ food in parts of 2368 calories per man per day under provision of FAN 355 and issues of clothing and other supplies under terms of FAN 338 (.).

10 2 2 7

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

- 3.
7. All items of Italian equipment presently available or becoming available in the future will be allocated amongst the units of the 3 categories under priorities established here to ensure that equitable distribution of such equipment is made, having regard to operational requirements (.)
8. Reference FAN 392 (.). The American contingent of the Army Sub-Commission was covered by theatre overhead and any alterations considered necessary as a result of the change in policy in FAN 391 can be adjusted within the theatre (.). No such alterations are envisaged until the new supply organization is operating satisfactorily

10 2 2 8

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

8044

10 2 2 9

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

COPY

CABLE

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

TO: AGWAR FOR THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

INFO: SHARP FOR EISENHOWER AND ETOUSA PASS TO BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF.
TROOPERS, AAI, ACC (For Army Sub-Commission)

FAN 387 and FAN 391 are references.

1. Because of non-availability of such equipment and continuing maintenance impossible to attempt to equip any units of Italian Combat Divisions with either Italian or captured Enemy material therefore must accept British equipment offered in Troopers 67589 LSM 5 of 12 Aug (not to all), details of which are at present being worked out between Troopers and ourselves. In consequence of divisions receiving British combat equipment, it is considered essential that these troops be regarded entirely as a British national supply responsibility for initial equipment and maintenance and are considered as such in breakdown of ceiling into categories under terms of FAN 391.

2. Para 2 of FAN 387 presumed to refer to U.S. equipment issued through War Department channels and not to equipment of U.S. origin supplied to British under Lend Lease terms.

3. Following answers to para 4 FAN 387 which requested our requirements for auxiliary units for combat divisions, the time required to train after receipt of equipment, and availability of Italian manpower.

(a) Requirements for auxiliary Artillery NIL.

For service units as follows:

Engineers

3 Field Park Coys.

Supply and Transport

3 Gen Transport Coys

1 Motor Amb Convoy

Medical

4 General Hospitals. Total 2200 beds

6 - 100 bed expansion

1 - Advance Depot Med. Stores

Ordnance

1 Mob. Laundry Coy.

4 Mob. Bath Units.

Provost

1 L. of C. Provost Coy.

Misc.

2 Transit Camps

1 Reinforcement Trg. Depot.

1 Graves Registration Unit.

(b) Estimated units will be trained and ready for combat 2 months after receipt of full scale of equipment, but this time could be reduced dependent upon scale of training equipment available beforehand.

(c) There is ample manpower available to meet all requirements we have for Italian Military Forces.

8043

10 2 3 0

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

TOP SECRET

4. The recommended ceiling for the international commitment is 123,880. Under our interpretations of FAN 391 it is assumed that you will confirm or establish this international commitment. However, it is considered that the national commitments may be varied within reasonable limits in order to meet operational requirements. Breakdown of the present contemplated utilization of Italian Military Forces into categories follows:

<u>U.S.</u>	<u>British</u>	<u>International</u>
Service Units — 79,000	Service Units — 93,000	Italian Admin. — 27,000
*Reinforcements 3,950	Combat Troops — 57,000	AA & CD — 600
Italian A.F. Serv. Units	*Reinforcements 10,350	Allied Cont. Comm. — 3,000
Serving U.S. Air 6,500	Ital. A.F. Serv. Units	Guard Bns. 14,400
<u>Serving</u> R.A.F. 2,500	Italian A.F. 22,000	Ital. Intell. service (S.I.M.) 1,500
	Italian Navy 75,000	Internal Security 19,100
		Carabinieri 55,000
		*Reinforcements 3,700
		32,800
TOTALS 89,450	259,850	123,880
Detailed Total 473,600	313,000	124,800

NOTE: * Reinforcements, equivalent to U.S. replacements, are included and figured as 5% for service units and 10% for combat units, and will provide a reserve to cover absentees, hospitalization, etc., and allow Italian units to be at authorized strength at all times.

