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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

Acc

1000/120/1042

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

1000/120/1042

G/104 HARVEST AID

Ap. - June 1945

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

SUBJECT: Use of Army personnel for Harvesting

LAND FORCES SUB-COM, AC (MMIA)

0 / 104

Jun 45

Ministry of War

Reference your 211673/II dated 26 May 45.
213-10-14

1. The matter is now being considered by A.F.H.Q., who are in possession of all the relevant facts connected with this problem and will be giving a decision shortly.

rd

[Signature]
Major-General,
MMIA.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

COPY

TRANSLATION

FROM : MIN OF WAR
TO : MMIA

REF : 211673/II
213-10-14

DATE : MAY 26 45.

SUBJECT : Use of military personnel as farm labour.

This is in reply to letter No G/104 of April 27, 45.

1. We have taken note of the contents of the above letter concerning the impossibility of using - this year - Army personnel in harvesting and threshing operations.
2. The measures already adopted for the release of the earlier classes (1913 and previous ones - 1st four months period of 1914) will undoubtedly contribute to alleviate the crisis which threatened - and is still threatening - in some areas due to a shortage of local labour, but will not suffice to avert it altogether.
3. In the FOGGIA area and in the province of MATERA, for example, during the height of harvesting and threshing operations (beginning of June - middle of July) there are needed about 10,000 and 12,000 workers respectively, over and above the amount of local labour.
4. The Ministries of Agriculture and Forests and of Industry, Commerce and Labour are all ready taking steps to deal with this grave crisis in accordance with the limited means at their disposal.
5. A measure which would contribute to solve the problem would seem to be that of organising in the provinces of FOGGIA and MATERA a reserve of 3,000 German P.W.s properly selected and placed under the command of Italian personnel, to be employed in the event of a labour shortage.
6. Please inform me of the decision - which I am kindly asking your Sub - Comm to take without delay - concerning this important and vital matter.


Signed: A. CASATI

Minister

WELK
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G. Sirin
Action G/104
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CA/mm




MINISTERO DELLA GUERRA

GABINETTO

N. di prot. 244673 / II
213-10-14

P.M. 3800 li 25 maggio 1945

OGGETTO: Impiego di personale militare in lavori agricoli.



ALLA SOTTOCOMMISSIONE PER LE FORZE TERRESTRI DELLA
COMMISSIONE ALLEATA - (M.M.I.A.) -

e, per conoscenza:

AL MINISTERO AGRICOLTURA E FORESTE - Direz. Gen.
tutela economica prodotti agricoli -

AL MINISTERO INDUSTRIA, COMMERCIO E LAVORO
- Sottosegretario al Lavoro -

ALLO STATO MAGGIORE R. ESERCITO - Uff. Ord. e Mob. -

ROMA

ROMA

ROMA

SEDE

Risposta foglio n.C/194 del 27.4.1945.-

Si è preso atto di quanto comunicato con il foglio sopraccitato in merito alla impossibilità di utilizzare - quest'anno - militari dell'Esercito nelle operazioni per la mietitura e la trebbiatura.

I provvedimenti già adottati per il congedamento delle classi più anziane (1913 e precedenti - 1° quadr. 1914) varranno indubbiamente a ridurre la crisi che si profilava - e tuttora si profila - in talune regioni per la deficienza di mano d'opera locale, ma non servono a risolverla in modo completo.

Nel Foggiano e nella provincia di Matera, ad esempio, durante il periodo di punta delle operazioni di mietitura e trebbiatura (primi di giugno - metà di luglio), occorrono rispettivamente circa 10.000

→ ALLA SOTTOCOMMISSIONE PER LE FORZE TERRESTRI DELLA
COMMISSIONE ALLEATA - (M.M.I.A.) -

R O M A

e, per conoscenza:

AL MINISTERO AGRICOLTURA E FORESTE - Direz.Gen.
tutela economica prodotti agricoli -

R O M A

AL MINISTERO INDUSTRIA, COMMERCIO E LAVORO
- Sottosegretario al Lavoro -

R O M A

ALLO STATO MAGGIORE R.ESERCITO - Uff.Ord.e Mob. -

S E D E

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più anziane (1913 e precedenti - 1° quadr.1914) varranno indubbiamen-
te a ridurre la crisi che si profilava - e tuttora si profila - in
talune regioni per la deficienza di mano d'opera locale, ma non ser-
vono a risolverla in modo completo.-

Nel Foggiano e nella provincia di Matera, ad esempio, durante
il periodo di punta delle operazioni di mietitura e trebbiatura (pri-
mi di giugno - metà di luglio), occorrono rispettivamente circa 10.000
e 12.000 unità lavorative in più della mano d'opera locale.-

I Dicasteri dell'Agricoltura e delle Foreste e dell'Industria,
Commercio e Lavoro stanno già provvedendo per risolvere, nei limiti
delle loro modeste possibilità, tale grave situazione di crisi.-

Un provvedimento che concorrerebbe alla risoluzione di tale sta-
to di fatto sembra sia quello di costituire, nelle provincie di Foggia

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FILE
DATE
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e di Matera, una riserva di 3000 prigionieri di guerra tedeschi - opportunamente scelti e debitamente inquadrati da elementi italiani --, da impiegare in caso di deficienza di mano d'opera.-

Rimango in attesa di conoscere le decisioni che codesta SottoCommissione riterrà adottare - con cortese urgenza - sull'impor-
tante, delicato argomento.-

I L M I N I S T R O



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[Handwritten signature]

SUBJECT: Harvesting

LAND FORCE SUB-COM, AC (MIA)

3/104
16 MAY 65

My Dear

1. You will be going to-day or tomorrow at AMHQ a signal from A.C. (No 7691 of 16 or 17 May) demanding 22,000 soldiers for harvesting in KOREA and MATRA.
2. The A.C. signal criticizes a memorandum I sent to them on this matter. I send you this memorandum so that you will be acquainted with my full views, in addition to the abbreviated statement in A.C. Signal 7691.
3. I don't quite know where the 22,000 can come from and I am pretty sure that a large part of those detailed (if the Army has to produce them) would not arrive, which in turn would mean further demands on the Army. These soldiers are put on leave for harvesting and do not draw rations, etc. Despite the attractive pay I think, as I say, Italian soldiers are not interested in harvesting under existing conditions.

Yours

L. Blowing

(Major-General)

Brig G. B. S. HINDLEY, G.B.E. (or Brig J. B. A. ANDERSON, D.S.O.)
G.3 CMB
AMHQ

2. The A.C. signal epitomizes a memorandum I sent to them on this matter. I send you this memorandum so that you will be acquainted with my full views, in addition to the abbreviated statement in A.C. Signal 769L.

3. I don't quite know where the 27,000 can come from and I am pretty sure that a large part of those detailed (if the Army has to produce them) would not arrive, which in turn would mean further demands on the Army. These soldiers are put on leave for harvesting and do not draw rations, etc. Despite the attractive pay I think, as I say, Italian soldiers are not interested in harvesting under existing conditions.

Yours

L. BLOWING

(Major-General)

Brig G. B. L. HINDEN, O.B.E. (or Brig J. D. A. ANDERSON, D.S.O.)
G.O. 5 ONE
AEEQ

been 62L

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(C O P Y)

SECRET

SUBJECT: Italian Army personnel for harvesting
in FOGGIA

LAND FORCES SUB COM AC (MOTIA)

G/104

TO : HQ AC (for Executive Commissioner) 30 April 45

In confirmation of our conversation on 28 April on the above subject:-

1. I understand that you are considering demanding some 15000 Italian Army personnel for harvesting in FOGGIA from about 1 June.

2. From the military point of view I must oppose this for the following reasons:-

(a) Situation 1944 as compared with 1945

Last year we had a very large surplus of unarmed soldiers and it was thus possible to allot 16000 (which proved 2000 too many) from the 200,000 odd available in SARDINIA. This year the reduced total of 313,000 is fully employed and committed. Any removal of soldiers to this civilian task must thus be at the expense of the war effort. It is of course possible that by 1 June the Italian Army commitments may not be so great. But these depend on the course of operations and the internal situation after liberation of NORTH ITALY, and therefore cannot be fully foreseen. It is also possible, even probable, that the existing ceiling of 313,000 may be drastically reduced.