5. The new policy created in FAN 391 will require certain administrative changes. Since supply channels presently established by FAN 338 are operative to cover all strengths, it is recommended that the date for new order of separate responsibilities be set as 15 September 1944. In the event of your approval of this date, it is recommended that lend-lease procedure within the theater be utilized until such time as supply action of the separate agencies can be made effective. The term supply is taken to cover provision of all items of equipment, rations, clothing, etc.

6. Considered essential all categories Italian Armed Forces receive common standard of treatment, both regarding rations, personal equipment, clothing and also discipline and administration. Recommend existing scales under international basis as most suitable. These scales provide for food imports of 2368 calories per man per day under provisions of FAN 355 and issues of clothing and other supplies under terms of FAN 338.

7. All items of Italian equipment presently available or becoming available in the future will be allocated amongst the units of the three categories under priorities established here to insure that equitable distribution of such equipment is made, having regard to operational requirements.

8. Reference FAN 392. The American contingent of the Army Sub-Commission was covered by theater overhead and any alterations considered necessary as a result of the change in policy in FAN 391 can be adjusted within the theater. No such alterations are envisaged until the new supply organization is operating satisfactorily.

TOP SECRET 8042

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

TOP SECRET

AGENDA OF A MEETING ON CCS PROPOSALS
FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF THE ITALIAN
ARMED FORCES ON A NATIONAL AND INTER-
NATIONAL BASIS

Copy No.

HQ ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY.

Tel: FILROT 23.

1605/50/63/G(SD1).

20 Aug 44.

Copy No.

1 - 3
4
5
6

Rekd 153.
Copy 15/2/4

M.M.I.A.	9/6/44
FILE REF	
Date Recd	20/6/44

Copy to: MA to CCS 7
MA to GAO 8
A 9
Q (AB) 10
War Diary 12 - 13
Spares 14 - 20

A meeting will be held at 1100 hrs on Monday, 21 Aug, in Room 835 Air Ministry Building. Please attend or send a representative. Agenda is as follows:

1. Attached at Appxs are the following signals between CCS, AFHQ and War Office:-

Appendix 'A'	-	NAP 720
Appendix 'B'	-	PAN 387
Appendix 'C'	-	TROOPERS 67588
Appendix 'D'	-	PAN 391

2. It will be seen from these signals that CCS propose that the Italian Army should be split into three categories:-

- (a) personnel serving US exclusively
 - (b) personnel serving British exclusively
 - (c) personnel employed "internationally" and to be supplied under the terms of PAN 338.
- (a) and (b) will be maintained from US and British sources respectively.

3. AFHQ require from AII a breakdown of the ceiling of the Italian Army in the three categories at para two above. A draft of this breakdown is attached at Appx 'E' for the consideration of the Meeting. The following points are relevant:-

A meeting will be held at 1100 hrs on Monday, 21 Aug, in Room 835 Air Ministry Building. Please attend or send a representative. Agenda is as follows:

1. Attached at Appxs are the following signals between COS, JHQ and War Office:-

Appendix 'A'	-	N.F. 720
Appendix 'B'	-	P.W. 387
Appendix 'C'	-	TROOPERS 67588
Appendix 'D'	-	P.W. 391

2. It will be seen from these signals that COS propose that the Italian Army should be split into three categories:-

- (a) personnel serving US exclusively
- (b) personnel serving British exclusively
- (c) personnel employed "internationally" and to be supplied under the terms of P.W. 338.
- (e) and (b) will be maintained from US and British sources respectively.

3. AMM require from JMI a breakdown of the coiling of the Italian Army in the three categories at para two above. A draft of this breakdown is attached at Appx 'M' for the consideration of the Meeting. The following points are relevant:-

(a) Should combat GPs be a British or an international

The meaning of para 2 of P.W. 337 (Appx 'B') is obscure but may be read to signify that any items of US origin which are supplied through US War Department channels will be under the control of the US Theatre Comd.

(b) Reduction of Italian Adm Installations

Dependent on the maintenance system of US and British units, it should be possible to reduce the figure for Italian adm but presumably compensating increases in US and British service units will be required to carry the additional maintenance load.

...../Sheet 2.