(1) in view of the world shortage of supplies

(11) because ITALY is already, to all intents and purposes, liberated and this is surely likely to be accomplished fact very shortly.

an

The remaining Italian Army would then certainly not be available to provide harvesters, as only units kept would be those required for essential military purposes.

In any event, at this late stage, time is very short for implementation.

Seen 622

2. From the military point of view I must expose this for the following reasons:-

(a) Situation 1944 as compared with 1945

Last year we had a very large surplus of unused soldiers and it was thus possible to allot 16000 (which proved 2000 too many) from the 200,000 odd available in SARDINIA. This year the reduced total of 343,000 is fully employed and committed. Any removal of soldiers to this civilian task must thus be at the expense of the war effort. It is of course possible that by 1 June the Italian Army commitments may not be so great. But these depend on the course of operations and the internal situation after liberation of NORTH ITALY, and therefore cannot be fully foreseen. It is also possible, even probable, that the existing ceiling of 343,000 may be drastically reduced.

- (i) in view of the world shortage of supplies
(ii) because ITALY is already, to all intents and purposes, liberated and this is surely likely to be accomplished fact very shortly.
an

The remaining Italian Army would then certainly not be available to provide harvesters, as only units kept would be those required for essential military purposes.

In any event, at this late stage, time is very short for implementing any plan that might be authorised for the use of military personnel.

(b) Source of Army provision

Even assuming that the use of military personnel was authorised, both on operational and I.S. grounds (particularly as you consider 10,000 more CCR are necessary), we cannot touch Combat Groups, I.S. Divs and Guard Bns; or their reinforcements which require training.

We cannot touch the Directing (M of W) or Administrative part of the machine, otherwise the whole will break down. We would thus have to draw from service units (Br and US) and their reinforcements.

2/.....

Seen 6.2.11.

16 15

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

-2-

(c) Service Units

- (i) These are fully employed. In fact under Priority list 8, we are still rapidly forming new units as a military necessity. Presumably therefore such units cannot be spared.
- (ii) Apart from normal wastage, 5% of a unit is authorized to be on leave. On discipline and morale grounds this may be increased to 10% or even 15% (see my A.O. 6 dated 24 April). In addition we will have to demobilize at an early date some 50,000 over-age personnel of the 1913 and older classes and of the first 4 months of the 1914 class whose homes are in the north. Such classes have already been demobilized in liberated (prior to our recent offensive) ITALY. We are faced (on these counts alone, apart from general grounds) with the possibility shortly of a very big drop in Army strength and it seems doubtful if the Army could bear a further strain of 15,000 for harvesting.
- (iii) For administrative (mainly clothing) reasons we can only take in some 19,000 a month into the Army.
- (iv) If the levy of 5% on every unit were made (to produce the 15,000 harvesters) executive difficulties would arise. The collection and movement of all these small parties from a large number of units in itself is a big task; we do not know where many units will be in a few weeks time and we have to bid for movement facilities 2 weeks ahead; temporarily movement of leave personnel has been stopped owing to the strain on the railways, which presumably will be at least as great as the North is liberated. I am sure that a large number of men would desert on route or not come back. We would thus be disintegrating the Army and loosening control at a time when the maximum control and discipline are necessary.
- (v) Reinforcements in depots should not be touched. These are largely young untrained men and are necessary to replace wastage.

3. CONCLUSION

- (a) I know that pre-war it was accepted and normal, that the Army

general grounds) with the possibility shortly of a very big drop in Army strength and it seems doubtful if the Army could bear a further strain of 15,000 for harvesting.

- (iii) For administrative (mainly clothing) reasons we can only take in some 19,000 a month into the Army.
- (iv) If the levy of 5% on every unit were made (to produce the 15,000 harvesters) executive difficulties would arise. The collection and movement of all these small parties from a large number of units in itself is a big task; we do not know where many units will be in a few weeks time and we have to bid for movement facilities 2 weeks ahead; temporarily movement of leave personnel has been stopped owing to the strain on the railways, which presumably will be at least as great as the North is liberated. I am sure that a large number of men would desert on route or not come back. We would thus be disintegrating the Army and loosening control at a time when the maximum control and discipline are necessary.