*British
uniformity
& ease of
control.
Fighting GPs
of all British
complications.*

*No over
reduction if
any. The same
total of all the
have to be adm'd.
no matter what
their category*

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

- 2 -

(c) Gd Bns*Yes* Pooling these permits flexibility.(c) Rfts*International A.R.V.* 40% backing is considered necessary to keep formed units at WE/TO strength. It would be difficult administratively to treat rfts on a national basis.Principles of Adm

The meeting is invited to consider in principle the administrative repercussions arising from the division into three categories. Points are :-

*Yes. Single
nation scale
without bonus*

(a) Desirability of a common standard of living for all categories.

Yes (b) Should all categories remain subject to Italian military law ?*No.* (c) The international category will be administered under the terms of FAN 338. Is any change required from the present system by which adm is under the supervision of MMIA ?*No.* (d) Will any alteration in the function of MMIA be necessary ?5. Eqpt for combat gps

✓ (a) Ref para 4 of FAN 387 (Appx 'B'). AAI's views were sent to AFHQ in ED 1112 of 17 Aug.

✓ (b) Ref Troopers 67583 (Appx 'C'). AFHQ G-3 Org, Org.4 and AAI Q(AE) are dealing with the priority of provision of eqpt for the combat gps.

6. Conclusion

The Meeting is invited :

(a) To approve a breakdown by categories of the ceiling of the Italian Army.

(b) To consider the adm repercussions arising from the division of the ceiling into three categories.

8040
Lieutenant General,
Chief of General Staff.

TOP SECRET

Appendix 'A' to 1605/50/63/8(301)
dated 20 Aug 44

AFHQ
INCOMING MESSAGE

FROM : AFHQ ADV CP SIGNED WILSON TOP SECRET BIGOT ANVIL

TO : AGWAR FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF AND TO
US FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF INFORMATION
TO AFHQ, AAI AND STAFF FOR INFORMATION

REF NO THIS MESSAGE: BX-15969

16 July 1944

Cite PHSGS

This is NAT 720

In view of the withdrawal of troops for ANVIL, it is essential to strengthen the forces in ITALY under the command of General ALEXANDER in every possible way.

From recent experience it is clear that the Italian Corps of liberation is fighting well and that Italian troops can be relied upon to provide a considerable contribution towards the forces of the United Nations actively engaged against the enemy.

I would therefore request that the previous decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff not to issue combat equipment to units of the Italian Army should be reconsidered.

I understand that the British Chiefs of Staff are prepared to make available gradually British combat equipment sufficient for 3 Italian Divisions, of which sufficient for 1 Division could arrive in this theatre towards the end of August. I would propose that this equipment should be used to reequip the Italian Corps of Liberation as the Italian equipment they are now using is rapidly becoming unserviceable. Later echelons of equipment should be used to convert 2 Italian Divisions previously earmarked for internal security into active Divisions.

On further consideration of the requirement in ITALY, bearing in mind the need to rearm 3 Italian Divisions and the fact that it is hoped shortly to advance into the populated area of the PO Valley, I consider that the total figure for the Italian Armored Forces, Army, Navy, and Air, should be raised from 444,300 as recommended in my RAR 694 of 14 June to 470,000 with the provision that this figure should not be considered immutable. I should like to be in a position to recommend to the Combined Chiefs of Staff revisions up or down in keeping with the changes in the general situation.

Further, I am of the opinion that if Italian troops are to be kept in a proper state of discipline and Esprit De Corps, a reasonable scale of necessities

From recent experience it is clear that the Italian Corps of liberation is fighting well and that Italian troops can be relied upon to provide a considerable contribution towards the forces of the United Nations actively engaged against the enemy.

I would therefore request that the previous decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff not to issue combat equipment to units of the Italian Army should be reconsidered.

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On further consideration of the requirement in ITALY, bearing in mind the need to rearm 3 Italian Divisions and the fact that it is hoped shortly to advance into the populated area of the PO Valley, I consider that the total figure for the Italian Arm Forces, Army, Navy, and Air, should be raised from 444,300 as recommended in my M.F. 694 of 14 June to 470,000 with the provision that this figure should not be considered immutable. I should like to be in a position to recommend to the Combined Chiefs of Staff revisions up or down in keeping with the changes in the general situation.