- (v) Reinforcements in depots should not be touched. These are largely young untrained men and are necessary to replace wastage.

3. CONCLUSION

- (a) I know that pre-war it was accepted and normal that the Army should get agricultural leave. But conditions this year, even compared with 1944, are vastly different.
- (b) Whether the existing ceiling of 313,000 is retained as necessary for the War Effort or is reduced owing to lesser commitments, the Army cannot afford to allot 15,000 men to a non-military task.
- (c) We have handed a large part of ITALY (in which ROSSIA lies) to the Italian Government. Surely we cannot expect that the Italian Government are so weak or inefficient that out of a population of some 20 millions in liberated ITALY alone (prior to our offensive), they cannot organize and draft into ROSSIA a labour force of more 15,000. This relatively small total cannot possibly, as I see it, upset the domestic or industrial economy in other directions.

15

- (d) At this stage in the proceedings and bearing in mind the potential changes and still nebulous future of the Italian Army, I feel that this additional complication should NOT be imposed on the Italian Military Authority and that the Italian Government should be ordered to stand on their own feet in carrying out this civilian commitment.
- (e) The whole matter is of course due for decision by AFHQ but I would like this letter to be attached to any communication you may make to AFHQ on the matter, as representing the military views of NSA.

(SGC) L. BROWNING

Major-General
NSA

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Major-General
MIA

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

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Seen with A
FILE: G/104
DATE: 1-5-45

PERSONAL

Brig. GBS Hindley, OBE,
G-3 Org. AFHQ., CMF.

29 April, 1945.

My Dear General,

Thank you for your letter of 23 April.

I fully agree with you, that it is not at all a happy idea to use the Italian Army for harvesting.

I hope very much that it will not be proposed officially but there are a number of points which would give it some weight.

If one assumes that the harvests are of very considerable importance, as we must in the present circumstances of global food shortage, there will be great pressure to ensure that labour of some sort is provided.

The only alternatives to military personnel are PW and civilian labour. I think it is probable that a lot could be done with PWs. If this does not become possible civilian labour could be used, but the trouble is that this leads to many complications. For instance essential labour at ports, docks and depots drifts away and pay questions arise.

However, I think the answer may be the use of PW and I hope we shall not be faced with the problem at all.

Yours Sincerely

(Signature)

Major General Langley Browning, CB, OBE, MC.,
Land Forces Sub Commission,
Allied Commission (LMA)
ROME.

mmc

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? Time for dis. Handed copies mid May.
WP

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Replied to on 30/2

SECRET

SUBJECT: Italian Army personnel for harvesting
in FOCCIA

LAND FORCES SUB-COM, AS (MILIA) 115

6/104

30 APR 45

TO : HQ AQ (for Executive Commissioner)

In confirmation of our conversation on 28 Apr on the
above subject:-

1. I understand that you are considering demanding some
15000 Italian Army personnel for harvesting in FOCCIA from about
1 June.

2. From the military point of view I must oppose this for
the following reasons:-

(a) Situation 1944 as compared with 1945

Last year we had a very large surplus of unused
soldiers and it was thus possible to allot 16000
(which proved 2000 too many) from the 200,000
odd available in SARDINIA. This year the reduced
total of 313,000 is fully employed and committed.
Any removal of soldiers to this civilian task
must thus be at the expense of the war effort.
It is of course possible that by 1 June the
Italian Army commitments may not be so great.
But these depend on the course of operations and
the internal situation after liberation of
NORTH ITALY, and therefore cannot be fully fore-
seen. It is also possible, even probable, that
the existing ceiling of 313,000 may be drastic-
ally reduced

(i) In view of the world wide shortage of
supplies

(ii) because ITALY is already, to all intents
and purposes, liberated and this is surely
likely to be

10275

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

above subject:-

1. I understand that you are considering demanding some 15000 Italian Army personnel for harvesting in FOCCIA from about 1 June.
2. From the military point of view I must oppose this for the following reasons:-