Further, I am of the opinion that if Italian troops are to be kept in a proper state of discipline and Esprit De Corps, a reasonable scale of necessities such as boots, mending material, soap, razor blades, etc, should be authorised.

NOTE: MAP 694 MC OUT 3376 14/6/44 G-3 ORG

ACTION: C-3

INFORMATION: SGS IS & PS C/S MTO C-4 C-4 SIGNALS CMO CINC MED
USN MAP AG RECORDS

8039

MC IN 10604

17 July 1944

CC53B

REF NO: BX 13969

all this takes about 3 Italian Divs: yet 5000 in the fig. 2 to be worked to. This may be before either 3 It. Divs. the exact counterpoint of 3 Br. Divs or 6 It. Combat Gps equal to 3 Br. Divs. (50) which is lastically desirable.

dated 20 AUG 1944

PRIORITY
TOP SECRET
BIGOT - DRAGON

FROM : ACTAR FROM THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
TO : WILSON FOR ACTION, SLAF FOR EISENHOWER AND
ETOUSEA PASS TO BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF FOR INFO

REF NO THIS MES AGE : WX 78676, 10 August 1944

REF 387

Coming at NAF 720

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff approved equipping not to exceed 3 Italian Divisions as a matter of urgent operational necessity provided that combat equipment is to be furnished from Italian sources, from equipment available without prejudice to other requirements of higher priority, or captured equipment, and it is not at the expense of the operational and reserve requirements of OVERLORD AND DRAGON.
2. Any equipment which is of UNITED STATES origin supplied to Italian combat units under this authorization, will remain under the control of the UNITED STATES Theatre Commander, to be returned to UNITED STATES possession at the conclusion of the war with GERMANY.
3. There are critical items in short supply which may prevent fully equipping these divisions.
4. There are certain points on which Combined Chiefs of Staff require information to enable them to estimate commitments which this decision entails. These are:
 - (a) Your requirement for auxiliary units, E.G. Artillery and service units to support these divisions;
 - (b) Your estimate of the time required to make these divisions operational after they receive their equipment;
 - (c) Your appreciation of availability of Italian labour, service and supporting troops for these Divisions in the light of other requirements in WESTERN for Italian manpower
5. With respect to the other questions presented in NAF 720, separate action of which you will be informed is now being taken with the British and American Staffs.

3 Italian Divisions as a matter of urgent operational necessity provided that combat equipment is to be furnished from Italian sources, from equipment available without prejudice to other requirements of higher priority, or captured equipment, and it is not at the expense of the operational and reserve requirements of OVERLORD AND DRAGON.

2. Any equipment which is of UNITED STATES origin supplied to Italian combat units under this authorization, will remain under the control of the UNITED STATES Theatre Commander, to be returned to UNITED STATES possession at the conclusion of the war with GERMANY.

3. There are critical items in short supply which may prevent fully equipping these divisions.

4. There are certain points on which Combined Chiefs of Staff require information to enable them to estimate commitments which this decision entails. These are:

(a) Your requirement for auxiliary units, E.G. Artillery and service units to support these divisions;

(b) Your estimate of the time required to make these divisions operational after they receive their equipment;

(c) Your appreciation of availability of Italian labour, service and supporting troops for these Divisions in the light of other requirements in HENRIERNE for Italian manpower

5. With respect to the other questions presented in NAF 720, separate action of which you will be informed is now being taken with respect to Italian Service Units serving under UNITED STATES and British Forces. This will result in limiting strength of Italian Army and Air Forces to those combat and internal security units serving under Italian Command. E.M. 338 authorizes the supply of food, clothing, medical supplies and fuel to Italian Troops. This is interpreted to authorize necessities such as boots, soap, etc. etc.

NAF 720 ref number BX 13969 MC IN 10604 17/7/44 C-3
ref number BX 13969 CP MD OUT 356 16/7/44 SG3
E.M. 338 ref number 774 MC IN 14413A 26/2/44 C-4
Classified "BROOK- DRAGON" by AFMA MC

ACTION: C-3

INFORMATION: SGS

TS & IS
ADV DET
RMTFUL

C-4
C-10
C-1
C-2

MR MURPHY
MR MCGILLAN
AS RECORDS

MC IN 6692 11 Aug 44 172B

8038

TOP SECRET

Appendix I to 1605/50/63/G(SD1)
dated 20 Aug 44

D R A F T

Breakdown of Ceiling of the Italian Army

Units under US Comd

PBS	51,000	5
Fifth Army	10,000	12
Sardinia	9,000	9
Corsica	5,000	5

75,000

Units under Brit Comd

Service units	93,000
Combat Gys	57,000

150,000

International Commitment

Italian Admin Installations	27,000
AA & CD	9,000
ACC	3,000
Cd bns	14,400
SLM	1,500
Two divs SICILY	10,000
One div SARDINIA	5,000
Internal Security Tps	4,100

Units under Brit Comd

Service units	93,000
Combat Gps	57,000
	150,000

International Commitment

Italian Adm Installations	27,000
LA & CD	9,000
ACC	3,000
Gd bns	14,400
SM	1,500
Two divs SICILY	10,000
One div SARDINIA	5,000
Internal Security Tps	4,100
Carabinieri	55,000
Rfts etc 10%	35,400
	164,400

(instead of 10000)

8037

389,400

NOTE:- Present ceiling authorised by AFHQ is 364,000
which allows only 10,000 for rfts etc.

0 2 4 0

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

5E

100-100000

Appendix 'C' to 1605/50/53/G(SD1)
dated 20 Aug 44.

U R G E N T

FROM: TROOPERS

TO: AFHQ INFORMATION MIDEAST

REF NO THIS MESSAGE: 67588 LSM 5,

12 August 1944.

Reference MAN 367

1. In order that we may take immediate steps to increase shipments of equipment and vehicles to you for purpose of training and equipping Italian Division, we require information forthwith as to your first priority requirements having regard to scales you propose to adopt and resources available to you in the MEDITERRANEAN.

2. Following factors are relevant.

(A) Owing to shipping limitations (vide 5th 58304 8 July) our contribution will have to be spread over a period of time and it is therefore important that initial despatches are confined to absolute essentials.

(B) War Office reserve holdings in MIDEAST are at your disposal.

(C) All reserve stocks surplus to essential operational requirements in MEDITERRANEAN should be tapped.

3. We propose to ship as first priority items required by you for purpose of equipping 1 Division. Request you cable earliest.

(A) Whether first consignment should be limited to stores and their ancillaries or whether any uncontrolled stores also required.

(B) What controlled stores are not required at all for 1st Division either because you propose to use Italian types or because they are not essential to proposed role of Division or because you can find from resources in MEDITERRANEAN.

(C) Controlled stores for which a full Infantry Division worth is not required in first priority for reasons as in 5 above, request you state quantities required.

Some Arty.
7. 12. 6.
42 mortar →
medical

2. Following factors are relevant.

(A) Owing to shipping limitations (vide 5th 56304 8 July) our contribution will have to be spread over a period of time and it is therefore important that initial despatches are confined to absolute essentials.

(B) War Office reserve holdings in MIDEAST are at your disposal.

(C) All reserve stocks surplus to essential operational requirements in MEDITERRANEAN should be tapped.

3. We propose to ship as first priority items required by you for purpose of equipping 1 Division. Request you cable earliest.

(A) Whether first consignment should be limited to stores and their ancillaries or whether any uncontrolled stores also required.

(B) What controlled stores are not required at all for 1st Division either because you propose to use Italian types or because they are not essential to proposed role of Division or because you can find from resources in MEDITERRANEAN.

(C) Controlled stores for which a full Infantry Divisions worth is not required in first priority for reasons as in B above, request you state quantities required.

4. Propose send Staff Officer to discuss whole question of equipping these Divisions as soon as you are clear as to the extent of your requirements on us. Cable your agreement this proposal and approximate date when Officer should arrive.