(a) Situation 1944 as compared with 1945

Last year we had a very large surplus of unused soldiers and it was thus possible to allot 16000 (which proved 2000 too many) from the 200,000 odd available in SARDINIA. This year the reduced total of 315,000 is fully employed and committed. Any removal of soldiers to this civilian task must thus be at the expense of the war effort. It is of course possible that by 1 June the Italian Army commitments may not be so great. But these depend on the course of operations and the internal situation after liberation of NORTH ITALY, and therefore cannot be fully foreseen. It is also possible, even probable, that the existing ceiling of 315,000 may be drastically reduced

(1) in view of the world wide shortage of supplies

(11) because ITALY is already, to all intents and purposes, liberated and this is surely likely to be an accomplished fact very shortly.

The remaining Italian Army would then certainly not be available to provide harvesters, as the only units kept would be those required for essential military purposes.

In any event, at this late stage, time is very short for implementing any plan that might be authorised for the use of military personnel.

(b) Source of Army provision

Even assuming that the use of military personnel was authorized, both on operational and I.S. grounds (particularly as you consider 10000 more CRR are necessary), we cannot touch Combat Groups, I.S. Dive and Guard Bns; or their reinforcements which require training.

.....E/..

Sheet 2.2. (Contd)

- (b) We cannot touch the Directing (M or W) or Administrative part of the machine, otherwise the whole will break down. We would thus have to draw from Service Units (AR and US) and their reinforcements.

(c) Service Units

- (i) These are fully employed. In fact under Priority List 8, we are still rapidly forming new units as a military necessity. Presumably therefore such units cannot be spared.

- (ii) Apart from normal wastage, 5% of a unit is authorised to be on leave. On discipline and morale grounds this may be increased to 10% or even 15% (see my A.O.16 dated 24 Apr). In addition we will have to demobilise at an early date some 50,000 over-age personnel of the 1913 and older classes and of the first 4 months of the 1914 class whose homes are in the North. Such classes have already been demobilised in liberated (prior to our recent offensive) ITALY. We are faced (on these counts alone, apart from general grounds) with the possibility shortly of a very big drop in Army strength and it seems doubtful if the Army could bear a further strain of 15000 for harvesting.

- (iii) For administrative (mainly clothing) reasons we can only take in some 19000 a month into the Army.

- (iv) If a levy of 5% on every unit were made (to produce the 15000 harvesters) executive difficulties would arise. The collection and movement of all these small parties from a large number of units in itself is a big task; we do not know where many units will be in a few weeks time and we have to bid for movement facilities 2 weeks ahead;

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- (v) Reinforcements in depots should not be touched. These are largely young untrained men and are necessary to replace wastage.
- (a) I know that pre-war it was accepted and normal that the Army should get agricultural leave. But conditions this year, even compared with 1944, are vastly different.

3. CONCLUSION

Sheet 3

- (b) Whether the existing ceiling of 315,000 is retained as necessary for the War Effort or is reduced owing to lesser commitments, the Army cannot afford to allot 15,000 men to a non-military task.
- (c) We have handed a large part of ITALY (in which POGGIA lies) to the Italian Government. Surely we cannot accept that the Italian Government are so weak or inefficient that out of a population of some 20 millions in liberated ITALY alone (prior to our offensive), they cannot organize and draft into POGGIA a labour force of a mere 15,000. This relatively small total cannot possibly, as I see it, upset the domestic or industrial economy in other directions.
- (d) At this late stage in the proceedings and bearing in mind the potential changes and still nebulous future of the Italian Army, I feel that this additional complication should NOT be imposed on the Italian Military Authorities and that the Italian Government should be ordered to stand on their own feet in carrying out this civilian commitment.
- (e) The whole matter is of course one for decision by AFHQ but I would like this letter to be attached to any communication you may make to AFHQ on the matter, as representing the military views of MMIA.

L. Browning

Major General
MMIA.

*Copy sent later to Brig. HANDLER D/O
6-3 brig. as a result of H.C.
7691 of 16 May demanding*

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

should not be imposed on the Italian Military Authorities and that the Italian Government should be ordered to stand on their own feet in carrying out this civilian commitment.

- (e) The whole matter is of course one for decision by AFHQ but I would like this letter to be attached to any communication you may make to AFHQ on the matter, as representing the military views of MIA.

L. Browning

Major General
MIA.

Copy sent later to Brig HANDLER D/O
6-3 brig. as a result of A.C.
7691 of 66 May discrepancy
22000 barrels

d R.
16 May

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

SUBJECT: Employment of Military personnel
on Agricultural Work

LAND FORCES SUB-COM, AC (MMIA)

G/104 (G/94)

27 Apr 45

TO : MINISTRY OF WAR

Your letter ref 15740 of 21 Apr 45 is hereby acknowledged.

1. This HQ has heard verbally from AFHQ that NO military personnel will be used on harvesting this year.
2. Under the circumstances, no action is being taken on your letter.

tv8

Major General
MMIA

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020Received SD
27 Apr 45

Translation

Trans: S.M.R.E

To: MMIA

J. G. 6/104.
21 Apr.

Ref: 15440

Date: 21 April 45

4

Subject: Employment of Military for Agricultural works
in 'FOGGIANO' Province. See 5

- 1) In the event ~~of~~ - as was the case last year - of it becoming necessary this summer to employ a group of around 20,000 military to assist in Agricultural ~~works~~ in the FOGGIA Area, I suggest drawing them from the following sources.

<u>Reception Camps</u>	13,000
----------------------------------	--------

Military - excluding Perm. Staff and officers. actually in transit in the camps amount to around 23,000 men. Considering that out of them about 6000 are to replace the men to be discharged Class 1914 (1st four monthly) and older (see letter 15600 Mob dated 14 of this S.M.) a reserve of about 10000 men will be left in the camps.

Call ups to be carried out

in Sicily (to complete the 14,000 required men)	1000
in Sardinia (to complete the 24,000 required men)	6000

20,000

- 2) In the a/m figures no account has been taken of the call up of 5000 men in course in the FOGGIA Province. It does not seem to be convenient to employ these men for agricultural ~~works~~ in their home province. Those men sent to Reception Camps will bring up the reserve mentioned in para 1 to about 9000.

MMIA - 'G'
FILE: 9/104
D TS: R22 4

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

3) This for information so that it may be of ^{your} guidance in
the decisions that you will take and that I would like
to know in advance to issue the necessary instructions.

Ernest
H

Signed Chief of the S.M.
J. R. R. R.

STATO MAGGIORE REGIO ESERCITO
UFFICIO ORDINAMENTO E MOBILITAZIONE
- Sezione Mobilitazione -

N. 15740/Mob. di prot.

P.N. 3800, li 21 aprile 1945

OCCETTO: impiego militari per lavori agricoli nel Foggiano.

ALLA LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION A.C. (M.M.I.A.)

ROMA

1°) - Nella eventualità che - come già lo scorso anno - si renda necessario anche nell'estate di quest'anno concorrere ai lavori agricoli della zona di Foggia con una aliquota di circa 20.000 militari, propongo di trarli dalle seguenti fonti:

- Campi di affluenza 13.000

I militari - esclusi quelli di inquadramento e gli ufficiali - attualmente in sosta ai campi assommano a 23.000 circa. Considerato che di essi circa 6.000 sono destinati a sostituire i congedati delle classi '14(1° quadrimestre) e più anziane (vedasi foglio 15600/Mob. in data 17 c.m. di questo S.M.), ai campi resterebbe una riserva di circa 4.000 militari.

- Richiamo alle armi in corso:

- in Sicilia (per completare i 17.000 uomini richiesti) 1.000
- in Sardegna (per completare i 24.000 uomini richiesti) 6.000

7.000

20.000

1°) - Nella eventualità che - come già lo scorso anno - si renda necessario anche nell'estate di quest'anno concorrere ai lavori agricoli della zona di Foggia con una aliquota di circa 20.000 militari, propongo di trarli dalle seguenti fonti:

- Campi di affluenza 13.000

I militari - esclusi quelli di inquadramento e gli ufficiali - attualmente in sosta ai campi assommano a 23.000 circa. Considerato che di essi circa 6.000 sono destinati a sostituire i congedati delle classi '14 (1° quadrimestre) e più anziane (vedasi foglio 15600/Mob. in data 17 c.l. di questo S.M.), ai campi resterebbe una riserva di circa 4.000 militari.