NOTE: PAN 507 MC IN 6692 11/3/44 G-3

ACTION: G-3

INFO: MAEN SGS ISARS ADV DET FRUITFUL G-4 CAO G-1 G-2

MR MURPHY MR MACGILLAN ++ Q MATT Q(AE) AG RECORDS.

MC IN 7503 12 AUG 44 23203 Ref No 67588 ISM 5 5/3/44.

8036

TOP SECRET.

Appendix 'D' to 1605/50/55/G(3D1)
dated 20 Aug 44.

MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

NR 126
FILED: 152055Z

AFSC M75/16
160324
dk

PRIORITY

FROM : THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF.
TO : WILSON FOR ACTION, SHARP TO EISENHOWER AND DUNN. PASS
TO BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF FOR INFORMATION.

REF NO THIS MESSAGE: WX-84029, 15 August 1944.

FM 391

First sentence, paragraph 5 FM 387 is reference.

Italian troops included in the British and United States
dilution programs or wholly Italian Service units working under
British or United States command will be considered as British and
United States troops, and will be the supply responsibility of the
nation with whom they serve.

Equipment may be loaned to wholly Italian Service units
working under British or United States command provided such
equipment will be withdrawn when such unit ceases to work under
British or United States command.

NOTE: FM 387 is REF WX 78673 MC IN 6692 11/8/44 G-3

ACTION: G-4

INFO: SGS
FACITFUL
G-1
MR MACMILLAN
Q MAINT

ISOPS
G-3
G-2
AS RECORDS
ADV DET
GHO
MR MURPHY
QAE
++

MC IN 9550 16 Aug 44 0523B Ref No WX 84029

FAN 367

First sentence, paragraph 5 FAN 367 is reference.

Italian troops included in the British and United States dilation programs or wholly Italian Service units working under British or United States command will be considered as British and United States troops, and will be the supply responsibility of the nation with whom they serve.

Equipment may be loaned to wholly Italian Service units working under British or United States command provided such equipment will be withdrawn when such unit ceases to work under British or United States command.

NOTE: FAN 367 is REF WX 78673 MC IN 6692 11/8/44 C-3

ACTION: C-4

INFO:	SAS	ISAPS	ADV DBT
	FRUITFUL	C-3	CAC
	C-1	C-2	MR MURPHY
	MR MACMILLAN		QAZ
	Q MAINT	AG RECORDS	++

MC IN 9550 16 AUG 44 0523B Ref No WX 81029

8035

10 2 4 4

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020**SECRET**NATO/USA
MESSAGE CENTER**INCOMING MESSAGE**WAR
43
FILED 160224ZAFSC N 551/16
13128
0100

ROUTINE

FROM: AGWAR FROM THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

TO: AFSC WILSON FOR ACTION, SHAFR FOR EISENHOWER AND ETOUSA
PASS TO BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF FOR INFORMATION

REF NO THIS MESSAGE: WX-81351.

16 August 1944

FAN 392.

FANS 387 and 391 are the references.

It is suggested that you may wish to recompute the requested authorizations for personnel in NAF 679 and NAF 713 in view of FAN 387 and FAN 391 limiting the Italian troops to be supplied on an international basis to those combat and internal security units under Italian command.

Your further comments are desired.

FAN 387 is Ref No. WX 78678 MC IN 6692 11/3/44 G-3 (BIGOT)
 FAN 391 is Ref No. WX 81029 MC IN 9550 16/8/44 G-4
 NAF 679 is Ref No. F 34583 MC OUT 4871 19/4/44 G-1
 NAF 713 is Ref No. F 59520 MC OUT 3593 15/6/44 G-1

ACTION: C 3

INFO : SGS
 FRUITFUL
 G-1
 MR MACMILLAN
 USN

IS & PS
 G-4
 G-2
 SIGNAL
 AG RECORDS

ADV DET Q(AE)
 CAO
 MR MURPHY JM
 CINC MED

ADDED DIST:

G-3 17/8/44
 G-4 (A) 17/8/44
 G-4(B) 17/8/44
 17/8/44

ADDED DIST: G-4 20/8/44

SOS NATO 20/8/44

MC IN 6692 16 Aug 44 1510E REF NO WX 81351 t/A/K

SECRET

8034 COPY No. 72

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

10 2 4 5

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

TOP SECRET

AFHQ MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

BIGOT

3

WAR
56
81200 102103Z

AFHQ H 732/11
112318
db

PRIORITY

TOP SECRET
BIGOT - DRAGON

FROM : AGWAR FROM THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
TO : WILSON FOR ACTION, SHAER FOR EISENHOWER AND
KOTHA PASS TO BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF FOR INFO
REF TO THIS MESSAGE : WX 78678, 10 August 1944

PAM 387.

Gazing at HAF 720.

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff approved equipping not to exceed 3 Italian Divisions as a matter of urgent operational necessity provided that combat equipment is to be furnished from Italian sources, from equipment available without prejudice to other requirements of higher priority, or captured equipment, and is not at the expense of the operational and reserve requirements of OVERLORD and DRAGON.

2. Any equipment which is of UNITED STATES origin supplied to Italian combat units under this authorization, will remain under the control of the UNITED STATES Theater Commander, to be returned to UNITED STATES possession at the conclusion of the war with GERMANY.

3. There are critical items in short supply which may prevent fully equipping these divisions.

4. There are certain points on which Combined Chiefs of Staff require information to enable them to estimate commitments which this decision entails. These are:

- (a) Your requirement for auxiliary units, E. G. Artillery and service units to support these divisions;
- (b) Your estimate of the time required to make these divisions operational after they receive their equipment;
- (c) Your appreciation of availability of Italian labor.

NO IR 6692

TOP SECRET

8033

BIGOT

COPY No. 50

10 2 4 5

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

REF TO THIS MESSAGE: WX 78678, 10 August 1944
AFHQ # 732/11, TOP SECRET, Cont'd, page 2

service and supporting troops for these Divisions in the light of other requirements in MEDITERRANEAN for Italian manpower.

5. With respect to the other questions presented in HAF 720, separate action of which you will be informed is now being taken with respect to Italian Service Units serving under UNITED STATES and British Forces. This will result in limiting strength of Italian Army and Air Forces to those combat and internal security units serving under Italian Command. FAW 338 authorizes the supply of food, clothing, medical supplies and fuel to Italian Troops. This is interpreted to authorize necessities such as boots, soap, et cetera.

HAF 720 ref number BX 13969 MC IN 10604 17/7/44 G-3
ref number BX 13969 CP MC OUT 356 16/7/44 SCS
FAW 338 ref number 774 MC IN 144134 26/2/44 G-4
Classified "BIGOT - DRAGON" by AFHQ MC

NOTES: G-3

INFORMATION: SCS
TSCPS
ADV DET
FRUITFUL
G-4
CAO
G-1
G-2
MR MURPHY
MR MACMILLAN
AG RECORDS
*

ADD DIST: G-4
JANITE
(AE)

ADD DIST. SIGNALS 14/8/44 cec

ADD. DIST. M & TN 15/8/44 cch.

ADDED DIST: M 17/8/44

ADDED DIST: SCS NATO. 13/8/44

ADDED DIST: G-4 20/8/44

MC IN 5698 11 Aug 44 1722B Ref. No. WX 78678 P/X/E

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

SECRET

(2)

**NATOUSA
MESSAGE CENTER**

INCOMING MESSAGE

APR 126
FILED 130552

APR 175/15
160324
GZ

PRIORITY

TO THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

FOR INFORMATION ACTION, SHARE TO EISENHOWER AND ETOUSA PASS
TO BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF FOR INFORMATION

RE: HQ WHIT. REGS. 11 WX-81029, 15 August 1944.

AM 190

Each section, paragraph 5 PAR 387 is reference.

Italian troops included in the British and United States of America groups or wholly Italian Service units work in under British or United States command will be considered as British and United States troops, and will be the supply responsibility of the nation with whom they serve.

Wholly Italian may be loaned to wholly Italian Service units working under British or United States command provided such units may be withdrawn when such unit ceases to work under British or United States command.

NOTE: PAR 387 is REF WX 78678 HQ IN 6692 11/3/44 G-3

ACTION: 1-0

17/8/44

INFO: JCS (S&F) ADV DEF
PROTBO 1-3 GAO
1-1 1-2 HQ MURPHY
HQ BACHMAN QAB
1-1 1-2 HQ RECORDS

ADDED DIST: C/S NATO
13/8/44
SOS NATO
16/8/44
C-4 (B)
16/8/44

ADDED DIST: G-5 - G-4(B) 17/8/44
HQ IN 35-10 16 AUG 44 0523H Ref to WX 81029 8/8/44

SECRET

8032

COPY No.

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THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

WAF

11-260318Z

copy

AFSC N 271/16
260630A

cjr

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y

ROUTINE

FROM: AGWAR FROM THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
TO: FREEDOM FOR WILSON

REFERENCE No. THIS MESSAGE AFHQ 774, SHAFF 179, USFOR R9876 26 Feb 44
2AN 326 of 26 Feb 44

Over-all policy regarding the type, class and quantity of supplies including clothing and subsistence to be furnished Italian troops other than Prisoners of War is as follows:

- (1) Only those classes of Italian troops who are in fact effective will be supplied. Supplies are to be limited to subsistence, clothing, medical supplies and fuel. Combat equipment is to be provided only from Italian stores. Within the above limitations, the number of troops and their scale of supply will be as recommended by the Theatre Commander and approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
- (2) You will establish and agency under your control in ITALY, possibly similar to the French Rearmament Committee charged with the authority and the responsibility for handling the problem of requirements, issues and record keeping. This authority is to be exercised through the Theatre Commander with the duly authorized representative of the country of ownership concurring in the establishment of requirements and disposition of supplies and equipment.
- (3) Specifically for the purpose of expediting administrative action, the US will assume primary responsibility for subsistence and requests and requisitions for subsistence will be submitted to the US War Department with information copies to the UK War Office. The US and UK will together assume responsibility for clothing, each contributing according to its agreed capacity as determined by established assignment procedures. Requests and requisitions for clothing will be submitted to the War Department with information copies of requisitions to be sent to the War Office. The UK will assume primary responsibility for medical supplies and fuel and requests and requisitions for such items will be submitted to the UK War Office with information copies to the US War Department.
- (4) Essential administrative action

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

than Prisoners of War is as follows:

(1) Only these classes of Italian troops who are in fact effective will be supplied. Supplies are to be limited to subsistence, clothing, medical supplies and fuel. Combat equipment is to be provided only from Italian sources. Within the above limitations, the number of troops and their scale of supply will be as recommended by the Theatre Commander and approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

(2) You will establish and agency under your control in ITALY, possibly similar to the French Rearmament Committee charged with the authority and the responsibility for handling the problem of requirements, issues and record keeping. This authority is to be exercised through the Theatre Commander with the duly authorized representative of the country of ownership concurring in the establishment of requirements and disposition of supplies and equipment.

(3) Specifically for the purpose of expediting administrative action, the US will assume primary responsibility for subsistence and requests and requisitions for subsistence will be submitted to the US War Department with information copies to the UK War Office. The US and UK will together assume responsibility for clothing, each contributing according to its agreed capacity as determined by established assignment procedures. Requests and requisitions for clothing will be submitted to the War Department with information copies of requisitions to be sent to the War Office. The UK will assume primary responsibility for medical supplies and fuel and requests and requisitions for such items will be submitted to the UK War Office with information copies to the US War Department.

(4) Eventual determination of sources of supply and subsistence and other items to be furnished here under and the financing thereof will be arrived at by US and UK Military here.

Action. C-4

Info: SGS
C/S NATO
ORD
QU
EMGR
GNS
SIGNALS

SURGEON
CAC
G - 3
G - 1
AG
SGS NATO
AG RECORDS
SUMMARY

ADD DIST
Q MAINT
P T SEC

8031

MC IN 14413A

26 Feb

1541 A Ref No. 774 Shaef 179
USFOR R 9846

0 2 5 0