- Richiamo alle armi in corso:

- in Sicilia (per completare i 17.000 uomini richiesti)	1.000
- in Sardegna (per completare i 24.000 uomini richiesti)	6.000

7.000

20.000

=====

2°) - Nel computo di cui sopra non ho tenuto conto del richiamo in corso di circa 5.000 uomini della zona di Foggia non sembrandomi conveniente impiegare gli stessi in lavori agricoli della regione di origine. Essi, inviati ai campi di affluenza, potrebbero a circa 9.000 militari la riserva di cui al precedente n. 1

.../...

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- 3°) - Segnalo quanto sopra perchè codesta M.M.I.A. possa averne elemento di giudizio nelle proprie decisioni che gradirei molto conoscere con conveniente anticipo per le necessarie predisposizioni.

IL CAPO DI S.M. DELL'ESERCITO



[Handwritten signature]

10 2 8 6

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6



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3

PERSONAL

LAND FORCES SUB-COM, AC (MMIA)

G/104

23 Apr 45

My Dear

I hear that there is a certain amount of talk in AC on the matter of ~~repeating~~ the same business as last year when some 20,000 soldiers had to be sent from the Army to assist harvesting in PUGGIA.

I gather INGLETON talked to you about it and that you were against it. This is just a line to say that I think the whole idea is simply monstrous! The Italian Army, particularly at the present time, has a full time job to do and the idea of taking 20,000 away for civilian work is simply fantastic, even if we could demote Districts and Armies to that extent. There are millions of civilians in ITALY and thousands of unemployed. If AC have not had the foresight or have not got the ability to do the civilian job (which is their task, not mine) I think that is a pretty rotten show!

In any event I will fight tooth and nail to prevent one single Italian soldier going to the harvesting in PUGGIA because I feel so strongly about it, and I am sure that you will do the same.

I am so glad they looked after you while in our Mess the other day. I am sorry I was on tour at the time.

See F. 7.

R 23/4.

Yours

2.13.

5

(Major General)



Brig. GBS HINDLEY, OBE
G3 Org
AFHQ
CMF
tw.

0 2 8 8

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Record of Conversation for File G/104 ←

Mr. di Fede of Labour Sub - Com. visited Lt. Col.

INGLEDEW of MMIA 21 Apr.

Lt. Col. INGLEDEW stated that there were NO Italian
military personnel available for harvesting this year.



Lt. Col.
GS.

21 Apr. 45.

Dist:- MA for G.O.C.
C of S
A
Q

10289

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COPY INCOMING SIGNAL

FROM : HQ ALGCM CITE ACEXC

12 NPT B

TO : G-5 AFHQ

RESTRICTED

REF : 5277

ROUTINE

SUBJECT IS MILITARY PERSONNEL FOR FOGGIA HARVEST (*)

PARA ONE (*) UNDERSTAND G-3 ORG FOREIGN AFHQ HAS REQUESTED MMIA TO MAKE SUGGESTIONS AS TO HOW TWENTY THOUSAND MILITARY PERSONNEL MAY BE FOUND FOR FOGGIA HARVEST (*)

PARA TWO (*) NO FORMAL DEMAND HAS YET BEEN MADE BY THIS HQ FOR ANY MILITARY PERSONNEL FOR THIS PURPOSE (*)

PARA THREE (*) PLANS NOW BEING FORMULATED AND WILL BE COMMUNICATED TO YOU IN DUE COURSE

INT DIST

C.A. SEC.
ECONOMIC SEC. (3)
LAND FORCES S/C

OFFICE OF EXEC. COMMISSIONER

300

Major TALECT E

SD DISTRIBUTION:

Action copy: G/104
JW 12 April

G. SD.

I brought this up with G.O.C. some time a few weeks ago and he told me we could not take it on the basis - it men are wanted, civilians - y who there are thousands unemployed - should be used

yes. above is understood in Exec

Com office. 16 Apr.

0 2 9 0